Be Killed Rather Than Transgress (Column 567)
Chillul Hashem, the Severity of the Offense, and Territorial Considerations
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In Parashat Emor there appear three warnings not to profane the Name of the Lord. The first (21:6) warns the priests to preserve their holiness. The second (22:2) warns them against profaning the sacred things, and the third (22:15) warns all Israel not to profane the sacred things. All of these are presented as a warning not to profane the Name of the Lord. Thus, for example, the second verse warns:
“Speak to Aaron and to his sons, that they keep themselves away from the holy things of the children of Israel, and that they do not profane My holy Name, which they sanctify to Me; I am the LORD.”
From the continuation of the verses it emerges that this warning, in its plain sense, also concerns the profanation of sacred things and of the priesthood, but it is always presented as a profanation of the Name of the Lord.[1]
Kiddush Hashem and Chillul Hashem
At the end of the chapter there is another warning with similar wording (ibid., 22:31–33):
“You shall keep My commandments and do them: I am the LORD. And you shall not profane My holy Name; and I shall be sanctified in the midst of the children of Israel; I am the LORD Who sanctifies you, Who brought you out of the land of Egypt to be your God; I am the LORD.”
Here the Sages understood that this refers to the prohibition of Chillul Hashem and the positive commandment of Kiddush Hashem as such (and not merely the profanation of sacred things). One of the principal implications derived here is the duty to give up one’s life so as not to profane the Name of the Lord (or in order to sanctify it).
Thus Maimonides (Rambam) writes in the Book of Commandments, Positive Commandment 9:
“The ninth commandment is that we are commanded to sanctify [God’s] Name, as He said, ‘And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel.’ The essence of this commandment is that we are commanded to publicize this true belief in the world and not fear any harm. Even if a powerful coercer arises against us and seeks to force us to deny the Most High, we must not listen to him; rather, we hand ourselves over to death and do not mislead him into thinking we have denied, even if in our hearts we believe in the Most High.”
As is well known, this mitzvah includes additional obligations (to live for Kiddush Hashem and not only to die for it), but we will not address them here. We will focus here on the obligation to give up life for the three cardinal sins, which is the main discussion in the Talmud and the halakhic decisors regarding the laws of Kiddush Hashem.
The Three Cardinal Sins
The Talmud in Sanhedrin 74a cites a baraita:
“Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: They took a vote and resolved in the upper story of the house of Nitza in Lodg that for all the transgressions in the Torah, if one is told, ‘Transgress and do not be killed,’ he should transgress and not be killed—except for idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed.”
That is, saving life overrides all commandments in the Torah, except for the three cardinal sins: idolatry, sexual immorality, and murder. The Gemara then discusses the sources for this ruling. It first brings that Rabbi Yishmael disagrees and holds that for idolatry there is no rule of “be killed rather than transgress”:
“Is it so that idolatry is not [overridden by saving life]? But is it not taught: Rabbi Yishmael says: From where do we know that if they said to a person, ‘Worship idolatry and do not be killed,’ that he should worship and not be killed? It is said (Leviticus 18:5), ‘You shall live by them,’ and not die by them. Could this even be in public? Scripture says (Leviticus 22:32), ‘You shall not profane My holy Name, and I shall be sanctified…’”
The halakha does not follow him; therefore, it is accepted that there are three cardinal sins that are not overridden by saving life.
The sugya then brings the sources for “be killed rather than transgress” regarding sexual immorality and murder:
“Sexual immorality and bloodshed—[we learn] like Rabbi, as it is taught: Rabbi says (Deuteronomy 22:26), ‘For as a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter.’ What do we learn from the murderer? This came to teach and ends up being learned [in return]: it juxtaposes murder and the betrothed maiden—just as regarding the betrothed maiden one may save her even at the cost of the pursuer’s life, so too one may save [a victim] from a murderer even at the cost of his life; and it juxtaposes the betrothed maiden to a murderer—just as with a murderer one must be killed rather than transgress, so too with the betrothed maiden one must be killed rather than transgress.”
“And regarding the murderer himself—whence [do we know]? It is logical: There was a man who came before Rava and said to him, ‘My master of the village told me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you.’ [Rava] said to him, ‘Let him kill you rather than you kill. Who says your blood is redder? Perhaps the blood of that man is redder.’”
Thus, for murder, the rule of “be killed rather than transgress” is learned from logic: your blood is not redder than his. Sexual immorality is equated to murder.[2] The Gemara later explains that in a time of religious persecution one must give up life even for minor laws and customs, but we will not enter that here. Rambam discusses Kiddush Hashem and Chillul Hashem in chapter 5 of Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, where he codifies all these laws.
A Fundamental Difference Between Murder and the Other Two Sins
There is a substantive difference between the rule of “be killed rather than transgress” in murder and that same rule in sexual immorality and idolatry. It is commonly thought that the reason saving life does not override these three is their great severity. That is indeed so regarding sexual immorality and idolatry; but with respect to murder, that is not the full picture.
