Mind and Heart—Emotions in Study and in Halakhic Ruling (Column 467)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
A few days ago, the Daf Yomi reached Yevamot 31a, where we encounter the beloved sugya: “A house collapsed upon him and upon his brother’s daughter, and it is unknown which of them died first; her co-wife performs ḥalitzah and does not enter yibbum.”
Chayuta Deutsch sent me this passage with the following remark:
This is brilliant! A paradigmatic example (one of many, but an especially beautiful one) of the encounter between a ‘laboratory-like’ halakhic-legal world and dramatic reality (a gorgeous, tear-jerking telenovela).
In the course of the discussion that unfolded between us afterward, I thought it worthwhile to devote a column to these matters.
Emotional and Human Dimensions within Halakhic Sugyot
When one contemplates this situation and enters it a bit more on the psychological plane, we are dealing with no simple tragedy that has befallen this unfortunate family (each in its own way, as you recall). But I, as an ordinary learner, do not notice this at all. It is a fascinating and complex halakhic discussion, and for me there are no suffering people here—i.e., no human beings. These are merely figures or shadows upon the halakhic-intellectual stage—target mannequins for training the mind—meant, at most, to reflect halakhic ideas through them. In our study we deal with murderers, thieves, butchers, liars, disasters and various unfortunates, and we discuss all this with wondrous equanimity. Thus children in heder can study charged sugyot which, in any other context, would have their parents escorted respectfully to social services, while the children themselves would be left slack-jawed in shock. Yet this entire procession passes serenely before us and we do not bat an eye.
I do not see in Chayuta’s words a protest. On the contrary, there is an admiration for the duality between the planes of discussion (the human and the halakhic). Still, I heard in the background a tone of critique of the chilliness of the discourse—namely, of the disregard for the harsh human dimensions of this case. The Gemara describes this case as if it were a chunk of meat that fell into a dairy sauce and proceeds to discuss the laws that apply. It completely ignores the terrible human tragedies that occurred here. This bereaved family is left without the woman (in fact, one of the co-wives) and the brother—both from the same family. Who will support the orphans? (Oh, right—there aren’t any, otherwise there would be yibbum.) Whose heart would not be moved and whose eye would not tear at the sound of all this?! Truly, at the hearing of it our soul grows faint.
I think the tune I heard in Chayuta’s words is based to a considerable extent on my day-to-day experiences in the doctoral beit midrash at Bar-Ilan (and in other women’s frameworks). Almost every time we reached such a sugya, there erupted impassioned responses about the human, ethical, and above all emotional aspects of such situations, and of course critique of the Gemara’s and the learners’ disregard for these aspects. The coldness and indifference it reflects are hard to understand or accept. We have all become accustomed to studying the sugya of a father giving his minor daughter in marriage to a man afflicted with boils, a woman forbidden to this man and that, agunot with no recourse, someone “stuck with his yevama,” and so on—classic Lithuanian-style Talmudic discussions.
I permit myself to say from experience that these criticisms characterize women more (and Ḥasidim, which is more or less the same in this respect—see, for example, columns 104 and 315).[1] Needless to say, Litvaks like me are spared such emotions, thank God. I would even offer some advice to the directors of that telenovela: for example, they would have done well to butcher also the brother’s second wife and leave her stuck with her yevama, who is the Hebrew maidservant of the cousin of his daughter’s co-wife—who herself is half maidservant and half freewoman, murdered by indirect causation by a convert who is situated between circumcision and immersion in the mikveh, with three log of drawn water minus a kartov, whose appearance is like that of wine. They could learn from the very best—that is, from the Minḥat Ḥinukh. This would enrich the discussion and make it far more captivating.
A Similar Critique in a Different Context
These criticisms are not directed only toward the Talmud and its learners. In column 89 I brought an example of a similar critique, this time in an academic-technological context. I refer to the well-known story about the “blood pipeline” at the Technion (which apparently even existed in reality). I will quote from there.
It is told of an initiative by Prof. Chaim Hanani of the Technion, who arranged that in an exam on flow in the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, students were asked to design a pipeline that would carry blood from Eilat to Metula. They were asked what material to make it from, what its diameter and thickness should be, at what depth in the ground it should be buried, and so forth. The tellers of this story (and I myself heard, with my own astonished ears, more than a few people who were morally scandalized by this matter—and needless to say, I was truly scandalized by their scandal) complain how the technocratic students of the Technion, who have long since lost the image of God (unlike PhD students in Gender and Home Economics, whose moral sensitivity is highly developed—especially when they design a pipeline to carry their articles straight to the editorial boards of the journals of pseudo-sciences), solved the exam and submitted it without batting an eye or asking why such a blood pipeline was needed. To heighten the astonishment, let me add that it is said such an exam led to the introduction of humanities studies into the Technion curriculum. Apparently someone took this critique very seriously.[2]
Beyond the question of taste and the author’s humor—about which one can of course argue (though to me it’s rather charming)—the critique itself seems to me quite foolish. What is the problem with such a question?! Does anyone imagine that the lecturer intended to design a concentration camp and was enlisting students to solve the problem of blood transport? Were the students who answered the exam supposed to consider that this was the situation and protest? Constructing and solving such an exam in no way reflects a lack of morality—nor even the level of moral sensitivity of the lecturer or the students. By the way, this ridiculous critique does not reflect a high level of moral sensitivity either. At best it is a declarative lip-service, and a rather silly one, to ossified political correctness and unnecessary sentimentalism.
Beyond the question of whether it is right and reasonable to pose such a question on an exam, I wish to argue that students who encounter it and solve it without batting an eye are very similar to halakhic learners who pass by a situation like the one I described with the same frozen eyelid. It is a matter of context. If the context is halakhic or scientific-technological, and it is clear to all that no one here intends to murder or to transport blood, there is no reason whatsoever for heart-strings to tremble or for protest. Best to save protests for real events. If someone’s strings do tremble—that’s fine, of course. Each person has his or her own psychological makeup, and as is known, no one is perfect. But to see this as a feature reflecting a person’s morality, and to take the absence of trembling as an indication of defective morality—that is, at best, a bad joke.
“Korah, who was clever, what did he see to commit this folly?”[3]
We can also recall the Aggadic midrash about Korach—“of sainted memory”—who complained about Moses our teacher (Midrash Shoḥer Tov on Psalms 1):
“‘Nor sat in the seat of scoffers…’—this is Korach, who would scoff at Moses and Aaron.”
