A Contemporary Look at Teshuva (Column 507)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

At the beginning of the previous column I wrote that this one would address teshuva from a different and current angle. It concerns a particular kind of teshuva that people do, and the obligation upon us to do teshuva regarding our own attitude toward the phenomenon. I will return to this at the end of the column.

Rabbi Bunim Schreiber on Haredi Ideology

I will begin with an article I read a few days ago, which reported statements by Rabbi Bunim Schreiber regarding the cooperation of the Haredi parties with Netanyahu and the Likud. The piece stirred quite a few unexpected reflections in me, and here I will try to lay some of them out for you.

Rabbi Bunim and his brother Rabbi Yoss’le Schreiber (sons of the late Rabbi Pinchas Schreiber, who was a dayan in Ashdod and also sat on the court of the late Rabbi Nissim Karelitz) are two outstanding scholarly prodigies of this generation of Lithuanian yeshivot. I don’t know them in depth, but from what I have seen and heard their thinking is original and broad, and they address varied topics from unconventional angles. I preface with this precisely because the words Rabbi Bunim wrote here—he is, as noted, a Lithuanian rosh yeshiva—do not necessarily reflect those virtues.

In his remarks he warns his flock about Netanyahu, explaining that he is a wicked man and an enemy of Israel (well, don’t worry, this is not about Bibi’s corruption or lack of integrity, but about his attitude toward the Haredim and Judaism). Such words may surprise a public accustomed to placing the Haredim in the national camp (yeah, right), as natural allies of Netanyahu. He warns the public, as well as outsiders, not to be seduced by the ongoing coalitions with the Likud and the right, which, he claims, are nothing but politically necessary conjunctures for practical needs. In their view, Netanyahu is wicked and causes the many to sin, no less than his counterparts on the left. There is no reason—and no license—to feel any shared path with him, nor to see this cooperation as anything beyond a practical necessity.

But it’s not only about Netanyahu:

Those sinners and corrupters who stand and run the state are such that they have lost—and year after year continue to lose—millions of Jewish souls, uprooting them forever; they caused those Jews to forget and have done the worst thing on earth. Their wickedness is not comparable to those who merely tried to kill the body and remove it from this world. They entered the entirety of Israel and destroyed it from within, took out of the collective countless souls who will never return and cast them down to the nethermost pit. Who can define in words the magnitude of the devastation they have brought upon us and the intensity of the hatred we ought to feel toward them.

He inveighs against identification with the state in general and with the right-wing parties that have long gone with the Haredim. He even writes that the hatred toward them should be harsher than the hatred toward the seed of Ishmael, for the latter pursue only the body while these pursue the soul.

He sums up his “in-depth” essay with the words:

So even when we sit against our will in the company of the people of the state and rescue from the lion’s paw, it is not appropriate to feel that there is any thread that connects them to us.

The key expression is “rescuing from the lion’s paw.” This is the classic, time-honored expression of the Haredi policy that justifies involvement in politics (usually cast as a duty, or a mitzvah, to heed the voice of the gedolim who instruct us with this “incomprehensible” directive. A veritable decree). Voting is a kind of obligation, a burden and an irreproachable necessity in order to extract what we can from them—but certainly not an act done out of identification. Rabbi Bunim says that we are essentially dirtying our hands and feet in Zionist and secular mud (not the political filth, as a secular ear might infer. As noted, corruption does not bother them at all), and we cooperate with them only to extract whatever we can, to rescue from the lion and the bear.[1] The main intent is to preserve Haredi education, the bubble, and separation, but also a bit of religious coercion (to save the lion and the bear from themselves).

It’s hard for me to refrain from noting the gap between the intellectual abilities of Rabbi Bunim and his ilk—their depth and originality—and the nonsense they utter whenever their heads deviate even a millimeter from the Talmudic page. Foolish comparisons, a distorted and agenda-driven view of reality, kindergarten-level preaching, clinging to slogans that don’t really hold water, and so on and so forth. True, one can find this among intellectuals in other fields as well (as the saying goes: only from intellectuals can you hear such great nonsense). I have noted more than once (see, for example, in column 62 and many others) that seclusion in the ivory tower is a tried-and-true recipe for detached thinking and a lack of understanding of one’s surroundings.

Double Talk

Back to us. For all those surprised to hear such talk from the mainstream of Lithuanian Haredi society, it is worth noting the double talk common in the Haredi world. Internally, slogans are repeated again and again about the mitzvah to vote (with the requisite grimacing, “as they instruct you,” which does not quite match the enthusiasm invested in promoting this “burdensome mitzvah”) in order to rescue from the accursed Zionists (it suddenly occurs to me that Khamenei may have learned from them). Externally, the discourse is of cooperation and loyalty. Internally, drafting into the army is prohibited—both to avoid spiritual corruption and because why should we cooperate with the Zionists; let them eat what they cooked. Externally, the Torah protects and saves, and of course only those who study are exempt, and everything is done for the sake of the people and the State of Israel, etc., etc. One must understand that, as expected from a defensive minority, a Haredi speaking outward is first and foremost a propagandist (often not consciously), and that is how everything he says should be treated.

