The Essence of the Prohibition of Chametz (Column 468)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
I assume we’ve all grown accustomed to the homilies that treat chametz as a metaphor for flaws of the soul (this already begins with Chazal, and—true to form—the Ḥasidim take it to the limit), and from there interpret the search for chametz as an inner probing and self-correction. The premise of these sermons is that chametz is something loathsome from which the Torah commands us to distance ourselves and eradicate. Seemingly there are several halakhic proofs for this: for example, on Passover chametz is not nullified even in the smallest amount. Beyond that, the Torah itself prohibited it with “it shall not be seen and it shall not be found” (bal yera’eh u-bal yimatzeh) and also commanded us to eliminate it (“tashbitu”), unlike all other prohibitions of eating and deriving benefit. It is cited in the name of the Arizal to be careful about even the tiniest amount of chametz, and more and more. These extra stringencies are taken as indications that this is a particularly repulsive substance from which the Torah commands us to keep far away.
But this common, worn-out picture has no real basis, and the halakhic proofs adduced for it are also dubious. What emerges from the Torah, and likewise from Chazal and the halakhic authorities, regarding the prohibition of chametz is something entirely different, and in a certain sense quite the opposite. My remarks here are based on my article about chametz on Passover and the sciatic nerve (gid ha-nasheh) as historically-grounded prohibitions. There I greatly expanded on the foundation and its halakhic implications; here I will bring only the gist.
First Difficulty: The Source of the Prohibition of Deriving Benefit from Chametz
The Gemara in Pesachim 21b cites a dispute among Amoraim regarding the prohibition of deriving benefit from chametz:
Ḥizkiyah said: From where do we know that chametz on Passover is prohibited for benefit? As it is stated (Exodus 13), “Chametz shall not be eaten”—there shall be no permission for eating it. The reason is that Scripture wrote “shall not be eaten”; had it not written “shall not be eaten,” I would have thought it implies a prohibition of eating but not of benefit. And this disagrees with R. Abbahu, for R. Abbahu said: Wherever it says “it shall not be eaten,” “you shall not eat,” or “you shall not eat (pl.)”—it implies both a prohibition of eating and of benefit, [until] Scripture specifies otherwise as it did regarding a carcass (nevelah). As it was taught: (Deuteronomy 14) “You shall not eat any carcass; you may give it to the stranger within your gates and he shall eat it, or you may sell it to a foreigner,” etc.
R. Abbahu holds that if the Torah formulates a prohibition in terms of eating—such as “you shall not eat,” etc.—this includes a ban on deriving benefit as well, unless there is an explicit verse (as with a carcass, which the Torah permits giving or selling) indicating that benefit is allowed. Ḥizkiyah does not accept this and, in his view, we require an additional source to teach that something is also prohibited for benefit. Regarding chametz, he brings such a source from the passive phrasing “it shall not be eaten” (lo yei’achel), rather than “you shall not eat” (lo tokhlu) or similar. Rashi explains that from the passive wording it follows that the prohibition is that the chametz be eaten by someone, for example, a non-Jew—yet a non-Jew is certainly not prohibited in chametz. It therefore appears that the reason is that the Jew sold him the chametz and profited from its price. That is, the prohibition is on deriving benefit from chametz, not merely on eating it.
It is clear from the sugya that the dispute does not pertain only to chametz, but to all prohibitions of eating in the Torah (although from the sugya there it emerges that there are very few practical differences, because in most cases there are additional sources that equalize the opinions). In that general dispute, Rambam rules like R. Abbahu (Laws of Forbidden Foods 8:15):
Wherever the Torah says “you shall not eat,” “you shall not eat (pl.),” “it shall not be eaten,” or “they shall not eat,” it implies both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit, until Scripture specifies otherwise as it did regarding nevelah—“you may give it to the stranger… or sell it to the foreigner”—or unless it is clarified in the Oral Torah that benefit is permitted, such as creeping things, swarming things, blood, a limb from a live animal, and the sciatic nerve, all of which are permitted for benefit by received tradition even though they are forbidden to eat.
Yet, remarkably, at the beginning of Hilkhot Chametz u-Matzah, Rambam brings Ḥizkiyah’s view as halakhah:
1. Anyone who eats an olive-bulk (kezayit) of chametz on Passover—from the beginning of the night of the 15th until the end of the 21st of Nisan—intentionally is liable to karet, as it says (Exodus 12), “whoever eats chametz shall be cut off.” If unwitting, he must bring a fixed sin-offering. This applies whether he ate it directly or dissolved it and drank.
2. Chametz on Passover is prohibited for benefit, as it says (Exodus 13), “Chametz shall not be eaten”—there shall be no permission for eating it. One who leaves chametz in his possession on Passover, though he did not eat it, transgresses two negative commandments, as it says (Exodus 12), “No leaven shall be seen with you in all your borders,” and “Leaven shall not be found in your houses.” The prohibition of chametz and of se’or (leavening agent) with which dough is leavened are one and the same.
It is indeed a known rule that Rambam does not insist on citing the source that remained the conclusion of the sugya, but the source that seems to him more lucid and compelling (see Kesef Mishneh here on halakhah 2). But here the source of Ḥizkiyah does not seem to have any particular advantage; on the contrary, you can see above that the interpretive derivation is rather convoluted.
Second Difficulty: “Half-Measure” (Chatzi Shiur) in the Prohibition of Chametz
In Yoma 73b, R. Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish dispute the status of a half-measure—i.e., if one consumes (not necessarily eating; this is not the place) less than the requisite quantity of a prohibited item. According to Reish Lakish, he violates only a rabbinic prohibition; according to R. Yoḥanan, a Torah prohibition (though liability to punishment applies only upon consuming a full measure).
And behold, in 1:7 of Hilkhot Chametz u-Matzah, Rambam rules regarding half-measure in chametz as follows:
One who eats from the chametz itself on Passover any amount whatsoever is prohibited by Torah law, as it is stated (Exodus 13), “Chametz shall not be eaten.” Nevertheless, one incurs karet or a sacrifice only for the full measure of an olive-bulk (kezayit). One who deliberately eats less than a kezayit is lashed with disciplinary lashes (makkat mardut).
