A Halakhic State: Torah and Politics (Column 669)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In the religious world it is commonly thought that the Torah has its own message and system regarding the governance of a state and society. As part of this, many aspire to establish a “halakhic state,” while others greatly fear it (“Iran is here”). In a debate held a few months ago between me and Yaron Yadan (which ultimately wasn’t uploaded due to poor audio), I was asked for my opinion on the matter, and to my interlocutors’ surprise it turned out that my vision on this issue is quite similar to Yadan’s. I wished to devote a column to clarifying these questions, which these days hover over us with no small intensity (despite the preoccupation with the war and its implications, and perhaps precisely because of them—namely, because of the “messianism” with which parts of the current coalition are charged, in my view quite unjustly)[1].
Two meanings of the term “halakhic state”
The discussion of a halakhic state should be divided into two distinct planes: 1) What is the utopia, on the assumption that all the people of Israel are committed to Torah and mitzvot? How would a state be run in such a situation? 2) What would I do if I were elected today to be prime minister and had control of the Knesset, but the demographic composition of the country were as it is now (a secular–traditional majority)? These are, of course, two different questions, including with respect to the threat they pose to the secular citizen (who, in the first case, in fact does not exist).
Question 2: A halakhic state in the current reality
Question 2 is relatively simple. I would not change anything essential. Of course there would be some changes, as you would expect from any new officeholder who implements his views. But this would not happen because of halakha or Torah. It would happen because I personally disagree with certain aspects that have existed until now. My considerations would be moral—values of freedom and liberal democracy—which, in my view, are today realized in a distorted way. In short, to my best judgment this would not be a halakhic state but rather a liberal-democratic state in the style of Michi Avraham.
One may wonder how a mitzvah-observant person is prepared to tolerate transgressions and not enforce observance of halakha upon the Jewish public when it is within his power. Is this a tenable stance from a halakhic-Torah perspective? My claim is that in the current situation it is not proper to impose the values of halakha on the general public. Coercion is ineffective for several reasons. First, it breeds hatred rather than bringing people closer. Second, acts performed under coercion are devoid of religious value. Coercion can be applied only when it comes to someone who is committed to halakhic values and deviates from them (due to his inclination or various interests). Coercion upon someone who does not believe (in God, or at least in the giving of the Torah) is pointless and valueless.
Moreover, when we use the state’s institutions to impose our values on others, it corrupts both the state and the Torah. It creates corrupt and squalid mechanisms such as the Chief Rabbinate and the Haredi parties, which enjoy the forceful backing of state institutions and use them for their own purposes at the public’s expense. Separation is first and foremost a religious interest, long before concern for the suffering secularists (this happens to them and to us because of them. They are the majority here, and therefore the power given to the religiously corrupt is given by them).
Beyond that, there is a more substantive point. I live in normative duality (see, for example, Columns 15 and 80, and on a more theoretical plane, Columns 541, 621, and more), meaning that I am committed to the values of the Torah and halakha and in parallel also to moral values (which, in my view, are liberal and democratic, generally speaking). Neither cancels the other, even though at times there are conflicts between them. Therefore, even if I were given the power, it would still not be right for me to impose halakhic values alone. Liberal-democratic values would be an inseparable part of the picture even in such a case, and therefore there would be no place for religious coercion. According to the liberal-democratic model, a state is not supposed to impose religious values on its citizens, even if most of them are committed to halakha.
By the way, I think that on this point I do not differ in my outlook from most of the religious and Haredi public, although others may recoil from saying this to themselves (when they speak outwardly there is, of course, no problem), since it seems to them inconsistent and not in keeping with their commitment to halakha. In my estimation, most of them intuitively espouse this dual commitment, even if they do not explicitly define it to themselves.
Question 1: A halakhic state in an utopian reality
My claim regarding an utopian halakhic state is more far-reaching. I contend that even there you would not find many differences compared to a democratic state today. The question of coercion would likely change, but not in an essential way. If there is a person who commits transgressions, the laws of coercion and punishment may return, but only because it is clear to him that these are transgressions and that they oblige him. One who does not believe in any of this is coerced by circumstances and exempt. In the utopian situation, by the premise, most people are not such, and therefore it is an esoteric question. That is, the change is mainly a question of proportions—regarding how many people coercion and punishment are justified—but the principled policy remains the same.
As for the state’s mode of conduct itself, one might expect the Torah to guide and direct it (as noted, this is what raises fears on the secular side and the desired utopian model on the religious side). But as I will argue now, even this is anything but simple. For that purpose, I must preface several points, all of which I have discussed in the past. I will therefore mostly summarize here and refer to the relevant sources. Our concern here is the broad picture.
The preliminaries
The first preface is that the Torah is divided into two categories (see, for example, Column 541): halakha and morality.
The second preface is that halakha is particularistic, i.e., it obligates only Jews, whereas morality by its very nature is universal. There is no Jewish morality and some other morality. The Torah is indeed the source of morality’s validity, but it is not the source of its contents (I do not learn them from the verses but from my conscience). Of course there can be moral disagreements, between people or different groups. But these disagreements are not related to Judaism and the Torah. If there are two reasonable moral positions, both will appear within the beit midrash as different interpretations of the Torah. In such a case we can discuss whether there is only one that is true (monism), or whether there can be disagreements in which there are several possible correct answers (pluralism). To me it is clear that pluralism cannot be sweeping—i.e., for all disagreements. But I do not rule out the possibility of disagreements in which both views are morally correct.
