Two Notes on Concepts of Sanctity (Column 472)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
This column is dedicated to my new, sweet, and beloved grandson, Gal Moshe (Bisli) Levanon.
I trust his parents will raise him with a balanced attitude between the sacred and the mundane.
This Shabbat in synagogue I spoke about Parashat Kedoshim, finding ourselves, of course, between Holocaust Remembrance Day and the Memorial and Independence Days. For quite some time I have felt that these days see a cheapening of the concept of sanctity, through its overly casual use. From the irritating and baseless talk about the “martyrs of the Holocaust” and “IDF martyrs,” and about the “sanctification of God’s name” by terror victims (I have dealt with all these sensitive topics elsewhere, so I would ask that protests and discussion of them be moved to those places), to the “sanctity” of the State, the Jewish person, redemption, and the like. Parashat Kedoshim is therefore a good time to touch a bit on the concept of sanctity.
I will do so here via two claims that build on one another: 1) The concept of sanctity is limited and does not even coincide with mitzvot and divine service in general, and certainly has no connection to the neutral realm of the mundane. 2) It is important to maintain this distinction, and blurring it comes with heavy costs and harms.
Parashat Kedoshim and an imperialistic use of the concept of sanctity
At the start of Parashat Kedoshim we read:
“The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the entire congregation of the children of Israel and say to them: ‘You shall be holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy.’”
Within the parashah appear dozens of mitzvot of every kind, and in its penultimate verse we read:
“And you shall be holy to Me, for I, the Lord, am holy; and I have set you apart from the nations to be Mine.”
This framing could hint that all the content included in the parashah belongs to sanctity. Among other things, we find there commands regarding reverence for parents; prohibitions of idolatry and of remnant offerings; all the commandments of gifts to the poor; theft, robbery, denial and oppression; the wages of a hired worker; placing a stumbling block before the blind; not cursing; not perverting justice; a set of commandments about our conduct toward others (love, not hating, not shaming, rebuke, not taking revenge or bearing a grudge, and more); forbidden mixtures in animals and plants; and much more. It is a very diverse collection of mitzvot and it is hard to see a common denominator. Hence one often hears various preachers explain to us that the concept of sanctity spans all realms of existence, and that even prosaic matters such as interpersonal relationships, fair commerce, and the like, belong to the world of sanctity.
Chassidut went further, extending the concept of sanctity beyond the world of mitzvot even to the “filthy alleys” (in the Lithuanian phrase from R. Chaim of Volozhin’s school), i.e., to the mundane realm. Thus arose the slogan of “sanctifying the material,” so beloved by our religious-Zionist cousins who, as is known, are a contemporary branch of Chassidut (in the last generation this has also surfaced openly through the study of Chassidut that has become so popular in our circles). Us Litvaks, like me, oppose this imperialism, and in our view sanctity belongs in the world of halakhah and mitzvot. The “filthy alleys” were created here so that we would distance ourselves from them, not so that we would sanctify them. I think Rabbi Neria was careful not to equate the domains fully when he wrote in his well-known song for Bnei Akiva: “Sanctify your life with Torah and purify it with work.” Torah belongs to the world of sanctity, but work—even if an ideal for him—belongs to the world of purity (that is, mundane life conducted in the spirit of the sacred).
The idea of sanctifying the mundane spreads in religious Zionism beyond the private mundane sphere to the realm of peoplehood and state. What was seen as the mundane realm (even somewhat base—politics, heaven forfend) has become the Holy of Holies. The State is sacred and its institutions are the Holy of Holies; I won’t repeat the grotesque claim that IDF uniforms are like the vestments of the High Priest (especially the navy, of course—“At all times let your garments be white, and let your head never lack oil”). Everything connected with the State—such as soldiers who gave their lives for it—is naturally sacred (the “sanctity of remembrance”). Flags enter the synagogue (my flesh crawls when I see this chilling fascism), and the Flag March, largely a nationalistic romp of enthusiastic youth, is also made a focus of divine service.
At first glance, the structure of Parashat Kedoshim supports this imperialistic use: it seems that mitzvot of every sort are our path to sanctifying the mundane and the material.
What is sanctity: a halakhic view
But unlike Chassidut and “machshavah” literature—which generally do not exhibit caution and precision in concepts, for they subordinate sources and terms to their desired ends (and hence time spent on them is usually wasted)—halakhah views the concept of sanctity in a more precise and “lean” way. The domains of permitted-forbidden and pure-impure do not coincide with the domain of sacred-mundane. In fact, halakhically, almost all of the forbidden-permitted realm belongs to the mundane. Sanctity is bounded to the world of the Temple and its sancta, and perhaps a few additional subjects such as kiddushin (see Kiddushin 7a: “the foot of this one ascends,” Tosafot s.v. “Chatsyaikh” on 7b; and at length in Kuntrasei Shiurim by Rav Gustman, Kiddushin, shiur 1).[1]
An illustration of this halakhic distinction can be found in the Gemara (Megillah 26b), which distinguishes between “implements of a mitzvah” and “implements of sanctity” with respect to the laws of genizah (storing sacred items):
“Our Rabbis taught: Implements of a mitzvah are discarded; implements of sanctity are placed in genizah. These are implements of a mitzvah: a sukkah, lulav, shofar, and tzitzit. These are implements of sanctity: cases for books, tefillin and mezuzot, a Torah mantle, and a tefillin case and its straps.”
A detailed discussion then begins about exactly where the boundary runs between sanctity and mitzvah (see also Menachot 35b). Halakhah is careful to keep “sanctity” a distinct category from “mitzvah.” One may not mix them; hence we treat sacred objects differently from objects of a mitzvah. Mitzvot as such do not belong to the world of sanctity.
An illustration from the “placenta” sugya
Another instructive example of the difference between these domains appears in Tosafot s.v. “Ein miktzat sheliya” (Bava Kamma 11a). The Gemara there discusses the impurity status of a woman who has given birth, distinguishing between a case of doubt whether a fetus emerged and a case of a double doubt:
“Ulla said in the name of R. Elazar: If part of a placenta emerged on the first day and part on the second, we count for her from the first day. Rava said to him: What are you thinking—to be stringent? That is a stringency that leads to leniency, for you thereby render her pure from the first day. Rather, Rava said: With regard to concern, we are concerned; with regard to counting, we do not count except from the second day. What is this teaching us—that there is no partial placenta without a fetus? But we have learned: A placenta some of which emerged makes [the animal] forbidden to eat.”
A woman who gives birth becomes impure for seven days (for a male) or fourteen days (for a female) from the time the fetus emerges. If a placenta comes out with a stillborn, she is also impure from the day on which most of the fetus emerged. What if part of the placenta came out on day A and part on day B? Do we count the days of impurity from day A or only from day B? The Gemara concludes that there is a doubt here, and therefore one must be stringent in both directions: begin counting on day A and end the count on day B. What is the doubt? Whether the portion of placenta that emerged contained most of the fetus or not. If it was only a minority, impurity would not begin that day.
The Gemara ties this to the question whether there is no partial placenta without a fetus; in other words, even if part of a placenta emerges, it is certain there was a fetus, and the only doubt is how much of the fetus (most or minority). But if there could be a partial placenta with no fetus at all, then we would have a double doubt: perhaps nothing of the fetus came out, and even if something did, perhaps it was only a minority. The difference between the view that there is no partial placenta without a fetus and the view that there is, is whether we have a single doubt or a double doubt.
Tosafot infer this from the Gemara and pose a difficulty:
“If you say that according to R. Elazar we are concerned because there is no partial placenta without a fetus, then if there were a case of partial placenta without a fetus she would not be concerned—what is the case? If it occurred in the public domain—even with a single doubt we treat as pure. And if in the private domain—even with a double doubt it is impure, for we learned: ‘All doubts [of impurity] that you can multiply, in the private domain—even a double doubt is impure’ (per Taharot 6:4)!”
Tosafot remind us that the Mishnah in Taharot (6:4) sets special rules for doubts of impurity that differ from ordinary halakhic doubts. A Torah-level doubt (de’oraita) is generally treated stringently, but a double doubt is treated leniently. In impurity, however, the distinction is not between single and double doubt but between where the doubt arose: if it arose in the public domain (reshut ha-rabim), we are lenient even with a single doubt; in the private domain (reshut ha-yachid), we are stringent even with a double doubt. In light of this, Tosafot ask: how can our sugya distinguish between a single doubt and a double doubt (hence the need to posit that there is no partial placenta without a fetus)? If this happened in the public domain, she should count only from the second day whether or not there can be a partial placenta without a fetus; and if it happened in the private domain, she should count from day A—again regardless of that question.
Tosafot answer:
“It may be said that our passage concerns forbidding her to her husband.”
Their claim is that the discussion here concerns only her prohibition to her husband, not her state of impurity. Therefore the rules in play are those of issur-doubt, not impurity-doubt.
From Tosafot it follows that with respect to impurity, if this occurred in the private domain we would be stringent in both scenarios; it would turn out that the woman is indeed impure, yet (on the assumption that a partial placenta can occur without a fetus) permitted to her husband. And if it occurred in the public domain, it would turn out that she is forbidden to her husband but not impure (on the assumption that there is no partial placenta without a fetus). Later authorities have already noted that Tosafot say something quite novel here: the prohibition of a woman who has given birth to her husband is not necessarily tied to her state of impurity.
Some later authorities raise a powerful objection: the whole rule about impurity doubts in public vs. private domain is learned from the case of a sotah (suspected adulteress): if there is a doubt and she secluded herself (in private) we are stringent; if not (in public) we are lenient. But there, too, the matter is her prohibition to her husband; by Tosafot’s logic, the rules of issur-doubt should apply there, not impurity-doubt. How, then, can we learn from sotah the rules for impurity doubts in public/private? Alternatively, if we indeed learn impurity doubt from sotah, then one cannot say that in the case of a woman’s prohibition to her husband the impurity-doubt rules do not apply, as Tosafot claim here.
