Two Notes on Torah Study (Column 479)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In honor of the approaching festival of Shavuot, I shall “punish” you with another column this week—this time, two notes about Torah study. These are matters I have written about before, but I decided to gather and organize them ahead of the holiday that is “entirely for you.” The column is divided into two parts: A. The purpose of study. B. Between Torah study and the commandment of Torah study. At the end I will try to connect the two.
A. The Purpose of Study
Toil in Torah and Torah “for its own sake”
At the beginning of Parashat Bechukkotai we find (Leviticus 26:3):
“If you walk in My statutes and keep My commandments and perform them.”
There are three components here in the service of God: to walk in His statutes, to keep His commandments, and to perform them. The apparent duplication is clear, and not for nothing do the Sages explain it in the following midrash, cited by Rashi here:
“If you walk in My statutes”—one might think this refers to fulfilling the commandments; but when it says “and you shall keep My commandments,” fulfillment of the commandments is already stated. What, then, do I fulfill with “If you walk in My statutes”? That you should labor in Torah.
“And you shall keep My commandments”—be toiling in Torah with the intent to guard and fulfill, as it is said (Deuteronomy 5:1): “You shall learn them and keep to do them.”
Rashi explains that to “walk in His statutes” is to labor in Torah. “And perform them” is to be taken literally (it appears that in the first clause he refers to “and perform them,” not to “and you shall keep My commandments,” since the latter is explained differently immediately afterward), and “and you shall keep My commandments” refers to studying with the intent to do. We thus learn that “toil in Torah” is not “study in order to act.” These are different levels and different modes of study. It seems that “toil in Torah” is not merely “sweating” over Torah as commonly understood, but engaging with it as an end in itself, not as a means to know what to do.
R. Ḥayyim of Volozhin in Nefesh HaChaim, Gate IV (ch. 3), which is devoted entirely to the conception of study as a value unto itself, cites the Rosh’s comments to Nedarim 62a:
“The truth is that the term ‘for its own sake’ means ‘for the sake of the Torah.’ The matter is as the Rosh explained regarding the statement of R. Elazar b. R. Tzadok (Nedarim 51a): ‘Do deeds for their own sake, and speak of them for their own sake.’ His words: ‘Do deeds for their own sake’—for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, Who wrought all things for His sake. ‘And speak of them for their own sake’—let all your speech and dealings in matters of Torah be for the sake of the Torah: to know, to understand, to increase learning and dialectic—not to quarrel or to aggrandize oneself… He was precise to explain the shift in R. Elazar b. R. Tzadok’s language: in deeds he said “for their own sake,” and in speech he said “for its own sake.” Therefore, concerning action he explained ‘for the sake of the Holy One…,’ whereas concerning study he explained ‘for the sake of the Torah,’ etc. His intent is clear: the performance of a commandment should ideally be with cleaving and utmost purity of thought according to one’s intellect and attainment, to bring praise above and effect rectifications in the worlds and powers and supernal orders—this is “for their own sake,” for “all that the Lord has made is for His sake,” and our Sages said: for His praise. And even though in commandments the essential requirement is the action itself, and the additional intention and purity of thought do not invalidate (as explained earlier), nevertheless the holiness and purity of one’s thought join the action to arouse and effect greater rectifications than if the commandment were performed without cleaving and holy thought. But regarding a person’s conduct when engaged in Torah in the laws of the commandments, he said “and speak of them”—that is, speech in matters of the commandments and their laws—‘for its own sake,’ meaning for the sake of the words of Torah: to know, to understand, to increase learning and dialectic. (And Rashi had another reading there: “for the sake of Heaven,” hence he explained that all your intent should be for Heaven. But the meaning of ‘for its own sake’ that our Sages use everywhere—even Rashi would explain here like the Rosh according to his text—and Rashi here does not intend cleaving, rather he excludes study for the sake of strife and pride, as the Rosh wrote…). And this is what the Talmud concludes regarding Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai—that he did not neglect… to fulfill that which is stated, ‘To endow those who love me with substance’ (Proverbs 8:21)—for it is explained in that passage that the ‘speaker’ is the holy Torah itself, which ‘cries out outside,’ and that it has the power to bequeath and give good reward to all who meditate and engage in it out of love for it itself—to increase learning and dialectic. These are ‘those who love me.’”
Torah study should not be done “for the sake of God” nor for any other goal besides the study itself—not even in order to act.
Further reflection on the sources
Indeed, the Sages extolled in several places the importance of studying in order to fulfill. But some of the statements are negative, such as Vayikra Rabbah, Bechukkotai, parashah 35:
“R. Yoḥanan said: One who learns not in order to do—it would have been fitting for his placenta to have been turned upon his face and that he never come into the world.”
This invalidates study done without intent to do, but it does not say that the goal of study is action. Study should be done “for its own sake,” but of course one must fulfill what emerges from it. One who studies with no intention to fulfill invalidates the study. There are also positive hyperboles in the very same midrash:
“R. Aḥa said: One who learns in order to do merits the holy spirit. What is the proof? ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate upon it day and night, in order that you observe to do according to all that is written in it; for then you shall make your way successful, and then you shall act wisely’ (Joshua 1:8). And ‘act wisely’ means the holy spirit, as it is said (Psalms 89:1): ‘A maskil of Ethan the Ezrahite.’”
These do not mean that the aim of study is action; rather, one who studies in order to act merits certain distinctions. But study itself is not necessarily defined as an activity whose purpose is to act or to know what to do.
And behold, in Kiddushin 40b (and many parallels) we find:
“R. Tarfon and the elders were once reclining in the upper story of the house of Nitza in Lod. The question was asked before them: Which is greater—study or deed? R. Tarfon answered: Deed is greater. R. Akiva answered: Study is greater. They all answered and said: Study is greater, for study leads to deed.”
The structure here is puzzling: if study is merely a means to deed, then deed is greater, and study is at most an accessory to a commandment. How then did they conclude from the fact that study leads to deed that study is greater? Moreover, the saying opens with a dispute and ends with a full chorus of consensus, without any argument. Why did R. Tarfon retract his previously firm position?
I once suggested that perhaps one should emend: “Study is great that it leads to deed,” i.e., the inquiry assumes two things—study and deed—and asks which is greater. In the end, all realize it is a mistaken inquiry, for there is only one thing: a chain of study that culminates in deed. Consequently, there is no sense in asking about each component separately which is greater; they are inseparable. So why is the conclusion that study is great? Because “study” means a mode of learning that leads to deed. Deed is not the goal of study but the form of correct study: when we learn, we conclude with a practical ruling (and of course we must also fulfill it in practice). This is the proper form of study—not that deed is the goal and study the means.
Study should end with the learner’s practical conclusion. From here we learn that those who split “analytic study” from “halakhic study” are not doing right. It is common among us that in analytic study one airs every notion freely in every direction without testing plausibility, and in halakhic study one consults codes and responsa to know what to do. The conclusion from here is that there is no such thing as “studying halakhah” as a separate track. There is Torah study, and Torah study is study that ends with a halakhic conclusion. Halakhah is the bottom line that emerges from analytic study. Incidentally, it follows that halakhah is not learned by perusing the Mishnah Berurah or the Shulḥan Arukh alone, for it should be the learner’s own conclusion (of course after studying the sugya, its commentators, and also those sefarim).
If a person studies instrumentally “in order to fulfill,” then the study is an accessory to a commandment, not a commandment itself. Hence, in the verse with which I began, the Torah distinguishes between studying in order to fulfill—which is important, to be sure, but is not the commandment of Torah study; it is an accessory to the commandments (for without it one cannot fulfill—“an ignoramus cannot be pious”)—and the toil of Torah itself, which is study for the sake of study, though its form is study that ends in a practical conclusion.
This distinction resembles the difference between two approaches to science and scientific research. R. Ovadia Yosef and his students understand the goal of study as halakhic knowledge and practical instruction; consequently the form of their study is less analytic and theoretical (though in my view, even to rule halakhah one must study differently). This resembles technologists who see scientific research as a necessary means toward technology and practical applications. The prevalent Lithuanian yeshivah outlook is different: there, study is not viewed as a means to instruction and practical knowledge but as a value unto itself—much as most scientists view scientific research. From their perspective, technological applications are a by-product (which usually also yields money and grants), not the goal or value of research.
The place of halakhah
In several places I have written that the core of the Torah is halakhah. Nefesh HaChaim there elaborates greatly. I have already noted that in ch. 6 he treats halakhah as the will and word of God, while aggadah is “the word of God” alone (implying that the degree of cleaving to God differs between engaging with halakhah and with aggadah). This is not the place to cite his words in detail. As is known, Rashi at the very opening of the Torah brings R. Yitzḥak’s question: why did the Torah not begin with “This month shall be for you…” but with Genesis? The question assumes that the essence of the Torah lies in the commandments; hence, Genesis and the first part of Exodus are, seemingly, superfluous (and of course there are more such parts). Aside from Rashi’s somewhat technical answer, the underlying assumption is that the essence of the Torah is halakhah. This can be seen elsewhere as well, and it is also a straightforward reason (for all the rest does not teach us anything by itself; we project upon it our own ideas and values). How does this square with the picture drawn above? There it seemed that study is not a means to know what to do, so halakhah should not enjoy a special status.