I recall one clear day when I was studying at the Netivot Olam yeshiva in Bnei Brak (for ba’alei teshuva). Suddenly I saw a lively movement of all the guys toward a bus waiting outside. When I asked, they explained that we were going to demonstrate in Jerusalem against the “slander” that Haredim don’t enlist. These were, of course, ba’alei teshuva who by nature had served in the army, and some continued in the reserves (especially those who failed to evade it), but the offended righteousness on their faces was instructive: how dare “they” say that Haredim don’t enlist? I’m a combat lieutenant colonel, a pilot, a commando, I serve here and there, I do several weeks every year, etc., etc. When I naively asked whether these data also apply to a Haredi from birth, and whether this service is not merely a residue of his previous biography, he didn’t understand what I wanted. They refused to admit that Haredism opposes military service and that Haredim do not serve. They knew the facts exactly as I did, but the sacred zeal washed their brains entirely. The self-persuasion with which everyone spoke was astonishing to me.

Returning to Rabbi Bunim, I am quite sure that his yeshiva students, after hearing his talk, surely said: “Well, tell us something new.” Although outside such things may sound surprising, to a Haredi ear they are trivial. This is the basic Haredi ideology on which everyone was raised and in whose name oaths are still made today (internally, of course. The “slander” that Haredim are there mainly for the money will be met with stormy protests). There is not a shred of novelty in them; they express the prevailing view since forever (actually since Sinai—the stage at which the hat, the shtreimel, Yiddish, and the gartel were invented).

The Other Side of the Coin

You probably think my goal here is to bash the Haredim. Actually, no—quite the opposite—and here I get to the punch line. Why did Rabbi Bunim feel the need to deliver his fiery essay precisely now? What exactly provoked his ire? What does he fear? It’s quite clear that he and his cohort, the guardians of the pure worldview, noticed that the public is slipping away and seeping outward. Not in the sense of leaving Haredism or religion—those are phenomena that are relatively easy to handle (simply deny their very existence, impose sanctions, and intensify the war for pure education and core studies). I’m speaking of men and women at the very heart of Haredi society who suddenly feel identification with the state, with the public at large, and stop seeing everything in black and white. They no longer buy the picture of wicked versus righteous, schemers versus persecuted, and the like. In politics, as well as a bit in study (though, of course, that is greatly prevented) and in the workplace, unmediated encounters arise with all the “wicked” around. And suddenly it turns out that here and there there’s also a reasonable secular person, pleasant, empathetic, with values and good aims—whose entire existence is not dedicated to destroying Judaism and Haredism. There they also encounter the troubles of others. They suddenly understand that the army has other goals besides mass religious persecution of Haredim. There are also some minor security problems we have to deal with. They begin to understand that there are people who bear this burden, who serve in mandatory and reserve service, who risk their lives, who pay with their time, money, business, and livelihood. As politicians they see that needs exist and that budgets don’t grow on trees, and that there are those who shoulder the economic burden. Suddenly the complaints about failing to share the burden begin to sound a bit less antisemitic.

For years it has been clear to me that Haredi representatives in the Knesset do not truly believe the very beliefs they themselves recite so emphatically (especially internally) about “rescuing from the lion and the bear.” They are partners in political conduct, and they understand that they themselves are no better than others (warning: understatement). In their roles as ministers, director-generals, and committee chairs, they also look after the general public (at least from time to time). Each one sees phenomena requiring treatment within his remit. If you are not stone-hearted, you rush to act. You can continue to preach about rescuing from the lion and the bear, but that is mainly to convince your senders and voters that you haven’t lost your humanity and haven’t surrendered to the Zionist system, heaven forfend. You are still “one of us” (unzerer). Sometimes you say it out of inner conviction because those are the slogans you grew up on (the “pure worldview”), even though you understand very well that it’s nonsense.

And yet, truth be told, deep down something like that does happen to you. Your outward talk, beyond the complaints of ongoing discrimination (sometimes even you understand they are false nonsense, but that is your job), your participation in what is done also for the lions and bears around you—this leads you to really mean it. A person who is inside a system and takes part in it becomes identified with it and starts to feel empathy toward it. MK Avraham Shapira, the legendary chair of the Finance Committee (“the state’s CEO”), was the first to alert me to this phenomenon. But I believe it applies to most of them. I even somewhat believe Gafni and Deri that sometimes they truly intend to act for the vulnerable—and not always as a pretext for funneling money to the Haredim (though that too, of course).

