Commandment of Circumcision as the Father’s Commandment Concerning His Son (Column 599)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

This past Shabbat (Parashat Lech Lecha) I spoke about some of the unique features of the commandment of circumcision (milah), in particular the relationship between the father’s commandment and the son’s, and their significance for halakhah in general. There is a legal-conceptual foundation here that, I believe, has not yet appeared on the site, and I thought this would be a good opportunity to present it. In this column I will discuss the special structure of the commandment of milah, which distinguishes between performance of the commandment and responsibility for its performance. In the next column I will discuss the significance of this structure and encounter it in additional halakhic contexts.

Circumcision as the Son’s Commandment Upon the Father

The Mishnah in Kiddushin 29a presents two categories of commandments that connect a father and a son:

“All commandments of the son upon the father—men are obligated and women are exempt. And all commandments of the father upon the son—both men and women are obligated.”

The Gemara there details “the son’s commandments upon the father”:

“What are ‘all the commandments of the son upon the father’? If you say: all commandments that a child is obligated to do for his father—are women exempt? But it was taught: ‘A man’—I have only a man; from where [do we include] a woman? When it says, ‘A man shall fear his mother and his father’—behold, both [are included]. Rather, said Rav Yehudah: thus he said—‘all the commandments of the son that are imposed upon the father to do for his son’—men are obligated and women are exempt. We have learned this [already] in a baraita: ‘A father is obligated with regard to his son: to circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to marry him off to a wife, and to teach him a trade; and some say, even to teach him to swim.’ Rabbi Yehudah says: ‘Whoever does not teach his son a trade—it is as though he teaches him banditry.’ [Do we say] that he actually teaches him banditry?! Rather, it is as if he teaches him banditry.”

The terminology here is confusing (indeed, in the Mechilta the wording is reversed), but the Gemara explains that these are commandments the father must perform for his son. One of these commandments is circumcision. Simply put, all these commandments prepare the son for a mature Jewish life (see the beginning of my essay “On Honoring Parents and Halakhic Territory”).

Indeed, in Parashat Lech Lecha, in chapter 17—after the barrenness of Sarah and the birth of Ishmael are described—the Torah speaks at great length about the covenant God makes with Abraham and his descendants. Within this covenant He commands (vv. 9–14):

“God said to Abraham: ‘As for you, you shall keep My covenant—you and your offspring after you throughout their generations. This is My covenant which you shall keep, between Me and you and your offspring after you: every male among you shall be circumcised. You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and it shall be the sign of the covenant between Me and you. At eight days old every male among you shall be circumcised throughout your generations—one born in the house and one bought with money from any foreigner who is not of your offspring. He that is born in your house and he that is bought with your money shall surely be circumcised; and My covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant. And an uncircumcised male who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin—that person shall be cut off from his people; he has broken My covenant.’”

Here there is a command to circumcise every male (slaves and children), and karet is the punishment for one who remains uncircumcised. Subsequently, the Torah describes Abraham’s execution of the command (vv. 23–27):

“Abraham took Ishmael his son, and all those born in his house, and all who were bought with his money—every male among the men of Abraham’s house—and he circumcised the flesh of their foreskins on that very day, as God had spoken with him. And Abraham was ninety-nine years old when he circumcised the flesh of his foreskin. And Ishmael his son was thirteen years old when the flesh of his foreskin was circumcised. On that very day Abraham and Ishmael his son were circumcised; and all the men of his house—those born in the house and those bought with money from a foreigner—were circumcised with him.”

Abraham circumcised himself, Ishmael his son, and all the members of his household. In the next parashah, after Isaac is born, Isaac’s circumcision is also mentioned.

At first glance there is one commandment: that every male undergo circumcision, and Abraham fulfills it upon himself and upon his son Ishmael. But we know that in halakhah the understanding is different, as seen later in that sugya:

“From where [do we know the obligation] to circumcise his son? As it is written: ‘Abraham circumcised Isaac his son.’ And where the father did not circumcise him, the court is obligated to circumcise him, as it is written: ‘You shall circumcise for yourselves every male.’ And where the court did not circumcise him, he himself is obligated to circumcise himself, as it is written: ‘An uncircumcised male who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin—he shall be cut off.’”

