An Analytical Look at Majority Rule (Column 553)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
A few days ago I read the article by Prof. David Hed,[1] titled “Let’s talk for a moment about ‘majority rule.’” It has several features typical of analytic philosophy—and of its shortcomings. I note that I already touched on the issue of ‘majority rule’ in column 548 (my remarks there will be cited below). Here I wish to expand on this a bit by critically examining Hed’s claims. I will do so through a critical reading, paragraph by paragraph, of his article (except for the last ones, which are not relevant here). This is also a good opportunity to practice some critical reading (keep in mind that the author is a professor of philosophy).
Why and When Do We Follow the Majority
Hed opens his article with the following claim:
Human beings are creatures whose values usually do not align with one another. In many cases this fact creates conflicts that require a decision. A majority decision is a known and effective way to resolve such conflicts, but it is by no means the only one.
In column 300 I addressed this point. I explained there that the essence of democracy is not majority rule, but the principle that political decisions are supposed to be made in a way that expresses the will of the public. However, there are situations of disagreement in which it is hard to define precisely what ‘the will of the public’ is. In some cases each person can be allowed to act according to his understanding and values, but in binary situations—namely, when decisions require us to reach a single outcome (such as foreign policy decisions and the like)—the situation does not allow for that. If in such cases we wish to reach a decision that can be considered ‘the will of the public,’ there can be several different ways to express it. In that column I mentioned Arrow’s theorem, which states that there is no way to reach a decision that truly can be considered such (see a detailed discussion in the fascinating book by Shmuel Nitzan, Preference and Social Choice, The Open University, and a bit in our joint conference here and here, within which he gave me his book to read). As a simple and quite reasonable resort, it is customary to adopt the view of the majority, although this method has nontrivial limitations.
Still, it is commonly argued that majority rule is not the sole criterion for democracy. It is important to protect minority rights. We shall now see that this claim can be justified in several different ways.
First Justification: A Clash Between Democracy and Ethics
It is customary to present the problem in following the majority in the way Hed describes it:
Here is an example: A family has three children. Whenever a game must be chosen in which all will participate—namely, when there is no shared preference—it makes sense to decide according to the two who want a certain game; that is, by the majority. But suppose that over time it turns out that the same two always share the preference for a game, and the third is always left frustrated that his wish is not fulfilled. Any good parent will admit that the majority method violates a principle of fairness and should be balanced, for example by occasionally acceding to the preference of the one who repeatedly finds himself in the minority.
Likewise, in a neighborhood with a secular majority, when a decision is needed about when the local pool will be open for separate men’s and women’s swimming, the majority principle may lead to the pool never opening for separate swimming. Most of us will see in the majority principle in this case an injustice toward the minority.
He sees here an ethical problem, since following the majority can cause injustice to the minority. I have previously offered a clear example of this via what I called “the David Levy effect” (see, for example, columns 226 and 237). David Levy led a large faction within Likud—let us say for the sake of argument that it included 30% of the Central Committee members. He complained that his faction’s members did not receive any executive positions. His rivals replied that everything was conducted democratically, with a vote for each position. Levy explained that this is precisely the root of the injustice: in such a system, a faction comprising 51% of the Central Committee members would receive 100% of the positions. Fairness requires that a faction comprising 30% of the members receive 30% of the positions. Here, too, although we follow the majority, the outcome is ethically problematic.
From Hed’s formulation it follows that the duty to protect minority rights rests on the fear of moral injustice. That is, indeed one ought to follow the majority’s decision, but there are other values in the world (not harming minorities), and they can override the value of following the majority. The demand to protect minority rights is thus the result of a trade-off between conflicting values. In my view, however, this formulation is inaccurate. I argue that this is a democratic injustice, not a clash between democracy and morality. Since the majority is our way of expressing the will of the public, logic dictates that positions within Likud be distributed according to the distribution of opinions (factions).
But this is true only for decisions that allow such distributions. Above I explained that the difficulty arises when decisions must be made this way or that, and there is no possibility of division. Yet it turns out that even in such cases one can challenge the method of following the majority. For example, if the decision in question carries different weights for different segments of the population, there may be reason to give the minority extra weight. If, say, 30% of the public are much more adversely affected by the majority’s decision than the majority benefits from it, there is reason not to adopt such a decision even if most support it. There is also room for the demand to give weight to the wishes of a quality minority—that is, a minority that contributes significantly to the whole.
In general, I think the justifications for protecting minority rights usually rest on values and ethics, and therefore the model within which they are examined is one of a clash between values: majority rule and following the majority versus harm to minority rights. In effect, this assumes there is a moral duty upon the majority to care for the minority and not to harm it, even though the majority’s basic right is to set the decision according to its view. But the two reservations I raised here (weighing the intensity of each faction’s desire and the quality of its members) hint that this cannot be the whole picture.
Second Justification: The Substantive Argument
Seemingly, things are stated more explicitly in the following paragraph of Hed’s article:
We must learn from the family and neighborhood examples that under no circumstances should the method of majority decision be regarded as sacrosanct, and that at times it violates moral principles no less important than the satisfaction of the majority’s preferences and values. All in all, majority rule is an efficient strategy for social decisions in certain conflict situations. But it does not express the “will of the people.” The will of the majority is not the will of the public, but only the will of a majority within it. If the government purports to represent the good of all citizens, it cannot content itself with a majority decision.
Note that in the first part of this passage he speaks in terms of the clash-of-values model described above, whereas in the second part he shifts—without noticing—to the claim that the will of the majority is not necessarily the will of the people. This is already a substantive justification. The claim is that we should not follow the majority not only because it may ethically harm the minority, but because the majority itself does not determine the matter. It is not true that the majority reflects the will of the public.
But this transition is not argued for, and the examples brought above do not at all illustrate it. They do indeed illustrate the ethical difficulty that can sometimes arise from following the majority, but the claim that this is not the will of the people is a very different claim. Let me remind you again of situations in which we must make a single decision that cannot be divided (a binary decision). There the injustice is, seemingly, an inevitable byproduct of the need to reach one decision for the entire public.
One might argue that claims of the first kind can be translated into claims of the second kind if we take into account that in a democratic state many decisions are made. This is apparently Hed’s intention in his next paragraph:
Repeated elections to the parliament are not the solution, since groups such as the Arab sector and the LGBTQ community find themselves always in the minority (what is called a “structural minority”). To represent them as well, at least partially, one must allow for an expression of their wishes, first and foremost by protecting their interests through rights and especially equality. The protection of the rights of the individual and of minorities is a relatively new method in human history that, only through a difficult struggle, has taken root in the legal systems of states. It would be a disaster to relinquish the gains of this struggle.
This is essentially what I called the ‘David Levy effect.’ Thus, even if all decisions are of the binary type, it would still be reasonable to demand that a certain percentage of decisions be made according to the minority’s view (in proportion to its share of the population).
But even this is not really possible, for on each decision the distribution of opinions can be different. It is not that in every decision the same minority faces the same majority. For each decision there is a minority composed of certain people, and in another decision the minority will consist of other people. Hence de facto it is indeed more reasonable to consider decision-making at a single decision node.
One possible model is to speak of different weights, as I described above. That is, we should try to assess how important the decision is to the majority and to the minority and factor that as well into our decision-making. But where the decision is equally important to both groups, it seems there is no escape and the majority should decide.
Third Justification: The Utilitarian Argument
In his next paragraph Hed again moves between different justifications:
The advantage of a system that combines majority rule with protection of individual and minority rights is that it brings government decisions closer to those that reflect the public interest, to “what the people want.” In doing so, it also strengthens solidarity among the different groups that make up the public and their ability to accept government actions even when they are not pleased with each and every decision.
He starts with his (unargued) substantive claim and continues with a utilitarian claim (maintaining social solidarity and cohesion).
But this claim is problematic as well, since it is presented as a consideration that the majority itself is supposed to make. The majority has an interest in preserving the social cohesion of the entire public, and therefore it itself should waive its prerogatives in decision-making. But what if the majority does not wish to do so? What if it prefers expression of its values over social cohesion? According to Hed’s approach, the minority cannot claim anything against it (apart from the ethical claims described in the first justification above).
Interim Summary
Bottom line, it appears that Hed’s arguments attempt—apparently without great success—to persuade the majority that it has an ethical duty to care for the minority and to protect its rights. He assumes that indeed one must follow the majority and that the majority has the right to set the decision, but that it would be proper not to trample the minority. Only the second argument, the substantive one, speaks a different language. But as I noted, he offers no reasoning to ground it. True, the will of the majority is not the will of the entire public, but it is the closest we have. How, then, can one derive from this the duty to protect minority rights?
Fourth Justification: ‘Migo’
I wish to propose here a fourth kind of justification, which can be based on the principle known in halakhah as migo (“since”). To that end I will cite passages from column 548, where I briefly addressed this point when explaining the duty to protect minority rights:
Contrary to what many think, this is not merely a moral requirement added to the democratic requirement of majority decision, but a result of the very logic underlying democracy and the authority and standing of the majority themselves. The majority has no authority over the minority unless the minority has accepted the rules of the game; that is, only when the majority and the minority together constitute a joint society that makes decisions together by consent. If we are not speaking of a public that is willing to play a joint game according to rules that were set with everyone’s agreement, there is no way to justify following the majority.
Thus, for example, State A cannot claim against State B that since it is larger and its citizens are the majority, therefore State B must accept State A’s decisions with respect to it. In halakhah as well there is no nullification by a majority when the majority and minority do not belong to the same mixture. Regarding court panels, the Talmud says that the conscientious in Jerusalem would check with whom they sit to dine. That is, a judge who joins a panel must ascertain before joining that he is prepared to sign the verdict even if he is in the minority against his two colleagues. If you do not respect them and do not agree to join in the majority’s determination, do not join the panel. If this is not a panel of three agreed upon by all, there is no justification for following the majority and the majority is meaningless. In columns 66 and 79 I explained that this argument is far more compelling for a democratic majority than for a court’s majority. I cited the view of Rabbeinu Tam, who goes even further and holds that in communal decisions (as opposed to a court) the majority has no standing and the verse “after the majority to incline” does not apply. In his view, political decisions must be made unanimously (I showed there that the other Rishonim also agree with him in principle, but practically it cannot work because it gives a veto right to the minority).
The upshot is that preventing majority tyranny is not a kindness the majority does for the minority. Without agreement to this rule, we do not have one joint society, and then there is no justification for the democratic game at all. Consequently, the majority has no authority to impose its view on the minority.[2] These are not two separate principles, but two sides of the same coin. When there is majority tyranny, the discourse is not based on justice and a real mandate held by the majority and a real duty upon the minority to accept it, but on raw force. In that case one cannot complain about a minority that uses counter-force and refuses to accept the majority’s view.
That is, the entire force of the majority and its authority to make decisions is based on the shared participation of all citizens in society. If the minority ceases to see itself as part of society and is no longer willing to play the joint game with the majority, the majority has no authority over it (apart from the use of force; here I am speaking of ethical justifications).