That is a mistake. The principal content of the Torah is halakhah, and halakhah indeed consists of practical directives (what to do). But this does not mean that the goal of study is action. Halakhah should be studied for its intrinsic value, not only to know what to do. In fact, it would be inaccurate to say that halakhah is a mere collection of “what to do.”
Is halakhah a collection of practical directives? R. Yisrael Salanter’s essay
R. Yisrael Salanter, in his Or Yisrael, discusses this point at length. His words appear in the essay “Ḥok u-Mishpat,” in Ketavim of R. Yisrael Salanter, published in the Dorot Library of the Bialik Institute (ed. Mordechai Pachter, p. 160). The essay’s subject is precisely our point: that study is not merely a means to practical observance. I will bring just two gems from it.
The epigraph to the essay is the Gemara in Sanhedrin 71a:
“In accordance with whom is the following teaching? ‘A wayward and rebellious son never was and never will be; and why was it written? Expound and receive reward.’ In accordance with whom? R. Yehudah. Alternatively, it is R. Shimon, as it was taught: R. Shimon said: Because this one ate a tartimar of meat and drank half a log of Italian wine, shall his father and mother bring him out to be stoned? Rather, there never was and never will be; and why was it written? Expound and receive reward. R. Yonatan said: I saw him and sat upon his grave. In accordance with whom is the following teaching? ‘An idolatrous city never was and never will be; and why was it written? Expound and receive reward.’ In accordance with whom? R. Eliezer. As it was taught: R. Eliezer says: Any city that has even one mezuzah cannot be made an idolatrous city… R. Yonatan said: I saw it and sat upon its ruin. In accordance with whom is the following teaching? ‘A leprous house never was and never will be; and why was it written? Expound and receive reward.’ In accordance with whom? R. Elazar b. R. Shimon… R. Eliezer b. R. Tzadok said: There was a place within the boundary of Gaza that they called Ḥorvata Segirta. R. Shimon, a man of Kefar Akko, said: Once I went to the Galilee and I saw a place that they were marking, and they said: “Stones afflicted with leprosy were cleared there.”
Three halakhic topics appear here—wayward son, leprous house, and idolatrous city—none of which ever occurred nor will ever occur (apparently due to conditions the Sages imposed on their implementation). Yet in each case there is also an opinion that it did occur, supported by eyewitness testimony (“I saw it”). It is strange for a tannaitic opinion to flatly deny a reported fact, and this has been discussed.
In any case, RYS challenges the thesis that these laws were written merely so that we “expound and receive reward.” What—without them the Torah would not suffice to occupy us all our lives? Has anyone finished everything, such that only these “extra” non-practical passages keep him busy? What would be lost if these seemingly superfluous, non-practical passages were omitted?
He therefore explains that the Gemara should be understood differently: these passages were written to teach us the principle of “expound and receive reward”—that we do not study merely to know what to do. If study were a means to practical knowledge, then occupying ourselves with these passages would be a waste of Torah time. But they were not written for themselves; they were written to teach that the whole Torah is not only a means to know what to do but has intrinsic value: “Expound and receive reward.”[1]
He adds the Gemara in Nedarim 81a:
“Why is it that Torah scholars are not commonly found to have Torah-scholar sons? R. Yosef said: So that people not say: Torah is their inheritance. R. Sheishet son of R. Idi said: So that they not become haughty over the community. Mar Zutra said: Because they lord over the community. R. Ashi said: Because they call people ‘donkeys.’ Ravina said: Because they do not recite the blessing over the Torah first, as R. Yehudah said in the name of Rav: What is the meaning of the verse ‘Who is the wise man who will understand this?’ This matter was asked of the sages and of the prophets, but they did not explain it, until the Holy One, blessed be He, explained it Himself, as it is written: ‘Because they have forsaken My Torah’—i.e., they did not listen to My voice and did not walk in it. R. Yehudah said in the name of Rav: they did not recite the blessing over the Torah first.”
The conclusion is that they did not recite the blessing over Torah study, and the Gemara regards this as “not listening to God’s voice” and “forsaking His Torah.” RYS wonders: how could people who dedicate their lives and energies to Torah study “cut corners” on the blessing? And why does the Gemara see it as so severe that such a punishment results? He explains that this is not a matter of sloppiness but a principled stance.
The Gemara in Menachot 42b states:
“R. Ḥiyya son of R. Huna sent in the name of R. Yoḥanan: On the arm-tefillin one says, ‘…who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to lay tefillin’; on the head-tefillin one says, ‘…commanded us concerning the commandment of tefillin.’ But to make tefillin one does not recite a blessing. Why? Any commandment whose making completes the commandment—such as circumcision—even though a gentile may do it, the Israelite must recite a blessing. But any commandment whose making does not complete the commandment—such as tefillin—even though a gentile may not make them, an Israelite does not recite a blessing [on the making].”
The Gemara teaches that we do not bless on accessories to a commandment (e.g., making tefillin).
RYS explains that those Torah scholars regarded Torah as a means to know what to do—i.e., as an accessory to the commandments—and therefore did not recite the blessing over Torah. The result (not a punishment) is that their sons did not turn out to be scholars themselves, for a Torah understood as a means and not as an end will not be transmitted to the next generations. People then see no importance in study except to know what to do, so they study the Kitzur Shulḥan Arukh or Mishnah Berurah.
The blessing over Torah for women
And since we are speaking of the blessing over Torah, the Shulḥan Arukh rules at the end of §47:
“Women recite the blessing over the Torah.”
This is surprising, as the commentaries there already note: women are not obligated in the commandment of Torah study, so why should they bless? Their premise is that the blessing over Torah is a commandment-blessing—a matter hotly debated.
The Bi’ur Halakhah there summarizes the later authorities:
“The reason: for they are obligated to learn the laws that apply to them; and further, they must recite the passages of the offerings just as they are obligated in prayer; thus the blessing relates to that (Beit Yosef, Magen Avraham). According to this reason, a woman could discharge a man’s obligation in the blessing over Torah; so writes the Pri Megadim explicitly. The Vilna Gaon, in his commentary, disagrees with this reason, see there. Rather, the reason women may bless is that even though they are exempt from Torah [study], nevertheless they may bless and say ‘…commanded us,’ no worse than any positive time-bound commandment, over which we hold that women may recite a blessing (see §17:2). According to this, they cannot discharge a man’s obligation; and certainly a minor who has reached the age of training cannot discharge an adult in the blessing over Torah, according to the many authorities who hold that the blessing over Torah is biblical; so too writes the Pri Megadim.”
The Magen Avraham holds that they bless because they must learn the laws that apply to them. But this is puzzling: if so, it is incorrect to say that women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study—they are obligated in the laws that apply to them. We are forced to say that study in order to know what to do is not the commandment of Torah study. Women are exempt from the mitzvah of Torah study, but of course they too must learn in order to know what to do. Not for nothing do other later authorities say that women cannot discharge others’ obligation, because they are not truly obligated in the mitzvah, and their blessing is not a normal commandment-blessing (perhaps like women’s blessings on time-bound commandments).
But if we understand that the blessing over Torah is a blessing of praise rather than a commandment-blessing (and that is the straightforward reading; many hold it is biblical), then the question does not arise. Women too must offer praise for the Torah given to us, even if they are not obligated in the commandment of Torah study. This assumes, of course, that Torah study is not just one commandment among the 613; it is far more foundational. Not for nothing did the Sages extol its value as “equal to them all” (Pe’ah 1:1), and greater than many very great things. For that we must praise God with the blessing over Torah—and that obligation applies also to women. According to this, they indeed can discharge all of us with the blessing, since it is not a commandment-blessing and thus not tied to obligation in the mitzvah; see further below.
B. Between Torah Study and the Commandment of Torah Study
The Nedarim sugya: Is Torah study discretionary?
In Nedarim 8a we find:
“Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: From where do we know that one may swear to fulfill a commandment? As it is said (Psalms 119): ‘I have sworn and I will fulfill, to observe Your righteous judgments.’ But is he not already sworn at Sinai? Rather, this teaches that it is permitted for a person to motivate himself. And Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: One who says, ‘I will rise early and study this chapter’ or ‘I will study this tractate’—he has vowed a great vow to the God of Israel. But is he not already sworn and standing, and an oath does not take effect upon another oath! What does this teach? That even mere self-encouragement (is valid)?—that is already Rav Gidel’s first teaching! Rather, this teaches that since, if he wished, he could exempt himself by reciting Shema in the morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect upon him.”