The Gemara determines that, fundamentally, this is the son’s commandment upon the father, who is obligated to circumcise his son. Only if the father did not do so does the court perform it; and finally, if that did not occur, the son circumcises himself. In other words, the command to Abraham to circumcise his sons was no coincidence: the father is the one obligated to circumcise his son.

The Fundamental Difficulty

This definition of the commandment of milah requires explanation. It would seem that the commandment is upon the father, and the son is merely the object of the act. But if so, why—if the father did not circumcise—do the court, and afterward the son himself, become obligated? Evidently the commandment is not only upon the father. One might have thought there are two different commandments, yet none of the enumerators of the commandments counts them as such. Moreover, there is clearly a connection between these two obligations, for if the father circumcises, the son is exempt (by contrast, if the child was born circumcised, he still requires the drawing of covenantal blood).

One could claim that the commandment is upon the son, and the father fulfills it as his agent. But that too is unclear, for we ought to leave the commandment to the son for when he grows up. Why instruct the father to “snatch” the commandment from his son and perform it earlier? Another possibility: the commandment is upon the father, but if he did not fulfill it, someone else fulfills it on his behalf. That too is strange: if the son circumcises himself (especially after the father’s death), how does that benefit the father, to be considered as having fulfilled the commandment? The son is not the father’s agent, and in some cases the father does not wish it or is no longer alive.

To sharpen the difficulty, let us distinguish among three types of commandments of a person vis-à-vis another person in halakhah.

Three Types of Commandments Toward Another Person

The first type comprises one person’s rights that generate obligations upon another toward him. These are the commandments of Choshen Mishpat (see my essay here). For example, if I damaged Reuven, Reuven has the right to receive compensation from me, and thus I have an obligation toward him. Such obligations may be litigated in court. The second type comprises my obligations toward the other that are not rooted in his rights. These are the commandments between a person and his fellow of Yoreh De’ah, such as usury and charity. The poor person has no right to receive charity from me, but I have an obligation to give to him. The upshot is that if I do not fulfill this obligation, he cannot sue me in court. Beyond these two types there is a third: my obligations where the other person serves merely as a “statist.” That is, he is the heichi timtza (the circumstance) for fulfilling my obligation, but that obligation is not toward him. The first two types are obligations between a person and his fellow; this one is not.

This third type is described in the essay Midah Tovah for Parashat Va’etchanan, 5767 (chapter 4). The question I dealt with there was: why do we not recite a blessing over the commandment of charity (though I cited an opinion that we do)? The Rashba, Responsa 18, deals with the rules that determine over which commandments we bless and over which we do not. Among other things, he writes:

“Likewise, we do not bless over a commandment that is not entirely within the doer’s control, because it is possible that his fellow will not consent and the act will be nullified—such as gifts to the poor, lending to the needy, and giving charity, and severance-payment grants and the like. And so too for matters that are submitted to the court, such as doing justice—perhaps the litigants will not accept his judgment.”

He writes that we do not bless over charity because fulfillment of the commandment depends on the other person, and if he does not consent, the act is nullified. Simply put, his intent is that there is concern that the other will not agree and the blessing will turn out to have been in vain.

I noted there that several later authorities object from the blessing on betrothal. There, too, the matter depends on the woman’s consent, and yet we bless over betrothal.[1] For example, the Chatam Sofer, Responsa Orach Chaim no. 54, raises several questions on the Rashba and considers various ways to resolve them. At the end he brings the challenge from the blessing over betrothal:

“Furthermore, Peri Megadim wrote on the Rashba’s responsum that any commandment not completed without another person’s assistance does not receive a blessing, and therefore we do not bless over charity and the like, for if the recipient says, ‘I do not wish to receive it,’ there is no commandment (cf. the proof he brings from tractate Niddah: the positive commandment ‘and she shall be his wife’ does not override a prohibition, because if she says, ‘I do not wish,’ there is no commandment). And Peri Megadim wondered from the blessing over betrothal, for if she says, ‘I do not wish to be betrothed to him,’ there is no positive commandment—for she is not commanded in procreation—yet we still bless.”