This conception has two implications relevant to us; the first follows logically from the picture I have described, and the second is less clear-cut:
- When the majority makes a decision that substantially violates the minority’s values, and the violation is so severe that the minority is no longer willing to play the joint game, then the majority has no authority to make such a decision—that is, the minority has no duty to obey it. It follows that the minority also has the right to employ force to oppose it and overturn it.
- Even where the harm to the minority is not severe, the very fact that the minority can dissolve the society and declare that it is not willing to participate in the game gives it some power to resist, even when the decisions are less cardinal. This, too, can be a reasonable basis for its demand that its rights be protected.
This is the fourth justification, which, as noted, is based on migo. In halakhic discourse, if a person advances claim X in court, a claim that does not help him win, but he has the option to advance claim Y with which he would have won, then he wins even when he argues X. His ability to argue Y enables him to win even if he does not argue it but argues X. The fact that the minority can leave the game—even if it does not actually do so—gives it the right to have its demands met. It is important to emphasize that I am not describing power politics (in the game-theoretic sense), but an ethical claim. I will now clarify this further.
A Brief Discussion of the Nature of the ‘Migo’ Mechanism[3]
In the halakhic context there is a discussion among the commentators about the nature of migo. The straightforward explanation, stated explicitly in the Talmud, is “why would I lie?”—that is, a rational argument: believe me that I am not lying in claim X, for if I wanted to lie I would have chosen to lie with claim Y, with which I would win. The conclusion is that although claim X is weak, it is clear that I am not lying when I advance it, and therefore I win even when I argue X. However, several later authorities have noted that this cannot be the only explanation for migo. There is another dimension, usually called “the power of credibility” or “the power of claim.”[4] This mechanism says that we transfer the power from claim Y to claim X, and this even where the rational “why would I lie” consideration does not exist (as in migo de-ha’aza, and more). The very fact that I could have won with claim Y gives me the power to win with claim X.
Many have wondered about this conclusion and asked what logic underlies it. How can we understand this “transfer of power”? Why does the ability to win with claim Y give me the power to win with claim X (which in itself would not have allowed me to win)? I will not enter into the details of the discussion (see the pamphlets mentioned), but I will illustrate it through a mechanism considered stronger in halakhah: beyado (“in his power”).
When a person testifies about something that he is beyado—able to bring about the outcome with his own hands—he is believed in his testimony. For example, a person comes and testifies regarding terumah that belongs to me: “Your pure foods have become impure,” meaning he testifies that my terumah has become impure (and is therefore disqualified for use and must be burned). He is believed, since he could have defiled it himself. Likewise, a person who claims that an ownerless object belongs to Reuven is believed, since he could have acquired the object himself and then given it to Reuven.
The beyado mechanism is very similar to migo. There, too, the possibility of reaching the desired result (credibility or prevailing in judgment) by one route gives me the power to reach it by the other route (which, by itself, could not have brought me to that result). But early and later authorities have pointed out differences between these mechanisms.
The main source for this is the Rosh in Gittin 5:13. He explains that the credibility of beyado stems from the fact that anything that is in my power is considered as if I own it. If I can defile the pure foods or fix tevel (separate terumah), then I am like the owner of the matter and therefore I am believed regarding it.[5] What does this mean? Why is what is in my power considered as if I own it, and why does that give me credibility regarding the matter?
Later authorities explain that the Rosh means that beyado is a stronger credibility than migo. Being the “owner” grants absolute credibility with respect to the matter. But note that we are not dealing with someone who is truly the owner. The witness is not the owner of the produce about which he testifies, but his ability to effect the matter himself is considered a kind of ownership over it. He has exclusive control over the situation.
Thus writes Sha’arei Yosher VI:4:
That is, one to whom the matter is entrusted—in his power—was given credibility by the Torah. It does not depend on a [formal] acquisition; rather, whoever is the owner of the power to bring this matter into effect is regarded as such.
It is still not clear what grounds this credibility. Why does the fact that I could have brought about the result give me credibility? How does it allay the concern that I am lying? Again, one could have explained this via migo—“why would I lie?”—namely, by the rational principle that proves I am not lying (because if I wanted to lie I would have defiled the terumah with my own hands). But why is there here a foundation for credibility stronger than what exists in migo?
In an appendix to the above pamphlets I added a pamphlet on “legal reasonings,” where I explained that there is another kind of reasoning that can explain credibility even in the absence of evidentiary logic. “Migo as power of credibility” is a prime example of this, especially if we recall that this principle has no scriptural source and rests entirely on reasoning. I argued there that there are legal intuitions that instruct us to believe someone not because the probability is high that he is right, but because he has a right to be believed in such a situation, or because legal reasoning says it is appropriate to believe him (one can also understand monetary presumptions in this way). This, even if there is no higher probability that he is right—that is, in the absence of ordinary evidentiary reasoning. In our case, the intuition says that the fact that you can bring about some result with your own hands and no one can prevent you gives you absolute control over the matter, and consequently credibility that it occurred.
So too, I want to argue regarding the duty to protect minority rights in a democracy. Since the minority can detach itself from the majority whenever it deems fit, and the majority has no (moral) power to prevent it, the minority is entitled to condition its continued participation in the game on the preservation of certain basic rules, in particular that its rights not be violated. This is the fourth explanation for the duty to protect minority rights. I stress again that I do not intend a power-based claim, i.e., to point to the minority’s power to secure fulfillment of its demands. As we see in the halakhic discussion, the principle of beyado also constitutes an ethical-legal justification. Their rights deserve to be preserved; that is, their demands for such are justified.
Application to Our Case: The Demand for Agreement on the Judicial Reform
All this explains implication (2) of the picture I described. That is, migo is a fourth explanation for our duty to protect minority rights. This is not merely a plea by the minority for the protection of its rights and for ethical conduct by the majority toward it. It is the minority’s right, and it follows from the very democratic structure. This explains the second justification that Hed mentioned without arguing for it.
From the picture I described we can derive that a substantive change in the rules that may harm the minority can justify the minority’s demand that the change be made by consent. Moreover, in our case we are dealing with a minority whose contribution to society in various spheres is apparently significantly greater than that of the majority; hence its use of these levers (economic, media, and security levers) is all the more justified. The beyado here is the ability to exit the game and inflict heavy damages on those who remain in it. In such a situation the beyado consideration becomes very strong, and, as noted, this is not merely a power-play; it also has ethical weight. Everyone understands that it is not decent to use the majority’s power and to do so by using the state’s treasury when the minority’s contribution to it is very large. It is unreasonable to take money they bring into the state coffers and use it for the majority’s interests—who contribute much less—at the expense of the minority’s interests. This is the power that arises from the migo or beyado I described above.
But when it comes to changing the rules of the game, there is no need to resort to such a consideration at all. In such a case it is clear that the minority can demand agreement as a condition for the change, regardless of the migo it has to leave the game. In other words, I am not relying here only on implication (1) above. This is a stronger claim than implication (1). Changing the rules of the game essentially defines a new game, but this is a game the minority has not declared its consent to join. Here we are not dealing with leaving the existing game, but with not joining a new game. In such a situation there is no need to threaten to leave the game. One needs to secure renewed consent to play together, and without it the majority’s decisions have no force whatsoever regarding the minority.
[1] Disclosure: I have harbored resentment toward him for about thirty years, for in his role as a professional advisor to the Ministry of Education he recommended not to approve a unique program I submitted for a matriculation in logic (at the Noam Yeshiva High School), in my view for reasons of sheer rigidity of thought. So I may have a special interest in exposing logical flaws in his words. Judge my arguments for yourselves.
[2] The point is even stronger if we understand that we are dealing with different majorities and minorities with respect to each decision. In every decision made in the state (as in a city or a community), opinions are divided among different people. Therefore, in decision A there is one majority against one minority, but in decision B there is a majority of other people against a minority of other people. It is therefore clear that without the entire public’s agreement to this whole “game,” there is not one public here, and the majority has no mandate to make decisions for the minority.
[3] See a full discussion in my pamphlet on Migo.
[4] In that pamphlet I explained that these are two different explanations.
[5] A similar principle is brought by the Taz, Yoreh De’ah §236:6, but he speaks of a person who truly becomes the owner of the matter and then is believed regarding it. One can infer there that his ability to become the owner is what gives him credibility, but he need not actually become the owner. See Shev Shema‘ta VI:6 and the article here.
I'm going to make a small mistake now and a less small mistake. The first mistake I'll make is something completely marginal in terms of the column and it appears in the first footnote. The second and much less minor mistake is that I'm going to compliment Michy. Not easy.
Something in this confession of Michy's (“I've been holding a grudge against him for about thirty years”) is so true, so “Lutheran” and so speaks to my mind and heart. You come to attack someone's position and most of your words are directed at the substance of the matter, at the very thing. But you're also a human being and you have a negative feeling towards him (at least in this case). What could be more correct, more purifying and more relevant than getting rid of it right from the start, putting this point on the table and then moving on? Wonderful! After all, Michy could easily have written a relevant column without reporting to us about his heart attack, etc. And we would have known nothing about his feelings, and that's why he chose to do it (report).
I felt that this is the main point of this column.
And there is not a shred of cynicism or irony in my words.
🙂
Democracy (liberal) is ideally a social way of life based on human freedom, equality of every person before the law, freedom of every person to express an opinion and to exert political influence, mutual consideration, and participation of all citizens in the improvement of society and the construction of its values. The form of government is derived from the ideal.
Democracy is not the rule of the majority nor the rule of the “people”, but the rule of people, all people, in the plural, that is, a government based on a plurality of opinions and on laws and mechanisms that protect the basic freedoms of every person, in such a way that general agreements are reached by listening, debating, speaking, and all from a positive view of society as a whole.
Regarding the claim about the minority's finances, etc., it's a bit like a man claiming that he went out to work alone during the marriage and therefore owes his wife nothing. In Tel Aviv, there is currently a severe shortage of "plain" labor, which pays less taxes, but the public welfare depends on its existence. So I'm really not sure that the way to weigh the contribution and "right" of each sector to express its position regarding a political decision depends on the size of its GDP.
But overall, the column is very interesting and thought-provoking. Thank you.
Clearly, the assessment is not simple, and yet the economic level can be an indication. Those who are richer probably contribute more. The government of the “right on full” (Aalek) will certainly admit this. But I will not go into details now. Everyone will assess the contributions and the relevant weights as they see fit.
Your claim that the entire justification for the principle of majority rule is only because the minority agrees to it seems unreasonable to me. According to this approach, a democratic majority will not be able to oblige people (even a few) who believe in a monarchical, aristocratic, theocratic or anarchist worldview, who do not accept the majority's decision out of principle, to do anything. Likewise, the majority will be obliged to grant autonomy or independence to any minority group that demands it, no matter how illusory. Consider, for example, the people of Mea Shearim, who oppose the "Zionist state" in principle, do not see themselves as part of it, do not vote in elections and even refrain from receiving government budgets. Is this why we are obliged to exempt them from obeying the laws of the state? And should, within the democratic system, the minority have the right to veto any decision, by claiming that it is "not willing" to accept it for itself? According to this, it would also not be possible to punish criminals without their consent. And all this is unacceptable.