Rambam learns the prohibition of half-measure in chametz from that same verse, “lo yei’achel” (“shall not be eaten”). Here too, the commentaries have already noted that it is unclear why he needs a special source when there is a general rule that half-measure is biblically prohibited. The Kesef Mishneh leaves this in need of explanation, and the Mishneh La-Melekh cites a resolution from the Maharlanch:
Accordingly, one may wonder about our master (Rambam): Why does he need a verse for chametz on Passover? For in all prohibitions of the Torah, we hold that half-measure is biblically prohibited… Our master, the Kesef Mishneh, already raised this question and left it unresolved.
I saw that R. Maharlanch, Responsa §51, was troubled by this question and answered: The prohibition of chametz is not comparable to chelev (forbidden fat), whence half-measure is learned, because chelev is always forbidden and never had a period of permissibility, whereas chametz is permitted before Passover; therefore, a separate verse was needed to prohibit half-measure of chametz (before Passover)…
Maharlanch explains that where prohibitions are time-dependent (i.e., they have a time of permissibility—what in other contexts is called “a matter that has a permit,” davar she-yesh lo matirin), there is no rule of half-measure; hence Rambam needed a special verse for half-measure in chametz. But this is quite surprising, since the dispute of R. Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in Yoma is stated regarding the eating prohibitions of Yom Kippur—which is certainly a time-dependent prohibition.
To explain this, we must enter a bit into the relationship between the prohibition of chametz and that of se’or (leaven).
The Relationship Between the Prohibition of Chametz and the Prohibition of Se’or
At the end of halakhah 2 cited above, Rambam notes that the prohibitions of chametz and of se’or (the agent that leavens) that both appear in the Torah are one and the same prohibition. The commentaries already note that he is alluding to the sugya at the beginning of tractate Beitzah. The first Mishnah there records a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel:
Beit Shammai say: For se’or the measure is a kezayit (olive-bulk), and for chametz—the measure is like a date’s bulk (k’kotevet). Beit Hillel say: This and that are [both] a kezayit.
Simply read, the dispute concerns the prohibition of eating chametz, and the question is whether the measure for se’or in this regard is the same as or different from the measure for ordinary chametz.
The Gemara there (7b) discusses this dispute:
What is Beit Shammai’s reasoning? If so, let Scripture write only “chametz,” and not “se’or,” and I would have said: If chametz, whose leavening is not strong, is [prohibited] with a kezayit, then se’or, whose leavening is strong, all the more so [should be prohibited]! If so, why did Scripture write “se’or”? To tell you that the measure of this is not the measure of that.
Beit Shammai reason that if the verse had written “chametz” and not “se’or,” we would learn se’or by a fortiori reasoning, since its leavening is harsher than regular chametz. From this they conclude that the appearance of the word “se’or” must teach that the measures differ between chametz and se’or. Why is chametz then a date-bulk and se’or a kezayit, and not the reverse? Apparently because, according to Beit Shammai’s logic, se’or is the more severe prohibition (its leavening is harsher, as the Gemara itself states), so a smaller measure suffices to incur liability for eating it.
Beit Shammai’s words are very puzzling, for se’or is so leavened that it is not fit even for a dog’s consumption (see, for example, the Tosefta brought by the Ra’avad at the beginning of the chapter cited). If so, the very fact that its leavening is harsh is a reason that there should be no prohibition of eating or benefit (as with all items prohibited for benefit in the Torah, which are not prohibited if consumed in an unusual manner or when not edible). Yet Beit Shammai see this as a reason for greater stringency (over regular chametz). Note as well that with the prohibition of chametz, the general halakhic rule applies that if the item is not edible there is no prohibition (see regarding moldy bread in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 442:2).
What do Beit Hillel answer? The Gemara states:
And Beit Hillel: [Both terms are] needed. For if the Torah had written only “se’or,” I would have said: Because its leavening is strong [it alone is prohibited]; but chametz, whose leavening is not strong—say it is not [prohibited]. Therefore “chametz” was necessary. And had the Torah written only “chametz,” I would have said: Because it is edible [it is prohibited]; but se’or, which is not edible—say it is not [prohibited]. Therefore “se’or” was necessary.
Beit Hillel dispute Beit Shammai and argue that there is a refutation to their a fortiori argument from chametz to se’or, because se’or is not edible. Seemingly they accept the very logic I raised above. Thus, in their view, had the Torah not written the prohibition of se’or, I would have thought that only chametz is prohibited to eat, whereas se’or is not, since it is not edible. And still, Beit Shammai’s reasoning requires explanation.
On a second look, we can see that even Beit Hillel do not wholly disagree with this logic. For they add in their “both are needed” that if the verse had written only “se’or,” I would not have known the prohibition of chametz, because se’or’s leavening is strong and perhaps only it is prohibited. That is, they too accept Beit Shammai’s odd a fortiori, except that in their view there is also an inverse relation between chametz and se’or, hence the dual necessity. The upshot is that what we noted about Beit Shammai is equally difficult regarding Beit Hillel: How can one make an a fortiori from chametz to se’or when se’or is not edible?
Note that once the Torah has written that se’or is prohibited, this is not such a difficulty—for that is precisely what is being taught (though there remains to ask why specifically here the Torah innovates a prohibition regarding something inedible). But the Gemara here shows that according to Beit Shammai and on one side of Beit Hillel, the word “se’or” would have been superfluous, since we would have learned it by a fortiori reasoning from chametz even had it not been written. That is indeed very difficult.