In the Haredi world a division is customary between the political representation, which muddies its feet in secular-political mud, and the Councils of Torah Sages, who remain inside the old beit midrash and are responsible for doctrinal purity. One of the main reasons for this split is the need to keep the representatives from slipping out—i.e., from becoming Zionists, heaven forfend—and beginning to identify with the environment rather than attending to their senders. This is the cord tying them to the Haredi world within and guarding the purity of their outlook and ideological conduct. It is well known that Rabbi Shach would have each of his Knesset representatives sign a contract that if he failed to obey, he would be immediately removed. It’s not only about decline due to interests but about the expected development of identification with the surroundings.

My claim is that Rabbi Bunim Schreiber and his colleagues keenly sense this process of destabilization. It is happening not only to Knesset members but to substantial parts of the Haredi public. The more they become involved in public life in the state (of course efforts are made to prevent this at all costs), in education, in the economy and work, and of course in politics (in recent years—actually in government), the more they develop identification and lose a bit of the sense of siege and of rescuing from the lion and the bear. The lions and bears suddenly acquire concrete human faces, and it turns out they are not so vicious. In my view, this is the reason for this outburst and others like it (voiced mainly internally, but here they leaked out). Those who remain in the yeshiva ivory tower feel that the outside world is slipping from their grasp, and Haredism is changing its character and its sentiments. Suddenly Netanyahu and the secular are not such great wicked people (in the Haredi sense—unrelated to corruption, which, as noted, does not really interest them). Haredi sentiment is changing all the time. Therefore they try to preserve the sense of discrimination, mount barricades over silly and incidental issues (like the Belz education issue), attempt to close off and block any connection to livelihood, study, and the secular world in general (see under: internet, mobile phones, and the like), and in particular remind everyone of what we received at Sinai: we engage only in rescuing from the lion and the bear. Heaven forbid to develop genuine identification.

But it is very hard to do this in our global world. Haredism is slowly slipping from the hands of its ideological politruks, and Rabbi Bunim’s outcry reflects this well. I tell my friends who know the Haredi world less well, again and again: the wars there are almost always internal.[2] The harsher the war with the outside, the more it means that something inside is destabilizing and beginning to look like the “outside.” In fact, they are fighting internal Haredi elements and the legitimacy of “secular” elements being expressed within Haredi society itself. The outside is merely a target for psychological projection of the internal factor.

If so, my claim is that despite the invective, Rabbi Bunim’s words are, in my eyes, praiseworthy. The more the ideological war intensifies and the rhetoric grows extreme, the more it means the public is moving in the right direction. Something is changing in not insignificant segments of Haredi society, and the desperate struggle to stop it is not very successful and, in fact, reflects the existence of this blessed phenomenon. Not for nothing did I write in my manifesto (column 500) that the Haredi mainstream is already Zionist in every practical sense.[3]

Since we’re judging favorably, I’ll add that even the indifference toward Netanyahu’s corruption—and corruption in general—is not necessarily due to anti-Zionism or moral failings. There is a mix here of distrust in the modern values of the state (democracy and integrity, transparency), distrust of the press (“there is no corruption; it’s all lies and persecution”), and, above all, distress. According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, when you’re fighting for your life and money you have neither the time nor the mental bandwidth to root out corruption and purify morals. On the contrary, at times you use it to solve your own predicaments.

The Dissonance Between Ideology and Practice

Thus, Rabbi Bunim’s quotations, which seem to express separatist and alienated positions, actually reflect the opposite and blessed processes occurring in Haredi society. Let’s not be mistaken. They accurately express the ideology, and that has not changed at all. But they reflect the fact that practical conduct, both among the public and its representatives, is changing constantly. These words are an expression of a deepening dissonance between ideological conceptions and declarations and the practical conduct on the ground. Moreover, the more practice distances itself from outlook and ideology, the more extreme the ideological counter-expressions become. I have written in the past that, in my opinion, extreme phenomena such as the shawl-women, the hilltop youth, the “Lev Tahor” cult, and the Lithuanian Jerusalem faction constitute a reaction by those who cling to ideology against the normalization of the mainstream and its practical distancing from ideology. I wrote that precisely because these phenomena fit the ideology and seemingly express it more fully and honestly than is customary, the mainstream’s war against them is more severe. How can a person who holds an ideology but compromises on its application go to war against one who applies it in the most straightforward and complete manner? For him it is a mirror reflecting his weaknesses and pragmatic compromise.