Rav Gidel rules that since one can technically discharge oneself with Shema morning and evening from the commandment of Torah study, therefore an oath to study an additional chapter is a discretionary matter, and the oath takes effect.
The Ran on the page objects:
“‘Since, if he wished, he could exempt himself…’—It seems to me this is not precise, for one is obligated to study constantly, day and night, according to his ability; and we say in Kiddushin 30a: ‘And you shall teach them’—that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, such that if someone asks you, you should not stammer… and Shema morning and evening does not suffice for this. Rather, it seems to me a proof for what I wrote… that anything derived from a derashah, even though it is biblical, since it is not explicitly written in the verse, an oath can take effect upon it. And here this is the meaning: since, if he wished, he could exempt himself with what is written explicitly—“when you lie down and when you rise up,” with Shema morning and evening—therefore the oath takes full effect upon him, even to require a sacrifice, like a discretionary matter…”
That is, in his view there is an obligation (derived by derashah) to study all day and to know all Torah. Therefore, an oath to study an additional chapter is not discretionary; however, since this obligation is from derashah and not explicit, an oath can take effect upon it.
But the anonymous commentator there writes differently:
“‘Since, if he wished, he could exempt himself with Shema morning and evening’—for since he fulfilled ‘this book of the Torah shall not depart’ with Shema, as R. Shimon b. Yoḥai says in Menachot 99b: ‘Whoever recites Shema morning and evening, he has fulfilled “this book of the Torah shall not depart,”’ and since, if he wished, he could exempt himself from ‘and you shall teach them’ with Shema—he has discharged his obligation from that oath of Sinai; therefore, when he says ‘I will study this chapter,’ since he had already exempted himself, the oath takes effect.”
It follows that any study beyond Shema morning and evening is truly discretionary.
So, too, the Rosh on the page:
“This is Rav Gidel’s first teaching—this comes to teach that since, if he wished, he could exempt himself… therefore the oath takes effect upon him, for it is not an obligation but a discretionary good, like a vow to improve one’s lot.”
Here the language is explicit: Torah study beyond morning and evening Shema is indeed discretionary.
This is very difficult—beyond the derashah cited by the Ran. There is an obligation to know the entire Torah (see the essays of Birkas Shmuel, Kiddushin 27, etc.). One cannot arrive at knowledge of Torah via Shema morning and evening. Is it possible that Torah study as a whole is only discretionary? Moreover, the Gemara itself in several places uses the term “bitul Torah” (neglect of Torah). For example, in Berakhot 5a we find:
“Rava (some say Rav Ḥisda) said: If one sees afflictions coming upon him, he should examine his deeds… If he examined and found none, he should attribute them to neglect of Torah, as it is said: ‘Happy is the man whom You chasten, Lord, and out of Your Torah You teach him’ (Psalms 94). And if he attributed and found none, it is known that they are afflictions of love…”
Clearly, there is a demand upon one who did not study; hence it is not merely discretionary.[2]
Explanation: An obligation without a command
It is clear that the obligation to study and to know the whole Torah is a true obligation. But it does not stem from a command. The Torah expects us to study out of understanding what Torah is, not because we were commanded. A command to study Torah would reduce it to a regular commandment. This is akin to what I have written more than once regarding the commandment of repentance and other matters (see, for example, my essay here). Had the Torah commanded us to study, we would do so as “commanded and performing,” like any other commandment. The Torah chooses not to command, so as to leave this obligation great and foundational, rather than count it among the 613. Rav Kook writes something similar in his letters about the absence of an explicit obligation to work on one’s character traits (see my essay cited above).
Consequences of this distinction can be seen in my essay on sevarot (where the analysis of the Menachot sugya to be presented momentarily also appears). For example, this obligation devolves upon anyone who understands its significance; there are no formal exemptions as we find in other parts of halakhah—no exemption for minors, for women, for Israelites versus converts, and perhaps even not for a gentile. We shall return to this below.
The Menachot sugya
In Menachot 99b there is a sugya whose subtext, in my view, revolves entirely around this point:
“R. Ami said: From the words of R. Yose we learn: Even if a person learned only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled [the verse], ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth’ (Joshua 1:8). R. Yoḥanan said in the name of R. Shimon b. Yoḥai: Even if a person read only Shema morning and evening—he has fulfilled ‘shall not depart.’”
It seems like a contest of who can minimize the commandment of Torah study more: R. Ami suffices with a chapter morning and evening, while R. Yoḥanan raises him: since we recite Shema anyway morning and evening, there is no need to add another chapter. Shema itself discharges one’s obligation even in the commandment of Torah study. If R. Ami minimizes the commandment to a bare minimum, R. Yoḥanan empties it of content entirely.
No wonder the Gemara now brings a dispute:
“This matter should not be said before ignoramuses.” But Rava said: “It is a mitzvah to say it before ignoramuses.”
If truly there is no obligation to study beyond this, what is the problem with saying it before the ignoramus? At worst, he will not study—but from that perspective there is no problem. We are forced to say that even if there is no commandment to study, there is the problem of bitul Torah—that is, there is an obligation without a command.
What lies at the heart of the dispute about whether to say this before ignoramuses? It appears they disagree whether the fact that one can discharge himself with a chapter morning and evening means that the value of study is small, or that its value is so great that we were therefore not commanded. R. Yoḥanan holds: do not say it before the ignoramus, for he will not understand and will think he is exempt—an ignoramus is one who thinks that only what is commanded must be done. Rava holds: it is a mitzvah to say it before the ignoramus, for this will demonstrate to him how weighty and foundational study is, and will spur him to study—something a formal command might not accomplish.
Immediately thereafter the Gemara brings an episode:
“Ben Dama, the nephew of R. Yishmael, asked R. Yishmael: Someone like me, who has learned the entire Torah—may I study Greek wisdom?”
A student once asked me: if he knows the entire Torah, how does he not know this question? My answer: he knows everything the Torah commands—all the formal Torah and halakhah. There is nothing more for him to learn from the sources in that sense. But this question is not about a formal obligation, for as we saw, there is no such halakhic command. The question addresses the obligation beyond the formal: Ben Dama asks whether, since there is no formal command, there is also no obligation to study. It is not part of the formal halakhah, which he already knows in full.
His uncle, R. Yishmael, answered him:
“He recited about him this verse: ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate upon it day and night’—go and find a time that is neither of the day nor of the night, and then learn Greek wisdom.”
If you can find a time that is neither day nor night—you may neglect Torah then. In our terms: although there is no command, you are certainly not permitted to desist from study day and night. This is not a formal halakhic obligation but a meta-halakhic one. The commentators in Nedarim do not cite “shall not depart,” for it is a promise, not a command. R. Yishmael answers Ben Dama with a response beyond the formal obligation.
Now the Gemara brings an opposing view:
“And this disagrees with R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani…”
This is astonishing. If we seek someone who disagrees with R. Yishmael, we have them at the beginning of the sugya: two amoraim (R. Ami and R. Yoḥanan), and even a tanna (R. Shimon). Why does the Gemara seek out someone else? Evidently, R. Yoḥanan, R. Ami, and R. Shimon do not disagree with him. All agree there is an obligation but no command. They defined the command, and then R. Yishmael adds that despite that there is still an obligation—just as we saw in Nedarim. Only R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani truly disagrees with R. Yishmael and his colleagues.
How so? Note how the Gemara presents his words:
“R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani said in the name of R. Yonatan: This verse is neither an obligation nor a command, but a blessing. The Holy One, blessed be He, saw that Torah was exceedingly beloved to Joshua, as it is said (Exodus 33): ‘His attendant Joshua son of Nun, a lad, would not depart from the tent.’ He said to him: ‘Joshua, are the words of Torah so beloved to you? This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth…’”
We should note his phrasing: “neither obligation nor command, but a blessing.” What is the difference between an obligation and a command? It seems that “obligation” here means a formal halakhic command, whereas “command” means a non-formal obligation (one might reverse the terms, but beyond terminology this is the idea). We saw that R. Yishmael holds it is a “command” but not an “obligation” (in the Gemara’s idiom: a non-formal obligation). It is no surprise that R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani—and he alone—disagrees, saying it is neither obligation nor command, but a blessing (a benediction/promise). And indeed the verse “shall not depart” is a promise; all may agree to that. But from this promise we learn the value of Torah study, and it becomes clear that there is an obligation even without a command.
To cap it off, the Gemara brings this baraita:
“The school of R. Yishmael taught: Words of Torah should not be upon you as a burden, yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.”
Note that the speaker is none other than R. Yishmael. He means: there is no formal obligation (and in that R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani is correct), but you are not permitted to exempt yourself (as Ben Dama thought). This is precisely the appropriate summation of the sugya. Incidentally, even R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani—who apparently disputes my conception—may accept it; he merely argues that it is not taught by this verse.