What did Korach do? He gathered the entire congregation, as it is said, “And Korach assembled the entire community against them,” and began telling them mocking parables, saying: There was a widow in my neighborhood who had two orphaned daughters, and she had a single field. She came to plow—Moses said to her: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together.” She came to sow—he said to her: “You shall not sow your field with mixed species.” She came to reap and make a stack—he said to her: Leave gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corner of the field. She came to make the produce into money—he said to her: Give the priestly gift (terumah), the first tithe, and the second tithe. She accepted the law upon herself and gave him.
What did this poor woman do? She sold the field and bought two sheep, to clothe herself from their wool and enjoy their produce. When they gave birth—Aaron came and said to her: Give me the firstborns, for thus did the Holy One say to me: “Every firstborn male that is born among your cattle and flock you shall sanctify to the Lord your God.” She accepted the law upon herself and gave him the offspring. The time for shearing arrived and she sheared them—Aaron came and said to her: Give me the first of the fleece, for thus said the Holy One: “The first of your grain, wine, and oil, and the first of the shearing of your flock, you shall give him.”
She said: I have no strength to stand up to this man—behold, I will slaughter them and eat them. Once she slaughtered them, Aaron came and said to her: Give me the foreleg, the cheeks, and the abomasum. She said: Even after I slaughtered them, I have not escaped his hand—behold, they are ḥerem upon me! Aaron said to her: If so—then all of it is mine, for thus said the Holy One: “Every devoted thing (ḥerem) in Israel shall be yours.” He took them and went, and he left her weeping with her two daughters.
Thus it befell this poor woman! So much do they do, and they attribute it to the Holy One!
Truly heart-rending, no? This is reminiscent of the critiques I described above, though here there is, after all, a difference. Korach’s critique has substance. It may wrench the matters out of context and invent a heart-rending tale, but indeed such a story could in principle occur, and this is in fact the halakhic ruling in such a case. Thus there is here a challenge to the morality of the halakhah, and that is a serious claim. I have noted more than once in the past the case of Israel Shachak, the chemist from Jerusalem, who concocted stories about the moral callousness of halakhah and of religious people, stirring up storms. The religious breathed a sigh of relief when it turned out that such a story had never happened, but I always wondered why that was relevant. Indeed, halakhah forbids desecrating Shabbat to save a non-Jew’s life. Indeed, halakhah obligates the wife of a kohen who was raped to separate from her husband. So even if it did not occur in practice, this is a perfectly legitimate critique.
In this sense, the criticisms of Shachak and of Korach are quite unlike the critiques we saw above, which deal with a hypothetical case and a very reasonable equanimity toward it. That has nothing to do with the level of morality of the people or of halakhah.
What Is the Problem?
Let us sharpen what is problematic in the critiques about the blood pipeline or the Yevamot telenovela. These are hypothetical cases that did not actually occur. When faced with a real case of this sort, I assume we would not remain indifferent. The indifference arises here because the hypothetical nature of the case is clear to all involved, and because of the context of the discussion. The connotation in which such cases arise is intellectual-professional. An engineering question is interpreted in its context as a computational-technological challenge, and rightly no one is troubled by the “purpose” of the calculation (because it is clear to everyone there is none—in fact there is: evaluating the student’s abilities). The same goes for the telenovela in Yevamot. It is clear to all that this is a hypothetical case meant to sharpen halakhic insights. To relate to a hypothetical case as if it were actually occurring is, no?, childish. Children tend to relate to a story as if it were a real case. Adults are supposed to understand that it is not so. This is similar, in my eyes, to questions about Talmudic cases like the “flying camel” (Makkot 5a and Yevamot 116a) or “wheat that descended in the clouds” (Menachot 69b), which wonder how such a case could happen. Once one pays attention to the context, it should be clear that no one claims such a thing happened or could happen. We are dealing with hypothetical cases meant to sharpen halakhic principles, like laboratory cases in scientific research (see more in my article on okimtas).
In short, the problem with these critiques is that they assume a person ought to relate to a hypothetical case that comes before him as if it were a real event. One might bring an example from a film or a book that describes such situations. Whose heart would not be moved at reading or seeing such a scene? How is this different? The answer is twofold: (1) There the context is artistic, i.e., the consumer (viewer or reader) is expected to try to enter the situation and experience it. That is the essence of artistic escapism. But this does not exist in the scholarly or technological-educational context. (2) Even if it is natural for such a movement of the soul to occur in people (or in women), it has no value. If it happens—very well (no one is perfect, as noted). But to demand of people, in the name of morality, that this must happen to them is an entirely different claim. To see moral defect in one for whom this does not happen is, in my view, utter nonsense.
Real Cases: The Importance of Detachment
I argued that being emotionally involved in a hypothetical case is, at best, childish. Beyond that, I now wish to argue that it also has a harmful dimension. When the above critiques arose among the doctoral students, I tried to instill in them, again and again, the importance of emotional and psychological detachment from the situation when engaged in halakhic learning. Not only does such emotional involvement have no value; it is positively harmful. Emotional involvement can lead to erroneous halakhic (and technological) conclusions. A decisor who rules on the basis of his emotions is a poor decisor (in fact, that is not a decisor at all—just a crybaby).
Note that here I am already speaking about a human response to a real case that comes before me, not just to a hypothetical one. If a case of a brother and his niece who perished together in a terrible disaster comes before me—this is a real case that occurred in reality, and therefore in such a case there is certainly value to sensitivity to its human dimensions. Here there is indeed value and importance in relating to this case on all planes simultaneously: the intellectual-halakhic, the intellectual-moral, and the human-experiential. And still, even in a real case, it is proper at the first stage to focus on the first plane and to detach the other two. The decisor must think coldly about the case before him. What halakhah says is unrelated to what emotion says (and in my opinion, not even to what morality says), and it is good that this is so. The decisor must cut the law with detached coolness, and thus he will merit to align with the truth of Torah. At the stage after the cold halakhic analysis, there is room to enter emotionally into the situation and its moral and human dimensions, and to examine it also from those perspectives. This means that when the initial halakhic analysis yields several possible options, one may take emotion and the human and moral dimensions into account in order to decide among them and choose the practical ruling. Emotion should not participate in the logical analysis, but at most come afterward. Beyond this, one may see value in the very participation and identification with the suffering of the person before you, even if it has no halakhic consequences. But all this must occur on parallel planes, and preferably after the initial halakhic decision. Emotional involvement in ruling is not desirable at all.
I will not repeat here in detail another claim I have presented more than once (see, e.g., column 22 and the series 311–315): namely, that morality has nothing at all to do with emotion. Morality is an intellectual matter, not an emotional one. Sometimes emotion provides some indicator toward the moral direction (empathy), but this is a very problematic indicator, and it is important to be careful to critique it and not be captivated by it. Respect it—but suspect it. In the final analysis, the decision should be made by the head and not by the heart—only that the head should take into account what the heart says. My claim was that identification in its experiential-emotional sense has no normative significance. It is a human trait, and as such it is a fact. But it has no value; those who are not endowed with it need not worry about their moral and normative standing.