In Nefesh Yehonatan on Parashat Chukat, the editor (Rabbi Yaakov Orner, “Tziyyon lenefesh,” §5), who is the nephew of the Avnei Nezer, brings in the name of his revered grandfather an answer to this objection:
“I heard from my holy master, our teacher and my revered grandfather, the gaon and saint, the illustrious rav of Sochatchov, an explanation of Tosafot based on the Kuzari (III:49): impurity exists only where there is sanctity—such as with sacrificial matters, terumah and tithes—whereas niddah vis-à-vis her husband is ‘mundane,’ as is said in Hullin 31a. Thus what the Torah forbade—a niddah to her husband—is not due to impurity but a simple prohibition. These are Tosafot’s words: that doubt regarding a niddah’s prohibition to her husband is judged by the rules of issur-doubt, not impurity-doubt. And that which we derive—impurity doubt in the public domain—from sotah, though her husband is ‘mundane’; how can that be impurity? The meaning of ‘her husband is mundane’ is only with regard to the law of niddah, for the prohibition is not because of kiddushin (marriage), since even with an unmarried woman there is karet; thus the niddah-prohibition is unrelated to kiddushin but to intercourse, and therefore her husband is indeed ‘mundane’. But sotah—whose prohibition is only to her husband, to whom she is consecrated, and kiddushin is a language of consecration (hekdesh) that renders her forbidden to the world like a korban; and the Gemara asks whether kiddushin spread everywhere as with a korban—since the sotah-prohibition flows from sanctity, it is rightly treated as impurity, which applies in a place of sanctity per the Kuzari. Therefore in sotah, a doubt in the public domain is treated as a simple doubt [with its rules], not as an issur-doubt. See also Tosafot in Yevamot that returning one’s divorcee after she married another is a prohibition of ‘the remnant of his flesh,’ since the prohibition stems from the first kiddushin; therefore it is rightly impurity doubt and not issur-doubt, unlike niddah where the prohibition does not stem from kiddushin but is a plain issur.”
His claim is that impurity pertains only where there is sanctity (he cites the Kuzari III:49). Why in fact are impurity-doubt rules learned from sotah? The source is the verse (Numbers 5:12): “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: If any man’s wife goes astray and acts unfaithfully against him.” Violation of the marital bond is described as “me’ilah” (misappropriation of the sacred), i.e., an injury to sanctity. Hence, too, the term kiddushin used to describe the bond between husband and wife; above I cited several sources on this. A woman who strays injures the sanctified marital bond with her husband; she has committed me’ilah, and therefore the prohibition she transgressed is of the type called “impurity.” Injury to sanctity is impurity. This is why we can learn from sotah the rules about impurity doubts in the public vs. private domain.
But the prohibition of a woman who has given birth is like that of a niddah. In such a case the woman is forbidden to the entire world, not specifically to her husband. Of course the prohibition is relevant to her husband, but it is not an injury to the marital bond between them (unlike sotah). Therefore the prohibition of a woman who has given birth, though accompanied by impurity, is not adjudicated as impurity but as an ordinary prohibition. Hence the relevant doubt-rules are those of issur, which distinguish between a single doubt and a double doubt. Her impurity status, naturally, will be judged by impurity-doubt rules; but as Tosafot wrote, here the discussion concerns the prohibition, not the impurity.
Interim summary
We have seen that the common identification between the world of sanctity and the world of mitzvot and divine service is mistaken. Sanctity is a small sub-domain within the halakhic and religious world, chiefly concerning the sanctity of the Temple and its holy things, the ten degrees of sanctity in Mishnah Kelim, and, in a certain sense, the kiddushin between spouses. Beyond the domain of sanctity lies the realm of the mundane, and the vast majority of halakhic commandments and prohibitions belong there. Sometimes sanctity-impurity appear alongside halakhic prohibition-permission (as with a woman who has given birth), yet it remains important to distinguish between them.
The mundane realm stretches between the world of sanctity and its antithesis—the world of impurity. It is governed by rules different from those of sanctity and impurity (for example, the laws of doubt). Needless to say, the mundane is not identical to “permitted discretion.” Halakhah and morality have much to say about the mundane realm. There is permitted and forbidden there, and the Torah and God care very much how it is conducted. But this is not sanctity or impurity; it is something we may call “mundane conducted in the spirit of the sacred.” Mundane life not conducted in that spirit is forbidden (halakhically or morally), but not “impure.”
The picture that emerges now comprises five domains: sanctity — mundane in the spirit of the sacred (mitzvah) — value-neutral mundane (permission) — mundane not in the spirit of the sacred (prohibition) — impurity. This structure parallels the five categories of speech that appear in the Commentary to the Mishnah by Maimonides on Avot 1:16:
“I say that speech, according to the obligation of our Torah, divides into five parts: commanded, forbidden, repugnant, beloved, and permitted.”
Around neutral speech (permission) there is speech that is fitting and unfitting, and around those, permitted and forbidden speech. I would add, around the latter, two further categories of sacred and mundane speech.[2]
One might think this is merely a semantic distinction. What does it matter whether we call it “mundane in the spirit of the sacred” or “sacred”? Why is it important to distinguish between mitzvot and transgressions in the mundane realm and sanctity and impurity? Moreover, we can find not a few metaphorical uses of sanctity-terms that refer to the mundane. Mitzvot “increase sanctity” (see Rambam’s Sefer Ha-Mitzvot, principle 4, and Ramban’s comments there; and commentators at the beginning of Parashat Kedoshim). This is not an invention of Chassidim or sermonizers; it occurs in the Torah and in the Sages. Nevertheless, it remains important to distinguish between metaphorical usage and the original meaning of sanctity-terms as defined by halakhah. The metaphor arises because even within mitzvot there is some manifestation of sanctity. The ten degrees of sanctity in Mishnah Kelim differ due to the degree of the Shechinah’s revelation in those places. So, too, with realms other than physical space (geography): the degree of God’s presence and connection determines the level of sanctity in the matter. In the Temple and the sacred realm it is more manifest, and that is what is halakhically defined as sanctity. In mitzvot within the mundane, it is more indirect and therefore does not merit the label “sanctity” except in a borrowed sense. But the categorical distinction between domains tells us that although the difference seems merely quantitative, it is significant and must not be blurred.
This brings me to the second remark, the next step in the argument. I now wish to contend not only that identifying mitzvah with sanctity is an error, but that it is a harmful and very dangerous error. Equating mitzvah with sanctity, and transgression with impurity, in effect erases the world of the mundane—and such erasure is dangerous and must be resisted. We must not allow the extremes to take over the mundane, neither the extreme of impurity nor that of sanctity.
The importance of demarcating sanctity and the mundane
I discussed this at length in my essay on sacred and profane on Chanukah (and in general), so I will not elaborate here. On the verse “The scepter shall not depart from Judah,” Ramban writes there as follows:
“This was the punishment of the Hasmoneans who reigned in the Second Temple, for they were exceedingly pious, and if not for them the Torah and mitzvot would have been forgotten from Israel; nonetheless they were punished greatly, for the four sons of the elder Hasmonean, pious men who reigned one after another, despite all their might and success fell by the sword into the hands of their enemies. The punishment reached its end in what our Sages said: ‘Whoever says, “I am from the house of the Hasmoneans,” is a slave’ (Bava Batra 3b)—they were all cut off for this sin. Although there was punishment in Shimon’s seed because of the Sadducees, all the seed of Mattathias the righteous were cut off only because they reigned though they were not of the seed of Judah and the house of David, and they entirely removed the scepter and the lawgiver, and their punishment was measure for measure, for the Holy One, blessed be He, set their slaves to rule over them and they destroyed them.”
“It is also possible that there was in their kingship a sin because they were priests and were commanded: ‘You shall keep your priesthood with regard to everything of the altar and of what is within the curtain; I give your priesthood as a service of gift’ (Numbers 18:7), and they should not have reigned, only served the service of the Lord.”
Ramban explains why the Hasmoneans were entirely wiped out despite giving their lives to sanctify God’s name and keep His commandments. He argues that this was because they appointed themselves kings even though they were priests. He then cites a dispute in the Jerusalem Talmud:
“I saw in the Jerusalem Talmud (Horayot 3:2 [15b]) that priests are not anointed as kings. R. Yehuda Antoria said: because of ‘The scepter shall not depart from Judah’ (Genesis 49:10). R. Ḥiyya bar Abba said: because of ‘so that he and his sons may prolong [their days] upon his kingship in Israel’ (Deuteronomy 17:20), and what is written afterward? ‘There shall be no portion for the priests the Levites’ (18:1). They taught here that we do not anoint kings from the priests, the sons of Aaron. First he explained it as an honor to Judah, that the authority not depart from that tribe; therefore, although Israel may establish a king from other tribes as needed for the time, we do not anoint them, so that they not possess the splendor of kingship, but be like judges and officers. And they mentioned the priests, that although they themselves are fit for anointing, we do not anoint them for kingship—and all the more so, other tribes; as the [Bavli] says (Horayot 11b), we anoint only kings of the house of David. And R. Ḥiyya bar Abba explained that it is a Torah prohibition that the priests, the Levites—indeed the entire tribe of Levi—not have a share and inheritance in kingship. And this is right and proper.”
R. Yehuda Antoria holds that kings must be of the house of David, so a king from the tribe of Levi is inappropriate. R. Ḥiyya bar Abba holds there is a special problem when priests become kings; Ramban himself inclines to this latter view.
In my essay I showed that, in the picture painted by Chazal, the Greeks operated with a consistent program of subjecting the sacred to the mundane. This is called “defiling the sacred.” The Hasmoneans, by contrast, acted with the opposite program: to subject the mundane to the sacred. Against the Greek thesis had to arise the Hasmonean antithesis to defeat them. As part of the Hasmonean stance, they appointed priests to be kings; and this, I argue, was not merely lust for power but part of their ideology (see more examples in my essay). Their aim was to manage even the mundane by means of sanctity. Kingship, too—which manages the life of the mundane—should be conducted by the priest.