For completeness I note that later in the sugya the Gemara understands that the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel pertains to bal yera’eh (it shall not be seen) and not to the prohibition of eating and benefit—but that is for a side reason. The questions—how can there be a prohibition of eating/benefit in se’or that is inedible, and why it is more stringent than chametz—do not trouble the Gemara.[1]
The Essence of the Prohibition of Chametz
We have seen that for prohibitions of eating, items that are inedible are not subject to the prohibition. The Gemara explains that such consumption is considered “not in the normal manner of enjoyment.” If, in the case of chametz, the Gemara assumes that se’or would be even more prohibited because its leavening is stronger—and is unbothered by the fact that it is not edible—the implication is that the essence of the prohibition of eating chametz is not about deriving enjoyment from eating chametz. Therefore it does not trouble the Gemara that eating se’or is not the normal manner of enjoyment. What, then, is it? It emerges that the Gemara understands the essence of the prohibition of chametz not as distancing from some loathsome substance (as with other prohibitions of eating/benefit), but as a prohibition on the act of eating chametz as a remembrance of what happened at the Exodus. My claim is that the prohibition of eating chametz—like the story of the Exodus—is a reenactment of what was. It is a historically-grounded prohibition. Just as our ancestors did not eat chametz, so too we are not to eat chametz. Note that the import is that chametz is not intrinsically loathsome. This is not a prohibition on the object (issur ḥeftza) but a prohibition on the act of eating (issur gavra).
If this is the essence of the prohibition, we can now understand why the Torah forbids se’or even though it is inedible. Se’or is certainly chametz. In fact, it is “more chametz” than regular chametz, since its leavening is stronger. When a person eats se’or, he performs the act of eating upon chametz; therefore it is prohibited. The Gemara is untroubled that there is no enjoyment here, since the essence of the ban is not enjoyment from eating chametz but the act of eating performed upon an object that is chametz—and se’or, as noted, is very much chametz. In contrast, moldy bread is not considered chametz at all, and for that there is indeed no prohibition of eating/benefit. Se’or is inedible because of its intense leavening and is used to leaven other doughs; therefore it clearly falls under the category of chametz.
Note that Beitzah says we would know this even without the Torah explicitly prohibiting se’or. That is, this very essence of the prohibition of chametz is clear even prior to the explicit mention of se’or. It follows from the Torah’s own presentation, which forbids chametz because our ancestors’ dough did not have time to leaven. Had our ancestors eaten chametz and not matzah, the Torah would have prohibited matzah for us and required us to eat chametz. There is nothing inherently loathsome or special about chametz per se.
Resolving Rambam: The Relationship Between the Prohibitions of Eating and Benefit in Chametz
We saw above that Rambam rules like R. Abbahu that any prohibition of eating also entails a ban on deriving benefit (unless the Torah permits benefit, as with nevelah). Why, in fact, is that so? Rambam offers an original explanation. In Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Negative Commandment 187, he writes:
Know, O questioner, that the prohibition of deriving benefit is not to be counted as a separate commandment, because it and the prohibition of eating are one matter: eating is a species of benefit. When He, may He be exalted, says regarding something that “it shall not be eaten,” that is one of the forms of speaking about benefit; the intent is that one may not benefit from it—neither by eating nor otherwise. This is what they of blessed memory said (Pesachim 21b and elsewhere): “Wherever it says ‘you shall not eat,’ ‘you shall not eat (pl.),’ ‘it shall not be eaten’—it implies both a prohibition of eating and of benefit—until Scripture specifies otherwise as it did regarding nevelah,” where it clarified the permissibility of utility, as it says (Deut. 14), “You may give it to the stranger…,” etc. According to this principle, it is improper to count the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit as two commandments.
He explains that when the Torah forbids something in terms of eating, its intent is actually to forbid benefit, but it chooses the example of eating because eating is the most common form of benefit. The Torah speaks by way of examples—as with damages: the Torah obligates a person to pay if his ox causes damage, and we understand that this is only an example that extends to any damaging property, and so on.
These words of Rambam sharpen the fact that in ordinary food prohibitions the Torah expects us to distance ourselves from the item and derive no benefit from it whatsoever. The thing itself is loathsome in its eyes, and therefore we must keep away from it in all respects. By contrast, with chametz—as we have seen— the essence of the prohibition is not the loathsomeness of chametz but the obligation to remember what transpired in the Exodus. Therefore, in the prohibition there the Torah forbids the act of eating, not “benefit via eating.” From here you can understand why, in the case of chametz, a ban on eating does not automatically entail a ban on benefit: Rambam’s logic does not apply there. Hence it is clear why Rambam requires a special source to prohibit deriving benefit from chametz, and does not learn it from the mere fact that eating is prohibited.[2]
Once an additional source is brought, it turns out that the Torah does prohibit chametz for benefit as well. Evidently, that source teaches us that just as there is a prohibition to eat chametz because our ancestors did not eat chametz, so too there is a prohibition to derive benefit from chametz because our ancestors did not derive benefit from chametz. The prohibition of benefit, like that of eating, is a remembrance of the Exodus.
Resolving Rambam: Half-Measure in Chametz
From here we can also understand why Rambam needed a special source to prohibit half-measure in chametz. According to most opinions, the rule of half-measure applies to “object-prohibitions” (issurei ḥeftza). Regarding “act-prohibitions” (issurei gavra)—such as carrying or transferring on Shabbat—there is no rule of half-measure (there are several explanations; this is not the place. See for example here). Hence, if the prohibition of chametz is not an object-prohibition but an act-prohibition—i.e., a ban on the act of eating—then the rule of half-measure would not apply.
This also sheds light on Maharlanch’s position cited above. He claimed there is no rule of half-measure in time-dependent prohibitions. Simply read, his intent appears to be that time-dependent prohibitions are issurei gavra (see Etvan De’oraita §10), and therefore they do not have half-measure. But as I noted, taken at face value this cannot be said, for the sugya of half-measure and the dispute of R. Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish concern the eating prohibitions of Yom Kippur, which are also time-dependent and thus (apparently) issurei gavra. According to our approach here we may suggest that this does not apply to every issur gavra. Specifically with chametz, the prohibition is historical—a remembrance of the Exodus—so there it is inappropriate to prohibit half-measure, since the chametz itself is not a loathsome object. But on Yom Kippur we are commanded to distance ourselves from the enjoyments of eating and drinking; therefore, although the prohibition is time-dependent, there the object is deemed “loathsome” (for that day), and thus the rule of half-measure applies there as well.[3]
Alternatively, one can employ here the view of several later authorities who hold that the rule of half-measure applies only to eating prohibitions (see the article cited), whereas the prohibition of chametz is not defined as a “food prohibition” but as a prohibition on the act of eating.
