“It Is Not in Heaven”: A Look at Rules (Column 505)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
This past Shabbat (Parashat Nitzavim) I spoke in synagogue about the principle of “It is not in heaven,” which is based on a verse in our parashah. The accepted understanding is that this verse forbids recourse to Heaven for deciding halakhah and directs us to human decision-making. I will begin with a discussion of whether and how such a principle arises from the verses, and then go on to comment on it and on the status of rules in halakhah and more generally.
The Verses
The section in which this verse appears ostensibly encourages devotion to God (Deuteronomy 30:11–14):
For this commandment that I command you today is not too wondrous for you, nor is it far. It is not in heaven, [as if] to say: “Who will go up for us to heaven and take it for us and let us hear it, that we may do it?” Nor is it beyond the sea, [as if] to say: “Who will cross for us to the other side of the sea and take it for us and let us hear it, that we may do it?” For the matter is very near to you, in your mouth and in your heart, to do it.
Simply put, the passage seems to be teaching us the lesson of R. Nachman of Breslov’s “Turkey Prince” parable: Do not think you are too small for serving God, that the Torah is too sublime and lofty for you and beyond your reach. It is close to you and within your power to fulfill it. As it is said: “There is no despair in the world at all” (aside from those cases where there is).
But it seems the Sages did not read the verses this way. In their view there is here a meta-halakhic principle. Thus we find in Bava Metzia 59b, in the story of the “Oven of Achnai”:
It was taught: On that day, Rabbi Eliezer answered every answer in the world, but they did not accept them from him. He said to them: “If the law is like me, let this carob tree prove it”—the carob uprooted itself from its place one hundred cubits; and some say four hundred cubits. They said to him: “One does not bring proof from a carob tree.” He returned and said to them: “If the law is like me, let the stream of water prove it”—the stream flowed backwards. They said to him: “One does not bring proof from a stream of water.” He returned and said to them: “If the law is like me, let the walls of the study house prove it”—the walls inclined to fall. Rabbi Yehoshua rebuked them and said: “If Torah scholars overcome one another in halakhah, what concern is it of yours?” They did not fall out of respect for Rabbi Yehoshua, and they did not straighten up out of respect for Rabbi Eliezer, and they remained inclined. He returned and said to them: “If the law is like me, let it be proved from Heaven”—a heavenly voice went forth and said: “What have you with Rabbi Eliezer, for the law is like him in every place.” Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: ‘It is not in heaven.’ What is [meant by] “It is not in heaven”? Rabbi Yirmeya said: Since the Torah has already been given at Mount Sinai, we pay no heed to a heavenly voice, for already it is written at Mount Sinai in the Torah, “After the majority to incline.” Rabbi Natan met Elijah and said to him: “What did the Holy One, blessed be He, do at that time?” He said to him: “He laughed and said: ‘My children have defeated Me, My children have defeated Me.’”
There was a halakhic dispute between R. Eliezer and his colleague R. Yehoshua and the latter’s younger colleagues/students; even a heavenly voice that supported R. Eliezer did not persuade them. The rule on which R. Yehoshua relied is taken from the above verses: “It is not in heaven,” from which he learns that we do not heed a heavenly voice, but follow the majority. The story ends with even the Holy One, blessed be He, smiling and saying, “My children have defeated Me” (that is: I tried, but it didn’t work…).
How is this principle derived from the verses? At first glance this is mere homiletics, since the verses are not dealing with deciding halakhah at all, but with encouraging people to keep the Torah and dispelling their despair and inertia. But a closer look at the verses shows the matter is not so simple.
In the two middle verses, the Torah does not suffice with stating that the commandment is not in heaven and not across the sea, but also rejects the statement “Who will go up for us to heaven and take it for us and let us hear it, that we may do it,” or “Who will cross for us to the other side of the sea and take it for us and let us hear it, that we may do it.” These additions do not fit the interpretation of the verses as pure encouragement and the dispelling of despair. If the verses were only meant to spur us to keep the Torah, I would expect it to say merely that it is not in heaven or across the sea but in your mouth and heart to do it. It is not far but within us and within reach. Despair about our ability to keep the Torah is not solved by sending someone to bring the Torah to us. That is not a relevant solution to such a situation. Nor does the term “too wondrous” (nifla’it) seem relevant if this is about difficulty; that phrase speaks to lack of understanding and intellectual distance. So too the conclusion that the Torah is in our mouths and hearts to do it: if the issue is difficulty, the problem is not in the mouth or the heart but in weakness and inclinations.
From all these considerations it seems the verses mean something else. It appears the Torah is indeed addressing a potential thought that could arise: since we despair of knowing what to do (the Torah is “wondrous” for us—its understanding beyond our grasp), we might expect someone to bring us answers from afar—from heaven or across the sea (a heavenly voice, a prophet, the holy spirit). To this the Torah says we should not expect that. Everything depends on us—that is, it is decided by our own mouths and hearts. The decision of what to do is entrusted to human beings here on earth; we should not anticipate heavenly decisions. I think this is how the Sages derived their meta-halakhic interpretation from the verses themselves, and in my view this is not mere homily but a reading that integrates well with the plain sense.
Deciding the Dispute Between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel
In Eruvin 13b we find a heavenly voice deciding the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel:
Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel: For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed; these said, “The law is like us,” and those said, “The law is like us.” A heavenly voice went forth and said: “These and those are the words of the living God, but the law is according to Beit Hillel.” And since these and those are the words of the living God, why did Beit Hillel merit that the law be established like them? Because they were pleasant and forbearing, and they would teach their words and the words of Beit Shammai, and not only that, but they would place the words of Beit Shammai before their own…
Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel could not reach a decision between them, and therefore resorted to a heavenly voice. It went forth and ruled that the law follows Beit Hillel. I already reviewed elsewhere the background and uniqueness of this dispute (here).[1] In any case, in conclusion it was the heavenly voice that established that the law follows Beit Hillel. This is the most emphatic halakhic ruling in the history of halakhah, and from then on it is accepted that “the words of Beit Shammai, where they conflict with Beit Hillel, are not [considered] Mishnah” (Beitzah 11b and parallels).