Accordingly, I argue that even at the second stage—after the initial halakhic analysis—there is no significant place for emotion. Perhaps for morality, yes; but not for emotion (as such—at most as an indicator, as above). On the contrary, emotional involvement is a proven recipe for distortions and improper deflections of thought and for erroneous decisions.
The upshot of all this is that, when studying a Talmudic-halakhic sugya, emotional involvement has no value whatsoever; indeed, it is proper even to strive to overcome such a movement of soul if it exists (I am speaking of those who have not yet managed to overcome it and accustom themselves). In practical halakhic ruling (i.e., deciding a particular case that comes before us), there one should suspend emotion and morality—and perhaps give them some place at the second stage (mainly morality; emotion less so).
An Instrumental Claim
There is a claim on the instrumental plane that a person who accustoms himself not to relate humanly and morally to such hypothetical cases will not do so with respect to real cases either. I very much doubt this. It sounds to me like a cute vort for a sheva berakhot speech, and I see no indication of its correctness. In any case, the one who makes this claim ought to bring evidence for it.
One might perhaps advance a similar claim regarding the habituation of professionals. The Gemara says that an artisan, a physician, or a man whose occupation is with women is “preoccupied with his work” (be’avidatei tarid), and therefore is permitted things forbidden to other men (e.g., yichud or touch). Being absorbed in his professional work dulls his feelings and prevents transgressions and forbidden thoughts. I do not know whether the gynecologist’s sexual drive is indeed blunted because of this even when he meets a woman in a romantic rather than professional context. I am doubtful, since the context is different—but it requires investigation. People know how to make separations and detachments, and in this sense the judge and the learner are likewise “preoccupied with their work.” When a person is engaged in his profession, he knows how to detach his emotions, and this does not mean they are dulled in other contexts. Of course, an artisan preoccupied with his craft is a more extreme situation than the above in halakhic study, since in the artisan’s case we are dealing with women and real situations, whereas in the learner’s case it is hypothetical cases. Therefore, even if we find that in the artisan the feelings are indeed dulled, it does not necessarily follow that this is what happens in the learner. Perhaps it is more similar to the decisor who detaches his emotions, for the decisor stands before real cases—only he does so in a professional context. There one might indeed say: be’umanutei tarid.
A Note from the Perspective of Learning
One might argue that a learner who encounters such situations and in whom the relevant human emotions do not awaken has not fully entered the situation. This is a claim against him on the plane of learning, not on the moral plane. The claim is that he learns poorly—not that he is immoral. I do not think that is the case. A person can certainly enter the situation in a learning context even if he is not immersed in it in human terms. This claim of mine is, of course, conditional on viewing halakhah as a professional-technical enterprise that does not involve emotional planes (except at the second stage, as above). In any event, I certainly do not see here any moral defect.
[1] It is not certain this is connected specifically to a “feminine nature.” It may stem from the novelty of these matters, since women generally did not accustom themselves to such sugyot from childhood.
[2] The outcome itself is, in my view, welcome. It certainly does no harm for Technion students to study a bit of the humanities. But there is no connection between that and the “blood pipeline” case. The case does not demonstrate any problem that requires solving, and even if there were such a problem, humanities studies would not contribute in any way to solving it.
[3] Rashi, Numbers 16:7.
The halakhic matter mentioned here was actually discussed, if I remember correctly, following the murder of the Meklef family in Motza during the events of 1989.
Sorry, I was wrong, I was referring to the murder of the Unger family in Safed, one of the responses in Ahiezer 3:3.
How do you find the answer? I would love to see a source. Thank you.
I will briefly summarize what is said there.
A. The case that appeared in the column:
[A man married his brother's daughter and another wife. If he dies, then his brother cannot marry his brother's daughter (a virgin), and therefore she and her additional wife are exempt from the obligation of marriage and are exempt from the obligation of marriage (prohibitions of marriage). If his brother's daughter dies before her husband and then her husband dies, then at the time of death the additional wife is not a virgin, and therefore is required to marry.]
What is discussed in the Gemara is if it is not known who died first, whether the husband died first and his wife (his brother's daughter) was still alive and then the additional wife passed away from the obligation of marriage, or whether the wife died first and then the husband died, and then the additional wife is required to marry. [And the law is that since there is doubt whether she is required to marry or is prohibited from marrying, then she is exempt and is not required to marry].
B. The case in Ahiezer:
[A man who dies and at the time of his death leaves a viable seed or fetus, his wife is exempt from the obligation of marriage. But if he had no children at all or they all died before he died, then his wife is obligated to pay the stipend. If he dies and leaves behind a fetus that was born after his death and even lived only one hour and died, or leaves behind a dying son, this is a seed for all purposes and his wife is exempt from paying the stipend.]
The person sentenced in Ahiezer is a father who died and at the time of his death left a son who died one day after his father. Is the son of a tripe considered seed for all purposes as a dying son and the wife of the deceased is exempt from paying the stipend, or is a tripe (who will certainly die within twelve months) worse than a dying son (who is a minority of those who die do live). [The Rose Garden thinks that a tripe is not considered alive at all and is worse than a dying son and the wife of the deceased is obligated to pay the stipend. Ahiezer proves from Tosafot that Ben Terifa was indeed exempted from Yavum]
https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=634&st=&pgnum=455
There is a similarity in that two family members died in a short period of time (from the same cause).
This is really the page for today 🙂
I assume that Nadav's intention is to answer Ahiezer's question in the middle of the 3rd chapter:
In the month of Adar 37 (3), according to the question of the 3rd chapter, in which during the days of the murder, the father was killed and then the son lived for one day, and the murderers stabbed him and pierced his lung, is it permissible to marry without a halitza, as in the Sephardi 3rd chapter of Ginat Wardim, it was brought in Barachi Yosef and Harek and in the 3rd chapter of On Shabbat, it is clear that a person who has been robbed is purified and dismissed, and I ask for your opinion on this.
