A Look at the Euthyphro Dilemma in Light of the Debate (Column 457)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In the previous column I presented the debate between me and David Enoch (see the recording here) on whether God is required as a basis for the validity of morality (or: whether without God everything is permitted). In the discussion, the moderator (Jeremy Fogel) raised the Euthyphro dilemma, which at first glance did not seem directly related to the debate. Later I was reminded that in Column 278 I had already discussed the dilemma and its implications for the argument from morality (the grounding of morality in God). In that discussion I briefly answered the question, and here I return to this topic to clarify its connection to the debate with Enoch and to sharpen distinctions I made there and in the previous column.
It is important to preface that the concept of God with which I deal in this column is not necessarily identical to the “thin” God discussed in the previous column. Some of the proposals I raise here constitute additions that are not part of the “thin” God required to give force to moral norms. I will return to this point at the end of the column.
The Euthyphro Dilemma
In Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro the following question is posed: Is the good good because the gods will it, or do the gods will the good because it is good? In other words, is there an objective meaning to “good,” or is what makes it good the gods’ decision—who could just as well have decreed that any other conduct is good or bad? Everything would then be subject to their arbitrary will. A similar question can of course be raised with respect to God, and Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman, in their book Religion and Morality, conduct a very detailed discussion of the issue. Their conclusion is that almost all Jewish thinkers espouse the second possibility. I shall not enter here into all the nuances and arguments raised in that book and elsewhere (in my view there are several inaccuracies), and will suffice with a brief survey of the basic rationales for both sides.
On the one hand, theologically we assume that God is omnipotent and subject to nothing. There is none besides Him. He created the world and set the laws that prevail within it. This means He could have set them differently, in any way that might have occurred to Him. From here it follows that there is no objective meaning to good and evil. On the other hand, if we adopt this view, the conclusion is that we cannot say that God is good. The statement that God is good assumes that goodness is defined independently of Him, and the claim is that His conduct and demands align with that objective criterion of goodness. But if His decision is what defines the concept of “good,” then the statement “God is good” is merely a tautological definition (or an analytic truth) and not a claim. Its meaning is essentially: God wills what He wills. But that is true of each of us.
Many theologians (and I humbly join them) tend to think this is a problematic position. God truly is good and could not have been otherwise. This of course presupposes that the good is defined objectively and that God Himself is subject to that definition. He could have confused us and blinded our eyes so we would not distinguish between good and evil, but He cannot decree good and evil otherwise. As I noted, despite the theological difficulties, it seems that most thinkers in Jewish thought hold the second view.
Sense and Reference
One could slightly soften the first view and formulate it thus: we have an intuition about good and evil. The claim is that God’s will aligns with that intuition. But that intuition was implanted in us by Him; therefore there is no truly objective concept of good and evil. In this way we can say that the statement is indeed a claim (and not a definition), yet at the same time it is a claim about our concepts and not about the world itself. As far as the world itself is concerned, the statement “God is good” says nothing (it is an empty identity, a tautology).
This is a special case of the problem of the relation between sense and reference. Take an example that analytic philosophers frequently use (see, for instance, here): the claim “the Morning Star is the Evening Star.” These were once thought to be two different stars (one seen in the evening and the other in the morning), but ultimately it turned out that they are the very same celestial body. Now we may ask: is this statement a substantive claim or an empty definition (an analytic sentence)? Does it have any content, or is it an empty tautology? Seemingly such a sentence says nothing, since it is an identity of a thing with itself. But our sense is that there is some novelty in this sentence. It teaches us something about our own concepts. The two stars we thought were different are the very same star. This sentence changes our knowledge of the world, even though in terms of its objective content it appears to be an empty identity.
Notice that this is so for any identity claim of the form A is B. Assuming the claim is true, its meaning is: A is A—an empty tautology. The analytic solution to the problem of the meaning of identity claims is the distinction between sense and reference. Analytic philosophers (following Frege) say that such an identity claim has sense but not reference (or, more precisely, its reference yields only a trivial identity). It has a non-empty, non-trivial sense for us, but if one looks at what it points to in the world, it is a trivial identity.
We can now return to the Euthyphro dilemma. According to the side that holds God is the one who defines good and evil, we may argue that the statement “He is good” has sense but not reference. With respect to reference (the “pointing” to the world) it is empty, since He is good by virtue of the very definition of “good.” Whatever He would do would leave Him under the definition “good,” and thus the statement that He is good is contentless (analytic).
