On the New Critique of the Talmud: Dov Elbaum (Column 675)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In the previous column I offered a general introduction to discussing critical arguments about the Torah and the Talmud, and now I wish to get more deeply into specific critical claims. I presented there a list of perspectives and modes of thought that characterize the difficulties and the ways to respond to them; the common denominator of most of them relates to conservative and rigid thinking. In what follows I will refer to that list and note which item I am addressing.
As noted there, I decided to focus mainly on the arguments of Dov Elbaum and of Yitzhak Isakov, because they are very typical. Isakov, in his lecture, raises a series of arguments about a collection of various Talmudic sugyot, and I will leave that for the next column. In this column I will present a critique of Dov Elbaum’s article. In that piece you will find various general criticisms of the Talmud and its students, but there is a specific critique there focused mainly on one Talmudic sugya—a “close-up shot” that, in Elbaum’s words, is indicative of the whole—and so I will begin with that. Afterwards I will move to a critical look at Elbaum’s more general claims.
“Sexual relations with a toddler are not rape. Yes, that’s what’s taught in the yeshivot”: the difficulty
The title of this section is the headline chosen by Haaretz’s editors for Elbaum’s piece. If the article has an agenda, the headline all the more so. And if the article is full of misunderstanding, so is that headline.
In the middle of the article Elbaum begins to describe the study method common in Lithuanian yeshivot, and he writes as follows:
“The study approach of Volozhin, known as the ‘Brisker method,’ shaped the mode of study in Haredi yeshivot to this day. It emphasized intensive, in-depth study of the Talmud (in some yeshivot from this stream they sometimes devoted many months to only five folio pages), with an emphasis on analytical thinking and the ability to study independently.”
Let us set aside the superficial identification he makes between the method of study in Volozhin and the “Brisker method” accepted in yeshivot today. That is merely a historical inaccuracy (the Netziv’s method is almost an antithesis to the Brisker method, and the same goes for his colleague, the author of Beit HaLevi, despite being the father of R. Chaim of Brisk). But there is an accurate point here: the focus that crystallized in Volozhin at the end of its days (by R. Chaim of Brisk) and continues to our time emphasizes analytical, in-depth study of sugyot, and less breadth (the Netziv certainly emphasized breadth, along with Scripture and other subjects far removed from the Lithuanian yeshivot that followed him).
My emphasis here is not only on “in-depth study” (ʿiyun) but also on “analytical.” What distinguishes the Brisker method is not necessarily depth, which exists elsewhere too (the Noda BiYehuda and R. Akiva Eiger were great deep thinkers, even though they preceded the founding of the Brisker school and studied in a very different manner). What characterizes them is the analyticity, i.e., the analysis (breaking down) of concepts and principles, and then the syntheses that lead to different possibilities of understanding within the sugyot. I stress this in order to point out later that in his critique Elbaum missed precisely the point he himself deemed fit to sharpen in his introduction.
Here are the relevant passages of his on this matter:
“Below is a list of ten Talmudic sugyot from Tractate Ketubot, with an emphasis on those that may raise very difficult ethical questions:
- “‘A father’s rights over his daughter’ (folio 46b)—discusses a father’s rights over his minor daughter. 2. ‘One who has intercourse with a minor’ (folio 11b)—deals with the laws of rape of a minor. 3. ‘One who vows his wife’ (folio 70a)—discusses a husband who forbids his wife from benefiting from his property. 4. ‘These leave without a ketubah’ (folio 72a)—details cases in which a woman forfeits her ketubah. 5. ‘Even though they said’ (folio 57b)—discusses the husband’s obligations toward his wife. 6. ‘A naʿarah who was seduced’ (folio 40a)—deals with the laws of seduction of a young woman. 7. ‘A woman who was widowed’ (folio 95b)—discusses the rights of a widow. 8. ‘What a woman finds’ (folio 65b)—deals with ownership over items a woman finds. 9. ‘One who writes to his wife “I have no claim in your property”’ (folio 83a)—discusses property relations between spouses. 10. ‘A widow is supported’ (folio 97b)—deals with a widow’s rights to maintenance.”
Thus far, a list of sugyot from the tractate to give a general impression. Some of them can indeed raise ethical questions, though in my view certainly not all. But Elbaum chooses to focus (when a yeshiva student calls this “to dive,” it’s frankly insulting) on the second:
“To fully understand what this list represents, I would like to dive into item no. 2 on the list: ‘One who has intercourse with a minor.’ This is perhaps one of the most difficult examples of a yawning chasm between universal moral values and the content taught in yeshivot. The Gemara cites a baraita: ‘A girl of three years and one day can be betrothed through intercourse… younger than this, it is like putting a finger in the eye.’ The Amora Rava adds and says: ‘An adult who has intercourse with a minor girl—it is as nothing, for younger than this it is like putting a finger in the eye.’ Up to here the words of the Gemara itself, and Rashi comments on the page: ‘Just as a tear that comes out due to a finger—another comes in its place, so too the hymen of one younger than this—another returns in its place.’”
“Most yeshiva students will also invest time in splitting hairs and delving into the sugya and will even check how this is ruled in practice. They will approach the library shelves in the beit midrash and open Maimonides’ great halachic work, the Mishneh Torah, which is the basis for contemporary halachic ruling. There they will be able to study his following ruling: ‘If she was younger than this (than three years old), both are exempt, for her intercourse is not considered intercourse. And likewise, a grown woman upon whom a minor had intercourse—if he was nine years and one day and up, she is liable to karet or death or lashes, and he is exempt. But if he was nine years old and below—both are exempt’ (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Forbidden Intercourse, ch. 1, halachot 13–14). And Maimonides, thank God, also has dozens of accompanying commentators, and thus they can continue to split hairs with them as well.”
“I will now explain in plain Hebrew what is being said here, for those who still need clarification: A person who has sexual relations with a girl younger than three is exempt from punishment or from paying compensation for damage to the girl. Likewise, a woman who has sexual relations with a male under nine is exempt from punishment even if she did so with her son. Also male–male sex with a minor under nine is exempt from punishment.”
“Few topics in the world of halachic interpretation cause a burning stomachache like this sugya, which opens a Pandora’s box of dark ethical abysses. The Gemara essentially determines that penetration by an adult into the body of a girl under three doesn’t harm her and is ‘like putting a finger in the eye’—a metaphor which, were we to hear it from someone in this context, would surely make us call the police immediately.”
“In a bold attempt to grapple with this challenging legacy, classic Talmudic commentators marshaled all their imaginative power. Some, in a blaze of scientific creativity, propose fascinating theories about accelerated biological development in the ancient world, which in their view explains why sexual assault of one younger than three does her no harm since ‘her hymen returns.’ Others navigate cautiously between the raindrops, noting the severity of the matter in our time, as if trying to say: ‘Yes, but it’s not really permitted—certainly not in our day.’”