In Column 291 I cited Rashi’s view that even harming another’s property is not overridden by saving life: “A person may not save himself with his fellow’s property.” There I brought that the author of Binyan Tzion extends this further and rules that this applies to any infringement of another’s rights. I explained that the prohibition against killing another to save oneself is not based solely on the severity of murder, but on the very fact that it is an injury to another (what I call there and elsewhere “territorial considerations”). Infringing on another’s rights is entering his domain, and within that domain only the rights-holder may make decisions—no one else. This is so even when the other has full halakhic justification; that is, even if his decision to waive his right would be halakhically correct, still the only one empowered to make it is the rights-holder himself, and no one else. Hence, if I need to damage another’s property to be saved, indeed the other is obligated to spend money to save me, and if he does not he is a wrongdoer and God will reckon with him. Yet the decision remains his; I cannot make that decision for him. See the elaboration there (and also in Column 562).
I now wish to draw attention to the implication (which was less explicit there). The reason I may not violate another’s rights is not the severity of the prohibition to do so. If the problem were simply severity, then the rule would apply only to killing another, since murder is one of the three cardinal sins. But harming his property or other rights, in terms of severity, is a regular prohibition like any other, and therefore, if the discussion were only about severity, it should be overridden by saving life. It overrides saving life because the refusal to override is not based on severity but on the fact that this is someone else’s domain (an infringement of a person’s rights). This, of course, is true of any infringement of another’s rights, not only of his life.
This also resolves the Rishonim’s question on Rashi: why were such prohibitions not listed among the three cardinal sins that are not overridden by saving life? Why not add theft, damage, humiliation, etc.? According to our approach, there is no problem: that list includes only those prohibitions not overridden because of their severity (the three “cardinals”). The prohibitions under discussion here (damage, theft, humiliation) are not overridden even though they are not so severe. They block saving life for a different reason, not because of severity; therefore they were not listed among the cardinals.
The Difference Between Murder and Other “Territorial” Prohibitions
Note that this means the prohibition of murder blocks saving life for two distinct reasons: both because of its severity and because it constitutes an invasion of another’s domain (a violation of his rights). In this sense, the extension of Rashi and the Binyan Tzion is not complete: theft or damage is not overridden by saving life only because it is an incursion into another’s domain. The intrinsic severity of those offenses is not such that, by itself, it would override saving life. By contrast, murder is not overridden by saving life both because it is another’s domain and because it is a cardinal transgression (like idolatry and sexual immorality).
The rationale the Gemara gives for “be killed rather than transgress” in the case of murder is the logic, “Who says your blood is redder?” What does this mean? Note that it does not invoke severity but the principle of shev ve’al ta’aseh (better to refrain): you cannot prefer your own life over your fellow’s. It seems this rationale reflects the problem of invading another’s domain, not the severity of the offense. You are not empowered to determine the value of the other’s life or blood. Even if from your perspective—and naturally—“your life takes precedence” (and even if that consideration is itself correct from your perspective; see Bava Metzia 62a), you are still not authorized to apply that consideration here, since it touches another’s rights. Only after concluding that murder is not overridden by saving life because of territorial considerations do we then say that, in such a case, there is a halakhic prohibition to kill the other—even there, only now does the prohibition of murder arise in this scenario.
Beyond all this, murder is also a cardinal sin like idolatry and sexual immorality, which is another reason it is not overridden by saving life.
A Similar Distinction in the Laws of Forbidden Relations
In note 1 in Column 562 (see also in my article on the guilt-offering) I mentioned a similar distinction regarding forbidden relations. The Gemara states in several places that we do not find “a wife of two dead men,” i.e., a woman who would require levirate marriage (yibbum) from two different husbands; the reason is that there is no situation in which a woman is simultaneously married to two men (as distinct from one man having two wives). Now, in Avnei Miluim 44:4 he cites a question raised by the Penei Yehoshua (Gittin 43):
“In Ḥiddushei Penei Yehoshua, chapter ‘HaSholeach’ (p. 43), he asks: Still, we can find a case of ‘a wife of two dead men’: before her emancipation she returns and is betrothed to Shimon; the betrothal of Shimon would also take effect with her, since regarding the betrothal of Reuven there is no [karet-level] prohibition, only a guilt-offering; it is not even like ordinary negative prohibitions where betrothal nevertheless takes hold.”
The rule is that with a shifcha ḥarufa (a woman who is half-maidservant, half-free, married to a Hebrew slave) there is no prohibition in cohabiting with her (certainly not karet; many hold there is no prohibition at all, only liability for a guilt-offering). Therefore, in principle betrothal should take effect with her, since betrothal takes effect even in ordinary negative prohibitions (and only fails in cases of karet). If so, if someone betroths a shifcha ḥarufa who is married to a Hebrew slave, there is no karet and the betrothal should take effect; she would then be the wife of two men. If so, argues the Penei Yehoshua, we do indeed find a case of “a wife of two dead men.”
The Penei Yehoshua answers:
“What we rule generally—that betrothal takes effect with ordinary negative prohibitions—applies to other negative prohibitions; but through betrothal itself you will not find betrothal taking effect [upon] betrothal: since Reuven’s betrothal took effect, she is in his domain and has no ‘hand’ to receive betrothal from another.”
