Another Look at the Hostage Deal (Column 666)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

The public discussion about a hostage deal in the Swords of Iron war has gone through several stages and phases. At first it was set against an entry into Rafah, then against holding the Philadelphi Corridor, and more—never with a clear number of hostages to be returned, and certainly not how many of them are alive or dead. This is a one-sided debate conducted among ourselves, focused on what we are giving. No one talks about what we are supposed to receive, since Hamas is not really a party to this discussion. It seems they are not interested in a deal at all. Because the debate is so one-sided, it’s no wonder that every time the government is blamed for clinging to these reasons and thereby sabotaging the deal—after all, there is no other side to the debate. As Shimon Peres once said, this isn’t “give-and-take” but “give-and-give.”

Thus, on the face of it there is no hostage deal on the table at all, and the bitter arguments about it are only among us, while Hamas sits on the sidelines rubbing its hands with glee. These “deals” are at most fantasies and wishful thinking for some of us. We are busy clapping with one hand and wonder why no sound comes out. Still, I thought it worthwhile to present another look at such a deal. I have done so more than once already (see Columns 607, 608, 611, 627, and more). In recent weeks several questions again arrived in the Q&A (Responsa) about my view on a hostage deal (see for example here, here, here, here and here, and in the talkbacks to Column 664). Some pointed to contradictions (which never existed) in my words, and also raised arguments—usually not very convincing—in favor of a deal, as expected in the psychotic state we are currently in. Therefore I thought it worthwhile to add another current column on this topic.

Two Options—and No Third

One can argue about the importance of each parameter and its standing relative to returning the hostages (how many of them?), but that argument is pointless, since it seems there was never really a deal on the table. Therefore, there is also no indication that any of those parameters actually scuttled it. On the contrary, the Americans say that Israel actually agreed and moved toward them, and Hamas is the one that keeps torpedoing the deal—something that was, of course, obvious from the outset. Already in Column 611, written about two months after the October events, I wrote that in my opinion the public discourse on this subject is based on lies, mainly on the part of the government. It speaks of achieving several goals: restoring security to the Gaza envelope, eliminating Hamas, and returning the hostages. Its opponents demand returning the hostages (without stating it explicitly, they in effect demand this at any price; see also Column 664). They indeed espouse a foolish position, but at least they are consistent. By contrast, the government’s goals for the war are, of course, mutually contradictory. You cannot both win and also return the hostages. Since then it has become ever clearer—what was obvious from the outset—that we have only two alternatives before us: continue fighting to the end, or forgo fighting altogether—in effect, surrender:

• The option of continuing the fighting until the goals are maximally achieved (I don’t call it “total victory” because that phrase has already acquired a cynical connotation) obviously entails giving up on the vast majority of the hostages (and by now it is clear that most are dead).
• The second option entails giving up all the other goals in the hope of returning the hostages. This, of course, assumes—dubiously—that Hamas will agree under the sword of renewed fighting. The possibility of getting them all back seems to me a pipe dream even if we choose this option. Hamas, unlike us, is an intelligent organization; it will not give up the only card it has against us. Moreover, choosing this option entails forgoing fighting in the future as well, since without clear guarantees Hamas will not agree to any deal. As noted, there are intelligent and determined people on that side, unlike on ours. Beyond that, after we leave Gaza there is no chance the world will let us return—even aside from the question of guarantees (see a wonderfully graphic explanation here).

These are therefore the two options, and there is no third. Anyone who says otherwise is simply delusional or lying. That was clear to any reasonable person from the outset,[1] but today there is no one who doesn’t understand it. As noted, the families of the hostages understand this and therefore demand choosing the second option (a deal at any price), and I assume that at least today the government ministers also understand this but choose the first (the accusations that they have given up on the hostages are entirely correct; only that this is not a reproach but their considered choice). The talk we hear from them about both war and hostages (again, I’m not speaking about rescuing a hostage or a body here and there) is mutually agreed-upon deception, driven by street pressure and the discomfort of the hostage families.