In my article I explained thus as well the words of the Pri Megadim, who wrote that there is no rule of half-measure regarding the sciatic nerve (gid ha-nasheh). The sciatic nerve is also a prohibition grounded in remembrance of a historical event (Jacob’s struggle with the angel); therefore, there too the prohibition is on the act of eating and not on the object (the sciatic nerve is not intrinsically loathsome).[4] To remember Jacob’s struggle with the angel, we were prohibited from eating the sciatic nerve—not because there is something repulsive in it. Consequently, there is no rule of half-measure there either.[5]
Summary
The conclusion from our discussion is that the prohibitions of eating and benefiting from chametz are not based on chametz being something loathsome, but are part of the remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt. One might support this by noting that if it were loathsome, there would be reason to avoid it all year and not only on Passover. But one cannot state this universally, since regarding eating on Yom Kippur we raised the possibility that although it is a temporary prohibition, the object is deemed loathsome for that day (though there is much room to distinguish between these two prohibitions). In any case, this conclusion emerges from the halakhic picture described here, and first and foremost from the plain sense of the Torah. In my article cited above I brought additional indications.
We also find this explicitly in the Passover Haggadah:[6]
This matzah that we eat—what is it for? Because the dough of our ancestors did not have time to leaven before the King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He, revealed Himself to them and redeemed them, as it is said: “And they baked the dough that they brought out of Egypt into matzah cakes, for it had not leavened, for they were driven out of Egypt and could not tarry” (Exodus 12:39)…
The proofs I mentioned at the beginning from the extra stringencies that halakhah set regarding chametz are not proofs either. The Torah sternly warns us to be careful regarding the act of eating or deriving benefit from chametz, not about distancing ourselves from the object itself. The added safeguards were instituted to prevent the act of eating, not interaction with the chametz per se. Note that for a kezayit there is the prohibition of “bal yera’eh u-bal yimatzeh,” as well as the obligation of “tashbitu.” But for less than a kezayit—i.e., chasing crumbs—the early authorities already wrote that this is only so that one not come to eat it (since one does not disengage from it during the rest of the year). That is, in the extra stringencies mentioned, the focus is distancing from the act of eating, not from chametz as such. Likewise, the obligation to destroy the chametz (after having nullified it) is only so that one not come to eat it.
Returning to the various homilies that treat chametz as something loathsome from which to distance oneself, I will say what I say about aggadic derashot in general: It is certainly proper to search our ways and examine ourselves, and to refine our character and divine service—but this has no connection whatsoever to the prohibition of chametz. This is precisely what is called “derush” (see in Column 52 on the difference between derush and pilpul). The value of such derashot is chiefly to serve as vortlach for sheva berakhot and festive meals (and one should immediately take care to forget them); if they are written, there is of course the important use of placing them under a wobbly table leg.
A happy and kosher holiday to us all.
[1] In the Shulchan Aruch cited (O.C. 442:2) he writes that for moldy bread unfit even for a dog, there is also no prohibition of bal yera’eh, and one is not obligated to destroy it. But with se’or there is certainly a prohibition of eating and benefit, and also an obligation to destroy it.
[2] In the Gemara in Pesachim, the dispute of R. Abbahu and Ḥizkiyah also pertains to chametz, but it can be shown that Rambam does not rule in accordance with that sugya throughout (there are a number of rulings concluded in that sugya that Rambam does not bring as halakhah. My contention is that the same holds for the dispute of R. Abbahu and Ḥizkiyah: Rambam rules like R. Abbahu, but the sugya in Pesachim thought their dispute applies also to chametz—and Rambam does not rule like it there. Perhaps the basis is the sugya in Beitzah that we saw, which takes a different view, and Rambam assumes there is a conflict of sugyot. See at length in my Pesachim lectures, classes 10–22.)
[3] One may discuss whether the eating prohibition on Yom Kippur is a temporary object-prohibition, or perhaps an act-prohibition (per Etvan De’oraita that temporary prohibitions are always issurei gavra). But since we are commanded to distance ourselves from a loathsome “object” (for that day), we treat it like object-prohibitions for this purpose.
One can also consider whether Maharlanch’s words can be interpreted along the lines I wrote here, even though he stated them generally about time-dependent prohibitions; in any case, the Yom Kippur prohibitions are difficult for him. If we assume the eating prohibitions on Yom Kippur are object-prohibitions, it is easier to explain them as I have suggested.
[4] This is the exact reverse of Yom Kippur (a temporary object-prohibition), for here it is a historical prohibition without a later permit. This sharpens my claim that the main point does not hinge on ḥeftza versus gavra, but on whether the ban concerns a loathsome object or an act (against a historical backdrop).
[5] See there also the apparent contradiction with the conclusion of the sugya in Pesachim; this is an additional support for my claim that Rambam rejected that sugya as halakhah.
[6] But see at the beginning of the article here for his discussion of Ramban’s words.
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Add that dough rising was invented in ancient Egypt.
Really? Very interesting. I didn't know. Is this agreed upon? Is there a source?
Who invented bread? Well, no one really knows, but it is known that at a very early stage in his development, man discovered the various types of grain – wheat and barley – which then grew in nature as wild plants. He also found that they could be used for food and therefore tried and succeeded in domesticating them, that is: to multiply them artificially by sowing.
The next step on the way to creating bread was to dry the grain in the sun and grind it by grinding it between stones. Grinding the grains created (and still creates) the flour. The flour was then mixed with water and a dough was formed that was worked into various flat shapes, baked and created the first breads in human history, which were flat and thin.
The ancient Egyptians were, in fact, the first to discover the ability to leaven dough from wheat flour (which was abundant on the banks of the Nile River) and to create bread from it in shapes and textures different from those known until then. The Egyptians did not understand how the dough rises and bubbles form in it, but they understood that mixing a little of the old dough with the new helps it happen. They may not have known it, but the Egyptians were the ones who discovered the “sour” or “sour leaven”. The sourdough is a habitat for yeast, a species of unicellular organism belonging to the fungus family and is found in the air around us and on grape skins.
https://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=12599
Who is wrong?