The view that seems more correct to me is that within every group, there is usually a natural right to make decisions that will also bind the minority. The minority cannot always withdraw from the group, since a person's affiliation with a particular group is – at least to some extent – a matter of fact, and not a matter of decision or consent. Not every minority has the right to self-determination; this right is conditional on certain external criteria such as a defined geographical concentration, a different language, a different history, a different religion or culture, etc.’. In intermediate cases, where the minority believes it has the right to self-determination and the majority believes it does not, there is really no democratic way to decide, and a compromise must be reached or a fight must be fought (see the entry Kingdom of Judah and Israel – even though there the seceders were the majority; the southern states of the US” Kosovo and Serbia; Catalonia and Spain; the Kurds and Turkey; etc.’).
The only moral limitation on the power of the majority is that it must make decisions honestly for the benefit of the whole and not just for its own benefit, since democracy is not “rule of the majority” but “rule of the people”, and the decision of the majority is only a mechanism for determining what is in the best interest of the people. Therefore, the majority has no right to harm the minority excessively. Although if, in the opinion of the minority, a certain harm to him is excessive and in the opinion of the majority it is reasonable (under the circumstances), here too there is no way to decide in a way that is acceptable to all, and a compromise must be reached or a fight must be fought as above.
Yosef,
You write, “The majority has a natural right.” What is a natural right?
Democracy is built on a worldview in which every person is important as an individual, and therefore their opinion matters, and in any case, it only succeeds in existing with a general agreement of all citizens on fundamental rights for every person and the equality of all citizens before the law, which in most democratic countries is called a constitution. The governmental system is a second tier designed to maintain and advance society according to the will of its citizens. However, if the first tier does not exist, or if many citizens are not interested in democracy, then it is a democracy that is not truly a democracy, even if there are elections and decisions are made by majority. What the powers of government are and what their limitations are, these are things that should be defined in the constitution, which, as mentioned, should be acceptable to all citizens. A democracy does not necessarily consist of one nation, for example Britain, – a democracy consisting of four nations. And even if it only includes one people, majority decision is not a mechanism to determine what is in the best interest of the people, because what is in the best interest of the people is determined by prophets and sages, not populist opinions. Rather, elections and majority decision are a way to improve and reform society in accordance with the will of the majority of its citizens, while preserving the fundamental rights of every citizen that are supposed to be anchored in the constitution from the beginning.
Yosef,
Of course. What is the problem you saw here?
This is of course provided that it is a matter that is essential to the minority. Sometimes considerations of feasibility also come into play, and the majority uses its power to coerce the minority even though there is no substantial justification for this, so that it does not harm itself.
Regarding the ”minority that is not willing to play by the rules of the game”:
1. The agreement was already made in the elections (and actually, long before). You can't decide that you are not willing to play after you lost. That's how children behave when they lose in a bet or a lottery.
2. Did you make the same claims in the disengagement and in Oslo? In the peace agreement with Egypt? And on the other hand - annexation? In my opinion, we could not make any “difficult” decision because in such decisions there will always be a minority that will be hurt by it and will not be willing to play the game.
3. Practically - how can you give such power to a minority when you give it the trust to define what is “really difficult for it”. Why shouldn't it take advantage of this for every decision or at least expand it greatly? And if you don't believe that will happen, you can see how the religious take advantage of the consideration for them and today they are “offended” when a Jew travels on Shabbat or eats non-kosher food next to them.
In addition,
4. Rothman & Co.’ claim is that Barak made a more serious blunder, even without a majority. So
5. Continuing with 4, one of the proposals that Rothman accepts (and proposed it herself), is to return exactly to the rules that existed before Barak's constitutional revolution. The minority is not willing to accept that either. Do you think it is reasonable that the minority would have a veto right even on a return to a reality that was agreed upon in the past?
Regarding the significant contribution of the minority-
6. These are not the rules of the game. In our democracy, every citizen has an equal voice and these rules are also accepted by the current minority. They are simply using the power they have.
7. Who said that the contribution is measured only in proportion to the GNP? The national religious public has a significant share in the combat officership in the IDF and in the relative tax of those who fall in wars (in recent years). Maybe the Ashkenazim who built the state will also have excess power over the Mizrahi? This is going to open up another set of public debates (as if we don't have enough).
8. In my opinion, the solution to the problem of the contributing minority groaning under the majority (and as a high-tech worker I certainly experience the difficulty) is for there to be constant tension between the majority and the minority so that the majority cannot enslave the minority too much because if that happens, the minority will emigrate to another country (this is already happening today, which is why I don't think the tax is being raised). It is certainly fair on the part of the minority - to threaten separation from the state. Although not so fair towards the minority who want to stay here for other reasons (family, language, culture, etc.)
Thank you for the proper disclosure. And as a graduate of the Midrashiya, it's disappointing that they didn't accept your offer 🙂
Just regarding 5. When has the Judicial Selection Committee ever been under the complete control of the coalition? I would love to receive a link that shows what you wrote in 5.
Not true. The agreement was made before the elections, but my argument is that sometimes the situation reveals that it was an agreement by mistake. They did not agree on purpose.
This is not a question of what I claim, but what the protesting minority claims. There was certainly room to argue this in other cases as well. Decisions that harm the soul of a minority should not be accepted unless they are willing to part with it. It is not true that every decision harms soul birds. This is demagogy.
This is not a question of exploitation. The separation will also come at a heavy price for the minority, and therefore it must seriously consider its steps. If you are under the impression that this is not a soul bird and that they are manipulating, do not give in to them, but be prepared to bear the consequences.
Well? What is your argument? Please let them separate. By the way, the Knesset could have intervened at any time and prevented Barak's kidnappers, but they preferred to howl about kidnappers instead of acting. By the way, then no one would have gone out to protest like today.
Definitely reasonable. It is true that the situation has changed and now the laws that prevailed in the past are no longer relevant and are not agreed upon.
You are talking about formalism and I am talking about ethics. Everyone has the same finger, but in discourse, not everyone has the same weight.
I have already explained that the measurement of who contributes more is more devoted to each of us. By the way, you are talking about the contribution of religious Zionism. What about the Haredim and Shas? I have my own position on the matter, but it is not important here.
Here you have spilled all the water you have accumulated so far.
Anyone who thought that the majority government was doing him an injustice could always present his claims in court
So that even if the bird of the soul was really hurt or there was just an unjustified and disproportionate disturbance, there were scholars and honest people in Jerusalem who could tell the government that they were exaggerating, this is not
Now that is being erased
From now on, anyone who is wronged by the government (and he will, even the righteous make mistakes, even those held in prison
And the head of the gang is accused of bribery, fraud and breach of trust) will really have no one to cry out about the injustice
From now on, everything is expected to fall apart according to nature
Hahahahaha. Anyone who calls the Supreme Court justices learned and honest people is assuming that he doesn't know between his right and his left (especially his left).
To Hananel.
Think about another possibility
Perhaps it is assumed that he simply reads the rulings and on really important issues even studies the reasoning with serious investment.
I don't agree with everything but appreciate the depth, seriousness, impressive scope of knowledge in many fields, even in Torah, and especially honesty?
Is there a chance?
I gave you a compliment for putting analytic philosophy in its place. K. is the son of K. that philosophy that is not analytic is suspect because it is like a withered leaf compared to the analytic one. In contrast to all this, you tend, and rightly so, to examine reality in the light of more established theories such as game theory and its associates, social choice theory, and decision theory, which, if you will, are a branch of game theory.
A realistic, empirical, positive analysis deserves to shun words like "the will of the people," "rights," and the like, which dissolve and evaporate when we come to analyze them. As you mentioned, when we come to define the will of a group (people, government, court) we encounter enormous difficulties, illustrated by Arrow's impossibility theorem, which clearly shows that there is no way to attach the preferences of individuals to social preference. Condorcet preceded Arrow by centuries, who pointed out the internal contradictions of majority decision. Similarly, you will find many paradoxes indicating the difficulty of treating a group as a single unit to which a will or preference can be attributed.
So too does the concept of right, which emerged in modern times, but it is a deceptive concept that deserves to be examined in an informed manner. Ludovico was right to ask Joseph about a compromise of "natural right" - a vague and unfounded concept.
It seems that any informed analysis of the structure of government and society should start from one fundamental concept, which is power, or more specifically, the ability to do. In the modern political structure in which we distinguish between three branches of government, only one branch has power, that is, tools of action: the executive branch. It has tax collectors, and policemen, and guns, and soldiers, and an army of officials who whip its staff. Max Weber taught us well that the state has a monopoly on violence. And to be precise, the violence of the state, at least the well-organized kind, is only that of the executive branch of the state.
The other two branches have nothing except the ability to speak. It is not for nothing that the legislature is called a parliament from the Old French word parler, meaning speech. And Agnon called it well in his book on the state, “House of Lips”. So too does the court, whose power is only in its mouth, and as Alexander Hamilton stated, the court has neither a sword nor a purse. Although Daniel Friedman wrote a book called “The Sword and the Purse” In which he claimed that our Supreme Court has a sword and a purse, since it intervenes in politics. But everyone who listens will laugh. After all, in the end, the court has nothing but its word and the writing that comes out of its hands. (And what Friedman wrote is not an expression of his very personal disappointment with the court.)
We have learned that what seems to us to be the power of the court is nothing more than what the real power, namely the executive branch, agrees to accept upon itself. Likewise, the legislative branch, which seems to us to be the source of the power of the government and expresses the “will of the people”, which, as we said, does not exist at all, also has no existence except by virtue of the power of the executive branch. Let us see here and now how the executive branch can limit the court. If you want, you can easily limit the legislative branch in a dozen different ways, and we have also seen this with our own eyes in other places.
If we look for images of the power of the executive branch, we will find them in the Lurianic theory of creation, in which the Infinite reduces itself to make room for the world. In the same way, the executive branch also reduces itself and leaves places in which it does not interfere, and what is more, it leaves the other two branches a gap to define themselves. In these places that have been vacated by the power of the executive branch, individual freedoms that we call civil rights grow. Another image, more everyday, is the father allowing his toddler son to ride on his back and run on all fours like a horse. Of course, this game is possible until the father gets tired of the game and throws his son to the ground.
The same must be said about the ability to do. After all, this is not limited only to the executive branch. Each and every individual has his own tool for action. It is also possible to distinguish different groups in society whose ability to do is greater than that of other groups. But this ability is limited because it is not organized and captured like that of the executive branch. But when an organization of individuals or groups is created, they can limit the power of the executive branch. And here we are witnessing the beginnings of such an organization here in the land of Canaan.
In conclusion, power can only be limited by power. Indeed, sometimes the power of the executive branch is limited by this power itself. But when we do not do this sufficiently, other forces may emerge in society that will limit the power of the executive branch. This is not about the rights of the minority or the rights of the majority or other nonsense that does not stand the test of informed analysis. Of course, it is always possible to use external forces to limit the executive branch. Indeed, we find among us a minority turning (both in its pocket and in its anger) to other countries that will exert their influence on local power. Of course, the righteous condemnations of such acts come to protect local power. Time will tell whose power will prevail.