The choice between these two options seems to me self-evident. We’ve seen that, as far as the hostages are concerned, there is no significant difference between the two options—at most, a slightly larger number of hostages might be returned in the second option, and even that is doubtful (to date we have not even demanded a proper list of who is alive and who is dead, so why wouldn’t they murder all of them before returning them?!). Reason dictates that we should at least try to achieve as much as possible of the war’s other two aims: eliminating Hamas and providing security to the Gaza envelope.

The Psychosis

As I have already written, the hysterical demonstrations for a hostage deal ensure that none of the goals will be achieved. If Sinwar sees that murdering hostages only improves his position, why would he agree to a deal and return living hostages?! The obvious conclusion he should draw is that he must refuse a deal and murder more and more hostages, thereby further tearing Israeli society apart and improving the terms he will receive for any deal—if he ever decides to make one. Every small child with a bit of common sense understands this, but it seems our media, generals, Brothers-in-Arms, and the families of the hostages (though in their case this is understandable) have completely lost it. They operate in wondrous symbiosis (even if not intentionally—this is clinical blindness) with Sinwar against the State of Israel and against their own interests.

All this shows that the issue touches raw nerves and arouses emotions (see, for example, this hateful column, one of many), and it is no wonder that the polemics about it resemble our usual debates: the hurling of unreasoned slogans, hatred, incitement, and false accusations. This exists on both sides, of course, but as I have already noted, my sense is that it is far stronger among those who support a deal and the protest organizations. There is wild incitement and direct accusations of murder against the ministers and the prime minister, without blinking. One day about a week ago I kept hearing in every news bulletin the words of Einav Zangauker, one of the main activists among the hostage families, calling on the government to stop the incitement against the hostages. I would like to say I was surprised to hear that from someone who engages day and night in wild incitement and is not imprisoned only because she is a hostage family member (see here for one of many examples), but I was not. As noted, the “discourse” has long since entered clinical realms.

Thus in recent weeks (especially since the murder of the six hostages) I have written that we are in the midst of a psychotic assault: a mass hostage psychosis. This is not a metaphor or a cynical remark. I mean a factual description. It is indeed a psychotic attack of the crowd. This psychosis causes people to take steps that will not advance even their own objectives; to ignore the insane prices at stake; to incite and accuse opponents of the deal of abandonment and indifference to the value of life and mutual responsibility (and of course to silence them); to refuse to hear or voice any counter-argument; and to do all this with absolute certainty, in full cooperation with journalists, generals, and commentators—precisely against the side that is not to blame. Part of this is accusing parts of the coalition of messianism (the fashionable pejorative of our time), even though, even if there is something of that there (and I’m not at all sure), one thing is clear to me: this moral-strategic debate about the deal has nothing whatsoever to do with messianism. It’s simply unrelated—but psychosis does not heed rational considerations.

The families have full justification. Their grief and distress—and that of their loved ones in Gaza—are insane, and this is a quite reasonable outcome of the despair into which they have fallen from the dead end. The false accusations are cries of despair and can be understood. But all this sits atop a political agenda (anti-Bibi and his coalition), and many exploit it well. As for those who encourage this psychosis—there is no place for leniency toward them.

And still, being psychotic does not mean that everything you say is nonsense. I would not want to fall into the opposite psychosis. Therefore I wanted to focus on one type of argument and examine it on its merits.