The contradiction to the Berakhot sugya
Several later authorities raised a direct contradiction between the sugya in Menachot and the sugya in Berakhot 35b (see, e.g., the appendix to R. Yehuda Levi’s article, HaMa’ayan, Tevet 5737):
“Our Rabbis taught: ‘And you shall gather your grain’—what does this teach? Since it is said (Joshua 1): ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,’ one might think [to take] the words literally. Therefore it says: ‘And you shall gather your grain’—conduct yourself with them in the way of the world—these are the words of R. Yishmael. R. Shimon b. Yoḥai says: Is it possible that a man plows in the plowing season, sows in the sowing season, harvests in the harvest season, threshes in the threshing season, and winnows in the windy season—what will become of the Torah? Rather, when Israel do the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by others… and when Israel do not do His will, their work is done by themselves… Abaye said: Many acted like R. Yishmael and succeeded; [those who acted] like R. Shimon b. Yoḥai did not succeed.”
R. Shimon, who holds that Shema morning and evening suffices, here does not compromise and demands constant, total study. And R. Yishmael, who there demands “day and night,” here reveals a rather liberal stance and permits involvement in other matters. This is a double, head-on contradiction—a “role reversal”—and it is no wonder many later authorities grapple with it.
But those later authorities overlook the words of the earlier ones we saw in Nedarim and the upshot of the Talmud’s flow in Menachot. On our approach, there is no contradiction. There is no fundamental dispute between R. Shimon and R. Yishmael; both agree that the commandment of Torah study is minimal, but the obligation is comprehensive. The debate in Berakhot is a secondary, downstream question: once we understand all this, may one go out to work, or should the non-formal obligation even preclude that? The tannaim disagree about this, but that does not touch the basic parameters of the commandment of Torah study.
In practice, the discussion is not about the parameters of the commandment of Torah study, but about Torah study itself. The commandment is fulfilled with Shema morning and evening, but the obligation—or “Torah study” plainly, not the commandment—is in force at every moment. This does not mean one may not engage in anything else, as R. Yishmael teaches. There are legitimate pursuits, and regarding them there is room for discussion (enjoyment, art, hobbies, livelihood, etc.—this is the question of leisure; see here), but in the background there is a sweeping obligation that every free moment should be filled with: Torah study.
C. Conclusion: The Connection Between the Two Notes, and Back to Women
What the conclusion about “study for its own sake” concerns
The conclusion that Torah should be studied for its own sake—not for any other purpose (including practical observance)—applies primarily to Torah study, not to the commandment of Torah study. One discharges one’s duty in the commandment morning and evening, and there it is clear that this is not study aimed at knowledge or observance. To know and to observe, one must study the whole Torah. But even there, study is not a mere accessory to a commandment; it is an act of intrinsic value. Even the study that does advance halakhic knowledge should be done for its own sake, not as a mere means to know what to do. As we saw, study in order to know what to do is not the commandment of Torah study but an accessory to the commandments. The commandment of Torah study proves this: there it is plainly about engagement itself (contact with Torah), not practical knowledge—hence Shema morning and evening suffices. And from the commandment of Torah study we learn about Torah study itself.
Conclusions regarding women’s Torah study and the blessing over Torah
In my essay on women’s obligation in Torah study I presented this analysis and concluded that although women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, they are obligated in Torah study. I argued there that any non-formal obligation admits of no formal exemptions: an obligation grounded in reasoned understanding of the importance of the matter binds anyone who understands it—women and even minors (!)—not in the commandment of Torah study, but in Torah study. I wrote similarly regarding minors’ obligations in commandments that are grounded in reason (see my essay on sevarot).
Note the implication: contrary to common belief, women are obligated to study—day and night, analytically—all areas of Torah, exactly as men are. In contrast to what might be implied by the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah cited above, it is precisely in the theoretical component that they are obligated. In the practical component—where study is a means to know what to do—there is an obligation only regarding the commandments that pertain to them. The exemption of women from the commandment of Torah study is perhaps a declaration, but it carries little practical significance (they would not need to recite Shema morning and evening, at least as a matter of the commandment of Torah study). But in Torah study they are fully obligated, and this pertains not only to commandments in which women are included, but to the entire Torah in all its parts.
Now you can understand why it is no wonder that women are obligated in the blessing over Torah. We saw this is a blessing of praise, not a commandment-blessing. Therefore, even if women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study and a commandment-blessing would not apply, Torah study itself applies to them just as to men; hence it is no surprise they must recite the blessing of praise for the Torah given to all of us. According to this, they can also discharge anyone else with the blessing.
[1] There is room to analyze how “three verses coming as one” can teach (and this is not the place).
[2] Specifically in that context one could interpret “bitul Torah” as neglect of fulfilling the commandments of the Torah; but the term certainly also refers to neglect of study.
Good luck!
I would be very happy to hear your response regarding a few matters that bother me a little in this context –
1 – Torah study is a noble and important value. In light of this, isn’t it our duty to define what is included in that study? You mentioned this in passing when you wrote about studying the Iyun, but can anything found in the “books” really be called “Torah” just because the Sages or the Rishonim or Aharonim discussed it?
Are civil laws, as they seemed logical to the Sages, really “the word of God,” whose study perhaps exempts the learner from his civil duties and from fulfilling other commandments? Tractate Shlomo – Ketubot – can be interpreted as a technical attempt by Chazal to make it “not easy for him to get it out”. The same applies to all sorts of other subjects in the law of the law. It is true that there are things that Chazal left to the king’s judgment, but are all of Chazal’s opinions regarding property laws and leases, etc., in fact, arrangements that are necessary for every society, really considered sacred?
And what about all sorts of legends about which it is not certain that we must accept the Maharal of Prague’s approach regarding their depth?
And so on and so forth.
2 – The article focused on the articles of Chazal and the first and last men on the subject of Talmud Torah. Don't you feel that the Sages have pretty much forced their interpretation into sources that don't really seem to refer to the obligation to study Torah all the time? I'm referring here to verses like "And you shall memorize them for your children" (which refers to "these things which I command you today in the Beit Midrash" - not to every explanation that comes up in the Book of Leviticus), "If you follow my laws, you shall walk in them" (the literal meaning is of course not related to labor in the Torah), and "And you shall meditate on it day and night" (a command to Joshua with a specific purpose later in the verse).
Especially in light of the fact that opinions are so divided about the nature of studying Torah - as is also expressed in the article - can we really say that this is a clear divine command?
Thank you very much, Shabbat Shalom and Happy Holidays
1. I have dealt with the definition of the areas of Talmud Torah in great detail in the second book of my trilogy. Including the Bible and legends (which in my opinion are not included in the Torah, and at most in the Gebra, if at all. In my opinion, we learn nothing from them and I doubt whether those who say so intended to teach anything beyond the vortis that are heard today in synagogues and mitzvah feasts).
Here I will comment a little on your questions. When it comes to the laws of the Torah, the interpretive explanations of the sages also fall within the scope of Talmud Torah, like yours and mine. This is the study of the halacha given at Sinai. However, the explanations of the sages of the Talmud were accepted as halacha. This does not mean that they are more sacred than your explanations, but rather that they are binding on halacha.
I really think that studying the details of the scope of rabbinical halacha is the study of halacha but not the study of Torah in the sense that I have defined here.
2. One of our problems with the halachic sermons of the sages (as opposed to the aggadot), is that we do not understand the methods of the sermon and we also do not know which of their conclusions are the product of tradition and which the sermon merely relies on. Therefore, the assumption is that we rely on what they said, as long as we do not have clear indications that they were wrong.
What about general principles that are not interpretations, such as the discussion of whether or not there is a choice when and why? Is this a study of the halacha given at Sinai? Do these explanations stem from a specific interpretation of the entirety of the halacha given at Sinai? Suppose someone says that there is a choice, what would make him think that there is no other than an explicit verse that dealt with the law of choice. If there is no such commandment, then it is apparent that this thought of his is independent of the halacha given at Sinai.
These principles are also an interpretation of the Torah. They do not arise from it but rather from an explanation, but they are interpretive tools for the Torah.
The term interpretation is vague. I asked from a certain angle, does this principle depend on any concrete content that was stated at Sinai. The Torah said that a divorce should be written for her and a donation should be set aside, so-and-so came and said that in all matters there is a choice. Now I ask, if the command was to summon the defendant in a lawsuit written in his name or to set aside 4% of the peaches and feed them to nursing camels, then that so-and-so also had the opinion that there was a choice.
If I understand correctly, you are saying that it is possible that in every matter and that thing he says there is a choice and his opinion is indeed independent of any concrete content given at Sinai and yet this is an “interpretation” of the Torah and there is a point in engaging with this principle for his name. I do not understand that.