But the bottom line is that the Hasmoneans’ program was itself also unacceptable. Moreover, it was so severe that God decided to eradicate them from the earth on its account, despite all their merits. As long as the war against the Greeks continued, this was the right program, for the Greeks had tilted the balance too far toward the mundane, and an antithesis had to come to return the scales to the middle. The punishment was imposed because they continued this program even after victory over the Greeks—i.e., because for them it was an ideology and not merely a means to defeat the Greeks. It is such a dangerous program that God decides to eradicate it with a strong hand.
The conclusion from Ramban is far-reaching: secularization/profanation of the sacred is dangerous and must be fought. But sanctifying the mundane is also dangerous and must also be fought strongly. The slogans I mentioned above about sanctifying the material and the mundane must be spoken and implemented with great care and balance. There is certainly a place to conduct the mundane in the spirit of the sacred, but not to turn the mundane itself into sanctity. If the king consults the priest, excellent. If the priest himself is the king, that is a very dangerous mixing of domains. On the level of terminology as well, it is desirable and proper to conduct the mundane according to the guidance of halakhah and mitzvot (and if sanctity-terms are used, it is important to stress that this is metaphorical usage), but not to view them as the domain of sanctity.
The problem
Here the difficulty I mentioned above reemerges: why is this so dangerous? Isn’t it merely semantic? It turns out that the domain of the sacred tends to appear differently than other domains—even those that belong to the moral sphere and to divine service (ethics and/or halakhah). Ecstasy, intensity, zealotry, an unwillingness to compromise or hear other views—these are all hallmarks of the sacred. In the sacred, everything appears in heightened intensities, and in the sacred there are no compromises. God’s response is accordingly: Nadav and Avihu, who erred slightly upon entering the sacred, were immediately struck dead. The response is horrific because the danger is so great. When ecstasy is high, dangerous steps are taken and grave mistakes are made (see Column 312, and the entire series there beginning with Column 311). The mundane must be conducted more sanely and in more balanced fashion than the sacred.
The implications for extending sanctity-terms to bereavement, the Holocaust, the State and its institutions are self-evident; I have addressed them more than once. Canonizing a state and a flag—paradigmatic mundane items—leads to fascism. Religious Zionism continues here the Chassidic approach (“contraction not in its plain sense”) that sees every expansion of existence as an expression of sanctity, and centers our lives around sanctifying the mundane—that is, extracting sparks of sanctity that the mundane hides. But those sparks are hidden there for a reason. God chooses to limit His manifestation to certain domains, and contrary to the Chassidic ethos, expanding it to other domains is not desirable; it is a grave and harmful mistake.
A state is a tool. It is a clear national interest and a wholly legitimate desire of a people to manage its life. But the State is mundane. There are mitzvot and moral and halakhic guidelines that must be considered in governing a state, but it is not right to make it sacred. The Chief Rabbi (even if someone worthy and a reasonable institution stood behind him) should not run the state, but at most advise “its heads, ministers, and counselors” (see my remarks on the model of the Council of Torah Sages in Column 217). That was precisely the Hasmoneans’ mistake, for which they were punished.
Seeing the State as sacred is dangerous fascism. The flag’s place (if one insists on ascribing meaning to that piece of cloth) is at Independence Day ceremonies, but not in the synagogue (see in Column 388 my remark about the flag dance). Likewise, canonizing “martyrs,” and certainly those who are not martyrs (see Column 215), brings severe moral confusion. Everyone who suffers becomes “holy”; suffering itself becomes a sanctified value. Life loses its intrinsic worth and meaning and becomes instrumental. This also leads to silencing and an inability and unwillingness to be open to criticism. Thus, when a bereaved family speaks on some matter, everyone is supposed to be silent and agree—and of course there is an obligation to publicize it (see for example here and here). The aura of sanctity hovers over them because they gave what is most precious “for the sanctification of God’s name.” See here for a paradigmatic example of tying bereavement to Judaism (via the attitude toward the State) and the distortions this produces. There is certainly room for gratitude for the sacrifice made on behalf of us all, and of course it is important to show sensitivity to the pain and bereavement. But the status given to such voices in the public discourse is, in my view, vastly exaggerated.
In short, in the domain of the sacred one treads on tiptoe and with sensitivity—and I, who am not inclined to tiptoeing (neither psychologically nor ideologically), think it is important to narrow that domain as much as possible. “Innovate only what must be innovated; add not to it.”
[1] See also the Gemara’s wording (Kiddushin 2b): “He renders her prohibited to everyone like consecrated property,” and Tosafot s.v. “De’asar,” there.
[2] These can be linked to things said only in the holy tongue, listed in the Mishnah at the start of Sotah ch. 7. These are generally utterances meant to constitute something (performative speech), not to communicate with someone or convey/express information (communication can be done in any language as long as the meaning is preserved).
“Holiness is a small subfield within the halakhic and spiritual world, and its main concern is the holiness of the sanctuary and its holy places, the ten holy places in the Mishnah of Kelim, and in a certain sense also in the sanctification between spouses.”
But the Sabbath was also called holy (a holy day shall be for you)
and the feasts (these holy days are my feasts)
and the commandment of redemption of the firstborn (all the firstborn shall be holy to me)
and the commandment of the Jubilee (the Jubilee shall be holy to you)
and the prohibitions of the Nazirite (it shall be holy)
and the prohibitions of eating (and you shall be holy men to me, and you shall not eat any meat that is devoured in the field)
and on and on
Indeed. That is why I mentioned the borrowed uses of sanctity, in the Bible and in the Sages. But from the perspective of Halacha, Shabbat does not have the meaning of sanctity in the sense of the Haftza. There is an obligation to sanctify it upon entering and leaving, but this is not sanctity in the Haftza. As I explained, it is a difference in dosage, but nevertheless this standard is very important.
The Sabbath is the sanctuary of time, and therefore whoever defiles it will be put to death (from Rabbi Yoel ben Nun).
Nice. I'll have something to say at the upcoming Sheva Brachot (if I don't manage to prepare something). I understand that my father and mother are also saints, since anyone who strikes them deserves death.
Sorry, but the verses are quite explicit:
12 And the LORD said to Moses, "Say to the children of Israel, 'You shall keep my Sabbaths, for they are between me and you throughout your generations, that you may know that I am the LORD who sanctifies you.'" And ye shall keep the sabbath: for it is holy unto you: whosoever doeth any work therein, that soul shall be cut off from among his people. Six days shall work be done: but the seventh day is the sabbath of rest, a holy sabbath unto the LORD: whosoever doeth any work in the sabbath day shall be put to death. 16 And the children of Israel shall keep the Sabbath, to observe the Sabbath throughout their generations, a perpetual covenant. 17 Between me and the children of Israel it is forever, for in six days the LORD made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he rested.
The Sabbath is defined as holy, and this has halachic implications. Not only is it a death sentence for those who desecrate it, but also the postponement of the construction of the Temple, which is forbidden on the Sabbath, the failure to put on tefillin on the Sabbath, and more. The verse also explains why the Sabbath is holy because it is a sign that the Lord sanctifies us. There is no such barrier with the father and mother. Whoever strikes his father and mother deserves death, but not because they are defined as sacred.
I didn't understand what this message added. I spoke in the column and on Talkbacks about borrowed usage in both the Bible and the Sages. As an indication, I asked above whether a Kiddush cup (in which the day is sanctified) is subject to Genizah as a sacred object or is it a mitzvah object?
All the implications you brought at the end are in no way related to the sacredness of Shabbat. On Shabbat, it is also forbidden to choose. So a choice is sacred? Not putting on tefillin is because Shabbat is a sign. What does this have to do with sacredness?!
You have two arguments.
A. We need to distinguish between the sacred and the profane, and the sacred must not take over the profane.
B. There is a sacred that is truly sacred and there is a sacred that is borrowed.
And here one wonders about point B: Why this distinction between true sacred and borrowed sacred? After all, the Torah uses the same language in all cases, so how do we identify what is truly sacred and what is borrowed?
We could say the opposite. Sacredness has different forms, and what is important is that they do not take over. There is sacredness in space (the Temple), there is sacredness in a relationship (wedding), there is sacredness in time (Shabbat and the festivals), there is sacredness in writing (set’em), and there is sacredness in man (the people of Israel in relation to the nations). Among the different forms of sacredness, there are laws that are common and there are laws that characterize each sacredness for itself. And one of the important requirements is that different types of sacredness do not take over one another. Between the holiness of the place and the holiness of writing there is a common aspect that both are excluded from the law: “You shall not do so to your God.” Does this mean that whoever damages the tefillin must pay a keren and a fifth? No, but there is a common aspect between them. Between the holiness of the time of the Sabbath and the holiness of the place there is a common aspect that both can be desecrated and death is due for the desecration. And yet the desecration of each of them is different; on the Sabbath it is a work and in the Temple it is uncleanness. And yet, although both are holy, the holiness of the place cannot harm the holiness of time, and therefore a Temple is not built on the Sabbath (and the works permitted in the Temple are only those for which a time is set for them to be done on the Sabbath, such as the offerings of the Tamid and the mosfim). Tefillin are also a hefza dekkusha, but their placement is a sign only on weekdays. On the Sabbath, the time comes and rejects the holiness of the tefillin.
Perhaps there is also holiness in the kingdom of Israel. The verse in Chronicles says, “And Solomon sat on the throne of the Lord” (1:29). Perhaps the problem in the Hasmonean kingdom is not the taking over of the profane but the attempted taking over of one type of holiness (the priesthood) by another type of holiness (the monarchy)? Or is it only in the kingdom of the House of David? Or is it just because they tried to be both, as the Pharisees told them?