On the 10th of Nisan 2
Ramada – Shalom Rav,
On leavened bread as a characteristic of Egypt, see the article by Prof. Zohar Amar, ‘We Do Not Eat Egyptian Bread‘, on the website ‘Mossaf Shabbat – Makor Rishon’.
With greetings, Hillel Feiner-Glossinos
In the Bible, Egypt symbolizes the boundless hedonism ‘as the deed of the land of Egypt’ and the greatness of the ‘great jackal lying within its lights, which says ‘Lights are mine, and I have made them’. Egypt was the source of horses, so the Torah forbade the multiplication of horses so as not to return from Egypt.
Hedonism and pride are characteristics of a developed civilization. The Torah does not see asceticism as an ideal. On the contrary, it sends the people of Israel to a ‘land flowing with milk and honey’ where God gives man ’power to do good’. But the enjoyment and refinement of life should be in moderation. No limitless permissiveness or inflated pride.
And so an Israelite king must sanctify himself even in what is permitted to him. Not to multiply wives, not to multiply horses, nor to silver and gold, and he must be careful not to exalt his heart above his brothers. And so the Torah permits leaven all year round and even commands its use in sacred service in the sacrifices of thanksgiving and the assembly, but it all begins with the seven days of abstinence from leaven so that we do not become addicted to it.
The days of Independence Day will mark for us throughout the year a careful and intelligent use of leaven, the 'light in the dough' will inspire us to action and development that will improve and settle the world, but we will be careful not to slip into limitless permissiveness and arrogance.
In relation to matzah, leaven expresses the value of human activity. Leaven bread is more invested and therefore tastier. It is the fruit of labor.
Just as labor is beautiful on weekdays when we are commanded to “do labor,” but requires one strike a week to remind us of His work that gives us “the power to do good.”
Likewise, leaven bread is beautiful and exquisite all year round, as long as we have times and places to abstain from leaven, the days of Passover and the Feast of Unleavened Bread, and the offerings in the Temple, when we abstain from eating leaven, and eat “bread of poverty,” which reminds us that “all our actions are also actions for us.” And the more we act and do, the more we depend on God’s help.
These are the times of the leaven strike, which will guide us throughout the year to remember how dependent we are on the grace of God.
Best regards, Hillel Feiner-Glossinos
On the 13th of Nisan 2
If the leaven is the ‘Egyptian bread’ symbolizing the culture of hedonism and luxury of Egypt – then Egypt was praised for the ’goodness of Egypt’ that Pharaoh sent to Jacob to lure him down from Egypt. ‘goodness of Egypt’ This is explained by the sages as ’grains of beans’
If so, there is a deep meaning to be found in the small abstinences on the Feast of Independence, beyond the reasons explained in the words of the poskim, that we abstain on the Feast of Exodus‘ from those ‘grains of beans’ Representing the ‘goodness of Egypt’ that attracted our ancestors to go down there.
With the blessing of Pek”sh, P”g
[What you wrote that Egypt symbolizes hedonism and excess, I will go and reveal your meaning, because Egypt is called excess in the Bible in several places, and in Isaiah 37:17, and Egypt is vanity and emptiness, they will help, therefore I called it excess, they are Sabbath.]
On the 11th of Nisan 15th
Telg – Shalom Rav,
May your strength be exalted for the mention of Egypt as ‘Rahav’ in the Bible. Indeed, that is what I meant.
With the blessing of a Kosher and Happy Passover, P‘G
Cultivating humility, is also expressed in the story of the Exodus around the ‘Mikra Bikurim’, in which the tiller of the soil presents the fruit of his labor, and ’reminds us of the forgotten’ that his ancestors were foreigners and slaves, persecuted and tortured, and therefore in times of success he must acknowledge the favor of his Creator. And to recite His praises.
Shalom Rabbi,
What is the idea behind the leaven that was passed on during Passover according to your explanation here?
This is only a rabbinical prohibition, and its purpose is to ensure that we do not leave any leaven with us on Passover itself.
Does this actually mean that if a person enters a hospital and there is leaven there that belongs to another person, he is not committing any offense of "not showing"?
Absolutely not. You are allowed to walk down the street even if there is a risk that you will end up eating chametz. Take care that this does not happen.
There is a similar opinion to the words of the Rabbi (according to the Rambam) in Maka. There is a ruling that there is no prohibition on choosing a half-shir on Shabbat (Shabbat, ed.), and the Maharal on Atar (not cited) explains the ruling by saying that choosing less than half a shiur is considered a choice at all.
There are many examples and many have argued for this. One explanation is that in a partial action it is not the action in a smaller quantity but something else. Not always convincing. In the displacement and assumption at the beginning of Shabbat (the Rosh and the Sheph) this seems very true.
Rabbi Yoel Ben Nun explains the matter of chametz and matzah through a fairly simple reading of the scriptures.
https://www.herzog.ac.il/vtc/0034201.html
You quoted from the Rabbi Levi that one should not learn half a lesson in leaven from milk because it is a lie that the leaven had a time of permission. And you made it difficult for him that half a lesson is prohibited on Yom Kippur without a special verse, even though it depends on time. Perhaps the Rabbi Levi did not mean the matter of time but rather the matter of leavening, since everything from His creation is not leaven, and only the event of leavening occurred in it and was prohibited, and leavening is like the mixture in meat and milk (a search shows that the Gemara in Pesachim thus says that meat, milk, and leaven had a time of permission, unlike circumcision), and something that is prohibited because of an event that occurred in it is (for some reason) easier than something that was prohibited from His creation, and is not a matter of time.
I was wrong. In the Haralba's response published by the Keren Ra'am Institute (Otzar Hochma), paragraph 18, he wrote (as quoted by the Haralba cited in the column) because leaven was permitted before Pesach, and not as I thought to suggest, since leaven was permitted before it soured.
However, it is still worth discussing, because it seems quite clear that Haralba took the interpretation from the Gemara in Pesachim 25 above, which says that leaven on Pesach had its time of kosher like meat in milk, and apparently there is no need to interpret the Gemara there as Haralba interpreted it, that leaven had its time of kosher before Pesach, but rather it can be interpreted that it had its time of kosher before it soured. [And with regard to half a shiur of meat and milk, which is considered to be at least a taboo when eaten, there is a regular prohibition even for half a shiur, even though according to this interpretation it was kosher. It is possible to invent that now that chametz is present on Pesach, it would prove that even though it was kosher, it is forbidden.]