The Argument

One argument from opponents of a deal is that we must not prefer the lives of the hostages (certainly not bodies) over the lives of many who will be harmed in the future as a result of such a deal. In Column 608 I discussed this argument, explained its rationale, and explained why I personally do not agree with it. In my view, in a deal of hostages for imprisoned terrorists we should prefer the hostages. But the debate over this argument is hypothetical, as it completely ignores the other consequences of such a deal. I have already explained that there will be no deal (perhaps for a small number of hostages that won’t change the situation—and even that is unlikely) of hostages for terrorists; so why discuss it? There will be no deal that does not end the war and allow us to return to Gaza. I already noted that the talk about resuming fighting “if needed” is, at best, empty fantasy and, at worst, a gross lie and denial of reality. The two options presented above are the only ones and there is no other: a deal in exchange for total capitulation (if Hamas even agrees to return all the hostages—I assume not), or continued fighting and giving up on the hostages (that no longer depends on Hamas). The price of a hostage deal is at the very least a final cessation of fighting, surrendering entire regions in the north and south and the security of tens and hundreds of thousands of their residents, losing the ability to confront the Iranian proxy forces that are constantly growing on our borders, and a future clash with them under far less favorable conditions for us. Anyone who thinks it is reasonable to pay such a price for a few hostages (some of whom are bodies) lives in a moral and strategic world entirely different from mine (and I am trying to speak gently).

The Same Argument as an Analogy

A few days ago I saw a column by Dana Gennusar in Haaretz that presents an interesting analogy attempting to undercut that argument—namely, why it is right to prefer the lives of the hostages over future risk to other lives. As noted, the hypothetical argument that ignores the other prices actually required by such a deal I already treated in Column 608, where I explained why I in fact agree with it (a deal that required only releasing terrorists, even all of them, would in my eyes be worth the price). But here I wished to address this analogy precisely because of its force. At first glance it seems very persuasive—and the question is what we should do with such first impressions.

Because sometimes the articles are not accessible to non-subscribers, I will bring the passage in full:

Up to here I actually agree with her approach, as explained in my aforementioned columns. But now she moves to the following analogy (please ignore the wild, characteristic incitement in the first paragraph):

Her main claim in this latter part is that whoever accepts a “preventive sacrifice” strategy should also kill COVID patients, or parents who drive their children without belts, smokers, and texting drivers. In all these cases there are future casualties expected. True, in each individual case no one is necessarily harmed, but in large numbers this is the reasonable expectation. Seemingly this is just like releasing terrorists to free hostages.

Before you get angry and dismiss her as antisemitic or pro-Hamas, I suggest stopping for a moment and thinking—examining the argument and calmly forming a position as to whether it persuades or not. This is a very important skill that is lacking among us. Pause the gut and think coldly about arguments. For me this is relatively easy here, since, as noted, I actually agree with her conclusion and prefer the lives of the hostages even at the price of releasing all the terrorists we hold. But this analogy, which at first glance looks very persuasive and fits my stance, nevertheless left me uneasy. I felt there was a problem in it. My options were, of course, to mock it and dismiss it with straw as foolishness without giving reasons; or, alternatively, to take the opportunity for an exercise in cool thinking, detached from emotion. To do so, we must devote more thought to this analogy, examine what exactly bothers me in it (especially since the conclusion fits my position), and whether the problem isn’t in me. I remind you I am speaking only about the argument of hostages for terrorists and future murder; other considerations are not on the table in this hypothetical discussion.

A Note on Paradoxes and Intellectualism

Reading this argument, I can’t help but recall Columns 654–655, where I discussed intellectualism. Among other things, I described a dilemma between an argument that seems logical and a conclusion that is patently absurd (as usually happens in paradoxes). I explained there that intellectuals tend to prefer the argument over common sense. This is their advantage (openness to surprising conclusions), but in many cases, in just that, they also fail (departing from common sense). I quoted Orwell’s remark about the nonsense of intellectuals. My feeling here was similar. It’s completely clear she is talking nonsense, yet the argument and her analogies themselves sound very logical, no?