The third preface is that neither of these two categories has absolute priority. When there is a clash between a moral value and halakha, decisions must be made according to the circumstances and the principles involved (as in a moral dilemma).
The fourth preface is that even within the halakhic world itself, particularly in the legal part (Choshen Mishpat), there are two parts (see the article here and Column 219): the “pure halakha,” founded on a commandment in the Torah (in verses or parashot or derashot), and various extensions added over the generations. Some extensions were created by the Sanhedrin as enactments or interpretations, and some were created over the generations by various commentators and by customs that arose in different places. Thus, for example, in Choshen Mishpat you will find various laws that were created by customs and decisors over the generations on the basis of common sense and morality rather than pure interpretive considerations. These parts do not have full halakhic force, since they are common-sense solutions not created by an authorized institution (the Sanhedrin or the Talmud), and therefore any sage in any generation can act differently with respect to them. Laws of this sort were also created in the Talmud, and these are ostensibly binding. But still, it is unlikely that there would be an essential difference between them and foreign legal systems, since their source is not at Sinai but in reasonable considerations of common sense and justice.
Implications
When a state is created that conducts itself according to halakha, there is no doubt that it will have a supreme authoritative institution (a Sanhedrin). Without this we could not truly run a state. The halakhic system as we know it today is not suited to managing a modern state and society (exemption for damage caused indirectly, the requirement of two valid witnesses and forewarning before any punishment, the absence of punishment for a robber, the lack of orderly attention to new economic and social institutions, and much more), and it will be necessary to adapt halakha to our current situation. This sounds very daunting to many, since we were educated on the eternity of halakha. But this is a mistake. What is eternal in halakha are the foundational principles that appear in the Torah, but all the additions do not belong to the eternal part; they belong to a transient part that comes to address arising problems and needs. Even the application of the principles in the Torah can change according to circumstances (see in detail the series of Columns 475–480 on Modern Orthodoxy). Even rabbinic laws, which certainly belong to the binding halakha, actually belong to this transient part (see Columns 582–583). The inability to change them stems only from questions of authority that are supposed to disappear in the utopian situation when authoritative halakhic institutions return.
When that utopian state wishes to shape its modes of conduct and its lawbook, it will have to find legal solutions for all the topics I described and many others. The rigid halakhic framework is fairly limited, and in the legal part of halakha it is truly thin. With respect to everything beyond that, these solutions will be found mainly by considerations of common sense rather than from the Torah. It is reasonable to assume that these solutions will not be very different from what exists today, which is also based on common sense and considerations of fairness and legal effectiveness. In an era in which the Torah does not function as a full, binding system, various proposals and approaches can arise in the beit midrash, and not all of them need to meet practical tests. Internal coherence of the picture suffices. But when it comes to implementation in the field, this requires adaptation to common sense and legal effectiveness (see Columns 84, 219, 356, 641, and more).
The conclusion is that the rules of morality will look quite similar to what exists today (and if there are changes, it is because of moral disagreement and not because of the Torah), and most of the legal part will also look quite similar. One can adopt here the Ran’s model in Derashah 11, but this picture is self-evident to any sensible person even without it. Moreover, in my estimation even coercion would be applied in such a halakhic state only with respect to someone who willfully transgresses and recognizes his obligation to halakha. Therefore, even here there would not be overly dramatic change. Even regarding Shabbat observance and halakhic constraints on the conduct of state institutions, see Columns 529–530.
In short, there is no doubt there would be some changes, but in my estimation they would be fairly minor. Bottom line, even in an utopian halakhic state that is indeed supposed to be run on the tracks of halakha, I do not anticipate all that many things that should frighten those who fear a halakhic state.
What is happening today?
At the end of my podcast with Rogel Alpher, he asked me for my opinion about the awakening of religiosity in Israel today, and to his surprise I said that I really do not like the matter. I presented two reasons there: 1) Many of the “awakened” are not truly committed. This is part of New-Age spirituality that overlays our tradition and religious sentiments. It gives religiosity and Judaism a bad name and presents them as a mystical movement that is part of the New Age. Judaism is nothing but a solution to the distress and feelings of emptiness of secular people. And when they sober up and realize this is not the case, either they leave or they invent a new Judaism for themselves and identify it with various strange ideas. 2) The current political conduct of the religious public is, in my eyes, very harmful and brings about a terrible desecration of God’s name. The stronger support our dreadful religious establishment receives (the religious parties, the Chief Rabbinate and its institutions, and the like), the more dismal our situation. Those who try to use the state to advance religious ideas and values bring only damage, corruption, hatred, and desecration of God’s name. The democratic values according to which such coercion is problematic dovetail nicely here with the religious view that sees desecration of God’s name as harmful and coercion upon a non-believer as an unjustified act.
Therefore I can fully understand the fear of a halakhic state, but my claim is that it is unjustified. Moreover, I also think that labeling Smotrich and others as “messianists” is groundless. This labeling does not pertain to questions of religion and state but to their political-security conduct. In those spheres they indeed expect the coming of the Messiah and redemption, and indeed believe in God, but their practical steps in these areas are usually derived from realistic ideological conceptions rather than mystical messianic delusions. In light of their problematic conduct, it is very easy to classify them as messianists and to point to a halakhic state and declare that “Iran is here,” but there is no real basis for this. The troubles they cause are not related to their messianism. Even in religion-and-state relations, in my estimation they do not have a genuine aspiration to establish a halakhic state in the threatening sense. As far as I know them, this is not mere lip-service apology, but a real conception regarding Question 2 (a halakhic state today, when most of the population is not committed to halakha). Regarding Question 1, they likely see the situation differently than I do (regarding coercion and the imposition of halakhic values via the state), but to the best of my understanding they will be surprised. When this situation arises, it will dictate changes as I have described here. The law will remain quite similar, as will the general modes of conduct. Halakha is very practical, and with respect to the utopian state we are all, at present, denizens of theoretical batei midrash. When this happens in practice, and when halakha is given the authority and power, it will also reveal the responsibility required. I am quite certain that the religious leadership will then understand the constraints and act accordingly. Their autistic conduct today stems from the fact that they have no authority and therefore no responsibility. As noted, in the beit midrash one can say anything.
