Re-examining Paradigms Following the Simchat Torah Events (Column 602)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

In the previous column we discussed solutions to paradoxes. A paradox sets an argument that seems logical against a claim we consider correct. I distinguished there between two kinds of solutions to paradoxes: (1) finding a flaw in the argument; (2) rejecting the claim. In the second case, the argument is nothing more than a proof that the claim is false—and that is precisely why we tend to ignore it and seek solutions of the first type. The surprise-exam paradox is resolved by the second route, teaching us that sometimes we should heed counter-arguments rather than be led blindly by our intuitions. If we make the effort to listen to the arguments, it may turn out that our claims were mistaken.

The implication is that if we hold a certain position, we tend to belittle the arguments that attack it. But sometimes the arguments are the correct ones, showing us that we should jettison our existing intuitions and paradigms. In summary I wrote that this recommendation naturally has many current applications, and I intend to touch on several of them in this column. I will address conclusions drawn from the events of the still-ongoing “Swords of Iron” war. Here too, it behooves each of us to re-examine our paradigms in light of events and to re-formulate our stance. This requires the same intellectual integrity I spoke of: a willingness to listen to facts and counter-arguments and to draw conclusions from them.

Disputes and unity after the recent events

In the weeks since Simchat Torah there has been an optimistic sense regarding the social rupture that accompanied us over the past year. Political and ideological disagreements, various hatreds, and polarization have seemingly vanished. There is wondrous unity, and many believe the rift is already behind us. Nothing could be more mistaken. It is indeed encouraging to see that we have not lost the will to live, and that this will naturally requires cooperation and temporary disregard of disagreements, but in my opinion nothing substantive has truly changed. The first shoots of the arguments awaiting us at “six after the war” are already sprouting—it’s just the squill heralding the onset of autumn. In my estimation, after the war, when each of us—every group—stands before the shards of their paradigms and before the results of the war (I have no idea what they will be, though I suspect the long-term situation will not change materially), the disputes will reawaken with greater force and vigor.

When someone on the left or on the right realizes that their previous paradigms have broken, they will need to rebuild their camp identity anew, and then, naturally, points of contention will be found to supply the goods. And if not, we will manufacture them—or focus on people rather than ideas. A common enemy always unites the camp during crisis. Even now, I think the hostages are beginning to constitute such a point (the demonstrations on their behalf look like a continuation of the Kaplan protests, with a theme change). I fear people will be unwilling to draw conclusions and change positions if doing so means admitting that the other/the rival was right. That is a recipe for fixation and for intensifying dispute.

It seems to me that the right way to prepare for the next stage is to re-examine our paradigms in light of these weeks’ events and to formulate updated positions with integrity. Each of us should keep what seems relevant and update what is not. Once we have a position, we can look around and see who is with us and who stands against us. It is not advisable to preserve the disputes along existing fault lines, though human tendency is to such inertia (we see this even now: many honestly admit ideological and paradigmatic fracture in light of events, yet it does not dull their quarrel with their opponents. You will not extract from them an admission that the other—who always said so—was right). If we begin this thinking now, perhaps after the war we may arrive at a somewhat different situation.

Shattering paradigms

My sense is that these events have shattered quite a few paradigms, and surely each of you has read many texts by people writing about that. At first glance I am under the impression that most of the shattered paradigms are associated with the views of the camp commonly called the “left” on our political map (note: for clarity and brevity, I use the terms “left” and “right” here in the imprecise, non-rigorous way common in our political discourse), and indeed most of the confessions come from there. I must say I have not heard, alongside those confessions, a straightforward admission to the ideological rivals who said this all along and were sometimes dismissed and belittled. Apparently there is a limit to people’s honesty—but at least we are on the way. There is also some fracture on the right, though I have seen fewer such admissions there. This column aims to contribute its share to this important process.

