Is Lehava a Racist Organization? (Column 484)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

Following the previous column that dealt with sane liberalism versus progressivism, I thought to add another column that looks at racism in a similar way. The trigger was an amusing story (see also here) about the short story contest of the organization Lehava (an association with abstract literary and artistic aims—part of the New Age phenomenon), which I read a few days ago. I then thought that perhaps this very article is itself the winning short story in Haaretz’s short story contest. Disclosure: my son Yosef once won a prize from Lehava for his own short story. Needless to say, he did it for the laughs, but for some reason that wasn’t reported in the media. Perhaps Haaretz, which is Lehava’s mirror image on the left, wasn’t sufficiently interested in stories that don’t fit the agenda.

The short story and its significance

Noa Stern submitted a semi-erotic story (that’s Haaretz’s description; I didn’t read it) that describes a Jewish man who marries a German woman, and it turns out she’s Hitler’s granddaughter. The story won second prize in the contest “Convince Her,” and was deemed helpful to the organization’s righteous struggle against intermarriage. As Haaretz enthusiastically reports, Noa Stern donated the prize money to the integration of Palestinian women into the labor market. Lehava, in its response, indeed kept its poise, explaining that it has no problem with the motives and deals only with the story’s quality and its contribution to their war effort; in that sense, Noa Stern rightly won the prize. Good for them.

I don’t intend to discuss this lovely and pure artistic competition or the anecdote I described, but to use them as a trigger for a discussion of racism. Indeed, in the past I have dealt more than once (see, for example, in Column 10, and especially in Column 445 and also 449) with the definition of racism, and even reached the conclusion that there is no such negative value in itself (it usually reflects either a factual mistake or some other negative value). Still, and perhaps precisely because of that, I thought it worthwhile to discuss whether Lehava and its various branches (“Kach” and related offshoots) express racist positions, and whether there is anything wrong with that.

To the core difficulty

Seemingly, Lehava promotes a halakhic value that is not in dispute: the prohibition of intermarriage. Beyond the halakhic prohibition, it’s hard to deny that Chazal and the halakhic authorities throughout the generations saw a deep flaw in marrying a non-Jew. They viewed it as a betrayal of Judaism and the Jewish heritage. Factually, that’s also true, for children born to such a couple will likely not maintain a Jewish connection, and they and the generations after them will be lost to us forever. Beyond that, even secular Jews—especially older ones who have not yet developed sufficient sensitivity to political correctness—speak of the “silent Holocaust” of intermarriage and the disappearance of Diaspora Jewry. There are state-sponsored research institutes that deal with this, and state emissaries attempt, to one degree or another, to preserve Jewish identity and, within that framework (with concealment within concealment, as required by the new rules), also to encourage aliyah and prevent intermarriage.

If so, it’s not clear why an organization like Lehava is perceived so negatively and arouses such strong feelings of antagonism (also in me). Is it only political correctness? Are we all lying to ourselves? Seemingly, Lehava activists merely dare to say out loud what we all think quietly and to do what we all think ought to be done. And we—not only do we quietly lie to ourselves, we also loudly condemn them, the honest truth-tellers. Outrageous, no?

Incidentally, I’ve written more than once that this is the feeling among many extreme avant-gardists, such as the “shawl women,” continuing through the hilltop youth, and ending with the Ku Klux Klan in the U.S. All of these believe they say out loud and do what most others don’t dare to say or do but think in their hearts. This feeling feeds their self-confidence, and that is the main reason the public fails to confront and eradicate these phenomena. I have no doubt Lehava’s people feel the same. They act out of a sense of mission and are sure their actions save us from ourselves and from the lies in which we are trapped. They are taking the chestnuts out of the fire for all of us. Are they not right?

And yet—racism

First, even if Lehava’s people truly act according to halakha and the values accepted in general Jewish society, that doesn’t mean they are not racists. It’s possible that halakha and our society are themselves racist. One can of course see this as legitimate racism (racism that is not a pejorative), or even as reprehensible racism. In any case, the fact that we all are, factually, like that does not necessarily mean it’s okay. It could also lead to the conclusion that we all need to do some soul-searching, and the result could go either way, including deciding on loyalty to halakha even if it is racist (I won’t enter here into what the right decision is in this context).