I will conclude with two remarks intended to demonstrate the (ir)relevance of the Torah and halakha to current issues: the hostage deal and rejoicing at an enemy’s elimination.
A. The hostage deal
A few months ago I saw a column by Rabbi Stav on Ynet regarding the hostage deal, and I thought it bore various connections to this column’s topic. First, try to think what a “halakhic state” would do with respect to this question. Many of the accusations against the government and its religious components (mainly the religious-Zionist camp) deal with its attitude to the hostage deal. They are accused of messianism and bizarre religious conceptions and of ignoring morality. Truly all the fears I have described here in one handful. It seems obvious to people that in a halakhic state (utopian, but also in our days) the attitude toward the hostage deal would necessarily look like it appears in today’s coalition: rejection out of hand. For that reason I thought that precisely on this charged issue it would be appropriate to illustrate my claims.
In Column 607 I already noted that halakhic considerations cannot really guide us with respect to hostage deals like these. Each side quotes the citations it prefers: supporters of the deal keep reminding us that the redemption of captives is the most important mitzvah in the Torah, and its opponents quote the rule not to redeem captives for more than their value. Neither of these quotations teaches us anything— not even by the faintest hint—regarding what to do in our case, but people love quotations. They feel that the desires of their heart are much better grounded if they buttress them with such or such a citation, usually chosen in a completely tendentious fashion and wrenched from context. It is clear to everyone that the circumstances dictate the policy in such cases and not this or that interpretation of halakha. If it becomes clear what is right to do in our case, that is what will be done—whether later they will offer interpretations that reconcile it with halakha (more or less convincingly) or not.
As I showed there, the theology that people try to enlist for the matter will also not bring us to a single, unequivocal solution. If so, neither messianism nor a “halakhic” state dictates policy in such a case. These are strategic, security-political considerations, and by their very nature they are universal. Accusing opponents of the deal of being driven by messianism and/or by fundamentalist subordination to halakha has no logical or factual basis. This is a debate about the price it is right or not right to pay in such a situation— that and nothing more (I have already written more than once that this argument is conducted among ourselves. Hamas has never offered a deal nor expressed willingness to a deal. The main thing is that we enjoy quoting and arguing about hypothetical deals that never came to be).
Rabbi Stav in his column ostensibly argues something similar, and in that sense he certainly strengthens the view I have presented here. His claim is that this is a strategic decision and not a halakhic one, and therefore it should be handed over to those entrusted with such decisions, namely the experts. The first clause is of interest to us here, while the latter clause (handing it to experts) is not. But to complete the picture I will add that I do not agree with the latter clause.
My critique of that latter clause is described systematically in this article. In brief: I do not agree with Rabbi Stav’s claim about handing the matter over to experts. I very much doubt whether there really are experts in security and policy in the same sense as in medicine or physics. These topics are extremely complex and vary according to circumstances, and as Ben-Gurion said, experts are experts in what was, not in what will be. Moreover, every decision and position in these areas is saturated with values, and it is very difficult to separate them from the professional questions (regarding which one can perhaps speak of expertise). Therefore, the positions voiced by security and policy “experts” on such matters are agenda-driven, and we have already seen the expertise tested by events, and the learned opinions of all the experts in the studios saying one thing and its opposite, always predicting the past quite well but struggling a bit more with the future. Again: tell me who the “expert” is and I will tell you what his opinion will be.
Moreover, as I explained there, there is room for a Torah/halakhic decision when there is disagreement among the experts, and that does have authority for a court or a Sanhedrin. In this too I disagree with Rabbi Stav. However, today we do not have institutions with such authority, and so this is a hypothetical caveat.
In the end, I agree with Rabbi Stav that this is not a halakhic question, and therefore rabbis’ opinions do not have much added value regarding it. The question is entrusted to the security establishment and the statesmen, not because they are experts but because they have the public mandate to make such decisions. Of course, one may express an opinion either way, and this is true for rabbis as well (“let not the priestess be as an innkeeper”).
This was a remark about the (ir)relevance of halakha and Torah to practical contemporary decisions—those that ostensibly have direct halakhic references. I will now bring another remark about the significance (more precisely, the lack of significance) of halakha and Torah with respect to value-laden aspects of current affairs.
B. “Do not rejoice when your enemy falls”
Following the blessed elimination of Hassan Nasrallah “of blessed memory,” there were those who handed out baklava or celebrated the matter in various ways, and there were also quite a few who criticized them and claimed that this is immoral and of course also “not Jewish” (at times like these everyone suddenly remembers their Judaism; cf. “Redemption of captives is the most important mitzvah in the Torah”). I am not telling you anything new when I say that one can quote in such a context “Do not rejoice when your enemy falls,” and the midrash “My handiwork are drowning in the sea and you sing a song,” and “May sins cease, not sinners”—how could we not?! And of course one can quote against this “When the wicked perish there is song,” and continue with more erudite quotes. For my part, I was very happy about the elimination of that scoundrel “of blessed memory” (though unfortunately I am not among the lovers of baklava), and those sanctimonious rebukes aroused in me profound nausea.