And he resolves it as follows:

“With due respect, this question is imprecise. The Rashba’s intent concerns any commandment that is for the benefit of one’s fellow, and if the fellow does not wish to accept that benefit, there is no commandment here. Not so with procreation, which is not for the woman’s benefit, but rather an obligation that the Holy One, blessed be He, imposed upon the man to procure himself a wife to marry him; and if he does not find [one], it is considered that he intended to do the commandment and was prevented. In every positive commandment, if one is coerced by gentiles or bandits, or if one does not find an etrog or tefillin and the like, this is not within the Rashba’s words. This is evident from the Rambam’s sweet language (Laws of Blessings 11:2): ‘Over every commandment between a person and God… whether it is obligatory…,’ etc. These few words include all the Rashba’s words: a commandment between a person and his fellow does not receive a blessing, for if the fellow says, ‘I do not wish,’ there is no commandment; whereas between a person and God, even if it requires another person—still, even if the other says, ‘I do not wish,’ we do not say there is no commandment, but rather that he was prevented and did not find an opportunity to fulfill it. And therefore this is a commandment between a person and God, and we bless over it. This is simple and clear, with God’s help.”

He explains that the Rashba’s intent is only regarding commandments intended for the benefit of the other person, not every commandment that depends on another person. Charity is a commandment toward another (of the second type, Yoreh De’ah), but betrothal is not a commandment toward the woman. The woman is merely the circumstance through which I fulfill the commandment. In such commandments we bless and do not fear the other’s refusal. The root of the matter is that in commandments intended for the other, if he does not consent, there is no commandment in the act at all; accordingly, there is nothing over which to bless. In contrast, in commandments like betrothal, which indeed depend on the other’s will but are not intended for his benefit (for procreation is incumbent upon the husband), there we do bless even according to the Rashba, and we do not fear that the other will not agree.[2] The other is merely the circumstance enabling fulfillment of the commandment. We may say that such commandments are “inter-personal” in the sense that the other is merely the subject of the commandment, not its goal. The commandment is fulfilled through him but not for him; therefore, it is not a commandment between a person and his fellow. The other functions here as a kind of extra.

Back to the Commandment of Milah

In light of the above we can consider the nature of the father’s obligation to circumcise his son. From the context of “the son’s commandments upon the father,” one might have understood that milah is one of the obligations by which the father prepares his son for a mature Jewish life—just like teaching him a trade, teaching him Torah, marrying him off, teaching him to swim. This is the father’s obligation toward his son; and yet in all of these, if the father did not do them for the son, the son will do them himself. True, in the commandment of Torah study the son will act because of the commandment itself and not to fulfill his father’s commandment; whereas with a trade or swimming he will do so out of self-interest (and one must consider what to say about marrying him off). In this sense, milah resembles Torah, not a trade.

Not always, when I am commanded regarding my fellow, is it a commandment of my fellow that I merely assist him in fulfilling. Sometimes it is my fellow’s interest, and satisfying it is my commandment. People commonly say: someone else’s “this world” is my “world-to-come.” At times I am commanded to grant someone else an interest; for me, that is a commandment. In milah, of course, it is not the son’s “interest” in that sense; nevertheless, we can still view it as a state which, from the Torah’s perspective, is desirable for the son, and the father’s obligation to bring him to that state is a commandment toward him. From the foregoing, it also emerges that in the commandment of milah the father’s obligation may not be toward his son; rather, the son here serves merely as the circumstance through which the father fulfills his obligation. In any case, if the father did not circumcise him, the son circumcises himself—and that is certainly not a commandment for the father’s sake. Therefore, it is more reasonable to understand that the commandment is upon the son, and the father is commanded to do it for him.

Put differently: the commandment is that the son be circumcised, and the responsibility for that rests first on the father, and afterward on the son himself. The content of the commandment is the state of the son’s being circumcised (a “result-commandment”), and the obligations here are the father’s and son’s responsibility to achieve that state. Therefore, among the enumerators of the commandments this is counted as a single commandment and not two.