Although there is no (serious) prohibition to cohabit with her, nevertheless betrothal does not take effect with her, because she is already married to another (she has no “hand” to accept betrothal). That is: generally, betrothal does not take effect in forbidden relations due to the severity of the prohibition of relations with an ervah (e.g., one’s mother, sister, etc.). But a married woman is a special and exceptional ervah: with regard to her, betrothal does not take effect for two reasons: (1) the severity of the prohibition of a married woman (death penalty and karet)—as with other arayot; (2) because she is already married (there is no one to betroth; she is not “available”). The second reason is unrelated to the severity of the prohibition; it is a “territorial” consideration: this woman is in another’s domain, and therefore one cannot enter and betroth her. Up to this point, this concerns a regular married woman, but the upshot is for a shifcha ḥarufa. She is a married woman; therefore, even if there is no (serious) prohibition to cohabit with her, betrothal will still not take effect for reason (2): she is, after all, in another’s domain.[3] This structure is entirely parallel to what we saw regarding “be killed rather than transgress” in murder.
Implication: Organ Harvesting
In an article in Techumin I discussed organ donation. The discussion concerns vital organs that can be taken only before the heart stops beating (such as a heart or lungs). The starting point is that one may not take organs from a living person and kill him in order to save another’s life; therefore this can only be done after the moment of death. This is, in effect, an application of the “who says [your blood is redder]” logic.
As is known, there is a dispute about the moment of death: some hold that brain death is the moment of death, others that cardiac death is. Note that the brain dies before the heart. It is commonly claimed that the permissibility of harvesting vital organs hinges on this dispute: according to those who hold that the moment of death is brain death, one may “harvest” these organs between brain death and cardiac death, since at that stage the donor is considered dead. But according to those who hold that death is cardiac, there is no way to take these organs, because at the stage when it is medically possible he is considered alive, and there is no permission to do so. In my article there, I argued that in my opinion one may “harvest” them even according to the latter view, for even if after brain death the person is considered alive, still his life is worth far less than that of a fully living person, and his “blood” is less “red” than his fellow’s.
But I added there that this is permitted only if the “deceased” consented (in advance—signed an ADI donor card). It cannot be done against his will. Seemingly, why not? If this is not murder but rather a kind of wounding or theft (of organs), then it should be overridden by another’s saving of life. True, we saw that according to Rashi and the Binyan Tzion, wounding and theft are also forbidden and block saving life. Here too the severity is not great, but it is an infringement upon another’s rights, and one cannot do so even to save a life.
This follows from the picture I described. If the issue were severity, the donor’s consent would make no difference. One may not murder even with the victim’s consent. If we see that the donor’s consent can permit “harvesting,” it indicates that the barrier to harvesting without his consent is not the severity of the prohibition but the territorial consideration. Decisions regarding his organs and life are his alone, not others’. Others cannot make such decisions about his rights—even if, halakhically, they would be correct (because the prohibition would be overridden by saving a life). Therefore, when he consents, the whole issue is resolved, because he is the one making the decision, not the harvesters.
What about a person who is willing to be killed or to kill himself voluntarily to save others? The common view is that this is forbidden (but see Hagahot Maimoniyot to Hilchot Rotze’aḥ 1, citing the Jerusalem Talmud, and Sefer HaMafte’aḥ there). It seems the reason is what we saw: there are two reasons not to kill one to save another—both severity and the territorial consideration. If the rights-holder consents, the territorial reason falls away, but the prohibition’s severity remains. In murder, the severity forbids transgressing even for saving a life; hence consent does not help, because the territorial reason falls away but the severity remains (consent is irrelevant to severity). From here it follows that regarding injury to monetary rights—where the prohibition is lighter and, in itself, is overridden by saving a life—if the rights-holder does not consent, it is forbidden (only he decides about his rights), but his consent helps.
Case Study: “Give Us One of You”
Rambam in Yesodei HaTorah 5:5 brings the following law, whose source is the Jerusalem Talmud, Terumot:
“Women to whom idolaters said: ‘Give us one of you and we will violate her; if not, we will violate you all’—let them all be violated rather than hand over a single Jewish soul. Likewise, if idolaters said to them, ‘Give us one of you and we will kill him; if not, we will kill you all’—let them all be killed rather than hand over a single Jewish soul. But if they singled someone out and said, ‘Give us so-and-so or we will kill you all’—if he is liable to death like Sheva ben Bichri, they may hand him over; but we do not instruct them so ab initio. If he is not liable to death, let them all be killed rather than hand him over.”
Gentiles lay siege to a city with many Jews and demand that the Jews hand over one of them to be killed, threatening that otherwise they will kill everyone. May they hand one over to be saved? Rambam rules (like Reish Lakish against Rabbi Yoḥanan in the Yerushalmi) that, in principle, they may not—unless he is liable to death by the kingdom; and even then, piety dictates not to hand him over.
