Women’s Aliyah to the Torah: Aliyah, Blessings, and Minyan (Column 510)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

This morning I was sent a post written by Rabbi Yitzhak Ben David about women being called up to the Torah and women’s minyanim, in honor of Simchat Torah, which falls tomorrow. Because of the urgency of the matter, I thought it appropriate to write a column about it. I beg pardon that I wrote it quickly and therefore it is neither complete nor exhaustive, but it should suffice to explain my view before the holiday.

Rabbi Ben David’s Remarks

First, a preface: his discussion is not about women’s blessings over the Torah reading, and it seems that on this point Rabbi Ben David takes it as obvious that it is permitted, since in the sugya in Megillah (23a) we find in a baraita that women count among the seven called up. True, the Gemara there limits this because of “the dignity of the congregation” (kevod ha-tzibbur), but many have already written that this consideration does not apply in our day. The Frimer brothers elaborate at length on this (see a reference and responses here), and their conclusion is that it still applies nowadays. In my view, however, it is obvious that there is no problem at all. There is no infringement of the congregation’s dignity today when a woman reads from the Torah, at a time when women can manage men, serve as presidents of the Supreme Court, as ministers, or as prime ministers.[1]

But one must discuss whether the baraita means that women’s aliyot to the Torah must be done within a minyan of men—since a minyan requires ten men—or whether it may also be done within a quorum of ten women. Rabbi Ben David’s discussion concerns this question: whether ten women constitute a minyan for Torah reading that enables reciting the blessings. It would have been proper to sharpen this point further and also to address in the background the very issue of women’s blessings (even in a men’s minyan).

In his main argument he brings an unusual ruling by Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Grodzinsky, in his book Mikra’ei Kodesh, which is devoted to the laws of Torah reading. Rabbi Grodzinsky infers from the wording of the Shulchan Aruch that with regard to matters of sanctity (devar she-bikdusha) it states that one needs “ten free adult males” (Orach Chayim §55:1), whereas with regard to Torah reading it states “ten adults” (Orach Chayim §143:1). From here he infers that regarding Torah reading, women are included in the ten. He explains that women are included in the mitzvah of hakhel, and according to the baraita they count among the seven called up; and according to several opinions they are obligated in Torah reading—therefore they are included in the ten for this matter. He excludes the call of “Bar’chu,” since that is a davar she-bikdusha and there one requires ten free adult males.

Rabbi Ben David notes that this is indeed a lone view that did not gain the agreement of additional poskim, but it is appropriate to know that such an opinion exists and to take it into account. Incidentally, he himself does not state his practical ruling, but merely presents this source to readers.

In the comments after the post, a discussion took place that focused mainly on the question of a lone opinion and to what extent one may rely on it; whether it is appropriate to present it publicly to a broad audience; whether that posek was indeed authoritative; and what the ramifications of such a ruling could be (Reform tendencies, slippery slope, and the like). I did not see any discussion of the substance of the ruling—neither by Rabbi Ben David nor in the comments.

Initial Critique

I will begin by noting that reading these remarks left me uneasy. This is a very typical discussion of a halachic question, in which the primary sources are entirely ignored and one begins straightaway with a survey of the views of poskim (roughly of our era). As if there were no Talmud, no Rishonim, no reasoning—everything stands or falls on some dubious inference by some author (authoritative or not) in the language of the Shulchan Aruch. The discussion then focuses on ad hominem questions—whether the author was an important posek and to what degree—and on various secondary tactical issues.

This is what I have called in the past (see for example Column 332, and in my articles here and here, and more) “second-order psak,” and I have also noted that it is very characteristic of liberal poskim who seek to innovate vis-à-vis the status quo. Apparently, they find it convenient to hang their position on towering authorities rather than present a stance of their own, for fear of being suspected of Reform, Heaven forbid. But a halachic discussion ought to begin with the primary sources, to understand whether, in principle, such a halachic path exists—and perhaps as an illustration or precedent one can then bring the view of this or that posek. An answer comprised entirely of illustration cannot be considered a halachic argument. If an authoritative author wrote something—does that mean he necessarily did not err? Have we not found strange rulings by authoritative poskim? Does the mere fact that they were printed mean we may automatically rely upon them? (See on this my discussion here regarding R. David Zvi Hoffmann’s ruling about conversion without acceptance of the commandments.)

Rabbi Ben David’s post is an excellent example of this odd phenomenon. In any case: if such a ruling has grounding in the primary sources, why do I need inferences from the wording of the Shulchan Aruch? The need and distress that exist today, and the changed reality and status of women, are sufficient reasons to adopt such a ruling even without inferences from the Shulchan Aruch. And if it has no place when one analyzes the primary sources—again, why should I care about that inference? Even if the Shulchan Aruch had stated this explicitly, I would not permit it; all the more so when what we have are dubious inferences from its language.

