Desecrating Shabbat to Prevent Apostasy (Column 636)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

In columns 618 and 619 I discussed two kinds of “uprooted” passages: uprooted laws and uprooted rationales—texts whose plain sense is not ruled as law. In column 351 I dealt with several types of declarative halakhot: laws that are written and even ruled, but in practice are not implemented. At the end of that column I discussed “one who affixes bread to the oven,” a special kind of declarative halakhah. This refers to a person who sticks bread to the oven on Shabbat; if it bakes, he incurs stoning. Before the baking is complete, he can pull the bread off (r’diyah) and save himself from death—but r’diyat hapas is a rabbinic prohibition (“it is skill rather than a labor”). The passage raises the possibility that he is forbidden to remove the bread, even though that will lead the sticker to a capital offense. Tosafot there (Shabbat 4a) argue that in such a case we do not forbid, because in any event he will not listen to us. Yet we saw there that other sugyot and commentators are still willing to accept such a prohibition. I explained that perhaps this prohibition is purely declarative—that even if it is ruled, it is not meant to be implemented in practice. In this column I wish to address a similar question, regarding desecrating Shabbat to prevent apostasy.

The Context

This past Shabbat I taught a class on drafting yeshivah students (see column 609), in which a discussion arose about the fear of “spiritual deterioration.” Among other things, the common claim came up: when a Haredi youth enlists, there is a concern he will abandon Haredi life and perhaps even religious commitment altogether. This can be discussed on a factual level (do all those who “deteriorate” do so because of the army, or do they come to the army because they have already deteriorated?), and also on the level of partnership and responsibility—on whom lies the duty to ensure that one can serve in a way consistent with the recruit’s values (must the general public pave the way for Haredim, or is that task theirs as well?). Beyond all this, I argued that even if the concern about deterioration is real, it does not justify evading service. Military service is a matter of pikuach nefesh (saving life), and war permits even full biblical prohibitions. When there is danger, a person must go out and fight; if there is a concern of spiritual deterioration, he must take care not to deteriorate. But that is certainly not a reason not to enlist. None of those making this argument would refrain from going to a doctor because he might see immodest sights on the way, and the like. First and foremost we save lives, and then we try to minimize damage.

Moreover, life itself matters greatly to each of us, and seemingly that is an even better excuse not to enlist. Is loss of life not a weightier consideration than the fear that religious commitment will be shaken? If there is an obligation to enlist despite the fear of losing one’s life, then fears of deterioration are likewise insufficient justification. This of course relates to our attitude toward that “deterioration.” Our Sages say that one who causes another to sin is worse than one who kills him; thus one might argue that the fear of deterioration is in fact more significant than the fear for life. One could also discuss the probabilities of each fear’s materialization (how many “deteriorate” versus how many are killed), but I will not enter that here.

In the course of the discussion I mentioned the dispute between Tosafot and the Rashba regarding desecrating Shabbat to save from apostasy, which would seem to deal precisely with this point. After the class, one listener—who had just heard a class on this very topic—approached me and said he left that class shocked. Even if halakhah obligates me not to desecrate Shabbat when my son or daughter is abducted and will be raised as a good Christian, would I really not desecrate Shabbat to save them? I added that I would do so even if the kidnapper were an upright Jew who would raise them on the foundations of Torah and fear of Heaven. If my child is kidnapped, then I desecrate Shabbat to save him or her. I think any reasonable person would do the same. This strongly recalls the discussion mentioned above regarding removing the bread from the oven.

Desecrating Shabbat for Pikuach Nefesh

The Talmud in Yoma 85a discusses the question of from where (not whether) we know that pikuach nefesh overrides Shabbat:

It once happened that Rabbi Yishmael, Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah were walking along the road, with Levi the arranger and Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah walking behind them. The following question was asked before them: From where do we know that saving life overrides Shabbat? Rabbi Yishmael answered and said: “If the thief is found breaking in” [Exod. 22:1]. Now this is a case that is doubtful with regard to money and doubtful with regard to life, and bloodshed defiles the land and causes the Divine Presence to depart from Israel, yet he may be saved at the cost of his life—how much more so saving life overrides Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva answered and said: “If a man schemes against his fellow… from My altar you shall take him to die” [Exod. 21:14]—“from My altar” (interrupt the service) to put him to death, but not “upon My altar.” And Rabbah bar bar Ḥanah said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: They taught this only to put him to death, but to save life—even from upon My altar. And here, where it’s uncertain whether there is substance to his words or not, and the Temple service overrides Shabbat—how much more so saving life overrides Shabbat. Rabbi Elazar said: If circumcision, which concerns one of the 248 limbs of a person, overrides Shabbat, then certainly saving a whole body overrides Shabbat. Rabbi Yose b. Rabbi Yehudah says: “You shall keep My Sabbaths”—you might think in all cases; therefore the verse says, “but (ach)”—a limiting term. Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef says: “For it is holy to you” [Exod. 31:14]—it (Shabbat) is given over into your hands, and you are not given over into its hand. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: “The children of Israel shall keep the Shabbat”—the Torah said: desecrate one Shabbat for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Had I been there, I would have said my proof is better than theirs: “And you shall live by them” [Lev. 18:5]—and not die by them. Rava said: All of them can be refuted, except for Shmuel’s, which has no refutation.

All of the proofs are ultimately set aside in the sugya, leaving two. One from reason: “Desecrate one Shabbat for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths” (which is seemingly set aside, yet the poskim do cite it as law, at least for certain pikuach nefesh; so explicitly in Shabbat 151b). And the other from a verse: “‘And you shall live by them’—and not die by them.” I discussed this sugya in detail in column 421 and will not return to it here.

Danger to a Limb

Now, the sugya’s conclusion addresses danger to life, not any other danger. The Rishonim do debate whether we desecrate Shabbat also for danger to a limb when there is no danger to life itself (apparently because in several places in the Talmud we find “what difference is there between total killing and half-killing”—i.e., danger to a limb is like partial danger to life. See a survey here), but the halakhah is ruled in the Shulchan Aruch and by later authorities that we do not desecrate Shabbat for danger to a limb (Orach Chaim 328:17):

A sick person who has taken to bed because of his illness, and there is no danger [to life]—Rema: or one who has pain and thus his whole body is weakened; then even if he is walking, it is like having taken to bed (Magid Mishneh ch. 2)—we tell a non-Jew to perform treatment for him, but we do not desecrate Shabbat for him with a biblical prohibition, even if there is danger to a limb.

Later there, a dispute is brought whether even rabbinic prohibitions (that are anchored in biblical law) may be done for danger to a limb; the Mechaber writes that this seems to him to be the law.

However, in Avodah Zarah 28b we seemingly find a sugya that disagrees:

The next day Mar Shmuel went out and taught: An eye that has “rebelled” (is protruding/coming out) may be treated with eye-salve on Shabbat. What is the reason? Because the cords of the eye are dependent on the chambers of the heart.

In the summary linked above you can see that some Rishonim understood from here that there is a permit to desecrate Shabbat for any danger to a limb (though this is somewhat difficult within the entire sugya there).

But Rashi there (ad loc.) writes:

“Has rebelled”—meaning it seeks to come out, like a person who rebels and goes out. But to play (with it) and bring (medicine) through the public domain—no, for this is not danger to life but danger of blindness. “Even to play and bring,” etc.—as we say below, the cords of the eye are dependent on the membranes of the heart; the light of the eye is intertwined and attached to the heart’s membranes.

We see that in his view the permit to desecrate Shabbat for danger to the eye is because it entails danger to life (since the eye is connected to the heart’s membranes).

But Tosafot, s.v. “Shuriyanei,” there, disagree:

“The cords of the eye are dependent on the heart” — Rashi explains: the light of the eye depends on the membranes of the heart. But it seems to me [rather]: it depends on the ‘understanding’ (u’v’nata) of the heart; “shuriyanei” with a shin as in “I behold (ashurenu) him, but not near” (Num. 24), or alternatively “suriyanei” with a samekh from the language of “he surveyed (sayer) his property” (Chullin 105a); “u’v’nata” with a bet, meaning understanding, as we say regarding the Chariot (Megillah 24a): he saw it “with the understanding of the heart.”

That is, Tosafot do not accept that this is danger to life. Why, then, permit desecration of Shabbat? Because the eye is of such great importance, and it seems that injury to the eye can impair our understanding.

