The Halakhic Tragedy of Our Time: The Chief Rabbinate and the Appointment of Women Rabbis (Column 648)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

Following a piece I read a few weeks ago about yet another decision by the Chief Rabbinate of Israel (those whom government officials consult for rulings in the laws of decay, nepotism, and corruption—always good to learn from the very best) to appoint women to the body that elects the two heads of this sorry institution. This raised a question about appointing women as rabbis, which I also wish to address here, after providing some background.

To those who know me: the cynicism here expresses bitter pain. When the verse is fulfilled among us, “Your princes are rebellious and companions of thieves; every one loves bribes and follows after rewards; they judge not the fatherless, neither does the cause of the widow come unto them,” and no one speaks up; when Torah girds sackcloth in the public square and its representatives trample it underfoot with haughty pride, sated with self-satisfaction—naturally, one turns to cynicism. Lest there be misunderstanding: this is not a Purim drosha but one for the approaching Tisha B’Av.

Background: The Electing Body and the Supreme Court’s Decision

The body that elects those two who, through no fault of their own, are called the “Chief Rabbis of Israel,” includes 80 rabbis. The law states that these will be “rabbis to be appointed by the Chief Rabbis of Israel, in consultation with the minister and with the approval of the government.” You can understand what that means. The two Chief Rabbis—appointed thanks to their fathers who were themselves Chief Rabbis (according to those decisors who hold that a rabbinate is inheritable even when the candidates are unworthy)—personally see to the continuation of this glorious chain and “restore the crown to its former glory”: ensuring that those next in line will be their sons, brothers, friends, or simply their loyal beneficiaries (for example, those who will continue to look after the profitability of the “Beit Yosef” kashrut). All of this must be done in consultation with the minister (of religious affairs), who of course is always an independent figure from… Shas. This is, after all, their registered property, and they do well to preserve it lest, Heaven forbid, we transgress the prohibition of diverting an inheritance; as is known, the sin of theft dances at the head, God spare us…

Now then, about five months ago, the Supreme Court heard a petition by various organizations to require the Rabbinate to include women among those 80 rabbis. The Supreme Court, with characteristic vigor and activism, decided that the Chief Rabbinate must consider appointing women to the body that elects the Chief Rabbis. Note well: they ruled that the term “rabbis” in the election law does not exclude appointing women. The Court did not even order them to appoint women, but rather held that the language of the law allows their appointment. This is a terrifyingly activist innovation, and no wonder it outrages all the great lights of the generation.

Needless to say, this is a bizarre ruling. I think they are a bit confused up there. The Rabbinate did not ask the Court’s permission to appoint women. Had it wanted to, it would have done so on its own. Believe it or not, I have no doubt that the High Court of Justice would not have stopped them due to some conservative reading of the law’s language, nor would it have built a dam standing firm against the Chief Rabbinate’s rampaging liberalism. The Rabbinate has refrained from doing this not because it interprets the law as applying only to men, but because it is chauvinistic and monopolistic—plain and simple (and perhaps simply because those illustrious families lack enough women to populate the electoral body). After all, the cat must somehow guard the cream. If we don’t safeguard it, Heaven forfend, we might see appointed to head this family estate rabbis who are not from the Yosef, Lau, or Deri families (and, bediavad, the Eliyahu or Shapira clans), and the like. As noted, this would be a clear prohibition of diverting/ transferring an estate and encroaching upon the border set by the first ones (namely, their father). See here for a brief review of how the owners conduct themselves on their estate. Legally, the petition sought to require the Rabbinate to do this. That it is legally permitted and possible—they know that themselves. And if we discuss the halakhah, the Supreme Court cannot issue halakhic directives to the Rabbinate (though in my opinion their halakhic abilities sometimes surpass those of the Rabbinate). So what exactly did the justices intend in this bizarre ruling? I have no idea.