It seems to me that the best way to address this difficult situation is for each person to honestly examine their own paradigms, not those of others (especially not of their opponents). Therefore I wish to list here the points I think we should reconsider in light of events, both from the left and from the right. In responses to the column, I ask each person to do one of two things: (1) add points I did not consider or arguments not raised here regarding existing points; (2) describe a paradigm shift—or at least their own doubts—regarding paradigms they held until recent events. Please do not deal here with criticizing others. I think this is not a bad preparation for the days after the war, when perhaps we can try to rebuild ourselves, find common denominators, and better understand positions opposed to our own.

Note that in the sections I will now enumerate, I present considerations that each person ought to take into account. I do not intend to state my own position, though I assume in some cases it can be inferred from my words. I will try to note places where second thoughts arise for me about my previous views.

1. Antisemitism and progressivism

Gadi Taub, in his book Mobile and Stationary, distinguishes between Israelis who typically enjoy higher economic and educational status and are “mobile” in the world. Their connection to the country is not necessary and therefore weaker. They speak a universal language and culture, have friends abroad, and travel often. By contrast, the “stationary” are provincial, attached to the land, and speak a local language and culture. The former usually align with what is called the “left” here and the latter with the “right.”

The mobile generally believe there is no antisemitism in the world (except for justified reasons). Therefore they tend to join outside critiques of us and see in them expressions of our flaws. They speak of war crimes by IDF soldiers, of apartheid toward Arab citizens of Israel, and so forth. In many cases they are the source of those global critiques. The mobile also believe that the global left is characterized by concern for the weak and suffering, by standing with the just—in short, by true liberalism. Hence the global left’s critiques of us stem from a genuinely liberal place (and not from antisemitism). The fact that our friends abroad typically belong to right-wing parties (Trump, Bolsonaro, Orbán, and the like) while left-wing parties are more critical and less friendly toward us was, for them, proof that we are in the wrong (not on the right side of history).

And lo, in recent days one can read pieces by several from the mobile camp confessing to the shattering of their “mobility paradigm.” Contrary to what they thought, antisemitic events around the world reveal to them that antisemitism does exist—that those (former) friends who criticize us do not always do so from objective motives. Not only that, but antisemitism appears more bluntly and sharply precisely within the circles of their peers (the global mobile left, chiefly what is called “progressive”). Their friends are no longer truly friends; the critiques of us are no longer truly objective; and suddenly experiences we thought had vanished from the world return to us (baseless hatred of Jews, persecution and violence toward Jews, refusal to recognize our existence and our right to defend ourselves, automatic support for our enemies, the need to hide Jewish markers, feelings of fear, etc.). Not a few are speaking of understanding the condition and helplessness of our parents’ generations in the Diaspora.

Moreover, anti-Zionist references worldwide that usually aroused their identification now suddenly appear as expressions of antisemitism. Attitudes toward the State of Israel are bound up with its being the state of the Jews; this is not merely criticism of some policy or government. Therefore, criticism of the State of Israel and of Zionism drags along antisemitic attitudes toward Jews around the world regardless of their relation to Israel, their citizenship, or their views. All these are features of the classic antisemitism we grew up on, which, as we learned, attempts to assimilate into the general society usually did not truly succeed in mollifying. One must understand this is a very deep break in the mobile’s worldview, and I have read some moving texts expressing it.

I myself partly shared in all this. It was clear to me that antisemitism certainly exists, and that anti-Zionism is tied to antisemitism (i.e., that the world does not judge us in a balanced and reasonable way), but I thought talk of antisemitism was exaggerated. Not everything is antisemitism; there is also valid criticism. I still think so, but the proportions are apparently different than I thought. Antisemitism is definitely present—and very ugly.

I must say these confessions arouse great respect in me, for they entail relinquishing a stance and an inner movement very fundamental to the universal liberal left’s outlook—the mobile’s outlook. On the margins I must nevertheless note that I missed an admission that there were those who said this all along—that the “stationary” right was correct.

2. Jewish identity

This continues the previous point. As part of those responses, I also see a return to Jewish identity (a retreat from universalism). This point certainly merits further thought. People felt they were citizens of the world, but that very world places them again—just like in the stories—before their Jewish identity from which they tried to flee.