This is the dissonance I described above. On the practical plane and in people’s inner feelings there is no significant distance between the Haredim and the national-religious. But the declarative and ideological differences remain for most as they were—only on paper. You will not hear a conscious renunciation of them. We continue to swear by the old slogans and the pure worldview, even though we ourselves have long not been there. By the way, this duality of planes exists in many places, but among Haredim it is a very pronounced feature. Haredim are a very pragmatic group, and they have no problem living with such duality. They can mock the conduct of the courts of Rabbis Elyashiv (and, as they would say, “the great R. Y.S. Efrati”), Steinman, or Kanievsky—and at the same time submit to their instructions and regard them as binding da’at Torah. Haredim are accustomed to theoretical talk detached from practical conduct. They declare that appearing in civil courts and cooperating with them is like planting an Asherah by the altar and raising a hand against the Torah of Moses, and at the same time send their best sons and daughters to study law.[4] Women on religious councils was once “be killed and not transgress,” until the Shakdiel High Court ruling decided otherwise—then suddenly the law changed as if by magic. I have shown before that this is also the case regarding their attitude to the obligation of hishtadlut (see, for example, column 279): on the one hand, of course, it is invalid and does not affect our lives (for everything is in Heaven’s hands), and at the same time one must not take it lightly—not even a shred. In the past I noted that the hardalniks (especially the “Kav” groups) are very ideological and not pragmatic. In this sense, the Jerusalem faction is closer to them.

So who is right? Whom should we esteem more? Seemingly those who apply ideology in life more honestly and fully. But here I want to argue otherwise. There are complex human processes in which ideology follows practice. The feelings that arise from life itself initially stand opposed to ideology and theory, but gradually those bend and adapt themselves to practice. After actions, hearts are drawn. Our direct grasp of lived experience sometimes hits closer to the truth than our ideological conceptualizations. Those perhaps sound correct and logical, but life tells us otherwise. I take these processes very seriously; I do not see in them ideological deviation but a blessed change in the ideology itself done “from below,” through practice. There is something in unmediated encounters with life and with other opinions that can influence in a way no theoretical analysis can. The people in the fields are sometimes more right than the smart alecks cloistered in their ivory towers.

There are theoreticians who will always be careful to point to this gap and to “identify deep processes,” that is, to show us that nothing has really changed and that we are in a war according to the doctrine of stages. The Haredim want to conquer us and therefore issue consensus statements outward, but look—see what they really say and write internally (=Rabbi Bunim’s words about rescuing from the lion and the bear). Various researchers of Haredim explain to us that they are deceiving us, that their aim is to seize another goat and another dunam, and they quote the sacred writings of Haredi ideology. But I do not buy this. On the contrary, even if they bring me dozens of citations about rescuing from the lion and the bear, practice in my eyes is stronger than anything. It merely means that the ideological declarations are an anachronism they cannot yet deny and confront—i.e., change—explicitly. The change is taking a more winding path, for that is the way of an ideological society (but not too ideological).

Similar Phenomena in the National-Religious Camp

In a similar way we are told that Smotrich wants to establish a halakhic state here. They claim that for now he speaks relatively moderately and improves his attitude toward LGBTQ people, etc., but that this is merely the doctrine of stages. After securing his place he will establish the Sanhedrin and begin executing heretics, destroying houses of idolatry, and blowing up the al-Aqsa Mosque. The learned among us will bring articles and ideological writings in which such ideology and theory are explicitly stated. Moreover, Smotrich himself will speak thus internally even if he denies it externally. After all, he cannot deny simple, undisputed halakhot.

Many believe that what is said internally and anchored in ideology is what truly matters and reflects the beliefs—and, by extension, the risks they pose. Practical conduct is merely tactical (the doctrine of stages). But here, too, I say that practice is stronger than any ideology, and if Smotrich does not conduct himself in that way, it is reasonable that he probably no longer fully thinks that way either. Contact with the “other” and with the life of action has a magical effect on ideologues and ideologies, and therefore, in most cases, I think movements and groups should be judged by their conduct in practice and not by their ideology (this too is a generalization, but I think the point is clear).

Needless to say, the same applies even more to Itamar Ben-Gvir and his “Otzma Yehudit” party. In recent days a lively public discussion has been underway about him. In the past he identified very clearly with Rabbi Kahane’s extremist statements, hung a picture of the “holy” Baruch (Hu) Goldstein in his living room, and was a central activist of Kach. In recent years he has been going through normalization, which has gained recognition in the media as well. They frequently interview him and thereby, of course, grant him legitimacy. Many criticize this media conduct and claim there is no real change here but a doctrine of stages. They quote his Kahanist theory, say it has not changed, and therefore conclude that he is merely adopting a tactic of niceness to garner support, legitimacy, and political power. Ben-Gvir’s current positions lie well within the legitimate domain, but his critics refuse to accept this. In a deterministic fixation they keep seeing it as dishonesty and staged behavior, for they will not ignore his ideological sources and his past, and they subordinate his practical behavior—though it factually appears quite different—to those sources.