Conclusion
Yet I find it hard to accept even this mitigated formulation. The straightforward intuition is that God indeed ought to be good, namely that the claim that He is good is not an empty definition but a substantive claim. Were this not the case, there would be no point in discussing God’s goodness, and no questions would arise from behaviors that appear to us immoral (such as the Binding of Isaac, the destruction of Amalek, and the like). One must understand that if what God wills is by definition “good,” then there is no room for moral doubt regarding Him. He commanded the binding of Isaac; therefore the binding of Isaac is good. The very sense that there is a dissonance between a divine command and morality points to a presupposition on our part that God is good. Just as the existence of ethical disagreement points to the objectivity of ethics (otherwise, what would there be to argue about), the existence of ethical criticism points to the objectivity of ethical facts (otherwise there would be no room for criticism of unethical positions and behaviors).
The conclusion is that simple religious intuition directs us to the second side of the Euthyphro dilemma, according to which the good is defined objectively and binds even God. In other words, God wills things because they are good, and not the other way around. Only thus can we claim that He is good, and also criticize Him (or seek explanations) for cases of conduct that are not good. But as we have seen, this approach raises the opposite difficulty, to which I now turn.
Between the Laws of Physics and the “Laws” of Logic
This approach raises a contrary theological difficulty. How can it be that God, who created everything and by whose power all is done, is nonetheless “subject” to an external set of laws that He did not legislate? To grasp this, we must return to a distinction I have drawn in the past between two kinds of laws (see, for example, Column 278). God is of course not subject to the laws of physics, for He created them, and “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted.” He is certainly not subject to the laws of the state (if only because He is not a citizen of it). By contrast, He is indeed “subject” to the laws of logic. The laws of logic are “imposed” upon God. He cannot make a round triangle or violate logic, simply because there is no such thing as a round triangle and no such thing as a violation of logic. A triangle, by definition, is not round. This does not follow from some legislation imposed upon the triangle against its will, but from its very nature. From its very definition as a triangle it follows that it is not round and cannot be round. Therefore the inability to create a round triangle is not due to an external constraint imposed upon God, and thus it is not a limitation of His omnipotence or a deficiency in Him.
An omnipotent being can do anything that can be conceived, even in imagination. But a round triangle is an empty concept. There is no such thing and it cannot be conceived. Therefore God’s inability to create such a thing is not a deficiency in His power. Imagine someone asking whether God can make a round triangle. I would first ask him to explain the concept to me, and then perhaps I could answer him. He will of course fail to explain it (does it have sharp angles or not? what is the sum of its angles? are all points on it equidistant from a single point?), and therefore the question falls away.
As I explained there, what underlies the confusion is the term “law,” which is used in these two contexts with different meanings. The laws of physics are laws that God legislated into the nature of creation. That legislation is His decision to create a specific nature for the world He created, among various possible options. He could also have created different laws of nature. By contrast, the laws of logic are not “laws” in that sense. The use of the term “law” in the logical context is borrowed. It is simply the definition of the things, not something external imposed upon them. [1] A triangle is not round not because someone forbids it and not because it is prohibited. By virtue of being a triangle, it simply is not round. Hence it is not correct to say that God chose one logical system among several possible systems. There is no alternative logical system. [2] Therefore, from here on, in a context similar to that of the laws of logic, I shall use the term “law” in quotation marks.
The Status of Moral “Laws”
The question that now arises concerns the status of moral laws: Are these laws in the sense of the laws of physics, or are they “laws” in the sense of the “laws” of logic? Those who take the first side of the Euthyphro dilemma believe that moral laws resemble the laws of physics, and therefore God determines and defines them. The second side of the dilemma, by contrast, assumes that moral “laws” resemble the “laws” of logic (they are “laws” and not laws), and therefore they are imposed upon God. He could not have created a different system of moral laws. Thus, for example, He cannot create a world in which a different morality prevails (where murder or torture would be positive acts). Morality, by definition, forbids murder.
He could, of course, create a world in which people enjoy torture (would it even be correct in such a world to call it “torture”?), and then perhaps there would be no moral problem in causing suffering. But there the causing of suffering would not be distressing. Causing people sorrow is bad in every possible world. That pertains to a world different in its reality, i.e., a world where suffering does not cause distress. One may also think of a world in which causing suffering is defined as good; but such a world is not one with different morality—it is a world in which people are blind to moral norms (and the God who created it is not moral). One can change any parameter in the world’s nature and create a different world in which that parameter is different. But given the nature of a particular world, the moral norms are derived from it in a determinate way (they are imposed upon us). It seems to me that this underlies the Ramchal’s well-known dictum “the nature of the good is to bestow goodness.” God, by His very nature, must bestow goodness. He has no other option (this is imposed upon Him).