So what do we do with the quotations? Well, there are thousands of pretexts to this side and to that, and I am sure they are readily available online to any seeker. As readers of this site, I hope you are not deluding yourselves: no one really formulates a moral stance in the light of such sources and quotations that contradict each other and do not say much. Tell me who the speaker is and I will tell you his conclusion on this matter, and what he will quote—just as happens in almost all other value-laden issues. And still, so as not to leave the page blank, I will say that I personally greatly enjoyed precisely the “answer” of R. Douglas Murray, may he be granted long life—the one and only—who offered a fascinating resolution of this grave contradiction, in this clip (see 10:40–11:20 there, and your heart will rejoice). For those who struggle, here is the passage translated:
So who said, “Torah among the nations—do not believe”? To teach you that sometimes in one healthy non-Jewish homosexual there is more Torah and common sense (and also charm) than in thousands of sanctimonious Jews.
[1] See, for example, a note on this in Column 664, §7d.
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I am shocked that there is a debate with Yaron Yadan and we will not get to witness it.
In what context did this interview take place? Did you just throw it away or is someone working on publishing it?
There are all sorts of solutions to poor audio quality, such as adding transcription using automatic tools or even uploading the conversation in text only.
I would be very happy to listen to/read such a conversation even in poor audio quality. (Willing to help with that if needed)
Checking if possible
And is it possible?
It is possible and was done quickly by the two friends here, Ariel and Oshi. Thank you to them. Will be uploaded to the site soon.
https://youtu.be/DxQ8rxFF_aI?si=APj6E2_z_uD-e29E
Just to note that the video was cut off, and the ending is missing. And it ends exactly at the time Shiron asked about your words, and you have not yet responded to him. Could you ‘repay the debt’ here (or elsewhere, or refer to a relevant column)?
It wasn't interrupted. It ran out of battery and we stopped. Maybe there will be a continuation sometime in the future.
What question do you mean?
Rabbi, isn't this a waste of your time?!
There will also surely be volunteers for manual transcription (or proofreading for automatic transcription). The recording will be uploaded (for the glory of the State of Israel) and there will be a shared file where those who wish can transcribe. For example, I am already volunteering to transcribe at least half an hour of the conversation.
And I'm also willing to volunteer to transcribe and even translate into English.
I agree with you. I wrote here that I'm willing to work on this even for free as someone who deals with building and promoting websites and things like that.
I agree with Ariel's request: "The people want to see the debate."
What about religious/ultra-Orthodox communities? Is it justified in them for the public to impose religious norms?
Because this is what actually happens in religious/ultra-Orthodox communities. There is coercion (regarding Shabbat observance in public spaces, modesty, wearing military uniforms, and I assume there are other examples that I haven't heard about..)
Not religious norms, but there is a place to impose reasonable norms. Like a person not walking naked in the street. And don't ask me what is considered reasonable. I don't have a general answer. For example, there was a protest by parliamentary assistants in the Knesset about not being allowed to enter wearing tank tops and shorts. In my opinion, that's completely reasonable.
Do you think that today a court cannot force a secular person to give a divorce, because the words of Maimonides, according to which “his desire is what he has forced, and since he was beaten until his desire was exhausted and he said, ‘I want to, I have already divorced him’, are not valid?
What should a woman do whose husband has returned the question?
True. I wrote this here before. There is no solution for a secular refusenik. She is essentially agunah.
The solution is of course an agreement and conditions in the kiddushin.
Last week you wrote
“Everyone now understands Biden's enigmatic but clearly jubilant statement from yesterday that he is even more aware than we all think of the danger of war in the North. After all, it is clear that the Americans are the first who should be happy that we are seriously harming the ”axis of evil” (the term is theirs, as you remember), without any costs on their part except for support that is mainly passive. Their attitude on the ground also shows that Israel has not really bent them and acted against their position (if they really wanted to, not a single tank would move here. All the armaments are from them, and the international umbrella is theirs), but is playing along with them”
And now it is being published by Amit Segal that Biden cursed and slandered Bibi for the assassination of Fuad Shukar, so I hope you will conclude from this to speak with less confidence next time, meaning that there is a super dramatic step here that Israel is taking without receiving prior consent from the US or more, all against the expected opinion of the US, this is definitely a frontal contradiction to what you wrote, and I also conclude that perhaps in this particular aspect (and God forbid in all aspects) at this time we would be better off with a leader with a backbone like him and not mollusks who want to hand over maritime territories because of diplomatic pressure (and he too bowed down to diplomatic pressure in the past, but apparently 8 years of Obama tempered him).
Reading comprehension difficulties are a bit difficult for me to deal with. I can only recommend to you what you recommended to me: a little less decisiveness and a little more thinking and attention to what you read. I didn't say that we never acted against the US. We did act, and we acted, and more than once. I claimed something about what happened specifically here, and I had indications of that (the immediate reversal of the US position). And I'm not talking about your absolute confidence in journalistic reports about what's happening with Biden in the Oval Office.
I'm sure that if you try, you can improve on that. Good luck in the future.
Well, I don't understand why this is my reading comprehension problem if you and I are both talking about the specific case of heating up the situation with Hezbollah and you are responding to something you didn't mean about US relations, we said - since the days of Truman, where in my words can it be understood that I meant never and not this specific case, I wonder.