There are quite a few videos of rabbis speaking with soldiers before heading into battle, praying, reciting Psalms, and engaging in religious discourse. This time it seems to be received with greater ease, and perhaps it is part of that awakening and return from universalism to Jewish particularism. I must say this phenomenon arouses some discomfort in me for several reasons. First, in my view these are not “commanded wars” and they are not connected to Judaism or to the enemies of Judaism. It is self-defense against enemies—like any normal nation fighting for its life and protecting its citizens. It is not conducted in the name of G-d but in the name of the right to live. Beyond that, there are soldiers not comfortable with this, and I think it places them in unpleasant situations. I suspect most are reluctant to object or criticize, to stand against their comrades and the prevailing mood, but we must be considerate of them as well.

This is a point for thought from all sides: whether one wants a Jewish/religious identity or not. But as long as not everyone has decided to enter under the wings of the Divine Presence, it is, in my eyes, improper to use the situation created to bring them there against their will. Of course, if there are soldiers who desire it, it is very good that they pray and hold any ceremony their heart wishes—but not as a compulsory framework and not as part of military procedures.

3. The source of Palestinian terror

The common view on the left was that terror arises mainly from the Palestinians’ economic and national distress. The conclusion was that if there were progress on the national conflict and if we alleviated economic distress, redemption would come to Zion. The blockade of Gaza was seen as the main cause of terror. Data showing that terror does not appear precisely among the weaker strata but mainly among the stronger (Hamas leadership is largely composed of academics—quite a few doctors and engineers; I think that has diminished in the current generation) received little attention in public discourse. The written and spoken Hamas/Islamic ideology that speaks of a religious command to conquer the territory in our hands and an inability to compromise in any way (as a religious command) likewise received little true attention. Perhaps one can distinguish between the religious elements among Palestinians and their nationalist ones, but in many cases the difference does not seem significant. As in other religions, some of the religious mentality has undergone secularization and characterizes the secular groups as well. It seems this occurs among them more than among Jews and Christians.

Here too, second thoughts are heard from the left. Suddenly the voices of experts on Islam and Hamas are heard, and they receive some attention. I must say that I myself tended to separate between a person’s or group’s written ideology and their actual behavior (see, for example, in column 507), both for judging them in the present and for forecasting their future conduct. I still think this distinction is important and correct, but recent events prompt me to rethink its applicability to Hamas and perhaps to Palestinians in general.

4. Innocents and non-combatants

Our attitude toward Palestinians who are not involved also merits reconsideration in light of recent events. For me it was clear that harming non-combatants is forbidden unless necessary to achieve our aims (protecting our lives, freeing the hostages, etc.). I still think so. Yet it is hard to ignore the participation of Gaza civilians who eagerly joined the Simchat Torah pogroms and kidnappings and even took a significant part in them. It is very hard to ignore the support of Gaza residents—and most Palestinians generally—for Hamas. Perhaps one can speak of non-combatants, but it is quite hard to speak of innocents (indeed, I used to use “non-combatants,” since I always thought there are very few innocents in Gaza).

It is very hard to relate to a society built wholly on murder and violence, that educates its children from infancy—in kindergartens, schools, and mosques—to terror, to killing Jews, and to antisemitism; that finances and supports terror in various degrees; that refuses any reasonable offer that would improve its life; that laments its terrible condition and yet, through lies and distortions, directs all its resources and the tremendous donations it receives from the world to terror instead of to the welfare of the residents—all without truly diminishing Hamas’s public support. Perhaps the opposite is true. Such a society is indeed a kind of Amalek (symbolically, not necessarily halakhically), and the attitude toward it cannot be like that toward an ordinary enemy society where we distinguish between soldiers/government and civilians. Therefore, today I do not truly recant my view on this matter, but I certainly better understand those who think differently from me about harming non-combatants.

5. The ethics of war

This section is of course related to the previous one. The question of harming innocents (or non-combatants) often arises during action against terror and against terrorists—for example, in targeted killings. Here too the division is between right and left (and in this case the dispute really does align with right/left, as I showed in columns 5 and 151; this is not a spurious correlation). It seems to me these questions must receive renewed attention, for the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is rather blurred. Recent events also cast new light on questions of proportionality (how many non-combatants may one harm to strike a terrorist).