Indeed, a burning stomachache, and not for nothing. This is the type of question often raised regarding such Talmudic sugyot (as I wrote in the previous column, their source is usually Aharon/Yaron Yadan. In this sugya as well, he was the one who raised it to public awareness). Elbaum is even correct in his description of the embarrassing excuses offered by today’s apologists (“Yes, but it’s not really permitted—certainly not in our day.” “Yes, but there is a rabbinic penalty (makot mardut),” and the like. See, for example, my column 15 regarding the “beautiful captive woman,” and there is much more of this sort. I remind you again of the video in which Yaron Yadan interviews Rabbi Aviner, mentioned in the previous column, where you can also see embarrassing answers (see another example here, one of many). Unfortunately there is a misunderstanding here—not only by Elbaum but also by the various apologists who ostensibly disagree with him—as I explained in the previous column under item no. 3 on that list: the relationship between ethics (morality) and halacha.
“Sexual relations with a toddler are not rape. Yes, that’s what’s taught in the yeshivot”: the explanation
It seems that on both sides of the divide, both Elbaum and his disputants, there is a misunderstanding about the relationship between morality and halacha. They all assume that halacha reflects the Torah’s morality, but from that they draw opposite conclusions: Yaron Yadan and Elbaum criticize the halacha, whereas their opponents twist themselves into knots and sometimes disqualify morality. I have explained more than once why this is a mistake, and I will not repeat it all here. I will only say that morality and halacha are two independent categories, and therefore it is not correct to examine a halachic determination through a moral prism (see elaboration in column 541).
When the Gemara and Maimonides rule that intercourse with a girl younger than three is not considered intercourse, their intention is to define the halachic concept of bi’ah (intercourse) and to derive the halachic determinations that follow from it. As is known, there are prohibited acts of intercourse in halacha, such as intercourse with close relatives, male–male intercourse, and so on. Prohibited acts of intercourse in halacha are offenses that entail punishment. Sometimes, when it is done by coercion, there is a fine that the rapist must pay, and the ground for payment is the damage to the hymen. The Talmud’s assumption was that with one under three—even if penetration occurred—the hymen regenerates; that is, there is no irreversible bodily injury to the child, and therefore this is not considered “intercourse,” both regarding the definition of the offense and its punishment, and regarding liability for fines.
Do all these determinations have a moral dimension? Absolutely not. Halacha does not deal with the question of whether the intercourse is moral or not, but whether a halachic offense was committed. The moral question must be discussed separately, and it is not the concern of halacha. Moreover, from a moral standpoint, norms may change over the generations, and therefore the moral attitude of the sages may change accordingly. Furthermore, there is no impediment to criticizing the morality of ancient sages, even if it fit the norms prevalent in their environment. But that is criticism of the sages, not of halacha or the Torah.
This may sound apologetic to you, but anyone familiar with halachic sources knows this well and can see it easily. The first indication is the placement of this law. The laws of Forbidden Intercourse in Maimonides do not deal with morality. Intercourse with a married woman (eshet ish) when both spouses and the paramour agree is a full prohibition and entails punishment, even though I see no moral problem here. The same goes for homosexual relations. There is a tendency to think that halacha and the Torah view these acts as morally flawed, but that is a mistake. It is a halachic offense. Regarding morality, perhaps some—including decisors—have thought (or think) it is immoral, but that is not connected to halacha; it is their moral opinion. Conversely, a husband’s relations with an unmarried woman who is not his wife may present a moral problem, yet halachically there is no punishment for it. Thus there is independence in both directions between halacha and morality.
The Gemara also determines that a minor girl (under three) cannot be betrothed through intercourse, but this is clearly a purely formal determination. After all, she can be betrothed with money. The problem is that if betrothal is effected through intercourse, then the act must count as intercourse; but intercourse with a minor girl is not considered intercourse. Is there a moral determination here? I do not see any. It is a formal determination regarding the validity of betrothal that depends on the halachic definition of the term “intercourse.”
Note that Elbaum himself adds (which does not appear in the Gemara and Maimonides he cited) that even if a father has intercourse with his daughter under three, there is no “intercourse” here. By contrast, when he does so with his daughter over three it is a forbidden intercourse (and he is liable to death). Is there a moral difference between these two acts? It is hard to see one. The difference is formal—whether there was halachic “intercourse” or not. Therefore, the determination that a father who had intercourse with his small daughter did not transgress the halachic offense of Forbidden Intercourse has no moral meaning whatsoever. It is a strictly halachic determination. Is such an act moral? Certainly not. The sages would even flog him with disciplinary lashes (makot mardut) for it (see here), and they would certainly prevent it if they could.
Let me sharpen again: moral judgment is entirely disconnected from halacha, and when discussing a halachic question we suspend the moral approach to the case and the acts under discussion. Just as, when students in a physiology class learn what would happen to such a girl physically, no one expects them to discuss it in moral categories (see an amusing example in this spirit regarding the engineering design of a blood conduit, in columns 89 and 467).
To sharpen this distinction further, I will bring here a similar example that arose in my debate with Yaron Yadan (back to the source; as noted, Elbaum’s example was likely taken from him as well).
“A man may do anything with his wife”
The moderator cited this law in Maimonides within the first minute, but in fact this is Yaron Yadan’s own challenge. I returned to address it near the end of the debate (starting at 1:23 in the video).
Maimonides, Laws of Forbidden Intercourse 21:9, writes:
“A man’s wife is permitted to him; therefore, anything a man wishes to do with his wife, he may do. He may have intercourse whenever he wishes and may kiss any part of her he wishes [and come upon her in the natural way or in the unnatural way], provided he does not waste seed. Nevertheless, it is an attribute of piety that a person not treat this matter frivolously, and that he sanctify himself during intercourse, as we explained in the Laws of Character Traits; and he should not deviate from the way of the world and its practice, for this matter is only in order to be fruitful and multiply.”
Sounds appalling, no? The woman is presented as the husband’s passive object, and he may do with her as he pleases without asking her. No wonder many quote this law as moral criticism of halacha and its attitude toward women. There are areas where I can certainly see room for justified criticisms of halacha in this regard, but this law is not one of them. It is a complete misunderstanding—and surprising, given that we are speaking of someone who once headed a kollel.