You wrote “Their attitude on the ground also shows that Israel really did not bend them and acted against their position” about this specific case, and now it turns out that in this specific case (assuming the report is correct of course) Israel went against their position and bent them, I have no other definition for eliminating number 2 in Hezbollah without informing in advance/asking permission in advance than bending them and acting against their position, so where is my reading comprehension problem??
Regarding the second comment regarding the reliability of the report, - if I have to decide between a report by the Watergate whistleblower and between my heart tells me that the Honorable Rabbi's - my heart tells me that I know where to put the olives.
No wonder you don't understand. You haven't read yet. There's no point in continuing.
Just assuming here from this morning
“The Wall Street Journal publishes
After Israel eliminated Nasrallah, Gallant called to update Defense Secretary Austin who said to him: “Excuse me, what did you say?” – This is in light of the fact that the administration was not informed in advance
Austin asked Gallant if Israel was willing to be “alone” when it comes to defending itself, given the administration's lack of updates on significant actions.”
And against this-
“Their attitude on the ground also shows that Israel really did not bend them and acted against their position”
Absolutely amusing
Fools have a well-known advantage. They enjoy their foolishness and delve deeper into it. The distinguishing feature of fools is that they do not realize that they are fools. And about this it is said: My father will punish you with fools…
For those who don't understand the nonsense here, how do you really reconcile this news with your understanding that we were coordinating with the US in the process of eliminating Nasrallah?
Exercise for the wise reader: Help the bewildered Micha find where it says that some assassination was coordinated? Now they have found twice that the matter has already been explained here correctly (read, did I already say that?).
And about this our sages said in their holy spirit: One does not deal with fools.
I thought I was the only idiot, but it turns out there are a few more, which brings to mind the story about the guy whose wife calls to tell him that there is someone driving against traffic and he tells her that he sees a lot of them.
“It is clear that the Americans are the first to be happy that we are seriously harming the ”axis of evil” (the term is theirs, remember), without any costs on their part except for support that is mostly passive”
Only in this respect could I accept that the Americans should be happy about the removal from the hit list of a million-dollar bounty on the head of Hezbollah's number 2, whose hands are stained with the blood of many Americans, and here Biden's response is a juicy curse on Bibi's head, so maybe it's not all just a bunch of nonsense from a wise man”.
I understand from his holy words that you are trying to disavow your words because you spoke about a specific step, but what can be done about this specific step? It turns out that Biden issued a flattering statement, and in closed forums he raged at Bibi. So it turns out that Israel did bend them and acted against their position, and again, a respected journalist with a resume among the most respected in the world of journalism is more trustworthy to me than theories like Annan Sahadi's, certainly when you are put on the wrong foot in terms of whether yours is yours.
Rabbi Michi spoke about the assassination of Nasrallah, and Ahmed is talking about the assassination of Shukar, which happened two months before and was the first assassination. And in general, what the Americans are afraid of is chaos. Not a victory for Israel or a defeat for Hezbollah.
I saw no point in continuing this bizarre discussion in which my interlocutor repeats the same nonsense over and over again and thinks it's a new argument. I've written more than once that talking to walls is not one of my hobbies lately.
So I'll just comment to Daniel: I really wasn't talking here about eliminating Nasrallah or about any elimination at all.
Hello Rabbi Michael,
Isn't the fact that the state (in this area) gave the mandate to a rabbinical court a solution for a secular objector?
After all, he wants to be part of the state (if I remember correctly, you even saw me write something similar once)
I didn't understand. So what if he wants to be part of the country? So deep down he actually wants to expel her? Very narrow-minded. I don't remember writing anything like that.
He doesn't want to divorce her but he wants to be a law-abiding citizen.
It seems to me that even a Torah-observant man who is forced to do so doesn't want to divorce his wife, but rather he wants to be a Jew who keeps the words of the Torah.
A Torah-observant person wants to divorce her because he understands that this is what is right. A law-abiding person is willing to comply, perhaps or perhaps afraid, but not because he thinks it is what is right.
You wrote two things:
1. According to the liberal-democratic model, a state is not supposed to impose religious values on its citizens, even if most of them are committed to the halakha
2. If a person commits offenses, the laws of coercion and punishments may be restored, but this is only because it is clear to him that these are offenses and that this obligates him
A. The things seem contradictory. A citizen who is a believer, is it permissible/necessary in the state to force him to observe the mitzvot?
B. I did not understand how the liberal-democratic model can eliminate the need and possibility of imposing the mitzvot. After all, forcing a mitzvot is an explicit halakha, and in the event that obedience to morality means abrogating the halakha (not just in a specific scenario), then the halakha prevails. Is this what you called "spast not"?
A. I don't see a contradiction here. A democratic state can impose agreed values even if they are religious. As long as it is an agreed framework.
B. Indeed, it is a fest nicht. Beyond that, there are other reasons: Actions under coercion have no religious value. The laws of coercion were written in a different reality in which freedom was not a central value. Coercion is not useful since it imposes the law on the public, and therefore it is a mistake to impose. Beyond that, morality is also the will of God, and when there is a conflict between law and morality, law does not always prevail. Therefore, it can be said that for moral reasons I will not enforce even if that is what law says. Law is not necessarily the bottom line (in law and morality classes, I have excluded laws that are explained in the Torah and that the conflict between them and morality is inherent and not accidental. But I am not).
As I have written many times, hypothetical discussions about an unfamiliar reality are quite pointless. Decisions about such a reality can only be made after we experience it and understand what things mean in that reality. When there is a country where the absolute majority of the residents are committed to Halacha, I suppose we will understand what is right to do. The discussion here is from our perspective today, of course.