These days one hears new tunes from prominent leftists calling to level Gaza and kill everyone “from infant to suckling.” Kibbutz members from the Gaza envelope, associated with the left, say this again and again. The question is whether they will remember it after the war, and what their view will be when terror victims are from elsewhere (say, in Judea and Samaria). Right-wing talk of “leveling Huwara” or taking a hard line against terror and against the society enabling it always (until a month ago) drew torrents of condemnation and scorn—suddenly the very same talk is heard straight from left bastions. That means someone here must think anew—with integrity.

6. Wartime policy and preemption

As part of the previous discussions, we must ask ourselves about a policy of initiating war. We usually recoil from preventive wars and try to contain almost every enemy move—especially if that move does not directly harm us but consists merely of force-building and preparations to harm us. We act based on successes and outcomes (whether we suffered casualties and how many), not based on capabilities and intentions (amassing weapons and forces for actions against us). The Six-Day War was a notable exception here, though even then it was preceded by prolonged hesitation.

All this requires rethinking. These days’ events teach that we must not accept the force-building of terror organizations on our borders. If they conduct a military exercise or preparations for an attack, that is grounds to destroy them just as for an actual attack. Attempted attacks are grounds for response just like successful attacks. A missile that was fired but did not hit anyone is not grounds for a major response; the very same missile, had it hit and killed, would be grounds for war. It seems to me that recent events sharpen the view that we must strike them ruthlessly even when they are not harming us and when we seemingly enjoy quiet. A policy of containment and a desire for quiet work to our detriment. Their quiet is only for the sake of preparations and force-building (well-anchored in Islamic doctrine), and there is no reason to wait. Initiative should be ours, and initiating war in such circumstances is neither aggression nor a “war of choice.” That includes necessary harm to non-combatants. As noted, our ethics of war should change.

By the way, this has implications for the northern front right now. This is an excellent opportunity to apply that policy toward Hezbollah. For now we have relative quiet (very relative), and we are forbearant (relatively). When the army is mobilized en masse and our population is already evacuated, this is a golden opportunity to deal with them with full force and determination—just as in Gaza. There is no difference between Hamas and Hezbollah in terms of intent, and there is a large difference in capabilities. The fact that Hezbollah currently has no “results” (no successes) should change nothing. They are not amassing power for its own sake; it is meant to be used against us, and so it will be—sooner or later. We cannot avoid addressing this problem forever. Of course, I do not know the data regarding our ability to conduct two such fronts simultaneously; this is merely a principled remark.

One can say our time horizon needs to lengthen. It is not necessarily right to pay prices—certainly irreversible ones—for quiet. In the long term it may exact very heavy costs. The policy of “peace now” and “quiet now” has its place sometimes, but it can also be destructive. Even the agreements with Egypt and Jordan, considered by most of the public as great successes, are not necessarily such. In non-democratic states these agreements are very fragile. As is known, they did not seep into the broader public, which in both states remains very hostile to us. It is an alignment of interests with the regimes alone, and in a non-democratic state such an agreement is dangerous. The next ruler can easily abrogate it (cf. Morsi). The prices we paid for those peace agreements (mainly with Egypt) may cost us dearly in the future. Present quiet is sometimes an illusion.

7. Is there a partner?

The distinction between different Palestinian groups underlies the left’s conception that believes in peace. Note that Bibi—justly criticized for supporting Hamas for years—did not do so because he thinks they are righteous. In his view, they and Fatah are the same garbage, and his entire aim was to divide and pit them against each other. Leftists can criticize him for supporting Hamas (again, justly), but they do so because they think Fatah is a partner and Hamas is not.