One more note about inferences from the wording of the Shulchan Aruch. The authors of methodological rules wrote that Maimonides’ language is precise, and therefore conclusions may be drawn from inferences in his wording (and from the placement of a given law in his book). By contrast, the Shulchan Aruch’s language is not precise; its writing is eclectic and unsystematic (as the author attests—this is a digest of the Beit Yosef), and therefore it is very difficult to rely on inferences from its language. Let us take an example from our very matter. The term “gedolim” (adults) appears in the Shulchan Aruch also in the laws of the priestly blessing (Orach Chayim §128:34), and there it is quite clear from the context that this refers to males, even though he does not write that explicitly. Likewise, the commentaries on the law of Torah reading (Orach Chayim §143:1) wrote that the requirement of ten adults is by virtue of davar she-bikdusha—hence it is clear that there was no need to specify that those adults are not women. In their view it is evident that the Shulchan Aruch relies on what he already spelled out in §55 (true, he does write here “free,” bnei chorin, but there is no difficulty in his omitting “women”). Moreover, if his intention were indeed to permit women—to say that the requirement of ten here is not on account of davar she-bikdusha—he should have written precisely that, rather than leaving it implicit for interpretive inferences. The fact is that all his commentators “erred” here—precisely in the very place where, according to Rabbi Grodzinsky’s approach, the author is so meticulous in his wording.

Incidentally, Maimonides, whose language is indeed precise, wrote regarding the chazzan’s repetition (Hilchot Tefillah 12:3 and 8:4) that one requires ten adult free persons (gedolim benei chorin), and he does not mention males. Are women included there as well? If so, then not only for Torah reading. In short, this inference from the Shulchan Aruch’s language is very dubious; if this is the basis for permitting women’s aliyah to the Torah, you have no shakier basis.

I now turn to the substantive discussion—and, as noted, due to lack of time I will do so briefly.

Questions Regarding the Law of Davar She-bikdusha

I begin with the law that davar she-bikdusha is not recited with fewer than ten. The source is in the Mishnah, Megillah 23b. The Rishonim there disagree about what falls under the category of davar she-bikdusha; the Ran’s position, for example, is that only the Kedushah is included. Beyond that, I have already written here in the past of my astonishment at this “prohibition.” I cannot understand what prohibition there could be to say some text with fewer than ten. Is it conceivable that it would be forbidden for me in my living room to say a sentence like “We will sanctify and revere You, as the pleasant discourse of the secret conversation of the holy seraphim,” or “Bless the Lord, Who is blessed”? Not to mention the sentences of Kaddish (which in any case do not appear in the Gemara and are rooted in the Geonim). This seems to me utterly implausible. There is no blessing here such that one could claim it is prohibited as a blessing in vain. In some of these, the Divine Name does not appear at all—so it is not at all clear what could underlie such a prohibition. The simple meaning is that there is no obligation to say a davar she-bikdusha when there are not ten—that is, it is not part of the prayer text (and therefore the Kedushah might constitute an interruption, and then there would be a prohibition to say it). But why should there be an intrinsic prohibition?! An individual, a woman, or a gentile wishes to stand in their living room and declare, “Bless the Lord, Who is blessed” (by the way, even without the Divine Name this is considered a davar she-bikdusha, since in the common conception the issue is not the Name).

The source for this law is brought there in the Gemara from the verse “I shall be sanctified in the midst of the children of Israel,” whence we learn that this should be said within a congregation of ten. But this very verse is also interpreted regarding the laws of kiddush Hashem (sanctification of the Name), and there too we have special laws for public kiddush Hashem—that it is a matter of publicity (in the presence of ten). Is it conceivable that sanctifying the Name as an individual is forbidden? Perhaps giving one’s life for a prohibition other than the three cardinal sins is forbidden as an individual (a dispute between Maimonides and Tosafot), but that is because the very act of giving one’s life is prohibited. It is not that there is a prohibition to sanctify the Name as an individual. So why, in reciting verses or sentences concerning sanctifying the Name, should there be a prohibition to say them with fewer than ten?

Incidentally, regarding the laws of kiddush Hashem, it is simple that women join the ten.[2] I saw someone cite from Igrot Moshe, Choshen Mishpat, part II, siman 66, p. 290, s.v. “aval ha-Rambam,” where he writes that one should not distinguish in the parameters between two laws derived from the same verse. Hence, if women join the ten for kiddush Hashem, they join also for a regular minyan and for Torah reading.