Your words are a beautiful expression of the shortcomings of analytical thinking. Not every concept needs and can be defined. But I have extended Toba in several places. In general, I really do not accept these forceful analyses (as in law and economics), and I certainly do talk about rights and desires. You can of course ignore basic facts just because you find them difficult to define, and thus become a strictly analytical person whose shortcomings outweigh his advantages. In this column I tried to argue that power also has meanings in the realm of justice, but not because there is no such thing as justice and rights, but only power. This was not a definition but an argument.
I am not an analyst. Quite the opposite. I am an empiricist. Everything I said is firmly anchored in the historical and contemporary view of reality. It is possible, of course, to indulge in vague, metaphysical concepts that have no hold on reality. This is the difference between someone who reads reality from the standard and someone who gets their hands dirty with benign blood and placenta and sees in the outside world how things work.
In my book Two Carts (and Really Unstable) I explained the connection between positivism and analyticism. Both deny synthetic-a priori insights, that is, the validity of intuitions. It is true that theorists are prone to errors in application, but even those who get their hands dirty with benign and benign things sometimes fail to see what is beyond them.
Indeed, philosophers who are considered analytical have denied the Kantian category of synthetic-analytic. (For example, Carnap in his famous article). Although it must be said that the use of the term “analytic philosophy” is also completely vague. But the use of the psychological category “intuition” and comparing it to the Kantian metaphysical category is an insult to the dead Kant 🙂
Indeed, everyone is prone to error: To err is human. But it seems to me that theorists' errors are more numerous, although they are more difficult to grasp because they are more subtle than they are obvious.
Perhaps these things should be clarified face to face as we once did. It is also possible over a steaming cup of coffee.
Oh, sorry. Synthetic a priori, of course.
You wrote "basic facts." It is indeed a fact that people talk about facts. But calling for rights facts is stretching the thread of thought until it breaks.
Indeed, rights are facts. Not facts in the simple physical sense but in the sense of what I have previously called 'ethical facts.' This is not stretching the thread of thought but simply using the threads of thought, which positivists do not really do.
Since I am not a philosopher, I cannot be a positivist, so I assume you are not referring to me when you talk about a lack of use of the threads of thought. In any case, attributing such a deficiency to me would be a complete disregard for well-proven facts 🙂
I understand and agree with the demand for agreement on the new rules of the game.
But I think the argument is equally valid for the other side. Supporters of the reform claim that the ”old” rules of the game have changed in a creeping way in recent decades to the point where they are no longer ready to play.
What will happen if they fail to reach agreement? Opponents of the reform are essentially claiming that if broad agreement cannot be reached, the reform should not be implemented for the time being. This may be true, but only on the condition that Aharon Barak's creeping legal revolution is also postponed until broad agreement is reached. Otherwise, this is a blatant lack of fairness.
In principle, you are right. But I think that the proponents of reform are grossly ignoring the blatant asymmetry between the need to balance the government and the need to balance the court, and I have already written about this. The government's influence on our lives and the power it is given are immeasurably greater than those given to the court. The court's influence on our lives is minor, while the government makes decisions every day that affect us all dramatically. Therefore, to argue that the breaking of the rules by the court (which certainly happened) justifies secession from the state because these are new rules of the game sounds to me like whatabautism. My argument is that Rothman and Levin are shooting at a fly with a cannon. They are coming to solve a real but fairly minor problem by dramatically changing the rules of the game in a way that will and will fundamentally harm our lives.
On the other hand, the government is naturally balanced by its dependence on the composition of the coalition, and by the scrutiny of the voters once every four years. Balances that the court does not have.
In addition, one can argue about the extent of the influence of lawyers on our lives. I think you are underestimating it.
If people die because of this problem, I don't think it can be called minor. I mention the murder of the Hatuel family (the High Court refused to allow the demolition of a house that posed a danger to travelers on that route, and the shots were fired from this house). And this is just one example. The deaths in the Jenin alleys at the Defensive Wall are a second example. In the next Shebelev, it will be a ban on firing missiles back into Lebanon and Gaza in response to their own massive rocket fire (hitting "innocent people"). The ban on neighborly conduct, etc. A ban on demolishing the homes of terrorist families or refusing to deny citizenship to terrorists. I could go on like this all day. The story with the fine for that cashier who refused to treat a transgender woman as a woman is just crazy. And he's just the swallow. And I can't fix this because all jurists are disciples of the theory of "purposeful interpretation" of laws that is taught in academia, which is simply the practice of lying in order to achieve social goals (which is simply setting real policy).
It is certainly possible. In this country, people die because of many things. Many more people die because of government misdeeds that were not corrected (by the court or at all) than because of legal rulings. According to this logic, the time has come to take the decision away from the government and return it to the market square. The important question is how much the rulings affect our lives compared to the government's decisions, and who is more important to balance. This is not determined by extreme cases. Therefore, the impact of the court is indeed clearly minor. The deaths in the alleys at the Defensive Wall angered me very much, too, but this is not a decision by the court but by the (distorted, in my opinion) morality of the army and the government. And of course also considerations (not necessarily distorted) of propaganda and defense before international law, in which I am less familiar. What does the court have to do with it? It is most convenient for the government to act and to hang the failures on the court. This is what they have always done. They could have made such a decision without any problem and no court would have stopped them in the act (in the middle of a military operation).
Only fundamental decisions such as the neighbor procedure or citizenship for terrorists are truly court decisions, and there is no evidence that this has changed anything in terms of security. The Ben-Gvir-style belligerents are sure that a tough hand will improve the situation. For now, there does not seem to be any evidence for this. If so, the government and the Knesset will be respected and will decide accordingly. The considerations of civil rights are very important, and the assumption that they should be rejected in the face of any castor security hypothesis is unfounded. Legal order is very important, even if there are injustices and injustices on its side. This is true for any legal system (including halacha, as Maimonides also writes, that halacha was stated in the general way).
In short, these are empty demagogies. These are all minor effects, and most of them are not related to the court. And the examples of damages caused by various governments are numerous and a thousand times more enormous, and even in some of the examples you gave, the damages are due to the government and not the court.
And I haven't even asked you about the benefit of a strong court that prevented government damage. A fair comparison should take these into account as well and only then make a balance. You didn't discuss the question of how many distortions are expected in a situation where the government has no criticism. A comparison that shows damage from one side versus the gains from the other is not really the most logical and fair methodology.
That wasn't the debate. The debate was whether the impact of the courts on our lives is minor or not. If their actions prevented real damage from the government, then it turns out that their impact is once again not minor (for the better). As I said, this is a discussion that is currently theoretical because those sitting in the courts currently have no obligation to the language of the law and are doing their own thing with it. As soon as honest judges sit there who will not try to educate the people about their progressive agendas but simply judge between people, it will be possible to talk about government restrictions. Personally, I don't think the clause of overcoming in the future is needed (only until the students of Aharon Barak are eradicated from the system), but rather with proportional representation in the Knesset in a committee according to the power structure and without even a single judge sitting on it.
The condemned is not like the witness. Many people die from accidents, but to die because of stupid and opaque decisions by someone else who has no responsibility is clearly intolerable. The government's damages stem, as you said, from failures or mistakes. That's how you learn and improve and progress. Those who don't do anything are not wrong. But the High Court never changes its mind. It is never interested in how it affects reality. That's why the sense of justice is a thousandfold greater because of extreme cases. Morality is a mutual matter and those who do not grant human rights to others (Arabs or terrorists) do not have human rights. And it has nothing to do with security considerations. It is a terrible injustice and it disempowers everyone who enlists in the country or works here. It is very understandable that the Haredim do not participate in the country against this background (although this was not their reason for doing so in the first place, but now it certainly is).
If the High Court's effects are minor, why does the absolute majority of the Jewish people come out against it with fury?
It's hard and not very helpful to talk to walls. So I'll stop here.
A fair comparison should take into account the chilling effect that exists in the entire governmental avenue following judicial activism (of the High Court, lawyers, the prosecution), and not just the decisions that the High Court actually made. One should also consider the accumulated frustration of citizens who feel that there is a “glass ceiling” for implementing their ideology, while the ideology of Bar Halugata receives a tailwind from unelected institutions.
Of course you are right that the government has a greater influence, but that goes without saying. Even if 5% of the government and Knesset activities are affected by a chilling effect or active decisions, that is not a small amount.
The benefit that the High Court brings, and it is great, should not be lost, because a balanced reform will continue to allow almost the same benefit with much less harm. No one has seriously proposed abolishing judicial review altogether. It won't happen.
Bottom line, the opposing side knows how to threaten to break the law, but it's very easy for them to forget that the other side can do the same. Except for a few righteous people in Sodom (like Elbashan or Barak-Koren), no one has even bothered to address the issue. We are so outnumbered.
I agree with every word. And yet, in my opinion, there is no comparison between the importance of the balance of government and the balance of the court (and the ratio between the degree of influence of the one and the other). Here I was only commenting on the quality of the comparison.
A historical pause.
Since everyone discusses force, including Rabbi Abraham, and there is a not inconsiderable possibility that the use of force will ultimately lead to civil or civil war, it is worth examining its manifestations, starting with the Bible.
Although the Bible has no real status in Jewish culture, certainly not in its halakhic version, of which Rabbi Abraham is one of its most magnificent flowers. (How many times is the Bible mentioned in the blog pages? How many verses are quoted in the Mishnah?) But since the return of biblical territorialism to the stage of history, the Bible has also returned to occupy a central place. First in Zionist thought, which sought to skip over two thousand years of non-territorial halakhic Judaism, and then in religious Zionist thought, which attempts to combine rabbinic-halakhic Judaism with biblical Judaism. This combination sometimes creates comic effects of anachronism and basic historical misunderstanding, for example when Smotrich’ and Gafni talk about King David. But that should be the subject of a separate article.
Well, there is no better way than to start with last week's parashah.
And Moses stood at the gate of the camp and said, "Who is the Lord? And all the sons of Levi gathered to him." And he said to them, "Thus says the Lord: The children of Israel put their swords on their sides, and went from gate to gate in the camp, and killed every man his brother, and every man his neighbor, and every man his neighbor. 28 And the sons of Levi did according to the word of Moses, and there fell of the people that day about three thousand men.
If we compare this civil war from gate to gate to the war at our gates and compare the size of the population today with that of then, we are expected to have a great many fallen. Who will be the sons of Levi today? Perhaps these are the ones who answer the call Who is to me?
But of course the first fraternal war is the one between Cain and Abel. Later we find solutions that allow us to avoid fraternal war: separations. The one between Abraham and Lot (which began with a quarrel) and the one between Jacob and Esau (Genesis 36:8). We must not forget the bloody fraternal war in the story of the concubine on the hill. Let's skip a few more civil wars and get to the days of the monarchy after Solomon. There too, the separation into two kingdoms is the solution that prevents (not entirely) fraternal wars.