I do not disagree with your first argument. It is clear that a distinction must be made between the profane and the holy, but perhaps the point here is not precisely the holy versus the profane, but rather one type of holiness versus another type of holiness?
If you've got the fundamental distinction, leave the semantics aside. What matters is what you do with it.
In the book of Hasmoneans, it seems that they were aware of this concern, and when Shimon was appointed governor, it was explicitly stated that the appointment was temporary until a prophet, a teacher of righteousness, would arise to appoint a king. Even on their coins, the Hasmoneans refrained from calling themselves "king." The coins were inscribed with the words ‘Peloni Ha-Kohen and the Companion of the Jews’. The only one who dared to call himself ‘King’ was Jannaeus, who called himself ‘Basilius Alexandros’ in the Greek version of the inscription on his coins, and he also wrote in Hebrew ‘Yehonatan Ha-Kohen and the Companion of the Jews’.
In the words of Chazal, there are also sources that do not seem to criticize the Hasmoneans as kings. And in the Baraita in Tractate Shabbat explaining ‘May Hanukkah’ it is stated: ‘And when the kings of the Hasmonean house prevailed and were victorious’. Even Yehuda Ben-Gedidiya, who criticized Binyamin for “placing a crown of priesthood on the seed of Aaron,” sees no problem with the “crown of kingship” on his head.. Likewise, Maimonides, in describing the miracle of Chanukah, notes with praise: “The kingdom was restored to Israel more than two hundred years ago,” and includes in his acknowledgment the kingdom of Herod and his descendants, and hence our “religious Zionist cousins” have come to thank God for the State of Israel of our day, whose leaders are no worse than Herod 🙂
With greetings, Yaron Fishel Ordner
In the fourth chapter of the book of Omer, the religious value is given in Judaism not only to the kingdom of the Torah, which raises the glory of the people of Israel and fulfills in the lives of the public and the individual the values of the Torah and its laws, for which reason Saul and David were called the Messiah of the Lord and were anointed as kings by a prophet, just as the High Priest anointed one of his brothers. And for this reason it is said of Solomon, "And Solomon sat on the throne of the Lord" (as mentioned in the fourth chapter).
The kingdoms of the nations of the world also have religious value, and therefore blessings are given upon seeing a king of the nations of the world, "Blessed is he who shares his glory in flesh and blood." There is a "kingdom of the world" in the The world is governed by stable life orders, a kind of ‘kingdom of darkness’, and therefore the Tanna Rabbi Matthias says in his letter to the Haresh who was sitting in Rome: ‘He is the one who prays for the well-being of the kingdom, for if it were not for the fear of the kingdom, one would swallow up one's fellow man alive”
The sages also commanded to run and meet the kings of the nations, and for this purpose they even permitted the priest to be defiled by the impurity of the rabbis, and their reasoning with them was ‘that if he merits, he will distinguish between the kings of the nations and the kings of Israel/. Seeing the glory of the kings of the nations – prepares the heart to aspire to see in the glory of the might of the kings of Israel, who will not only maintain proper social orders, but will fulfill in their kingdom the eternal values of the Torah of Israel.
The kingdom of Israel of today is an ‘intermediate state’. There is more here than a kingdom that protects society from the chaos of ‘one devouring another’. There is a raising of the horn of Israel here, in the return of the land to Jewish rule and the return of the children of Israel to their land whose gates have been opened and are open to receive them.
This is ‘half the glass is full’, but there is still no ‘throne of God” here, since the authorities of the state and its laws do not recognize the laws of the Torah and its judgments. As individuals, the State of Israel is the safest place for a Jew to live a Jewish life. But in terms of the fulfillment of the Torah in public life – the state is still far from complete. ‘The foundation of the throne of God” was built here. For this, we thank the past, and we cry out to God that we may be granted the privilege of seeing the throne of God” Shalem, in the resurrection of the ‘Kingdom of the Most High’ as Daniel saw.
With blessings, Shaltiel Nachman Haim Blau HaLevi
The religious value of a kingdom, for whose welfare one prays, and the faces of its bearers are treated with respect and blessing: ‘Blessed is He who shares His glory with flesh and blood/ with those who fear Him’ – There is also a halakhic validity to the laws of the kingdom, as the Amora Samuel says: ‘Dina demalchuta dina’
With blessings, Nahash”b HaLevi
On Independence Day 5722
It is possible that the religious value of the kingdom explained above stems from the altruistic aspect of loyalty to society, which requires a person to ‘bend his will and needs’ and develop awareness and consideration also for the will of the excluded.
A common denominator can be found in the commandments included in the parashat ‘Kedoshim Tehi’, most of which are a person's consideration for what is ’outside him’ starting with ’Thou shalt fear thy mother and father’, and continuing with ’Love thy neighbor as thyself’ and the commandments of concern and help for the poor and the stranger. And in the commandments of restraint and patience even with those who have wronged a person, that one should not take revenge and hold a grudge against him, but rather correct him in a way that is respectful.
Respect for others also requires respect for symbols that represent the honor of God, “You shall keep my Sabbaths, and fear my sanctuary,” and respect for sacrifices, not to mutilate or sacrifice those with a defect.
It can be said that the issue of holiness is respect and consideration for others, and this is adherence to the quality of God, who treats his creatures with restraint and consideration that bring a full measure of patience and care.
With greetings, Hasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen Kavas
Paragraph 1, line 4
… Consideration also for the wishes of others.
Paragraph 3, line 1
Respect for others also requires respect for the symbols that represent…
The word holy can also be understood in the simple sense of – special – intended
The Sabbath is holy to’ – special to’. And so is “holy to you”.
And on the other hand –
The verse preceding ”holy you shall be” says –
And you shall keep my watch, not to do the abominable imitations that were done before you, and not to defile yourselves with them
For the transgressions are called uncleanness – (and there are other examples)
Congratulations on the birth of your grandson,
but it's not entirely clear what the purpose of this whim is…
You chose to call everything that is not called holy in the language of halakhah – holy in a figurative sense, if so, then calling the Holocaust saints holy is also holy in a figurative sense.
You define a concept of holiness that no one uses, create an irrelevant division regarding how to conduct oneself around the sacred and the profane, and then complain about people sanctifying the profane.
Simply say in one sentence that the conduct surrounding these things is too emotional.
Politicians don't go to take pictures with bereaved families because someone said they were holy, but because of the emotions they arouse in the relevant audiences. The term holy in the general public is simply a translation of martyr and has no real implications for anyone's behavior.
The same goes for the flags in the synagogue – It's not fascist. It's simply celebrating Independence Day in the synagogue, just like decorating it with flowers for Shavuot. In the high school yeshiva, we would also hang decorations for Purim and Hanukkah.
The criticism is perhaps relevant to parts of religious Zionism that usually have no real practical output.
The impression created is that you just enjoy being in the position of needlessly slaughtering sacred cows, and that's not appropriate.
Joel, I answered that in the column itself. It is indeed possible to use borrowed usage, and they did so in the Bible and in Chazal. The question is whether they are careful to be aware of this or whether they are resorting to blurring the boundaries between the sacred and the profane. My problem is not semantic but substantive. For my part, let them call holy whatever they want, but one must pay attention to the implications.
The flag in the synagogue is often accompanied by an ecstasy that does not accompany the decoration of the synagogue for Hanukkah or Shavuot. Don't be fooled. It is not decoration in vain.
One can argue about the reality with the flags. But in any case, this behavior is not the result of applying the concept of sanctity to the state but, if the dimensions are significant, just fascism that has also entered the school.
I disagree. This is of course a generalization, but it is clear that there are such dimensions here.
This was more or less my argument, at least with regard to fascism in the non-Jewish world (outside Israel). Even if the fascist insists on finding “sacredness” in the state and its symbols, he does not derive it from religious sources. Or almost not. In essence, fascism is a revolutionary political radicalism that is alien in spirit to the ancient religious world.
If I understood you, one of his arguments was that there is a problem with the borrowed use of the concept of sacredness: whoever does this is not aware that it is only a question (and therefore attaches religious sacredness to something that does not belong). My argument is that such a borrowed use does not really exist.
Where does the assumption come from that the list that Nathan provided is a borrowed concept? How can one distinguish between holiness as a borrowed concept and holiness as a “real” concept? From your words, it would seem that there is the desired assumption here…
Why not make a very reasonable assumption, that when the Torah uses the concept of holiness, there is holiness in reality?
Why not accept the assumption, for example, that Shabbat is indeed an object of holiness (and can be desecrated, and therefore those who desecrate it will be put to death)?
Of course, from this we must conclude that not all holiness is hidden by impurity, but that the meaning of the holiness of time is a sabbath, and of the holiness of place is impurity, for example.
I explained this in the column. Indeed, it all has to do with holiness, and even the borrowed usage has a real root. Holiness is the appearance of God in the world, and this also exists in the mitzvot and other things. But the halakhic distinction is still important, and the indications are halakhic. In your opinion, does a kiddush cup (used for kiddush today) require ginizah? Are these holy utensils or mitzvah utensils?
And what is “holiness” in truth?
Professor Dov Landau, a blessed righteous man, listed several different meanings of holiness.
(You can also find it in the pages of Bar Ilan's weekly parashat on the parashat Behukoti)
Rabbi Eliezer Berkowitz – finds another – surprising – meaning based on an analysis of the use of the word holy in the book of Isaiah
, and from there he also explains other places.
According to him, the holy is always the one who is close to the person, the helper, not the transcendent –
“I will dwell on high and holy – and with the poor and lowly in spirit”.
The holy is the connection to the person – “I will make your way holy – and your path in many waters – You will land like a flock among your people ”
The sanctuary is the path through many waters for the Israelites crossing the Red Sea.
According to this, we can also understand “Be holy – for I am holy ” – and to whom will you be likened – How can we relate His holiness to Him?
But if holiness is understood in a relationship – the verse is understandable.