Here I saw in the answer to the Garden of Roses and I did not find any evidence there to renew it, only from the law that he is dying and is not given a ransom, meaning that he is not dismissed. However, from the law that is added, the same applies to the days of the dead, and it is also added to the law that he is dying because he is killed by a person who is not alive, so the law is added. And in the law that is added It seems that this is the same as dying at the hands of a person, which is explained in the Sanhedrin by Rabbinical scholars as prey, and so Maimonides in the book of Philosophers says that a murderer who is killed is not killed as prey, and so on, in the Ritva and in the Torah, the seer explains that there are people who interpret it as such, even though he is being led and is dying. It is also explained in the Torah by the Rabbis that there is no end to the life of a person who is being led. And so on, in the Torah, the seer explains that there is no end to the life of a person who is being led. There is a place where a person is killed by a predator that is not a prey, see there, as it is explained in the Mishnah that a dead person is a prey, and so on in the chapter on the 16th chapter of the 17th chapter of the 18th chapter of the 1920th chapter of the 20th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 20th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 20th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 20th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 20th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 20th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 20th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 20th chapter of the 19th chapter of the 19 Rulings of the Law of Chabad from the Gaon Rabbi David Friedman, the late Havdak Karlin, C.J. We do not care what is a terpa, since the dying and the Maggid are purified from the divination and are exempt from the divination. In general, it is strange that if a great son left a terpa that would require a halitza, and there would also be a divination with the wife of a brother who has a son who is a terpa, and since he brought from then the words of the Torah on Shabbat Kalu, which is explicitly stated there that a terpa is purified and exempt, and is also proven by the divination of the divination of the divination, then certainly there is no reason for the doubt of the divination, and she does not require a halitza and is permitted to marry. +Response in Responsa Beit Yitzhak Chaiv Chab Si’t that Gek raised the Halacha in raids that are not like a rose garden and do not require a halitza and are permissible to carry, and so the matter has settled down, God forbid, to say yes. And in Responsa Beit Yitzhak Chab that Gek wondered if Gek had added a halitza on Shabbat.+
But this is not our case. It is true that one can be impressed by the way of treatment and the absolute lack of consideration for emotional dimensions.
[Regarding the end of your words regarding the method of treatment, a wander through the treasury of wisdom reveals that the questioner from Ahiezer is Rabbi Zvi Pesach Frank, who was asked about this by the Rabbi of Safed, where the incident occurred, and they have already expressed their shock, etc., so Ahiezer did not have to express shock twice]
For a brief moment I thought that perhaps it was similar to the story in the Bible about the priest who murdered his friend over a lamb, and what's more, his father is babbling about the kashrut of the knife, about which articles and sermons have been written, but it's not similar at all because this is about the murder of enemies and not the heartless murder committed by a Jew.
On the 13th of Nisan 5772 (11th of Rabbi Yosef Karo)
The entire discussion about the feelings or lack of feelings of the halachic authorities about the difficulty of wording their answers is irrelevant. The sages expressed their excitement about the events of the time in their sermons in the community, which were intended to arouse the emotions of the audience. In the halachic answer, the discussion is halachic ‘dry’. Ruling separately and sermon separately.
It is worth noting that only a few of the works of the sages of Israel were printed, partly due to the high cost of printing. Therefore, they tried to print the selection that contained significant innovation. Whether it is innovation in halakhic law or innovation in legend. In expressing feelings of joy over good news and sorrow over bad news – There is no novelty, everyone feels it, and there is no need to prolong it by adding issues. Even in the novelties, they printed a little from the little.
Greetings, the young man Zatzir.
Paragraph 1, line 1
… Based on their wording…
It should be noted that sometimes the rebuke is prolonged with words of sorrow, when one is forced to rule harshly. When the judge feels that despite his great desire he is unable to save – then he will sometimes express his sorrow in his ruling.
For example, Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky would briefly state his position in a few words, but Rabbi Menachem Burstein related that there were cases in which Rabbi Kanievsky said: ‘Oh oh oh. I cannot permit’.
Something similar happened when a Gentile asked the head of a yeshiva how they deal with the issue of P&P without it causing them sexual arousal. He replied that the students do not deal with reality, but with halachic norms relating to it.
A truly strange response, because the description in the mishna is not an “actual event”.
And for much less than that, the faithful of Israel, led by the learned rabbis, are mobilizing to help families
These issues are like a “crash test” for cars, to check their durability in extreme situations. Not that we are sure that every car will survive something like that on the road.
A. Your analysis completely misses the humor in my words (and note: a telenovela! In the wonderful repository of scripts provided by the tractate, perhaps you will write more.).
B. I and your doctoral students (those who are not interested in articles for scientific journals and regret, and who do not study in the department of macrame and home economics. Who said essentialism and chauvinism and did not accept it?) understand well the duality of perspective. As mentioned, some of us even enjoy it. Indeed, most of us encounter issues of this type of Gemara for the first time, and it seems to me that the knowledgeable and accustomed scholar can only benefit from our surprised and new perspective (the “foreign” perspective) precisely because it is an initial perspective and not an unaccustomed and routine one. The healthy ability to look at things anew is important to everyone. Don’t worry, better scholars and judges (not transgender) will emerge from it.
C. However, the learned judge and the judge really do not need to sob bitterly and destroy packs of tissues while studying, instead of using their minds and the ability to reason and learn. I am talking (I spoke) about a healthy double look. Yes, even a wink works. Not just a tear.
D. And will there be a priestess as an innkeeper? Go out and study what the rulings of Supreme Court justices who, by virtue of their position, discuss important issues that sometimes also touch on disasters of one kind or another look like. The legal analysis will be there in all its sharpness, and without detracting from the sharpness of the discussion, there will always be some brief introduction or accompanying expressions that relate to the ethical and moral side.
E. The question about the rivers of blood and the pipe is a good example of bad humor. It touches on a constant debate here, about the disdain and failure to attribute importance to context, atmosphere, and education.
Hello Hayutha.
A. I didn’t miss a thing. On the contrary, I wrote about the admiration and enjoyment of duality and I understood the humor well. And yet, from the Shitin, I understood that there was a tone of criticism, and of course I was right. Your words here clearly express this. In general, the Gemara does not include a poetic introduction in the style of Cheshin.
B. This is certainly a perspective that can be profited from, but is generally not widespread in the halakhic realm. I commented on this at the end of the column. I focus on the moral criticism, which is irrelevant.
C. I understood that this is a double perspective, and that is what I addressed. The question I was dealing with is whether the lack of a second perspective in relation to a hypothetical case should be of concern or not.
D. The Supreme Court justices, unlike the poskim, deal with the law and not with the halacha. The law has greater weight than the halacha (not always rightly) for their feelings. Beyond that, the ruling of the halacha deals with practical cases, the Gemara does not. In my remarks, I made this distinction.
E. I mentioned the criticism of bad humor, and I made it clear that this was not my concern. The question I was addressing was whether there is room for moral criticism.