In the post-biblical period we find fraternal war, simply put, in the twilight of the Hasmonean kingdom. These are the wars that ultimately turned the Land of Israel into a Roman province. The sages were not enthusiastic about this kingdom, and in any case, they did not mention these wars, as I think. But the sages did mention the fraternal wars of the end of the Second Temple period. Those wars that mark the transition from the territorial and temple-based biblical Judaism to the Judaism of the Sages, which replaced the territory and the temple with spiritual and intellectual content.
Along with the renewed territorialism of our time, there have also been a few and clearly unimpressive internecine wars. What does the future hold for us?
Two questions, please:
1. Can the fact that the process of ”changing the rules of the game” was previously done without consent and in a manner that is hidden from view, establish an ethical justification for ”turning the wheel back” even without consent?
2. Ultimately, it seems that it is not complicated to understand that there is an ethical obligation for the majority (in the various contexts) to harm the rights of the minority, and ”abuse its power against them”. I really doubt that people who support/promote the reform are rubbing their hands with pleasure, ”Yes, finally it is possible to rob the individual rights of the minority!”.
The more critical questions in my opinion are –Is there indeed harm (a largely empirical question like that”n), is it justified, and who will decide? In my opinion, the Supreme Court is the one that harms the minority - the real minority, the one that does have a majority in the Knesset, but is quite absent from all the relevant elites (the Ministry of Justice, the media, the courts, cultural channels, etc.). The Court does not ask me and many others like me for my consent.
I couldn't understand anything here. What are you talking about? Who are you asking? What's the question?
The rabbi writes that there is a great reason to consider the minority among us who give more to the state. But it seems to me that this is precisely the argument against it - that the reason the left has more money or ability is because it has the educational institutions and power in its hands, and this is precisely what the right wants to change.
I hope and assume you're joking.
The Migo argument is just an extension of the substantive argument. After all, from an ethical perspective, a minority that tries to get more than its share (in the family parable, a child who tries to force his favorite game on more than a third of the games) just by virtue of the fact that he can disengage, would be considered blackmailing (it seems to me that you tend to accuse the Haredim of such behavior, although they do so by exerting their political weight on issues that are important to them and not by violence. This column teaches a lesson in rights over them). Of course, that is their right, but then they should disengage and suffice instead of squeezing the majority more than they (the minority) can handle.
An argument that several users have raised here and that you do not seem to have understood correctly:
Given that the reform only returns the situation to its original state before the Barak revolution (this can be discussed, of course), the changes included in it do not constitute a change in the rules of the game. Therefore, your claim about the lack of legitimacy of the majority to impose its opinion while changing the rules of the game falls flat (because there is no change in the rules of the game) and one can rely on the agreement regarding the rules of the game that existed throughout the period of the classical court (before Shamgar and Barak). There is no need to secede, one can simply legislate.
I have never blamed the Haredim for their path. The blame lies with the goals for which these paths are used. Using political influence to achieve worthy goals is not problematic (within any limits). The goals for which Haredi blackmail is used are the problem: advancing narrow interests at the expense of the public (also Haredi).
I responded to this claim. If something doesn't seem right to you, you should elaborate.
As far as I can tell, two users have raised the second argument I presented (restoring the situation to its former self is not a change in the rules of the game). You answered both of them using the term disengagement, a term you used in your article to describe a case in which the minority abandons the democratic game after the majority hurts its own soul. In previous columns, you noted that such an act on the part of the minority is only acceptable in extreme situations (otherwise it squeezes more out of the pie than it deserves at the expense of the majority). My argument is that, given that the reform restores the situation to its former self, it does not change the rules of the game, after all, we all agreed on these rules until the Barak revolution. If the reader agrees up to this point, he should draw two conclusions:
Since the reform is not a change in the rules of the game, it can be enacted if it gains a majority in the Knesset (there is no need to threaten disengagement if it is not enacted, as I understood from your words, but simply enact it and that is it).
It is difficult to morally accept the minority's right to threaten secession in response to a move to restore the status quo, as agreed upon at the time.
It is likely that a significant portion of the opponents of the reform will reject the claim that this is a restoration of the status quo and therefore will not accept my conclusions, but it seemed that you did not understand the argument raised by Phil and Leonardo, and that is what I wanted to clarify.
Can I intervene? In what way does reform = restoring the situation to its original state? I'm really asking, when, for example, was the Judicial Appointments Committee controlled by the coalition? When, for example, were legal advisors positions of trust? When was there a broad override clause with a majority of 61?
Because of the nature of judges today, the only way to restore the situation is to elect judges who were like in that situation - legally conservative. Therefore, we need to ensure that there is a majority in the coalition on this committee. The judges never had anything to look for there.
” When, for example, were legal advisors positions of trust?” Well, you are probably very young. It was a decision by the High Court of Justice after Barak's constitutional revolution. Maybe the name “advisor” is supposed to hint at something to you. It is simply terrible. What is happening in this area today is simply a joke at the expense of the concept of “government”
The override clause is only needed temporarily until the composition of the judges in the High Court of Justice changes to non-activist judges (judges who can be trusted), and that will take many years. When this happens, it will be possible to cancel the override clause.
You say that this is the “only way to restore the situation”, but who guarantees that it will be so? What is certain is that it does not restore the situation to its former state because the situation was never as the reform describes.
And I ask again: When were the legal advisors positions of trust? Gideon Hausner was before Barak, I think, and he had already had time to quarrel with Ben-Gurion. So when?
We do what we can. It is impossible to predict the future and nothing is certain. The main problem is that judges today do what they are supposed to do with the law (“purposeful interpretation”) and this must be limited in every way, if not to fire them. It is simply a dereliction of duty – it is a real breach of trust. Politicians have more integrity than these liars, if only because they have a responsibility and are required to report to voters
That there should be no positions of trust. There is simply no need for them. That their opinion will not bind anyone. And regardless, there are always arguments between professionals and politicians, and in the end, the opinion of the latter determines, and if it is not good for the professional, he should resign. In truth, even now their opinion is not really binding. Once the court has exceeded its authority, its words are null and void and there is no obligation to keep its words.
Itay:
Once the advisor's decisions are not binding and after splitting his role, the meaning of him being in a position of trust is almost entirely technical (there are considerations against it, such as the ability of the various government ministries to speak with one voice before the court). Gideon Hausner confronted Justice Minister Dov Yosef in the context of the position of Attorney General that he holds and not the advisory position that the reform is about (Dov Yosef wanted control over that as well, in a rather horrifying way). The Agranat Committee, which was called upon to look into this issue, explicitly stated that the advisor's opinion is not binding.
All I'm saying, and now both B and A agree with me, is that the reform does not restore the previous situation, because the situation after the reform was not before, not in the override clause, not in the appointment of judges (at least since 1953) and not in attorneys as positions of trust. So you claim that the reform may indirectly restore the previous situation. Maybe, who knows? Everything is possible. Although it does not convince me in the least.
But what is 100 percent certain, and you both agree with me, is that currently this is not what the reform proposes, so why claim this?
I was not talking about the reform itself, only about this specific claim. I hope it is clear now.
No. The reform wants to achieve the degree of intervention of the judges that existed then (and which was barely there - precisely because of the reasons of the expectation of re-election by the public, lack of responsibility, and failure to report to anyone) and the degree of integrity that they had. This is the essence. It is clear that the reform provisions that are tools must change because the judges have changed and become egotistical and opaque, and there is no way to limit them without new tools (especially replacing them with honest people). We have explained how the reform provisions are supposed to achieve the reality that existed then.
I agree with most of what the Supreme Court wrote, except for the matter of positions of trust. I am not familiar with such a decision by the High Court of Justice. There was a conclusion by the Agranat Committee that the opinion of the advisor is not binding and a conclusion by the Shamgar Committee that permitted the use of a private lawyer in certain cases.
In addition, until 1983, the Supreme Court justices were elected by the government!
The overriding clause was intended to balance the provision of the possibility of invalidating laws that did not exist before the Barak Revolution (except for the Kol Haam ruling in which the Court apologizes for being forced to enter the realm of the legislative authority and suggests that it enact a "law bypassing the High Court of Justice" on this issue). Since it is impossible to close all the loopholes without integrity on the part of the judges (see the entry "Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment" - a rule invented by the High Court to allow it to invalidate basic laws), there is no choice but to change the composition of the committee. Especially when adding to the court the ability to invalidate laws that has been controversial until today.
So you're not claiming that the reform restores the previous situation either. So I don't understand why you'd even claim that.
As for the other things, forgive me, but that's killing the baby to wipe his ass. Things have already been explained ad nauseam, and anyone who doesn't see how bad this reform is, won't see it anymore.
Rabbi Michael:
I bothered, I bothered. It's hard to accuse me of misunderstanding,
since in your response you asked “What is your argument?” and suggested that they disconnect. Only after that did you raise arguments that could be interpreted as if you understood the question, framing them under the word “By the way”.
To our point:
You probably know the rule that a governmental authority is prohibited from doing anything that is not expressly stated in the law. And since the police do not muster the strength to fight crime sufficiently, a law is needed to prohibit it?
The Barak Revolution does not only amount to the authority to invalidate laws for which some find reference in the law (really not obvious). There is also the issue of the binding authority of the Attorney General, ‘a constitutional amendment that is not constitutional’ and more, which are really exceptions to the law.
Regarding the protests: Similar to my previous argument, you don't need to be protested against for your violation of the law to be considered criminal. In addition, some of the court hijackings did not make headlines at the time and the public did not understand their possible implications at all (especially in light of the High Court's practice of first publishing the innovation as an obiter – an incidental remark and only using it in subsequent rulings. Such as the Mizrahi ruling and the discussion on the invalidation of the Nation Basic Law). How many people in the early 1990s knew that we had a constitution?
There were also protests against the court. For example, the Haredi demonstration in 1999 (350,000 participants according to police estimates).
Regarding the claim about the statute of limitations: What has changed in the last thirty years that makes what was until then no longer appropriate for our country?
Well, of course you didn't bother, but I think we've exhausted it.
Just as for the different reality, today personal basic laws are being enacted to appoint criminals and offenders to senior positions and improve their material conditions in their positions. They are abolishing all sensible regulation and going completely wild with the appointments and decisions, and are showing a terrible lack of responsibility for the future of all of us. There are of course other obvious changes, but that in itself is enough to seek a new balance. That's it.
From the moment they lost faith in the courts, the concept of a criminal or offender has already been taken with an asterisk. And if the High Court is going wild, then it is possible to "go wild" to stop its rampage. Regarding the other appointments and lack of responsibility for the future, with all due respect, this is not a matter for the courts to intervene, but a legitimate political opinion that should be expressed in the next elections. It is better for a minister to appoint someone of his own who believes in him or his policies than a left-wing professional who will fight and threaten him, will not implement the policy, and will even try to disrupt the implementation of the minister's policy by others. As far as I am concerned, every minister today needs to fire all the people who staff his office and appoint a collection of appointees, and this will already provide an opportunity to examine any policy and learn from mistakes on the ground. These officials do not allow the government to learn at all. Their job is to advise and execute, and if they don't believe in the government, then resign. They think the ministers are their rubber stamp.
https://hashiloach.org.il/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%9A-%D7%90%D7%99%D7%91%D7%93%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%9C%D7%94-%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%96%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%92-%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A4%D7%98%D7%99/
Without any actual connection, the agitators did not actually clash with the government before. And in any case, not everything that happened in the past was good. It was very bad. This is the rule of officials who have no responsibility and report to no one, even more so than the rule of the High Court.