This means that the statement “Murder is bad” is analytic, just like the law of non-contradiction. It is indeed an ethical fact, but it is not contingent (rather, necessary). Therefore there is no impediment to claiming that it is imposed (more precisely: “imposed”) upon God, just as logic is “imposed” upon Him. This differs from, say, the laws of nature. Take, for example, the law of gravitation: any two bodies with mass attract each other by a force proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. This is not an analytic statement, and it could be false. There could have been a world in which the law of gravitation is different (e.g., a force proportional to the cube of the distance). Therefore such a law is up to God, and only His decision determines its content.
How This Fits with the Previous Column
In the previous column I argued that there can be no valid morality without God. Does that not contradict my claim here that morality is imposed upon God and precedes Him, and thus is not the product of His will? Seemingly there is a direct contradiction. I now understand that this is probably what our moderator Jeremy Fogel meant when, in our discussion, he raised the Euthyphro dilemma and asked my view of it.
In the discussion itself I briefly explained that I distinguish between the definition of good and evil and our obligation to them. The definition of good and evil is imposed upon God and cannot be otherwise. Even He cannot decree that murder is good or that helping others is bad. But the obligation to do the good and refrain from the evil does not exist without God. In other words, the normative claim that murder is forbidden—that the ethical fact of the prohibition of murder has binding force— is not imposed upon God. It derives from His command and is brought into being by it.
If we return to the notion of “ethical facts,” we can put it thus: they may exist in and of themselves, as David Enoch argues (i.e., God did not create them), but as I argued against him, even if they exist and sit there in some corner of the world of ideas (is), that still cannot be binding for me (ought). I remind that in the previous column I distinguished between the question of who created the ethical facts (Enoch’s concern) and the question of who gives them binding force (my concern). What I have described here is that while God did not create the ethical facts (they are imposed upon Him), only His command can give them binding force.
One can now ask: what obligates God Himself in morality? If He is good, then He, too, ought to be bound by morality (by His categorical imperative). Is He bound by His own command? That is very strange and, in fact, contradicts my claim in the previous column that a separate agent is needed to confer de dicto authority upon a law.
I think it is correct to say that God is indeed not obligated by morality, but chooses it. He does not choose what morality is (for that is an absolute, rigid datum not in His hands), but He chooses to will and to demand of His creatures moral conduct. This is similar to what I argued in the previous column against Ari Elon: a human being can legislate for himself whether to be moral or not, but he cannot legislate the moral laws themselves (define what is good and what is evil). If so, both humans and God are constrained by the moral laws. The definition of good and evil is imposed upon them and is not theirs to determine. But God can command morality and thereby confer binding force on those definitions with respect to us, whereas a human being cannot do even that. [3]
I will now add another layer to the picture. It is hard to speak of temporal priority of ethical facts (the definitions of good and evil) to God, since He has always existed. There was nothing “before” Him because there is no time prior to Him. There is and can be no world, not even imaginary, in which God does not exist. But in theory there could be a world in which God does not command us to be moral (unless we assume that His good nature compels Him to bestow goodness and to require it). Note that we have now learned that morality indeed precedes the divine command, but not God. That is regarding temporal priority. There is, however, also a qualitative (essential) priority.
The ethical facts do not depend on a divine command, and they are not the handiwork of God. Yet there is still no meaning to the claim that morality exists without God. Assuming that God is a being whose existence is necessary (and here I mean the religious God, not the “thin” God of the previous column), one cannot speak of a reality in which a necessarily existing being does not exist. Therefore, even if morality (or the ethical facts) exists without a command, one cannot say it exists without God. Even if both exist in parallel, the ethical facts do not necessarily depend on God.
But now we can perhaps reach a slightly different definition: moral facts are of God’s very essence; they exist as He exists, and just as He exists necessarily and always, so do they exist necessarily and always. And still, their binding force is not permanent and not necessary. They do not have binding force unless He commands them.
Between One Who Serves God and One Who Does Not
At the opening of this column I noted that the concept of God considered here is not the “thin” God of the previous column (the God required to confer validity on moral laws and ethical facts). You can see this when you review the various proposals raised here: that He is a necessarily existing being who has always existed, that ethical facts may be part of His essence, that His nature is to bestow goodness, and more. All these are additions that somewhat “fatten” the minimalist, “thin” being I discussed in the previous column.