This halakha is astonishing, as the Kesef Mishneh already asked there:
“Remaḥ wrote: Although this is found in a Tosefta, I do not know the reason. For the Gemara (Pesachim 25b) concludes that the reason we say ‘be killed and do not transgress’ in murder is that it is logical—‘Who says your blood is redder?’—but here that logic does not apply, for they will kill them all and him as well; better that he alone be killed and not all of them. And I say: His claim is no claim against the Tosefta, for we can say that there it is different, since they singled him out and said, ‘Kill so-and-so.’ Were it not for ‘Who says your blood is redder,’ we would not say ‘be killed and do not transgress’; hence it teaches in the end ‘if they singled him out.’ But at the beginning, when they did not single out anyone—when they said only, ‘Give us one of you and we will kill him’—whichever one they wish to hand over, we can say to them, ‘Why do you deem his blood redder? Hand over one of you and save this one. Perhaps this one’s blood is redder.’ And on this claim they cannot hand over anyone. But if there is a difficulty against Reish Lakish, there is: for he says that even if they singled him out, if he is not liable to death they may not hand him over—yet there is no ‘who says your blood is redder’ here, for if they do not hand him over they will all be killed.”
As we saw, the rule “be killed rather than transgress” for murder stems from the logic that one may not prefer one person’s life over another’s. Therefore, between two alternatives—Reuven dies and Shimon lives, or Shimon dies and Reuven lives—we may not choose; we must leave matters to take their course. But here the alternatives are different: if they do not hand him over, then all (including him) will die; if they hand him over, he will die and the others will live. He will die either way, so why not hand him over to save the rest? This is an overwhelming challenge to this law (which, as noted, comes from a Tosefta and the Yerushalmi, and from there to Rambam).
Because of the difficulty, the Kesef Mishneh offers a very strained answer:
“It is possible that Reish Lakish held that what [the Bavli] said—that in murder the reason is a logical one—is not the principal reason, but that there was a tradition that in murder one must be killed rather than transgress; they merely gave a logical reason where it applies. Therefore, even where the logic does not apply, the law is still that one should be killed rather than transgress.”
That is, the rule “be killed rather than transgress” for murder is not really based on the “who says” logic. It is a law received by tradition or a scriptural decree; the rationale is only to give it flavor. Therefore, he claims, it applies even where the rationale does not, as in our case. This is very difficult—against reason and the plain sense of the Gemara. But the challenge to this ruling does demand resolution.
And the Lechem Mishneh writes there:
“…The Rav’s answer does not suffice. One could say, with difficulty, that there it concerns a situation where they had some chance to escape under duress and not all would be killed; therefore they should not hand over a soul, for perhaps they will be saved. But what we say in the Gemara—‘who says your blood is redder’—applies when there is no chance of escape unless he is killed; therefore we needed that rationale. All this is difficult.”
It is forced to say that the halakha concerns only a case where it is not certain they will all be killed—perhaps it is a bluff to get them to hand someone over. From his words it emerges that indeed, in a case where they would otherwise all be killed, there is no permission to hand him over—clearly strained in the Gemara and certainly in Rambam.
A Possible Explanation in Light of the Above
In light of the foregoing, we can explain this puzzling law as follows: Indeed, the “who says” logic does not apply in this situation, but the severity of murder remains. The assumption is that handing the demanded person over to those seeking his life constitutes murder that we commit, and this is not overridden by our saving of life. Even if, in outcome, the calculus is advantageous, we may not decide on our own about another’s life. Perhaps this is also what the Kesef Mishneh intended: the “who says” rationale is not the principal basis for “be killed rather than transgress” in murder; it is only an additional branch. Beyond that, there is the severity of the prohibition, as with idolatry and sexual immorality; and this is the fundamental reason for “be killed rather than transgress” in murder. Hence he writes that even where the logic does not apply (as in Rambam’s case), the rule still holds.
Admittedly, the plain sense of the Gemara in Sanhedrin does not indicate this, which is difficult for the Kesef Mishneh. As we saw, the Gemara presents the logic as the basis. Perhaps we can propose that the two-way analogy between the betrothed maiden and the murderer actually says this: there is a derivation from the maiden to the murderer and from the murderer to the maiden. With the pursuer against the maiden and the pursuer to murder, the prohibition is severe, and therefore one may save (even the pursuer) at the cost of his life, for we must save him from a severe transgression. This shows that the severity of murder is like that of the maiden, and from here we also learn “be killed rather than transgress” for the murderer, like the maiden. Beyond that, in murder there is also the “who says” logic. The order is inverted, of course: in murder we have “be killed rather than transgress” due to the logic; from there we learn to the maiden—though there the logic does not apply—that the rule still holds, apparently due to severity. And now we learn that the severity of murder is similar to that of the maiden; therefore, even in murder, the rule holds due to severity, not only because of the “who says” logic. Still, these points require further analysis in the Gemara and in the Kesef Mishneh.
An Alternative Explanation
In my article on separating conjoined twins, I brought another explanation (citing Prof. Ankar) for this law. In the laws of murder and preservation of life, in a case where everyone’s life (including the demanded individual’s) is in danger, it is permitted to hand over one in order to save the others. What the law cited by Rambam forbids is only when it is a capitulation to the demand of idolaters. Such capitulation is Chillul Hashem; therefore, despite the consequentialist calculus and although the “who says” logic does not apply, one may not hand the demanded person over to them. In short, this law belongs to the laws of Kiddush and Chillul Hashem, not to the laws of murder and preservation of life.