Agency in Milah

We can see this structure of the father’s obligation through a dispute among the Rishonim regarding agency (sheliach) in milah (see about this in the essay Midah Tovah for Parashat Tetzaveh, 5767, chap. 4. In the preceding chapters I demonstrated the same point regarding tending the lamps in the Temple).

The Tosafot Rid on Kiddushin 29b asks why a verse is needed to exempt a woman from circumcising her son; after all, this is a positive time-bound commandment. He explains as follows:

“Answer: When we say that women are exempt from positive time-bound commandments, that applies to a commandment dependent on her person, and she is commanded only at a set time and not at all times; but a commandment not dependent on her person, such as circumcising her son—even though the son’s circumcision has a time—granted, the time is fixed for the circumcised son, but the parent whom the Creator commanded to engage in his son’s circumcision, that engagement has no time, for whether by day or by night he must exert himself and prepare his son’s circumcision; therefore, were it not for that [verse], we would obligate the woman as well, and there is no fixed time. Consequently, we exempt her—because I might have said that she should engage day or night until she circumcises her son in its time. But tzitzit is a commandment dependent on the person’s body, and if we were to obligate the woman, her commandment would be time-bound; therefore, she is exempt.”

He explains that the parent’s commandment is not to circumcise his son with his own hands but “to engage in” his son’s circumcision, i.e., to ensure that his son will be circumcised. That engagement has no fixed time; therefore, were it not for the verse we would not exempt women from this commandment.

So too writes Maharach Or Zaru’a, Responsa no. 11, regarding appointing an agent on the father’s behalf for his son’s circumcision (see also Kli Chemdah, Lech Lecha, §4):

“From the matter of milah it seems that the father is not obligated to circumcise his son with his own hands, but rather to engage such that he be circumcised—just like all those listed there: to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, to teach him to swim. Would he not hire a teacher to teach his son Torah and for all those…? Rather, in all those, the essence of the commandment is not the doing, but that the circumcision be sealed in his flesh… And milah as well—its essence is likewise, for otherwise, why did King David, of blessed memory, who felt distressed when he entered the bathhouse and saw himself naked without a commandment, then remember the milah? If the commandment of milah were only the act, why did he rejoice in it more than in his head and his arm and his entire body, in which he fulfilled the commandments of tefillin, tzitzit, and many commandments? Rather, milah is a commandment at all times…”

“Furthermore, if the father himself were obligated to circumcise him—either he or specifically his agent—then if another circumcised [the child] without the father’s permission, for he does not desire his agency, [the child] would not be circumcised, and one would need to draw covenantal blood from him—just as one who says to his agent, ‘Go and separate tithes,’ and [the sender] then went and found that they were [already] separated; we say, perhaps another person heard and went and separated, and the Merciful One said, ‘You [shall do so] with your consent…’ (Hullin 12a). Rather, certainly the father is not obligated to circumcise with his own hands, but to engage so that his son be circumcised. No need to elaborate.”

From his words it emerges—and halakhic authorities have concluded likewise—that the father need not appoint the mohel as his agent at all. The commandment of milah is not imposed upon the father such that, if someone else performs it, he must be the father’s agent. The father is only charged with ensuring that his son be circumcised (to bring the mohel and supply the needs of the circumcision), and thereby he fulfills his obligation.[3] This is a halakhic consequence that follows from the Tosafot Rid’s approach above.

We can liken this to the commandment of a guardrail (ma‘akeh). If a person’s house already has a guardrail, he is not obligated to erect one. Likewise, if someone else erected a guardrail for him, he is exempt, even if the other was not his agent. True, the commandment will likely not be credited to him unless the erector was his agent (though in any event he has not neglected a positive commandment). By contrast, in milah it seems that if the mohel is not his agent, not only is he exempt from the obligation, but the commandment is even credited to him (at least if he ensured that his son be circumcised).