Indeed, this is also how it appears in Eruvin 6b. The sugya opens with a baraita:
Do we act by (the stringencies of) both [schools]? But it is taught: The law is always according to Beit Hillel; and one who wishes to act according to the words of Beit Shammai may do so, and one who wishes to act according to the words of Beit Hillel may do so. [But] one who acts according to the leniencies of Beit Shammai and the leniencies of Beit Hillel is wicked; [and] [one who acts] by the stringencies of Beit Shammai and the stringencies of Beit Hillel—of such a person Scripture says, “The fool walks in darkness.” Rather, if [one acts] like Beit Shammai—[one must do so] according to their leniencies and their stringencies; if like Beit Hillel—according to their leniencies and their stringencies.
A person must be consistent and follow a particular decisor, either Beit Shammai or Beit Hillel. One may not even adopt “two stringencies,” that is, to be stringent like two contradictory views.
The Gemara pauses and now raises an internal difficulty on the baraita itself:
This itself is difficult: you said, “The law is always according to Beit Hillel,” and then you said, “One who wishes to act according to Beit Shammai may do so.”
If the law follows Beit Hillel, how can one choose to follow Beit Shammai? The Gemara offers three answers.
The first:
It is not difficult: here [we speak of] before the heavenly voice; here, after the heavenly voice.
It concerns the period before the heavenly voice that decided the law follows Beit Hillel. But after the heavenly voice, one may no longer choose to follow Beit Shammai.
The second:
And if you wish, say: both [clauses speak of] after the heavenly voice, and it is Rabbi Yehoshua—who does not heed a heavenly voice.
Even after the heavenly voice one may follow Beit Shammai. The baraita here does not follow the view of Rabbi Yehoshua (in the “Oven of Achnai” sugya) who pays no heed to a heavenly voice. From this answer it emerges that there is a dispute on the matter, and this baraita holds that there is no rule of “It is not in heaven.” Yet in practice it seems from Bava Metzia that the law follows Rabbi Yehoshua, so according to this answer the law would not require ruling like Beit Hillel. That is rather puzzling.
The third:
And if you wish, say: this is what it is saying—wherever you find two Tannaim or two Amoraim who dispute each other, like the dispute of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, do not act by the leniencies of this master and the leniencies of that master, nor by the stringencies of this master and the stringencies of that master; rather, act either by the leniencies of this master and his stringencies, or by the leniencies of that master and his stringencies.
In fact the baraita is not speaking about Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, but about disputes that are still open and have not been decided in practice. With respect to Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, there is truly no option to choose to follow Beit Shammai.
In all three answers, the assumption is that the heavenly voice obligates ruling like Beit Hillel—at least if one does not follow Rabbi Yehoshua—even though from Bava Metzia it simply appears that the halakhah was decided like Rabbi Yehoshua.
Tosafot on the Contradiction Between the Sugyot
On this, Tosafot (s.v. “kan,” there) ask:
“Here—after the heavenly voice.” If you will say: What is different such that we do not hold like the heavenly voice in the case of Rabbi Eliezer regarding the oven (Bava Metzia 59b)?
How does this sugya’s assumption (that the heavenly voice deciding for Beit Hillel has force) fit with the sugya in Bava Metzia (that a heavenly voice has no halakhic standing)?
He brings two answers:
One can say that there [in Bava Metzia] it went forth only for his honor, as is evident there.
According to this answer, we do in fact heed a heavenly voice; in Bava Metzia it was a heavenly voice that went forth only for R. Eliezer’s honor, and did not intend to decide the law (though it is not clear how the hearers there were supposed to understand that).
A second answer:
Furthermore, there it was against the majority, and the Torah says, “After the majority to incline.” But here, on the contrary, Beit Hillel were the majority, and the heavenly voice was needed only because Beit Shammai were sharper.
We do not follow a heavenly voice only when it goes against the majority, since the halakhic rule is to follow the majority (so the Gemara in Bava Metzia explicitly says we do not heed the heavenly voice because the Torah says, “After the majority to incline”). If so, a heavenly voice has no standing against halakhah, but not that it has no standing at all. What happened here with Beit Hillel? Here the heavenly voice favored Beit Hillel, who were the majority. Yet Tosafot are troubled: why was a heavenly voice needed at all? The halakhah should have been decided for Beit Hillel without it, by “After the majority to incline.” They answer that the heavenly voice was necessary because Beit Shammai were more incisive and sharper. I will explain this further below.
Tosafot conclude with a difficulty:
If so, what does it mean that “it is Rabbi Yehoshua who says we do not heed a heavenly voice”? Did not Rabbi Yehoshua speak only about the heavenly voice regarding R. Eliezer? One can say that “It is not in heaven” implies that one should never heed any heavenly voice.
Here Tosafot explain that all the above was said according to the first answer in the Gemara. But according to the second answer, we do not heed a heavenly voice in any case—whether it comes to decide the law or whether it does not run counter to the rules of halakhah. In this, however, there is a dispute among the Tannaim (between our baraita and Rabbi Yehoshua). It is not clear how that dispute itself was decided (for one cannot decide it by majority…). Beyond this, I have already noted that it appears our baraita does not follow the halakhah.
Conclusions
First, it is not clear why a heavenly voice was needed here in the first place. Tosafot explain that it was because Beit Shammai were sharper. Does sharpness stand against majority? If not, we have gained nothing. If yes, then we are back to a case where the heavenly voice comes to decide something against the rules of halakhah.
It seems they mean there was an initial thought not to follow the majority because Beit Shammai were sharper, and the heavenly voice decided that even in such a case one must follow the majority. That is, it clarified for us the meaning of the halakhic rule that instructs us to follow the majority. In conclusion, it does not act against the rules for deciding halakhah but only sharpens and clarifies those very rules. Tosafot apparently assume that a heavenly voice may do that.
Did Beit Shammai themselves accept this decision? From many places in the Talmud it appears not. In our baraita we see that one who wishes to act according to Beit Shammai may do so (though, as noted, there are various answers about this). Likewise, in the first chapter of Beitzah we find several disputes between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel regarding the meal, and there are Amoraim who ruled like Beit Shammai. The Amoraim certainly operated after the heavenly voice, and yet they ruled like them. How is that possible? We are compelled to conclude that one who holds like Beit Shammai will certainly not begin to act like Beit Hillel because of a heavenly voice—and surely Beit Shammai themselves did not do so. In their view one must follow sharpness, and the majority does not determine against it.