But I think there’s something in them beyond loyalty to halakha. This manifests in at least two realms: the absence of conflict, and the identification they make between the halakhic command and the factual characteristics of non-Jews. I will now discuss these two features in turn.

A. The absence of conflict

Even if someone decides to be loyal to halakha despite its being racist, I expect them to have pangs of conscience about it. When I am forced to do something ugly, even if justified, I shouldn’t do it wholeheartedly. On this the Sages expounded the verse said about the subverted city (ir hanidachat): “And He will give you mercy and be merciful to you.” Even when one does an act demanded by halakha (according to the Talmud, this is likely a law not intended for actual implementation), there is still concern that we will lose our compassion and morality. We must do the thing, but it’s important that we do it with a heavy heart. The feeling that accompanies me when I hear the actions and statements of Lehava’s people is that their hearts do not truly ache. This is not a decision between conflicting values but a clean and unequivocal action, with perfect feelings of justice and purity. There are good guys and bad guys here, and we are entirely the good guys.

Incidentally, this is why political correctness manages to operate even among those who believe in marriage within the Jewish people (and oppose intermarriage). The reason is that deep down, decent people feel that this is an ethically and morally problematic approach. They indeed think that the value of preserving Judaism outweighs the racist problematic aspect, but that doesn’t mean there’s no problematic aspect. The sense is that this is a case of “deferred” (dechuya) rather than “permitted” (hutra). People who are not endowed with the capacity for complex thinking can easily get confused and think that such a decision is immoral and racist. Hence arises the critique of the universalists (who in many cases are incapable of understanding and containing conflict situations), and hence also the capitulation of the particularists to political correctness. They simply cannot explain to themselves why the universalist critique is wrong. Both camps fail to understand that deciding a conflict between two values does not necessarily reflect disloyalty to one of them. The fact that someone acts against intermarriage does not mean he does not see the problematic aspect in it. On the contrary, the existence of a conflict before the decision reflects precisely the loyalty to the two clashing values. But that is said with respect to those who criticize the activity itself. The critique of the sense of absolute justice is certainly in place, since it does not contradict the complexity of the situation. I can side with the activity and the statements, but do so with a heavy heart.

Note that equally, the absence of conflict, as can be seen among Lehava’s people, does not necessarily express greater loyalty to nation and halakha, but perhaps a lack of moral sensitivity. People who recoil from such actions, or at least identify with them with a heavy heart, are not necessarily less loyal to nation and halakha. It is quite possible they are in conflict, and therefore it is harder for them to adopt the decision firmly and unequivocally. One can of course accuse them that this isn’t right. A decision in a conflict is supposed to guide our practical activity; otherwise there is no decision. A person who is paralyzed in conflict situations has not truly decided. In saying this I am explaining that weakness, but not necessarily justifying it.

In any case, had Lehava’s people decided against intermarriage and acted against it forcefully, but while being aware that this is a decision in a conflict between two values and accompanied by the requisite stomachaches, I would of course not see any moral flaw in that but rather consistency and determination worthy of appreciation—and indeed loyalty to the values of halakha and Judaism.

B. Normative stance versus factual characterization

Lehava’s people do not content themselves with religious preaching and attempts to persuade people to follow halakha and preserve their Jewish identity. Moreover, they usually speak to populations not obligated by halakha. Therefore, their public-facing focus cannot be the halakhic prohibition, but rather painting the non-Jewish public in repulsive and ugly ways. They explain to women the great dangers in marrying an Arab and in living in Arab society in general. Among other things, they repeatedly say that the whole matter begins with intentional premeditated schemes. He plans to take you to the village and abuse you. He is sub-human; his family is primitive, and so on. They draw a general, sweeping portrait, and are prepared to do so even in cases where it is clearly not true and certainly not necessary. They certainly don’t examine each case on its own merits.