The opening line of the law says it all: “A man’s wife is permitted to him.” That is, the discussion here is not about a man’s rights over his wife (what he may impose upon her against her will and what he may not), but about halachic prohibition and permission. For example, halacha sometimes forbids two consenting adults from having sexual relations—for instance, a brother and sister. That is a halachic prohibition (and in my view has no moral problem, but that is another matter). The same applies to relations between a husband and wife when she is a niddah. This prohibition is not about protecting the woman’s rights, for she may well want it. The prohibition is imposed by halacha upon both spouses, even if they both desire it. All the Laws of Forbidden Intercourse deal with prohibitions of this sort—i.e., prohibitions imposed by halacha. “Forbidden intercourse” (issurei bi’ah) are prohibitions the Torah imposes on both parties, and they do not depend on whether both want it or one coerces the other. What is stated here in Maimonides is that any form of sexual relations between husband and wife is permitted—there is no halachic prohibition. It does not speak in any way, even by hint, of a situation where the wife does not wish it and the husband seeks to force it upon her.
It must be understood that the spouses’ mutual rights are not discussed at all in the Laws of Forbidden Intercourse but rather in the Laws of Marriage. There, the rights that each spouse has vis-à-vis the other are described. If Maimonides had written this very formulation in the Laws of Marriage, it could indeed have been interpreted that way—for then we would have had to understand that the husband has such rights over his wife. But here that is not what is being said. Note well: this is not an apologetic excuse, and it does not even depend on the distinction I drew between halacha and morality. It is simply basic reading comprehension of a halachic text. There can be—and is—no dispute about this.
I stress that this distinction is not related to item 3 of the list in the previous column (the relationship between halacha and morality) but to item 6 (distinguishing different aspects within halacha: “two dinim”). My claim is that even if halacha were identical to morality, Maimonides’ words here would not be morally problematic, for here he addresses the aspect of prohibition/permission of the two spouses vis-à-vis the Almighty, and not the aspect of their mutual rights vis-à-vis one another. These are, in fact, “two dinim” of the relationship between a husband and his wife, and this is precisely the division between the Laws of Marriage and the Laws of Forbidden Intercourse. Of course, this is an additional indication of my earlier claim that the Laws of Forbidden Intercourse do not deal with morality but with halacha. If this law had appeared in the Laws of Marriage, then one could examine it in light of the relationship between halacha and morality (item 3).
If I return to the difficulty Elbaum described regarding intercourse with a minor under three, there—as we saw—there is a distinction between the halachic aspect and the moral aspect. One can claim this is a special case of the “two dinim” analysis we saw here. There it is a split between a halachic aspect and a moral (extra-halachic) aspect, whereas here it is a split between two halachic aspects (prohibition/permission vs. mutual rights of the spouses). After Elbaum’s introduction about the analytical nature of yeshiva study, it is strange that he does not apply analytical methods to the very question he is discussing. This is elementary.
Aviad Markovitz, in his critique of Elbaum, deals with a specific aspect of the sugya “one who has intercourse with a minor,” regarding a “mukat etz” and the amount of the ketubah a woman receives when her husband does not find her hymen (that is the context of the sugya in Ketubot that Elbaum dealt with). He says things similar to mine in that specific context. However, his phrasing is, in my view, imprecise, for he distinguishes between values and facts; perhaps he means my distinction between law and morality.
Reservation: two types of critique
Elbaum uses this example and others like it to raise two different types of critiques: (1) A moral critique of the content. How can it be that halacha (=which, in his assumption, is identical with Jewish morality) does not view intercourse with a minor girl as rape in every respect, and perhaps even more severe than rape of an adult? (2) An educational critique. What will be the character of someone who, during his formative years, is nourished by the study of such sugyot? He claims that one who studies such sugyot necessarily emerges with a dulled moral sense. I have answered the first critique above. It must be admitted that the second critique raises a real difficulty.
As I have already noted, the view that identifies halacha with morality is shared by most of those who defend the halachic tradition against criticisms like Elbaum’s and Yadan’s. Therefore it is very likely that when they teach their students in yeshiva, they do not explain to them that this is a halachic discussion but that morally the act is patently wrong—for in their view it is the same discussion. Personally, I tend to think that intuitively both teachers and students do understand this, yet it turns out that at least when the question is placed on the table they are unwilling to admit the distinction between halacha and morality. Thus, implicitly, one can indeed understand from the study of such sugyot that the Torah does not view this act as morally severe. In that sense there is substance to Elbaum’s second critique—the critique of what such an educational system produces—but that is precisely because the learners and teachers share his conception of the relationship between halacha and morality. This is a critique that may be justified, but it targets the learners and teachers in the yeshivot, not halacha or the Talmud themselves.
Yet I very much doubt how justified even this critique is. There is another implicit assumption in the second critique: that if one studies such sugyot in a cold manner, this influences the student’s soul and dulls his moral sensitivity. I am not at all sure of this. Even if one studies these sugyot without distinguishing morality from halacha, I still do not think this necessarily dulls moral sensitivity. The fact is that the yeshiva student typically disconnects the material studied from his daily life and feelings. One can criticize such study, but it is hard to deny that this is the reality in yeshivot. I can say from my experience that when I taught in-depth Talmud to women—who, by their nature, had not undergone yeshiva education—I had to work very hard to create in them a separation between moral revulsion at the act or situation and the legal-halachic analysis thereof. Regardless of the relationship between morality and halacha, that separation greatly benefits the quality of legal-halachic analysis. Many women tend to think that precisely invoking moral sensitivity contributes to a better understanding and to more correct conclusions from the sugya (and perhaps also to preventing the loss of moral sensitivity). I disagree. On this, see again my remarks in the columns cited above on the question of the blood conduit.
An educational note
Even so, in my impression there is indeed notable moral dullness among yeshiva graduates, mainly Haredi (though not only). One can see this in the detached arguments raised by Haredi yeshiva graduates to justify their distorted moral conduct (for example, regarding the draft, or when they justify other Haredi conduct. See examples in columns 629, 609, 655, and more). In the past I attributed this to partisanship and cognitive dissonance (the familiar human need to justify at all costs the choices we have made), but I now think it also stems from the yeshiva’s cold, detached analytical study style. When you get used to analyzing every situation in a cold manner, you may come to see in such an analysis a moral justification as well. I stress again: I do not think we should mix halacha and morality, since these really are independent categories. But it is important that alongside the cold, juristic study of the sugya we also note that there is another aspect—moral—and discuss it as well. This is usually not done (apparently because of the assumption that halacha and morality are identical), and it is likely what produces the moral dullness of yeshiva students. Here you have a direct harm from the prevailing conflation of halacha and morality (whose aim is ostensibly positive—to defend the morality of halacha—but in practice it is not only wrong but also very harmful). It turns out that the approach I proposed—namely, to separate morality from halacha—is not only correct and not only resolves in the most convincing way the tension between them, but it is also the only approach that allows us, educationally, to cope with the consequences of the habit of relating to such sugyot in a cold, analytical way. We must not forgo the important and correct habit of bracketing emotion when studying, but it is still important to mention the moral dimension separately and not leave it unaddressed.