The implication will be for similar situations that do not involve capitulation to threats from idolaters, etc. For example: conjoined twins (twins sharing a vital organ—a heart or brain) who are expected to die within nine months, and the only way to save one is to perform a separation surgery in which one is sent to his death and the vital organ is given to the other, thereby saving his life. It is commonly held in halakha that such surgery is forbidden, but I argued it should be permitted, for the “who says” logic does not apply: if no surgery is performed, both will die—just like in Rambam’s case. What Rambam forbids is only because there it involves Chillul Hashem in capitulating to the threats of idolaters. But in the case of conjoined twins there is no element of Chillul Hashem; only the laws of murder and preservation of life apply, and under those laws it is certainly permitted to hand over one to save the other (when the alternative is that both die).
I would add that the same applies to fetal reduction. The case is one in which there are many fetuses in the mother’s womb and they are all expected to die unless we “reduce” them. There one must kill one in order to save the others, and this is permitted because there is no element of Chillul Hashem (no capitulation to threats), only the laws of murder and preservation of life.[4]
I thought to bring proof for this explanation from the placement of this law in Rambam—Yesodei HaTorah. It is known that Rambam’s placement of laws is deliberate and one can draw conclusions from it regarding the nature of the law in question. Why, then, did Rambam place this law in Yesodei HaTorah and not in Hilchot Rotze’aḥ uShemirat HaNefesh? Because it concerns the laws of Chillul Hashem, not the laws of preservation of life.
True, the obligations to give up life for sexual immorality and idolatry also appear there in Yesodei HaTorah. This is not unique to murder. However, when you read Rambam’s words there, you will see that throughout the chapter he speaks about capitulation to threats, and concerning that he says that one should transgress all mitzvot except the three cardinal ones. He does not discuss danger without threat. When we are threatened to commit idolatry or forbidden relations, a situation of Chillul Hashem is created just like the scenario we described, and therefore one must not capitulate.
What about a situation without threat—a case in which I must commit forbidden relations or idolatry to be saved, but the threat is not a person? Rambam writes about this in 5:6:
“Just as they said regarding compulsion, so they said regarding illness: How so? One who fell ill and is close to death, and the physicians say that his cure is through some matter prohibited by the Torah—we do so, and one may be healed with all prohibitions in the Torah in a case of danger, except idolatry, sexual immorality, and bloodshed—even in a case of danger one may not be healed through them; and if he transgressed and was healed, the court punishes him with the appropriate punishment.”
First, we see that the chapter until here indeed speaks of coercion, i.e., threats, as I explained. But here he expands the law to illness, and it would appear that in his view even when the threat is not a person but a natural cause, the same law applies: one may not transgress one of the three cardinal sins in such a situation. Moreover, it seems this too is part of the laws of Chillul Hashem.
It may be that any transgression of one of the three cardinal sins under threat—even if natural—constitutes Chillul Hashem. We are expected to withstand it and not transgress; if we did, we profaned the Name. Up to this point the cases concerned situations in which Chillul Hashem resulted from threats. In 5:6 Rambam innovates that the concept of Chillul Hashem extends also to a situation without threat. Still, in a situation where, consequentially, it is preferable to kill one person to save the others (i.e., when the alternative is that all will die), there is no ordinary Chillul Hashem, for we are handing over the one who would die in any case in order to save the rest. This is not called transgressing a sin brazenly in order to gain something (even our lives). Therefore, in principle, this should be permitted. And to this Rambam writes in 5:5 that nonetheless it is forbidden to hand him over because of the Chillul Hashem in capitulating to threats.
In any case, from this analysis we see that even if we adopt this interpretation (of Ankar), the obligation to give up life is connected to Chillul Hashem and not only to the severity of the offense in and of itself. Transgressing a cardinal sin is Chillul Hashem, and the duty to give up life is for that reason; it is not merely a non-override due to the offense’s severity alone. However, according to this, the general non-override on account of Chillul Hashem applies in all three cardinal sins, not only in murder. All three involve an element of Chillul Hashem beyond the offense’s severity (and perhaps it is Chillul Hashem alone that causes the non-override). If so, we see that in the duty to give up life across all the cardinal sins, an additional parameter operates besides severity—Chillul Hashem. Still, as we saw above, murder (and other infringements of another’s rights) is exceptional, for there the “who says” logic is added, i.e., the infringement of another’s rights. And in infringements that are not murder there is only the territorial aspect (since their severity is not like the three cardinals).
A Side Note
To conclude, I note that the commentators on 5:6 disagree about the end of Rambam’s words there. He writes that one who transgressed and was healed through a prohibition is punished by the court with the appropriate punishment. In the earlier laws he writes that one who transgressed one of the three cardinals and did not let himself be killed is not liable to punishment, for he is considered coerced (against Tosafot). The question is whether he means the same here, merely adding that it is proper for the court nonetheless to find some punishment to educate him, since he did not act correctly. If so, then the same should be done for the offender in the earlier cases as well (i.e., in threatened situations, not only illness). Or perhaps his intent is that, unlike the earlier cases (threats), here—when he is ill and not coerced by a person—he is truly liable to the Torah’s punishment for the prohibition he violated, i.e., he is not considered coerced at all (thus understood by the Or Sameach there and by many later authorities; incidentally, the Tashbetz, in responsum II, also wrote similarly). This touches another aspect of the topic that I will not enter here.