Thus we learn that according to Rashi and Tosafot the eye is exceptional, and only for it do we desecrate Shabbat (not for other limbs). For Rashi this is because it involves danger to life, and so there is no significant novelty. But according to Tosafot, it appears that we desecrate Shabbat even when there is no danger to life—i.e., there are other considerations that can be equated to danger to life and warrant desecration of Shabbat.

In columns 476 and 530 I mentioned this dispute and proposed extending it to public dangers that are not life-threatening, and I also noted the possibility of extending the permit to desecrate Shabbat for the prevention of mental illness. The claim is that such dangers, though not life-threatening in the simple sense, are dangers equivalent to danger to life—no less than the eye, according to Tosafot.

Perhaps this can be applied as well to the dispute among the Rishonim about redeeming captives. The Talmud in Gittin 58a relates that Rabbi Yehoshua redeemed a child for a very large sum, which is seemingly against the enactment not to redeem captives for more than their value (brought in the Mishnah there, 45a). Tosafot (s.v. “Kol mamon”) and the Meiri there write that there it was a case of danger to life, and therefore the law differs (we redeem even for more than their value). By contrast, Tosafot (s.v. “D’lo ligarvu”), 45a, do not bring this answer—apparently in their view, even in danger to life we do not redeem for more than their value. And the Ramban in his Ḥiddushim there (45a) writes this explicitly: he notes that in all captivity there is danger to life, and therefore he does not permit even when there is danger to life, and needs other answers.

One could understand that the intention of the Rishonim is not to assert a factual claim—that every captivity entails pikuach nefesh. Rather, the claim could be that captivity as such is a state so severe that its status is like danger to life; therefore, if in place of danger to life we redeem the captive at any price, then in all captivity we ought to do so. This is especially true regarding the state of our hostages today in Gaza, who are subject to daily rape and abuse (in the law of the pursuer, pursuit to rape is considered like pursuit to kill, and both justify killing the pursuer. In fact this is explicit in Scripture: “For as a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter” — Deut. 22:26)[1]. But even in “ordinary” captivity: imagine a situation in which there is a captive among the nations who demand more than his value, but his life is not in danger. We have the money to do so, and if we do not redeem him, he will rot there all his days (with no option of military rescue or diplomatic leverage). Would we not want to redeem him at any price just to save him from the captivity itself? Indeed, the poskim distinguish between redeeming relatives and redeeming others, etc., which in my understanding gives expression to the claim we saw above about removing the bread. Who would truly abide by such a directive?! A reasonable person will not obey such a halakhic instruction, and thus it is difficult to accept it as binding law. Alternatively, perhaps we accept it in theory, even as we assume it will likely not be fulfilled (a declarative halakhah, in the terminology above). In any case, it may be that these Rishonim follow Tosafot in Avodah Zarah 28b: according to them there are additional considerations equivalent in force to danger to life, and therefore we desecrate Shabbat for them as well.

Desecrating Shabbat to Prevent Apostasy: A First Look

Among the Rishonim (see discussions here and here, and also Rabbi Yisraeli’s article in Techumin II) the question is raised about someone who sees that non-Jews have seized his daughter and intend to raise her as a gentile. Her life is not in danger, but this is a danger of apostasy (indeed, assured apostasy). Seemingly this depends on the rationales for permitting desecration of Shabbat. According to R. Shimon ben Menasya it would seem that here, too, we should permit, for the rationale is fear that he will not keep Sabbaths, and that applies here as well. But the rationale of Shmuel, “and you shall live by them,” seems to apply only to life and not to “spiritual pikuach nefesh.”

There will be a practical difference. If we base ourselves on “desecrate one Shabbat,” the Talmud in Yoma says this justifies desecration only when there is certain pikuach nefesh, but not in cases of doubt. By contrast, the permit based on “and you shall live by them” applies even in cases of doubt. According to this, if we permit desecration of Shabbat to save from apostasy because of “desecrate one Shabbat,” that would permit only in cases of certain apostasy. Admittedly, one can challenge this conclusion, since the permit to desecrate Shabbat is based on the value a person places on his life—and thus we permit him to desecrate Shabbat. By contrast, desecrating Shabbat to save from apostasy is based on the value of mitzvah observance and not the interest of the person saved (though if it is very important to him personally, perhaps there is his interest as well). Here one could argue that even doubt would override Shabbat.