I think the explanation is that according to Beit Shammai the heavenly voice offers a way out that contradicts halakhah (since in their view halakhah is that sharpness decides and not majority). Therefore, from their perspective one should not heed it, for we do not follow a heavenly voice when it contradicts the rules of halakhah. The conclusion is that even after the heavenly voice, one who holds like Beit Shammai (both on the substantive issues and on the meta-rule of following majority, in which they say sharpness decides) may act like Beit Shammai. The heavenly voice went out for the sake of those who have no position on the mode of decision and who do not belong to Beit Shammai or hold like them. To them, the heavenly voice instructed to follow Beit Hillel.
There is also another possibility: that the rule “the law follows Beit Hillel” is not a binding rule but only guidance for one who has no position of his own. But one who holds like Beit Shammai must certainly act according to his understanding and not follow the heavenly voice. I will explain this further later in the column.
Another Proposal
If we look at the situation before the heavenly voice, the question arises: why was the dispute between the two schools not decided at all? What was unique about it relative to all other disputes? It seems this can be explained along Tosafot’s lines. There was a limbo in decision-making: Beit Hillel held that one should follow the majority of persons, while Beit Shammai held that one should follow the majority of wisdom (sharpness). Therefore the rule of following the majority could not decide the halakhic disputes between the schools. But even the meta-halakhic dispute itself (does majority determine or sharpness?) cannot be decided by a vote, for each side is entrenched in its meta-halakhic stance (see Column 195 on the “anti-paradox”). Beit Shammai will say we must follow sharpness and will thus remain with their position that sharpness decides, and the reverse for Beit Hillel. In such a situation there is justification for appealing to a heavenly voice.
Where there is no decision according to majority and there is no halakhic rule of decision, there the principle “It is not in heaven” does not apply. That principle only instructs us to use the halakhic decision rules and not to seek external substitutes. But when we have no halakhic way to decide, there one may—and perhaps must—use a heavenly voice.
The Difference Between the Proposals
This proposal seems very similar to the second answer in Tosafot, but it is not identical. In Tosafot it sounds like the prohibition to appeal to a heavenly voice applies only when that is to act against the rules of halakhah (for example, when the heavenly voice instructs us to go against the majority). According to my proposal, the prohibition to appeal to a heavenly voice applies only when there is a halakhic way out. When there is no halakhic way out, there is no prohibition. The indication of this difference is that the claim that “Beit Shammai were sharper” appears in Tosafot only as a side remark, to explain why there was a need to appeal to the heavenly voice. According to my proposal, however, that claim is essential to the very permissibility (the permission to heed a heavenly voice derived from the fact that we were in a limbo between majority and sharpness).
One could say that according to Tosafot there is an explanation that reconciles the decision for Beit Hillel with the rule “It is not in heaven”: the rule does not apply when the action is not against halakhah. But on my approach, no explanation is needed. Even if this rule does apply to the present case, we cannot remain stuck because of it, and therefore we act against it. In a place where a decision is needed, we will reach one even if it contradicts the relevant rule. Of course one can say this is itself an interpretation of the rule (i.e., that it does not apply in a limbo), and that is true—but it is nonetheless an interpretation we did not receive as part of the tradition alongside the rule itself; rather, we arrived at it by reasoning and necessity. Below we will see the significance of this distinction.
To sharpen this further: We saw that according to Tosafot’s second answer the rule “It is not in heaven” is sweeping. It applies in all situations, even where there is no conflict with halakhah. Therefore that answer holds that our baraita likely does not fit R. Yehoshua’s view. Now consider what R. Yehoshua himself would have done had he been in the situation described in Eruvin. Seemingly, he would have been stuck forever. Note: I am not asking whether, according to R. Yehoshua, one may follow Beit Shammai even after the heavenly voice; Tosafot explicitly write that one may. I am asking a more basic question: what would R. Yehoshua (as an observer) do with the halakhic limbo if he does not heed heavenly voices? It seems that in his view the dispute would remain undecided forever, for he does not heed heavenly voices. Lucky for us he was not there. But my claim is that even he himself, had he been present, would have accepted a similar decision and heeded the heavenly voice. It would be against the rule “It is not in heaven” (in his view), but there is no alternative. In such a case it is clear to me that even he would act contrary to the halakhic rule, even though in his view it applies here. With all due respect to rules, there are situations in which we must deviate from them.
One implication of this difference concerns determining a majority in a court. According to Tosafot’s proposal, the heavenly voice decided that the determining majority is the numerical majority and not sharpness. Now that this has been decided, we must conduct ourselves thus in every context. For example, when in a court there is a dispute between one sage’s view and the view of two other judges who are lesser than him in wisdom, we follow them and not him (for number overrides sharpness and wisdom). But in practice this matter is disputed among the halakhic authorities (see Column 69, and also 79, and for example here in Rabbi Yoel Amital’s article on majority in general, not only in court). According to those who hold that even today we follow the majority of wisdom and not number, it is unclear how they interpret our sugya. Seemingly, it here received an instruction to follow the numerical majority.
According to my proposal the conclusion is different. The fact that there was a tie between number and sharpness merely enabled the Sages there to resort to a heavenly voice, but the heavenly voice did not necessarily decide that one must follow the numerical majority. It decided that in the disputes between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel the law follows Beit Hillel (and the reason given there in the Gemara does not address a decision of numerical majority versus sharpness). The question of number versus wisdom remains open, and each decisor may decide it according to his understanding. This allows us to read the sugya according to those opinions.
The Role of Rules
Perhaps we can learn from this the proper attitude toward halakhic rules in general. We saw a situation in which there is a halakhic rule that blocks us: “It is not in heaven.” When we find ourselves with no way out, there must be a way to overcome it and arrive at a decision. In such a case we determine that this rule does not apply to such situations and we deviate from it. As noted above, one can always claim that this is itself an interpretation of the rule—but that is an interpretation born of the predicament and not stated by the one who formulated the rule. The implication is that this is what can and should be done in other cases where we have a problem with some halakhic rule. We saw above the example of a situation in which R. Yehoshua would be in a limbo; I claimed that there he would deviate from the rule.