I explained there that in the face of a paradox we have three options: (1) adopt the argument and its conclusion (and reject common sense—be open to the fact that it sometimes misleads us); (2) find a flaw in the argument and reject the conclusion (that is, remain with common sense); (3) remain undecided (if we didn’t find a flaw in the argument but it is very clear to us that the conclusion is wrong). I also showed why it is not correct to say that the last two options express intellectual dishonesty. Since I have basic (if not absolute) trust in common sense and my intuitions, the first step I take with such paradoxes is to inspect the argument and see whether it contains flaws. That was also my feeling here. The conclusion actually seemed correct to me, but the argument (analogy) seemed very problematic. So it’s worth re-examining it.

Counter-Examples

In the responses to that column I found two examples of counter-analogies. Here is the first:

According to this approach, we could also move the border fence closer to Be’eri if Hamas sets it as a condition for releasing the hostages—because it’s only land; there are people suffering who were abandoned, and we will know how to prepare. Incidentally, calling sober realism and risk management “utilitarian morality” is not a very successful salad.

The observation—raised by several commenters—regarding her problematic use of the term “utilitarianism” has something to it (she would have done better to say “consequentialism”), but that is not our concern here. The commenter’s claim is that if we belittle future risks, then we should pay any present price to save any person in present danger.

The second example is this:

Each year we could save hundreds of people with expensive drugs not included in the national health basket. For budgetary reasons we don’t purchase them, knowing people will die. If Highway 90 (the Arava road) had been widened ten years ago, dozens of lives would certainly have been saved. It wasn’t done due to budget prioritization. These are relevant examples. The analogy of actively killing people—besides being childish—is not relevant to the thesis/argument you’re trying to make.

Here are examples of preferring present savings over future risks. The writer, of course, assumes that in these examples the columnist would agree (I’m not sure she would).

I will just note that these counter-examples don’t indicate a flaw in her argument; they only sharpen the fact that similar arguments lead to problematic conclusions. At most this is motivation to look for a flaw in the argument—or perhaps proof that such a flaw exists—but to reject it we must point to the flaw itself. Still, I think the smugness and dogmatism with which she writes—a manifestation of total confidence in her own righteousness—are truly absurd (though very typical of the Church of Haaretz writers and readers). The examples brought here, and many others—even if they don’t identify the flaw in the argument—prove that such a flaw is there. That suffices to show we are dealing with a monad (see Column 664) that echoes among members of the church the dogmas they presuppose as absolute truths (this is one of the roots of the psychosis mentioned above). When you are unable to see that there is another side, you are convinced your conclusion is correct, and then you very easily fail in presenting faulty arguments for it.

So What Is the Flaw in the Analogy?

The opposing examples we encountered hint that a “preventive sacrifice” argument is not absurd on its face (as the columnist assumes), but is also not absolute (as some of those she criticizes assume). It probably depends on the circumstances of each case we discuss. Therefore her analogy is indeed meaningful in showing proponents of preventive sacrifice that their seemingly persuasive argument—because of its arithmetic nature (comparing body counts between two options)—is not so clear-cut. She shows them that there are implications under which they, too, would not accept this consequentialist thesis that leads to a preventive-sacrifice approach. On the other hand, it’s clear there will be situations in which she herself would accept such a thesis (even with more extreme numbers—e.g., if it were one hostage versus releasing tens of thousands of terrorists. I didn’t see demonstrations like that for the release of Avera Mengistu; and likewise in the examples above).

I think the fundamental flaw in this analogy—beyond the question of the respective weights on the two sides of the equation—is that in all the examples she brought it is a matter of present murder in order to save lives in the future. But in our case regarding the hostages, we are speaking about indirect and uncertain killing. It is not a decision by us to murder the hostages, but rather a failure to act to save them. Their murderers will be Hamas. Moreover, with regard to the hostages it is quite possible that some will be saved by the IDF—by chance or by planned operations—as has happened so far. If so, our comparison is between two risks, both indirect, future, and uncertain: to the lives of the hostages or to the future lives lost due to releasing the terrorists. Here there is more room for numerical comparisons (how many lives we will pay if we make a deal and if we don’t). The term “preventive sacrifice” is actually more precise (assuming “sacrifice” here does not mean ritual slaughter but rather not saving). But the analogies she brings against that expression ignore this meaning and speak of murder, not sacrifice. That is demagoguery.