The link you included does not mean that until that High Court decision, attorneys had positions of trust, contrary to your claim above.
I don't care if there were positions of trust. Their opinion was not binding. I quote:
“In the Pinhasi ruling, signed by Supreme Court President Meir Shamgar and four other justices, then-Vice President Aharon Barak debated whether Harish had exceeded his authority when he refused to represent the government. Barak's conclusion was that this was not the right question: in his view, the question was not whether Harish was permitted to refuse to appear in court, but whether the law permits the prime minister to ignore the opinion of the legal advisor. Barak's answer to this question was puzzling: he ruled that in fact the legal advisor is not the government's legal advisor, but rather he is the one who adjudicates legal matters for it, and that the government is obligated to accept his decisions[1].
Jurists welcomed Barak's ruling as an important victory for the rule of law: for the first time, the government was found to be subject by law to the authority of the legal advisor. However, in many ways, this ruling only gave official seal to a far-reaching conceptual revolution that Meir Shamgar himself had brought about twenty-five years earlier, when he served as Attorney General. According to this revolutionary concept, the Attorney General plays the role of a judge, not a lawyer; and his role is not to facilitate government actions, but to judge them.
” A constitutional amendment that is not constitutional” – This is a piece of invention. They don't even notice that there is a logical contradiction in this expression. Both unconstitutional and foolish.
B:
The principle of benevolence can place the phrase "unconstitutional constitutional amendment" within the bounds of logic even if not within the bounds of law.
It is possible to interpret the constitutional amendment as contradicting other provisions of the Constitution (or the Declaration of Independence if it is included in the Constitution) and therefore as "unconstitutional".
There are reasonable and completely understandable interpretations for this (one doesn't necessarily have to agree with the claim, but to say it's contradictory is nonsense). But in light of the insistence here, I see no point in discussing it.
A
Amendment of the Constitution creates a new constitution that repeals the previous one. So the contradiction between it and the previous one is meaningless because the previous one was repealed and a judge cannot decide that the previous one is the one that represents the will of the people when the people changed their will. There may be internal contradictions in the new constitution, but that does not mean that parts of it are unconstitutional. In short, I laughed for an hour when I heard this bluff. The stupidity of these judges who think that we can be fed every morsel that exists, surprises me every time. I have no principle of mercy because it is clear to me that for them the constitution is only the law of human rights (which does not really exist. They spread it out of “human dignity and freedom”)
I understood you correctly and I already answered that in my reply to Leonardo. It seems you didn't bother to read and you're repeating the same things again in the hope that something will be renewed. See here:
https://mikyab.net/posts/80181#comment-71500
First of all, we are not proposing a return to what was, but rather something much more radical. But I answered the hypothetical question that was asked there on the assumption (hypothetical and erroneous) that this was indeed the proposal at hand.
I wrote that sometimes when the situation changes, the old rules are no longer sufficient and returning to them is a change in the rules of the game. If they were to return me today to the life of a shepherd with Abraham our father or Jethro, Moses' father-in-law, I am not sure that my signature on the agreement with God in which I pledged to keep the Torah would still remain valid. This is even if I had been alive since then. A little sewage has flowed in the Yarkon since then. It doesn't seem too complicated to me to understand.
The harm to the minority's "spirituality" is that they are truly losing power in state institutions for the first time and the majority is beginning to rule for the first time after 40 years. The minority is sick of control and this is its spirituality. It doesn't seem like it should be taken into account in such a case. It needs to calm down and drink water and not assume that the majority wants it badly. The only minority that might be "hurt" is perhaps the Arab public (which is really a fifth column as we saw in "Guardian of the Walls") who might finally receive exactly what they contribute and not receive all sorts of illusory rights like National Insurance that they would never give us. And certainly not "corrective" discrimination in academia and government institutions.
I certainly agree that protecting the rights of the minority and taking into account their wishes, a system of checks and balances, separation of powers, decentralization of powers (the federal system), and reduction of government powers are an integral part of a stable modern democratic government.
But even though the principle of the supremacy of judicial review (see the Marbury v. Madison ruling) was accepted in the United States as early as 1803, to this day there are serious jurists who challenge this decision as a "usurpation of authority" that the (American) Supreme Court has taken upon itself and is not anchored in the Constitution.
In fact, according to the American Constitution, each branch (legislative, executive, judicial) owes its loyalty to acting according to the Constitution to the best of its understanding, and in the event of disagreements between the president and the court or between the legislature and the judges, one branch does not have supremacy over the others. The system was originally built using the gridlock method to create difficulties and obstacles to the natural human tendency towards power and tyranny.
And certainly in American history, President Abraham Lincoln interpreted the Constitution according to his understanding and when the Supreme Court strongly opposed his decision, he stood his ground and refused to bow to judicial criticism.
The above case should not be seen as a constitutional crisis, but rather this is how the system was built according to the intention of the Founding Fathers.
Ultimately, opponents of reform tell us that the Supreme Court is the guardian who protects the rights of minorities and stands as a barrier between us and the tyranny of the majority.
And against this I pose Plato's ancient question: “Who will guard the guards?”
The opponents of the reform tell us at length about the enormous restraint that the High Court demonstrates, about the few times it has repealed laws (ignoring the "chilling effect" of judicial activism, all the laws that died in committees or at the whim of one legal advisor or another).
The very fact that they boast and take pride in the fact of demonstrating restraint shows that in fact their power is not limited, only thanks to their great morality, they do not act according to the natural human tendency to power and thanks to their lofty morality their (ultimate) power has not corrupted them (according to Lord Acton's saying).
One can disagree with this advocatory interpretation of the legal/political history of the State of Israel, but let's assume that it is true.
But who guarantees us that future Supreme Court judges will be soldiers, God-fearing, men of truth, haters of evil, knights of justice, and restrained from the lust for power?
The answer: No one!
I completely agree that serious brakes are needed against the legislative/executive branch we have, and a reform that ignores this is dangerous.
But where are the brakes on the judiciary?
I am not satisfied with signatures that pat themselves on the backs of their restrained heads.
I agree with every word. And still, the need for restraints on the executive branch versus the judiciary cannot be compared. In general, I have written here more than once that in my opinion reform is essential, but not the reform (in the news) that is currently being proposed.
Do you think the current reform should be completely thrown out and a fresh start should be made, with only a few corners to be rounded, or can it be saved with a serious overhaul?
If you have already written a critique on the details of the reform, alternatives, etc., I missed it, I would be happy to link it.
I didn't write a review of the details, nor do I see much value in it. I also don't see a big difference between the alternatives you presented. It's not something very complex, so fixing it or rewriting it isn't very different.
This is theoretical. In practice, from the moment the judges (and lawyers in general) started to do with the law as they please with their ”purposeful interpretation” they simply violated the public trust. They are liars to the core, and also lack self-awareness.. and in a situation where they have neither responsibility nor accountability, then the politicians are more honest than them. In such a situation, the legal system should be limited as much as possible until honest judges are appointed.
Itay:
My argument was that according to the person who raised this argument, it outweighs Rabbi Michael's argument about changing the rules of the game. Personally, I don't think the reform restores the situation exactly (especially the change in the composition of the committee. A change that is justified in itself, although I would prefer proportional representation by the Knesset instead of representation by the government. This change places us in the middle between the two election methods that were used in the past), but it is not different to the extent that it justifies breaking the rules. I assume you understand that the Barak revolution does not allow us to return the situation to its original state precisely and expect it to remain that way. Judges who see themselves as authorized to invalidate basic laws, without any basis in the language of the law, will also scold and annihilate the restoration of the situation to its original state. There is no escape from a broader move that will prevent the judges from abolishing it all at once.
But this argument is not valid, so whoever makes this argument is wrong or misleading, so why even talk about this argument?
As for the rest of what you wrote, I completely disagree. In my opinion (and I know there are people who disagree with me on this) there needs to be judicial review of the government, and the reform as it is today is crippling it. This will allow the government to do whatever it wants, and who suffers from that? Let them wait for the elections (assuming there are still elections).
Again, I am not talking about some hypothetical reform (such as proportional representation on the committee as you wrote above), but about the reform as it is proposed today. If you think (and again – I know not everyone thinks this way) that there should be judicial review of the government, you must oppose the reform as it is proposed.
To argue that the reform changes the rules of the game in a way that justifies the minority breaking the rules of the game and negating the legitimacy of the majority's move, a more radical change is required, otherwise every new law is a change in the rules of the game. Therefore, the argument is valid, even if in a more refined version.
In practice, the situation to which the court has deteriorated tips the scales in favor of the reform, even if there is a hypothetical future concern (slight in my opinion). Proposals such as adding a House of Representatives can be considered good criticism of the Knesset, although one should examine the shortcomings in the system's clumsiness. Certainly in a country like ours that is surrounded by enemies and must make decisions immediately.
If this is a response to me, I don't understand what you're saying. This argument is invalid no matter how you twist it. The reform doesn't restore a previous situation, and these are simply the facts.
A hypothetical future concern? Why future – It's clear what this specific government wants to do. There's nothing hypothetical here. Examples abound, from an attack on the environment (or nature in general), appointments of people who are clearly unsuitable for senior positions (for example, in the Ministry of Transportation or the Central Intelligence Agency), the politicization of the police, the Donations Law (I wonder who the boy next to him is on his desk?), the shamelessness of a prime minister with 2 houses who demands that we support his houses financially (the Accountant General is afraid to complain, as reported in Haaretz today), basic (!) personal laws designed to appoint one person (!) to a dual ministerial position in a government with a record number of ministers for nothing, and so on and so forth. What's hypothetical here? That they will deny voting rights to citizens? All of these things will happen very quickly (immediately, after all, Israel is surrounded by enemies), without judicial review.
All of this seems like a pretty justified concern to me. You may be in favor of all of these things, or you may be against them but also against judicial review in principle. If so, I have no argument with you, we simply live in parallel worlds.
Itay:
The argument is valid because it tries to deal with a claim that talks about changing the rules of the game. Therefore, there is no need to accurately reproduce the situation so that it does not count as a change of the rules (on the assumption that not every change, even of the balance between the authorities, is necessarily a change of the rules of the game that morally justifies a threat of secession by the minority).
Regarding the concerns: It seems to me that we live in the same universe, although I am not satisfied with judicial review, as long as there is no constitutional court based on a political key. Regarding the examples you brought up, I disagree with some of them, I agree with some of them, and I was not familiar with some of them and I will try to check. We can discuss this, but I am not sure that the owner of the site will like the diversion of the discussion in this column while adding many comments.