Thus, when studying the section about the “beautiful captive woman,” the case of intercourse with a minor, or the relations between husband and wife, it is important to analyze them in a cold manner and not to mix in emotional and moral considerations. But at the same time it is important to state that all this is a halachic analysis, and to note in parallel that from a moral perspective these are patently wrong acts. It is important to clarify that halachic permission says nothing about our moral attitude to such acts. To say that this is indeed “halachic morality,” or to say that today none of this is relevant, or to use a set of other unconvincing excuses common in our circles—this is not only wrong but also harmful.
I now turn to Elbaum’s other criticisms, and will do so briefly.
Additional moral criticisms
Elbaum brings a list of several sugyot that contain moral distortions:
a. Misogynistic attitude: the woman is seen as the property of her father before marriage and the property of her husband afterwards. b. Attitude toward non-Jews: they are not included in the definition of “person.” There is no need to try to save their lives, to return their lost property, and according to some sages it is even permitted to rob them of their property. c. Corporal punishment: capital punishment for anyone who transgresses the Torah’s laws. d. Ostracism and negation of any phenomenon of homosexuality, gender and sexual variance.
Some of these criticisms are correct and others are not. In brief, I will put it this way.
a. The determinations regarding a father’s authority over his daughter are legal determinations, not moral ones. The woman is not her husband’s property, but because he is obligated to support her and thus responsible for her, he may also determine various matters for her. There is logic in granting him this authority, as he is the one who must ensure that his daughter can subsist. One must remember that in the past women’s ability to earn a livelihood was very limited, and therefore there is logic in enabling the father to marry off his daughter or even sell her as a maidservant in extreme cases. By the way, when the father oversteps morality, the court will compel him not to do so, for there is no statement here that such steps are moral. Today, when that is not the case, there is no reason at all to preserve these rules, and I assume the court will not allow the father to do so. The Torah responded here to an ancient reality and did not set binding moral lines. Over the generations until today, sages, decisors, and courts have emptied these rules of their substance. In any case, these are legal, not moral, determinations. There is no impediment to holding the view that all these steps are immoral, and the commitment to halacha does not dictate otherwise.
b. Regarding the attitude toward non-Jews, see my article “Is There an ‘Enlightened’ Idolatry?”. Similarly with regard to the status of the convert, see my article “The Personal Status of a Convert—Inferiority or Social Status?”.
c. There is nothing wrong with this, as long as there are witnesses and prior warning, and the person knows what he is facing and the consequences of his actions, and he also understands that he himself sinned. Clearly, if that person does not believe in halacha and acts from a different worldview, he is considered coerced and is not liable to punishment. See my article on causing a secular person to transgress, here, the columns on “coercion” regarding beliefs (657, 490), and much more.
d. Regarding homosexuality, the Torah indeed forbids it, but this should not be seen as a moral determination. It is a halachic prohibition. See columns 25–26, and especially columns 16 and 92, and more.
Again I must say: in all these issues, conservatives who identify halacha with morality will indeed need embarrassing answers—but only because they share Elbaum’s and Yadan’s mistaken assumptions.
Absurd conceptions of the natural world
Under this heading Elbaum mentions Talmudic sugyot that deal with mistaken and anachronistic conceptions of nature that in our day have been shown to be incorrect: the earth is the center of the universe; a snake’s gestation is seven years. Here I must invoke items 1, 4, and 5 from the previous column. I showed there is no reason to assume the sages had any superlative knowledge, and certainly there are not a few scientific mistakes in the Talmud (see also here).
On the margins I will add that here Elbaum falls into a mistake common among many atheist critics who think that Copernicus’s determination—that the earth revolves around the sun and not the other way round, or that the earth is not the center of the universe—is a scientific discovery, and therefore whoever thinks otherwise is wrong and not up to date with scientific knowledge. That is a mistake. Copernicus at most proposed a different coordinate system within which it is easier to describe the paths of the stars in our galaxy. There is nothing more “true” in his words than in those of his predecessors. The claim that the sun revolves around the earth is kinematically equivalent to the claim that the earth revolves around the sun; it is merely a question of convenience. On this, see my article here.
Torah magena u-matzla (Torah protects and saves)
His critique of the claim that this study protects the State of Israel and the Jewish people—supposedly spreading a mystical Iron Dome over them—does not depend on his moral critique of the law about intercourse with a minor. He uses that as a demagogic argument when he writes that yeshivot believe that studying the sugya of intercourse with a minor spreads an Iron Dome over us. But in fact his claim is about all Talmudic study (and not specifically about sugyot that are morally problematic).
To that I can only say that he is attacking the childish Haredi claim that is being heard even more in these days, but in this there is certainly no attack on halacha or its study. As for the inventions of Haredi articles of faith—I certainly have no interest in defending them. I have stated my view about them many times.
I must add that in my view this study does indeed protect us—but not in a mystical sense. One who thinks that mere continued existence is our goal in effect assumes we have no purpose. That is apparently Elbaum’s view as a secular person. But he cannot criticize, on that basis, the views of believers who think we do have a purpose here. In my book HaMetzui HaRishon (The Prime Existent), in the fifth conversation, I explained that the assumption that the world and we have some purpose requires that it be something beyond the smooth functioning of life and hence beyond morality (if the purpose were the functioning of life, it cannot serve as an explanation for our creation; it would have been better not to create us, and then there would be no need for that “purpose”). This study preserves our identity and constitutes a purpose for our existence here. This is what we are here for; there is therefore no need to seek purposes that it helps promote. The study is not a means but an end in itself (see column 479 and elsewhere).
For some reason, a secular person like Elbaum will enthusiastically join the claims now being heard that art and culture protect us, or that sport is a guarantee of our existence. These claims arise whenever there is a threat to cut state budgets for these purposes. Then all the secularists pop up and discover the wonders of mysticism. They fervently claim that all these pursuits and aims have supreme value and therefore their budgets must not be cut. Such claims are voiced enthusiastically under every fresh media tree, with no one objecting. A play about events in Venice in the tenth century, a comedy set on a kibbutz, a historical or other film, a singer’s performance, or any other nonsense—these surely protect us as a mighty Iron Dome. Yet at the same time they do not hesitate to assert that the claim that Torah study protects us is downright absurd. A topsy-turvy world I have seen.
Sex education
Toward the end of the article Elbaum brings data (some of which contradict themselves) about the percentage of sexual assaults among Haredim and religious people (for example, in the settlements), which is significantly higher than their proportion in the population. These are horrifying data that indeed deserve attention and must be taken into account (the religious and Haredi public lives in denial about them). Yet he explains these data on the basis of reliance on sugyot such as “one who has intercourse with a minor,” and the like. No wonder, he argues, that they emerge as rapists and harassers, and so on.