See the first paragraph in the description of their doctrine on the site’s opening page:

The best way to deal with the problem of assimilation is by preventing the problem in advance and addressing the roots of the issue: do everything so that the girl will not meet the gentile; strengthen the separation between Israel and the nations; educate our children to be Jews who are proud of their Judaism, their people, and their land.

Being a proud Jew is excellent. Strengthening Jewish identity and halakhic commitment is certainly legitimate and appropriate. But the separation between Israel and the nations is usually presented tendentiously and inaccurately—certainly if one insists first and foremost on not meeting the gentile. In that way, any nonsense can be sold to us. I assume that in their view these are “holy lies,” but this is a particularly ugly example of such lies (see Column 21).

One must understand that when addressing a non-religious population, propaganda based on commitment to Torah and mitzvot is far less effective. A person who does not keep Shabbat, does not eat kosher, and does not observe mitzvot—and certainly if he looks at the Chief Rabbinate and the form of marriage it offers us—won’t be particularly interested in what the Torah expects of him regarding his marriage. The most natural way to speak to such a person and influence him not to form a relationship with a non-Jewish partner is to describe Arab society and its people in repulsive and tendentious ways.

I want to stress that I do not mean to say that these descriptions are baseless. There are problems in Arab society, and marrying an Arab involves various risks, and yet there is here an ugly and, of course, non-rigorous and incautious generalization. They certainly do not bother to check who is involved and whether these concerns have a basis, but rather generalize. They completely ignore the fact that among Jews there are quite a few problematic marriages as well, and that even among those who married Arabs there are successful marriages. I don’t think the proportions are the same (I haven’t checked, but that’s my impression), and yet these generalizations are problematic. Exaggeration in description and in the proportions of factually correct cases of abuse, or the distorted portrayal of such cases, are problematic generalizations. The fact that there is a prohibition on intermarriage does not necessarily mean that a gentile (including an Arab) is a vile person and that marriage to him is necessarily a terrible risk or a foolish, self-destructive act. And certainly this does not mean that we are dealing with a scheme by the gentile driven by ulterior motives (and not by romance).

Self-examination

I propose that every reader examine themselves: what picture forms in your mind when you think of a romantic relationship with an Arab? When I examine myself and my surroundings (I assume we will also see this in the comments to this column, despite this remark), I find that a typical such relationship is seen as a scheme by the Arab to take control of a Jewish woman and capture her with him in the home. He plans in advance to bring her to the village, abuse her, and Islamize her, all funded by the New Israel Fund with Qatari money. In short, a surefire recipe for disaster. In any case, for me such a picture certainly exists, despite my knowing no statistics that have examined these matters. Of course, one occasionally hears such a story (naturally, a story of an Arab and a Jewish woman living in tranquility and love does not become a front-page headline. Certainly not in B’Sheva), and clearly there are several such cases. But from there to painting a general picture—the distance is great.

Take as an example the case of Sapir Nahum from a few days ago. She lived with an Arab partner (a TikTok star with a criminal record) and broke up with him. At some point she disappeared, and he was suspected. As of these days he is still a suspect (the trial has not yet taken place). I have no clear information on the matter, nor did I check. But already in real time every noble netizen had very firm opinions about this case. Clearly there is a nationalist issue here—something for Lehava to handle. No one considered that a person with a criminal record, even if he is Jewish, is not necessarily a normative, pleasant partner with whom it is advisable to live. I recommend performing a random Google search for “ספיר נחום,” and seeing the results and people’s reactions. Here is a random selection I got from a Twitter search today. Untouched.

In accordance with what I wrote in Column 445 about racism, the problem here is not racism, since in my view there is no such value problem per se. It is a false—or at least biased—description of the facts, and a portrayal of entire populations in a sweeping and inaccurate way that relies on a few examples (even if there are not a few of them). This is a classic case of confirmation bias, where every case I hear about is taken as confirmation of my thesis, and I of course ignore (not necessarily consciously) the existence of other cases. One must understand that the salience of an example is directly proportional to its fit with my theses.