As long as you are engaged in the interpretation of the mitzvot and the laws, it is Torah study. Your interpretation also includes your principles and insights, and that is part of the interpretation. So also the principles of Chazal, such as choice, and of course also those that have not been ruled upon by law (such as choice in the Torah). The authority only concerns the question of what of what you are learning is law, but the very definition of study has no bearing on this.
So yes, you understood correctly, and it seems very simple and logical to me.
In the Bible, the importance of learning, which shapes the student's faith and values, and connects his intellectual and emotional world with the wisdom and will of God and the depth of the wisdom of the sages of the generations, is twofold.
In addition to the fact that learning is an "action" in itself, since learning the Torah is one of the commandments, learning the Torah has an "added value" in that it is a foundation stone that leads the student to meticulous observance of the commandments, both in the practical aspect, since without knowledge of the Torah it is impossible to observe the commandments as they are without error, but more than that, the in-depth learning, which reveals to a person the depths of learning and thought in the Torah, in its entirety and in its details, – There is no one like him to inspire the learner to fulfill the will of his Creator with excellence.
And it is not without reason that we ask in the Torah blessing ‘And please intertwine the words of Your Torah in our mouths and in the mouths of our descendants and the descendants of Your people, the House of Israel. The sense of assurance in learning – is the great guarantee that our learning will lead to action.
In the blessing of receiving the Torah with joy, Hanoch the humble Feinschmecker-Palty
It is therefore understandable that the content of learning that inspires action is different from learning to learn. There are those for whom the study of the Bible inspires them to action, and there are those for whom the Bible, the legend, Hasidism and thought, and clear and concise laws – will inspire them to increase love, fear, and be meticulous in their actions. It is appropriate for each one to examine what learning enlivens them, and not torture their soul with learning that is ‘considered’ And a prestigious one whose soul finds no taste or interest in it.
Halacha is the main content of the Torah. Therefore, the main study is the study of Halacha. What is it if not the study of knowing what to do? In other words, what is the value of learning what to do if you don't do it?
My feeling is that you wrote in a negative way (study is not knowing what to do, Halacha is not a collection of instructions, etc.), and it should have been in a positive way (so what is the purpose of study? To know what? If Halacha is not a collection of instructions, what is it??)
I dedicated an entire section to this. Halacha is practical instructions, but studying them is not intended to know what to do but to cling to the will of God. Of course, after learning, one must also practice.
Does this mean that "studying Torah" applies even without the giving of the Torah?
The giving of the Torah created the normative sphere, but before that, God's will had already appeared in one form or another (for example, in His speaking to our forefather Abraham), and if studying Torah is a study that He wanted to adhere to, then even before the giving of the Torah it is also true to say that people would have studied Torah, right? Or, in other words, if we go further, is there really no connection between studying Torah and the holiday of Shavuot?
I don't think so. Torah is the will of God expressed in a commandment. The rest is at most the word of God and not the will of God (in the terminology of the Rakhi).
I think the difficulty raised by EA is real and I do not see a satisfactory answer in your answer.
In principle, the position you express in this column is that God's will, expressed in the Talmud Torah, precedes the divine command expressed in the Torah itself. However, here you introduce the opposite idea (hence the paradox): in order to anchor the priority of the divine will to the command, you rely on the Torah itself, that is, you rely on the command in the Torah. This creates a kind of logical loop.
You may try to defend yourself by claiming that you infer the priority of the divine will from your reasoning, and not from the Torah itself. You have tried to do this many times in the past. But such a defense, in order to succeed, must show that the Torah at least allows for such a move. I do not think this is the case.
As my predecessor hinted: in the giving of the Torah, we were given a super-norm – to see in the Torah itself (i.e. in the ”command”) the source of all norms whatsoever. Therefore, I argue that your proposal to prioritize the divine will over the divine command directly contradicts the central tenet of the Torah.
I didn't understand the difficulty. Of course, the commitment to the will of God is not because of the Torah, since the commitment to the Torah itself stems from it. But God, in His own will, told us that His will appears in two forms: in a previous explanation or revelation, and in what appears in the Torah as a command (which is Halacha). What did I miss here?
I do not disagree with you on the assertion that the obligation to the will of God is not because of the Torah. I argue that it is the Torah that disagrees with you, especially if we interpret the “Torah” as you do, that is, we place the commandments (halakhah) at the center.
If at the center of the Torah is a normative “commandment” claim (as opposed to, for example, claims of fact), which tells us that studying Torah is the main thing, then from this logically follows a simple thing: the commandment precedes the will of God. This is a paradox and EA has already hinted at it before. Note that there is no compromise here: the claim regarding the commandment nature of the Torah is a categorical claim.
In a sidebar, I will mention that Leibowitz perfectly identified this paradox, although he placed it in a slightly different arena (the relationship of the written Torah with the Toshhab). Leibowitz's mistake was (and you and I actually agreed on this in the past) that he thought he had solved it because it exists in the religious sphere. This is, of course, nonsense.
Can I have a Hebrew translation? Even with a microscope, I don't see a question here, nor a connection between the premise and the conclusion. Honestly, the words don't connect to me.
I am not surprised.
1. Do you understand that I agree with you that God's will precedes the Torah or the commandment or even the law?
2. Do you understand that a body of knowledge that is essentially normative (commandment) cannot make factual claims about the world? For example, it cannot claim that there is a God, that there was a Mount Sinai situation, where the Torah was given to us, and so on. All of these are factual claims, and even though the Torah does in fact claim them according to your interpretation, it cannot do so…. Therefore, I say that there is a contradiction between your position and the position of the Torah.
3 A person like you who has dealt a lot with the naturalistic fallacy should not have had a problem understanding my words. I am not saying agree or accept… just understand.
Maybe EA does understand and will help me..
Translated into Turkish (sorry, Turkish. They changed the name)? Still not a single word connects to its predecessor for me. God's will precedes Torah and Halacha. A body of knowledge can certainly make claims about the world (for example, a body of scientific knowledge). A normative body does not make claims about the world, with which I completely agree of course. So far everything is correct. Where is the contradiction here? I am really at a loss. I don't understand a single word.
Did they change it to Turkish? You've updated me.
You characterized the Torah first and foremost as a normative body – “halakha”, “mitzvot” etc. So even according to your words, it claims nothing about the world.
I would offer you a historical comparison to another religious text, competing and explaining to you by way of contrast why the logical problem I point out in the Torah does not exist there. In my opinion, there is great didactic value to this comparison. But I will not do so because in my experience with you it greatly clouds your spirit… I don't want to burden you.
https://travel.walla.co.il/item/3480835
I'm convinced about the Turkish one. You still haven't responded about the rest.
I would appreciate your response... If we have already both agreed that a normative body of knowledge (laws, halacha) "does not make claims about this world", and if you have already said that the essence of the Torah is its normative nature (because in your opinion it is essentially halacha), how can you still claim that according to the Torah itself, God's will precedes the divine command?
I would be really happy to answer if I understood the question. You keep repeating a collection of words that sound like nonsense to me. I can't understand, and I really tried.
There are two simple points you are making here;
1. The Torah is essentially a normative body of knowledge (because it is essentially Halakha)
2. A normative body of knowledge does not allow for factual claims (“information”) about the world, but only imperatives.
Have I described your position fairly?
I will answer for you: You will probably say that in my last response I described your position fairly and accurately.
Then I will argue: Given that the essence of the Torah is imperative (=normative), the most important theological principle from its perspective is that God's imperatives must precede His will.
The problem: This principle is inconsistent with your position (and my position) according to which the will precedes the imperative.
I would also appreciate responses from other readers (who at least understand my argument, even if they disagree).
About right. Just a small correction: a normative body of knowledge does not contain factual claims (nor does it allow them).
But your question is beyond me. I don't understand it.
You agree with me on almost everything, but then comes a “small correction” and somewhat destroys what you say. According to your correction, a normative body of knowledge just does not (in practice) contain facts, and not as I said when I categorically stated that it cannot even contain facts.
That is, according to your theory, there are possible worlds in which normative bodies of knowledge do contain facts… If this is your claim, then it is meaningless and in any case my original claim does not need any “correction”.
Now let's return to the body of knowledge called the Torah (Pentecost). According to its own theory, it cannot contain any information and certainly does not distinguish between the imperative-normative function of which it is composed and the “will of God”. Its basic logical structure forbids this (because again: it is a purely normative body of knowledge that cannot give us anything other than “guidelines”).
If anyone finds “divine will” in the Torah, it is only because he borrows the concept from his intellect and imposes it on the text. This is the essence of my argument.
I am a rabbi for well-known reasons. The phrase “does not allow” is very imprecise and vague, so I corrected it.
The Pentateuch contains a great deal of factual information. About creation, the exodus from Egypt, the existence of God, the fact that He commanded us, that He wants things from us, and so on. Halacha is a body of normative nature, but not the Torah.