Consider another context. What happens when there is a halakhic rule that instructs us to a certain decision, but it is clear to us that this is not the correct decision for the case at hand? I want to argue that even then we should act against the rule (that is, interpret it such that it does not apply to this case—just as we did with “It is not in heaven”). Rules are not an impenetrable wall, and when circumstances demand it, we must deviate from them. To sharpen the matter, let us take a few examples.[2]
A first example concerns the disqualification of relatives as witnesses (see on this here). The Gemara, and the halakhic authorities following it (see for example Rambam, Laws of Testimony 13:15 and elsewhere), state that this is a “decree of Scripture,” meaning there is no reliability problem with close relatives as witnesses, for there is a presumption that a person does not sin for another’s sake; but the Torah decreed that we not accept their testimony for its own reasons. We do not sense the problem with this principle, for even if two relatives come to testify that Reuven murdered, at worst we will not punish him, and if need be perhaps we will punish him “not according to law.” In monetary law, one can even follow the judge’s impression (see Rambam, Sanhedrin 24:1 and 24:10), and therefore one may rule even on the basis of relatives.[3] Therefore most students do not appreciate the very great difficulty of this (non-)explanation for disqualifying relatives. But now think of a situation in which two valid witnesses convict a murderer, and then two relatives arrive and render them false witnesses (hazamah). Seemingly we cannot accept relatives, and therefore we will ignore the hazamah and execute the murderer. Note that the “renderers” are telling the truth, since there is only a scriptural decree not to accept their testimony as relatives. If so, we effectively know this person is not a murderer (the first witnesses are liars),[4] and nevertheless we must kill him. Such a ruling is unthinkable, and a court in such a case must certainly recuse itself and spare him from death. Is there a rule in halakhah that permits this? Is there a limitation on disqualifying relatives as witnesses? If there is—let it appear at once. It seems to me the meaning is that in such a case we must deviate from the rules.
Another example relates to rules of decision (see on this Columns 482 and 119). It is accepted that in disputes between Abaye and Rava the law follows Rava, except for six cases remembered by the mnemonic Ya’al Kegam (see Kiddushin 52a and parallels). Yet the Rambam in several contexts rules like Abaye against Rava in other disputes. For example, in the law of “Lo Titgodedu” the Rambam (Avodah Zarah 12:14) rules like Abaye, who forbids two courts in one city; and in “If one did it, it nevertheless takes effect,” in the view of several of his interpreters the Rambam (see commentaries to Laws of Sales 30:7 and Shabbat 23:15) rules like Abaye that an act performed against the Torah does in fact effect legal change.
How is it possible that the Rambam goes head-on against an explicit Talmudic rule of decision? The compilers of rules offered various qualifications, some of which are not clear or reasonable and also lack a clear source. They qualify the rule that the law follows Rava with all kinds of limitations in order to fit the Rambam’s rulings. The obvious question is: from where did the Rambam himself learn these hidden qualifications? How did he permit himself not to follow explicit Talmudic rules of decision? But according to what we have seen here, there is no need for any of this. If the Rambam had a reason to rule like Abaye in a given dispute—by his reasoning or by some sugya—he preferred that over the rule that the law follows Rava (this is essentially a kind of lex specialis consideration; see on this, for example, my responsum here). In those columns I tied this to the halakhic “rule” that “one does not learn from generalities, even where it says ‘except’ ” (see Eruvin 27a and parallels).
Perhaps we can broaden this and say that halakhic rules should be taken with a grain of salt, for they are approximations to the law and not its very definition. Just as rules of grammar only approximate correct speech (there are exceptions to every rule), but they do not define correct speech, so in a case in which it is clear that a rule does not lead to the correct conclusion, one may deviate from it. We will assume this is yet another exception—even if we have a detailed list of exceptions and this case does not appear among them (as with Ya’al Kegam).
We can perhaps expand the scope even further and argue that rules are only operating guidelines for situations in which I have no reasonable way to proceed by local judgment. But if I do have such a way, there is no need whatsoever to resort to rules. This is a more radical perspective. The rule is not only an approximation, and I do not even need to suspend it only in special predicaments; rather, the rule from the outset was intended only as a tool that assists us in making decisions when we have no other way to do so.[5] There is no problem in deviating from a halakhic rule when warranted, because the rule does not intend to be sweeping and absolute. This parallels precisely my proposal above regarding the rule “It is not in heaven.”
Perhaps this is how to understand the possibility of being lenient in a pressing circumstance (see on this my article on the meaning of leniencies and stringencies in halakhah), that is, to rely in such cases on a view that was not accepted in practice. Seemingly it is very difficult to justify this conduct, for if the law was decided like another view, then this is acting against halakhah because of a predicament—and we do not find such a thing (when there is no dispute, we do not act against the law even in pressing circumstances). But even if the law was not decided in our case, we still have rules for deciding doubts (a doubt in a biblical law—to be stringent; in a rabbinic law—to be lenient; and the like). If so, to choose a lenient view in a biblical doubt is to act against halakhah even where there is no clear ruling. How, then, is it permitted to do this in pressing circumstances?
According to my proposal here, the matter is more comprehensible. If I am in pressing circumstances, that itself permits me, halakhically, to choose a lenient view—that is, it gives me a way to decide the question before me. Now I am no longer in doubt, and therefore the rule that obligates me to be stringent in doubts no longer applies. Of course, one can say this only if one assumes that the rule to be stringent in biblical doubts was stated as an assisting rule for cases in which I have no other way to decide. But when I do have another way to decide, there the rule does not apply at all. In other words, the rule “a biblical doubt is decided stringently” is a rule that is applied last—only when all other avenues have been exhausted.
This is what I proposed above regarding “It is not in heaven.” It may be that it applies to the situation prevailing between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, but in a limbo there is no choice but to act against the rule. My proposal here is that this is so regarding all halakhic rules. There are circumstances in which we must deviate from them, and this need not be viewed as a special permit or a deviation from halakhah. This is halakhah itself. The rules are not the halakhah itself but at most an approximation to it, or default guidance when there is no other way out. This of course requires more thorough clarification and study—of kinds of rules and kinds of situations—and my purpose here is only to point to the general direction.
[1] See also the prologue to the third volume of the trilogy.
[2] I will not bring here the law of “a sin for the sake of Heaven,” for it is reasonable to say that such an act is not according to halakhah. I seek halakhic examples.
[3] This is my view. Most later authorities did not hold so. See on this my Migo pamphlet.
[4] Admittedly, hazamah is also a scriptural decree, but I showed in my article cited above that this cannot be understood literally; clearly the second set is in fact more credible than the first.