Needless to say, a similar problem exists on the other side in the opposite direction. Those who advocate universalism ignore, consciously or not, the cases of abuse and the problematic aspects that certainly exist in such marriages. For them, it is a noble romance in the spirit of Romeo and Juliet, against social pressures and difficulties, and all of Lehava’s descriptions and examples are presented by them as lies and distortions. But that is of course a lie and distortion in the other direction as well (indeed, there it’s clear there is no racism—but as noted, racism as such is not necessarily a negative value)[1]. Both camps paint an untrue—or at least biased—reality in order to advance an agenda and thus act unethically (see Column 21 on “holy lies”).

I don’t know what Lehava’s people would do if the non-Jews around us were Swedes, Australians, or French. I assume they would also find problems and flawed traits among them (after all, “their flesh is the flesh of donkeys and their emission is the emission of horses.” See below). It is not very hard to find a Swede or an Australian with a criminal record who married a Jewish woman and abused her. In this context, one can examine how the fight against intermarriage is conducted in the U.S. I assume it is much harder there to sell these agenda-driven tall tales, and not only because of political correctness. No wonder the fight against intermarriage there enjoys less impressive successes.

The link between the halakhic command and factual traits

People tend to think that if there is a halakhic command that forbids marrying a non-Jew, it must be based on the non-Jew’s being inferior in some sense: morally, personally, developmentally, and so on. Therefore, if halakha forbids intermarriage, then obviously non-Jews are not human, are wicked, abusive, etc. But that is a childish identification. It is entirely possible that halakha forbids some act even though there is no moral flaw in it. Equally possible is that halakha forbids intermarriage even though non-Jews are regular people like you and me. In my view it is far more likely that it forbids it because it seeks to promote Jewish values and intermarriage harms that—not because of the human level of non-Jews.

Why must the existence of a prohibition force the adoption of certain factual traits? A similar issue arises in the discussion of halakha’s attitude toward homosexuals. The fact that the Torah forbids the act does not necessarily mean there is any flaw in the people or in those acts—not that they are wicked, and not that they are sick.[3] The act is forbidden, that’s all. Moreover, this does not even mean there is a moral flaw in the act. It is a halakhic prohibition and not necessarily a moral one. Eating pork is not morally flawed and is nonetheless prohibited. The same holds for separating terumah, ritual purity/impurity, and more.

As we saw in the previous sections, childish conceptions cannot digest complexity and engage in complex thinking; for them, if something is halakhically forbidden it must also be immoral, and conversely: if something is halakhically obligatory then it is certainly moral. I have shown more than once that neither is true. Straightforward propaganda against intermarriage should focus on the prohibition, not on the dangers. If one wishes to warn about dangers, that too is possible (since there are dangers), but then those should be drawn honestly and fairly, and of course not tied to the halakhic prohibition (which exists even vis-à-vis an enlightened gentile, the pick of humankind).

Halakha’s attitude toward non-Jews

One could claim that Lehava’s people draw on additional halakhic and rabbinic sources that explicitly speak of such traits among non-Jews. Seemingly, it is not only the halakhic prohibition that leads them to portray non-Jews so inferiorly, but also Talmudic and Biblical sources.

Here I will only say that these conceptions (which, in my estimation, are found in circles far wider than Lehava and “Kach”) suffer from a fossilized and superficial reading of halakha. They ignore changed circumstances and adopt Talmudic statements as-is (see my series of columns on Modern Orthodoxy. Specifically regarding non-Jews see Column 476, as well as my articles “The Gentile Whom Halakha Did Not Recognize” and “Is There “Enlightened” Idolatry? On the Attitude Toward Non-Jews and…”).

I’ll take only one Talmudic source as an example, which (justifiably) arouses not a few antibodies in anyone who encounters it. Rabbeinu Tam’s view in Tosafot Yoma 82b is that intercourse with a non-Jew does not forbid a woman to her husband:

“And Rabbeinu Tam explained, in that passage in Ketubot and regarding Esther, that she was not obligated to give up her life to avoid relations with a gentile, for his intercourse is not considered intercourse, and she is not liable to death for his intercourse, for the Merciful One rendered the seed of an idolater ownerless, as it is written: ‘whose flesh is the flesh of donkeys and whose emission is the emission of horses’; and it is like bestiality in general. Consequently, he permitted a Jewish woman who had apostatized and married a gentile, and then repented and the gentile converted, to remain with him; for although it is said, ‘just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to the paramour,’ that applies to the intercourse of a Jew—but not of a gentile.”