On the face of it, this depends on the dispute among the Rishonim whether a person is permitted to give up his life for other commandments (beyond the three cardinal sins). According to Tosafot and other Rishonim (see Kessef Mishneh to Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah 5:4), this is permitted; if so, it would appear the entire discussion is about a person’s right over his life—interest (life) versus value (keeping Shabbat). By contrast, according to the Rambam (see Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah 5:1,4) it is forbidden to give up one’s life for other prohibitions (and one who does so “is accountable for his life”), suggesting that in his view human life is a value, not merely an interest. If life were only an interest, it would be reasonable to allow a person to waive it; he simply would not be obligated. According to the Rambam, then, the value of life is a value, and the permit to desecrate Shabbat is because of the value of life; consequently, the value of mitzvah observance (preventing apostasy) is in the same plane as the value of life. But according to Tosafot, life may be an interest and not a value, which leaves room for the distinction drawn here.

Yet upon further consideration, the very argument to permit desecration of Shabbat to save from apostasy “so that he will keep many Sabbaths” can be rejected. I prefaced that the overwhelming majority of authorities permit desecration of Shabbat even when the person saved will not keep “many Sabbaths,” such as saving “mere moments” of life or saving Shabbat desecrators. This suggests that “keeping many Sabbaths” is not the essential rationale for the permit (see also the columns cited above). If so, it is not clear that one can equate apostasy with danger to life, even though in both cases the result is that he will not keep Sabbaths.

In any case, it seems that the discussion here resembles what we saw regarding the eye. There is another value, not actual life, which is equivalent to the value of life; on that basis there is room to permit desecrating Shabbat for it. Let us now see what the authorities say.

Desecrating Shabbat to Prevent Apostasy: Tosafot vs. the Rashba

The Rashba was asked exactly this question, and his words are brought by the Beit Yosef, Orach Chaim end of §306:

The Rashba was asked about one who was sent word on Shabbat that his daughter had been forcibly taken from his home by a Jewish apostate in order to remove her from the Jewish people; whether he may set out on the road on Shabbat lest they frighten her and she convert; whether it is permitted to go even beyond three parasangs according to the view (Yerushalmi Eruvin ch. 3 end of hal. 4) that a three-parasang boundary is a biblical law; and even to bring an official seal from the government—do we set aside Shabbat for this doubt as we set it aside for doubtful danger to life? He answered: the matter requires study; nevertheless, this is how my opinion inclines—that we do not set aside Shabbat for saving from prohibitions, for they said (Shabbat 4a): we do not tell a person, “Commit a sin so that your fellow may merit,” and we do not permit even a minor prohibition in order to save one’s fellow from a major prohibition. For no more than they said in “Bameh Me’arvin” (Eruvin 32b): a ḥaver would prefer to transgress a minor prohibition rather than have an am ha’aretz transgress a major prohibition—only when that prohibition comes upon the am ha’aretz through the ḥaver; but otherwise, no, as is implied in the first chapter of Shabbat in the question of one who affixed bread to the oven (4a). And the matter still requires study until it can be fully clarified.

The Rashba argues that one should not desecrate Shabbat in such a situation, since we do not tell a person to sin so that his fellow will merit (unless the fellow’s sin comes about through him).

By contrast, the Beit Yosef continues, it appears from Tosafot that they disagree with the Rashba on this:

And Tosafot wrote in the first chapter of Shabbat (ad loc., s.v. “Ve’chi”) at first like the words of the Rashba, and then they posed a difficulty from the Mishnah (Gittin 41a): one who is half slave and half free—we compel his master and he makes him fully free; and we hold (ibid. 38b) that whoever frees his slave transgresses a positive commandment. They answered that procreation is a “great mitzvah.” Another answer: only where he acted negligently—he affixed the bread near nightfall; but where there was no negligence, it is permitted to do a minor prohibition so that his fellow not do a major prohibition; and they proved this from Pesachim (59a) and Eruvin (103b). So too they wrote in Eruvin (32b s.v. “V’lo”) and in Gittin (41a s.v. “Kofin”), in Bava Batra (13a s.v. “Kofin”), in the first chapter of Ḥagigah (2b s.v. “Kofin”), and in Pesachim (88b s.v. “Kofin”). And now, if according to the answer that it is a “great mitzvah,” the matter is clear—there is no greater mitzvah than saving her so that they not frighten her until she apostatizes; and if according to the answer that distinguishes between negligence and non-negligence—here, too, she did not act negligently. Therefore, desecrating Shabbat to oversee her salvation is permitted, and there is even a mitzvah; and if he does not wish to act, we compel him, as we find regarding one who is half slave and half free—we compel his master so that he not be prevented from the mitzvah of procreation because it is great; and it would seem that even to desecrate Shabbat with matters forbidden by the Torah is permissible—for against preventing apostasy and transgression all her days, desecrating Shabbat would be considered a minor prohibition.

The Beit Yosef understands that according to Tosafot, one does desecrate Shabbat in such a case, and the principle “we do not tell a person to sin so that his fellow may merit” does not apply. Why not? At the end of his words he hints at R. Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale—“desecrate one Shabbat so that he may keep many”—and associates it with committing a minor prohibition so that one’s fellow not commit a major one. Note that Tosafot themselves did not discuss this specific question; this is the Beit Yosef’s conclusion according to their approach. From here on I will refer to “Tosafot,” but I mean the Beit Yosef’s understanding of them.

Tosafot do not permit because I am “losing” my son or daughter, but because of the future trangressions they will commit. The goal is to prevent the prohibitions. This recalls the discussion in column 15, where I pointed out that the transgression that concerns the commentators regarding the captive woman is not the rape of the captive, but intercourse with a gentile; that is, the permit to transgress stands opposite a halakhic value, not the violation of the person’s interest. The harm to the person does not concern them. So too here: what troubles the authorities are the future transgressions, and for the Rashba those are insufficient to justify desecrating Shabbat. Even Tosafot, who permit, do so not because of saving my son or daughter to remain with me, but to save them from apostasy.

The Difficulty in the Rashba’s Position

The Rashba’s words are very puzzling. First, is apostasy merely a “major prohibition”? Are entire lives without Torah and mitzvot reduced to one great transgression? Does he not see this as a more severe problem—at least severe enough to justify a transgression for its sake, as Tosafot write? Beyond this, is such a kidnapping not a situation equivalent to pikuach nefesh, thus justifying desecration of Shabbat? Is it not more serious than injury to the eye (the case of the eye above), for which we saw Shabbat may be desecrated?

That is regarding the ruling itself. But even if we accept it, there is a practical-human difficulty: does the Rashba truly expect anyone to abide by such a law? If I saw my son or daughter being kidnapped and about to vanish from my life forever, I would certainly desecrate Shabbat—Rashba or no Rashba. This is very similar to the case of removing the bread in Tosafot (which the Rashba himself cites). Moreover—and this challenges even the Beit Yosef’s reading of Tosafot—even if the kidnapper were an upright Jew who would raise my child on Torah and fear of Heaven, I would still desecrate Shabbat to save the child from him and keep the child with me, regardless of future transgressions. I would be desecrating Shabbat for the sake of the interest, not merely to prevent sins. How can the human distress be ignored, treating this solely as an issue of transgressing in order to save from transgression? This of course returns us to column 15, where we likewise saw disregard for human distress and a focus exclusively on the halakhah.

Possible Explanations

According to Tosafot in Avodah Zarah, it seems straightforward that there is a permit to desecrate Shabbat to save a person from apostasy, for this is no worse than the eye case. Even according to those Rishonim in Shabbat who forbid a “minor prohibition” to save from a “major prohibition,” here there is room to permit, since this is apostasy and not merely a standard transgression. According to Tosafot in Shabbat, it seems obvious they would permit here, since in their view we do not forbid that which no reasonable person would obey (as in removing the bread). But both Tosafot and Rashba as cited by the Beit Yosef are difficult.