Indeed, the Halacha does not tell us any fact, not even that God wants or commanded something. This is an assumption that is based on the Halacha and not halakhic content. But the Torah certainly tells us that He wants and that He commands, and a lot of other factual information (that there was a man named Abraham, Sarah, Moses, and so on, and that such and such actions and various events were committed).
This babbling resembles, in my opinion, someone who makes it difficult to understand how morality assumes the existence of moral commands (not their validity, but their very existence). And concludes from this that they must be kept even though they have no validity.
First, I don't see anything “vague” in the phrase “does not allow”. There is a logical obstacle here: there are no possible worlds in which normative statements suddenly miraculously become information carriers. Clear and simple. If you know of such worlds, I would be happy for you to tell me about them. That would be a very interesting innovation…
Secondly, your claim that the Torah carries information is not in dispute and is irrelevant to this discussion. My claim was that even if in practice the Torah distinguishes between facts and norms (and therefore carries information), then in its own view its essence is in the very abolition of this distinction. “do and hear”. In other words: the Torah is caught in a paradox in which it itself violates the overarching principle it advocates (the centrality of the normative sphere).
If you don't see this, it's only because you refuse to take seriously the idea that a text should testify to itself that it is primarily a normative (halakhah) character. What can we do, that's what this specific text does, and in my opinion, an interpretation that ignores this is inconsistent and does not describe the fundamental trend that is found in it.
PS
I have been arguing for many years that in this respect there is nothing special in the Torah. This paradox that I described is found in every position or “philosophy” that turns its back on metaphysical dualism, on the intuitive capacity of man, etc. I could give many examples of this, but I don't want to be exhaustive.
In conclusion, I have often suggested that you make a comparison with your favorite criticism group. There are other religious bodies of knowledge in human history whose basic logical structure is constructed differently. This comparison has great didactic value in my opinion, and therefore I highly recommend it to shed light on our topic. On the other hand, the last time I brought up the subject of the New Testament and Christianity, you reacted so emotionally that I started to worry about you?
Maybe it's worth re-reading the quote from the urgent one that you put at the top of your website as a motto.
The stage has come (as expected) where we part as friends. All the best.
There's nothing new or surprising in this either. All the best.
1 Regarding the people of the land – It is unlikely that the people of the land would make such a complex argument, that if the obligation is only to recite the Shema, then it is simply that Torah study is too important to be commanded. It is much more likely that the question of whether it is worth being wicked in itself (a debate that is heard a lot in our generation in the Haredi world, whether someone who earns a living is a “type B”. It is possible that even within the Tannaite ba'i midrash, where there was hostility or disdain between the sages and the people of the lands, there was such a “kinship” motivation)
2 Regarding Torah study for women – The presentation of things is as if the reasonable person is engaged in the existence of da'vey and rabbi all the time, and women in general. It is more likely that the command was given to men with the intention that they would be the ones to engage in all parts of the Torah intensively, while women are not required to do so, only allowed to do so
3 It seems that my two questions stem from a dispute over a fundamental concept – Is it indeed logical to assume that Torah study is an “obligation without a mitzvah”, or is the intuitive and simple assumption more correct, according to which Torah study is a mitzvah as a kind of permission, like giving charity, which a person will fulfill according to his ability (a definition that the Rambam uses in similar contexts) but there is no need to strive for the unattainable goal of knowing the entire Torah – but only to be committed to fulfilling this mitzvah as much as possible.
4 Are the words of the soul of the living written at the beginning of the column taken as an axiom on which the entire column is built? The book was not delivered from Sinai
1. When you say this to the people of the land, you also explain the basis to them.
2. I brought my evidence and arguments. If it is not reasonable in your opinion, then no.
3. I did not understand what a mitzvah is like a permission. An existential mitzvah? The Rabbi at the beginning of his commentary on the Safra writes that women trust a permission that is reprehensible to the one. That is, an existential act is also reprehensible to the one, and it is likely that in his opinion an oath does not apply to him either.
4. Illustration.
What is the point of studying something specific that has *only* formal authority? (Or the element of substantive authority within it is highly questionable). Formal authority is directed toward action and it does not seem reasonable to study its contents for its own sake. Or is it?
I wrote above in the reply that the rabbinical laws do not include Torah study in the sense I am talking about here, but rather are merely a means of knowing what to do. But in the laws of the Torah, one can study any interpretation, authoritative or not, and this is an engagement in Torah and therefore is Torah study. Therefore, even studying the opinions that are rejected from the law is Torah study in every sense. The difference between studying the interpretation of a Rabbi and my interpretation is only with regard to knowing what to do (because he has formal authority).
Would you not change the study for its own sake, i.e. the directions of thought and the scope of engagement with a particular subject and what kind of reasoning to develop to the end and examine its subtleties and in which directions (as opposed to your conclusion), if there was no formal authority in the world at all, neither for the Gemara nor for the Rishonim? Why study mainly the Gemara and not the Avni Nezer answers or the Mishnah for its own sake?
I don't think so. It's just a question of efficiency. If you're already studying Torah, it makes sense to focus on sources that have been ruled on by halakhah because it also yields you halakhic knowledge beyond Torah. But in terms of the actual study, it doesn't matter at all.
This is a bit surprising, because there seems to be a common practice among the poskim to rule as follows: "From the Dashkil and the New Gemara Aliviah." It seems that they thought that the Amoraim had no reason to discuss a rejected system (unless it sheds light on the established system) from the "Talmud Torah." Is this also due to considerations of efficiency? (Efficiency of the discussion in the Amoraim's court, or at least the efficiency of introducing the matters into the Gemara)
This is truly puzzling. There are several explicit examples of issues that discuss an opinion that is not halakhic.
This claim must be distinguished from a ruling that simply states that an issue is of the same opinion, which is logical.
Perhaps discussing the opinion that is not in accordance with the law contributes to understanding the opinion that is in accordance with the law? If you have a reference available for such an issue, I will try to get an impression of the matter.
I think this is always true. When there is a disagreement, clarifying one opinion helps to understand the other.
On the issue of non-work, opinions are divided as much as those of the halakhic scholars (even the Rambam is not entirely clear whether he ruled in my favor). In Pek Dvitsa, from the very beginning, there have been quite a few discussions of the opinion of the B.S. on various issues.
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Brings Tosafot Sukkah 9 that there is a discussion that helps clarify the dispute and there is an internal discussion within the system. And it seems that in an internal discussion within a system that is rejected from the Halacha (formal authority!) one wonders “Tema deploni ata lashmuainan”. That is, as a rule, what is rejected from the Halacha is rejected from learning but as a means.
Perhaps the question is what area of authority is covered only by formality without substantive. If the area is small, that is, the substantive area is large, then it turns out and pays to nail the substantive authority with formal authority (and as a rule of thumb, there is no point in discussing rejection from the Halacha, because there is an error there. And the Gemara is more “Torah” from Jerusalem and Mishnah and Avni Nezer). And if the area is large, then creaks begin (like the voices raised in the conservative columns of the Midrashiya).
In the second half of the twentieth century, the author of the post, who claims to be a modernist, is aware of the importance of knowing the "reasons of Torah", the spiritual and ethical world of the shapers of halachic literature, the sages and the first and last generations, and assumes that changes in reality require changes in halachic law. After all, it is impossible to propose divisions between the days of the sages and our days unless we are aware of the depth of the reasons for the laws.
Therefore, the author of the post who claims to be modernizing the laws, as he excludes the "completeness of Torah" from the category The Bible, the literature of Midrash and Aggadah, and the literature of thought and philosophy of the sages of the generations, first and last. Without deep knowledge in / Torah flavors’ = How can we understand with understanding the essence and flavors of Halacha?
With greetings, Elisaf Gershon Brotzky (Bar-Tsnak9
Rabbi Michi,
It is interesting to note the words of the rabbi in his novella Ha-Ha Therefore, this is not a law that pertains to the mitzvah at all, only the Torah itself requires a blessing, and women are exempt only from the mitzvah of the Torah, but they are not deprived of the very desire for the Torah, and their learning is in general the Torah, and it is good for them to bless their learning, since they are not subject to this by force of the mitzvah of the Torah at all.
And regarding the form of study, let us examine the introduction to the Shul, Teshuvot and HaNagaot Ch. 1:
And behold, when we examine a certain halakha, we begin with the root, namely the Shas, from which our early rabbis drew, and when the early rabbis connect it to the Gemara, the matters become truly illuminating. And from this we understand the rulings of the latter, to divide what they intended in their words, and when their rulings are valid, and it is obligatory upon everyone to know that there are no such divisions as these: there are two Torahs, the Torah of learning and the Torah of teaching, only learning is related to teaching and teaching to learning, and therefore God loves The verses that are mentioned in the halakha (Berachot HaShanah) and we were actually as explained in the Maharash there, and the intention seems to be to study Shas and Rishonim in such a way that we can learn halakha from them, and not those that tie up the meaning of the meaning to make reasons, and there are no explanations worthy of instruction from them, which do not have a solid foundation to the point that it is appropriate to determine halakha from them, which is the will of God.