Thank you.
Regarding the inherent and accidental conflict, I talked about that when I wrote that the meaning here is the abrogation of the law of the compulsion of the commandments – completely, and not just in a specific scenario. If in the optimal system of government this law is null and void, then apparently we have not obeyed the will of God. But I agree with you that it is all completely theoretical.
I agree except for the claim that we did not obey the will of God. I wrote here that my words revolve mainly around laws that are explained in the Bible. Coercion is an interpretation of the sages. Beyond that, morality is also the will of God, and not just the law.
In the days of Chazal, was there religious value in acts under duress?
According to this principle, it is never right to coerce religious acts
Absolutely. In their time, people believed and were committed to the law, and this is a law that compels him until he says "I want it," which has been explained here on the site several times.
Regarding such a thing, the Rashba wrote (Response Part 3, Section 3):
“If you base everything on the laws prescribed in the Torah, the world will be destroyed, and as the sages said,
Jerusalem was not destroyed except by those who based their words on the laws of the Torah”
A. Do you think there is no problem with the state today implementing prohibitions from the Torah? For example, public transportation on Shabbat, and more.
B. In a utopian halachic state, would the Sanhedrin and the court be two different bodies?
C. In general, how would the concept of a Sanhedrin work? How do you think the names of the people would be chosen, for example? Or is this a utopian vision and we don't have the solutions…
A. What does “no problem” mean? Of course there is a halakhic prohibition, but sometimes morality or Fest Nitz arguments reject the halakhic. Beyond that, the state does not make prohibitions. The one who makes them is the Jew who violates Shabbat. At most, the state does not force him to refrain from it. Search here on the site for discussions on the ‘Fest Nitz’ arguments.
B. Such questions are hypothetical and only when we experience the situation can we formulate a solid position on them. As far as I am concerned, today they are. As the Rambam in Drush 11 writes about the king's law and the Torah law.
C. Indeed utopian. The early ones have already disagreed on this (the Rambam, on the renewal of the ordination, claims that it is the consent of the sages of the Land of Israel. Others believe that it will come from above). I think that when a situation is created where there is a person or body that receives a seal of approval from the general public, we will understand it, and that will be the ordination.
You mentioned that you didn't upload the conversation with Yaron Yadan because of the poor recording quality.
By the way, there are programs and even AI programs that can greatly improve the quality.
And I know a little about computers, so I don't mind doing it even for free if you want.
The rabbi speaks to the elites and I live on the land. When I hear stories about doctors being called to visit a life-saving home on Shabbat in ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods and wondering whether to go because their car will be punctured, or when I encounter attempts to force women out of the public space with violence in the name of modesty, I understand that the ultra-Orthodox street is not there. From his perspective, every trip on Shabbat is a desecration of Shabbat. Every presence of women in the public space is trespassing, and more. Do you think that if he had the power, he would avoid religious coercion in the name of abstract principles? I don't think so.
I'm not really talking about elites. First, the coercion is on both sides, and one leads to the other. It escalates. Second, I argued that when a state is created in which Halacha has authority, there will also be responsibility. Of course, this does not say anything about the current situation. On the contrary, today both the religious public and its political and rabbinical leaders are stone fools with whom there is nothing to work. But as long as this is the case, the situation I'm talking about will not arise. With authority comes responsibility and pragmatism. There are countless examples of this (just as an example, the permission to participate in the government when it became clear to the Haredim that they would not be able to serve in it without responsibility. Women serving on religious councils. Torah study for women, and more). The principles of "let it be killed" and "let it not pass" vanish like smoke as circumstances change. That's why I'm not very impressed with the current situation. I don't like it, and it really horrifies me. But it doesn't concern predictions. It will vanish like smoke as circumstances change. And if it doesn't vanish, they simply won't change. In my opinion, there will be no situation where the law will have the authority to manage matters here, and all these characteristics will remain as they are.
You are ignoring the big elephant in the middle of the room of the traditional interpretation of the prohibition not to turn. According to the traditional interpretation, there is an obligation to prevent free thought and critical discussion. Responsibility and pragmatism are at the technical level. At the substantive level, there is no responsibility and pragmatism among the Haredi. In a state of halakhic law in the Haredi version, there will be no place for universities, freedom of opinion, critical literature, including that of the rabbi and, most likely, also of Rabbi Kook, and more. At most, engineering institutes will remain. A free university and free research will be prohibited. Cultural works will also be censored in a sweeping manner. I have known schools with excellent children's libraries that were completely destroyed as a result of Haredi influence. It will not remain there. The rabbi himself witnessed this with his child in the Haredi yeshiva. Why wouldn't what happened at the micro level happen at the macro level?
I completely agree with the description of the Haredim. What's new in that? My argument wasn't about them, but about a future situation that will be created. But I added that when the Haredim are the only ones here (if everyone is Haredim, Rachel) they will be involved in high-tech and academia and the army and libraries. Otherwise, they will become extinct.
Economically, I agree that the Haredim, as an economically leftist phenomenon based on the welfare state, have their limits, like all welfare states. But politically, if the Haredim come to power and have the opportunity to establish a Haredi halakhic state according to their interpretation of the halakhic law, then the consequences I presented of the dispersal of universities, censorship, and religious coercion will appear very quickly. Even the Muslim Haredim did not believe that they would get where they did, but in both the Shiite case with Khomeini and the Sunni case, they proved that these were only illusions despite the heavy price they paid economically and politically. The Jewish Haredim will also prove that pragmatic considerations are only secondary to them, and in fact they are already proving this in matters of economy and security.