The reason is that the discussion in this column takes place entirely in the theological sphere, and not only in the meta-ethical one. In fact, the Euthyphro dilemma itself belongs to the theological sphere. Without theology there would be no problem claiming that God defines the moral laws (for there would be no need to assume that the statement “He is good” is a substantive claim about Him rather than a definition), and then the dilemma would not arise. In addition, in the philosophical sphere, no contradiction would have surfaced with what I wrote in the previous column. If God defines good and evil (the ethical facts), that fits perfectly with what I claimed previously, and this whole column would have been unnecessary. My aim here was to reconcile my meta-ethical claim from the previous column with the God of the theological (Judeo-Christian) plane, about whom the assumption is that He is good. This is a distinctly theological discussion (and not a meta-ethical one).
The Euthyphro Dilemma for Religious Values
More than once in the past I have pointed out the difference between religious values and moral values (see, e.g., Column 15, the beginning of my book Walking Among Those Who Stand, and much more). The solution I propose to contradictions between halakhah and morality lies in the fact that these are two independent systems of values. An act X can be halakhically obligatory (because it advances religious value A) and at the same time morally forbidden (because it harms moral value B). Religious values are a-moral, and sometimes they can stand in direct opposition to moral values and sometimes only in conflict (when the clash arises only in certain circumstances). My claim is that there is no impediment to such tensions arising, and, in fact, it is more correct to say these are not contradictions (there is no theoretical difficulty here) but conflicts (it is difficult to decide what to do in practice).
Following this, Tirgitz asked the following question (in a comment thread to the previous column):
Meaning that in the next column you will address Euthyphro also with respect to religious values and other values, which, according to you, are values by virtue of which God allows Himself to shrug off any moral obligation. And that would seemingly mean that these too were not arbitrarily legislated by God.
I will explain his question. According to my view, God commands us anti-moral commandments to advance religious values. If so, Tirgitz argues, it appears that religious values are also imposed upon Him and are not the result of His arbitrary will (His sovereign legislation). If the commandments were not “halakhic facts” imposed upon God but were created by His legislation, then He could have legislated them differently. In such a case I would expect that, given His will (and nature) to bestow goodness, He would not legislate laws that run counter to morality. The existence of conflicts indicates that the laws of halakhah (or the religious values that halakhic laws promote) are also imposed upon God, and thus He finds Himself (or places us) in these conflicts against His will.
This is an excellent question, and in my opinion he is indeed right. Just as there are ethical facts, there are also halakhic facts. Both do not depend on God and are imposed upon Him. [4] At the beginning of the third book of my trilogy I discussed the comparison between the Kantian picture of moral behavior as honoring the categorical imperative and the halakhic picture I propose of performing a commandment as honoring the obligation to the command. Here we see that this analogy goes even further. [5]
This brings me to another question by Tirgitz, asked a few days earlier (see the unfolding discussion in the thread here). In the moral context it is customary to think that in cases of conflict between values, even if I had justification to do X and thereby violate Y, there remains a problem in having violated Y. I should feel sorrow or sadness at having harmed a person or done something immoral, even if I was compelled to do so. Tirgitz asked whether such sorrow should also appear in the halakhic context (as it is said: “Your pain and My pain”). That is, should I regret that because I was engaged with a met mitzvah (a corpse with no one to bury it) I did not wave the lulav (or that because I was ill I did not fast on Yom Kippur), just as I regret that because I went to war I had to kill people (and sometimes civilians)? In short, his question is whether, in this respect, there is a difference between halakhah and morality.
I answered him there that I think there is a difference between the contexts: in the moral context, even if some value is overridden by another, I should still feel sorrow or dissonance that I violated the overridden value (I harmed a person). By contrast, in halakhah, if there is no obligation and I did what is incumbent upon me, there is no reason to regret what I did not fulfill. It is entirely permitted and no one was harmed.