[5] See my responsum here for a discussion of the nature of rules of decision in the Talmud.
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Adds: Why is the Halacha like Beit Hillel when Beit Shammai is a Tefi scholar?
Because Beit Hillel is more respected, they also consider the opinion that disagrees with them and then decide according to the truth and not according to their own perception alone.
This is consistent with the rule that the House of Joseph rules according to the majority between Maimonides, the Riff, and the Rosh, or the rule that Rabbi Ovadia ruled according to the Shulchan Aruch.
Just a note, you say about conspiring witnesses that they speak the truth only that there is a written decree, this is not accurate, because everything that conspiring witnesses accept is puzzling in itself (meaning that they accept their testimony completely and punish the first sect and do not use their testimony as a doubt and no one is punished) and can be considered a written decree, and therefore it can be treated as a written decree that cancels the written decree.
They are still no less than witnesses of denial, so your words can still stand, even though there is one sect here who is probably lying in any case.
Do you mean that this fits with their exceptions to the rule they themselves set?
I alluded to your question about conspiring witnesses by referring to note 4 of my article on the subject. There I dealt with it in detail.
Indeed, I meant that the rules exist mainly to violate them.
Regarding conspiring witnesses, I didn't notice the comment, I accept that there is a reason, leaning towards the interpretation you gave the Maimonides.
A question that has been nagging me for a long time is to what extent they discussed in a technical way, that is, if according to the halakhah on paper they are supposed to be executed but the judge has doubts, what do we do?
Of course there is the matter of Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva who say that no one would ever be killed (which appears, by the way, in Tractate Makot), but even on this the Gemara says that they get hung up on technical details.
It is also interesting that on this issue the criticism of them is that they are often bloodsuckers, that is, for offenses that are between a person and a place, there is apparently no criticism of the system (leaving a lot of room for demanding and receiving a reward).
But what really concerns me is whether all the technical details have been settled and the judges still have doubts about the veracity of the testimony, for example. I don't know of any sources that deal with this, if any.
First, there is the law of “deception”, meaning that if a judge feels that despite the evidence, this is not the truth, he can withdraw from the case. I was talking about something else, of course. In my case, this is a situation where the halakha is clear and the reality is clear, but the result is problematic.
Regarding the criticism of the R”A and R”T, I do not think that the intention is specifically to shed blood. They are many criminals in Israel, and not necessarily murderers. I have written here in the past about this issue, and I explained that the R”G was the president of the Sanhedrin and had practical responsibility, and the R”A and R”T who were not in the Sanhedrin were scholars without practical responsibility. This is probably the root of the argument.
1- Regarding the actual interpretation in the words of the Rabbi, “It is not in the sky,” I did not understand that his intention was to learn this from the verse, but rather that the general principle is from the explanation [just as they did not receive evidence from the carob tree and the water source without a verse] and from the fulfillment of this interpretation in the verse (from the fact that the verse does not only contain what the explanation gives and nothing more)
2- According to your explanation in Tos, it is puzzling what benefit there is in Bat Kol, that is, to what extent is Bat Kol not useful? If so, there is no benefit in its appearance even for the person who is satisfied (who is not from these ba’it midrash), since the reference to it itself depends on the position that it came to clarify.
3- I understood that according to Tos, too, there was no side that any advantage in severity fundamentally negates the law of following the majority. It is also simple to say that in any case there is an advantage in wisdom for one of the parties, we will not say the majority rule, because then we will never follow the majority, after all, who knows how to say that the parties are exactly equal in their wisdom (and if the majority are superior in wisdom, then by God we would have ruled like them and not needed the majority rule only in equals).
The entire argument between B.S. and G. revolves around the principle that the majority is only the rule of conduct. And like all other rules of jurisprudence and law, it cannot say what the truth is in the argument before us, only how we should make decisions and act on the disputed matter. [For the sake of the matter, even witnesses do not really clarify the reality and it is only the law of the leadership to say that they clarify, as the Maimonides says in their essence, “just as we were commanded to decide the case according to two kosher witnesses and even though it is possible that they testified falsely, since they are kosher with us, we establish them on their kosher basis. In these and similar matters, we say that what is hidden to our God and what is revealed to us and our children, and we say that a person will see with his eyes and what will see with his heart”].
Another principle is that there is a fundamental advantage for someone who knows the truth about himself, so that even against a majority, he must act according to his opinion (like someone who knows about a piece of milk, even if a hundred witnesses testify that it is fat, he will not listen to them). I will use your terminology, a first-order decision is always preferable to a second-order decision. As the Maimonides said in the Laws of the Magi, in the Disputation, in the Explanation, and in the Interpretation, one does not need to be great in wisdom in the Minyan.
So far, as I understand it, the things are consistent with the proposal you made (“that one does not always have to follow the rules”. Only, in my opinion, there is no exception to the rule here at all, since it is not stated in a way that is known how to act, but only in the place provided). But in my opinion, there is a level of ‘second-order’ knowledge that is equal to ‘first-order’ knowledge. For example, a reasonable person would respond with disdain to conspiracy claims regarding the moon landing, as you responded in your previous response. And contempt is not just “Leave me alone, you failed to arouse my curiosity”, but “You failed to arouse my doubt”. Such knowledge is not just “a rule of conduct” but it is an accepted way of taking a position on a particular subject. And even if I have not researched the subject, I will consider the opinion that was given as a position that I accept as truth and as knowledge of reality (and as an analytical rather than synthetic position).
Example - On the question of why there is an obligation to accept and not to disagree with the Talmud, the opinion of the Haza”a is “Because they were really wise, and what are you worth compared to them….” In my analytical opinion, it is fair to say that there is some kind of understanding here that we are obligated to listen to their words even where we believe they were wrong, except that the Prophet himself assumes that anyone who recognizes their greatness will never approve of a position against their words (a point that can certainly be disputed). So here is not just a formal consideration (as the opinion of the Rabbi Wasserman) to obey their words, but a substantive consideration.