[1] Some argue that writing “Chillul Hashem” is incorrect and one should write “Chillul ha-Shem (‘the Name’),” since one cannot profane the Lord Himself, only His Name. Here, “ha-Shem” is not a fully written version of the abbreviation “the LORD”; rather, “the LORD” refers to the entity itself, and “ha-Shem” to that entity’s name.
Incidentally, in logical notation one could also write “Chillul ‘the LORD’,” since quotation marks indicate that we refer to the word or term, not to the object designated by it. According to this, perhaps one may indeed write “Chillul the LORD,” since in Talmudic and biblical writing there is no punctuation or vocalization (including quotation marks).
However, we saw above that in the verses themselves it always appears as “profaning the Name of the LORD,” not “profaning the LORD.” So perhaps that is, after all, correct.
[2] I note that this analogy is different from other analogies in the Torah. Usually the Torah places two laws in proximity and we, the Sages, construct an analogy on that basis. The analogy is made by the interpreters of the Torah. But here the Torah itself draws the analogy, comparing sexual immorality to murder. Likewise with the ten qal va-ḥomer in the Torah (Bereishit Rabbah 92), which differ from other qal va-ḥomer that the Sages derive from laws stated in the Torah. In those ten, the Torah itself explicitly makes a qal va-ḥomer.
[3] See in my above article the implications of this understanding and why a guilt-offering is required. I note that the Avnei Miluim himself later explains why he does not accept the Penei Yehoshua’s answer; this is not the place to elaborate.
[4] True, there is another reason to be lenient there, since killing a fetus is a lighter prohibition. Therefore, even authorities who forbid separating conjoined twins permit fetal reduction. But in my view this argument is problematic, for we have already seen that severity is not the decisive parameter here.
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A. You wrote that it is forbidden to save oneself with one’s friend’s money, not because of the severity of the harm to another, but because of the invasion of territory outside the boundary. It seems that the necessary explanation for this was not provided. After all, as you wrote in several places, deciding between things indicates a common measure, and in the same measured thing, an invasion of territory is a serious matter. However, in the consecration of a wife, there are no normative territorial considerations, but factual ones that have no hand, just as it is impossible to consecrate a table.
B. In May Hazit, I did not understand the claim that the reasoning reflects the problem of invasion. Both in the case of loss of life (tema deretz) and in the case of invasion of territory (tema defilisha), there will be a result anyway, and the matter is only a question, as you wrote, and therefore the Gemara sets this question. And apparently the language rather reflects the opposite, because from the territorial point of view, the whole argument is that even if the other person's blood is less red, it is still forbidden to invade it. And there is something else that does not quite add up. On the one hand, you said that the reasoning for murder is territorial (and beyond that, there is also severity), and on the other hand, you agreed with Rashi that they did not also count robbery because there the reasoning is from the territorial point of view. And even though you later clarified that in murder, even without territoriality, it is forbidden to kill oneself voluntarily to save one's friend.
C. Violating the rights of a brain-dead person who did not agree to donate is a very formal violation, because in practice he will never be able to use his organs and lacks nothing (like a chicken that rebelled). Such a territorial consideration would be difficult to explain in the explanation of the general world-repair that without unequivocal protection of property rights, society will weaken. Although of course you present territorial considerations as an independent value (as usual). It is a bit strange that the prohibition of murder is relaxed in such a life against the life of another, but the prevention of invasion of territory is not relaxed even with such a weak hold on territory against the life of another. It seems to me that your argument regarding this is that only when there is a reason who will presume does the prohibition of murder arise, but I do not understand this. And in addition, in the reply regarding killing a person an hour before the resurrection of the dead on Shabbat, that in matters of human life it is appropriate to take a formal and forbidden approach, is the attitude here towards the brain dead a formal approach, or is formality being pushed aside in the face of other human lives.
D. Your explanation of the Rambam that to violate the three graves during a threat is blasphemy and one should kill and not pass. Where is the explanation for the meaning of this combination of three graves and a threat together, that each one separately should pass and not kill, but together they should kill and not pass. In other words, a threat is not enough to turn an ordinary offense into a blasphemous offense (if they say, "Give us this animal and we will kill it with sorrow," and we give it to them), but a murder offense without anyone claiming it - which is something that is permitted in the Siamese Twins - that same threat does become the most serious of all, as it is. By the way, what do you think if the Gentiles are gentle merchants who do not threaten to extort but rather seduce (the one you brought up), give us so-and-so and we will kill and we will give you water, and if not, you will all die of thirst as if we were not here, do you give them so-and-so here?
E. By the way, do you also demand a lottery in the dilution of embryos, as in the Siamese Twins? And in particular, you wrote in note 4 that the severity of the prohibition is not the important parameter here. Or do they have no identity (a kind of donation of fertilizer S. Sha'id regarding a pocket of gold).
