Two Remarks on Halakhic Decision-Making in Advance of Passover (Column 706)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

In the next column I will return to the question of dynamism and statics in Halakhah and their implications. But in the meantime, ahead of Passover, I thought to briefly raise a column with two halakhic points and add holiday wishes. I will touch here, in a nutshell, on two (adjacent) points where in each one it would have been reasonable to think that, according to my approach, I would agree with them, and yet I oppose them. The first concerns the value of autonomy, and the second my opposition to conservatism.

Matzah Ashirah (Rich/Egg Matzah)

When I was a youngster in the illustrious Bnei Brak, I did Passover shopping and, among other things, bought “rich matzah” cookies under a mehadrin certification from Rabbi Ovadia. It did not occur to me that there could be a problem here, since there was no hint of it in the kashrut approval on the package. During the holiday I discovered, to my astonishment, that I was apparently eating full-fledged chametz with Rabbi Ovadia’s approval, and this joined his policy that I saw in other cases as well, where he writes his view decisively and does not bother to qualify it and note that there are other opinions and other customs (such as regarding kitniyot, and the like). I well remember my shock then, and against this background how amazed I was when this year my wife again bought such cookies for Passover, bearing a sharp and unequivocal kashrut approval from the school of Rabbi Ovadia (they write that it is according to Rabbi Ovadia’s rulings).

I will preface by saying that I did not, in fact, check chemically whether there is scientific support for all the theses that will be presented immediately, but the lenient and the stringent themselves do not rely on scientific testing but on the Talmud and the Rishonim, and therefore I too will discuss this within that conceptual framework. See here for a survey by Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu (whose father prohibited matzah ashirah as a serious prohibition, and he follows in his path).

Briefly, matzah ashirah is flour kneaded with fruit juice or wine, and not with water. The Gemara (Pesachim 35a) states that this does not ferment, but several Rishonim wrote that there is nevertheless a biblical prohibition to eat it (albeit without kareit). This appears to be how the Rema ruled in Orach Chayim 462:4 (though his wording implies this is only a custom and not that he rules there is an actual biblical “lo ta’aseh”). In contrast, there are Rishonim who ruled it is completely permitted (and so ruled the author of the Shulchan Aruch there). Yet the Rishonim state that if water is added, matzah ashirah ferments even more than regular dough, and this appears in the halakhah in the Shulchan Aruch itself (there, in §2), even though he permits matzah ashirah. There is a dispute whether we are speaking of water added specifically after the kneading, or water mixed with the fruit juice before it was introduced to the flour. In any case, contemporary poskim have pointed out that in the industrial production process of matzah ashirah cookies it is almost impossible that no water will mix in, and therefore we are dealing with full-fledged chametz (meaning not merely a biblical “lo ta’aseh,” but actual kareit). In the MB (Mishnah Berurah) there on §4 it is written that if leavening/raising agents are mixed in, matzah ashirah is full-fledged chametz. In our cookies, such agents indeed are included.

In my eyes, the kashrut approval by Rabbi Ovadia for matzah ashirah cookies is an outright corrupt scandal. With all due respect to him and his approach, when he grants kashrut certification for the public he is obliged to note that this is according to his position and that there are many poskim who disagree. In granting certification to an industrial product he is not answering a private question addressed to him but providing a service to the general public. The arrogance, brazenness, and typical definitiveness of him and his sons—as if they and no other—should lead us to avoid relying on them in anything whatsoever. In my view, they are not to be trusted in matters of kashrut or in the laws of issur and heter in general.

I have written more than once that a person should decide according to his own judgment and not be overly rattled by the existence of other opinions and precedents. But precisely for that reason it is important to raise here a few limitations:

1. We are dealing with a posek, not a dayan. A posek who decides one way or another does not obligate the one who asks him to obey. By contrast, a dayan rules a judgment that obligates the litigants. Therefore, it is reasonable to demand of him to rule for them according to accepted conceptions, or at least to inform them that he has an unusual approach so they will not come before him. This is what is termed in the legal world “legal certainty.” A person who comes to judgment is supposed to know the binding law so that he can act accordingly. If a person acted according to a reasonable halakhic approach, it is not reasonable that he will be brought to judgment and punished for it.
2. Even regarding a posek, we are speaking of someone asked a personal question, and in particular he can explain his answer to the questioner. And this too applies because the questioner has the option to examine him and not rely on him (I will not reopen here the rule “a sage who prohibited, his colleague may not permit”). But if he paskens in a way that cannot be examined—him and his reasoning—he cannot do so. Especially a posek who provides a public service, and everyone relies on him to have checked the facts. Relying on him does not constitute acceptance of his halakhic positions, particularly if they are unusual.
3. I have written more than once that a posek asked about some law, if he knows there are other views, must present to the questioner all the options, for in my opinion—contrary to the common conception—it is specifically the questioner who must decide in practice, not the posek. See, for example, in my essay on leniency and stringency.

By way of analogy, I will bring what I have cited more than once (see, for example, in Column 21) in the name of the Magen Avraham. He permits saying your words in the name of a great person so that they will be accepted from you. On the face of it, this is an utterly unreasonable permission, for a layman can thus mislead others and cause them to stumble in serious prohibitions. I further challenged this from known forgeries, like the forged Yerushalmi on Kodashim, which the sages of the generation strongly condemned. Seemingly the forger acted well, fulfilling the words of the Magen Avraham. So whence the criticism of him?

I explained there that this ruling applies where a person senses that his arguments are being belittled and not seriously weighed. But the assumption of the Magen Avraham is that even if one says the words in the name of a great person, the listener will not accept them automatically; rather, he will weigh the arguments more seriously before forming his own position. Where there is concern that the listener will accept his words without forming his own view, it is certainly forbidden to lie thus. Therefore it is clear why the sages opposed the forged Yerushalmi, for if there is a Talmudic source, everyone accepts its authority without the possibility of considering disagreement. It is certainly forbidden to speak in the name of a formal authority, or at least before an audience that will accept the words solely because of the speaker. So too regarding an audience of laymen who are not capable of weighing the position of that “great one.”

If so, it seems the same applies in our case. A kashrut approval printed on a product’s wrapper is directed at the general public, who are not capable of forming a position, and naturally will accept that approval automatically. Nor are reasons given there that one can weigh. This is the causing of the many to stumble, and one who grants such certification violates “placing a stumbling block before the blind” for the many, and his iniquity is too great to bear. This is so even if he has a halakhically well-founded position of his own.

It is true that several times in the past (see, for example, this essay) I brought the words of the Ritva (Sukkah 10) who permits Reuven to cause Shimon to stumble in something permitted according to his own approach but prohibited according to Shimon’s. But I noted that the Ritva himself writes there that this is only if the one causing the stumbling informs Shimon and draws his attention to the fact that this is the situation, so that Shimon can form his own position (see there what the novelty is). This, of course, is not done regarding matzah ashirah cookies, especially since the audience is not composed only of Torah scholars who can even weigh the matter. The Ritva explicitly writes that this permission applies only when those “caused to stumble” are Torah scholars.

In such a situation, it would have been appropriate to write on the wrapper that it is kosher according to Rabbi Ovadia’s approach, and to note that many disagree. One could phrase it as “kosher for those who customarily eat matzah ashirah,” or something like that. Again, the brazenness and arrogance of the Yosef family, evident in every lesson and talk, show up here as well. This is aside from their other lofty “virtues,” such as their mafioso conduct—as a crime family that treats the rabbinate and public offices as their personal domain—about which I have written more than once in the past. One can hear the lessons in which Yitzhak Yosef, or another of Rabbi Ovadia’s sons, expresses a view (sometimes entirely unfounded) with complete arrogance, as if the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself is speaking from his throat, while disparaging other opinions, if he even mentions them. It is all the more infuriating when it is directed at a herd of blind followers, as most of their audience, for this audience trails after them like the blind in a chimney and is convinced that all their words are the words of the living God. The problem worsens when we speak of a certification directed at the general public, who are not necessarily bound to the halakhic approach of the Yosef family and innocently rely on the certification. I am sorry for the harsh words, but someone must put an end to the brazen and arrogant stupidity-mafia of this family.

As noted, my autonomist approach would ostensibly have supported such a stance—but it does not. Everything has its place and time. In kashrut certification for the general public there is no room for autonomy, certainly not when one does not bother to note that this is an unusual approach.