Of course, I brought these things not because your words need external support, but as additional interesting sources that are also consistent with your words.
Chen Chen.
Indeed, the things are ancient and there are other methods and discussions about this. Among other things, his student in Emek Bracha also discussed this.
There is an error in the designation within the soul of the living. The Gemara is Nedarim Sab, not Nedarim Na.
thanks
Apart from studying Torah day and night, you claim that there is no mitzvah to study Torah.
You write: “It is clear that the obligation to study and know all of Torah is a complete obligation. However, it is not the result of a commandment. The Torah expects us to study by virtue of understanding what Torah is and not because of a commandment. A commandment to study Torah would dwarf it into a regular mitzvah. This is similar to what I have written more than once about the mitzvah of repentance and more (see, for example, my article here). If the Torah were to command us to study Torah, we would do it as mitzvahs and do it, like any other mitzvah. The Torah chooses not to command us in order to keep this obligation great and fundamental and not to include it as one of the 333. This is what the Rabbis wrote in his letters regarding the lack of an obligation to work on the virtues (see my article above).”
So my question is, what is the understanding by virtue of which we would want to study Torah even if we were not commanded to do so? Why is it important to study Torah if it is not a mitzvah?
On the 17th of Sivan, 2nd of June
Lyon – Shalom Rav,
The words of Ramada”a that there is a commandment only to ‘meditate on it day and night’ are puzzling. After all, in the Torah we are commanded ‘and you shall memorize it for your children’ and Chazal demanded ‘that the words of the Torah be memorized by you’ from which we learn the duty of a person to know the Torah clearly, so that he can pass it on.
With blessings, Hanoch Hanach Feinschmecker-Palti
It should be noted that this has no parallel in other religions, none of which have a religious obligation to study and know their holy scriptures, whose knowledge is only incumbent on the priests of the religion. Only in Judaism is there a thing called "and all your children will be taught by God."
Shchel, this is exactly the comment of the Rabbi in the vows. Your complaint is not about me (which in itself has no substance, since this is not a positive boundary of the mitzvot of the Torah, as the Rabbi himself writes. And the other commentators there write that it is the word of the authority and that is how the issue is explained there, and it is against them that he commented).
The Rabbi writes (Bada Ha Kamel Dai Bei Pater Nafshia):
It seems to me that he is not necessarily a pater, since every person is obliged to study constantly day and night according to his ability, and we say in the Book of Dekidushin (page 31): “Recite and memorize them, so that the words of Torah may be sharp in your mouth, so that if a person asks you something, do not stammer and tell him, etc.; and in the morning and evening, you are not able to do it.”
Rather, this seems to me to be evidence for what I wrote in the chapter on Shavuot Two Days in Tara, that everything from my hand to my study, even though it is from the Torah, is clearly stated in the reading of the Hadith, and an oath applies to him. And here is the most important: Since the soul is exempt from what is written in the text of the Hadith, namely, “when you lie down and when you rise” in the morning and evening prayers – because the oath is completely upon it..’.
This means: According to the Rabbi, a person is obligated by the Torah to know the Torah clearly, but since this obligation comes from the Midrash of the Sages and is not explicitly stated in the text – an oath is imposed on him.
With blessings, Hav”sh
There was a place to say differently, ’and you have memorized – that is, you have memorized the Torah – that is, you have memorized it in your mouth’ does not require knowing the entire Torah, but that what you learn – It should be clearly known that the obligation is on quality and not necessarily on quantity, and as Gershon Meladi wrote in his halakhah of 5222;t, that it is better to learn a little that will be retained in memory than to learn a lot and forget.
Gershon also distinguishes between those who are able to learn and know the entire Torah, who are obligated to study day and night according to their ability, but those who cannot achieve this are obligated by the principle of the law only by setting times for Torah, and therefore it should be said that it is said of such a person: “Damtzi petr nafshia in the morning and evening.”
Well, and therefore the question is why is this not included in the commandment from the Torah itself but from the Midrash? Because even in his opinion the commandment to study Torah does not include this. It is a different obligation. And according to the Rosh and the commentator there, there is no such obligation at all in the Halacha but outside the Halacha (or perhaps an existential mitzvah).
In the words of the Rabbi, it is explained that what I have said in the sermon is from the Torah, but one does not swear and stand by anything except what is explicitly stated in the Scripture.
Also, what the commentator and the chief Rabbi spoke about was about the authority, that is, about studying this chapter. At this time, the Torah does not require this, and certainly not at the level of a "sworn and standing" mitzvah, since the nature of the mitzvah of learning Torah is that it be done with desire and love, and therefore one must study in a place one desires, and precisely with a rabbi who is suitable for him (whose "Meglin" rabbi is with him), and therefore there are periods in a person's life when he is given to "mindful of small things"; and there are days when "eliminating it is his existence"; and there are situations of "restraint from his study", in which one needs to "reduce pressure" a little so as not to lose the desire completely.
The mitzvah to know all of Torah is a calling "greater than life", about which it is said ‘It is not your job to finish’ and on the other hand ‘You are not free to abandon it’. A mitzvah that is a lifelong calling – requires that it be done with desire and purpose, and this requires flexibility and consideration for the ups and downs of mental strength, and therefore flexibility in conduct is an essential part of fulfilling the mitzvah effectively.
With blessings, Hanoch Hanach Feinschmecker-Palti
Sure, but it's still a different charge.
In the 15th of Sivan, 5th of B.C.
However, the enumerators of the mitzvot, Rambam in Acts 11 and Hinukh 19, defined the mitzvah as “to study Torah and to learn.” And both quote the sermon of Chazal, “And you have memorized it.” They are sharpened in your mouth. And in Hinukh he explains: “A mitzvah is to study the wisdom of the Torah and to learn it,” meaning how to do the mitzvot and guard against what we have been prevented from. This means that this is the main boundary of the Talmud Torah mitzvah, and not some extra-halakhic obligation..
With blessings, Eliam Fishel Werkheimer
In general, it should be noted that “and meditate on it day and night” is stated in the Book of Joshua, and it seems more like a positive mitzvah from the words of Kabbalah, and not the main mitzvah from the Torah. It should also be noted that the language of the Rambam regarding “the one who says ‘bite and repeat’” is “isn’t it like a vow?” And isn’t it a complete vow from the Torah? And so on.
The language of the Maimonides (Halem Nedarim 1:29): “He who says, ‘We will take and renew,’ is like a vow.” It can perhaps be understood that the obligation is because there was a promise here towards the community. However, according to the version before us in the Gemara, ‘We will take and renew,’ the obligation is towards Heaven.
With blessings, Apoor
The Maimonides used the language, ‘It is like a vow,’ also in chapter 2 regarding the unbeliever, but there the Maimonides interpreted it as ‘However, it is not a vow.’ And here Maimonides does not say “although it is not a vow,” but rather “although he did not utter a vow,” and apparently he means that he judged it as if it were a literal vow. And chap.
I wanted to make it harder for you to argue that the study that some of the sages forbade women from is the limited obligation that applies to men every day, for fear of incomprehensible prayer in such a situation (it is unlikely that reciting the Shema would cause particularly great harm). I later saw that you answered this in your article on the obligation of women to study Torah (you linked to it in this article) in a good way. I refer those troubled by the question there.
You rule out the possibility that the purpose of study is the act, since this purpose makes study a mere kosher mitzvah.
One could suggest another:
A legal principle says that ignorance of the law does not exempt from punishment. Despite this, many citizens are not found in the Book of Laws, apparently out of an intuition that most of their actions do not conflict with the law. Similarly, it can be argued that the mitzvah of studying Torah was intended to obligate study even for those who feel this way about certain mitzvahs in the Torah. Such a mitzvah can stem from a lack of trust in people's self-motivation or from a concern for the preservation of tradition, especially for mitzvot that are not found and are prone to being forgotten. But this is only the essence of the mitzvah; in practice, the mitzvah is obligatory and is not just a voluntary act aimed at serving another mitzvah - a kosher mitzvah.
I don't understand. Is this a mitzvah device or a mitzvah?
Continuing my previous response:
This is a mitzvah, not a mitzvah instrument. A bit like testing for leaven, which is a mitzvah in itself, even though its purpose is to assist in the mitzvah of the Sabbath. The purpose of the study is something that pertains to the mitzvahs and therefore has no practical implications in determining the study as kosher for the mitzvah.
So this is a much simpler argument. You claim that I demand a reason to read. My argument is that it is a fence, not a reason.
So, why is testing for chametz not a kosher mitzvah?
You sought to rule out the possibility that the purpose of the mitzvah of studying Torah is the fulfillment of the mitzvahs. My argument was that such a purpose does not necessarily make the study an instrument, since it can be said that this purpose is only a reason for reading and not a limitation (although you can argue that it is a limitation, but to rule out the second possibility completely you need a reason).