Finally, the accusation of essentialism and chauvinism is typical and irrelevant (it is usually used well when substantive arguments run out). When I report my impressions of experience, I am talking about facts. If the result is essentialist, then essentialism is probably correct. The way to deal with this is not to deny the results or accuse essentialism, but to argue in a reasoned manner that the facts are incorrect. If you intended to do so, I did not perceive such an argument in your remarks. One of the evils of weak populations (women in this context are definitely a weak population, not always their fault. Here I am even willing to partially accept the disgusting expression “weakened”), is to protest the factual description instead of dealing with the facts. I wrote about this in relation to female scholarship in the first source, and most of the women who read it were offended instead of drawing the necessary conclusions and trying to improve it. This is a proven recipe for perpetuating the situation (if you think it is good, then perpetuating it is not necessarily bad in your eyes, of course, but then I don’t see what I am being accused of).
My criticism is not of the Gemara but of the scholarly-Lithuanian approach that ridicules the request for double reference. The example from the judges does not have to follow the well-known excessive poetics of Cheshin, it has much more successful and serious examples, as you know I am currently busy with the teachings of another dear Jew who graduated from the aforementioned Supreme Court, and there the things are worthy of observation.
I accused you of a substantive issue concerning style and not content, that is, how surprising – again, of ridicule. Whoever insists on ridiculing the sons and daughters of his company over and over again, precisely he should be suspected of having less successful arguments. Or, to paraphrase your holy words: “The above sneer”is typical and irrelevant (it is usually used well when substantive arguments run out)”.
I understand, of course, that in practice you encounter this type of response from many students, and that justifies such and such theories. I am only objecting to the dismissive style (unlike PhD students in gender and home economics, who have a very developed moral sensitivity, especially when they plan a pipeline that will lead their articles directly to the editorial boards of journals for the sciences of the arts”), in other words, we are back again, and I will quote your holy words this time, “to the constant debate that exists here, about the disdain and failure to attribute importance to context, atmosphere, and education”.
But the double reference is missing from the Gemara itself. It is not an invention of Lithuanians. The Lithuanian scholar merely clings to what is there, and his claim is that the double reference is completely legitimate but is not a matter for studying the subject, and certainly does not in any way indicate a moral virtue or vice.
I did not understand your claim about the style. There is no mockery here. These are completely typical arguments of idiots and idiots of the faculties/departments of gender. This is what they do almost all the time. What I said about all women, even those who do not study gender (most of them are like that for me), I said that such arguments are typical of women, and I do think that these are the facts that emerge from my experience. There is no argument here, but a factual observation.
Indeed, as I wrote to Sarah, there is no moral flaw here. I saw on Facebook a scholar who suggested that, regarding the examples that Tractate Yevamot repeatedly brings up about Reuben and his rape, that perhaps it would be better to preserve the honor of Reuben and Shimon and give in their place examples of Aridhata and Delphon and the other ten sons of Haman. (On the other hand, there is a possibility that this was said because of Purim and he did not mean it at all.) To accuse gender scholars of not really intending to publish articles is slander and not a factual observation.
Sharp as ever. Good luck.
A few unexplained thoughts:
A. Hayutha's humor was indeed missed. (I will admit that I missed it on the first reading too)
B. I think it helps the child in Haidar that he is formulating it in the terms of the Gemara. If his benchmate asks him what exactly is a "bea that is not his way" he will start to get confused and blush.
C. If my wife tells me that she saw a crushed mouse in the street, without giving precise details of the appearance, it will not make me nauseous. If I tell her, she will vomit. Some people picture for themselves the reality they read about and then experience it in a certain way and some do not. A person can read Harry Potter and then watch the movie and say - I really did not imagine it like that! And another person simply did not imagine me. I believe that the doctoral students at Bar Ilan understand the dual perspective, but are unable to not picture the situations in their minds.
D. As a certain implication, it seems to me that if a person experiences the situation he is learning about in reality, it will be harder for him to be detached. He will immediately picture the situation to himself as he experiences it. Another reason why it is easier for a child in Haidar to learn about coming out of the way and all that. It does not belong to his world so much.
E. It is also possible that the desire to innovate, which is found in some of the scholars, and to project from their world onto the Talmudic world and not come completely as acceptors, leads to the study becoming emotional.
F. Without a doubt, emotional detachment is useful for understanding the issues clearly. It is possible that we are still missing something if we do not connect emotion to it afterwards. I am sure that morality must be connected to understanding the issue, perhaps emotion also has a place there somewhere.
(I didn't understand what the problem was with the blood pipe. Don't you transfer blood through pipes to patients? Isn't it possible to transfer blood sterilely between wards through a pipe? Or transfer the blood of slaughtered animals through a pipe for fertilizer? Or just to the sewer? I can understand that there is a problem with asking a detailed question like: If you had to help a vampire transfer the blood from the area where he slaughters people to the kitchen using a pipe, how would you build it, etc. But this is an innocent question.)
A. Maybe you missed it. But not me. All my criticism is in its place, regardless of the question of humor.
B. Indeed, it's like asking Rabbi Haim what a frying pan is.
C. That's perfectly fine. I have no problem with those who picture the situations in their mind's eye, and with those who are shocked by it. I just don't think that this shock indicates a spiritual-moral virtue, nor that its absence indicates a flaw.
D. See C. This may be related to my qualified comment at the end of the column about the flaw in the study itself.
E. For health. Is there any argument here? I'm not dealing with the diagnosis of women or students, but with the essence. Not where it comes from but whether it is important and essential.
F. I explained where it belongs.
I didn't understand what the problem was with a question about a vampire. I don't see any problem with it.
Hayutha,
After all, the Gemara is written with the art of vigorous brevity. (This is one of the wonders there, in my eyes, the astonished reader).
Worlds of worlds may be folded into a three-word sentence, a paragraph may contain gaps of hundreds of years, how relevant is a comparison to the Supreme Court's ruling? What lies within one short, sharp sentence of the Gemara would have spilled over dozens, if not hundreds of pages.
I do not suspect that the artists who drafted the final Talmudic page were less sensitive than any woman or any Supreme Court judge.
And we must remember that it all began with a mouth, and then the lack of writing instruments, the need to copy and preserve generations upon generations..
Perhaps you can offer an example? What and how would you introduce this into the present issue?
I agree with you, and it doesn't occur to me to rewrite the Gemara. The comparison to today's rulings concerns today's rulings. And perhaps the way a rabbi teaches his students. I suppose that if it were a rabbi who would teach, she would teach this issue to her students, but there would be a small symbolic gesture. A wink, a statement, and the like. The story of the death in the landslide has no moral significance at all, just a tragedy that could happen even today in Ukraine. You have an interesting comment about the orator. Are you suggesting that there were certain gestures there that were not preserved in the summary written down for later times? I don't know and I don't think there is a way to know. Perhaps it would be worth challenging the knowledgeable here to see if somewhere in the Shas there is a slightly more ”emotional’ reference to something. For example, on today's page there is the favorite expression that appears several times – from the very beginning we are dealing with the wicked? It's a completely matter-of-fact statement, but it has a certain tone of pleasant bewilderment.