Sorry. This is not an exact return to the previous situation, nor is it even close to an exact return. The situation that will be after the reform is unlike any situation that existed before it.
I mentioned the concerns because you spoke of a hypothetical future concern. The concern is immediate and not hypothetical at all.
Apart from the personal basic laws (it is interesting that this did not bother your ilk in the case of the attempt not to allow Netanyahu to run) all the things you mentioned do not belong to the review of a court and are matters of successful or not policy and what should be decided in them is elections and you are simply a dictator who wants to impose your policy with anti-democratic tools. Environmental quality is always something that comes at a price and you always need to consider when you need or can pay the given price at the given time. There is no such thing as an inappropriate appointment. The appropriate people are simply leftists who will try to sabotage and disrupt the minister's policy and he is a rubber stamp for them to implement their policy. In such a situation, I would only appoint my relatives and hire private professionals for advice and execution.
The police are already political. All state institutions are political and therefore act against the elected government.
. It is time for the majority in the country to be represented in these bodies
In my opinion, this engineering and opinion only reinforces the need for reform and as soon as possible
Specifically, the Accused Law did bother me and I thought it was a bad idea. Not because it is a personal law - a personal law is not necessarily a good thing - but because I thought it would have very bad consequences for the sense of justice of a large part of the people, who would feel, perhaps rightly, that they were being deprived of their right to vote and in some sense were changing the rules of the game while they were playing (even though it was the next election). I am in favor of such a law that would not apply to Netanyahu, because we have seen where a prime minister accused of crimes can lead.
There are inappropriate appointments, of course there are. For example, my appointment to the position of head of the Central Bureau of Investigation is an inappropriate appointment.
If the option is someone who will lie, cheat, and disrupt the Minister of Finance's policies in order to implement his agenda, then I'll hire you too.
*hypothetical
Article on a Haredi website called Forum for Torah
https://tora-forum.co.il/threads/%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A4%D7%98%D7%99%D7%AA.42764/post-814785
https://tora-forum.co.il/threads/%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A4%D7%98%D7%99%D7%AA.42764/post-813198
Precisely for your good disclosure, for your concern that your words are influenced by any resentment, being young in years, I really, really do not suspect you, and I do not believe that it influenced your opinions because that is what, what do I suspect and do not believe? That you also know that this explosive issue that has broken out is almost completely beyond reaching any logical decision, that it is possible to give it a thousand ways here, and immediately after that, to give a thousand ways, to the other side, like pastel in the hands of the creator, at his will convincing here and at his will convincing there, if you manage to convince, even half a human being, I will fight for you, so that you can be at the head of the presidential institution, since you succeeded where he failed
For your information, I wrote this a day before the president deployed his naive doctrine. If so, you can start running for president. Just remember, if in the end the business falls apart, the culprit responsible, as far as I know, is none other than Alma, one of our acquaintances, Barak, who you tied crowns to, for his tremendous contribution to the legal system. For example, how is this similar to a man walking naked through the streets of a neighborhood in Kaplan in Tel Aviv, having invested all his money in a beautiful tie? Now perhaps the chip falls on you, why is this monster so hated? Such a colossal disaster, this crazy, crazy man has brought upon us, all the ills of the Chief Rabbinate, according to your opinion, are worth a billion, in the disaster, that this villain has brought upon the people who live in Zion, you once said that you do not understand the point of studying moral books, here is the statement of our sages in the Mishnah of the Fathers, jealousy and lust and honor take a person out of the world, while the pride in this one's heart took the world out of the person
Sorry – The one who is to blame is the one in power. Couldn't they have behaved more sensibly in January of this year (not 30 years ago!) that wouldn't have led to such a crazy reaction? There were many ways they could have acted, and this government chose the worst way of all.
Dear friends.
Keep arguing about justice, about the minority and the majority. In the meantime, power speaks. Not that of the minority or the majority, but of those gathered beyond the border fences and beyond the Green Line. To understand Israel's unpreparedness for the next war, it is worth listening to Brik and internalizing it. We can also listen to the traitorous leftist Eisenkot, who reminds us of the Yom Kippur War. So run to the stores to stock up on bottled water, batteries and canned goods. In the next war, there will not be much electricity, we can forget about cell phones and the roads will also be considered dangerous.
In three months, a government run by criminals and madmen has managed to prove Nasrallah's spider web theory. Now its leaders, ministers and advisors are gathered in fear in the headquarters, while the one who is at its head, the one who has been paralyzing the regime for five years, goes on vacation trips abroad. As his wife said in the famous recording: “May the country burn”. Indeed, she was given the prophecy.
It is hard not to be impressed by how disconnected the theoretical discussions conducted here are from reality. Wonderful material for historians.
I agree. It's not just criminals and lunatics, but also clowns and superficial people. And they're the ones who want to make a coup d'état here.
As someone who heads his camp, a hollow clown like Lapid and a collection of completely empty people - media people who have been warming up with externalities and superficiality ever since. People who have no truth in their world (postmodernists) I wouldn't dare talk about superficiality and certainly not clowning
Even Benny Gantz is hollow and empty. The left today is simply a joke. Even Miri Regev is more successful than Lapid. Just a crowd of suits on hangers
This is also the reason why no one is addressing your calls about "criminals", etc. It's not worth arguing about because it's actually worse, right? It's simply not defined. An attempt to create reality through words. Which is of course derived from the (anti) postmodernist concept
As Churchill wrote:
Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.…’
(Anyone who has received a religious state education and speaks English like Smotrich is welcome to use Google Translate).
B perfectly demonstrates the shortcomings of democracy. Imagine that intelligent people like him have the right to vote. He also enjoys, of course, the right to express his opinion, although the concept of “opinion” must be stretched very far to apply to him.
Eli:
Your efforts to demonstrate your wisdom are commendable. After all, most people are convinced that they are smarter than average, so you probably think so too. Just please, let those who want to fix important things in our world do so. That is one of the advantages of democracy. Everyone has the right to express their position regardless of their IQ, in the hope that the more correct ideas will be accepted. You don't need to be a judge for that.
The camel does not see its own hump …
How can you even talk about an opinion? Do you know what this word indicates at all? Does this word (like any other word) indicate anything in external reality at all in your world? After all, in general, the entire left is devoid of opinion – in every second sentence it contradicts itself. The vast majority of it consists of empty people. People who believe in nothing but democracy. Their god is a system of government. They work for procedures and not for content. They have neither Torah nor the Land of Israel nor the people of Israel nor anything. If it weren't for the high-techists, I wouldn't want them to live here at all. They are anti-contributors. Not only do they not contribute. Believe me, I have no desire to share any system of government with you. From a practical point of view, I wish you weren't here and I didn't have to talk to you at all. You just need to keep people away from you.
Interesting: Why did the high-tech people get permission from you to live here? What's so special about them?
Because they are people who contribute to the world (productive people. That is, they have some sense of truth). My sister works in high-tech, among other things. In fact, I support productive people because it means that their core is good even if they are broken on the outside. Everyone else - lawyers, journalists, public figures of all kinds, media people, artists on a dime, etc. - are anti-contributors. I actually do not recommend that any country in the world accept them as close. Let them live in Greenland.
Producers = Is there a sense of truth? This is new.
And what exactly do they create? Sites like Facebook and TikTok that have brought more harm to the world than good? Or those who build apps designed to solve problems that we never knew were problems without a clear business model that convince investors to invest in them anyway? (And then of course it turns out that there is no demand for their product, their company collapses, and the banks are with them? And the taxpayers have to bail them out?)
Or alternatively, they engage in algo-trading, meaning they make money from subtle differences between stock prices and actually create nothing? Do they have a sense of truth?
I have nothing against high-tech people, and high-tech has certainly contributed a lot to the world (see how we communicate), but give me a break.
And as for the people you mentioned who are anti-contributors. Artists like whom? Composers like Matti Caspi? Who would you throw into Greenland?
There is no shortage of public figures in the religious sector either.
To create, you need some kind of interaction with reality and receiving feedback from it. Something needs to work.
In any case, Facebook and TikTok didn't bring evil into the world, they just exposed it. They are tools that also brought good into the world. Every tool can bring good or bad into the world, depending on the intention with which it is used. According to your method, there is no such thing as creativity. Farmers don't produce either because they also feed evil people.
I do agree that the field of high-tech is full of lies and inflated marketing and image. That's true. I was speaking in general and in principle. Algo trading is generally useless (although they may help stabilize the value of shares)
Activists from any community who are harmful can be sent to Greenland. But at least those from the religious community are not fighting the Jewish people. At least they don't harm them.
From my point of view, most of the work of “artists” today is childish in my opinion, so I'm not that objective. There is no right-wing or left-wing artist that I appreciate. But anyone who is still puffed up and harmful to the Jewish people (“A man remains a man, don't call me a people” for example. I have no problem with the song, but a problem with the artist) would happily go to Greenland, as far as I'm concerned. Including Matti Caspi. Sometimes I'm amazed by the lack of self-awareness of these people. They think the world is about them.
You can also talk about farmers if you want. You can ask whether the agricultural revolution contributed to our quality of life or not.
Facebook's algorithm works in such a way that it promotes content that angers the viewer in order to keep them on the page (so they see ads). There is a lot of evidence that shows that social networks like Facebook and Twitter are harmful to public discourse by making people live in a sound box. It's an integral part of their business model, it's not a “tool”, it's the essence of the matter. Their business model is to create a debate.
And algo-trading helps stabilize stocks – People tell themselves all sorts of things to justify what they do, that doesn't mean I have to believe it.
I didn't get the point about interacting with reality. I really don't. How can you not be interacting with reality? A writer who writes a successful book, is he not in interaction with reality? You wrote that “something works” – The fact that people buy his book, doesn't that prove that something works? The fact that he brings pleasure to many people, isn't that worth anything?
Aren't religious activists harming him? In my opinion, they harm him much more than any secular activist, because they give Judaism a bad name, and that's much worse than some judge.
Well – You don't like art, so you don't understand its value. Not surprising.
Farmers too, of course. But they are improving (organic farming, sustainability, etc.)
The principle is clear. I'm not talking about Facebook, but about the idea of a social network. You could ask if Facebook has caused more harm than good, but it's just like the arms industry. In the meantime, it's also a productive industry (at the lowest level, but still).
I didn't say I don't like art. I actually appreciate art. Just not Israeli art (except for a few exceptions like Ephraim Kishon and of course Sh”y Agnon). I think it's rude or childish. I appreciate classical music (although it has a certain amount of bloat).
There's no point in me talking about business. They do contribute, sort of like intermediaries of sorts.
“Since Medan”. :):):)
There hasn't been a perfume like this since May Golan's ”homogeneity”.
I have no idea how it came out. I wanted to write “always”
It is worth learning how a country works, what are the basics of existence, and only then everything else.
When you realize that the basics of existence (almost) in all areas are held day by day, hour by hour, by a very specific group
And they now feel that the story does not suit them, you will be very stressed.