I understand. But it is unlikely that Talmud Torah is just a tool, even if it is just a matter of taste. A tool is not equal to everyone. Beyond that, there is my other evidence.
This is apparently true. But since we are dealing with the meaning of the mitzvah and not its scope, we are not subject to the conclusions of the sages and are allowed to disagree with them (there is no ruling on what to think). Although there are clear voices among the sages who see Torah study as a value in itself (‘against all’), it is difficult to find such a direction in the Bible. It seems that there the meaning of the mitzvah of study is as a tool for action, as in Joshua 1:8: “This book of the Torah should not depart from your mouth, but you should meditate on it day and night, so that you may be careful to do everything written in it. For then you will make your way successful, and then you will have wisdom”.
Well, if you offer a different view from the Sages of the commandment to study Torah, then fine. I spoke within the framework of the Sages. Surely you can't explain Rabbi Ovadia and others like that.
I'll just mention that I spoke about the scope of the mitzvah and not just its reason, and in this the Sages have authority.
I agree. I would like to point out that I see this as an example of how it is possible to learn new things from the Bible, since a priori I do not see a decision in one direction and the Bible dispels doubt.
Absolutely not. This is far from dispelling doubt. Just a suggestion, one of several. Beyond that, of course, laws are learned from the Bible. I'm talking about values and beliefs (beyond the trivial, God, creation, etc.).
I don't know how long you want to debate this. In short, I would say that, in my understanding, the Sages enhanced the significance of Torah study beyond what it is in the Bible. Alongside this, they have halachic authority and they chose to define Torah study as a mitzvah and not as an instrument. Therefore, drawing conclusions from the Bible has a non-trivial meaning (he takes from the Sages' understanding) in the realm of beliefs and not in the realm of laws (which excludes the authority of the Sages), even though this meaning deals with laws (because it deals only with the conceptual realm of laws). Even if you disagree with me, you must agree that theoretically a person who holds to my assumptions will draw non-trivial conclusions from the Bible. Which means that learning from the Bible is possible.
It is clear that if you adopt enough assumptions, you can learn many insights from the Bible and also from Copico (to distinguish between them). My argument is that this does not happen. It simply does not happen that assumptions are made that lead you to conclusions that you do not hold in advance.
I don't think I make more assumptions than you do, they are simply different assumptions (regarding the interpretation of the Bible, probably, although I don't know what exactly prevents you from accepting my interpretation). I am convinced that many of my readers also hold similar views because they are common. However, it seems that these assumptions are not enough to learn anything from Kopi Kopi (if only for the simple reason that Kopi Kopi is not trustworthy to me as a description of reality and therefore I will only accept things from him if I believed them before. On the other hand, the Bible is trustworthy to me as an interpreter of the reasons for the commandments, and therefore I accept from him this interpretation of the commandment to study Torah, although without him I would certainly have relied on the tradition of the sages regarding the reasons for the commandment).
From the understanding of what Torah is, and that it is an expression of the will of God, the Almighty, and the way to adhere to Him and His will.
I can ask you again: Why is it important to keep what He has commanded? Because it is His will. That is also His will.
How do your words that there is an obligation for women to study Torah align with what the Sages said: “Anyone who teaches his wife Torah is like someone who teaches prayer”? And also the Maimonides, who ruled that initially a woman should not teach her husband Torah, etc.?
I guess they appreciated that women in their time weren't the most beautiful.
On the 1st of Elul, 3rd of July
Lana – Shalom Rav,
Throughout the generations there were women who studied Torah and the sages of their generation treated them with respect. The author of the ’Prisha’ (Yo”d Remo) explained that the command of the sages not to teach his ‘daughter’ meant that when a child is young and does not know the seriousness of her intention, but when one knows that her intention is serious – one can teach her. Additional reasons and much material on the subject, in Dr. Yael Levin's article, "Rabbi Yitzhak Nissim's Response on Women and Talmud Torah", Akademut 13 (on the website "Beit Morasha").
With regards, Fishel
The words of R’ Eliezer, “as if she taught prayer,” were interpreted by Rashi as a concern for forbidden relationships with men. The Rambam explained that the concern was a distorted understanding of the words of the Torah, “since most women do not have a mind directed toward learning.” The expression “a mind directed” was also stated by the Rambam in the laws of prayer, meaning that someone whose mind is not directed is exempt from prayer, and it is proven that “a mind directed” means “the ability to concentrate.” On the surface, it seems that in our generations, women’s ability to “pay attention and concentrate” in learning has increased.
Best regards, Fish”l
It should be noted that the Rambam wrote at the end of Chapter 4 of the Fundamentals of the Torah that the things he explained in those chapters are a "big deal," but the explanation of the Torah commandments, knowing what is permissible and what is forbidden, are things that anyone can understand, "great or small, man or woman, with a broad mind and a narrow heart." This means that the work "Mishnah Torah" is also intended for women.
With greetings, Fishel
A- And do we fulfill the mitzvah even without uttering it, such as not uttering the words when learning a gam’ or other
B- What is the reason that the Torah condemns and punishes in your opinion, I want to say that you are examining according to empirical tests, as you said regarding prayer that it does not work because in Nachshon Waxman it did not work.
C- What is the logic of a person studying science (for fun or to enrich knowledge or just any other purpose), if every moment he loses the mitzvah of learning, is it not worth not overcoming this desire like any other desire, and calculating the reward of a mitzvah against the loss?
A – Why not? He studied then he fulfilled the mitzvah.
B – The interpretation is probably an incentive to study Torah. In practice I do not believe this, at least today (when God is not involved).
C- The poskim have already extended this by saying that the mitzvah of studying Torah is when you can. Other pursuits are legitimate in a reasonable amount, and in the rest, try to study as much as you can. But beyond that, scientific studies have value in their own right (what I called ‘Torah in the gabra’).
I forgot
D- And so what is this “And you shall keep and do it, for it is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the peoples who shall hear all these laws and say, "Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people." How exactly do the Gentiles see the wisdom of the Torah? It seems that the wisdom of the Gentiles and their inventions and their wise men are a little more?
Some have interpreted this as referring to the beginning of the year and the sanctification of the month, and this is wisdom that everyone recognizes. But beyond that, I do not accept Maimonides' claim that the commandments are the wisdom that everyone will see. Perhaps the result of engaging in Torah and commandments is that the Jewish people are wise, and everyone notices this even today.
A- So if I understand from what you say, even in the study of sciences (even before the entire Torah is finished) the mitzvah of studying Torah is fulfilled? Look, I'm building on that in the world, I'm currently (more accurately up until now) at a level that worries about the reward of the world.
B- Your interpretation, Gabi, is that it is your wisdom and understanding, it is puzzling and why haven't you seen Avigdor Amitai's article "The Average Time of Birth and Its Origins Over the Generations", which was not related to the Jews as people think, I don't know how to upload it here but this is his email, Mada.Hazal@Gmail.com. He happily sends it, as well as the rest of the article. Interesting,
And also what you wrote “Perhaps the result of engaging in Torah and mitzvot is that the Jewish people are wise and everyone notices this even today”, but unfortunately all those whom the world recognizes for their wisdom and knowledge and who have indeed contributed to wisdom and science are those who do not observe Torah and mitzvot.
So it is not clear what wisdom is, in the meantime I see not only gentiles, but also secular people laughing at the Torah, like in your debate with Yaron Yadan?
A- Search here for Torah in Gebra and Haftza.
B- I didn't see it.
No connection. The wisdom of Jews is probably a result of their general culture.
B- Here I have attached the article for you here that shows that the wisdom of the embryo is not our wisdom
https://daf-yomi.com/Data/UploadedFiles/DY_Item/31693-sFile.pdf
https://daf-yomi.com/Data/UploadedFiles/DY_Item/39443-sFile.pdf
I did not understand your answer “no connection”, the Torah writes and you have kept and done it because it is your wisdom and your understanding in the eyes of the peoples who will hear all these laws and say, "Only a wise and understanding people is the great nation" This means she is talking about the wisdom of the Torah and not about “general culture”
Rabbi, did you get to go over this a little bit?
So anyway, for our purposes, then, what is it that you have observed and done, because it is your wisdom and understanding?
What is it that you have heard of these laws and said, "Only a wise and prudent people will hear them."
Absolutely not. And it won't come out either.
I answered. Repeating the same question over and over again is the troll.
Forgive me
But you answered that it does not speak of the wisdom of the Torah
And I emphasized to you again in my question
That the verse explicitly does speak of the wisdom of the Torah as it is written “And you kept and did it because it is your wisdom and understanding” It is explicit because it is precise,
And it is explicit that because of “And you kept and did it” we were again on the wisdom of the Torah.
And yes, if you thought that the wisdom of the Ivor is indeed related to us, then you should read this short Konte’ by Rabbi Avigdor