You argued that the Gemara accepts that leaven is forbidden (K6:16) even though it is not fit to eat, and that the Rambam needed special studies for half a shiur and pleasure even though these are general laws for all eating prohibitions. And you explained that leaven is a special prohibition based on historical memory and is defined as a prohibition of the act of eating, and therefore a) does not depend on the view of eating as one enjoys it, b) since it is not from the Maiasut, it is not clear that pleasure is forbidden and a special verse is needed that also pleasure is included in memory as was forbidden by our ancestors, c) since it is a prohibition of action, there is no general half a shiur in it, but a special innovation in the prohibition of the action of leaven, in which there is a half shiur for some reason.
A. In the end, everything rests on the Gemara in the fact that there is a side to learning that leaven is forbidden even though leaven is not fit to eat. This is where you got the central idea that the prohibition of chametz is not actually a prohibition of enjoyment, and from there you learned that the Rambam did not study the case of Pesachim that you cited in note 2 (Sher’ Yossi the Galilean permits chametz for enjoyment even though it is written not to eat, and it is difficult for Hezekiah and R’ Abbahu, and the Gemara will not agree that R’ Abbahu's general law does not at all concern chametz, which is a special prohibition) but that chametz is a special prohibition, and the Gedera + Tema dekra is that it is a prohibition of action based on historical memory, and therefore special studies are needed for half a lesson and the prohibition of enjoyment, and the Rambam, with his strong hand, went and found such studies for him.
And this is based on the fact that you interpret in a nutshell that the words of the Gemara in B’S and B’H regarding Shaur and chametz are also correct, despite the words of R’Abbahu's sermon. It is said that there is a prohibition against eating in the Shaur, “This is the light, this is the leaven,” and this sermon that was brought forward in the continuation of the Sugiya (as in the Gemara there is early and late) is only a “side reason” for causing a dispute in the B’s and B’s only regarding the prohibition of not being seen.
Is this interpretation in the Gemara in the egg an excuse for the Rambam (what did he see to invent sermons regarding half a shiur and enjoyment of leaven and apparently not as a Sugiya on Passovers) or does it seem to you to be correct in itself? I will assume that it is correct in itself, because at least the Rambam, according to your words, should think that this interpretation is correct in itself.
The alternative interpretation (which seems very simple to me) is that the prohibition of eating with a light requires a special verse since it is not suitable for eating and there is no side to learn the prohibition of eating with a light from leaven since it is certainly easy and materially it is very puzzling, and only regarding the prohibition of not being seen did the B&H and B&H disagree after the light was forbidden in eating and the leaven was forbidden both in eating and in seeing the light, whether it is forbidden that the light of the light be seen (Beit Shammai) or whether the rabbi still has something to say about the light not being suitable for eating and perhaps there is no not being seen in it even though it is prohibited for eating (Beit Hillel. Perhaps there was less concern that he would eat by mistake).
And in this it is self-evident that leavened bread is permissible to eat even for the House of Shammai, and they do not learn it from chametz (and according to your interpretation, they are not interested in this detail of being fit to eat according to one's own pleasure, since the prohibition of chametz is a prohibition of the act of eating and not a prohibition of eating, so why do the B”S not learn a loaf of bread that has been left from the Shaor, and you explained that the Shaor, since it is leavened, is called by the name of chametz and the name of its ancestors, even though it is not fit to eat, and this is a simple explanation for the B”S and the B”S). Then this also fits the Sugya in Pesachim, which did not occur to her that chametz is an exception to the teaching of R’ Abbahu (although Hezekiah's teaching is certainly not exceptional since the Torah in the leaven adopted a special passive language. And from the very evidence from Pesach that it is not like a leaven [for your interpretation], it is ostensibly rejected that the difficulty there with Mary is only for Hezekiah and not for Rambam Abbahu).
And only the difficulties remain with Rambam, who brought sources from himself, and your rejections of the simplistic answers that he simply brought a source that seemed more convenient to him since there is no source are apparently not solid enough to build such a large volume of Rumi on them.
B. Isn't it very surprising that leaven is a special prohibition of all prohibitions, and yet, miraculously, all its laws are the same as all prohibitions of eating, that what is not fit for eating is permitted, and half a portion is forbidden, and forbidden for enjoyment, and only in the shor is there a special prohibition (which you explained anyway from another side of the coin, although it seems that this comparison should be discussed). It is beautiful that there are sermons, and that you explained that they still fit together even when the main thing is historical memory [the prohibition of enjoyment did not exist even for our ancestors. And what is not fit for eating "does not have the name leaven" on it; and there is not even a historical memory in it. And half a shiur is a special innovation, even though it is a prohibition of action, it is still prohibited and the reason is unknown (and why don't we learn about half a shiur in other prohibitions of action), but it is still a rather surprising phenomenon to see a matter that in all its laws is equal to all others, quacking like a duck and being eaten in orange sauce like a duck, and yet to say that on the truth side, it is a rooster and a rooster is its doctrine.
A. Not everything is based on the Gemara in Bitza. I wrote that it could perhaps form the basis for the Rambam's decision to reject the issue of Passover from the halakhah. I gave several reasons for my understanding of the prohibition of chametz, including the Torah and the sayings of the Sages. Therefore, there is no room for evidence from the issue of Passover, since in my opinion it was rejected from the halakhah according to the Rambam. There is much more evidence for this that was not presented here.
You completely ignore the Gemara in Bitza, which bases this on the prohibition of eating. It only goes to the conclusion that it should not be seen, and not for that reason. And even in Bitza, it is strange to say so, since it is simply said that chametz is prohibited from eating. Certainly for the early systems, this is a restriction (da'orita) for eating.
B. Its laws are not entirely identical. There are strictures in the shor, in the nullification of something, in the obligation to eliminate and not to see, and so on. But as a general rule, Halacha follows fixed paths as much as possible, and this is the path of every normative system.