On the 9th of Nisan 5772 (11th of Rabbi Aryeh Levin)
To her and Sarah – Shalom Rav,
The Tannaim and Amoraim, the authors of the halakhah – were also authors of aggadah and authors of prayers. In their words on the halakhah – they were careful to formulate them in a matter-of-fact manner. While they expressed their emotional world – in their words on the aggadah and the prayers they founded (some beautiful personal prayers said by the Tannaim and Amoraim ‘after the tselotia ‘were collected together in Tractate Berakhot, and many of them were incorporated into the ’siddur’). A time for Torah alone and a time for prayer alone’.
With greetings, Hillel Feiner-Glossinos
And unlike the tendency of Torah students today to combine study with emotion, of whom it would be said: ‘He who teaches his daughter Torah – teaches prayers 🙂
Although the study must be in the form of a ‘mach ruling over the heart’ . Torah study requires listening to the Torah, which does not always coincide with the inclination of the heart– therefore, after the intellectual clarification – we must transfer the things to the heart in the desire to create personal identification with the learned
See the article by Rebbetzin Or Machloff (Rami”t in Midreshet Migdal-Enz), in the collection ‘Ki bem Chaytani’, Migdal Ez 57:7, p’ 31 ff. There she cites, among other things, the pain of the rabbi”d Soloveitch’yqef ‘The Haredi youth succeeded in the field of intellectual effort… he acquired knowledge, opinions and legal rulings. He enjoys beautiful lessons and delving into a complicated subject. But the heart still does not participate in this action; the law does not become a mental reality for him. The actual acquaintance with the Divine Presence is lacking (Divrei Haskhapa, p. 209). He will study the article in length
It is clear that the Torah requires the activation of the heart before and after it. Before it, a longing to connect with it through its wisdom and will in the Torah and a prayer that we may be worthy of directing ourselves to the truth; after it, a prayer that we may be worthy of applying in life the values we have learned.
,
With blessings, Hillel Feiner-Glossinos
Paragraph 1, line 4
Personal identification with what is being learned…
In the 9th of Nisan 2
A halachic arbiter, when approaching a decision, must act out of a two-sided storm of emotions. On the one hand, woe to him and woe to his soul if he errs and permits another man's wife, and on the other hand, woe to him and woe to him if he anchors a woman who can be permitted. The arbiter is likened to a man walking on a narrow path on the edge of an abyss, where any slight deviation to the right or left – is liable to plunge him into the abyss.
And the arbiter must be doubly anxious, for indifference will lead him to an untrue ruling due to a lack of concern, and a God-fearing arbiter must be anxious, anxious that he not err and permit what is forbidden, and anxious that he not prohibit what is permitted. His anxiety and anxiety that justice will come to light – is the motive for his tireless pursuit of the exact truth.
But the very storm of emotions that prevents him from clarifying the law – itself requires that the clarification itself be done in a balanced and calm manner, because clarification out of anxiety and loss of temper – cannot overpower the truth. Therefore, the posk must be calm during the clarification, and be prepared to consider all options, even the most painful ones. Therefore, when the question comes – the posk must put the storm of emotions aside and think calmly.
In this, the person of the law is similar to a soldier who is being shot at, who is forbidden to react immediately. He must stop for a moment, take cover, watch where he is being shot from, and then take aim and shoot accurately at the target. A mistake in hitting the enemy is dangerous for the shooter, since it gives the enemy the place of shelter.
And so is the situation of the rescuer who arrives at a traumatic event, with many injuries and many casualties, who must quickly read the situation and determine priorities. Treat immediately what is in immediate danger, treat urgently what is urgent, and leave for the last stage what is less urgent. Supervised situation assessment – is the foundation of proper treatment.
The strong desire to win the battle or save the injured – is the fuel that motivated the fighter or the caregiver to volunteer for the combat unit or the rescue force, but the decision of what and how to do in the event of a ‘problem’ must be made with calculated and calm judgment.
Of course, it is almost impossible to think calmly when faced with an unexpected incident, when under pressure all the ’theory’ is forgotten. To this end, halachic adjudicators, fighters and rescue personnel maintain a ‘training course’ that aims to anticipate all ‘problems’ It is possible to formulate patterns of action in advance for that possible situation, and to practice not responding in every situation. Then when the ‘problem’ comes, – the ‘plan of action immediately pops up and one can act in an orderly manner without having to re-think. The plans were calculated and worked out in advance.
The concerns of Tractate Yevamot. Disasters of earthquakes and collapse of houses, diseases and epidemics, disappearance of people on trade voyages and sinking of ships at sea, wars and robbers and plots – were completely possible situations in the world in which the sages lived, and in particular during the days of the revolts against the Romans, the Destruction Revolt and the Bar-Kochba Revolt, in the shadow of which the sages of the Mishnah operated and created.
A guidebook for effective treatment of catastrophic stress situations must be relevant and concise, and clearly and briefly encompass all the prototypes of possible scenarios and offer them a ‘treatment scheme, which is why Tractate Yevamot is formulated in a short and dry manner, just as a book on combat theory or first aid would be formulated in a short and dry manner.
With greetings, Hillel Feiner Gluskinos
In the Mishnah and Talmud, the ’telegraphic’ formulation is required due to their oral transmission. In order to be able to memorize them, they must be formulated in an easy and receptive manner. Long, in-depth rambling or outpouring of the soul are not good for memorization. The Talmud is intended for in-depth study, and prayer is intended for outpouring of the soul. The ‘Mishnah’ must be short, relevant and concise
And so our father Jacob, who prays in fear and worry, "Deliver me from the hand of my brother Esau, lest he come and make me a mother of children," continues and acts calmly. He does not immediately begin to flee. Rather, he and his camp go to sleep (and who can sleep in this terrifying situation?) and wake up refreshed so that they can fight when they meet Esau's army.
And even David, when he flees from Absalom his son, as he walks broken and cries out and prays for his salvation from the multitude rising up against him, the whole nation against the handful of faithful ones who remain with him. He expresses all his anxiety in prayer, and his prayer gives him the strength to act with practical judgment. He tries the path of intercession by sending the senses of the arch to violate the advice of Ahithophel, and after prayer and intercession, he is armed with confidence in it, and is able in his terrifying situation to hold ‘In peace together I will lie down and sleep, for you alone will surely make me sit down.