I think this position is worth reconsideration, and this time the direction is not univocal. On the one hand, it has been clear for some time that a significant majority of the Palestinian public supports Hamas (hence Abbas avoids elections), so we have a general problem with the Palestinians, not with a specific party among them. On the other hand, in recent weeks we are hearing more and more voices among Arab citizens of Israel distancing themselves from Hamas’s deeds and even taking part in aid to evacuees and victims. The large southern HQ of “Brothers in Arms,” which assists the army and evacuees, is in Rahat. Among the Bedouin in the south there were those who cooperated with the Simchat Torah attacks, but there were also those who fought them and rescued Jews. As is known, some of the murdered were Bedouin. Even the few Arab Israelis expressing support for Hamas (sometimes this is a false accusation, part of the general hysteria washing over us these days) are exceptions that prove the rule that the general public is not there. Part of the reason there was no “Guardian of the Walls”-style unrest here as in “91” is the lack of identification with Hamas and its deeds (and of course also fear that now such acts will no longer be tolerated). A few days ago I saw a poll citing 85% of Arab Israelis opposing the atrocities perpetrated on Simchat Torah. True, 15% not opposing is quite worrying, but it still seems to me this datum should be weighed when formulating our stance on prospects for progress with the Palestinians and the way to achieve it.

8. On the right and racism

On the left there is a tendency to link the right with racism. A discriminatory or differential attitude toward Arabs is seen as improper inequality. I have written here more than once that none of this necessarily has to do with racism (though of course that exists as well), since it concerns enemies seeking our lives. The stance one forms regarding Arabs in general can also radiate onto this question. One who concludes that we are indeed dealing with a nation of enemies (and not a peace-seeking nation with terrorists in its midst) will likely view differently those unwilling to grant them equal treatment. Not everyone who supports the use of force or a strict stance toward Arab nationalism(s) is a racist (regardless of whether they are right and whether I agree).

9. The disengagement

These days one occasionally hears voices expressing second thoughts about the disengagement. They are heard mainly on the right, but the matter certainly merits re-examination. Likewise, many have an automatic aversion to statements about returning now to Gush Katif. They claim the settlers prefer land over people and blood, but recent events should rouse in all of us a willingness to think again. It seems the price exacted from us was not only in land but also in blood. I do not think there is a straightforward conclusion here, but the entire issue requires renewed thought.

I have written more than once that the disengagement is not a one-off step. When asked my opinion of it, I replied that I have no opinion because the question is ill-defined. Such an action is not merely withdrawal from territory; in tandem one must define responses and policy for every subsequent event. If one speaks only of leaving the territory without defining accompanying policy, one cannot properly discuss the question. I think everyone understands that had we taken a tougher stance toward Hamas’s force-building and toward rocket fire, tunnels, and incendiary balloons, we would not have reached recent events. Therefore, laying everything at the feet of the disengagement is making life easy for ourselves—not to mention the dangers to the communities that would have lived inside the Strip and to the soldiers who would have protected them. Undoubtedly, supporters of the disengagement must rethink matters—but its opponents cannot bring a simple proof for their position from recent events either.

10. Gilad Shalit and the cash suitcases

It is now very fashionable to blame Bibi for the Shalit deal, which set a problematic precedent encouraging kidnappings for bargaining. Is it right to do so when the overwhelming majority of the public supported and exerted enormous pressure to make such a deal? Suddenly it turns out that everyone was very wise and only Bibi was foolish. I remember that my wife and I visited the Shalit family’s protest tent near the Prime Minister’s Residence at the height of that immense pressure and engaged in a heated argument about the justification for such a deal (by the way, even they did not fully support it; at least they said they expected some actions applying pressure levers to free Gilad—not necessarily a swap deal). Those who opposed the deal at the time were portrayed as far-right fanatics indifferent to human life. Media and public consensus in favor of the deal was wall-to-wall, save for a few rightists (mainly rabbis) portrayed as extreme and marginal. Moreover, even I—who opposed the deal then—fully support a swap deal today (given the number of captives, their ages, and the chance of freeing them otherwise). You can see the immense pressure these very days for freeing the hostages and especially for a deal. Of course, that will not prevent criticism of such a deal, if made, by those same people.

In my view there is no necessary dependency between then and now. Moreover, even if Gilad were still in captivity, do you really think Hamas would lack motivation to mount this mega-attack? Do they not understand it gives them a tremendous card and a good chance to get a deal? And even if they had not taken captives, they would have killed them. The calculus is far from simple.