A. Oh, I focused on halachic arguments as opposed to the Torah and the sayings of the sages. Rejecting the issue of Passover (meaning even in the incidental things that came into it, such as the assumption that the sayings of Hezekiah and R’ Abbahu are also relevant regarding chametz) is not enough to renew the idea that chametz is a special law in that it requires special studies for half a lesson and the prohibition of enjoyment, and therefore, as far as I understand, the halachic basis for renewal is only the Gemara in Bitza, which in your interpretation allows you to learn the prohibition of eating leaven from the prohibition of eating leaven in a general way, even though leaven is not fit to be eaten, which is very puzzling, as you wrote, and hence eating leaven is a special matter, etc.
[I have nothing to add, but I will write my opinion at length to remove the complaint that I ignored the Gemara in Bitza]
I say that the Gemara's silence in explaining the teachings of B'Sh and B'H is indeed correct only according to the conclusion (and in accordance with the baraita) that they dealt with Babylonian fear, and according to the Ha'A who supposedly thought that the controversy also revolved around eating, then the teaching from leaven to light is not correct at all because light is not fit to be eaten.
The Gemara asked about Beit Shammai, since there is a teaching that Shaur and Chametz are equal, and in particular equal in shiur, and answered that the teaching is regarding the shiur of eating (and from this teaching they apparently also derive the main prohibition of eating Shaur) and it is indeed equal, but B ”S ”B And on what grounds did you reject this interpretation in the column (which was presented only in passing ‘to complete the picture’) – on the basis of the order of the parts of the issue in the Gemara, as if in the Havva Amina that the dispute between B”S and B”B revolves around the issue of eating, tacitly accepting the teaching of B”S from leaven to leaven. And on the basis of this minor issue, you wrote that I completely ignore the Gemara in Bitzah.
Besides the fact that it is easy to settle the question, the Gemara could have made the study of B's difficult in this way, but it preferred a more important question than the actual ruling of B's: how can they divide between chametz and shor, since there is a study that they are equal, and it explained that the study only concerns eating, while the dispute between B's and B's revolves around elimination (and in any case, the question that the Gemara chose not to make difficult was also removed), and it also stated that in general, the arrangement between the parts of the issue (as opposed to the arrangement within that part) does not seem necessary to me, since the difficulty from the words of R' Zira is about the actual words of B's and does not concern the silence of the Gemara before that, and perhaps the question from the words of R' Zira (and the help from the Baraita) were still long before the Shk”t May Te'ma Dev”sh and B”h.
On the other hand, regarding the interpretation of “your” there is the enormous problem that you presented in the column that the words of B”sh (and also the words of B”h) are “very puzzling” etc., which is actually the great one that in the evidence does not deal at all with the prohibition of eating, and the solution comes only with a serious revolution. And I did not add anything that is actually in it.
B. Thank you. By the way, now I am thinking that perhaps the prohibition of not seeing leaven is the main root of the idea from the Sages onwards that leaven is so obscene. From a historical memory perspective, what is the meaning of this special prohibition of not seeing leaven?
I don't understand what you answered, nor what the difficulty is in my words. After all, what I wrote that is difficult in B&B and B&V will be settled by my own reasoning according to my principle. So what is the point of making my interpretation difficult? And what did you answer about the evidence from the first part of the question that does not agree at all with your words? You didn't answer anything. So call your proposal the simple interpretation of the question?! I wonder! At most, you can suggest, as Tos writes from time to time, that they could have made this difficult too, but since it was rejected anyway, they didn't bother to do so. But that is of course a big push. Add to that all the evidence from the Rambam and you will see that my words are the simple and clear interpretation of the question.
B. I don't see why historical memory wouldn't be appropriate for the aggravation of Bel Yairah and other aggravations on Passover? Why does a regular eating prohibition justify them and a historical prohibition not? On the contrary, there are normal boundaries in eating prohibitions, and if this is an exception here, then there is a basis for my claim that this is not a normal eating prohibition.
A. I am equipped only with the eyes of flesh, and with them I see no difficulty (at most a slight grammatical quibble, and the price you pay to remove it is much more expensive than it is worth). I will try to search the commentators to see references (how did they explain the great wonder of the Havva Amina in your interpretation of the House of Shammai, who teach the prohibition of eating a light meal with a light and a leavened substance, even though a light meal is not fit to be eaten, and what did they disagree about in the Bible).
B. You are right.
In the Commentaries of the Treasury, they cited the opinion of Rosh Yosef in Bitza, https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=15206&st=&pgnum=57&hilite=, who writes that the explanation that light is not fit for eating is relevant only to the law of not seeing:
“Obit Hillel Tzrechi, etc. ’. Apparently, the taste of their group, because in appearance it is not a solution that is fit for eating, certainly in the matter of eating, one must write that every leavened bread and cut it off without impurity is not fit for eating, since it is fit. And Beit Hillel Sabri, the main reason for the explanation of the double view, the Torah forbade it because of the distance that one should not come to eat […] and therefore light is not fit for eating, which is brought to the category of not eating.
Incidentally, later on he writes (I quote his language in order to discuss it a little): “And what is the meaning of the word ‘nafk’ [in the shiur, whether it is kazeit or kakobet], since it is not read, half a shiur is forbidden. From (because of what?) it is not necessary to eat a pers. (See what I wrote in Frye Liv’d).”
This question is about the prohibition of bil yare’ah, which has methods that do not involve it, and not about the prohibition of eating chametz, which certainly involves it. As for why there is no half a shiur here, the intention of the rabbinic council can seemingly be interpreted in two ways.
Way A Babylon will see that there is no half-measure rule because it is not really a prohibition on eating, and therefore it is not said in it that Hezi la Istropi la Zeit in order to ‘eat’ Pers. And this is because he understands Hezi la Istropi as a reason and not as a sign.
In the second way (which seems correct) Babylon will see that light and eating light do not have Hezi la Istropi since it is not fit to eat, and he means what you said in the passage that you briefly quoted in the column (I did not see it in person) that Hezi la Istropi does not belong to things that are not fit to eat. [And now your words will come and explain why in these two cases there are prohibitions on eating even things that are not fit to eat at all – because these are from historical memory].