However, this distinction assumes that in halakhah there is only the command; when there is no command, nothing happened. But in light of the picture that emerges here, it seems I must retract that distinction. If we assume that the halakhic command is intended to advance religious values, then even if I justifiably violated a halakhah (because another halakhah overrode it), something in the spiritual world is nonetheless harmed (I acted contrary to a halakhic fact and brought about spiritual damage). Seemingly, from the picture I present here it follows that there is indeed no difference between halakhah and morality in this respect. [6]
Yet, upon further thought, one can argue that in halakhah, if I did something permitted, then the spiritual damage is also prevented (see my article on citric acid on Passover, where I brought sources that write this). One may say that God performs a miracle and prevents the damage so that no mishap should come through a righteous person like me, who is faithful to halakhah. This of course does not occur in the moral sphere. There, even if I was compelled to harm a moral value, the damage is unavoidable. The difference stems from the fact that in the moral context we are dealing with physical facts, whereas in the halakhic context we are dealing with spiritual facts. God does not change physics because He does not intervene in the operation of the physical world, but He does change spiritual facts (for in the spiritual world He does intervene; there it does not operate mechanically). [7] It is important to note that although, as we have seen, ethical facts are not physical facts, they depend on physical facts (harm or suffering to a person, for example). For instance, if I stole money from someone to save a life, then even if it is permitted and perhaps even a mitzvah, the harm to the one robbed occurred and there is room to regret it (here no miracle will occur whereby God returns the money to him).
The implication will be for cases like those I described in the previous column, where the categorical imperative tells me I must not do X even though it has no negative consequence. In such cases, it seems that if the matter is overridden by another value, there is nothing to regret. This is similar to the situation in the halakhic sphere. For example, suppose I evade 1,000 NIS of taxes to save a person’s life. In such a case I have nothing to regret about the tax evasion, since it has no negative consequences (as I explained in the previous column). Beyond the absent problematic consequence, what we have here is only a transgression of the categorical imperative, but of course that was justified under these circumstances. Indeed, it is more correct to say that I did not violate the categorical imperative at all in such a case. The universal law says that everyone should evade tax to save a life.
[1] In the previous column I explained why the law of non-contradiction as a logical-analytic claim requires no justification. This is the same idea from a slightly different angle.
[2] Consider the question whether God can create a wall impervious to all bullets and also a bullet that penetrates all walls. The answer is, of course, negative, because if the bullet He created penetrates all walls, then there is no wall impervious to it; hence there is no wall impervious to all bullets—and vice versa. God’s inability to create these two objects simultaneously is not a defect in His power. Simply put, such a state of affairs does not exist at the logical level. See here for implications regarding the “stone God cannot lift” question, and here on the problem of natural evil (see also the second book of my trilogy, ch. 10).
[3] The conclusion is that God’s “goodness” differs from ours. For Him there are no binding laws by which He acts; rather, He is the one who confers them with authority. A person is obligated by the categorical imperative, whose validity is a given for him, and therefore he must decide to act accordingly. By contrast, God is not obligated; He chooses to confer that validity. The Ramchal would say: His nature is to bestow goodness.
[4] At the beginning of Column 278 I discussed the concept of nehama de-kisufa (“bread of shame”), and it seems to me that the discussion there also addresses this question.
[5] See my article on the categorical imperative in halakhah, which shows a continuation of the analogy between halakhah and morality—but this time it concerns content and not logical structure. There I argue that the categorical imperative has halakhic standing.
[6] I will raise here a preliminary thought that still requires clarification. I think there is nevertheless some difference. In the moral sphere there is the obligation to moral values, whereas in halakhah there is both the obligation to religious values and the obligation to obey the command by virtue of its being a divine command (regardless of the fact that it also advances religious values). The assumption here is that in morality there is no divine command but only divine will that we act thus. The categorical imperative does not have the status of a command within halakhah (though, in my view, it does have halakhic standing—see my article here).
And thus it follows that when I do not fast on Yom Kippur because I am ill, the dimension of command truly does not exist, since in such a case the command is to eat and not to fast. Therefore, from that eating no damage occurred and there is nothing to regret. By contrast, in the moral sphere, even if a certain value is justifiably overridden, the moral obligation to fulfill it remains in force (except that it is impossible to comply). In fact, I claim that in moral conflict it is always “deferred” (dekhuyah) and not “permitted” (hutrah). But in halakhah there is also the consequential dimension (the repair brought about by a commandment and the corruption from a transgression), and with respect to that there seems to be a similarity to what we saw in the moral context. This relates to the distinction between de dicto fulfillment and de re fulfillment, and this is not the place to elaborate.
[7] See a note on this in my article on punishment in halakhah, ch. 4, where I argued against mechanistic approaches to heavenly punishment.