Here there is a simple logical error. Elbaum ignores many other parameters that can cause these phenomena: for example, gender separation customary in these communities; the prohibition on sexual relations and on self-relief; the taboo on dealing with these topics; the lack of sex education; and much more. All these do not depend on the character of the Talmudic sugyot and their influence. In short, this is a critique of the religious and Haredi society and perhaps also of halacha, but it has no connection to the nature of the Talmudic sugyot that are the subject of his article. Above I already mentioned a possible way to address these problems. There is no need to stop studying the relevant sugyot nor to change the method of study. One can append to them a parallel moral discussion, even if it is not mixed into the sugya’s analysis itself.
I generally agree with the principles you wrote, but I disagree with the example of “whatever a man wants to do to his wife, he does.” The source of this halacha in the Rambam is the Gemara Benedir 22:2, and there it is explained that the Sages did not see a moral problem in the matter either. A woman complains to a Rabbi about her husband acting this way, and the Rabbi answers her “The Torah schools have abandoned you, and what can I do to you.” Today, I don't think there is a serious Rabbi who would answer in this way.
There is no connection. First, because I did not write that the Sages thought it was immoral. What I wrote is that the halakhic determination has nothing to do with morality. Therefore, the evidence from the Rambam is not evidence. Second, even in the Gemara there, the entire context is prohibition and permission, not human rights in his wife.
The act came after the Gemara took the example of Yochanan ben Dhabai, who claims that there is a prohibition in this (not because of the coercion but because of the act itself), and here they came to say that there is no prohibition:
“But the Sages said that there is no halakhic rule according to Yochanan ben Dhabai, but whatever a man wants to do to his wife he does”. It is clear that there is no discussion here about rape, but about the act itself.
Now, that woman who came before the Rabbi complained and the Rabbi did not intervene. This can be interpreted in two ways:
1. The Rabbi told her a halakhic statement and not a moral one. Alternatively, he thought it was also moral, but I disagree with him. In any case, this is not halakha, but morality.
2. What is more likely is that the woman came before a rabbi to complain about the offense (she thought as Rabbi ben Dhabai) and not about rape, and he said that there was no offense in it. Maybe it was inappropriate, but there was no offense, and therefore he did not intervene.
Even according to Halacha, a man is forbidden to rape his wife. At most, he can divorce her.
It seems to me more correct (or understandable) to see these issues as diabd issues. That is, a case of a man who assaulted a minor has come to the Sages' house of learning and now their halakhic status must be discussed. In other words, the problem is that there have been cases in the past (and even today) that have required Sages to address the issue. (A sad anecdote: most cases of sexual assault occur within the family, that's what I heard in the title of the law.)
This distinction reminds me of a division in the contract law of Jewish law (I forgot the posak in question) regarding an illegal contract. That posak explains that the contractual part must be separated from the criminal part, the criminal part must be applied to the offender and the contractual part must be discussed separately. For example, a man who slept with a prostitute and refuses to pay her. In such a case, we would require him to pay under the law of contracts but would apply the penal sanction for this offense to him.
Of course. This is a whore and a dog's price.
1. On the issue of a man's wife, you wrote, "This does not speak in any way, not even hintingly, of a situation where the wife is not interested in it and the husband wants to force it on her." So what is meant by "[and came to her according to her ways and not according to her ways]"?
2. Is it possible to say that in the distant past (the Middle Ages, the Second Temple period or before) there was an identity between morality and halakhah? In general, this seems to be the era in which most Jewish thought developed. So the division between morality and halakhah seems like a later invention.
3. During the 2nd part of my analysis of the scarcity of the Gemara, there are times when arguments are brought from what is found in the field. Do such arguments rely on what is found being moral or halakhic?
1. I didn't understand the question. As it is, the intention is in advance and not as it is in hindsight. What does this have to do with her will?
2. Absolutely not. See my reasoning in column 541 and you will see that it is built into the halakha.
3. Each argument is on its own merits. In most cases, an expression that is common is cited, not an act.
Although I like the conceptual separation between halakha and musar that you made both here and in the discussion with Yaron Yadan, I think it is worth wondering about it:
1. Does it indeed fit the concept of halakha/Torah itself, or is this separation itself apologetics – even if more convincing and sophisticated.
Let's take one of the examples you gave – male sexual intercourse. As mentioned, you claim that there is no moral prohibition here but a religious prohibition, but the language of the Bible itself is “and a man shall not lie with a woman's bed, for it is an abomination”. From this, two possibilities remain, and in my opinion both are equally apologetic. The first is that the problem is linguistic, and that the word abomination in biblical Hebrew is used with a different semantic meaning. The traditional commentators do not understand it this way. Harlev”g says “that this matter is detestable in itself” and Ibn Ezra “and mentions an abomination is – because it is a thing detestable to a holy soul”. Of course, here too, one can say that they do not intend the modern meaning, but there is no end to the matter. The second option is to include this also in your conceptual system and claim that abomination is not a moral category but a halakhic one. But then why did it need to be mentioned, it would have been possible to be satisfied with the first part of the verse. Of course, in the rest of the fornication section, the author does not avoid moral condemnations. In fact, I think that with a careful reading, there is no shortage of examples of how the Bible explicitly mixes these categories. That is, the argument of legal orders is very convenient when there is a separate halakhic codex, like the Maimonides, and even then I doubt whether it is faithful to the original authors' intention. Does this Briskerian thinking really reflect the text?
2. Even if it is not faithful to the source - does it matter?
Apparently, this is the difference between apologetics and truth. In other words, one can of course disagree and say that the starting point is that the Torah and the Halacha develop, and therefore interpretive moves like the one proposed are faithful to Judaism even if they completely change its theological perception. In my opinion, this is an easy task. If I drop this assumption, then the ideal religious aspiration should be to get as close as possible to the "source" as it is expressed in the Bible, and any theological (and also halakhic) escape actually distances it from the divine command. I am of course going against the entire accepted Orthodox view here, but that doesn't bother me and I assume it doesn't bother you either. In other words, doesn't your interpretation create a new religion? And if so, how is it more justified than the Orthodox view (or the Reform, Conservative, or any other interpretation) other than the fact that it is more sophisticated? Each of you has raped Judaism in a way that best suits your conceptual system and basic assumptions.
Shabbat Shalom.
This question has come up here more than once. I explained that the term “abomination” is not used in a moral sense. See Nedarim n. It appears in the Torah in several places not in a moral sense. When the Torah says that male intercourse is an abomination, it means a religious abomination, not a moral one. Even on the moral level, not every offense is an abomination. There is a difference between saying that it is forbidden and saying that it is an abomination, both on the moral level and on the religious level.
Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin, page 8, page 1, said Rava: He was forced to die of hunger – exempt. Another place: Rava said: He was forced before Ari – exempt: And another: Itamar, he forced a tub on him and he was punished for leaving, Rava and Rabbi Zira, one said: He is liable, and the other said: exempt. And there, in another place, Ez 2: Rav Papa said: Is it not possible for a man to force his friends and weigh them in blood – He is a murderer, and he is not liable. This is Milli – in the first place, but in the second place – He is a murderer. Thus there is a whole issue in detailed divisions in the Aisha. These gammars that are taught in yeshivas are ways in which the murderer is exempt from death as long as he kills in the correct manner according to the Torah! Is there any greater immorality than this? It's not for nothing that the percentage of murderers in the ultra-Orthodox community is several times higher than in the secular community (the ultra-Orthodox deny this, but anyone familiar with police and prosecutors' data knows this), who study such studies and still expect them to behave morally?
And seriously: Your words are very true, although trivial. And all of Elbaum's cheap demagogy about what boys study in yeshiva is simply nonsense. Isn't it also that someone who rapes an adult (and not a girl) is not liable for a fine, and it must be assumed that shame and guilt also apply to a girl under 3 years old (I didn't have time to check), so it's clear that the only difference is only halakhic regarding the reasons and not a moral difference. (The reason Elbaum focused on a minor and not an adult is that it served his purpose, isn't cruelty to adults more moral than to minors?) Is there anyone who studied Talmud and understood that the distinction between an adult and a girl is moral?
Regarding the second example of everything a man does to his wife, things are so simple that if this is the level of the new Talmud criticism (new??? Who will remove the dust from your eyes, Yal”G? And why should they go to poor Yadan? Yal”G's demagogy at the expense of Y”D is much more successful, and arouses strong feelings about the fanatical Talmud!) I don't know what to think (but no! It's the ultra-Orthodox who are stupid). You continue to treat Yaron Yadan seriously, and you don't understand how there is so much lack of understanding, including the former?! That's why I wrote in Talkback for the previous column what I wrote so that you will understand that there is no lack of understanding here, but rather malicious biases, from a corrupt person.
(As a side note: Your method is excellent, we will continue with the method of God that you do not believe in and I do not believe in either… that is, it is not the Jewish approach but the stupid/parasitic/evil/infantile Haredi/+ Yes, and I tell you the Haredi that you are attacking, I am attacking too, you are building an entire model of Haredim but that is a straw man! These are not the perceptions of the Haredim (that I know of)! Every 13-year-old student (and even a child younger than 9…) understands this distinction between morality and halacha. I know you will answer: Not true, these are indeed the perceptions of the Haredim. Well, well, in the previous talkback I asked you for sources for what you wrote about the prevalent perception of scientific knowledge in the Talmud and you did not answer me. And by the way, not everything the Haredim say to the media is what they really think, they definitely advocate - and not rightly so, because it is not helpful - esotericism, and the recruitment of The yeshiva is a successful example. Not a single conscientious Haredi - if there are any - thinks that the Torah they are studying deploys an iron dome over the country. The real answer to why they think they shouldn't serve in the army is completely different, and I'm not saying they're right.
Good week
Why did the Torah write laws that are halachically permissible if, in any case, they are morally prohibited and we have no reason to be concerned about this permission (is it only to magnify the Torah and glorify it as a rebellious son and teacher)?
She wrote so that we know that there is also a halakhic prohibition in this, not just a moral one. You could call it increasing the Torah and glorifying it. But it goes beyond that, because there is a punishment for a halakhic prohibition, and there is no punishment for a moral prohibition.
What is the source that if the father deviates from morality, the court forces him not to do so? (It turns out, but I would love the source)
Do you think it is true that there are sexual assaults in the religious and ultra-Orthodox public that are significantly greater than the rest of the public, I thought that the religious and religious value only strengthens morality and goodness (but maybe it's just naivety)?
It's not a matter of origin, because it's not a halakhic principle. It's what happened and is happening in practice. Even in the Shulchan Aruch, there are many places that impose something that is not a halakhic obligation, and imposing the measure of Sodom in the Bible is the whole issue.
Rabbi Aviner's answer to Yad'an is not embarrassing.
He explained to Yad'an that his understanding and manner of presenting the halakha is superficial, because in practice Jews are not seen as gentile murderers for the most part (almost non-existent).
So it's not an explanation like yours, but it can be said that your explanation (theory) + Rabbi Aviner's explanation complement each other.
You wrote that there could be other causes for these phenomena, such as a prohibition on sexual relations and self-discharge, separation, etc. Is there a solution to this that is halakhically permissible or is there no advice and no wisdom against it (or in other words, a religious value versus a moral value)?
I don't know a solution.
But I'm saying that it's not exactly a religious value versus a moral value. There is no moral value in permissiveness. It has some positive results (and also negative ones).
It's like after the Rabin assassination when they accused religiosity of murder (those who believe may end up murdering). Here too, it's not a clash between values, but a clash between a value and its possible problematic result.
” Whatever he wants. The husband does ” … But .. But
Thus wrote Maimonides” (De'ot 5, 4):
“And he shall not rape her and she does not want it, except with the will of both and with their joy”.
It is not enough for both of them to want it (until he says, Do I want it?) but “and with their joy” .
If the scholar was indeed a Rosh Kollel – it is not possible that he did not know the words of the Rambam
above. And it is not possible that he did not understand that there is no contradiction between the two laws.
But when one engages in propaganda, one does not really pay attention.
Regarding Dov Elbaum. He also knows and is familiar with the figure that Yeshivah education is aimed at.
It is assumed that he also read the books of Chaim Grada.
A very nice column! But still sometimes the issue is really strange and it is not possible to answer what is written in the column. See for example here (short video from Da'at Emet) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G40g-Kjf6Ig
I don't see anything there that hasn't been answered.
Could you please clarify: Do you think that Halacha includes all of the Torah and has no connection to moral values, or are Halacha discussions as a professional field separate from morality? Does the Torah of Hashem also teach us morality and values, or does it focus only on a system of religious laws?
The Torah consists of Halakhah and non-Halakhic parts. The non-Halakhic part has moral elements, but no one learns morality from them. A person's morality is what his conscience tells him, and then he "finds" it in the Torah. Furthermore, morality by definition is universal (there is no Jewish morality), and Gentiles are supposed to understand it for themselves without the Torah.
Shalom Rabbi,
First of all, congratulations on the article that awaits you.