On the other hand, the P'M'G, which, as mentioned, interpreted the first part of the Sugya (regarding the chametz-shaur studies) solely according to the conclusion of the second part of the Sugya (that the dispute in B'S and B'H concerns only the prohibition against eating leaven), I saw in the Ha'Tzar commentaries that the method is grouped together, that it interprets, as the Tur says, that the first part of the Sugya also follows the Hava in the second part of the Sugya (that the dispute in B'S and B'H also concerns the prohibition against eating leaven).
https://mefo.otzar.org/#/t/143409.92281982023/b/173923/p/19/s/638129
I would like to find out if the rabbi wrote the article before Silman resigned from the government due to the Knesset chametz affair in hospitals? Because at the moment it is certain that chametz is an abomination, even for those who are like Minister Horwitz, and perhaps not just on Passover in a traumatic way (consider that the Hasidim will tell future generations “Chassidic stories” about a rabbi who was careless in defining the “prohibition of chametz” and ended up agreeing on the “prohibition of legumes”)?
The Radb”z is not a Katla Kanya
Is there a conceptual connection between chametz/shaur of Passover and the prohibition of sacrificing on the altar?
I have seen all sorts of fragments of ideas from Ezra and what was raised here in the comments – Rahav etc’.. This prohibition and its meaning are not really clear, and the prohibition of chametz in two different contexts is a bit strange, as is the prohibition of honey.
On the 11th of Nisan 15th
For a pure offering – Shalom Rav,
The Maharl says that matzah is ‘poverty bread’ due to its simplicity, its lack of complexity. Matzah contains no added flavorings or processing that adds flavor, but only flour and water. Such is freedom, in which a person does not depend on others, but is independent and lives with what he has.
In the service of the ’ Temple, there is also an emphasis on simplicity. There is much splendor and beauty in the Temple, but the priest works in simple white garments. Only the High Priest, who represents the entire people, is dressed in finery, but at the height of his work on Yom Kippur, when he enters the temple to ask for mercy and atonement – he is dressed in simple white garments.
And so the offerings that are offered to the altar do not include the leaven that tastes good, nor the sweetness of honey, but semolina and oil. This teaches us that God does not need flavorings, but the simplicity and humility of the person who comes before Him, and that his humble offering is pleasing to God, as it is written, "Your soul will be sacrificed." The simple offering expresses the quality of "walking with your God" that God demands of man.
With a blessing, Hillel Feiner-Glossinos
Perhaps the importance of simplicity is also related to the law that "there is no one to remove the Afikomen after Pesach," and on Seder night, the delicious sweets should not overshadow the main thing. And perhaps that is why they hint to the wise son, "There is no need to leave the Afikoman after Passover," so that he will not occupy the family conversation with his brilliance and profound insights, because on this night the goal is to strengthen and internalize the simple foundations of faith.
See the article by Rabbi Yoel ben Nun, cited in Hayutha above.
Thanks to the readers, and to Hayat for the article
Beautiful and tidy.
Happy Holidays
And perhaps the other deceptive meaning of honey -“Honey you have found enough to eat..” also connects to the end of the process proposed in the article.
After all, the end is not really the end.
The sinew is forbidden because it is a reminder of a historical event. Hence, as with hametz, the hafza is not disgusting, but rather one should distance oneself from the act of eating. Hence, as with hametz, the Torah should have taught us from another source the prohibition of enjoying the sinew. So why did the Rambam include it with the other prohibitions of enjoyment that are based on the very disgustingness of the hafza and not distancing oneself from it?
As far as I remember, Maimonides does not prohibit pleasure in the flesh.
Oh right, right, my mistake, sorry.
Do you think that the prohibition of eating leaven as you explained (historical basis) is the non-ta'a corresponding to the act of eating matzah (as in the mitzvot of Ma'qa, which has non-ta'a and act parallels)?
There is a similarity. See a series of columns on the subject where I dealt with this.
If this is really just a historical prohibition and does not stand on its own, then why did they themselves receive a command to eat only matzah for seven days? Why was the prohibition to eat leaven and the command to eat matzah given even before the Exodus from Egypt? Along with the command to sacrifice a lamb, at the beginning of the month in general?
We also say on Shabbat that it commemorates the Exodus from Egypt, does that mean it does not stand on its own?
This is a question that has nothing to do with me. I did not invent that matzah is because of the Exodus. Without going into the future vision of God, it seems to me that the simple precept was to eat the sacrifice with matzah, but the obligation to eat matzah itself is a different matter.
On Shabbat, the fact that it is a remembrance of the Exodus requires explanation. It has nothing to do with the name. Shabbat is a remembrance of the act of creation.
True, but in your opinion the question is much more difficult, because the prohibition is only historical, and there is nothing actually in matzah. It is like it would be very puzzling if we say that the Torah had forbidden our forefather Jacob to eat the sinew of the hansa even before the struggle, and then wrote that only because of the struggle is there a prohibition to eat.
I brought up Shabbat to say that the fact that it is written that eating matzah is a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt does not mean that it is only a remembrance of the fast, like Shabbat, which has both the prohibition in itself and what it reminds us of. I agree that your explanation excuses the difficulties you raised, I simply claim that you have replaced one difficulty with another here.
I didn't replace one difficulty with another. My difficulties lead to my foundation. Period. Now you can make it difficult for him, and you have to look for an answer. I offered an answer that seems completely reasonable to me. But if you enjoy staying in the ”, cheers.
In the Ten Commandments in the Book of Yitro, the reason given for remembering the Sabbath day to keep it holy is, “For in six days the Lord made the heavens and the earth, the sea, and all that is in them, and rested on the seventh day.” However, in the Book of Etachan, the reason given is, “So that your servant and your wife may rest like you, and remember that you were a servant and the Lord brought you out from there with a strong hand and with a stretched-out seed.” Therefore, the Lord commanded us to keep the Sabbath day.
This means that he rested on the Sabbath: both a remembrance of the act of Genesis and of the Exodus from Egypt. To teach us that He is the God of the entire world and the God of Israel and its Redeemer. Both the Creator of the world and its established orders, and also the one who always ensures that his world is run justly.
Best regards, Amioz Yaron Schnitzel