Also regarding the dispute between B.S. and B.H. - B.S. held themselves to be the sharpest of the points to such an extent that B.S.'s words instead of their own words do not matter. B.H. did not accept their position (a fact that they did not hesitate to disagree with them). Hence the question of how the average person would behave? How would he decide this question? There are no analytical tools to prove whether B ”S is not really much better than B ”E, and in this sense there is a synthetic position here. For this, Bat Kol will be useful. After all, everything that we do not listen to Bat Kol according to my words is not because the Torah commanded not to listen to it, but because there is a second-order consideration here that cannot override a first-order consideration (the analytical is superior to the synthetic, reason is superior to faith, etc.). But instead of a first-order decision, then we will receive a second-order decision.
According to this, it is also explained according to Tos; that the appearance of Bat Kol will benefit the common person even according to their system, and that it will not benefit them regarding themselves, and yet they still hold their opinion against B ”E (since in every dispute there is a first-order consideration that is superior to the Bat Kol consideration, which is a second-order consideration). And the words of the rabbis are also clear, as they did not accept that one should follow the majority just because they are sharper than Tefi.
1. I understood this too. That is why I wrote this column, to show that it is not so.
2. Not true. I distinguished between two levels of discussion. A person can believe as a rabbi on the halakhic issue in question, but regarding the question of which majority is decisive, he has no position. After all, even without all my words, you can see for yourself that the rabbis really were not convinced and the Amoraim ruled as they did. So how do you explain this? It has nothing to do with my picture, exactly.
3. We follow the majority of people except where there is a clear advantage for wisdom over foolishness. Therefore, the rule of following the majority has significance. And indeed, there are several rabbis who wrote that in the rabbinic law what determines is the majority of wisdom, and they were not bothered by the fact that it would lead to a situation in which we would not be able to decide. Because that would not really lead to that, and so on.
Both the witnesses and the majority are certainly clarifying the reality. The sources you cited do not contain a shred of evidence against this. However, this clarification should receive a seal of approval that is sufficient. Two witnesses definitely clarify the reality and are not just a guide. But there was a place to say that five witnesses would be needed or that one would be enough, and therefore the Torah states that two are needed and two are enough.
I did not understand the long lines regarding the connection between analytical and synthetic.
2- What I tried to say (more at length in Part 3, which I wrote) is that in my opinion the Amoraim did not rule against the Bat Kol but ruled on the subjects themselves. That is, because the Bat Kol is a ruling for lack of knowledge, just as the majority ruling is for lack of knowledge, and the entire majority ruling belongs where there is doubt, meaning that a person does not have a position on the matter before him. But where he has a position on the matter itself, then he does not have the right to follow the majority (and as the R”M”M ruled in the disputes in the interpretation, not because there are great scholars in wisdom or in number).
(3-) If we follow this path, then even the B”S admit that a person “who has not studied the issue” and does not have a position on the matter, must follow the Bat Kol. And the Amoraim who followed the method of B ” And if the ordinary person is satisfied, then there is a first-order consideration to assume that the B's are right and there is no room for second-order considerations intended for the satisfied person.
Here is a subtle point that I was unable to write successfully at first, - as if according to the last argument (-whose severity is so great that one can rely on it "and know" according to it and therefore there is no room for the laws of "leadership"), again there is no use in a voice. After all, according to their system, in every dispute, each person has a perception [at the level of knowledge] that the truth is according to the B's. And so why did it come out at all?
But it really seems that the ordinary person on the street still has to listen to a voice [and therefore it came out], even according to the B's.
After all, the reason why the B's claimed that one should follow their words against the Rabbi is based first of all on the assumption that they are much more severe than the B's. But the B's thought that they certainly deserved to be B's followers and that the differences did not justify canceling their opinion because of the B's opinion. So the question that should be discussed is what is the true level of severity of the B's compared to the B's (and accordingly - should we follow the severe ones or the majority).
Such an argument is an argument that could not be clarified analytically by a research method, and the reason is simple - to the extent that a person claims to be much smarter than me and therefore I cannot understand him, I have no way of denying him. Just what, - in the average case I will simply understand that I have no reason to assume that he is really saying things that I do not understand due to my shortsightedness, but that he is talking nonsense (a person is instinctively enslaved to his own mental autonomy). But in the case where I heard a physics professor talking about quantum theory, although the things sound somewhere between strange and delusional, I assume from the beginning - even before I heard a proof/explanation - that it is delusional for me but at most strange but real and even genius for someone who deals with the field. Just like a small child is loaded with very important insights about life… but still understands that there is a chance that his father knows something about this life that he does not yet know (and I added that I understood this to be the perception of the prophet in relation to the sages, and that is not disputed by the Talmud).
Likewise, B&H is more pointed (according to everyone), so it is not possible to analytically prove that they are wrong in the very claim that they are so pointed that B&H's opinion should not be taken into account. Nor is it possible to prove that B&H is wrong, because factually they are fighting back a hair and they are not friars themselves. But on the other hand, perhaps if we were as sharp as B&H, we would understand that B&H simply does not understand the depths of B&H's words.
Thus, the position of the ordinary observer-person in relation to B&H's sharpness is a synthetic position. In the sense that this position is the starting point of the discourse and that it is not possible to clarify that claim from the discourse. (And in fact, B ”h themselves relied on their own mental anatomy, and so did B ”h. But the viewer is embarrassed and has no tools to favor an argument over its companion)
In such a place, we have no clarification left from within the discourse, and we must turn to an external means to ascertain whether B ”h is worthy of disagreeing with B ”h. And indeed, the Bat Kol came out and said that they are worthy [and the law is fulfilled according to their words, Dasli’ Bat Ruba].
And B ”h also understands that they themselves are subject to their opinion and that reason is binding, but the person on the street does not have such subordination (he does not know the issue at all and he also does not “know” what is clear about them, that they are a level above B ”h) and he must follow the Bat Kol.
4* I don't want to divert the discussion, but it is clear as day in the language of the Maimonides that I cited that witnesses are not really clarification, only the Torah said to act as if the matter were clarified. “And it is possible that he will perform a sign and a miracle and is not a prophet, and this sign has things in his body, and yet it is commanded to listen to him, since a man is great and wise and worthy of prophecy [he] is placed on the basis of his authority, which we were commanded to do. Just as we were commanded to decide the case according to two qualified witnesses, and although it is possible that they testified falsely, since they are qualified with us, we place them on their qualification, and in these and similar matters it is said that things are hidden to our God and things are revealed to us and to our children, and it is said that a man will see with his eyes and he will see with his heart.” - Yesodat, end of chapter 7. [You really don't need the Rambam to understand that hearing is not the same as seeing. And here there is only a probability threshold of some kind, but certainly not at the level of knowledge].