Justice Daphne Barak-Erez reasoned that the electoral assembly is not a halakhic forum, and therefore there is no justification for not appointing women to it. That is, it is clear to her that women cannot be appointed to a halakhic body, but she argues this is not one. That strikes me as odd: if women can fit within the statutory language as “rabbis,” then why can’t they integrate into a halakhic body? And if they cannot be part of a rabbinic body because they are not rabbis, how can they be considered “rabbis” for purposes of the electoral body? True, one could contort her words with tongs upon tongs, and they might harmonize in toto, but just now I found yet another contradiction in this ruling—though today we put person against person. Justice Barak-Erez writes that the term “rabbis” is not limited to those certified by the Chief Rabbinate (which of course stubbornly refuses to certify women even without appointing them to rabbinic positions, thereby neatly closing the monopolistic circle). She adds that, in fact, in the past, men who lacked such certification were chosen for the electoral body. Her conclusion is that a “rav” in this context is “a teacher, one who instructs his student” (say, a rebbe in the cheder, or the “sports rabbi” or “geography rabbi” in a religious junior high). If such luminaries can be appointed, then why should women be excluded?! Are they not capable of teaching geography or reading and writing in a cheder? Oops—actually, not even that. Perhaps this excuses my earlier difficulty (why they cannot integrate into a halakhic body): they may indeed teach the Torah of geography to students, but certainly not as learned scholars and decisors. Certainly not on the exalted level that characterizes the members of the aforesaid electoral body, and even less so with the requisite pedigree (a great-grandchild of our teacher, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, of blessed memory, or our master Aryeh Deri, may he live long—before whom no secret can remain hidden).

In any case, I saw that Justice Mintz, in dissent, argued against Barak-Erez that only someone with certification can be appointed to the electoral body (otherwise how will they ensure he belongs to one of the dynasties with title to the estate?!). But if Barak-Erez is correct that in the past men without certification were appointed, I do not understand how one can advance that claim. Well, I missed something again. Perhaps in the distant past the Rabbinate was in violation—though I find that very hard to believe about them—but good that at least now they have mended their ways, and where penitents stand… is due to crowding (duchka de-kallah).

But our saga is only beginning. Now comes the Rabbinate’s handling of this activist ruling of the Supreme Court. Don’t go anywhere.

The Rabbinate’s Decision

At its last meeting under Maran Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, may he live, before he formally goes on to serve with splendor as the head of Shas (which he has done informally until now—unlike his father, who did so formally during his tenure until rebuked by the High Court and forced to resign from the bench), the Rabbinate discussed the matter substantively, as is its way, and decided that… it is impossible. Tell me something new. In a report on this revolutionary and surprising session, I saw wondrous things that would shake every heart; I address them below. But before reading, please contemplate the picture above to fulfill “and your eyes shall see your teachers,” in the spirit of “Listen, you rebels, shall we bring forth water for you from this rock?”—and “water” means Torah. From these rebellious “teachers” no Torah issues forth—not even by chance.

For the benefit of the holy public, I must bring the quotation in full, for it is full of all good things:

Before I turn to discuss the (so-called) halakhic “ruling” on appointing women rabbis, one more historical note.

Precedents and Predictions: The Shakdiel Case and Women’s Suffrage

It is impossible not to recall a strikingly parallel case concerning appointing women to the “rabbinic” office on a local religious council. As is well known, members of religious councils throughout the land are all blinding Torah luminaries who dim the sun’s light. One fine day, a brazen woman named Leah Shakdiel (full disclosure: a friend of ours) from Yeruham dared to apply to the religious council in her town. There arose an uproar, and not for nothing is the case remembered to this day in the annals of our blood-soaked nation (as it is said: “Then for the rite…” etc.). The land quaked and trembled. How could a woman be appointed to so exalted a public office as membership in the Yeruham religious council?! Heavens, listen—and earth, give ear—for the donkey has spoken. The Chief Rabbinate of course “ruled” that such a thing could not be considered. A wall-to-wall rabbinic consensus across all shades decreed that this was a case to fight, for it meant the destruction of halakhah handed down to us from our rabbis generation to generation. I still remember that amusing consensus as if it were today. Note: we are not talking about appointing a woman to a rabbinic position, or even appointing a “rabbi” as part of the chief-rabbinate electoral body (as in our case). Here we spoke of appointing a woman to an organ providing religious services to the people of Yeruham. It’s like appointing a female religious liaison in a battalion to distribute wine for Shabbat. Has such a thing ever been heard?! What, in Heaven’s name, could be problematic about that? Our “Torah of truth” has the answers.

Happily, the Supreme Court did not buy this tall tale, and in a panel that included the (then only) religious justice, Menachem Elon, it unanimously held that these were nonsense and that there was no legal—and not even halakhic (!)—bar to appointing a woman to this exalted religious position. At long last there was someone in the judiciary who understands halakhah. Apparently the Chief Rabbinate has few such people.

And behold, immediately thereafter the noise died down and the world fell silent. No bird chirped and no swan swanned. Women were appointed to religious councils across the universe, including Yeruham, and the world did not collapse. What’s more, not only was there acceptance of the reality—the terrible “prohibition” itself vanished. To this day no one remarks upon this grave prohibition that has been brazenly trampled by all the faithful of Israel who appoint women to religious councils, Heaven forfend. Years later, when I was already in Yeruham, the Haredi community there supported the appointment of a traditional woman to the religious council against a religious man!!! And I was left astonished: where did that “prohibition” go? And what became of the damage to the vineyard of Israel? I must note that the statements back then were far harsher than the drivel I quoted above. It begins with a grave prohibition of “be killed rather than transgress” and cries of damage to the vineyard of Israel, and within a day everything fades into thin silence as if it never was. Well, at least we tried! Someone else will now hoe the vineyard of the House of Israel.