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A woman giving birth regrets that she was prevented from fasting on Yom Kippur. In terms of the commandment, she is completely covered - she is exempt. Conversely, the commandment of protecting her life and the life of the fetus is greater. But she regrets, even though she knows very well that her commandment at the moment is to eat, because she did not get to fast. She misses the day of fasting, purification and atonement. Will you dismiss these feelings as a form of atonement, and excuse this under the pretext of "psychology" - arguments that you do not consider? Or is there other material here that in a certain way resembles regret over a moral failure?
I completely understand this sorrow, and I also think it definitely has a place. What I discussed was the question of whether there is an interest/obligation (not halakhic) to be sorry. In short, I am dealing with the normative and not the psychological level. If people lost a football game they are sorry, so wouldn't a priest be like a host?!
I didn't ask if you understand grief, but rather whether you see in it a value that is close to or similar to the loss of a moral value. Not the grief of missing a football game.
Not to the same extent, if at all. According to what I wrote in the column, assuming that God prevents spiritual harm, if someone acted lawfully, then nothing happened. And if he regrets his loss (the loss of the experience) - that is of course his right, but it does not necessarily have value. Perhaps it expresses a kind of fear, since sorrow shows that things are important to him. But moral sorrow is something beyond expressing that the value is important to him. The claim that something really happened here is problematic, but that I am not guilty. In the halakhic context, nothing problematic happened. At most, you lost an experience.
I think there is no evidence from the fact that there are moral questions about God that morality is imposed on Him.
These questions only assume that God chose to command morality as a supreme principle, and therefore ask how it is possible for Him to contradict Himself.
Sharpener – The question is clarifying and not attacking. That is, it is clear to her that there is a moral justification for this, since she assumes that morality is the overarching principle that God chose.
I didn't think she was being harsh. After all, if she's good, then the motivation doesn't matter. But I think you're missing the point of these questions: You present them as logical questions (about their coherence), but these questions are ethical. It's like Abraham, who ordered his son to be circumcised, wondering only about the consistency of God, who promised that Isaac would be called a seed, and ignoring the question of how God could possibly command such a thing. From your perspective, these are similar logical questions. That's not what the poets mean.
Regarding Tirgitz's question, this is really a good question, because the feeling is that the law is different from moral obligations (just as the Rambam divides between intellectual and physical commandments, etc.). One way to explain this is that God is subject to a complete spiritual system that we have no grasp of. Then the question will naturally be asked: If God is subject to such a complex system of laws, then apparently this system of laws is a higher being, a kind of God who is impersonal and indifferent to Pinocchio, but in a non-physical, "natural" world. It seems to me that the question of God's subjection to laws is very weak to non-existent in the case of logical laws, as you explained (that they are not "laws"), and it is a little stronger in the case of moral laws, because you argued - a little bit narrowly, but you argued that I can accept - that they are necessary in the same way. But in the case of halakhic laws, it is a little harder to accept, in my opinion. Because their necessity includes the creation of a world in which they are necessary, ostensibly, and on the face of it, it seems unnecessary (the claim is that they are necessary at the highest possible level, but it is still impossible to understand them - and this is a big stretch, unless the world was created along with these laws, and then the question of the dogma is raised). This is also true regarding moral laws (“”Causing pain is bad” this is an argument that is relevant only to a world where there is pain – and the big question is why God created pain in the world and not why He said it is forbidden to cause pain), and yet somehow it seems to me that it is stronger in a halakhic world where the rules seem more arbitrary. In any case, it places God within a world that preceded Him and over which He has no control. Incidentally, there is also another theoretical possibility to deal with this question, which I don't know what I think about – to say that God could have chosen a world in which only moral laws are relevant as a human obligation, and He could have chosen a world in which these laws themselves are rejected in the face of other values, the content of which could be anything and is subject to His choice. And he chose the second option because without such a situation, we would hardly observe these laws, they would be self-evident (as the Maimonides writes about the Tree of Knowledge and so on). According to this option, the existence of a halakhic world that contradicts the laws of morality is sometimes justified for some external reason, not necessary, and does not require an entire world of rules to which God is subject. On the other hand, as mentioned, the very decision to create such a world can seem questionable.
I didn't understand the argument. I'll just comment on two points in your words (which I hope I understood):
1. The laws are not applicable. The definition of good and evil is not necessarily there, but perhaps a fact. Therefore, there is no point in talking about the question of whether they are higher than God or not.
2. Moral laws are also laws only in our world. If another world were created that was entirely different with creatures that were built completely differently (they didn't have sorrow and suffering), then different laws would apply there. But if they were moral laws, then these were applications of our same moral laws to those circumstances. This is exactly what you described regarding Halacha, so apparently there is no difference.