Regarding the imposition of religion by force on people who are observant of the Torah and the mitzvot in principle, it seems from your words that there is a willingness to do so. But is it right for a state to impose its own principles on a citizen even when his actions do not harm any of the citizens? A state is supposedly an institution that helps its members better than they would on their own; it is not intended to fulfill the citizens' desires for themselves through the power of the state. Even if people want this imposition, is it still right to use public power to uphold the principles of the individual over himself? If citizens want fines for infidelity between married couples, is it right to use the power of the state for this, when the one who chooses to marry in this way (let's say there are several ways) takes on the fine, apparently this is not the role of the state. Likewise, in the field of religious coercion, there is no benefit to the members of the state and there is no point in imposing one's own principles on a person; he must deal with them himself.
As I wrote, if the absolute majority of citizens see Halacha as a public goal, it becomes a necessity of society. In such a situation, there is room for a position that justifies a certain amount of coercion. But as I wrote, one can only formulate a position on the matter when we experience the matter ourselves and understand the significance of the situation. Regarding the other disadvantages of coercion, I certainly agree and even wrote about it. A position on coercion should take them into account as well.
The Halacha State is an envelope, the question is who will fill it. The “Halacha State” supposedly religious Zionism, is one thing, the Haredi version (which to a certain extent is expressed in Haredi communities and localities) is something else: lack of transparency due to the laws of slander, nepotism, irrational Sage belief in the coming of “Daat Torah” and more.
Everything you wrote here still exists today in a country that is not a Halacha state. It varies according to interest.
Today it exists as a deviation from standard behavior, with everyone, at least in the general and private sectors, admitting that it is a deviation. No one is making up corruption cases, because “it is forbidden to speak slander and one must respect the sages”. In a state of ultra-Orthodox halakhah, this deviation may become the norm.
Let's take, for example, the area of sexual offenses. In a halakhic state, no one would publish investigations against the next incarnation of Chaim Walder and Yehuda Meshi-Zhahav, no one would complain to the police about them (and even if they did, they would be ostracized by their community, or the police would censor the affair).
This is not true, because the problem today is that the Haredim do not trust external government in general and Zionist government in particular. In European communities, when the community had the authority to punish, criminals were definitely handed over to the community leaders.
examination
Doesn't the rabbi think that promoting Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip, as some members of Knesset and religious ministers do, does not stem primarily from a messianic perception that ignores real reality?
Absolutely not. Their motivation is indeed the settlement of the land. But this is a religious and national commandment or perception, not a messianic consideration. You make it messianic if you claim that it is an unrealistic aspiration that will cost us a heavy price and they ignore it (I have columns here about messianism, you should see there). But note that according to them, this is not true. On the contrary, they claim that giving up the settlements cost us a heavy price, and returning there will improve our security. Both because of the IDF's control over the territory, and also because they show the Palestinians that they are paying a price for their behavior and losing territory, and perhaps this will deter them in the future (because human lives taken from them do not really work for them).
You can argue about this, but this is not messianism but a debate between perceptions. People enjoy making life easy for themselves and classifying those who think differently from them as ”messianic” Thus exempting themselves from a substantive discussion.
For me, the lack of realism is not expressed in any particular price that we will or will not pay as a result of Jewish settlement in Gaza, but in the zero feasibility of such a move, mainly in light of external constraints. Therefore, although it is indeed possible to theoretically discuss each of the arguments in favor of settlement in Gaza (which do not necessarily coincide with the arguments against the displacement of settlements), it is impossible to ignore the lack of feasibility of such a move, a matter that, from what I have noticed, is not being addressed at all by those in favor of settlement.
Incidentally, in column 584 you yourself argued against Smotrich that he acts according to a messianic view, so who hates him?
I really disagree. There is certainly a possibility, just as there is a possibility of establishing a death zone or no-man's land at the expense of the Strip, which many want to do. The world will be angry and angry, and we will move on. They also said (and I did) that the war was not feasible. In the meantime, it continues. Taking territory from the Strip is a very logical step in these circumstances, whether for the benefit of settlements or simply leaving it empty. Just like settling in territory captured in the war, when here it is even a smaller problem because we did not capture it from a state.
Even if you disagree, in my opinion referring to someone who does think this way as a messianic is an unnecessary and demagogic labeling.
There are indeed messianic elements in their conduct. But it is not true that every step we do not agree with is messianic. Specifically, I do not think that messianism can be attributed to resettlement in Gaza, and so on.
I did not claim that every step they took stemmed from Christianity, and therefore I did not address the claims against them regarding the hostages, where I do not think it is necessarily Messianic (although in my opinion it is not a binary matter, but with respect to this issue it seems that there are indeed weighty claims in their mouths), but with respect to the feasibility of Jewish settlement in Gaza, when this is not even defined as part of the goals of the war, when the Prime Minister himself has said several times that he opposes it, and not to mention the world, to me personally it seems irrational to hold conferences on the subject and present concrete plans for Jewish settlement within their framework, and therefore, as far as I am concerned, in this case the scale tends to attribute Messianic motives to this conduct, and unfortunately mainly Messianic.
Are the ideas of equality and peace not messianic?
So what if it is not defined? In their opinion, it should be defined. Furthermore, if it were defined, then it would not be messianism? Isn't it possible for a messianic government to set messianic goals for war? You contradict yourself. And if the Prime Minister doesn't think so, then I am not allowed to disagree with him? I simply can't understand the connection between your words.