We have now reached precisely the definition proposed above: the commandment is that the son be circumcised, and what is imposed upon the father is only the responsibility that this be realized. More generally, we may say there are three levels of fulfilling a commandment via an agent: (1) ordinary commandments can be fulfilled through agency; (2) there are commandments for which agency is ineffective (halitzah, annulling vows, tefillin and all bodily commandments); (3) and there are commandments for which no agency is needed, like milah. What sets apart commandments for which agency is unnecessary is that the commandment is on the outcome, not the act. That is the case with the father’s obligation to circumcise his son: the commandment upon the father is not to circumcise his son but to ensure that he is circumcised. This aligns with all the son’s commandments upon the father, which—as we saw—are all obligations to ready him for adulthood (as noted, these matters are elaborated in my essay referenced above, “On Honoring Parents and Halakhic Territory”).

Hiddur (Enhancement) in Milah

There is another consequence of this conception regarding the tzitzin (residual protrusions of skin) that do not invalidate the milah. The Mishnah in Shabbat 133a brings the following law:

“One may perform all needs of milah [on Shabbat]: one circumcises, uncovers [the glans], sucks [the blood], and places upon [the wound] a compress and cumin, …”

And the Gemara there (133b) discusses the case of one who finished circumcising and then saw that he had not cut the tzitzin that do not invalidate (they are cut only for beautification). Does he go back and cut them or not?

“Since it teaches ‘all needs of milah,’ what does this include? It includes that which the Sages taught: The one performing milah, so long as he is engaged in the milah, returns to cut both the tzitzin that invalidate the milah and those that do not invalidate it. If he disengaged: for tzitzin that invalidate the milah he returns; for tzitzin that do not invalidate it, he does not return.”

The Gemara states that the law is that he does not return; and so is the halakhic ruling. For example, in the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 331:2:

“As long as he has not removed his hand from the milah, he returns even for tzitzin that do not invalidate. If he removed his hand, he returns only for tzitzin that invalidate. These are the invalidating ones: flesh that covers even most of the height of the glans in one place.”

This appears in the laws of Shabbat and clearly pertains to Shabbat. On a weekday he certainly returns even for tzitzin that do not invalidate. So it appears as well from Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 266:2, and parallels in the Tur.

Yet, strikingly, when the Rambam brings this law he does not mention Shabbat. Thus he writes in Laws of Milah 2:3–4, where he defines the act of milah:

“3. There are tzitzin that invalidate the milah and tzitzin that do not invalidate. How so? If there remains from the foreskin flesh that covers most of the height of the glans, he is as uncircumcised as before—this flesh is an invalidating tzitz. But if there remains only a little, not covering most of the height of the glans, this is a non-invalidating tzitz.

4. One performing milah—so long as he is engaged in the milah—returns for both invalidating and non-invalidating tzitzin. If he disengaged: for invalidating tzitzin he returns; for non-invalidating tzitzin he does not return. If he circumcised and did not ‘uncover’ (peri‘ah), it is as though he did not circumcise.”

It is quite clear that he rules not to return for non-invalidating tzitzin even on a weekday. True, there (2:6) he writes:

“One may perform all needs of milah on Shabbat: one circumcises, uncovers, sucks, and returns for invalidating tzitzin even if he disengaged, and for non-invalidating tzitzin as long as he has not disengaged…”

But in light of what he wrote above, it seems he means: one does not return on Shabbat because even on weekdays one does not return. Therefore, if he nevertheless returns, it is unnecessary and thus constitutes desecration of Shabbat. Several of his commentators indeed understood him this way.

We thus learn that the Rambam disagrees with the other halakhic authorities (like the Tur and Shulchan Aruch) who understood this as a law of Shabbat. In my view, even on a weekday one does not return for non-invalidating tzitzin. The question is: why? On Shabbat one does not desecrate Shabbat for a hiddur (enhancement) of a commandment detached from the act of the commandment once he has disengaged. But why, on a weekday, should he not go back and enhance the commandment even after disengaging?

Two sages of the Brisker school addressed this question on the Rambam, offering an explanation for the dispute between the Rambam and the Tur (and the Shulchan Aruch): the Beit HaLevi and his grandson, the Griz (see about this in the essay Midah Tovah, 5767, Parashat Beshalach, which deals with hiddur mitzvah in general and this sugya in particular). The Sha’agat Aryeh, no. 50, also discusses this question.