I have no doubt the same will happen here. Soon, with God’s help, the electoral body will be suffused with light as the noble women of the Yosef, Lau, and Deri families take their seats, and all will return to its place in peace. You will surely ask: why from those families in particular? After the “women” correction, won’t this be corrected too? Absolutely not. We may overcome the stumbling block of women, but the inheritance will not, Heaven forbid, be diverted. There is halakhah, and there is “halakhah.” Some things can be compromised; some things—whose sanctity surpasses all—cannot. Women—acceptable, but only from the right families. “And I saw the entire people sitting by their families.” Truly, how splendid was the sight of the High Priest.

It is worth mentioning here the matter of women’s suffrage (and here on the situation in Israel and in Judaism). As is known, most rabbis vehemently opposed granting such a right to women. For some reason, I do not hear today Haredi or Hardal voices (Rabbi Kook also opposed) or the Chief Rabbinate calling on righteous women to act according to the tradition of our forefathers and the rulings of our rabbis on this grave matter (and thus, of course, to give up half their electorate and power in the Knesset). To be elected they still cannot, of course, in the Haredi parties to this day—but their votes they do not forgo. Interesting, isn’t it? Apparently the holy tradition and the grave prohibitions of heresy that we received from our luminous sages occasionally tolerate change—when needed. The only question is: for what need? (Preventing diversion of the inheritance or amassing political power—yes. Preserving halakhah and preventing desecration of God’s Name—most certainly not.) To be clear, I do not criticize the rabbis back then—well into the twentieth century this was the accepted norm even among gentiles. I do criticize the fools who cling to archaic norms long since obsolete, claiming this is the tradition of our fathers and presenting it as settled halakhah even though that is utterly false—yet doing so selectively, only when it suits them.

Appointing Women Rabbis and Women’s Qualification

The Rabbinate’s decision is quoted in the article, and these are their pearls (section 1):

The Council of the Chief Rabbinate hereby clarifies that according to halakhah there is no halakhic possibility of appointing women to the position of rabbi; likewise, even consideration of appointing a woman to the position of rabbi is forbidden, as it acknowledges that a woman can bear a rabbinic position—something contrary to the position of halakhic decisors and the greats of the generations and the Chief Rabbis through the generations.

As I noted, this passage is quite hard to read (I do not know if these manglings are in the original or only in the article). I am not speaking only of the odd redundancy that “according to halakhah there is no halakhic possibility” to do something. I cannot make sense of the sentence about “consideration of appointing a woman to the position of rabbi.” Who considered, and where? Perhaps they mean that the Council is forbidden to comply with the High Court’s request and even to try to consider appointing a woman as a rabbi, because the very consideration is heresy against the position of decisors and greats of the generations, etc. But who asked them to consider appointing a woman as a rabbi? The issue is appointing a woman to the electoral body. The law speaks of “rabbis,” but nobody asked them to appoint her as a rabbi. On the contrary, we saw in the Court’s ruling that, in the justices’ view, the term “rabbis” in this context is not a halakhic term and this is not about appointing women as rabbis. The Rabbinate apparently has a different interpretation of the law—and they are the legal experts, not the Supreme Court justices. And altogether, did this very meeting not deliberate whether to do so? So did they consider—or not?

But let us leave aside the silliness of terminology and phrasing, the misunderstandings of the Court’s ruling, and the limping arguments they splashed on paper. Let us turn to the bizarre rationale they offered. The deep halakhic reasoning was that this “contradicts the position of halakhic decisors and the greats of the generations and the Chief Rabbis through the generations.” That’s it—that’s the reasoning. I have never heard such a halakhic rationale. Is there any source that forbids it? Why was it not brought? A prohibition must be grounded in halakhah, not in the opinion of this or that rabbi, however great. Once there is a source that forbids, one may bring the interpretations of great authorities. If the greats of the generations did not like pickled herring, does that make it a prohibition one must not transgress? The greats of the generations also did not agree that women study Torah—not even Ḥumash and Mishnah. Why is it permitted to deviate from their view there? Why does a change in circumstances in our era justify changed norms there—at least ones that have not a shred to do with halakhah? And that is precisely the case here as well, just like women’s suffrage and their service on religious councils. I hope and predict this is a rearguard battle, and in the end they will retreat from this “grave prohibition” as they did from its predecessors.