And our holiness is keeping the commandments – This is the relationship to God Almighty
Do you have a reference where R.A. Berkowitz wrote? On the face of it, the claim sounds extremely weak to me.
In the book “Essays on the Foundations of Judaism” – Shalem Publishing, 2004
Editors Yoram Hazoni and Rabbi Yitzhak Lipshitz.
The article is very convincing – In every passage of Nechama the word holy appears (and in particular “ holy Jacob” )
In descriptions of calamities the name ” tseb-ot” is used.
For example “ “ Our right hand and His holy arm have saved Him … All the ends of the earth have seen the salvation of our God”.
He interprets the words ” holy arm” not as ” His holy arm” but as ” the arm of the holy” –
The Redeeming Arm.
Although at the beginning of the article he focuses on the book of Isaiah – but he also looks at the examples I gave.
Thanks (but I don't have the book. I thought it was an article that could be found online. I'll keep an eye out, maybe I'll get it). I find it hard to believe there's any sense in it, but I'll wait and see.
To the T”G – Motzai L”E, happy and pleased,
See this in my responses here: ‘The holiness of altruism’, ‘Holy be you for I am holy– an inviting divine presence’, and also in my response ‘Holiness– the spiritual attachment of a man to his wife’.
Holiness in biblical language is ‘invitation’, as it is written ‘The Kaddish is called as a bridegroom’. God is available to those who seek Him and invites them to approach Him and to cling to Him.
With greetings, Hasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kwass
Clarification – The article as stated is based on the use of the word holy in the book of Isaiah,
with expansion to other places.
The link to Parashat Kedoshim is mine – to my credit or my obligation..
If indeed this link is loose – the looseness is mine – and not Rabbi Berkowitz's
Thanks for an interesting column.
Have you ever dealt with the definition or description of holiness itself? In your opinion, is it a state, a quality, a “substance” or a process? Or maybe something else? How can we know it (itself, not its concept)? In your opinion, is Jewish (or halakhic) holiness different from “non-Jewish”holiness?
Your journey towards complete identification with Isaiah Leibowitz continues with vigor!
Here you are already using the word “fascism”. Congratulations! Another tiny effort and you will reach ”Judeo-Nazis”.
But in the end these are logical conclusions (or at least reductio ad absurdum) of the Litvak approach of expelling God from the world.
Yossi,
I admit the facts and plead not guilty. This is indeed fascism, even though Isaiah Leibowitz said so. I am not saying that every national sentiment or national ideology is fascism. But giving religious value (and especially sanctity) to nationalism and the state is fascism.
Doron,
I don't remember writing about it. Simply put, it's part of reality. There is a holiness that overlaps with certain places and objects. It's a quality or condition of them.
In my opinion, there is no other holiness except for the Jewish one. The reason for this is that the concept of holiness is not given to us but to God Almighty. He defines what is holy and what is not. Be holy because I am holy.
So another question for you. It seems that Leibowitz (whose name was mentioned here) said that there is no holiness except in God, and I understood his words to mean that in fact there is no holiness that is outside of God, holiness in the world. Therefore, there is really no holiness for a place or time.
What is your opinion? Is there holiness in the world (from God) or is it confined within God?
Here, too, my association is from Amichai…
“God is full of mercy,
If God were not full of mercy
There would be mercy in the world and not only in Him”
It is clear that there is holiness in the world. This is an explicit mishnah and explicit laws. There is holiness in Israel and Jerusalem, in the Temple, and in sacrifices. The holiness of time, we talk about something like this in relation to the Sabbath, but I don't think it has a halakhic meaning, and therefore it is doubtful whether it is not a borrowed use. On the halakhic level, holiness is supposed to be perceived in objects (this is the “din hafza”). Although I wrote in the past that there are hints that from a halakhic perspective, time is also hafza (if it is possible to perceive a vow in it), and this is not the place for that.
I did not understand the association from Amichai who talks about mercy and not holiness.
Is it clear that there is holiness in the world?
In the wilderness of Rabbah – Parashat Hukat –
I will send a spirit of impurity from the earth that feeds on it and it flees.
After he went out, his disciples said to him: For this you rejected in the reed, what do you say to us?
He said to them: Your life is not that the dead defile, nor that the water purifies,
but the Holy One, blessed be He, said: I have enacted a statute, I have decreed a decree,
Are you permitted to transgress my decrees, as it is written: This is the statute of the Torah.
As it is said, the dead do not defile because of the power of impurity that is in them – but the decree of Scripture.
After a decree was made, perhaps the power of impurity was born.
And so it is with regard to holiness
In the book "Seven Years of Conversations on the Weekly Parshas," Leibowitz refers to the concept of the Holy in Rabbi Kook and the light-loving Samach of Dvinsk, and he says that he met Rabbi Kook in his youth and told him/hinted at him that he did not understand the meaning of the blessing "which distinguishes between the holy and the profane."
And thank you for the warm blessings (including the wonderful sting – literally stinging from a scholar)
With pleasure. Congratulations.
By the way, I really didn't mean to be sarcastic. That was a serious statement. I was planning to talk there about the connection to negative adjectives (originally it was said that everyone would say things for a few minutes).
“But giving religious value (and especially sanctity) to nationalism and the state is fascism.”
I know that you believe that it is impossible to learn anything from the written Torah, and despite this, I recommend that you try to internalize the basic concepts written in it.
If you do not do so, you will continue to reach funny conclusions such as the fact that the vast majority of rabbis in the country are actually fascists . . .
And another small question, do you accept the masks of the Oral Torah. So how is your argument quoted at the beginning of my message with the following text taken from the Gemara:
R. Yochanan, why did Omri deserve the kingdom
Because he added one volume in the Land of Israel
As it is said “And he bought the mountain of Shimron from Shemer with a shekel of silver
And he built the mountain and called the name of the city that he built after the name of Shemer, the owner of the mountain, Shimron” (1 Kings 17:24)
(Sanhedrin 122)
According to this Gemara, does a national matter have no religious value?
I would be happy to internalize anything I find there. You are welcome to try to suggest topics for internalization.
What comes out of my words regarding most rabbis neither elevates nor detracts. Either I am right or I am not, and in order to compete, one must raise substantive claims and not use ad hominem arguments. Although in my opinion, factually you are not right. Beyond that, the fact that someone is a fascist should not harm him. He truly believes in it. Those who hold to fascism believe that it is appropriate and not wrong. Fascism is not necessarily extreme or immoral acts. This is just some perception that I do not agree with, and of course there are many dangers in it.
I do not accept the authority of the Toshva”p but of the Talmud, and even that is not in the realm of legends. You are right that there is a religious value in settling the Land of Israel, after all it is a mitzvah. How does this relate to nationalism, and certainly in the modern sense (state, etc.).
According to the Gemara in the Megillah, a hefza dakdusha is an object on which the name of God is revealed. The name of God is revealed on the people of Israel, and therefore the Jews are also hefza dakdusha (they are buried like a hefza dakdusha is buried, their clothes are torn off when they are seen to have passed away, like a Torah scroll that is burned, and so on). If a Jew is killed as a Jew, then there is a revelation of the name of God in the world that was damaged, and therefore one must mourn for it even if he was destroyed (and not if he was simply killed as a criminal by the police).
The Holocaust was blasphemy and not kiddush of God, but it was not just a sad event. Harming the people of Israel is harming the name of God in the world, and this cannot be ignored.
Harming a Jew on the basis of his worship of the Name is indeed blasphemy. Indeed, holiness is determined by the degree of revelation of the Name of God, and I wrote that there are different levels. But holiness in its precise sense is only a small subfield of all of these.
I also wanted to make a minor comment regarding the connection between fascism and religion or religiosity. As far as I understand, there may be similarities in terms of passion and commitment between the two phenomena, but there is a cardinal difference between them: fascism is a distinctly modern phenomenon: the psychology is different (the experience of modern alienation is a central motivator for the fascist), the sociology is different (social polarization involves increased population mobility and changes in settlement patterns - for example, accelerated urbanization), and the fascist attitude towards religion is also very ambivalent (to the best of my knowledge, it is rare to find religious figures as leaders of fascist movements).
The fact that fascism is a modern phenomenon means nothing to us. Attributing sanctity to nationalism leads to fascism (today). Psychology and sociology don't really interest me. I deal with values and ideologies, not the motivations and psychology of people to hold them.
The point is that the (excessive) meaning attributed to nationalism is not truly sacred in the religious sense. Not because of the halakhic matter you extended, but because from the start the fascist draws his ideology from a modern and largely secular world, that is, a non-metaphysical world. If the fascist is confused from a value and ideological point of view, it is not so much because of what you said.
What is true is that Israeli fascism (there is such a thing) is connected to its religious roots (planted in the ancient world) probably more strongly than the forms of fascism corresponding to it in the secular post-Christian world. This is of course because Judaism is not only a religion but also a people.
In the Omer of 1522, Rudolf Otto believes that the foundation of holiness is the sense of awe and emptiness in the face of the infinite greatness of God. In contrast, the section “Kedudom” opens with the exclamation “Be holy, for I am holy.” God’s holiness invites man to strive to be like Him. Man is beloved, created in the image of God, and from this he is called “to keep the way of God, to do righteousness and justice.” And there is a great affection for Israel, “who were called sons of the place,” and as the Defines ‘My sons are the firstborn of Israel’, and as ’My sons are the firstborn’ the people of Israel are responsible for maintaining ‘a kingdom of priests and a holy nation’, to establish a model society that will set an example to the entire world in its noble life, continuous with constant responsibility for others and dedication to a life of truth, goodness and honesty,
As we see from the many commandments of Parashat ‘Kedoshim’, holiness is tested in a life corrected according to the Torah. Respect for parents and respect for the temples of ’, the temple in place and the temple in time, namely the Sabbath day, concern for the poor and the weak, and a respectful, loving and restrained attitude towards everyone. Even against those who have harmed you ‘You shall not rise up and reproach the children of your people’ But ‘Prove your fellow’ in a respectful and honorable manner ‘and do not bear sin against him’ by whitewashing his face in public. Even in eating it, a person is evident in his lack of lust. Not to be like a beast of prey that pounces on its prey, but ‘And you shall be holy men to me and shall not eat any flesh of prey in the field’, and even in the realm of marital life, holiness requires strictness from that which does not lead to a healthy family life.