I will add: every combat operation of the IDF is a present sacrifice of soldiers for future aims—which, incidentally, will not necessarily cost us more human lives. Civilian normalcy is also a very relevant consideration. The Entebbe rescue, or the attempted rescue of Nachshon Wachsman, also ran counter to that (purely arithmetic) logic. True, in all those cases no specific soldier is sent to his death; all the soldiers take risks and some will likely lose their lives (see Column 530 and much more on the difference between an order to sacrifice life and an order to risk it). Still, the expected net benefit in human lives is not necessarily positive in all those cases—and yet such actions enjoy broad public support here.

Inconsistency

It is worth noting that the confusion she creates (apparently deliberately) between murder and sacrifice suffers from the same flaw she attributes to her opponents: consequentialism. If it makes no difference whether we kill with our own hands or merely “sacrifice” (=fail to save), what is that if not consequentialism? The view is that what matters is the number of souls lost, regardless of whether by act or omission. But if so, why does the consequentialism of her opponents seem to her more fundamentally problematic? I remind you that in Column 608 I invoked the well-known trolley problem that examines precisely this point (consequentialism, which views failure to prevent as murder, versus a deontological ethics of action that distinguishes between not preventing and killing).

Continuing this line: if the situation were that we had limited medical equipment and had to decide whom to save with it—smokers or texters versus others—I definitely think we should prefer the latter. Here it would be a matter of not preventing harm or not saving, not of murder. But from there to the conclusion that we must murder the texters or smokers—the distance is very great. Note: precisely because I am not a consequentialist.

A Note on Right and Left

In the background there is of course also the difference between right and left, which, in my opinion in this matter, is essential rather than a flaw—or a spurious correlation (see Columns 607, 608, 627, and more). I am willing to bet that the columnist votes for a party to the left of Yair Lapid. Why? Because the right sees the good of the collective as the fundamental parameter and is willing to sacrifice individuals for the collective; whereas the left places individuals at the center, and the collective is born only to serve them. The attitude toward the hostage deal is indeed linked to this dispute.[2]

So Why Do I Still Support the Hypothetical Deal Discussed Here?

Seemingly this is a comparison between uncertain, future, and non-concrete prices on both sides, and in such a situation the numerical consideration ostensibly opposes a hostage deal. Because, in my view, there remains a difference between a present, existing danger and the state’s duty to save its concrete citizens, on the one hand, and future risks whose scope depends in part on us, on the other. I explained this in Column 608.

But I am far from disparaging those who think otherwise, and I certainly understand that they have a considerable case. I think that even in this I am more sober than the columnist, even if I share her stance regarding the conclusion of this hypothetical argument. The picture is not black-and-white as it appears through psychotic eyes. The lesson for both sides is that this is not a matter of wicked fools versus righteous sages (each can choose his own pairing). It is therefore worthwhile to think substantively about the arguments for and against and to form a balanced position. Do not harness all our logic to our heart’s desires. Sometimes positive motivations and concern for human life can lead people to practical and intellectual behavior that is psychotic—and does none of that good.

[1] Before the war began (see Column 596) I raised the possibility of surrender in exchange for the return of all the hostages. That was on the assumption that we had no option of full, long fighting and conquering Gaza until Hamas is eliminated. Moreover, I raised this as a proposal—but it’s not at all clear that Hamas would have accepted it, since even now, when their situation is far worse, we have not seen them accept it.

Incidentally, in Column 602 you can see another of my prophecies from those days—that the public dispute from the period before the war has not abated and will likely return in full force, and even more so, later on.

[2] Though one can quibble that the citizens who will be harmed in the future are also individuals whom the state is supposed to protect.