I didn't want to comment from the beginning, but the direct implication of this being only a guiding law that instead of two conspiring witnesses who are close, we don't discuss that there is a "deceitful law" here. It is certainly true that it is more likely to believe conspiring witnesses than unconspiring witnesses, but the evidence of the conspirators is equal to other evidence in the matter, so there is no real investigation of reality here from the standpoint of their testimony, only if the Torah gives validity to conducting an investigation here based on their testimony. And the Torah did not give this validity to the relatives, so there is a “probability” here - that justice is with the initiators, against a lower probability - that the truth is with the initiators, but the Torah considered precisely the initiators before us as inquirers. So this is not a question of probability versus low probability, but probability versus inquiry.
2-3. So you go back to my formulation. The rule is valid but not binding in itself, and therefore when I have a different position there is no need to follow it. It has nothing to do with the question of whether a majority is a leadership or a clarification. If that is what you call leadership, then it is just a change of name. I don't see what the argument is about.
The question of how to decide who is more severe than whom is of course a good question, but the fact that the Gemara and the Torah did state that the more severe are more severe. That is, there is a way to determine this. When you don't know, then you return to the usual majority law for all opinions.
4. Regarding Maimonides, you are of course wrong, and I have already explained this. You are confusing the claim that the testimony of two witnesses is not certain with the claim that it is an arbitrary leadership.
Regarding conspiring witnesses, see my article that I referred to.
* For my part, the rules were not broken, they were not stated in such a place.
* The main point of the length is to explain that even the Toss did not intend to say that a general question was decided here, but a private question in relation to reality.
* Obviously, a person has ways of seeing who is sharper than his fellow. But only in a comparative manner, one against the other. What cannot be defined is the gap between them, is it such that it justifies not attributing importance to the opinions of those who disagree (it is a question of quality, I think it can be likened to what you brought from the book with the Zen and the motorcycle, which cannot be defined but can certainly be seen to be seen).
*Regarding witnesses, I agree that it is more reasonable to assume that the truth is with them, but they certainly do not raise the view of reality to the level of knowledge. It does not come close to a level of certainty like the certainty that the Twin Towers fell. That the Americans landed on the moon, etc.
The Rambam compares them to accepting the words of a prophet, who writes that even magicians can do some trick to predict the future, and in any case we must accept his words, so too with the witnesses. His language, “we were commanded to cut off the judgment,” “the hidden things of the Lord,” shows what kind of “certainty” the Rambam attributes to the witnesses.
At the same time, I think it is possible that everything about the witnesses is also about a synthetic position. 🤦♂️😉
I didn't understand all the long story, it's just clear to me that witnesses are not a state of certain knowledge.
A1. You have established the words of the sages that the verses also deal with the attainment of the Torah and not only with the observance. But why did it not say that although the decision is left to humans, where there is a revelation from heaven then the revelation prevails (not only when there is limbo. Such as the oven of the Achnai, the revelation as Rabbi Eliezer will prevail over the decision of humans). It is not only in heaven but certainly it is also in heaven.
A2. It seems that the sages simply do not have the authority to determine that it is not in heaven. If I hear a faithful revelation from heaven and the sages tell me to ignore the revelation, then I will certainly ignore the sages, the words of the rabbi and the words of the student are the words of who hears. The sages can at most say that where there is no revelation, one can rely on a wise man and on reason and the like, and not everything is just according to the laws of doubt.
Even if the Torah explicitly stated that there is no oversight of the Bat Kol and that no prophet is permitted to innovate anything, it is still not at all clear that we will not oversee a reliable Bat Kol (because in what way is it less good than the Torah itself if not in terms of reliability). And now that it is only an interpretation, then surely the Bat Kol itself believes a different interpretation of the Torah and why should we not go with it (by the way, there is also a lex specialis in its favor).
A3. (The tune repeats again). If it is not in the heavens, then what is the meaning of halakhic monism, that is, what defines the objective halakhic truth that you hold (and in addition, there is also some side law given monism called autonomy). If something is not the Torah of God, which is objective truth and is found in the heavens, then what is the point of studying it except for the need for technical knowledge to know what to do.
B. You wrote that in Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai there was a problem (limbo) and therefore they bypassed the rule (it is not in the heavens). Why is such indecision problematic? According to this, if a Bat Kol were to come out today to decide between the Sheik and the Pharisee, what law would we then follow in this Bat Kol? Or maybe only in public matters such as conversion? In your opinion, should someone who believes that the Rabbi received revelations from God decide as the Rabbi when there is a dispute over revelation?
C. Regarding the Rambam who ruled as my father against the rule, you say that it is not a question because perhaps he has an explanation or a side revelation. If there is such an explanation, it should be “shown immediately.” This explanation should be of such force that we think it is reasonable to assume that in all the other disputes (in which the Rambam adhered to the rules of the ruling as a reward for his mother) the Rambam did not happen to have an explanation of a similar force that was contrary to the rule. In other words, in any case, we need to find uniqueness here for these isolated cases, and distancing the uniqueness from the “reasoning” does not help, because we really need to find a reasoning with unique power in these isolated cases *and only in them*. The Amoraim could certainly circumvent in their explanation a direct ruling that Amoraim like them had conquered, and even did so (as explained, for example, in the long discussion of the Gemara in Eruvin Mo regarding the validity of personal ruling rules).
A1. I didn't understand. When there is a revelation, it should/is it permissible to obey it? So when is it forbidden? What is the innovation that is not in heaven? When heaven does not say anything?
A2. The sages did not determine this, but rather learned it from the Torah. This is exactly what I tried to show.
A3. There is one halakhic truth and this is the intention of the Almighty. Each of us must try to reach it, and only one of the dissenters succeeds in this. Still, there is an obligation to rule autonomously, and it outweighs the value of the truth.
B. I explained this in the prologue to the third book. There was a fear of losing the people and the Torah in general. There was, for the first time, a division of the public into two parts, two groups each holding a completely different mishnah that do not speak to each other. Two blocs. This is not like disputes over one halakhic issue or another. Especially if we are dealing with issues where a decision needs to be made for the benefit of the public. What's more, it happened in a framework that did not yet recognize the phenomenon of controversy in its full scope and did not know how to deal with it.