‘Holy men’ do not withdraw from the life of this world. They sow and reap, eat and enjoy the world, but they are careful to live their lives while maintaining the ‘boundaries of the sector’ The worthy ones, to be ‘good for heaven and good for creation’, and to live in a way that honors their being ‘Bethlehem Elohim’ and ’sons to the place’ who respectfully represent their Father in heaven.
And in honor of the new grandson ‘Gal Moshe’, it is said that the divine holiness is like a power that strikes waves in ever-expanding circles. The more a person speaks in the ways of truth and goodness of his Creator –, the name of the Lord is revealed and sanctified in the world.
With blessings, Amioz Yaron Schnitzel”
As I explained the verse “You shall be holy, for I am holy,” that man’s destiny is to be like a wave that continues the power in ever-expanding circles, so man, in his noble, honorable, and respectful behavior, continues and reveals the holiness of God in the world.
And so it is in the realm of purity that a “wave that is torn off” continues the being of the spring even when it is torn off from its place (Mikvaot 5:6), and in the mikvah, the wave continues the being of the mikvah to the height beside it as long as the wave is connected to the mikvah (Shef 7:7).
And so we bless the “wave of Moses” May he grow up to be a ‘Etpaştuta Damash’, both in Torah and wisdom and in good qualities, in humility and devotion to the people of Israel, and like Moses our Rabbi, may he enlighten the eyes of the people of Israel with the Torah and good deeds, and may he combine the powers of strength and splendor of the mountains of Lebanon with the powers of holiness of ‘this good mountain and Lebanon, and may his parents and family be abundantly happy, and may they thank and praise him: ‘I will praise the Lord’ for He has done great things for me’ 🙂
With blessings, Aisha
In the Sabbatical Year of the Omer, every individual in Israel is commanded to be holy and to be holy to me, but the people of Israel are commanded to sanctify the lives of the public and to be a kingdom of priests and a holy nation. There are commandments that can only be fulfilled by a public organized as a sovereign political entity. In the independent State of Israel, the commandment is fulfilled: “And you shall inherit it and dwell in it.” In the sovereignties over the territories of the Land of Israel that were liberated from foreigners, the public fulfills the commandment: “And you shall inherit it.” And in opening the gates of the land to every Jew who wishes to immigrate to the land, the The commandment of “and you shall dwell in it” and the commandment of “helping Israel from the hand of trouble” are publicly observed.
The return of the people of Israel to live in their land in peace, in safety and in spiritual and material prosperity is a great salvation for the people of Israel, also from a spiritual perspective. Even those who are far from Torah are protected in Israel from assimilation much more than their brothers in exile, where assimilation is eating away at tens of percent. And for Jews who are observant of Torah and commandments, the land constitutes a spiritual center that not only “fills the land with Torah” but also radiates Torah to all the ends of the world, “for from Zion shall go forth Torah, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.”
Whoever remembers how much our enemies have humiliated us by stating that the Jew is destined to be an ‘eternal wanderer’ due to the rejection of ‘their Messiah’, and they have prided themselves on the success of the victorious ‘church’ against the misery of the humiliated ’synagogue’ – how happy he will be to see that ’despite their anger and wrath’ –the ‘eternal wanderer’ has returned to a life of proud rebellion in his renewed land.
Whoever remembers the murders and persecutions, the decrees and humiliations, which we suffered from the wicked Gentiles during the thousands of years of exile that culminated in the terrible Holocaust – How great will be His joy that the persecuted people will return to a life of pride and confidence in their land, that the exiles are gathering as the prophets had predicted, and that Zechariah's prophecy is being fulfilled before our eyes: "Old men and women will still sit in the streets of Jerusalem, leaning on their hands for days, and boys and girls will play in its streets."
And the long journey we have already traveled from humiliation and debt to a life of pride and prosperity strengthens our hope and prayer that we may soon attain the ripening and completion of the vision that all the children of Israel will be "followers of the Lord," whose path the Torah illuminates toward complete redemption in the restoration of the kingdom of the House of David and the return of the Shekhinah to Zion.
With blessings, Amioz Yaron Schnitzel
In the Book of Omer, Chapter 2, the Ramban, in his commentary on the verse “Be holy” (Leviticus 19), cites the interpretation of the Sages: “Be holy” and “Be chaste.” He explains that “chastity” is also the caution in permitted pleasures that they should not be in lust: “For the Torah warned against fornication and forbidden foods, and permitted a man to have sex with his wife and to eat meat and wine. If so, the man of lust will find a place to be washed in the lewdness of his wife or many wives, and to be in wine-drinking places with gluttons for meat, and to speak as he pleases about all the abominations, for this prohibition was not mentioned in the Torah.” And there will be a “vile in the presence of the Torah”‘.
And the Ramban brings many examples of restrained secular life. That the scholars of the Torah should not be found with their wives like hens, and not be ‘eaters of meat and wine’, and abstain from impurity, just as the monk was called “holy” also because he kept himself from the impurity of death, and for this reason the ’companions’ were careful to eat mundane food in purity, and thus the redeemed should guard his mouth and tongue from the abundance of coarse eating and from disgusting speech, as the scripture mentioned: Every mouth speaks vile things.
In general, sanctification in secular life is maintaining the cleanliness of one's hands and body, as they said (Berachot 55): And you shall be sanctified and be holy – “And you shall be sanctified” these are the first waters. “And you shall be holy” these are the last waters, “for holy” is evening oil. For although these are commandments from their words, the main point of the scripture is to warn us to be clean and pure and separate from the multitude of people who defile themselves with luxury and ugliness’.
A higher level than this is the degree of ’holiness’ which the Ramach’ describes as the peak of the path of the servant of God, in which a person maintains devotion to Him’ Even during his physical actions and pleasures, until they themselves become religious acts, similar to what is said in the sacrifices that ’the priests eat and the husbands atone’. His words are based on the Kabbalistic idea that eating constitutes ‘clarifying the sparks of holiness’ in matter.
It is found that the work of holiness in mundane life begins with noble and honorable behavior befitting ’sons of kings’ and culminates in devotion to the Creator even during mundane life, until even mundane acts become religious acts that strengthen a person's devotion to His Creator.
With blessings, Hillel Feiner-Glossinus
In the Holy Letter, the Ramban explains the sanctity of marriage as being done with love and complete mental devotion of the couple to each other, so that during the marriage there should be no distractions or extraneous thoughts that contradict the couple's mental connection.
These things are based on the warning of Chazal against marriage in states of sadness and quarreling and their opposite in states of intoxication, and in states where the couple is thinking about others, things that damage the marriage and even cause a mental defect in the children who will be born from such a marriage (the ten qualities). The marriage must be out of a complete mental union of the man and the woman, like Adam and Eve in the "ancient Garden of Eden" where there was only her and him in their world. It is not for nothing that the union between a man and his wife is called in the language of the cupbearers ‘consecration’.
Perhaps this is also the depth of the root of the prohibition explained in the Torah to come upon a woman ‘bendat devatha’, since the mental state of the divorced woman is associated with suffering and pain that interfere with the full mental unity required at the time of union. Even the Torah's prohibition on a man taking back his divorced wife after she has married another is justified by ’her first husband will not be able to take her back after she has been defiled’. Although there is no prohibition for a divorced woman to marry another man – nevertheless something is irreparably damaged in the ability to create full mental unity between them again. After ’she has been defiled’ – she will not be able to be ‘consecrated’ again In the full sense of the word, because the sanctity of the union of a man and his wife – must be in complete spiritual devotion.
With blessings, Akiva Yosef Halevi Radetzky
On Independence Day 5772
At the end of the laws of Shemitah and Jubilation from the Maimonides: ‘And not only the tribe of Levi, but every man and woman whose spirit has moved him and who has understood from his knowledge to be set apart to stand before the Lord; to serve and worship Him and to know the Lord, and to walk uprightly as God made him and to remove from his neck the burden of the many accounts that men have sought– for this is sanctified, the Holy of Holies, and the Lord will be his portion and inheritance forever…’.
The Maimonides describes the feeling of constantly standing before the Lord in the Teaching of the Perplexed, Part 3 We see it as the purpose and intention of all the deeds of the Torah, because in all those practical details and in their constant practice, it will reach the individual Hasidic people until they attain human perfection, and fear the Lord, and fear Him, and know who is with them, and then do what is right. God, the Blessed One, has already explained that the purpose of all the deeds of the Torah is to reach man, this is the act of doing. The Maimonides further explains that the knowledge taught to us by the Torah is what gives birth to the love of God in man, while the fear of God and the feeling of His constant presence are acquired by man through the observance of the deeds of the Torah.
An extract from the Maimonides' description of the special way in which a person feels as if he is standing before God. The Maimonides, in his gloss on the Shulchan Oroch, section 1,1, brings: ‘”I am always with you’: – It is a great rule in the Torah and in the virtues of the righteous who walk before God. For a person's sitting, his movements, and his affairs, when he is alone in his house, are not like his sitting, his movements, and his affairs, when he is before a great king1; nor is his speaking and opening his mouth as he pleases, when he is with his household and relatives, like his speaking in the king's court. All the more so when a person realizes in his heart that the great King, the Blessed One, whose glory fills the whole earth, – stands over him and sees his actionsæ Immediately, awe and submission will come to him in the fear of God, blessed be He, and he will always be ashamed of Him (Mun 83:55).
In short: holiness involves the constant feeling of standing before God and the constant readiness to stand and serve Him and do His will.