It may be that the entire discussion of Tosafot and Rashba is only about the formal halakhic question: is apostasy a sufficiently weighty transgression to justify desecrating Shabbat? According to Tosafot, yes—hence a halakhic permit; according to the Rashba, no—hence no halakhic permit. Running in parallel to this, however, is another track of permit grounded in the great human distress, which also can justify desecration of Shabbat—or at least lead to recognizing the legitimacy of such a transgression (akin to a “transgression for the sake [of Heaven]”). According to this suggestion, the Rashba only says that in the plane of value-clash there is no halakhic permit to desecrate Shabbat to save from apostasy; but my interest and the human distress of my child being taken do justify desecrating Shabbat—only that this is not the topic there. Similarly, Tosafot do not ignore the human difficulty; they simply do not treat it. Their concern is the analysis of transgressing to save from transgression, and in their view that alone permits desecrating Shabbat; thus, there is no need to invoke interest and rights.

I explained something similar in column 15 regarding the “beautiful captive” (eshet yefat to’ar). I argued there that although the Torah permits it, one cannot derive that there is no moral problem. The Torah’s discussion is halakhic, and in the halakhic plane it is indeed permitted; morally it can be entirely forbidden. There the moral plane leads to stringency, while here it leads to leniency (to desecrate Shabbat). But saving one’s child is not necessarily only a leniency in the laws of Shabbat; it is also a stringency in my duty toward my children. To be sure, if I cast it as “my interest,” that I want my children, the claim is harder to make; but if I frame it as my duty toward my children, it is more understandable and compelling.

I remind you of my earlier note regarding whether there is an obligation to desecrate Shabbat in such a case, or merely a permit. We saw that in ordinary pikuach nefesh the Rambam holds one must desecrate Shabbat and it is forbidden to be stringent. I explained that in his view desecration of Shabbat is to gain a halakhic good, which exists only for the three cardinal sins; for other prohibitions the halakhic gain is insufficient to justify martyrdom and it is forbidden. In his view, life is a value and not merely a right or asset, and the permit to desecrate Shabbat is because of the value of life; therefore, in his view one must desecrate Shabbat to save life. But according to Tosafot, one may even be stringent and give one’s life in order not to desecrate Shabbat or to avoid lesser transgressions. I explained that for Tosafot the permit to desecrate Shabbat is only a permit grounded in my right to preserve my life, not because of the value of life; thus it is a permit and not an obligation. Likely, in their view the same would apply to desecrating Shabbat to save from apostasy: if it is based on my interest, it is a permit, not an obligation. According to the Rambam—who bases the permit on the value of life—it would be an obligation. But interest or right may not justify desecration of Shabbat (at least in the halakhic plane).

Another Consideration

In my article on killing a thief, I showed that one may kill a thief who tunnels in—even on Shabbat—even though Shabbat desecration and the prohibition of murder are not set aside for monetary distress. Financial loss does not justify violating such grave prohibitions. I explained there that when the Torah sees someone exploiting halakhah in order to infringe upon my rights, halakhah “sets itself aside” and no longer restricts me. Thus, when the thief exploits the murder and Shabbat prohibitions to steal from me (knowing I cannot defend myself), halakhah removes those restrictions and allows me to defend myself. Likewise in our case: when halakhah “sees” that kidnappers come on Shabbat and exploit Shabbat restrictions that limit my ability to defend myself, halakhah “sets itself aside” and does not bind me. See there how I apply this reasoning to permitting Shabbat desecration for matters of straw and fodder in a town near the frontier.

Add to this the consideration that if halakhah does not allow me to defend myself, then the nations will always kidnap Jews on Shabbat, counting on Jews never being able to defend themselves. Our security cannot be ownerless on Shabbat; it is obvious that here we must permit (see also the series of columns 529–531 on operating the police on Shabbat). This consideration resembles the rationale in Gittin 45a, “lest they be encouraged to seize and bring more,” i.e., if we redeem for more than the captive’s value, the nations will capture more Jews for profit.

A Note on the Difference Between Theory and Practical Ruling

In the beit midrash one can engage this dispute with Olympian calm, setting opinions against each other and weighing proofs and arguments. No one there feels the absurdity of conduct in practice of this kind, because they deal in ideas and do not experience it in reality. Practically, however, it is clear that any sensible person who faces such a situation will not hesitate for a moment and will immediately desecrate Shabbat (even if he happens to have heard of the Rashba and not of the Beit Yosef). Afterwards he may look for ex post facto justifications. Poskim can sense this consideration, but most will try to justify it using the usual halakhic tools; they will hide this rationale behind distinctions without real basis, in order to preserve the halakhic framework. But at base this is a “past nisht” consideration (see columns 447–448).