I assume that, among other things, his intention is that if Bibi does not define this as a war goal, when he has a lot to gain from it in the Bayes, this is an indication that it is not feasible on a geopolitical level.
And no one is allowed to disagree with that, and is the one who disagrees a messianic? Blessed is he who shares his wisdom with those who fear him, who are not flesh and blood, but God who does not err.
Again, everything I wrote relates to the feasibility of the move, and therefore the fact that the government did not find it appropriate to include this in the war goals and in light of the Prime Minister's opposition (in addition to the overwhelming opposition of the world, all our friends), all of this tips the scales towards the lack of feasibility of such a move.
See my answer above. Insistence on the word "alma".
The secular public, but also the religious (less so the Haredi), has a problem understanding that a state of law is a secular concept. The concept of "religious" is also a secular concept. In terms of truth, there is only sacred and secular, or redemption and exile (of the people of Israel or the Divine Presence, etc.) and that's it. If we were already engaged in sociological modeling, then there would be a point, if anything, in talking about a "state of Torah" and not a "state of law" since it represents something that is more than a collection of rituals, but even this - since it deals with shaping the face of human society, which is a lie by its very nature - is a secular concept. Secularism is external and deals with the sociology of people who are empty of content, while the sacred is concerned with unity or individuality. The Holy One wants to take all things in the world and turn them into something singular or more precisely, to find the unity that lies behind the multiplicity and separation.
Therefore, the Holy One (and the truth) hates and abhors sociology. As with the very concept of “religious” which is a secular concept from the truth's perspective, there is a problem with people not understanding that the actions of the commandments (with the appropriate intention, which is the main thing, of course) are supposed to achieve a goal that everyone is supposed to see as something and they cease to be rituals. For example, if, as in the past, we were all going to war and God came with us with storm clouds and the advance artillery rumble of lightning into the enemy camp, or stones from the sky right on the heads of the enemies and zero dead and wounded in the war and also a lot of loot – frequently, and suddenly stopped doing so, because He is no longer among us because someone sinned, then I don't think there would be any problem for anyone – To eradicate evil from among us - to execute someone who decided to live with us for some reason, but despite this, desecrated the Sabbath in front of two witnesses and with a warning. The whole purpose of enforcing the commandments is precisely so that righteousness will reign among us and the preservation of the law among us is something operative that can be seen with the eyes. That is what is important, not modeling a Halacha state. In any case, the true goal of spiritual people who observe the law is redemption, not sociology that is empty of the content of a Halacha state. Redemption from the prison that is the meaningless reality around us that is realized in any phrase of the type: "State (complete the missing)". Sociology is the realization of the meaninglessness of our existence, and every person with a spirit should abhor it. Only people who are empty shells (we can call them "demons") like to engage in it (lawyers, humanities people, media people, etc.).
And we say Amen.
I just hope you're saying Amen to something you understand. As for saying Amen to blessings
You claimed that there is nothing to fear from Smotrich because he is acting in a messianic policy, and I disagree with that.
Smotrich manages the economy using the method of “with the help of God”, as he himself said. I wish it were just an expression. The man is throwing our money at the expense of our child's economic future and is hanging on to the fact that in the future the Messiah will come and throw us bills out of the air, otherwise there is no logic to his ”policy” (is not advancing a state budget a policy? Or is he simply too busy with the defense cabinet) and his lack of attention to the finance officials, to all the economists, to the governor, and of course, he waves them away. The result was that he was right, but of course all the credit rating “leftists” listened less to the ”arguments” of Mr. Economy Smotrich and lowered the rating to the bottom.
So after the facts above (immersed in my descriptions), do you still think that Smotritz is not acting from a messianic policy?
[Just a comment from this post – https://mikyab.net/posts/797/%5D
I didn't even remember him. Chen Chen.
Is it permissible to impose Halacha in a religious community or religious neighborhood? Because in practice today, religious communities and Haredi neighborhoods enforce Shabbat observance in the public sphere (and there are other examples of coercion, especially in Haredi neighborhoods)..Is this okay in your opinion?
I think there is a place for this in a reasonable and logical dose. Like closing to traffic on Shabbat if there is an alternative route. It is difficult to determine sharp indicators.
One might wonder how a person who is observant of the commandments is willing to accept offenses and not enforce the observance of the law on the Jewish public, when the matter is in his hands. Is this an acceptable position from a halachic-Torahic perspective? My argument is that in the current situation it is not right to impose the values of the law on the entire public. Coercion is not useful for several reasons. First, it creates hatred and does not bring people closer. Second, acts done under coercion are devoid of religious value. Coercion can only be exercised when it comes to a person who is committed to the values of the law and deviates from them (because of his instinct or because of various interests). Coercion on a person who does not believe (in God, or at least in the giving of the Torah) is pointless and worthless.
I would appreciate it if you could provide me with halachic sources in Judaism that believe this (or even refer to the Torah)
This should be appreciated. Halachically and morally there is a place for coercion on a believer who is lying. But in a democratic country there is no place for this because of the values of democracy. I see no need for sources. Why did he call me a Sabra?! I can collect sayings like not to say anything that has not been heard, fences on proven evidence, etc. But this is unnecessary since the discussion is not there.
In the context of institutional halachic coercion, I think it is appropriate to mention the Sanhedrin's decision to leave the gallows chamber once they saw that the death penalty was of no interest to anyone and that if they had to implement the law, they would have to open a slaughterhouse. What I understand from this is that the sages themselves understood that punishment and coercion are only relevant when the people want the legal system, and if not - there is no point.