With blessings, Chaim Shaltiel Blau-Weiss the Blue-Eyed
B”d 2”d Le”omer p”b
Even the angels who are separated from matter and stand before God to serve Him are called in the Bible ‘Irin Kaddishin’. Even the commandments of Parashat ‘Kedoshim Tehiyo’ They shape their makers, to be detached from materialistic desires and to be ready to dedicate the name of their God with love and unity as the ministering angels,
And as the words of Rachel (in the book of the Lord, "By the hands of the weak"): "Is it not a veil and a veil, and there is no ephod and teraphim, and a veil and a veil, and tamdim and mosfim, and incense and atonement, to atone for sins, the holiness of God in Israel, to resemble the sheparim, and the poor in the house of the house, to give thanks to God, to dedicate the Holy One of Jacob, and the God of Israel."
With blessing, the Lord thought
Even about the flags, he said in the Midrash, that Israel desired flags as the ministering angels, and perhaps he meant that the flag symbolizes the ability to connect to a common ideal.
In the Book of the Omer, Rabbi Ovadia Sforno explained the verse: “And your being with the holy one of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 22:19): “I will be eternal to the life of the world to come.”
And similarly in the Book of the Sanhedrin 27:1: “Tana Debi Eliyahu: The righteous whom the Holy One, the Blessed One, will resurrect do not return to the dustbin, as it is said: “And he who remains in Zion and he who remains in Jerusalem will be holy, it will be said to him, ‘What is holy forever endures, they too will endure forever.’”
Adherence to the Lord leads to eternal life. And see more in Rabbi Ze'ev Neuman's article, “Holy for Everlasting Life” – The Concept of Holiness in the Teachings of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda’ on the ‘Orot Yisrael College’ website.
Best regards, Eliam Fish”l Werkheimer
B”D 2’ Sivan 2”B
Also from the Tikvul in Tehillim between verse 13: ‘Cast me not away from thy presence, and take not thy holy spirit from me’ to verse 11:: ‘Return unto me the joy of thy name, and strengthen me with a willing spirit’ – It seems that the feeling of holiness is bound up with joy and a willing spirit’, the feeling of a person who is desired in the eyes of his God and invited by Him to draw near to Him.
With greetings, Hasdai Shraga Feibesh Lichtman
Paragraph 1, line 2
… The section ‘Kedoshim’ opens with the reading…
Paragraph 2, line 5
… Man is evident in his lack of lust. …
Ibid., line 7
… Holiness requires one to distance oneself from what does not leadæ
Chen Chen.
Paragraph 4, line 2
… The more a person adheres to the ways of truth and goodness…
Giving religious value to nationalism and the state is fascism, it is a paraphrase of the words of Yair Golan when he was Deputy Chief of Staff and of Justice Aharon Barak, and stems from the perception of nationalism and religion in Europe and Christianity.
I already noted above that not all fascism is Nazism. There is indeed fascism in it, but that doesn't mean that everyone who holds it is a bad person. I don't agree with this perception and I also think it is dangerous. But it is in itself a perception like any other perception.
In general, you got carried away with your language this time, the disparaging use of our religious Zionist cousins,
There is a Hasidic basis (not stories) for the existence of holiness in the world of action and the mundane, even if it does not fit with all the Lithuanian definitions and divisions whose honor is in their place
Our religious Zionist cousins, as we know, don't have much of a sense of humor, which is a shame.
If there is a Hasidic source of holiness in the secular world, this is excellent evidence that I am right. What the Hasids say is presumed to be wrong until proven otherwise. So thank you for confirming my words.
That is a great thing about things. It seems to me that Rabbi Kook compares studying Aggadah to drinking wine (wine, secret, kiddush, sanctification, good materials for the requirements…) and accordingly states that those who study Aggadah too much will become a kind of drunkard-madman. It seems that the same can be said about those who study too many lights, to the point of breaking the vessels
The Land of Israel, Jerusalem and the Temple, and also sacrifices and so on, are holy, not because they did some act of sanctification of God. Holiness is defined by the passage and prohibition – Daser la Ach”a as a kedesh, and to distinguish “pen teks maksad mala” - sanctified and charged with skin. Mitzvah utensils are thrown away and holy utensils are charged with giniza – This is the very definition of holy utensils – those that are stored and lost. And of course a sacrifice that was consecrated to be offered and burned on the altar. Therefore, one who is killed for the sake of His name is called a martyr for the sake of God – because he is completely lost from the world for the sake of His name. The commandment of mervot kedesh – This is the question of God because in the act of the mitzvah there is effort and sacrifice but not complete fulfillment and therefore it is not full holiness. Therefore, simply anyone who is killed because of being a Jew - that is, for the very appearance of the name of the Lord and his people in the world - will be called holy. This has nothing to do with his decision or his choice - he was sacrificed on the altar of faith in the Creator of the world. Of course, all the strengths that stem from holiness (the positive ones except for "lest the whole be sanctified") stem from the dedication of the soul (not exactly the choice) - the magnitude of the sacrifice and the loss that is created while realizing the goal of the revelation of the name of the Lord in the world. (Of course, there is still much to discuss: A. The ten martyrs of the kingdom, whether they died by the emperor's choice. B. The martyrs of Lod - were they allowed to surrender themselves? C. Those killed for a mitzvah other than three serious offenses. And of course the hidden point of contention, whether the people of Israel were chosen because of their actions, or whether God chose them first. Does a person have intrinsic value or only because of their actions?)
I'm not entirely clear about this collection of statements and what their purpose is. To complicate things? To agree? Just a short essay on the concept of holiness?
In any case, some of the things are banal in their simplicity, and some are incorrect. In particular, the diagnosis that the basis of the dispute is the question of Israel's choice is incorrect. No connection.
A. I thought it was clear, but if most things are banal in their simplicity, then I hope we will also reach the same conclusion:
I disagree with the statement in your article that “the concept of holiness is limited and does not even overlap with the commandments and the worship of God in general, and certainly does not belong to the neutral secular world.” This is in contrast to the
“annoying and unfounded talk about the saints of the Holocaust and the saints of the IDF and the sanctification of God by the victims of terrorism … and the continuation of the sanctity of the state, the Jewish person, the redemption and so on.”. Your main basis is on the baraita “Our rabbis taught: Mitzvah utensils – throw away, holy utensils – store. And these are the mitzvah utensils: sukkah, lulav, shofar, tzitzit. And these are the holy utensils: book covers, tefillin and mezuzahs, a Torah scroll case, and a tefillin pouch and their straps.” – apparent proof that mitzvot are not part of holiness – There are holy utensils and there are mitzvah utensils. This is of course a mistake, you will have to admit that there is holiness, for example, in the mitzvah of the sukkah – “Just as the name of Heaven applies to the celebration, so it applies to the sukkah” – A direct comparison to the holy things and sacrifices. Rashi in Sukkah 37: And the rabbis learned that in all the commandments there is holiness at the time of their performance, therefore they are limited to their commandments, the utensils of a mitzvah are holy at their time, the utensils of holiness, as I have already written, are called so, because their holiness continues forever – because they are set aside. Therefore, every sacrifice, that is, a sacrifice for the name of Heaven – has some holiness in it. A total sacrifice like a sacrifice is permanent holiness, and a partial sacrifice of effort or use at a certain time is the holiness of the commandments – “ which we have sanctified by its commandments” (How would you explain the language of the blessing if there is no holiness in the commandments?). It is clear why The victims of the Holocaust are saints – they were sacrificed on the altar of Judaism. And just as the sacrificed victim is the saint and not the sacrificer, so was he murdered even if it did not depend on him, if he was sacrificed on the altar of Judaism – he would be called holy. I understand that you have a dispute about the definition of the state, but you also admit that there is a commandment to appoint a king – that is, to establish some kind of state. Therefore, anyone who sees in the state something of the Kingdom of Israel sees the victims sacrificed on the altar of the existence of the state as saints – so I explained why the talk about these saints is not supposed to upset – All sacrifice associated with Judaism is generally holy. (What you quoted from the Avenger”z defines the concept of purity, rather than the concept of holiness, in my opinion.)
B. Your sentence in the previous post “Now think of a person who walked down the street, Or sat in his house, and was murdered in a terrorist attack. Is there any justification for considering him a saint? What did he do to earn the title of saint?” (Essay in the following sentences) In my opinion, this clarifies the root of the controversy - is a person chosen only because of his actions, or does God choose his reasons regardless of his actions, a statement that you seem to oppose (and in my opinion it is what is spurring the foaming).
C. I am not a prophet, if you do not write what you think is wrong, I will not be able to try and explain.
I don't understand the argument. I wrote that every mitzvah has holiness and still people mix up categories, because that holiness is borrowed (or weak). The name of the sky on the sukkah is evidence to contradict it. None of the first and last understood that it was about holiness, perhaps the Rishba in Bitzah 3 in his difficulty with Abiy (Madraim 29) regarding the holiness of the body expiring in vain. Why don't they interpret the Gemara simply? Because it is clear to them that the holiness there is a borrowed name. Therefore, even a muktze is not related to the discussion, since it is not an expression of holiness but that it is designated (=muktze) for the mitzvah.
Everything else is vortim (the temporary and permanent division and other vegetables).
Your words that I wrote that are banal are the nonsense you wrote about the fact that there is holiness even though they did not do any act of sanctification. It is clear. Who said otherwise?! What kind of argument is this?
And it is not true that my opinion is only from the difference between sacred objects and a mitzvah, but from the very terminology that differs between pure and impure, forbidden and permitted, holy and holy, etc. As for the sanctification of God (the sanctification of the Holocaust and other vegetables), this is just nonsense and does not need any source. What an important Jew once called “the sanctification of error” (see my column on this).
The question of why God chose Israel is in no way related to the discussion. God can choose Israel regardless of their actions, and still an act without a choice is not an act of sanctification of God. I do not understand what is to be discussed here at all. This is a maxim that has no source and no logic, and everyone recites it simply because that is how they got used to it.