And indeed, Ben-Gvir’s associates, like Baruch Marzel, Michael Ben-Ari, and others, say otherwise. In their view he is truly deviating from the Kahanist doctrine and is in fact betraying the “Jewish idea” (the name of Kahane’s yeshiva). It turns out that Ben-Gvir himself agrees precisely with his critics on the right (i.e., he claims his positions truly have changed), although, of course, his critics on the left will say this is only a tactic. I have even seen the conjecture that this is a joint scheme planned with his critics on the right to lend credibility to his normalization.

But in my unlearned impression (I don’t know him), Ben-Gvir is undergoing a genuine change. Practice and the encounter, in the arenas of action, with other groups (leftists, Arabs, LGBTQ folks, and so on) are doing something to him. He does not sit in an ideological ivory tower but gets his hands dirty in politics and even seeks senior executive positions. He works in cooperation with colleagues from other parties and groups, meets with them, and reports to them. This brings him to the conclusion—or feeling—that his ideology is detached and likely incorrect. Unlike the Haredim, he even dares to voice this aloud.[5] In my estimation he is already further to the left than what he himself expresses out loud. As noted, ideology always lags behind practice.

The Implications of This Tension

The path of practical progress without touching ideology has power. In this way one can effect deep changes without hopeless wars. On the other hand, ideology has a very strong force that is hard to withstand. A person is constantly measuring himself, and being measured by others, against his ideology and theirs. This tension constantly challenges those who are bringing about the change, placing them before the ideological mirror. This is especially true at the stage when the changes in practice have not yet been translated into the ideological plane (this is the stage of double talk). In the initial state the ideology remains unchanged but practice is already elsewhere; then a practical person may sometimes feel that he is in fact a compromiser and weakling, and that he is required to return and cling to his ideology (to do teshuva). For this reason, militant and extreme groups succeed time and again in overcoming the pragmatism of the majority, for they are perceived as more credible and honest representatives of the correct ideological path. At the same time, ideological voices crying out truth against practice (like Rabbi Bunim) also serve critics standing outside to prove that the process is not real. Thus leftists prove that Smotrich, Ben-Gvir, and Gafni are extremists in disguise. Thus they ground the thesis regarding the doctrine of stages or the “salami method,” by making comparisons to ideology and accusing them of double talk inward and outward. They sound moderate in Hebrew and extreme in Yiddish, and critics prefer, of course, to relate to the Yiddish.

It is important to understand that the representatives and people on the ground themselves sometimes use the terminology of the doctrine of stages to describe their own mode of operation. They say our hand is not strong, the time is not ripe, we must rescue from the lion and the bear, and so on. These are ex post facto justifications for the gap between ideology and practice. But in many cases, I think, they do not actually intend to proceed to the next stages. Even when our hand is strong they will not stone Sabbath desecrators, will not destroy houses of idolatry, and will not outlaw leftism. In my view such expressions are often intended merely to calm the ideologues and tell them that for now our hand is not strong and therefore we focus on this stage. Afterwards (may that “afterwards” never arrive) we will talk about the next stage. My claim is that in many cases this is in fact a move toward substantive moderation, and the talk of stages or the salami method is merely a way to justify it vis-à-vis the ideology (which they do not dare to touch). Therefore, I think it is more correct to judge such groups and representatives by practice rather than by ideology and their internal written sources.

Incidentally, hence the importance of conceptualization—that is, translating practice back into the ideological plane. Until that is done, the process is reversible, for the tension between practice and ideology can pull us to either side and even reverse the direction of progress. When one succeeds in translating the practical change into a corrected and moderated ideology, the direction becomes more stable. Of course, the guardians of the ideological flame will oppose this, for it robs them of their power and leadership (rescues the lion and the bear from their hand), but this is a very necessary stage for stabilizing such blessed changes. Ideology possesses a charm and force that practice sometimes cannot withstand. This is my modest contribution in several arenas, where I try to conceptualize and formulate changes that everyone already tacitly agrees to but is unwilling to admit (regarding changes in halakha, foundational thought, the attitude to democracy, and more). But even if one fails to change the ideology, that does not necessarily mean the practical change does not express a real change.

Mansour Abbas

I assume it is relatively easy for readers of this site to understand—and perhaps also identify with—my claims, in particular with the interpretation that sees practice as substantive and not merely tactical, insofar as we speak of religious Jews and Haredim. What if I propose applying this also to Arabs? Please, before you jump, try to compare the situation to what we saw so far within our own camp. What is happening outside looks very, very similar.