Anxiety finds its expression in prayer, and from it the person is armed with confidence to act with judgment.
With blessings, the Prophet
I agree with everything you said.
And even within the halacha, there are often times a lot of emotions that I will store. And of course the combination of legend and halacha allows this to a certain extent,
such as, for example (to her), one of the most touching, in my opinion: “A rabbi said: A man should always be careful about his wife's infidelity, for since her tears are present, her infidelity is imminent” (Bava Metzia 55a). (I wonder if there is a judge in the Supreme Court who allowed himself to be so outspoken)
Sure. They quote it.
They quote yes, but it's not certain that they would initiate such a claim.
Incidentally, one can see how long and tedious the rulings become, over the years, when the hand becomes light on the keyboard, and all the sources are available, and there is no longer any need to dictate to a template.. It seems to me that the rulings in the courts are like that too.
On the 12th of Nisan 15, 2020, the Hasidim explained the statement of Chazal, “So Aaron did.” It teaches that he did not change. It is not clear why the Holy One of God would have changed the command of God. The Hasidim also explained that Aaron was full of enthusiasm when he went to light the menorah, and there was reason to feel that he would make mistakes in details due to his enthusiasm. The Hasidim explained that despite his laziness, Aaron was careful to perform his duty with precision.
With blessings, Hillel Feiner-Glossinos
Regarding the instrumental claim (which I also do not accept), in the thread you opened yourself, perhaps the people of Sura are an extreme illustration of this claim in a non-hypothetical case. https://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?cat_id=24&topic_id=2827720&forum_id=1364
Indeed, there with Rami Bar Dikoli things are a tragedy and a comedy in one. But there you can say that since things have already been done, he was asked for his actions. And apparently he didn't want to trust the messengers of others.
There is room for "judicial feeling" according to the Gemara when two parties come to argue before the dayanim and there is no clear decision, what is known as "shuda dedayani".
Shuda Dedayani is a ruling in very specific cases and not in every situation where there is no decision. For this there are laws of sufficiency. But Shuda is also not an emotion but an intuition. Not a close approximation.
In my opinion, it worked: Someone started an online discussion about the question “If you found out tomorrow that Christianity was true, would you change your lifestyle accordingly?” Some of the idiotic answers were “It won’t happen, so there’s no point in asking.” People really have a hard time understanding the hypothetical question. I tried to explain to them that they probably wouldn’t ever have to throw a very fat person onto train tracks to prevent a train from running over five bound people, and yet it’s a basic question in moral philosophy courses; but it didn’t work.
Then someone argued with me that in principle hypothetical questions are fine, but some things are too emotionally shocking and therefore it’s not okay to discuss them hypothetically (unlike, say, a very fat person being run over by a train, which is probably not shocking at all). The writer was a high school yeshiva teacher, and I really don't know what he's doing with issues like the one you mentioned here. Anyway, after a short argument, he asked me if I thought it was legitimate for him to ask me "What would you do if you found out tomorrow that your mother was a murderer?" Of course, I didn't understand what the problem was with that, and I even went to tell my mother, who also didn't understand what the problem was with that question. Moreover, during the argument, he actually asked the question, so I didn't really understand what point he was trying to make.
Bottom line: When people have a hard time dealing with the content (intellectually!) they run to the sidelines and try to point to cosmetic "problems" as an excuse for why it was "inappropriate" to begin with. To engage in this content (then all that remains to be learned on Shavuot night is ‘Ilan Ilan, what shall I bless you’ – which is truly a very aesthetic story).
Indeed. I will only note that there is room for his claim regarding Christianity in the following way: Perhaps in his opinion if Christianity were logical then it would not be the Christianity we know. Therefore, there is no room for the question of what I would do if I discovered that Christianity was true. Likewise, there is no room for the question of what Maimonides would say about a situation in our day. If he were alive in our day, he would not be Maimonides.
Hello Rabbi Michi.
It is difficult to argue with your claim, indeed, in common sense it is clear that the cleanest and most correct is to work with a purely halakhic rational analysis. But it is impossible to ignore the fact that many times the scholarly issues of Shas are wrapped in stories that give them a human emotional or moral direction.
I will give 2 examples (the first is a bit weak): After Tractate Gittin discusses the details of the various hypothetical and real problems, it bothers to end with a sermon on hatred and divorce. And how painful it is for God to be concerned with the very idea of divorce. Why is it important for the Gemara to end the tractate like this? Isn't there a direction here?
In the Gemara in Kiddushin there is a beautiful legend about Rav Assi and his mother. It is so important that it was included in its entirety in the teachings of Memariam, chapter 6 of the Rambam. At the end of the Sugiya, it is written that Rabbi Asi said, “I did not leave the land of Israel, I did not know.” Most commentators have explained this sentence through halakhic lenses. Rabbi Asi says that he would not have left the Land of Israel for a variety of halakhic reasons (the impurity of the nations because he is a priest and other reasons). Maimonides wrote in the halakhic text that indeed if one’s parents were to become destitute, one can leave them and order someone else to take care of them. The Mishnah reinforces Maimonides and says that although it is not explicitly stated in the Sugiya, it is likely that this is how Rabbi Asi acted. The Rabbi is angry with Maimonides and claims that this is not the way and how can one leave one’s parents to someone else to take care of them. (It can be argued that this is a halakhic consideration, but in simple terms it implies that he cannot tolerate the idea morally.) The Rash does not like the interpretation that the commentators have made that "if I did not know, I would not have left the Land of Israel" means that he left the Land of Israel. Rather, he claims that "if I did not know, I would not have left Babylon." And he refers to the Rabbi's attack on Maimonides.
The truth is that in practice the halakhic justice is with Maimonides and money matters, but our eyes see that a scholar and a posek read this agga as a halakhic deed in a romantic, moral reading.
I estimate that if I had before me the book of the scholar Rabbi Yehuda Brandes, "an agga in deed," I would have brought a few more examples, and certainly more successful ones.
PS: Waiting and anticipating a column on the conversion controversy (how much can you hold back?)
Indeed, there are quite a few examples. See, for example, in column 214 about Ashu because of his arrows. But that does not concern my words here. They wanted to teach me that divorce is a bad thing. What does this have to do with the ruling of the halakhah in these matters? It has to do with the general practice of the halakhah that one should try to avoid divorce.
“The posak should think coldly about the case before him. What the halakha says has nothing to do with what the feeling says (and in my opinion not even what the moral says), and that is good. The posak should cut the law with a detached coolness, and thus he will be able to direct himself to the truth of the Torah. ” That's all you have to say.