The takeaway from the above analysis is twofold: On the one hand, to think that theoretical halakhic rulings must always be implemented exactly as stated is naïve and wrong. On the other hand, it is important to clarify the halakhah and its rationales even if in the end it is not implemented—because ultimately the practical consideration too must be conceptualized and admitted as a halakhic consideration. This contributes to halakhic theory and to its application. Beyond that, even were there no practical contribution, such clarification has Torah value—“study and receive reward.” I have often noted the difference between “Torah” and “halakhah”: some domains count as Torah even if they are not halakhah, and some are halakhah even if they are not Torah. For example, monetary laws in halakhah are Torah, but as a matter of practical obligation we are bound by dina de’malkhuta (the law of the land). Thus they are “Torah that is not halakhah.” Conversely, legal studies or dina de’malkhuta are not Torah even if they are what bind us halakhically. See on this columns 582–583 and here. Declarative halakhot are Torah that is not halakhah, and it would seem that the Rashba’s words here about desecrating Shabbat to save from apostasy likewise fall into that category.

The problem arises when theoreticians are empowered to rule practical halakhah, or when people cloistered within the four cubits of halakhah are tasked with leading the public in practice and making practical decisions. This is a fateful mixing of domains that must not be done. Empowering one detached from life who does not understand people and their ways to decide practical questions and lead a community (as is customary in the Haredi world) is a grave error, and any reasonable person can see the results. This does not mean such people have no importance. They certainly do, for “all need the master of the wheat” (i.e., scholars). It is worthwhile to hear their views, but they must not be given authority to decide practical matters and lead the public. See, for example, columns 139, 277, and others.

A fine example appears in the Mishnah at the end of the first chapter of Makkot (7a):

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva said: If we had been in the Sanhedrin, no man would ever have been executed. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: They would thereby increase murderers in Israel.

The Gemara explains there that R. Akiva and R. Tarfon presented a pilpul that would save every murderer—by asking the witnesses whether they saw with certainty that there was no preexisting perforation exactly where the sword penetrated (in which case the killer would be exempt, because he killed a treifah—a person who would have died anyway). In column 351 I explained that the dispute stems from different vantage points. R. Akiva and R. Tarfon were theoreticians—they did not sit on the Sanhedrin. They sat in the beit midrash and played with theories. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the Nasi of the Sanhedrin, bore responsibility to ensure that murderers not proliferate in Israel; he explained to them that practically it is impossible to run a society this way. This is what happens when one conducts practical affairs on the basis of purely theoretical considerations.

A similar feeling accompanies me upon hearing many Haredi arguments about the draft and beyond. The arguments are logically consistent and devoid of common sense. They simply don’t hold water (see, for example, column 609 and the talkbacks that follow). That does not prevent them from clinging to them with great devotion and being convinced that these are knockout arguments, because they live in a bubble detached from life and its constraints. Like children, there are others who live for them and support them. A very apt formulation of this feeling appears in an insightful article by Elchanan Nir, “Religious Zionism and the Haredim: An Unholy Alliance,” in Makor Rishon, parashat Pekudei of this past week. Near the end appears the following passage, in the name of some well-known Haredi rabbi (another Haredi trait: it is hard to know what a person really thinks; there is no real connection between his declarations and his thoughts):

“And toward the end—an anecdote. Recently, I paid a prolonged visit, together with my friend Rabbi Tamir Granot, to a well-known Haredi Gadol. ‘Come, be part of the people of Israel,’ we cried in his ears. He understood and even agreed that we were right. ‘But if I go out publicly and say that you are right,’ he justified himself, ‘they will pursue and excommunicate me.’ He then added candidly: ‘We are a public of children; you are a public of adults. We will not succeed in growing up on our own. The internal mechanism will cut off any attempt at change. You will have to give us a kick; only then will we grow.’”

I highly recommend reading this fascinating and incisive article.

[1] As I noted in column 15, in the plain sense of the Torah the problem is not the rape per se but that it concerns a betrothed maiden.