A. It was up to the Rabbi to cite in his article the Gemara on Shabbat 22:17; and that there is a holy lamp in it. But it is precisely there that the Ramban in Halachmot says that Wart distinguishes between the perpetual holiness of holy utensils, and mitzvah utensils that are not holy forever, and mitzvah utensils that, although they are thrown away after their mitzvah, are treated holy during their mitzvah, so that they do not become vile mitzvahs. They are treated as things that are holy and forbidden in everyday use during their mitzvah. It is necessary to discuss what exactly the Rabbi disagrees about, and in particular that the Rashba there makes it difficult to see why the Gemara Brings blood and not sukkah wood, and makes the excuse that the one who is satisfied with sukkah wood cancels the mitzvah, since the one who is satisfied with a number of them. Again, it is clear that in the mitzvah of lesser holiness, because the prohibition is temporary for the purpose of the mitzvah – it is not a question of full sacrifice as in the sacrifice – but there is still holiness. B. I read the column, and this is precisely what I disagree with, I do not prove the holocaust saints, from the other holy things, even though they contained a heroic act, I prove the holocaust saints – The sanctification of God is not defined as a heroic act, but as a great sacrifice that was sacrificed in His name. I prove this precisely by the fact that the sacrifice is holy and not the one who sanctifies, even though the animal did nothing. And by the choice of the Land of Israel and its holiness (or the choice of the people of Israel) regardless of their actions. Therefore, the sacrifice of the victims of the Nazis' actions is still – They are saints, even though it was not their choice. (I also alluded to the evidence for this from the ten royal martyrs that the emperor chose precisely them – and if it weren't for their own virtue, they would be considered saints (it is true that he probably chose them because of their virtue, but there are other sages, so because he chose them precisely that is why they would be above that no one stands in their way and the rest of the sages don't?). I also alluded to the act of the martyrs of Lod that must be discussed, for if the Gentiles want to kill everyone or to hand over one of them, it is forbidden to hand them over, so why were they allowed to hand themselves over? I do not come to decide this, but to imply that the act is not certain to be so great and right, and despite this no one can stand in their way, because the king issued a decree against the Jews and they were killed for their Judaism. It is also similar to the discussion about someone who surrenders himself for one of the other commandments that the Maimonides consider a murderer, but other rishon allow, and one could extend this at length.) 3. And if we are talking about terminology (pure, impure, forbidden, permissible, holy, and holy), how do you explain that Maimonides' Sefer Kedusha does not include the work of the rabbinate and the Temple, but rather the laws of prohibitions of entry and forbidden foods? Sacrifice is holy (as I wrote the first time, the word kodesh is the word for prohibition of pleasure, distinctions), and therefore things that a person abstains from bring holiness. And so every sacrifice offered by a person is included in the general law of holiness.
I think we're exhausted.
If I understood correctly, you (the Habanez) say that in the Sutta the prohibition is dependent on the impurity, while in the Nidah the prohibition is separate and the impurity is separate.
If it is possible to separate and we separate prohibition and impurity (just as a woman who touches a dead man is not prohibited from her husband), then they are simply two sides of the same coin. A. Why do the states of prohibition in the Nidah coincide exactly with the states of impurity, and when she is purified, she is permitted, and that this is a case of treason. B. Since it is necessary to separate, then how did the Sages teach in the Sutta that the prohibition is from impurity (and one is purified and one is purified for the husband and one for the prostitute), they would say that impurity and above are above that which is permissible, the bond is damaged but permitted [just as a person is permitted in his divorce and is free, and from what they say that a damaged bond is worse than a severed bond]. And how did the Sages understand that there is a connection between impurity and prohibition if not that they took the idea from the verse in which it is written, "You shall not approach a woman in her impurity," and the spirit of the verse that there is a fundamental connection between impurity and prohibition.
This is a question about the origin of a correlation. As we know, it can have several origins. It could be a coincidence. It is possible that A is the cause of B or B is the cause of A, and it is possible that both have a common cause. In the case of a niddah, I assume that there is a common cause, and neither one causes the other. Therefore, you can treat the laws of spikut differently in the two branches.
In the case of a sota, they did not teach a prohibition against impurity. The prohibition is impurity. After all, a sota is not impure in the sense of impurity and purity. Just as the kiddushin are holy, the misappropriation of them is impurity.
I was wrong that there is impurity in the sotah, sorry for the confusion.
The unknown reason for the prohibition of niddah passes when the niddah counts the days and immerses in the mikveh, where have we heard such a prohibition that ends with immersion if not that this prohibition is related to impurity in its navel?
There is something that passes with the immersion and the counting, and as a result it is both purified and shaken.
This is formally possible but apparently it seems [to me] improbable.
Incidentally, regarding the Hasmoneans and the Greeks, it seems that in Christianity there was also a similar tension between the popes and the kings in Europe, which the kings wanted to separate (two swords, one for the king and one for the bishop), and some popes somewhere strove as Hasmoneans to control the Holy See in full or in part.
Of course. Give to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's. And the walk to the fine.
It is worth reading the series of articles ‘The Sacred and the Profane’ from the booklet ‘Nader in the Sacred’, articles by Ray”a, p. 404 (not available online)
The rabbi wrote in this language
And this despite all their rights. As long as the war against the Greeks was going on, this was the right trend, since the Greeks tipped the scales too much to the side of the secular, and an antithesis had to come to bring the scales back to the middle. The punishment was imposed on them because they continued this trend even after the victory over the Greeks.
Ostensibly, this is the situation in our time, since most of those living in Zion are secular and some are even progressive, and an antithesis is needed to bring the scales back to the middle
The article is true for perhaps another 50 years when most of the country will be religious, and perhaps then the students of Rabbi Zetzuk”l will scream what their rabbi saw in his holy spirit about the desecration of the Holy
Even if you are right, and you are not, it is still important to distinguish between a means adopted for tactical reasons and a fundamental concept. This is wrong even if it is right to use it. I also don't think you are right, because the war against secularization is not about expanding the sacred. It achieves the opposite results in my opinion. Among the Hasmoneans, there was a war that came to arouse the people against external enemies. To breathe life into them. Here you present yourself as an eccentric who does not inspire any identification.
In relation to the kingdom, this is not accurate. The terminology in the Bible of holy must be accurate because the Sages of Padut continue the Bible even at the level of language and terminology, and the word holy during the Bible period indicated things in a precise and not borrowed manner. And the Sages do not distinguish between halakhic and legendary language in this regard.
And the Bible seems to show that the king of Israel and everyone who is anointed with holy oil has holiness in him (non-halakhic holiness but with implications. Just as there is non-halakhic impurity in the Bible in Ezekiel that no impurity comes to him, etc. or the prohibition against touching the carcass of animals that are unclean for eating (which are simply called unclean) and they did not distinguish between the types of impurity). This is the reason why David was so afraid to lay his hand on Saul, the Messiah of the Lord, and also killed the one who killed him, even though it was Saul's own request. He really explained it there: How were you not afraid to lay your hand on something holy, etc. This was not just a Hasidic requirement, but he really grasped the reality that whoever lays his hand on something holy will be punished for it (as in the halakhic practice of laying his hand on something holy).
Apparently the perception is that the king of Israel is a high priest (the head of a kingdom of priests and a holy nation. And the holiness of Israel is something solid from a halakhic perspective) who is also anointed with holy oil. He is the Messiah. Also in the Psalms, in Psalm 12: Sit at my right hand, etc., by the word of Melchizedek (who was a priest to the Most High God). The name of the psalm is directed at the king. So there is the same kind of holiness for the kingdom as well. But in Vardai it does not belong to the State of Israel (whose leaders were not anointed with holy oil) unless it is said that the state is also like the ancient kingdom from a halakhic perspective (whose state has a king's law)
Who said there was a question about the word “holiness”? Maybe the original meaning of the concept “holiness” is broader than the halakhic meaning. And the sages and the halakhic scholars wanted to cut and define so that things would be clearer. Then the Bible did not lend the term “holiness to other things but used it in its original meaning. Maybe that's how, and maybe that's how the rabbi knows how to decide?
I don't disagree with the rabbi's distinction, but with the exclusivity he tries to create for the concept of holiness – there is holiness of the Temple and its holy places and there is holiness of the Sabbath and other things.
How is the rabbi's insistence on fighting semantics because of the dangers it poses different from the insistence of the line not to use the word gender or to be shocked by the gender point or not to donate blood because of parent A or parent B?
Let them call it holiness (because that's really what it's called in the sources). The main thing is that they understand that there is a difference between the Temple and its holy places and the Sabbath and the sacred places of the Jewish systems. And if there is a danger, we will detail it and explain what is dangerous and not fight over semantics because that's exactly how we lose the substantive and fruitful discussion.
As I wrote, the problem is with the meanings and usage. The semantics are really not interesting.
Honorable Rabbi Shalom, it seems to me that in the language of the Bible there is no use at all of the term "holy" in the sense of something mundane that is opposed to the sacred. It seems to me that this question began in the Second Temple period.
Hello Asael.
Even if there is no such term in the Bible, it only strengthens my position (of course 🙂 ) that some of the uses are borrowed. At least Chazal and all the later commentators understood that there is such a category and it is distinct from holiness.
“To distinguish between the holy and the profane, between the impure and the pure” ?
Where did you get the idea that people sanctify the flag in the synagogue? Just nice and nice, everything is good. Where do such assumptions come from, on which almost the entire column is based? There may be some extreme expression here and there about uniforms, no one takes it seriously and we can relax.
The call to martyrs for the murdered and for the soldiers derives from the concept of dying for the sanctification of God. Although there is an extension here – reference to everyone who died for the defense of the people of Israel dying for the sanctification of God, I will allow you to argue about that, but what does it have to do with fascism. Come on