I gave an example from the story of Rav Assi and his mother who were judged by the halakha; I showed that the Maimonides, the money changer, and the Maharash discussed it using halakhic tools. I concluded by saying that the rabbin and the Rashash disagreed with them halakhically, on human or moral grounds.
A partial quote is worse than a full quote at all. After all, I wrote that there is room to introduce such considerations in stage B, after the basic halakhic options are discussed. If the law is not settled but several options remain, the way to decide between them can also include morality (and perhaps emotions as an indication).
1. Maybe this is one of the reasons that the Gemara is not for women and they are disqualified from discussing it? (The questioner does not state)
2. The truth is that when I read “Two Readings and One Translation” I come across stories from the Torah that, for me and for our female generation, lack emotion (ostensibly of course). I have never shared this with those around me because I do not have the words to convey my feelings, especially since we are preoccupied with emotional matters. I do not remember many examples now, except for one when Eliezer came to negotiate to take Rebecca (at the time, the Glebus had not yet become one family, it may have been a worldly separation from her family, which adds to the emotional aspect here). And her father, Bethuel, and her brother, Laban, tried to delay. After which it is stated in the Torah that her brother and mother answered Eliezer. The girl’s mouth was asked (not to forget that she was three years old, another point that contributes emotion to the whole play). Chazal asks, “And where is her father, Bethuel?” Chazal answers, “He died (he ate the poisoned plate that was prepared for Eliezer by an angel who replaced the plates, as I think are memories from the Chaydar) and it is immediately stated that indeed They asked and sent Rivka on her way, and here the son asks. Let's imagine the situation in our day. Such a tragedy. Father suddenly passed away. I suppose everything would have come to a standstill. Eliezer would have put his plans aside, at least for the time being, and would have felt a little embarrassed about his entire status and his presence in their home right now in the face of the family tragedy (perhaps trying to quietly pack up his equipment and leave the area as if he had come at such a difficult time, or perhaps alternatively out of a feeling of discomfort from the entire situation that had landed here, supposedly forgetting the purpose of his arrival and helping with all his body and soul to organize the funeral and build a tent and bring chairs for the mourners, etc., etc.) But in practice, in the Torah, the world as it is, continues as usual, except that the plans continue as planned. There is no expression or hint of any sensitivity whatsoever. The husband reads for a moment as if he were a joke and then moves on to the next matter. The rabbi is sometimes accused of autism. The rabbi here has a "Daurahita" to be in good company (there were years when when the husband read about Esau “and cried out with a great and bitter cry” I had to hold back from crying and when the husband arrived and called out to Esau’s tears, saying “One blessing for you, my father” I could no longer hold back, let’s not talk about the story of Joseph and his brothers. Yes, gentlemen, this is the situation (this shock of Esau’s did not go smoothly according to the Sages. This was paid off by the Jewish Mordechai thousands of years later, as is well known). Rabbi Eliashib once replied that he did not let the difficult cases that came to him (perhaps while he was sitting as a judge) penetrate beyond the button of his shirt. Once, when the judges tried to dissuade one from granting a divorce to his wife by telling him that it is written that the altar brings tears to him, he replied to them, “It’s not so bad, to this day I have shed tears, it wouldn’t hurt if he shed a few tears now too.” It seems to me that there is a reason to attribute to Sugiya here the instructive story in the Gemara of a father who witnessed his son being stabbed in the Temple and the father entered a trance of halakhic grammar and ordered his son to be taken out. While he was trembling from the help for fear of impurity (instead of missing a beat) and the Gemara discussed there about this father, does he have excessive fear of God or “autism” in relation to murder
3. In the context of the rabbi’s comment “It’s like asking Rabbi Chaim what a mahvet is” the rabbi’s example is not successful and I will illustrate this with a story. Once, Rabbi Avraham Gnichovsky came to ask Rabbi Chaim about the type of avocado seed (which children sometimes grow at home) regarding perhaps donations and tithes. Rabbi Chaim asked him what an avocado is? Rabbi Avraham was moved and said, “Do you understand what I mean by a lot? In all the Babylonian and Jerusalemite and the Midrashim and the Toseftos and the Zohar etc. the word avocado does not exist
The mahvet mahvet is already mentioned in the Torah several times and here is the place to thank the rabbi for “the article that the rabbi did not write” following the passing of our rabbi in fulfilling what was decreed. Just as it is commanded to say something that is heard, so it is commanded not to say something that is not heard (since it is clear that the article was about Some praised him, while most of him was critical) and Agam, the rabbi who loves to slaughter holy cows from everywhere, is currently in his thirties, more prone to blowing up the Temple Mount dome during warm-up than slaughtering a holy cow. I once asked our rabbi in the neighborhood, who is well-versed in the laws of slander, whether I am allowed to tell a secular person something that is truly praiseworthy (and I add that to me, it is great praise), but the one who hears the slander thinks this story is derogatory, and I brought as an example the stories about Rabbi Chaim (by the way, Rabbi Chaim used to pray about this three times a day, not remembering anything except the Torah, this is further evidence against the rabbi that prayers help). And it seems to me that the rabbi answered me that it is probably forbidden, and in the process told me that when he was a yeshiva student in America, there was a presidential election, I think for a president named Johnson, and they had a yeshiva server by that name, and their rosh yeshiva, being so absorbed in study, when they told him the next day that the president-elect was Johnson, the rosh yeshiva was surprised how a yeshiva server had become overnight. To the President of the United States
R’ Chaim of the frying pan is R’ Chaim of Brisk
Where do you get this from? In any case, the main thing is that we both admit that this is not Rabbi Chaim Walder.
It is said that R’ Chaim of Brisk took the pans and pots out of the Yore Dea, meaning that you don’t need to know exactly how a pan is built and what the ratio is between the length of the handle and the diameter of the surface, but it is enough to know its required properties that are relevant to Halacha and the Halacha regarding it. Thus, when it comes to not doing it the way it is, there is no need for a child to understand what it is exactly, but only that something is done differently and there are all kinds of laws, and his Halacha understanding is not impaired by this in any way.
And in general, just R’ Chaim is R’ Chaim of Brisk (at least in places where they are dealt with in the Gemara more than in Halacha), just as the Rashba is just R”a Shlomo ben Aderet and not R”s of Shantz, even though both are very respected.
The rabbi gave me a deja vu of a story I heard in exactly this context:
I remember in a class I attended, the rabbi who taught the class told us (all the participants were men) that he taught a class on Gemara for midrash students, and it was on Tractate Yevamot.
He told us that he drew the entire “family” of the subject on the board and put Xs on all the “dead” ones. Then he looked back and saw that the faces of the tselmids were horrified.
They took pity on the “dead” ones that were drawn on the board.
Needless to say, we all laughed and smiled at the story.