Two questions for you:
1. Regarding the division between law and morality: I can accept this distinction when it comes to a Talmudic issue that aims to define the law, such as what is considered a pretext and the like, and therefore we also find many theoretical cases that the Supreme Court has discussed in order to refine the boundaries of the law in terms of law, but not in practice. However, when it comes to verses in the Torah, such as the rape of a beautiful woman in war, it is seemingly difficult to accept this. The purpose of the Torah is not to discuss the boundaries of the laws theoretically, but to instruct what is permissible and prohibited in practice, accordingly, the permission that the Torah writes supposedly speaks to all levels - halakhic and moral. It is simply permissible in practice. It is not clear to me why you avoid accepting the common excuse here that indeed during the time of the Torah, the rape of women during war was a moral thing, especially if it helped the warriors continue to fight, and therefore the Torah permits it with certain restrictions that refine the attitude towards women, and a call for a direction for the future that it should be avoided if possible (“The Torah did not speak except against Yitzhar”, and the whole issue of a wife of good appearance will have a disobedient and mischievous son”). After all, you yourself used this excuse (that there is a difference between our time and their time) regarding the rights of a husband over his wife/daughter: ‘We must remember that women once had a very limited ability to earn a living, and therefore it makes sense to give the husband the option of marrying off his daughter or even selling her to her mother in extreme cases” if that is all there is to the difference?
2. Regarding the claim that the Torah protects and protects, even if we leave aside the endings (the heresy and more) that can be explained in a different way, I did not understand how the Rabbi explains the explicit verses in the Torah that if we follow the path of the Lord, it will have a good effect on us (including that we will not have to reach a state of war, “and the sword will not pass through your land”, and also success and victory in wars that will occur: “and your enemies will fall before you by the sword”) and if not, then the opposite (“A scythe will pursue one thousand, etc.), does not the observance of the Torah and mitzvot (including study) protect in this sense, in the Rabbi's opinion?
Thank you
1. You are saying what I am saying in other words. The Torah does indeed teach a permissiveness in practice, but it is a halakhic permissiveness. Morally, every person, every generation, and in every circumstance make moral decisions.
I used this only as another branch of the system of those who do not accept my division between halakhic and moral, but there is no real need for it.
2. First, the words of Hizka are not helpful. But beyond that, I have already written that the involvement of God in the world described in the Torah decreases with the generations. Search here on the site for divine involvement in the world.
God's overt involvement has diminished, but behind the scenes He certainly operates in ways that can be explained as nature.
The debates are very much needed to raise the low morale in the hearts of many rational Halacha adherents who sometimes feel that they are broken by this and cut or remain but in their hearts are already cut
They really show that believing and keeping Halacha is rational
So receive reinforcement in continuing this holy work
I have no idea why my response is spooky9bbe460711 The site didn't ask me who I am this time
Know
Honorable Rabbi Michi,
Thank you for the long-awaited post.
You wrote: "There is no reason in the world to preserve these rules, and I assume that the court will not allow the husband to do so. The Torah responded here to an ancient reality and did not establish binding moral lines. Throughout the generations until our days, sages, poskim and courts have emptied these rules of their content. Either way, there are no moral determinations here, but legal ones."
This is just an example, I have heard you say several times that the Sages are the greatest reformists, this is probably a true fact that is subject to apologetic interpretation from the 'traditional/ultra-Orthodox' side.
But on the other hand, there is no doubt that some of the Torah's laws are not relevant today (some of which were listed above in your article), and especially according to your view that the law has no morality, so what is there in these commandments?
I would appreciate it if you could expand a little (or refer to the article you wrote) regarding the attitude towards the Torah and the law as an eternal book:
1. Is the Torah even eternal? If so, why are so many of the commandments irrelevant and in need of reform or far-reaching interpretation to adapt them to later times?
2. If we are already accepting one reform or another, where is the line drawn? Are the modern reform movements acting correctly in adapting religion to the comfort zone?
3. Regarding those laws that have undergone reform or far-reaching interpretation, in your opinion is it better to say that these parts (at least) were written by man and are not from heaven, since they are appropriate for the period in which they were written and are not universal and immortal.
Thank you very much!
Lavie
It is worth presenting examples, otherwise the discussion is general and cannot be conducted.
A Torah law that I do not understand cannot be irrelevant today. Either the claim is that a practical society cannot be run in this way and therefore must be renovated, or these are laws whose purpose is clear.
In general, I say that the question of the border does not bother me as much as a garlic peel. The border is infinite. What is right is right and that is it. Questions of a slippery slope are not important to me in most cases.
I have dealt with the definition of Reform in several places. See, for example, the series of columns on modern Orthodoxy 475-480.
Thank you. I read the posts you mentioned, and I understand your approach to reform.
Since in your opinion, midrashic conservatism is not reform, perhaps I will focus on the Torah itself and not on the laws learned from the Torah or from the rabbis cited in the Talmud and of which you have given many examples in the above posts.
I will start with the example you gave in the post here, the sale of a small gift to a mother or a kiddushin by her father (and even to a woman who has been circumcised). You wrote that the Torah apparently answered an ancient need and that there is no Jewish law that would allow this today. Do you think this proves that the Torah, or more precisely, this specific law, is not eternal, and therefore it is likely that it was written by a person in a different period and culture?
And perhaps I will go further with another example to understand whether there are even limits to interpretation. Is it similar to the interpretation of the Sages – You certainly agree with me, 'an eye for an eye' refers to a monetary payment, isn't it better to assume that this verse was written by a human being during a time when thieves cut off the hands and gouged out the eyes of those who blinded their fellow man? 'When a flaw is inflicted on a person, it will be inflicted on him' – These are clear enough words, but here the Sages take the value of the laws of torts and money (I am careful not to use the word moral) and apply it to the law of 'cruelty', in order to interpret the verse in a more plausible way while removing it from its simple and clear meaning.
It is much more reasonable to 'delete the verse' on the grounds that it is probably not authentic and was inserted into the text by a human being?
And if I go further, what prevents me from interpreting the laws of consensus in a modern interpretation – like the Sages? If an eye for an eye = wealth, a woman's bed = pink bed linen.
Having relations between two males was not mentioned at all and was forbidden, just as mutilating a woman was not commanded at all.
I could even argue that the common understanding of the verse "And a man shall not lie with a woman's bed" as a prohibition on relations between two males is far-fetched and wrong, since it is impossible for a man to lie with a woman because he physically does not have a female organ, but only by coming in inappropriately (and since such an act belongs to both sexes, it cannot be defined as "lying with a woman"). Why would the Torah be "cruel" towards those who prefer to have relationships with members of their own sex (just as the Torah is not cruel to someone who blinds his companion to have him blinded)?
Of course, there are many more examples, but I will stop here for now.
I appreciate your consideration.
There are laws that seem to be immaterial on the surface, such as the right of a father over his daughter. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret that it came to meet a need.
The sermon on an eye for an eye is not a simple interpretation but an equal derivation sermon. Sermons are not supposed to meet the tests of simplicity, but it does not mean that the Sages did whatever they wanted. There are rules for sermons as well.