Most Arab citizens of Israel do not identify with the state. Their ideology is surely based on the Nakba and discrimination, on alienation and claims of inequality; there is also not insignificant support for terror and violence against the state, its citizens, and its institutions. Their connection to the Palestinians living outside Israel as a minority dictates this inevitably. A Palestinian today can hardly declare Israel a reasonable democratic state that grants its citizens reasonable treatment—even if not fully equal (just compare to what they receive in Arab countries, or under the Palestinian Authority and in Gaza). This is the declared ideology, and its guardians labor over it. Whoever speaks otherwise will be attacked and presented as a compromiser and a traitor to the “Palestinian idea” (the name of Abu Mazen’s yeshiva).

Traditionally, Arab parties do not enter coalitions, they oppose any security (and not only security) activity of the state, and the impression is that they are hostile to the state as such. Their members identify with terrorists and terror (with faint condemnations, mainly outward) and, of course, with enemy states, and so on. This is likely one of the reasons why the condition of Israel’s Arabs improves too slowly. The main reason is that those who engage in these processes are principally Jews. The Arab representatives deal with the Palestinian problem, remain ideologically pure in the opposition, and thus ignore their voters’ needs. At times one feels they have an interest in perpetuating the sense of discrimination rather than solving problems, in order to advance Palestinian politics. For some reason, they do not see themselves as obligated to enter a coalition, to shoulder the burden, and to effect change, but demand that Jews who are in the coalition solve the issues for them. When that does not happen, the easiest and most convenient (and politically-diplomatically beneficial) move is to accuse Israel of racism and discrimination.

Against this backdrop, Mansour Abbas (and a significant part of his Ra’am party) is a new and refreshing voice on the bleak map I have described. His very willingness to participate in a Zionist coalition that includes right-wing parties, to cooperate in all actions, and thereby also assume responsibility (though not yet as ministers—this is a matter of time, as with the Haredim), is highly unusual. Mansour Abbas belongs to the Islamic Movement and yet speaks in a more moderate and cooperative language, which makes it all the more surprising. He does not declare a renunciation of fundamental Palestinian ideas (statehood, right of return, discrimination, etc.), but he focuses on rescuing from the lion and the bear—that is, on improving the situation of Arab citizens of Israel—even at the price of ignoring the Israeli-Palestinian problem. During the last Gaza operation he remained a member of the coalition contrary to apocalyptic predictions from the right (that he would prevent the government from acting), even as many of his people (including uninvolved civilians) were harmed. No wonder he was harshly attacked by the guardians of the Palestinian flame (see, for example, here), yet he stood firm in an impressive way.

In my eyes this is a revolutionary novelty on our political map. No less revolutionary is that, despite ongoing prophecies that he has no electorate in the hostile Arab street—that he will not pass the electoral threshold—he consistently receives not a few votes in the Arab public. He has his four seats (far more than the extremist Balad), despite harsh attacks on him and despite the cooperation that until a year or two ago was unthinkable. It seems, therefore, that this is a broader social phenomenon in the Arab public, not merely one courageous individual. He also has not insignificant achievements. He has managed to secure substantial government budgets, to spur police and other activity addressing violence in Arab society, and more and more—things all the shouters in the other Arab parties never succeeded in doing, and which all the shouters on the right protest against.[6]

How to Interpret the Abbas Phenomenon

With respect to Abbas and Ra’am, precisely the same voices and interpretations arise as we saw regarding his Jewish counterparts (the Haredim and Ben-Gvir). His Palestinian critics (the guardians of the flame) accuse him of betraying the ideology. He himself does not deny the ideology, and explains that he is merely rescuing from the lion and the bear—and Jewish critics on the right latch onto this. Motti Kedar explains to us morning and evening that this is lip service (he shows us that Abbas and his colleagues speak differently in Arabic and Hebrew), and therefore it is the doctrine of stages and the salami method. He anchors this in written Islamic sources, in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and of Palestinians in general, and, of course, in quotes and decisions of the Shura Council (the Islamic “Council of Sages” of Ra’am). It sounds very persuasive, for the man knows the material and quotes scholarly citations.

But in my view exactly what happens with the Haredim and with Ben-Gvir is happening here. What I described in the previous paragraph is a one-to-one match with the picture on the Jewish side. You will not find a single element missing. There is a gap between practice and ideology; there is criticism by flame-guardians and the religious ivory tower; there are suspicions from outside that this is the doctrine of stages; and there is no denial by the representatives themselves of the ideology (apart from their practical conduct otherwise). They, too, speak differently inward and outward (in Arabic or Hebrew, as in Yiddish or Hebrew). Therefore, here too I, as someone who is quite a minor expert on Islam and the Palestinians, read the map differently from all the so-called experts.