“Any identity statement of the type: A is B. Assuming that this statement is true, then its meaning is: A is A, i.e. an empty tautology.” – I have difficulty finding the problem here. Assuming that this statement is true, it is logically equivalent to the statement A=A, but also to the statement 1+1=2 and to any other true statement. If the meaning of a sentence is the information it adds, then no sentence has “meaning assuming it is true”. If we assume/know that it is true, then saying again that it is true does not add any information to us, and therefore is not meaningful.
In other words: it has meaning and not instruction.
In the book of Acts of the Apostles, the dilemma of a beautiful letter is for idols, for whom it is not entirely clear to what extent they are identified with morality. On the contrary, according to the stories of mythology, it is clear that they are full of envy and wickedness.
In contrast, the God of Israel is the source of truth and the source of goodness. He is not ‘subject’ to morality and truth. He is truth and morality in their absolute purity. We, as His creatures, know only a small crumb. We know a little through our senses, our feeling, and our observation, but what we know is a tiny crumb of the complete picture, which only the Creator of the world knows in its entirety and only He knows its purpose.
Our moral questions about the ways of the Creator are like the questions of a child who does not understand why his father hits his hand when he was simply trying to stick a hammer into an electrical outlet, and does not understand why his father handed him over to the cruel gang of men in white coats who pull out their knives and tear the flesh of the unfortunate child.
Regarding human parents, we have already understood that the hit on the hand comes to save the child from electrocution, and the ’knife pullers in white coats’ perform a life-saving operation on the child. All the more so because of the actions of the Creator of the world, which took humanity hundreds of years of research to understand some of the depth inherent in them – that we are allowed to give some ‘credit’ to our Creator, that even the suffering and torment he brings us are for our good, to prepare us in the ’corridor’ So that we may be worthy of the ’lounge’, and know with our hearts ‘that as a father chastens his son, ’your God chastens you’
With blessings, Ot’Yipron Nephishitim HaLevi
If the Creator has complete identity between His will and the objective good, then for man there can be a gap between his sense of what is good and what is just and between the instructions he receives from his Creator. And this gap is not only ‘possible’ but necessary, but it narrows as long as man deepens and understands more deeply the will of his Creator.
It would seem that it would be possible to be content with accepting a yoke from the certainty that the Creator of the world acts in law even if the man does not understand, but that is not enough. For man must not only be a ‘slave’ faithful to his Creator, but also a ‘disciple’ who knows how to decipher the will of his Creator even in situations for which he has not received explicit instructions.
For a ‘slave’ it is enough to dictate ‘do this’ or ‘do this’. He will not move a step without receiving explicit instruction, but in order to be a ‘student’ who knows how to direct his master's will even as a ‘sherik’ to understand a thing from a thing’, there must be an understanding of the meaning of things, by which he can apply the principles even in changing situations.
For this purpose, a written Torah was given that was dictated from on high word for word ‘it was written on the tablets’, but there must also be an ‘oral Torah’ that strives to understand the meaning and logic of the laws of the Torah, and from an understanding of the depth of the laws of the Torah – it is possible to absorb the spirit of things and apply them even in changing situations.
Through the Oral Torah that explains the law of freedom – Man is gradually freed from the “dilemma of the letter”, as the will of the Creator, which began as an “acceptance of an external burden”, becomes for him more and more a “Torah of the Day” which he understands and identifies with.
With greetings, Hanoch Hanach Feinschmecker-Palti
“But when [man] sinned at the tree of knowledge… he was punished by having that intellectual attainment taken away from him… and therefore it is said “And you shall be like God, knowing good and evil” and it is not said ‘Knowing falsehood and truth’ or ‘Achieving falsehood and truth’.
And in necessary things there is no good and evil at all, but falsehood and truth’ (Mo”N, Part 1, p’ b)
Perhaps Maimonides is also speaking here about ethical facts and makes Euthyphro's dilemma redundant?
See column 177 where I explained that it is about politeness and not morality.
Thanks for the reference, I read it, maybe I didn't understand, but I didn't see a problem with Maimonides' words.
It seems to me that the sentence should be divided into two:
“And you were like God, knowing good and evil” – This is about the awareness that has developed in you of what is famous, what is beautiful and what is indecent, what is good and what is evil. So now morality also seems to you as good and evil.