He grounds this in the verse “whose flesh is the flesh of donkeys and whose emission is the emission of horses.” Truly shocking. One can, of course, claim that this is an attitude toward non-Jews as our ancestors knew them in their time, who were indeed at a lower human level (see my articles above). But here I want to suggest another possible interpretation: that intercourse which forbids a woman to her husband is only intercourse that can effect marriage (ishut), and therefore only the intercourse of a Jew. Intercourse with a non-Jew is like intercourse with an animal in this respect—that it does not effect marriage (among non-Jews there is no kiddushin and no marriage in the full halakhic-legal sense; the relationship is more natural and less formal-legal-halakhic). Therefore such intercourse does not forbid a woman to her husband. One can bring support for this from additional sources; I won’t do so here.

For the sake of fairness I should note that in other sugyot one sees that this attitude to non-Jews is indeed essentialist and not merely a formal halakhic ruling as I suggested here. But sometimes we are led astray by modes of expression, and we must interpret them in their context and according to the conventions of speech in the text being interpreted. To view such expressions through the lens of contemporary political correctness is anachronistic.

In conclusion, in the two features I have described—the absence of conflict and the presentation of a sweeping and distorted picture—there is a moral and value flaw. Whether we call it racism or call it insensitivity and a biased, incautious presentation of facts about an entire public, it is clear there is a problem here.

Conclusions: Who is a racist?

The conclusion that emerges from this analysis may be surprising to some. A religious person’s opposition to intermarriage has nothing whatsoever to do with racism—so long as he does not base it on collective (incorrect or sweeping) traits of non-Jews but on the halakhic prohibition, and so long as he understands that his decision entails a moral price (the conflict).

It is precisely the secular person who rejects intermarriage who is a racist. He opposes choosing partners based purely on ethnicity/race, with no connection to values. A non-Jewish partner can hold the same values and the same culture as his son or daughter, and he still opposes their marriage. How is that different from opposing the marriage of an Ashkenazi and a Mizrahi? In my view, it is exactly the same.

This also answers Oren’s question from a few days ago regarding Itamar Ben-Gvir. If he acts with the sole aim of preventing intermarriage, there is no racism here—at least not in the pejorative sense. But if to that end he employs stereotypes, portrays Arabs in sweeping and inaccurate ways, and stirs up unjustified hatred toward them—then indeed there is. Since I am not dealing here with specific individuals but with ideas, I will not enter into a detailed examination of the statements and actions of this or that person (and that is also my answer to Yehoshua Benjo’s remark in the same thread, which tried to anticipate matters).

Link to the previous column

I’ll end with a note that ties us back to the previous column. We have seen here another example of how an excessively extreme struggle harms a just struggle. A crusade against those who oppose intermarriage and branding them as racists harms the just struggle against real racism. Lehava is indeed a racist organization—but not because it opposes intermarriage. I too oppose it, and to the best of my judgment I am not a racist (in the negative sense).

Exactly as we saw regarding abortions and the opposition to them, witch-hunting is a matter of religious fanaticism, not a matter of a value-based struggle. Seeing everyone who thinks differently from me as a witch, inflating any phenomenon that has a whiff of a problem as if it were a Holocaust—these are expressions of childish thinking that cannot digest complex situations, exactly as I argued in the previous column.

[1] This is a good example of the distortion in discourse created by the “racism” label that is attached to other value problems (and hence the importance of the analysis I did in Column 445). Thus it turns out that in situations where the same value problem exists but one cannot attach to it the “racism” tag, it is not perceived as a problem.

[2] On the distorted perception of the gentile in the religious public, see my article “The Gentile Whom Halakha Did Not Recognize.”

[3] As for their being “sick,” see my debate with Yoram Yovel in Columns 25–26.