C. This does not have to be an explanation. It may also be due to a parallel issue. In any case, this is, in my opinion, the reasonable explanation for Maimonides's exceptions.
A1. The innovation is that we can trust human judgment based on assumptions and that it is within human power to understand. Otherwise, we would have to resort to endless doubts in all matters.
A2. The sages went to the extreme that even when we find someone who ascends to heaven for us and takes it from us and makes it heard, we will not treat him. The Torah should be interpreted in the same way as the above-mentioned Shofi that where we do not find such a person, we can still get along. This idea that it is not in heaven is so absurd and far-fetched to me that I find it hard to believe that anyone really thinks that way.
A. In the second excuse in the Gemara, you explained a dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and the Baraita about whether they are to be observed in Bat Kol (Rabbi Yehoshua does not), that is, whether there is a general rule that is not in the sky (Rabbi Yehoshua does) and you wrote that this is a dispute about whether the halakha has an obligation to rule as Beit Hillel (Rabbi Yehoshua does not have an obligation) and you stood in bewilderment because on the one hand, the halakha is like Rabbi Yehoshua and on the other hand, there is an obligation to rule as Beit Hillel.
Ostensibly, the interpretation in the Gemara is that the entire Baraita is Rabbi Yehoshua and after Bat Kol, and then Rabbi Yehoshua says the halakha is like Beit Hillel (because that is his opinion), but in any case, whoever wants to do as Beit Shammai does. Exactly as Rabbi Yehoshua said before Bat Kol came. And so the language of the Gemara is somewhat distorted, which in the first excuse made separate statements “here … and here” Whereas in the second excuse the wording is different (I checked several other occurrences of “I've heard a mother” in the Gemara and the wording is used here and here).
B. Completely biased. The Tosafot say at the beginning (on the first excuse in the Gemara) that the Shabbat Kol according to Rabbi Eliezer is weaker than the Bat Kol according to Beit Hillel. Then they have difficulty understanding how the Gemara (in the second excuse) is based on Rabbi Yehoshua not observing the weak Bat Kol of Rabbi Eliezer in order to claim that Rabbi Yehoshua does not observe the strong Bat Kol of Beit Hillel (the Tanna proposal requires substantiation, not possibility). And the Tosafot respond that although Rabbi Yehoshua ruled out a weak Bat Kol, his reasoning and wording rule out every Bat Kol in the world, and therefore the Gemara (in all excuses) holds the view that Rabbi Yehoshua does not observe the Bat Kol at all. Is that how you understand the Tosafot? Or another interpretation (some wording made me wonder if you have a different interpretation).
C. I found (but did not look into it) that in the Yad Hada's bivouacs, the opinion that "Beit Shammai did as they said" even after Bat Kol is like Rabbi Yehoshua, who did not look at Bat Kol at all.
A. It may be possible but it really doesn't seem simple to me. Certainly not in Tos’.
B. That's how I understood it too.
C. There is a parallel issue there and this is indeed one of the possibilities there too.
Rabbi Zeini reached a similar conclusion, that the rules are the last resort only if there is no other way to decide.
In the book of Acts, he went to the court
To the best of my memory, the ruling as an individual in times of need is specifically in matters of rabbinic law and not in the Dauraita (which is subject to the strictest interpretation).
With greetings, Yaffo
Absolutely not. After all, if it is a question of the rabbis, then there is no need for a time of stress. And perhaps you mean that there is an individual versus many, and in principle, the law is as the majority, but in the rabbis one can follow the opinion of the individual. But if that is what you meant, then why is it that the rabbis doubt the kollah? After all, this is not a situation of doubt.
Again, I saw that Rabbi Shilat brought up a dispute here about this: https://www.yeshiva.org.il/midrash/24918
And in my opinion, it is a Pishta that one goes to the kollah even in Torah, at least in a time of great stress. And so the words of the Rem’a Chom Sik 25:2 in the name of the Rashb’a:
And if it is in the teaching of prohibition and permission, and it is a matter of prohibition from the Torah – he goes to the Ḥumra, and if it is not the matter of the rabbis – he goes after the lenient one, and precisely if the two who disagree are equal, but do not rely on the words of a lesser one against the words of a greater one in wisdom and in number, even in times of need, then there would also be a great loss, and likewise if it was an individual against many, they follow the many everywhere.
The rabbis who did not divide between the rabbis and the Torah.
Indeed, the Rem’a, in the introduction to the Torah of Sin, writes that he never leniently dealt with something that was forbidden by law. See my article ‘On Kula and Ghumra’.
1. I assume you don't accept this as a historical truth that has been proven to be true. How do you understand this? Is this just a myth created in retrospect to decide a dispute that has no other way of deciding? Are they lying?
2. Why do we even need rules of jurisprudence that rule as X and not Y, instead of discussing the substance of the claims on each issue?
1. Indeed, I do not think this is a factual description. As Rabbi Margaliot wrote in the introduction to his edition of the Sh”t Min Hasham regarding the words of the Rabbi”d, ”The Holy Spirit appeared in our school”.
There was a feeling (intuition) that a decision had to be made, and perhaps it even told how to make the right decision. The mythical description is nothing more than a legend or myth that accompanies this decision. A myth is not a lie but a genre for conveying messages. Did the Rabbi lie? Absolutely not. Especially since even in the Babylonian and Jerusalemite versions we find ”Hechi Demi Bat Kol”, and the answers are exactly of this type and not anything involving female voices coming out of the sky. Coincidences and listening to the environment.
2. The way the Tosheva, Mishnah and Gemara should be written. The feeling was that there was no escape and that a framework for discussions should be established. Furthermore, I have written more than once that in my opinion the rules do not replace substantive discussion. They only teach us what to do when we do not have a substantive conclusion. Therefore, the Rambam ruled as I did in additional places to the Kagham, and the Gemara says that we do not learn from the rules even in a place where it says except. Of course, the rule itself is based on the poetry, which is closer to the truth. That is, the halakha is like a Moel in law against a Rav and in prohibitions like a Rav against Shmuel because their expertise was such. This does not mean that it will always lead to the truth, but if a rule needs to be established, then it makes sense to establish it this way.
1. So, your entire discussion here about "not in heaven" needs re-explanation, it's a legitimate intuition like all the other intuitions that we use in discussions.
I didn't understand anything.