Complacency stems from a lack of knowledge A. Who holds and maintains the basic existential construction here
B. How deep is the value rift
And it is doubtful whether they will be convinced to continue to strengthen (sometimes at heavy personal costs) the burden of this entire nation.
I hope I helped the desire for life, as it were.
That particular group has been concerned throughout the generations that no one else but them would "maintain and uphold the basic existential construction here" precisely in order to continue to rule here and impose its values (?) on others. It is also doubtful whether this particular group believes in "this people". (Unless the citizens of the country are meant).
The Rabbi raises the argument of “migo” if the minority is not willing to participate in the game, there is no justification for the majority to force it, and the very ability of the minority to dissolve the partnership already gives it the power to argue against the majority.
It seems more likely that this argument is not a migo argument but an argument of non-silence, and that there are times when the majority can argue to the minority that it is better to boast.
And regarding our case, is there any weight to the majority’s need for the minority? The minority can always flex its muscles and argue in a way that is not at all compelling (of course, in practice, it is impossible to burn the club for every decision, and only decisions that are truly significant in the eyes of the minority will lead to this), but in this way, the minority essentially controls the majority and will force it to take every decision into account, and if the majority truly surrenders, then the will of the majority will not be expressed. Is it necessary to enter into calculations of "go and show off" here, and will the degree to which the majority will have to consider the minority depend on the level of need for it and the majority's unwillingness to really break up the package? Or is it that when the wishes of the majority and the minority are in direct conflict, the will of the majority always prevails?
Just commenting that the person who wrote this is me 🙂
Of course with me. You are with me, and the other is “with me from Lebanon,” which is the matter over which the feeble-minded Minister of Defense locked himself in the barracks.
Pity the family's decision problem. Should they go to Berlin?
If they don't go, they will prove to the entire world and to the country's ill-wishers that its leadership is indeed in a panic.
If they do go, they may have nowhere to return. You are invited to listen to the famous recording again. The historical record is before us. Refusing to take it seriously is our fault. But the family can always seek political asylum in Germany.
By the way, this may seem cynical, but it is true to the truth of Petah Tikva. Maran Chazva's famous statement to Ben Gorgo, about the empty cart of the secularists, is not it? Your first book, the chosen name Two Carts and a Hot Air Balloon, is called and bound after this definition of Chazva's, and here the son asks what is your mind, now that you have moved with the force of the legal reform, (preferably on its entire circumference, as you defined it, and if I find favor with you, even without any cosmetic changes whatsoever) according to the secular atheists on the left, now is the end of all summers and democracies, dictatorship, and every seed of shame, may the one who pushes the leaf, blessed be He and blessed be His name, that is to say, according to them, at least from now on, the cart is not only empty, but full of snakes and scorpions, (And simply, this is the case of the secularists who are right-wing, on the right, rather, we would be in a judicial dictatorship, fragmented, rotten, and corrupt, composed of those who were never elected, electing and duplicating themselves, using invalid methods, and in some cases even corrupt, such as sex in exchange for an appointment, (see the article, the Efi Neve affair, and the Crises, and the “burden of evidence” and the head of the Bar Association, Avi Meyumi, who, being a Harami, wanted to advance to the Supreme Court, by lowering his lower back, and even tilting his hand), if so, according to their opinion until today, we have been in an empty cart, full of filth, so would those secularists have the honor to tell me, please, why and why are they offended by this statement? That your cart is empty? After all, if half the people are looking at the cart from this side, and shouting in their hoarse throats as they block the Ayalon Highway, shame, shame, the cart is empty, and half the people from the other side are shouting the same thing about the cart from their side, then what kind of cart is this? But what will you say until it comes to the judgment pocket of Pope Barak and his gang, it would seem to any of them that the cart is full, for this the prophet came at that time as a wise man better than a prophet, and revealed to David Green's ears that this is a cart pike, and the ball burst for him, and only the man of truth remains, Moses is truth and his Torah is truth, and no man stands by the words of his master until after 40 years,
Dear friends. This discussion has exhausted itself to the point of bloodshed. For some time now I have been debating whether to delete everything, and in the meantime I have left it. If it continues like this I will consider deleting everything altogether. You are repeating yourselves without any taste or smell, full of empty slogans and unfounded and personal accusations. And even you, Shmuel, have chosen to return to us in exactly the right place. See, you have been warned.
Essentially, what you're saying here (as a result of the 'Migo' clause) is that since the left is willing to pull out its civil war argument for anything it doesn't like, the right, which is not interested in separation and civil war, must bow to the left in everything?
No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that your perspective is terribly one-sided. When a large public tells you that this is a dramatic change in the rules of the game, then they are not lying, but that is really what they think. And that is also true, of course.
And the second thing I'm saying is that you can of course go with your head against the wall until the end and suffer the consequences (if there really is a rupture, and if there really is severe damage to this reform). Taking risks in the rabbit game is not a sensible policy.
Well, I'm happy to announce that my proposal was accepted by Levin. I wrote here in one of the recent posts, I don't remember where, about three proposals of mine that I had as an attempt to bridge difficult disputes, sometimes of years, now that this proposal of mine has been accepted, two out of these three proposals were accepted. The first proposal that was not accepted, I called it a "cynical" proposal, in the controversy surrounding the incident with Fuhrer, who asked that women not appear and there was an uproar from the left about it, for the sake of excluding women, that I proposed, at the time (I actually proposed, I called both sides, Fuhrer's assistant on the one hand and the media on the other) to bring Dana Intenional, who is a man according to the Haredim, who is allowed to hear him and even shake his hand, and whose voice is not at all indecent, not even legally "indecent in a lamp" And he was mistakenly gendered as a woman by the secularists, and came to Zion as a savior, and eliminated the exclusion of women, but in the end, Fuhrer's humility prevailed over the purity of the screaming left, and he canceled the event. A second proposal that I called an "irritating" proposal, but true to its truth, is to enact a Basic Law for Torah Study, the meaning of the verb that comes out of it, is that the one who applies the Torah, is the true protector, and the national strength, as the saying goes for the good ones for the pilot, and the outstanding ones, for the yeshivahs and kollels, (perhaps this sounds to clumsy people, who have not seen the light of day, as something delusional, but I have personally known several squadron commanders, former in the Air Force, with an intelligence level that is above the norm, truly above and beyond, intelligent, with wise thinking, and even with one of them who bombed the reactor in Iraq I had a Torah connection, Rabbi Yochai Eshkol of Marzsim, And Amir Yahel, the late head of the Kiryat Sefer kollel, and Raanan Tzur, a friend of Dan Halutz, the instigator of refusal, all of whom have repented and become Tahsin today and whose Torah is their art, who think exactly like me on this matter, and even more extreme than I do,) and this proposal, to my delight, was accepted and forwarded through a certain head of the yeshiva, all the way to the Knesset, and is about to be enacted in the Knesset. And last but not least, my third proposal, which I call a "logical" proposal, and perhaps even a wise one, is in our case a daily matter, the great emotional and emotional controversy over legal reform, I wrote here about two weeks ago, that for now what Levin needs to do is to stop and postpone the entire package for now, and focus on the issue of the committee for selecting judges, in a decent manner, which means giving each side its share of the pie in order to diversify the The high stronghold of injustice towards various minorities in society who are not from the Barak family's plenum, from which all the harsh decrees against minorities come, those I am among, which is why as soon as the right balance is reached, in terms of the people there who represented our publics, we can trust them to stop destroying us, and the people, and who knows, it may not even be necessary to continue with the rest of the reform, and from overcoming, it will turn into adulthood. And why am I writing this here, Mikhi, because you are used to accusing me of a multitude of accusations, childish as you define them, without foundation and reasoning, although I like to dip my words in descriptions, cynical, and sarcastic, but you see that soon I will have power, over ideas, that were accepted, where the president of the state, and many better than him, including you, were not accepted, then I have credit, in relation to your proposals, which may be well-reasoned, but in practice, are not accepted, on the heart, this means that it is possible that I am not the extremist, Here
To complete the picture so that you don't say I don't provide data, then if you would like a sample of ”one of 60″ From the feeling that the Haredim will then have, that they will be completely excluded from the entire human landscape that resides here in our holy land, take for example the following figure, which was also published here 11 and was expressed in the Finance Committee by the Chairman Mr. Gafni: from all the universities and colleges in the country, including the most highly regarded ones such as Tel Aviv University, and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and also from Haifa and of course from your place in Bar Ilan, those who passed the exams of the Accountant's Office and the Ministry of Justice, and came in first place, disproportionately to the other universities, are the girls from the Beit Yaakov Seminary Association, the Haredi girls, who passed with a phenomenal success rate of 96%, for comparison, for example, from the Hebrew University, 34% and Tel Aviv 54%, and from yours at Bar Ilan only 64%, lest you say, maybe only two girls applied, on the contrary almost the most of all They applied, that's where 95 girls went, when 91 of them passed, when a person like me and you in 2023 is exposed to such a thing, you start to analyze, how is this possible? You try to go to tight spots, such as maybe because they are used to studying seriously, without boys, in the background, and maybe without the impure iPhone, or just dismiss it as racism, that we are smarter and more talented than you, it doesn't work out, because even the Lev Academic Institute that they applied to, as I think they are Haredi, 52 girls applied, and only 32 girls passed, which is a 64% success rate, so what is the secret, Lord of Petah Tikva? They are asked in the article, and they say it simply, prayers, prayers, and here the son asks is this one of those sporadic cases, that God intervenes in creation? And if so, why? Did he just remember to intervene? Or did the thesis that prayers don't help, collapse in light of these data? I don't know only for God, and for atheists, solutions, I am attaching a data table for you here
https://www.kikar.co.il/haredim-news/440684
And also the link to the article
https://www.kikar.co.il/haredim-news/440684
What do you have to say in your defense?
Very interesting. Some details have already been commented on in the comments that I think change the big picture a bit:
1. The reform is a response to a distorted reality, and even if there were opportunities to correct it that were not realized, it is irrelevant. The influence of the High Court on our lives is very significant because it directly limits the government that affects our lives (without going into examples where the rulings directly affected). The reform will have less of an impact on the public, although as you said, it is not relevant what actually happens, but what the public thinks (just as I think the reform is not really a change in the rules of the game)
2. I do not think that the "quality" of the citizen gives his vote more meaning (unless he is an elected official). Although it is ethically wrong to take tax money from a public that pays less, as long as he does not illegally evade it, it is irrelevant to the discussion. It should be noted that many of the left-wing opponents of the reform are socialists in their worldview, which makes this even less relevant.
3. It should be noted that the public is largely mistaken / exaggerates in its understanding of the “change in the rules of the game” that the reform is causing. This causes many of them to also refuse to compromise. I am not sure that refusing to discuss a compromise justifies addressing minority rights.
4. Regarding Migo, it is a bit difficult to argue this in today's reality because it is unrealistic to secede and establish a separate state, neither economically nor in terms of security, which greatly weakens the ability not to participate in the game. And although in principle I agree with your logic, in practice much of the public believes in a defensive democracy, and it is right to apply it “on them” as well.