The same applies to the Qatari cash suitcases to Hamas. Now everyone is wise and criticizes Bibi for that decision. In real time, many supported that policy to maintain quiet in the Strip and not give them motivation for attacks. Even those on the left who criticized Bibi for it did so mainly to show his inconsistency, not out of genuine opposition to the move. After all, one who opposes the blockade of Gaza cannot say he opposes transferring the cash suitcases.

In any case, all these are complex issues, and hindsight wisdom is the easiest. This certainly demands honest, renewed thinking—not the release of agenda-driven slogans for or against Bibi.

11. Trust in the IDF: “Let the IDF win”

We all grew up with almost absolute trust in the army. Although most of us were there and know how it operates (including the jokes that reason stops at the gate), somehow the army’s status in Israeli society did not truly suffer. People tend to think that if the government did not interfere, the army would solve all problems. It turns out that is not necessarily the case. Our army is apparently rather mediocre, lacks genuine creative thinking, operates negligently, and of course does not really want to win. Israel’s constant policy—aimed at buying a bit more quiet at reasonable prices—does indeed receive support in the army. In many cases the army moderates the government, not the other way around.

These days’ events caught the army with its pants down. It is convenient for those on the left to attribute everything to the government, but it is quite clear that the core problem was actually in the army. Much has already been written: we were captivated by technological charms, by the desire for quiet, by the “deterrence” we thought we had achieved, by lack of thought, by reactivity, by lack of initiative, and more. Therefore our attitude toward the army now requires a deep, root-level refresh (up to the question of a professional army, strategic think-tanks outside the army and government, etc.).

12. Limits of power and political constraints

The term “limits of power” has two meanings relevant here.

• We do not have infinite power—far from it. Ministers in the current government told Biden and the Americans to mind their own business and let us handle our problems, out of some hubris that we can solve everything ourselves if only others wouldn’t interfere (an extended version of “Let the IDF win”). But these days it becomes clear that our power is not unlimited; it is conditioned on the Americans (and on other countries). It’s not just the diplomatic backing needed to keep fighting, but also the supply of missiles and munitions (Iron Dome, smart bombs, bunker-busters, and more) without which we could not conduct this war—and certainly not if it expands to the northern arena and Iran, etc. Think what would happen if our Iron Dome interceptors were exhausted against Hezbollah’s hundreds of thousands of rockets (even against Hamas they would likely be exhausted at some point). Our dependence on the Americans and the world has been sharply highlighted. Precisely because our enemy is a relatively primitive terror organization—not very strong or well-equipped—and we see that even against it we lack a real ability to handle the problem on our own, this should teach us some humility and elevate the importance of realpolitik considerations. This does not mean we must yield on everything; but if there is a genuine American dictate (they will not support us unless we do X), we have no real choice. All the armchair sages should take note, instead of sending Biden to do his homework.
• Even if we had infinite power, power’s ability to solve all problems is limited. These events show that power indeed does not answer everything. Hamas—with its hang-gliders, tunnels, and balloons, and with drones bought on AliExpress—manages time and again to outwit a powerful, sophisticated, well-equipped IDF, and to embitter the lives of residents in the envelope and the south. Thinking and creativity are parameters no less important than power, and of course the constraints within which we wield power matter as well.

Here too, debate naturally rages between right and left. To the right it is clear that power answers everything and we can overcome and manage on our own; the left explains again and again that power only creates problems and does not solve them. The situation is more complex. Power is important and we should certainly use it (see previous sections), but it has quite a few limits as well.

13. Trust in the “full-on right” policy

This follows the previous section. Even before recent events it was plainly evident that a forceful policy does not necessarily yield good results in security and crime. Ben-Gvir and Bibi, who spoke in the name of governance and security, brought us to abysses in these realms, and the past weeks are only the tip of that process. This must prompt further reflection on the limits of power and on effective policy for dealing with crime and terror. This does not mean that peace processes will do the job better, but bluster and ratcheting up force are apparently not particularly effective tools either.