The Law of Reclining (Haseivah)

Yinon recently asked me in the Q&A regarding reclining at the Seder night. The claim is that nowadays reclining is not the manner of freedom, and therefore the question arises whether there is an obligation to recline and why. Here, too, this touches my approach advocating changes in Halakhah if circumstances require them, and again my aim here is specifically to qualify that.

I wrote there that the view of the Ra’avyah is known—that in our day one need not recline, for today the manner of freedom is different. He writes almost exactly as the questioner’s approach. The compromise adopted by the Rema is also known, that women do not recline for the Ra’avyah’s reason. On the face of it, this is very puzzling: if we adopt the Ra’avyah’s view—then men too should not recline; and if not—why should women be ruled so? This is especially true of women in our day who are considered “important” (as the Rema writes), and there is no reason to distinguish them from men.

I brought that I once heard from Rabbi Mann of Yeshivat Or Yisrael a nice distinction in this matter. He said there are two reasons to recline on Seder night: 1) to sit in the manner of freedom; 2) as a remembrance of what was done then when they went out to freedom (I am ignoring the fact that this “manner of freedom” was likely more in the Roman period than in Egypt. Thus the Sages saw it, and thus they instituted). It may be that this is the root of the difference in the Rambam’s versions between “a person must see himself” and “show himself.” To “show” is to recall what was then, while to “see himself” is his own manner of freedom now.

The claim is that the second reason is part of the telling of the Exodus and the remembrance of those events, and therefore it does not depend on today’s manner of freedom but on what was customary then. Regarding the second reason, the change in circumstances—namely that today reclining is not a manner of freedom—is irrelevant. For the first reason, of course, it is relevant. His contention was that the Seder leader must also recount the Exodus to the other participants, and therefore he reclines for both reasons. The implication is that he must recline even today, when this is not the manner of freedom, for he must still demonstrate how it was done then. By contrast, the listeners (not necessarily women—but women are usually among the listeners) recline only for the first reason, and since today this is not the manner of freedom they are exempt from reclining. This may be the reason women are exempt from reclining today, even if they are “important.” The implication is that women who lead the Seder will need to recline, and the men there will be exempt. The distinction is not between women and men but between the Seder leader and the listeners.

But one must also discuss the very rationale that exempts listeners from reclining. “Manner of freedom” is not necessarily synonymous with comfort. It may be that even today reclining best expresses freedom, even if it is not the most comfortable posture. Therefore there is logic in reclining even today (for the listeners as well, not only the Seder leader), for when we recline, by changing and deviating from the ordinary way, we are reminded that we must feel freedom—something that will not happen if we sit on the most comfortable chair or armchair. In my eyes, this is a simple and correct rationale. It may be that this is why the Sages instituted according to the manner of reclining of their time, for already then this seemed to them the most fitting way to express freedom, even if in earlier times people did not sit thus.

In conclusion: in my opinion there may be room to be lenient, but it is proper to recline. The Seder leader certainly should, and I think everyone else as well.

Note that here too, according to my “reformist” approach, I would have been expected to support changing the Halakhah in light of changing circumstances—and yet I do not. Before instituting changes, one must examine the “conservative midrash” that underlies them (see the series of columns 475 – 480). Not every rationale and change that appears reasonable on its face is truly reasonable. Sometimes further examination reveals that the argument does not, in fact, hold water.

To sum up: I am entirely in favor of autonomy and entirely in favor of reforms—but everything has its place and time. A bold halakhic position does not mean anything goes and that it lacks constraints and limitations. On the contrary: the more radical the position, the more it requires extra caution and extra critical scrutiny.

On the eve of the Festival of Freedom I will add my hope that our freedom—which includes, among other things, autonomous conduct and a willingness to make changes and to formulate positions independently and in accordance with circumstances—will not make us lose our minds. One must adhere to autonomy and be willing to change, but that too must be done critically and carefully.

I will conclude with wishes for a kosher and happy holiday for us all, and with hope for good tidings whose chances of realization are, sadly, rather slim: the speedy return of the hostages, the restoration of sanity to all sides in our besieged realms, and the swift eradication of Hamas and all that pertains to it, speedily in our days.