Therefore, the question of the limit is irrelevant. They demand when it is true.
If you think that Mechvei Isha does not speak about homosexuals, then permit. In my opinion, this is a very weak argument.
Beyond all, there is also a meaning to the tradition that also conveys to us the meaning of the verses. You have to be very convinced to go against it. What is more, the Sanhedrin and the Talmud have formal authority.
After all, to decide that something is a later human addition, strong arguments are needed, which I did not find here. It should also be noted that the claim that it is a human addition contradicts the claim that it can be interpreted differently. If you interpret it differently, there is no difficulty that requires you to conclude that this is a human addition.
A. Because of the lack of essential necessity in the Torah law regarding the father's proprietary right to his small house, the question arises whether the verse is authentic at all. Moreover, the father's right to his house is not only 'immaterial', it is contrary to basic values in the modern perception and probably already in the time of the Sages and the Rishonim. Does it make sense that God commanded something temporary and that after a while it would not be relevant (of course you could argue that in the future it would be relevant again, like the commandments for priests and sacrifices).
But isn't it more logical/correct to say that this is not a divine command at all, but a law written by man, than to say that it was intended to meet a temporary need?
B. Assuming that the argument I presented regarding male intercourse was stronger and correct in your opinion, would that be enough to permit homosexual relations and prohibit males from sleeping in a pink bed?
To strengthen the claim, I could, for example, demand a similar decree, "You shall not lie down," "You shall not lie down" (in the case of a poor person). What is the scripture talking about here in terms of night coverings (of the poor), even in the mention of the scripture talking about night coverings (feminine). And if I insist further, perhaps I can even find a few more sermons and explanations for the gay community.
Even the Talmud rules themselves, such as the similar decree that you mentioned (and other virtues that the Torah requires), were not written in the Torah (or not) and we have no proof that they were not the creation of those who wanted to use them as they understood them.
Is it because the Sanhedrin apparently did not disagree on the Orthodox/Sage interpretation that there is no possibility of changing this forever (or until a Sanhedrin greater in wisdom or in number breaks into the Gazit chamber)?
And on the opposite question, if, for example, the culture of organ harvesting as a punishment were to become acceptable again, would you insist on maintaining the Gazit that an eye for an eye = wealth?
I'm simply trying to understand when we have the authority (if at all) to reform the Torah's words – as the Sages did. As for the explanations and sermons, with a little patience, imagination and talent we will find or invent them.
I will point out again that your arguments contradict each other. If you interpret everything as you wish, there is no difficulty and there is no need to conclude that this is a human addition.
A. The verse is completely authentic and its applications change with the generations. I don't see what problem there is with that. The Amalekite life has also changed, and neither has ‘thou shalt not congregate’ (today, no one forbids two courts or synagogues in one city).
B. Assuming the argument were strong, I would accept it. It sounds almost like a tautology to me.
C. When we get to know the ways of preaching and you convince me, there is no problem. I will accept it.
D. You have no proof of anything. Tradition is that the virtues are the law. If you have other clear evidence, there is room to consider it. I am not aware of such evidence.
E. Indeed, a Sanhedrin can change anything that a previous Sanhedrin has established.
F. When I know the secret of equal decrees, we can discuss. There is no point in engaging in such hypothetical questions. When we live in a situation we can discuss it.
G. We can do everything that the Sages did, as long as it is done seriously and with an understanding of the tools (the virtues of the sermon). Of course, if we go against the Sages, this requires an appropriate bi'd (or the consent of all the Sages of the generation).
I will just emphasize, I am not interpreting as I wish, I am only referring to the actual law that ignores at best or, in the worst case, contradicts the law of the Torah.
A. I do not know where the Amalekite life changed, only that we cannot maintain it today for various reasons (such as offering sacrifices). As for not gathering together, isn't this a specific act of mourning? The other interpretation is already Talmudic.
B. The answer to that in Bg, then I will skip the logic with your permission.
C. I understand the point, only it is not clear from your words whether it is a matter of knowledge or authority.
D. The tradition of the virtues came in parts, and not as a clear message. As proof, even among the Sages there are a number of sayings and methods regarding the list of virtues and their use, which can lead to the conclusion that these are not the LBM (at least for the methods that claim that it was not disputed in the LBM).
E. It is clear, but is this the only way?
F. What is meant by 'Sudan'? Was it hidden along with the jar of manna and the tube of oil and will it be revealed at the coming of our righteous Messiah?
G. I think that here you have summarized and sealed everything, everything that was written before is irrelevant, according to you it is only a question of authority. So we need to understand how the laws were abrogated after the Sanhedrin was abrogated, what is an appropriate rabbinic authority? What is the consensus of all the sages and who are the sages, is that enough?
If I jump to the next level, does a conservative interpretation also need authority and if so, is it the same level of authority?
Thank you for your patience!
You are completely explosive as you wish. You don't even adhere to the simple, contrary to what you wrote here.
A. The Amalek sacrifice is no longer relevant, and this is a change of application without changing the obligation itself. It is the same with regard to a father and his daughter, whose situation has changed and therefore the law is now irrelevant, and certainly without you getting carried away. It is clear that this is a Talmudic interpretation. So what? If you are a reader, then there is no point in this discussion.
C. First of all, of knowledge, and that is what I was dealing with here. Of course, there is also a problem of authority.
D. The fact that there are disputes does not mean anything. And the 'methods' that claim that there was no dispute (the Rambam) are unfounded, as the experienced S. Katsav showed.
E. Yes, to change. There is the possibility of applying it differently and so on. And there is no room here to elaborate. I wrote in the third book of the trilogy and also in an article about changing regulations in our time.
F. Indeed, the skill of using proportions has disappeared from us. Forgotten.
G. Well, this is just nonsense. I wrote that there is also a problem of authority and this does not contradict other problems and statements. The question of what would be considered consensus has no clear answer.
I think we have completely exhausted it.
Two final points, please:
1. I am not a reader, but I wanted to focus on examples from the Bible and the interpretations of the Sages (for example, the era of beliefs in the law of money, such as no one repays his debt within time), in order to clarify where the interpretation of the Sages prevails over an alternative interpretation. Ultimately, if I understood your words correctly, this is mainly a question of authority, at least in the interpretation of the Bible itself.
2. You wrote that the skill in using sermons has disappeared and therefore we should not demand new sermons or argue against sermons of the Sages (although this is an argument of lack of knowledge or 'skill' as you put it, effectively it is a lack of authority because we have no way to reach this knowledge today).
On the other hand, you advocate a method that conservative criticism is permitted and even necessary in many cases. Is there no room here to doubt our ability to criticize the words of the Sages?