My claim is that here, too, practice is very important, even if one can find very emphatic and rigid ideological quotations. Citations from the Shura Council and from Abbas himself (especially in the past) neither impress nor threaten me. I do not ignore them, but I take them with a grain of salt. My conclusion from the gap between practice and ideology is not that this is necessarily a doctrine of stages and a tactic, but that here, too, practice precedes ideology, and the path to changing ideology can pass only through practice. Therefore I am not impressed by the quotes (though some are correct), nor even by the fact that Abbas does not deny them and does not disavow them. We have seen this with Ben-Gvir and with Gafni. In my eyes Abbas—like Ben-Gvir, Gafni, and Avraham Shapira—is a person involved in political action and in the broader society; thus, identification with his surroundings emerges in him and in the society he represents, and it is stronger than ideology. As a coalition partner Abbas suddenly understands Israel’s security predicament and the limited options we have to address it without harming his Palestinian brethren. The lion and the bear are no longer such great villains, for he himself shares the dilemmas and decision-making. To Abbas, who sits in the room with them, you can no longer sell the claim that his coalition partners are all mass murderers for no reason.

As a thought experiment, try to imagine people assessing religious Judaism by quotations from its halakhic sources. There is no dispute about the halakhic rulings concerning the treatment of idolators, the annihilation of Amalek, the “ir hanidachat,” saving a non-Jew on Shabbat, the prohibition of granting gentiles a foothold in the Land of Israel, and certainly not their rights (e.g., not being appointed to positions of authority). The law of “lower him and do not raise him,” destroying idolatry, etc. Not to mention the attitude to LGBTQ people, women, non-Jews, or secular Jews. A religious representative cannot deny these halakhic sources, and for most (those who are not reformers like me) they are fully binding and relevant (this Torah will not be replaced). So how will the religious politician explain that, practically, he does not espouse all this? He has no choice but to say internally that we are rescuing from the lion and the bear, that our hand is not strong, and externally to issue denials (“we invented equality, democracy, and morality, and our women are daughters of kings”) and other crooked excuses he himself does not believe. The alternative is to present himself as a reformer not bound by halakha. I want to believe—and truly believe—that they mean seriously what they say outwardly, i.e., that even when our hand is strong they will not do all this. We will already be in a very different place. How will they then justify it? The gates of creativity have not been locked.

In short, despite the tendencies of “deep” thinkers and researchers who prefer to examine roots and foundational depth theories, it is more correct to examine groups precisely on the “superficial” plane—that is, by their actual conduct—and not by their theoretical ideological sources. In light of what I have described, this is, in fact, the deeper plane, for over time it will emerge and change the theories, which are actually what lies on the surface.

It follows from what I say here that double talk is an inherent feature of groups belonging to rigid ideologies, and precisely for this reason I am not perturbed by it. The way to address ideology and change it is precisely by focusing on practice and ignoring ideological quotations. They are not very important and not very influential. Of course it is advisable to try to narrow the gap, to conceptualize and embed these changes in ideology as well, but that is a difficult and painful process, and in many cases unnecessary; therefore it is not right to insist on it (cf. changing the Palestinian charter, or renouncing the idea of Greater Israel).

Implications and Conclusions

I think this is precisely the way to try to reduce the alienation between Israel’s Arab citizens and the state and Jewish society. I am not sure there will be tremendous success here, and I am quite sure the baggage will not disappear and that hostility and identification with their people outside will likely accompany us further. I also agree there is an element of the doctrine of stages here, for Abbas himself declares as much (just like Gafni and Smotrich). Nevertheless, there is a new direction here that, in my eyes, is very important to give a chance and to encourage. In any case, we have no other way to move forward on this front, and the alternatives are much worse (they have already proven themselves valueless). I also do not see what could be so bad in cooperating with and encouraging this direction. Even if Abbas brings budgets to his constituents, I do not think this will create a greater threat to the state. After all, a truly democratic state should care for equality among all its citizens. And, instrumentally, closing these gaps may improve our situation on the internal front (and perhaps consequently on the external one as well).

I am not calling for naiveté, but I am calling to open ourselves to an unconventional interpretation of the gaps and tension between ideology and practice and of double talk. It is not right to be led astray by experts, because—as Ben-Gurion said—experts are experts in what was, not in what will be. Let them continue to talk about Nakbas and discrimination and the right of return, and let us continue to try to narrow the gaps and integrate them into the work. This is, I think, a path well worth trying.