In Responsa Beit HaLevi II:47, he challenges the Rambam from the sugya of flaying the Passover sacrifice (Shabbat 116) and offers this explanation of his view:

“What seems, in the Rambam’s view, to resolve [the difficulty] is the following reasoning. Indeed, it is difficult: what is the Gemara’s question [that we should derive hiddur from ‘This is my God and I will beautify Him’ and bring the baraita about making a beautiful sukkah]? What comparison is there between them? With sukkah and lulav, when one makes them beautiful there is, at the time of fulfilling the commandment, ‘and I will beautify Him’—it is appropriate to say that the fulfillment of the commandment should be in the most beautiful, enhanced manner. Not so with milah: once he has circumcised and disengaged, the very act of the commandment has already been completed entirely—for the commandment is to circumcise his son, and behold, he has circumcised him. If he then returns, after he has already disengaged, to [cut] the tzitzin that do not invalidate, he will be ‘beautifying’ without fulfilling a commandment. Granted, before he disengaged, when it is all one act, he is indeed obligated to cut even those that do not invalidate, so that the act of the commandment should emerge enhanced; but after disengaging, there is no longer any commandment from the Torah—so in what would he now be ‘beautifying’? And ‘hiddur mitzvah’ without [an actual] commandment—we have not heard of such a thing. How, then, could they be compared?”

That is, he assumes there is no hiddur after the act of the commandment has ended. The enhancement of a sukkah is indeed done during construction—i.e., not at the time of performing the commandment—but when he sits in it, the sukkah is enhanced; therefore, it enhances the commandment of sitting in the sukkah. But with milah, after he has finished cutting the invalidating tzitzin and the act of milah, the commandment is complete, and there is no hiddur in cutting the non-invalidating tzitzin. This is the explanation he proposes for the Rambam: even on weekdays one does not return for non-invalidating tzitzin, because there is no hiddur mitzvah there—so it would simply be the prohibition of wounding another.

And in section b there he explains the view of the Tur:

“As for the Tur’s view—that on a weekday one must return—even though, according to the conclusion, on Shabbat one does not return—the reason is that the Tur holds that the commandment of milah continues upon a person all his life. Just like, for the opinion that boxed garments are obligated in tzitzit, from the time one affixes the tzitzit he fulfills the commandment so long as the garment lies in the box—so too with milah: besides the very act of milah (cutting the foreskin), which is a commandment, there is additionally an ongoing commandment forever, namely that Israel be circumcised, as it is written, ‘And My covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant.’ Likewise, for a father with a son—until the son grows up—the commandment continues upon him. For there is a commandment upon every Jew that any son he has shall be circumcised. Therefore, the Tur holds that even if he disengaged (which begins a new act), it is nevertheless appropriate to beautify the commandment ‘before Him.’”

According to the Tur, milah is like sukkah, for there is a commandment to be circumcised in addition to the commandment of the act of circumcision; therefore, even if one cuts the non-invalidating tzitzin after finishing the act, he is still within the commandment, and it is still meaningful to enhance it.

On this understanding, both early authorities agree that one cannot enhance a commandment after disengaging from its performance. Their dispute concerns whether milah is a commandment of an act or of a state (result). The Rambam holds that milah is only a commandment of an act; therefore, once he disengages, the commandment is over, and at that point it cannot be enhanced. For this reason, even on weekdays he does not return for non-invalidating tzitzin. The Tur, however, holds that milah is also a commandment of a result (the commandment is to be circumcised, not only to circumcise). Therefore, even after completing the act of milah he is fulfilling a commandment, and so one can enhance it even after disengagement; in his view this is still hiddur at the time of fulfilling the commandment. By contrast, in the Griz’s novellae on the Rambam (Laws of Chanukah), he explains the Tur differently: the Tur agrees with the Rambam that the commandment is to circumcise, but he disputes him precisely on this point—holding that one can enhance the commandment even after the act. He applies this to Chanukah lights; see there.