I have often written that reason is a more effective instrument than gut and emotion in these matters and generally. My sense is that both right and left focus too much on feeling. If we did not disparage our moral sense yet did not see it as the be-all and end-all, and if we overcame the frustration caused by terror and by Palestinian refusal and thought more coolly about what to do, I think we could reach not insignificant agreements on proper policy.

14. Credit to public representatives and political compromises

One cannot ignore who the members of the current horror-show government are and what their capabilities are. Many voters were ready to swallow many frogs just to advance a “full-on right” policy, governance, and security—and also a judicial reform. To that end they were prepared to buy corruption, appointments of cronies and of unqualified people to key posts, the splitting of ministries and opening of content-less offices, the transfer of funds and catering to parasitic groups that only drag the economy backwards, division, incitement, and factionalism among segments of the population; ministers spineless and lacking courage and independent thought, who exercise not a drop of criticism of their leader even when it is against the interest of the state and their own; and more. These days—in which we have a government of 33 ministers plus various deputies that utterly fails to function (and in such an extreme situation this stands out sevenfold), while civil society does almost all the work—we are eating the rotten fruits of such compromise conceptions.

Each person must now ask themselves whether it still seems right to pay all these prices and accept these problematic figures and conduct merely because this is a “necessary evil” (so that we get “full-on right squared”). And it is not only because the full-on-right policy has clearly not proven itself; even if it had, these days show the heavy prices we pay for it. We tend to belittle norms of proper administration and are used to treating public funds and political appointments as tools for maintaining power and creating coalitions. As is known, proper administration is for embittered leftists. I say this about the current government because it is the one in office now. But the lesson is general and applies in all directions (it is not as if in left and center parties everyone is competent and morally exemplary, nor that everything there was and is conducted properly). In other words: should we choose a party only because of its platform, or must we also examine the ability and will to implement the platform and—no less—the people serving in it and the propriety of its conduct? We must ask whether the ends justify all means. As noted, this point addresses right-wing voters mainly, but the principled questions must be asked regarding every party and every voter.

15. The importance of all parts of society

At both political extremes there was a feeling that one could manage without the other side. Karai and other ministers told the leftist pilots to go to hell (along with Biden). In their view, Golani infantrymen can also man the Air Force. On the other side there was hubris as well, as if everything depends on them. These days’ events show that all sides are likely required—certainly when we have no government, but even if we did. One side truly cannot manage without the other: not in the economy, not in society, and not in the army. We need cocky pilots and left-leaning startup and hi-tech people, as well as fanatically right-wing religious infantrymen—and also right-wing thinkers and rabbis who will warn us of the movie many from the mobile bubble live in, as exposed these days. But we also need left-wing defeatist thinkers who teach us the limits of power and draw our attention to moral rules and sensitivities that still exist even in such conflicts.

At the same time, perhaps we need the rabbis’ fiery talks and prayers before battle (personally, I have had my fill of flimsy homilies about the war and its deep religious meanings), but to the same degree there is room for those who protest and are irritated by it. And especially, we need sensitivity to manage this with attention to the fact that the IDF is not the army of G-d and does not fight the wars of G-d. In general, the attack on Simchat Torah is not an opportunity to promote redemption; it is a security—and perhaps also national—event that must be addressed so as to prevent its recurrence.

There is a delicate fabric here; therefore, although in quite a few units there is dominance of soldiers from one particular side of the politico-religious map, we must not follow the tendency to exploit their sensitivities and extreme states to advance our agenda. A military rabbi is a formal role, and in our army there is no “Chief Secular Officer” (à la Eretz Nehederet) opposing him. Whether one accepts this or not, it is a sensitive matter that merits attention.

16. Drafting women for combat roles

There are other, very different questions that require renewed thought. Many voices point to female fighters and commanders who acted with great courage and saved lives—in infantry combat and in tanks. Many say this war proved that opposition to drafting women is anachronistic. In my view, this certainly merits renewed thought, but I still want to say the conclusion is not straightforward.