As an aside, I will only say that if you wish to vote for Ra’am in the upcoming elections, I will not tell you that this is a foolish idea. All the other parties are more of the same. You will not find any new message there, and I assure you faithfully that nothing will change after the upcoming elections compared to what has been until now. By giving a vote to Ra’am there is at least a real chance to advance one front in positive directions. True, there will be declarations about the Nakba and the Shura Council. So what? We have that today as well.

Is This Leftism?

It is hard to ignore the claim that this is classic leftist thinking. Our leftist cousins are always accused of ignoring citations and ideology and placing hopes in practice. So first of all, sometimes leftists are right (a stopped clock, etc.). Beware of ad hominem fallacies. Beyond that, leftists generally also want to make far-reaching concessions based on those hopes. A sane right, by contrast, can act in a “leftist” manner to realize those hopes, as I suggested here, but without making significant concessions—at least until we see them realized. This sounds to me like a very sober and logical way to manage things, whether you label it right or left. Names and labels really don’t matter. The two other ways are either naive (classic left) or despairing, demoralizing, and without horizon (classic right).

Connection to Notions of Teshuva

I began by noting that this column relates to the Ten Days of Repentance. The connection is in two aspects: first, the groups I described here are doing a certain kind of teshuva. They are moving from a problematic ideology toward more worthy directions—but sometimes it happens “by accident,” that is, without realizing it. Sometimes not. The second aspect concerns everyone else. They must do teshuva regarding the rigid and distrustful attitude they direct at these groups and processes. We must be prepared to accept that different groups undergo changes and that not everything is fixed and deterministic—even if their ideological discourse still lags behind their practice. I have had my fill of quotations from ideological sources purporting to prove that nothing has changed, is changing, or will change.

One’s fixation on clinging to his own ideology demands teshuva, and it is being done by the very groups I have described. But to the same extent, our fixation on clinging to the other’s ideology and not looking at his practice demands teshuva from us all. Perhaps now is an auspicious time for that.

If I may, this Yom Kippur it might be worthwhile to focus a bit less on general, stirring, theoretical declarations, and a bit more on practical changes in our conduct in the coming year and beyond. In addition, it is not always advisable to examine our practice by comparing it to ideology. Sometimes the teshuva we must do is not from practice to ideology but precisely from ideology to practice. Sometimes it is our Torah that needs to do teshuva, not we.

Gmar Chatima Tova to us all.

[1] This expression is based on various rabbinic phrases about rescuing a lost item from the mouth of a lion or a bear, but its source is already in Scripture (see, for example, 1 Samuel 17:37; Amos 3:12).

[2] In the past (see columns 90 and 330) I illustrated this through the character of Tsemach Atlas, the hero of Chaim Grade’s novel.

[3] Admittedly, there are still infuriating remnants of their crooked worldview. See, for example, an article about purchasing gentile produce during the Sabbatical year. The Haredim—who, recall, are an inseparable part of our blazing national and Zionist camp—diligently ensure the livelihood of Gaza’s farmers at the expense of Israel’s farmers. All this, of course, from fear of the “lo techonem” prohibition in the heter mechira, which could grant gentiles a foothold in the Land of Israel. There is no limit to the absurd.

[4] In column 448 I noted that, in fact, everyone understands that we have no real option to boycott the courts, and that all the halakhic discussions are pilpul, nothing more. It is hard for people to admit that in our situation halakha is not applicable; as noted, they do not go out against the ideology but simply act against it, period. Thus a façade of a quasi-halakhic discussion is created. In practice, almost all think it is forbidden, yet nevertheless go to the courts—some more, some less. From time to time a Jew like Rabbi Avraham Yosef comes out with a tasteful explanation that lawyers and judges are sinners who should not be counted in a quorum and should be ignored as if they were air (he dared say aloud what everyone thinks), and then all fall silent in embarrassment. After all, in practice he, too, like all of us, will need the courts in many cases.

[5] It seems to me the reason is that the principles for which he fights are not halakha and do not belong to the hard core of Judaism. This is a kind of ideology, and therefore it is easier to say that it is inapplicable and irrelevant today.

[6] By the way, honesty requires acknowledging that Bibi has a share in this phenomenon. He was the first to invite Abbas to his coalition, which did not come to fruition (and is now, of course, vehemently denied. Bibi, as is his way, is meticulous to fulfill the verse “He speaks truth in his heart”). That, of course, does not prevent Bibi and his friends from crying out that the last government cooperates with “parties that support terror and are not Zionist” (and no, this does not refer to Gafni’s and Litzman’s parties). Even when he finally does something positive, he denies that too and cries foul. Well, Bibi also strengthened Hamas economically and militarily and did nothing against it (except the disgraceful capitulation in the Shalit deal), and still can cry that he is Mr. Security and that they do nothing. Facts confuse no one there.