Also incidentally, Mourner’s Kaddish (Kaddish Yatom) is recited by minors, even though the Shulchan Aruch states that Kaddish requires ten adult free males. It is true that the ten listening are adults, and the minor does not count toward the quorum—but still, he himself is saying a davar she-bikdusha. Apropos: a woman reciting Kaddish in a men’s minyan, or her being called up to the Torah with a blessing in a men’s minyan.

I will not delve further here into this puzzling matter—which requires a separate analysis—but I place it in the background. Since it is accepted among the poskim that this is indeed prohibited, I will assume for the continuation of the discussion that there is such a prohibition (even though I myself very much doubt it).

A Minyan of Women

Let us now assume that it is prohibited to say a davar she-bikdusha with fewer than ten, and let us assume that Torah reading is not an exception (contrary to Rabbi Grodzinsky’s inference, and in line with all the commentators there). Must it follow that women are excluded from the minyan? Whence comes the law that women do not join the ten? The source is in Megillah 23b; but even if you search with a microscope, you will not find there that the ten in question are males. It says that ten are required, or “congregation,” and that is all. Moreover, regarding Torah reading it is stated explicitly in the baraita on the previous page (Megillah 23a) that everyone counts toward the seven, including women (with the caveat of kevod ha-tzibbur, as above), with no reservations. The picture that emerges is that from the Talmud’s law there is no hint that women do not join the ten for any davar she-bikdusha.

Women’s exclusion from the ten was done by later commentators, for various reasons. It is likely they anchored the reality that prevailed in their times, for there is no clear source. I would say something similar about the Rosh’s well-known view in Berakhot that women are not included in arevut (mutual responsibility; his proof from fulfilling another’s obligation can be refuted). It is fairly clear that these are ex post facto explanations for an existing practice that was probably based on women’s status and role in the synagogue and in the public domain. There is no source here from a verse, a derashah, or even a clear Talmudic source. If so, for one who comes to change this in changed circumstances, the task is much easier.

I do not see why today—when women’s status is equal to that of men, and when there is no real reason or unambiguous source to exclude them—we should not include women in the minyan, both for prayer and for Torah reading. The fact that Orthodoxy has not practiced this and the Conservative movement has, is not an argument. At most it is an indication that obliges us to examine ourselves—but what determines the halacha is the analysis of the halachic sources. If the sources allow it, then it is possible. Note that women are obligated in prayer according to virtually all central poskim, and the Torah reading on Mondays and Thursdays is part of the prayer.

Incidentally, the Rosh himself writes that no post-Talmudic posek has absolute authority; this is also brought as law in the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat §25. But here we are not necessarily speaking about a position that disagrees with the Rishonim; rather, about a different application under different circumstances. Here too I will bring the Rosh’s position regarding the mitzvah to write a Torah scroll: nowadays, one can fulfill it by purchasing books of the Oral Torah (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah §270). If the Rosh does this to a clear, biblically mandated mitzvah, explicit in the Talmud—can I not do this to the Rosh himself, that is, to argue that a change in circumstances dictates a change in the application of the halacha in our day?! This brings me to a note on the difference between Reform and what I propose here.

A Note on Labels

I saw a survey of Maimonides’ position regarding counting women, in a Conservative responsum—see here—and the arguments seemed to me quite reasonable and persuasive. I suppose that presenting a position like mine will elicit claims that this is Reform or Conservative. What exactly is the difference between me and them?

I have written more than once that labels are not an argument. Even if a claim is labeled “Conservative,” if it holds water it should be accepted. One must accept the truth from whoever states it. Moreover—and regrettably I must note—our halachic responsa often rely on some obscure source or dubious inference (as we saw here), and even where they do not, it is still customary to hang everything on the Rishonim as an absolute source, despite the fact that this has no real halachic basis (see the Rosh and the Shulchan Aruch cited above). In most cases, in our circles we do not engage the primary sources—and certainly not textual witnesses—not to mention historical context. And this is so even where there is genuine need and distress, where it is clear that there is significant weight to possible directions even if they were not accepted in previous generations, so long as there is no clear reason to forbid. Such an approach is called for especially where the issue clearly relates to social practices—then it is obvious that one must examine the circumstances and take changed realities into account.