Anyone who thought that women are essentially incapable of fighting or lack courage is living in a fantasy. That is now proven—if proof were even needed. But the question concerns large numbers of women (how many such women are there), different kinds of combat (which missions suit women), screening methods, training concessions, endurance in training and battle (including medical injuries due to exertion), fear of female soldiers falling captive and what would be done to them (consider: had Gilad Shalit been a female soldier, would the attitude have been similar?), how decisions should be made when the risk is to female soldiers and not male soldiers, and more.

All these points still require attention, and my sense is that both sides do not address them honestly. Undoubtedly, even the army’s examinations are biased by various agendas; information is withheld from us; thus this debate proceeds from the gut.

For example, I have often heard that a certain abducted female soldier “is just a 19-year-old girl who needs to come home,” and other statements you likely would not hear regarding a male soldier captive or abducted. One cannot deny that a female soldier’s captivity differs from a male’s and that the attitude toward her differs—ours and that of captors. Let me remind us that the terrorists on Simchat Torah raped young women, not young men[1] (I understand that under Islamic laws of war there are three days in which anything goes—especially rape and looting). Consider also that since the abductions on Simchat Torah, we repeatedly hear talk of a “humanitarian deal” returning women and children. Why are women different from men? Are male civilians not a humanitarian concern? My sense is that in real time, distress causes slogans to vanish and true conceptions to surface. Again, nothing here is meant to stake out a position, and I do not think recent events can determine one. My aim is only to raise a point requiring honest, up-to-date thought and to point out that it is not necessarily correct to generalize from a few cases and aspects to the entire issue.

On the margins I note that if our attitude toward the army changes, then officers will not necessarily receive preference for roles and careers in civilian life, and then the problem of inequality regarding women in combat roles would diminish. Today, part of the motivation to integrate women into all roles is built on the desire to give women an equal footing for advancement in civilian careers and positions.

A few concluding remarks

As noted, most of these points address left-leaning voters and figures, but there is plenty of food for thought here for the right as well. Each person must formulate their own stance and examine whether they must change something in their existing paradigms. Events as extreme as those we experienced over the past year—and especially over the last month—should rouse us to honest and courageous thought; otherwise, at “six after the war,” we will say “as last year.” The current emotional wave of unity (too syrupy for my taste—likely a reaction to last year’s polarization) will not endure for long; after the war, the disputes simmering beneath the surface will return and rise with greater force. The problem is not the existence of disagreements but the fanatic clinging of each person to their position and the unwillingness to reconsider it—and no less, the mutual attitudes that prevent us from making decisions acceptable to all.

Against this backdrop, one more important note: Formulating a stance regarding these questions aims not only at reaching conclusions but also at understanding the other side’s position. Thus, for example, even if I conclude that we should treat Arabs equally and that they are partners for peace, I can still understand one who thinks otherwise (sees no chance for peace and/or advocates a tougher use of force toward them). He is not necessarily a racist or benighted. Likewise, one who does not believe that force is the ultimate solution to all problems is not necessarily a leftist defeatist, hedonist, traitor, or non-Zionist. This remark is very important for other points in the public debate as well (for example, the judicial reform in its various clauses). In most cases there, too, one who thinks differently from me is not necessarily wicked; but I did not address those aspects here because I wished to focus only on points connected to the “Swords of Iron” events.

It is important to qualify: Formulating a position should not depend on trust in or esteem for the other side. I must form my position from arguments, regardless of my attitude toward those presenting them. Still, mutual esteem matters in at least two respects: (1) when one respects those arguing, one is more willing to listen to their arguments against one’s own and to reconsider one’s views; (2) when there is esteem, I do not see the other as stupid or evil, and that helps conduct the debate and reach agreed decisions. It prevents the social disintegration we experienced in recent months.

I reiterate my request regarding comments to this column. I asked respondents to do one of two things: (1) add points not raised here; (2) tell of a paradigm shift—or at least of your own doubts—regarding paradigms you held until recent events. Please do not engage here in criticizing others, patting yourself on the back, or saying how right you always were. Responses that aim to promote an existing agenda, or that do not fit this aim, will be deleted with a heavy hand, contrary to my site’s usual moderation policy.

[1] Someone told me young men as well, but I do not know. Well, at least for the sake of discussion I think it is an argument that prompts thought.