A. The whole idea is that here it is not a decision between things. It is the whole idea of a consideration of territory. There is no rejection of a prohibition because of another prohibition that requires a common standard to weigh them against each other. Regardless of the different severity, there is no possibility of entering another's territory.
B. It is clear that what I proposed is not the usual way to learn this, but I still propose such a way. First, from the front, it certainly does not express the severity of the prohibition. Second, my proposal is that because it is the blood of the other, they come to deny the rule of your predecessors. The argument is that in the territory of the other, you cannot make such a consideration. De facto, everyone's blood is equal. This is not a positive argument but a denial of your ability to decide differently.
In murder, there is also a consideration of severity, which is why it was included. It is true that there is something more to it.
C. The violation of a right is not because of the ability to use it. It is simply his. I have already written in the past about the distinction between ownership and rights of use (which are only a result of ownership). Therefore, the owner of a withheld get of release is compensated for harming a slave even though he does not own it.
The comparison to a chicken that rebelled is really interesting. The feeling is that the chicken's name is no longer his, and the fact that he cannot use it is an indication of this. Think about the methods that the prohibition of enjoyment is considered proprietary.
Indeed, human life is a formal matter. Even a life devoid of value must not be harmed.
D. I did not understand the question. I showed the Rambam that he consistently speaks of threats up to Halacha 6. But I did not say that only under threat is he to be killed and not to pass. On the contrary, Halacha 6 shows that this is not the case.
Your question about Gentiles who threaten and say, "Give us an animal that was killed in sorrow," is seemingly a good question. Apparently, it is like at the time of the extermination, and in reality, even surrendering to a minor offense will be killed and not to pass. At first I thought that perhaps a distinction should be made between the delivery of an animal that is not a tsiur (the gentiles are the ones who And note that even minor offenses due to illness will not be prohibited of course. The severity of the offense is part of creating blasphemy. Simply put, thirst is like an illness.
E. A lottery is definitely required. But there is room for the assumption that they do not have an identity and therefore taking one is itself considered a lottery. Beyond that, even if they have an identity, reaching out and taking one of them is itself a lottery. Nature is playing a lottery here. See column 538 about the ship from Liverpool.
A. I don't get it. Is this stunt open to any two values, A’ defeats B’ in any conflict but not because A’ is God forbid serious but because of a supreme principle ex machina that it is impossible for B’ to overcome A’. The language in column 421, for example, “The problem with incommensurability is not that we are not smart enough to know the answer but that there is no answer”.
C. “The violation of a right is not because of the ability to use it. It is simply his”. In life too, you would say that the violation of life is not because of all sorts of things but that he is simply alive. Just as the value of this life has decreased, the value of his simple life here also decreases. Why in life do you measure on a scale but in territory it is binary and single.
D. In the column, it was explained that according to Halacha, the alternatives are equivalent, and therefore threats are irrelevant, and he must take a risk and not kill his friend in order to be saved. But when the alternatives are not equivalent (Gentiles who have contracted Siamese twins and dilution, and in the case of brain death), then it depends on the question of the threat and the severity of the offense, and the combination prohibits. And this is the question in the second part of the book, the meaning of the combination (and this is the Shabbat, which certainly says that the severity of the offense plays a role). Since the alternatives are not equivalent, then the offense is no longer as serious as Siamese twins, and therefore why does the threat make it forbidden, unlike other non-serious offenses (such as delivering an animal) that the threat does not make forbidden. Is it because the threat created the entire outline of the alternatives that the offense is as serious as any ordinary murder (and what kind of rape on the last day or robbers like that conquered it).
I did not understand the comparison of tempting Gentiles who will give water to the law, and in tempting Gentiles the alternatives are not equivalent and required for the question of the threat, and in this one must ask about the difference between blackmail and temptation.
A. This is not a stunt (an ad hoc statement that can be used anywhere to solve problems) but simple logic. What prevents me from forcibly taking a kidney from you if I need one because of a pecuniary obligation? The prohibition is obligatory (the assumption that you will not die) and it is rejected before a pecuniary obligation. It is the law for someone who threatens me that I will give him a shekel or he will kill me. Do I have to give him the shekel? But I have explained this in the past in several places, and it does not belong here.
C. Indeed. I have explained this more than once. My article on challot is dedicated to this point, and there I showed and explained why ownership is not a collection of rights of use, but rather are derivatives of ownership.
D. When the alternatives are not equivalent, then by principle we should have chosen the easier one, were it not for the threat to which submission is blasphemy. We must remember that it was the threat that created these two alternatives and the inequality between them. Therefore, it is not like a minor offense where even with a threat, no one is spared. There, the offense is minor not because of the threat but because of itself.
A. You have explained in the past in several places how it is possible to create a practical decision-making mechanism between values without a common measure? Not just announcing that it is possible or proving it based on the result of the decision, but a theoretical discussion.
C. I know. But in a similar way, life is not a collection of possibilities to move, and therefore life is not damaged by brain death.
A. As far as I have reached, there is no way to conduct such a discussion. The decision is made intuitively. My explanations are intended only to clarify why such a decision is not necessarily arbitrary and therefore can be adopted. There is no need to throw it away as an illusion.