Another problem—beyond the inherently bizarre, corrupt, and desecrating position—is their taking God’s Name in vain under the banner of halakhah. They declare a neutral matter to be halakhically forbidden without any rationale—and then retreat and do it in practice. This turns halakhah into a laughingstock and itself causes a great desecration of God’s Name—and rightly so. Both because it has nothing to do with halakhah, and because if some ignoramus in the Chief Rabbinate thinks it does, then he ought to be consistent and refrain even when inconvenient or contrary to his interests. Do not forget: we adhere to the position of the greats of the generations and the Chief Rabbis through the generations. Let me remind that the first Chief Rabbi (Rabbi Kook) opposed women voting (and also opposed Ashkenazim praying with a Sephardi accent).

I have written before that the policy of decisors to describe something not recommended as a halakhic prohibition—a prevalent practice in our circles, sadly—is very serious. Beyond the halakhic prohibition of “bal tosif” (adding to the Torah), it breeds contempt for halakhic determinations generally. Everyone sees this is a cynical use of halakhah, easily changed when convenient. So why should anyone take genuine halakhic claims seriously? For example, that homosexual relations are halakhically forbidden—or any other halakhic claim. No wonder the public treats that as a caprice of conservatives who misuse the crown. After all, the rabbis do here whatever they wish.

This is the message of the well-known midrash Rashi cites about Eve and the serpent (Genesis 3:3–4):

“Nor shall you touch it”—she added to the command; therefore she came to detract, as it is said (Prov. 30:6), “Do not add to His words.” “You will not surely die”—he pushed her until she touched it and said to her: just as there is no death in touching, so there is no death in eating.

Eve told the serpent that God had commanded not to touch the tree (whereas He had commanded only not to eat of it), and the serpent pushed her; she touched the tree and nothing happened. From this the serpent proved there is no prohibition and one does not die thereby, as Eve said. And what was the end? Consequently, Eve ate of the tree as well; that is, after she expanded the front, even what truly was forbidden no longer commanded trust. She came to transgress what God had indeed commanded. This is the cost of expansions of the front of the sort I described.

The greats of the generations’ opposition to appointing women as rabbis also lacked a halakhic basis. It was the social norm of that era (as with the right to vote and be elected)—and nothing more. Opposition to appointing converts to positions of authority seems to me similar to the alleged prohibition on appointing converts to office (see my essay on the matter, where I show this is a social norm, not a prohibition). Regarding women as judges, there are even Tosafists who wrote it is permitted (from Deborah the prophetess, who judged Israel. See column 70). But in the State of Israel today such a position is surely absurd—for women can serve as judges, prime ministers, ministers, and police and army officers—yet in the electoral body of the Chief Rabbinate, or in the Yeruham religious council, this is an exalted authority and thus halakhically forbidden to women. Any sensible person understands that a woman can be prime minister—but not a member of the Yeruham religious council. One might perhaps argue it on grounds of modesty, but such a consideration is surely circumstance-dependent. Why, then, under our new circumstances, must we cling to it? Shall we also refrain from driving cars because the greats of the generations did not drive? Perhaps we should use the remedies recommended in the Talmud because the greats recommended them?

On the margins, I must add one more anecdote (see it discussed in column 485): Prof. Halivni Weiss left the Conservative movement over a dispute about appointing women as rabbis. I wrote there that this is bizarre, for the Conservatives do things that flatly contradict accepted halakhah, and he leaves them over a policy that entails no halakhic prohibition (only runs contrary to longstanding practice). In this he shared the Rabbinate’s view that what has been customary since time immemorial must be preserved even when circumstances have changed.

This is a primitive and childish conception of halakhah. If we are speaking of custom—indeed, custom has significance, but custom is not halakhah. Customs, by nature, change as circumstances change. Just as a custom is born ex nihilo and altered the prior status quo, so too can a new custom arise and alter the current state. And certainly when that custom harms people and groups, and when harms flow from preserving it (a desecration of God’s Name, among others), there is no reason in the world to preserve it. And to present it as a halakhic prohibition is a lie that also involves the prohibition of “bal tosif”—and, of course, it is simply harm to women and to all of us and a terrible desecration of God’s Name. But the Chief Rabbinate’s main contribution to Judaism and to religious life in the State of Israel is precisely the desecration of God’s Name. So who says they have no successes?!

In conclusion, I return to Tisha B’Av and Lamentations (5:8): “Slaves rule over us; none delivers us out of their hand.”