Among Conservative responsa, I generally find more serious answers on these subjects. In substantive terms, their psak is “first-order.” I do not mean extreme sharpness or erudition (which I usually do not find there), but rather an approach that addresses the primary sources and conducts a systematic analysis without prior assumptions—and certainly does not latch onto some obscure source and decide the practical bottom line accordingly. You will not find there reverent deference to every Rishon or Acharon who wrote otherwise (though there is indeed a review of the views of Rishonim and Acharonim up to the latest authorities. In my opinion this is even a bit excessive, once one understands that we are dealing with first-order analysis). In my view, this is the correct and proper approach. With all due respect to the Rishonim, they have no formal authority. Their interpretations certainly carry weight and establish custom—but if we are not dealing with a binding law, there is room even to disagree with them; and certainly it is possible to change the application of the psak in situations where reality has changed.

Bottom line: the way we currently conceive of women leads to the conclusion that their status should be equal to that of men. True, there are laws in which it is difficult to implement this in practice because there are clear sources excluding women (testimony, serving as judges, kiddushin and divorce, and the like). Even in some of those contexts, in my opinion, there is room to equalize women’s status to that of men; but in our case—where there is no clear source that prevents it—I see no reason to refrain. To this we must add the distress and need of women to take part in religious practice, which certainly justifies consideration and even reliance on non-consensual halachic possibilities. This has been the way of halacha since time immemorial.

In Column 508 I noted that need and distress, by themselves, are not a halachic argument. In order to ground change in halacha, one must resort to a conservative midrash (interpretive mechanism). What I have brought here is a simple example of applying the mechanism of conservative midrash that I defined in Columns 475–478. Note that here it is not even an argument that changes a halacha established by an authoritative source, but rather a custom based on conceptions of Rishonim that were likely shaped by the reality of their own times. There I also explained why this is an entirely legitimate halachic path (I called it “interpretive conservatism”), and the labels of “Reform” that will surely be raised in relation to it stem from misunderstanding. In Column 478 I explained in detail how this differs from Reform (where, beyond need and distress, a conservative midrash is also offered). A similar move was presented in my article about the status of a convert; and there I had the impression that this was entirely accepted.

It is no accident that I ignore the secondary discussions about slippery slopes, the greatness of this or that posek, whether it is appropriate to present the truth to the public or whether it is preferable to mislead them and say it is forbidden even though it is not, and so on. I have expressed my opinion of “holy lies” more than once. In any case, even if one takes such considerations into account (in rare cases this might be appropriate), it is clear that this cannot replace the substantive, essential discussion. At most, after that discussion is concluded, one can add a discussion of those aspects. Thus, we may agree that it is permitted, but still be stringent upon ourselves not to make use of the permission.

Practical Halachic Conclusions

Regarding a women’s minyan, in my opinion there is certainly room to permit it. Both because, in principle, there is no prohibition even for a davar she-bikdusha; and because perhaps the quorum for Torah reading is different from that of davar she-bikdusha (as per Rabbi Grodzinsky’s inference); and also because this concerns reading from and being called up to the Torah—matters for which, according to the Talmudic law, women are relevant; therefore it is reasonable that they can constitute the quorum even if, regarding a davar she-bikdusha, they would not join. Especially in light of the current distress, there is certainly room to rely on a non-consensual halachic consideration.

Beyond joining the minyan, there is the question of the blessing in an aliyah to the Torah. As noted, from the plain sense of the baraita in Megillah it appears that women also recite the blessings. It is not reasonable to forbid them to bless—for according to many views one can bless on a custom and on time-bound positive commandments; so why should they not be able to bless for an aliyah to the Torah?! Moreover, it is ruled in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim §47:14) that women are obligated in the blessing over the Torah; so why should they not be able to recite it when they are called up?! I will note that on Simchat Torah even minors recite blessings (and in the baraita cited, they too count toward the seven). Should women not be able to bless?!

Regarding saying “Bar’chu,” some forbade it as a davar she-bikdusha. But beyond what I noted above—that this prohibition is very puzzling (is it a blessing in vain? Why should a woman not be able to invite the congregation to bless the Lord, Who is blessed?)—this is especially true if there is a men’s minyan; then it is obvious to me that it is permitted (just as a minor says Mourner’s Kaddish). In my view this is also the case in a women’s minyan (in light of what I concluded above—that they join the ten for a davar she-bikdusha; and especially since here it is akin to kiddush Hashem). Bear in mind that the very claim that “Bar’chu” is a davar she-bikdusha is itself unclear—it is a matter of dispute among the Rishonim in Megillah there. Therefore, in my view, women may certainly say “Bar’chu” as well.

So much for now; may it be pleasant to the listener.

[1] On this matter, see my article on the status of a convert, where I made a similar argument regarding appointment to positions of authority in our day.

[2] See Gilyonei ha-Shas to Sanhedrin 74b, s.v. “mah lehalan,” Margaliyot ha-Yam Sanhedrin, part II, p. 86, §27, and more.