C. Therefore, the claim is that brain death is not death. And yet, in my opinion, the level of blood flush of a living person has significance, as is stated in the Gemara itself. Therefore, even if the value of life in itself is formal and absolute, there are different levels of value, at least in extreme cases such as brain death.
A. This claim seems like a major theoretical innovation in moral philosophy, and I can't digest it right now. It's true that the decision between things with a common measure can also be presented as arbitrary (never mind that he has “more”), but that seems different. [The decision itself that individuals cannot infringe on the right to property in any way can also be explained as a consequential categorical imperative that allowing the invasion of territories will lead to mass kidney harvesting and general mass looting and anxiety of the entire population, and in the end the result will be less good. And of course, this is in the background of everything I asked].
C. But aren't there different levels of ownership? And if there is only a weak ownership here, then blood will reject it just as blood rejects the taking of a weak life. Perhaps this goes back to question A. Mm I won't continue asking this question any further, but will look at the answers again.
I meant to write “It is indeed possible to present the decision between things with a common measure as intuitive”. And not “as arbitrary” as I wrote. Admittedly, this is a bit of a digression to another question: how does a common measure help at all?
King David was told, "A king breaks a fence." If the prohibition against saving with his friend's property is more severe than the prohibition against stealing, what is different about a king? It is proven, as the Rabbis say, that it is permissible to save with the intention of paying. Therefore, territorial considerations do not invalidate the issue of stealing. So why is it forbidden when he does not have to pay? (Perhaps when his intention to pay is not to "take" his friend, which is very strange, or territorial considerations add a certain weight to the matter, and each case must be judged on what is greater, plus the level of intrusion into the other person's territory and other considerations.)
I didn't understand what the evidence was that the king was allowed. A king can also confiscate money and declare war on an enemy (so if you can kill them, you can also take their money).
It is difficult to understand why David did an act that was not proper? (Even though he was allowed to do so)
(Simply because it is forbidden to save with one's friend's money because it is not a proper act)
If the reason for the prohibition is the lack of authority and considerations of territory, it is understandable that the king has ownership over the people.
PS. To say that the reason for the prohibition is because the prohibition of robbery repels the saving of lives is not such a side to it.
If the king is not prohibited from stealing, then even if the law were based on the fact that the prohibition of stealing rejects the king's will, it would be permissible.
I haven't checked this, but perhaps Maimonides believed that according to the law of all Israel, they are guarantors to one another, and it is forbidden to hand someone over to die, and therefore only a wicked person who deserves death is permitted to be handed over, as some rabbis in exile point out. If the king imposed a tax on the Jews and exempted one of the Jews from a tax, he must also pay. According to the law of Israel, they are guarantors to one another,
Do territorial considerations also impose duties of standing up and doing or only sitting back and not doing?
[A thief left a person in a car without brakes that was driving into an abyss. If a person is forbidden to save himself with his friend's money, then he is forbidden to tilt the car into his friend's pile of lentils in order to stop if he loses the lentils. What if the car drives toward the pile of lentils (by the thief, or even by the person's own steering wheel tilts in the past when he did not yet see any lentils on the horizon) is he obliged to tilt the steering wheel into the abyss].
Toss writes that a person who has fallen from above and is about to hit a person lying below does not have to tip himself over and die to save the other. It is better to tip over even if the other person dies and not me. The same applies if I am about to hit someone else's property, in which case I do not have to tip the car over.
Regarding lentils, this is forbidden only according to Rashi, but even that is only because the owner of the lentils does not agree. We can assume that he does agree, certainly if you return the money to him.
Although in additions the whole reason is from the side of the enemy, and territorial considerations are a different kind of decision? If I am not allowed to invade someone else's territory at any cost, then why does it change in the enemy? (The fact that my territory will be invaded and so on are supposedly my internal considerations)
You don't invade it in vain. The invasion is automatic. You just don't prevent it, but there is no obligation to do so.
It's good to be Jewish, according to the director of the Israel Electric Corporation. "The widespread power outages at the end of last week led the Israel Electric Corporation to disconnect communities with a secular majority from the electricity grid, in favor of connecting communities with a religious majority. This was stated by the director of the Israel Electric Corporation, Meir Spiegler, at the conference of the Association of Directors and Secretaries in Local Authorities, which is being held today at the Queen of Sheba Hotel in Eilat."
Yes, indeed. You said that bloodshed is forbidden because of the severity and also because of the invasion of territory. Because of the severity, it can be said that it has returned to being a reverse teaching from a girl to a murderer, although I don't understand how "Mayi Zahid" teaches about the invasion of territory? After all, if it were like robbery, etc., it would apparently be enough for the general to say that Pico does not reject bloodshed because Pico does not reject offenses between one person and another, etc., and this means that "Mayi Zahid" is a unique opinion about robbery.
Your intention is unique in murder. Indeed, that is the simplification. What I suggested might be the intention is to say that there is a territorial prohibition. In any case, this is what must be said according to Rashi and the Zion Building.
Regarding the invasion of territory, it seems that this is well defined in the Niddus of Rashshak Nedarim 61, Meshek Hochma, and Leviticus 19:3.