Subsequently, the Beit HaLevi also explains, on this basis, the Tur’s view regarding the father’s obligation: that he has a commandment that every son of his be circumcised—just as we defined above. It therefore appears that these are not two separate commandments. Rather, the commandment is that the son be circumcised, and the father’s obligation is to ensure it. If he did not, then the son himself must ensure it. All this is according to the Beit HaLevi’s explanation of the Tur. But there is no necessity to conclude that, according to the Rambam and the Griz’s explanation—and even according to the Tur—this definition is incorrect. It is possible that they too agree that the commandment is that the son be circumcised, but in their view hiddur can be done only during the performance of the act, even if the commandment is to be circumcised. Perhaps this depends on whether cutting the non-invalidating tzitzin is an enhancement of the cutting act or of its result (in contrast to sukkah, where hanging decorations enhances the sukkah; it is not that the building act is performed more beautifully).

A Note on a Further Enhanced Performance After Fulfilling the Commandment

In passing, I will note that the Beit HaLevi there writes immediately afterward:

“For a long time I have been uncertain about one who took a valid lulav on the festival of Sukkot, and afterward a more beautiful lulav became available to him: is he obligated to take the more beautiful one? One could say that although initially, if both were before him together, he would be obligated to take the more beautiful, now that he already took and fulfilled the commandment—since he is under no obligation of the commandment [any longer]—in what way would he be beautifying it [now], without a [current] commandment?”

A person took a valid, non-enhanced lulav, and then a very beautiful lulav became available. Must he take the enhanced one again to fulfill hiddur mitzvah, or has he lost the opportunity because the commandment was already fulfilled? A slightly different version of this question circulates in yeshivot in the name of R. Chaim [Soloveitchik]: one has before him a valid but non-enhanced etrog and also a very beautiful etrog of doubtful validity. Which should he take first? The answer: the enhanced one, of course, for if he first takes the valid one he will have fulfilled his obligation and can no longer enhance it. The Sha’agat Aryeh cited above, no. 50, deals with a similar discussion; I will not enter into it here (I hope to address this question in another column).

In any case, it seems the Beit HaLevi sees a connection between that question and his discussion here, for ostensibly it too concerns enhancement after the performance of the commandment has ended. But of course one must distinguish: even if enhancement after the performance is possible, perhaps here—when the commandment has already been fulfilled—there is no place for a further performance. Especially here, where the further performance does not enhance the previous performance but constitutes a renewed fulfillment with enhancement. That is not the case with the non-invalidating tzitzin in milah.

Summary

We have seen that the definition of the father’s commandment to circumcise his son is responsibility that the son be circumcised—in other words, that the commandment of milah is a result-commandment—and we saw several consequences of this definition. It is difficult to assume there is a special commandment of responsibility for milah imposed on the father, if only because none of the enumerators of the commandments counts it separately. It is more reasonable that there is one commandment, namely that the son be circumcised. That is, it is the son’s commandment, but the responsibility for its fulfillment is imposed upon the father. Therefore, the father’s obligation is a component of the commandment of milah, not a separate commandment.

If this is the case, then we have here a rare instance in which the commandment is fulfilled in the son and by the son, yet the responsibility lies upon the father. In the next column I hope to address the very distinction we have reached: responsibility for a commandment’s fulfillment versus the fulfillment itself. In a later column I hope to consider the question raised here incidentally regarding an enhanced performance of a commandment after we have already discharged our obligation.

[1] True, according to common conceptions this is not exactly a commandment (but only an instrumental means toward the commandment of procreation), but I will not enter into that here. Simply put, we treat it as a blessing over a commandment.

[2] In passing, I will note that even if the woman ultimately does not consent, it may be that this is not a blessing in vain, in light of the Ritva in Hullin 106b. He writes there that one who blessed over food and then changed his mind and does not wish to eat—it is not a blessing in vain, and he is not obligated to eat in order to “save” the blessing. He explains that, after all, when he blessed he intended to eat, and therefore it is not a blessing in vain. I elaborated on this in our book Logic of Time in the Talmud, chapter 20.

[3] Accordingly, it is reasonable that one who “jumps in” and circumcises his fellow’s son need not pay him the fine of ten gold coins imposed upon one who “steals a commandment” from his fellow (see Bava Kamma 91b, regarding covering the blood).