“And [the verse] did not say falsehood and truth or achieve falsehood and truth, and in necessary things there is no good and evil at all, but falsehood and truth” – Here Maimonides is referring to morality. That is, in this sense, you have distanced yourself from God and have lost the intellectual ability that you previously had to perceive morality in a factual – divine category that is truth and falsehood.
This should be read as a question and answer – And why didn't the verse say “falsehood and truth”? Answer – Because you have lost that. But know that in truth, with God, necessary things (morality) are not good and evil but falsehood and truth. And here Euthyphro's dilemma is superfluous.
I no longer remember the exact wording, but I understood that it deals only with politeness and not with morality. In any case, even if you are right that the Rambam has some statement, it does not eliminate the Euthyphro dilemma. At most, you could argue that the Rambam had his own position on the dilemma.
In the book of Proverbs 15:2, the contrasts are not between "religion" and "morality" but between "morality of compassion" and "morality of deterrence." The side of compassion requires caution against disproportionate harm to the sinner and providing the possibility of repentance and correction. In contrast, the morality of deterrence requires bringing cruel revenge on the sinner that will remove from the future sinner any "Yahweh Amina" of repeating the crime.
Here we need the "divine order" that will provide the right dosage that will bring about a balance between the need for significant deterrence and the divine desire to pardon and allow correction.
Thus, for example, deterrence requires eradicating from the roots the peoples who have developed an ideology of hatred and evil – Amalek and the peoples of Canaan – and on the other hand, compassion requires calling them to peace and allowing them to escape by ‘changing direction’ by accepting the basic values of faith and morality – the Seven Commandments of the Children of Noah.
With greetings, Hasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kwas
It is clear that there is a circular triangle. It is something that has all the properties of a triangle and all the properties of a circle.
Something that is a circular triangle is both circular and made of three straight lines.
Although this contradicts everyday logic, fortunately for us reality does not dance to the tune of our logic. Otherwise, we would not exist.
I don't think the picture you've described suggests that religious values are imposed on God. By virtue of being who He is, He Himself is an authority who can determine that certain religious values (which He created) are important enough to override moral values. The fact that moral values are binding does not mean that they are necessarily the first on the scale of priorities.
I don't think you understood my argument (or Tirgitz's). Assuming that religious values are in his hands, meaning that he can determine them as he wishes, there is no reason in the world for him to determine a religious value that contradicts morality. Why do so if he can determine the religious value in a way that is consistent with morality? This implies that religious values are not in his hands either.
If that's really how it was before, I didn't understand, but I don't think it follows from that either, for two reasons:
1. It may not be possible to create a religious system that is completely consistent with morality (like your words about creating a world in which there is no evil). This doesn't mean that it is forced upon him, since he can give it up completely, unlike the situation with morality. But assuming that he wants one for some reason, it must conflict with certain moral values. He probably chose the one that is least fulfilled, and this also explains the significant correlation between the values of the Torah and the values of morality.
2. God Almighty can compensate, in this world or the next, anyone who is morally harmed as a result of upholding a Torah value. He can ensure that, in the overall summary, his degree of happiness will be exactly as it would have been without the Torah value.
1. So that means it is forced upon him. If he sets the system as he wishes there is no constraint so what prevents it from conforming to morality?
2. That he can compensate for Ziza may be true. But there is no reason in the world to do so. He can set these values so that they conform to morality.
1. He determines the system as he wishes, but this does not mean that there exists in the space of possibilities a system of religious values with 0 moral harm. He can not determine any religious system, or choose from those that harm morality the least.
Just as he could choose not to create a world, but (perhaps) he could not create a world with all the benefits of this world but with 0 evil. This does not mean that the creation of the world is forced on him, but that if he wants (!) to create a world with free choice, then there will also be evil in it.
I don't understand this insistence.
If there is no limitation beyond his control, what prevents him from determining that a priest's wife who was raped should be separated from her husband? He could have determined the opposite (give us a Torah without this detail). What constraint prevents him from doing so? In the context of evil, I explained that rigid natural laws may not be without points of suffering and evil. There is no other system. But systems of religious laws have no constraints on them. They are arbitrary. So what in the religious context prevents him from determining only twenty-two commandments without a priest's wife?
Rabbi Narali, you should write a column (or you did and I'm not aware of it)
Regarding the part of the halacha that reality is obligatory, as well as permitted and rejected, etc.
I didn't understand the request.
[You did what is not deserved as a deserved one. I just felt something vague (and it came out of your words too) and not in the sharp way that you specified it]
The picture shows that there is no difference between halacha and morality in the matter of conflicts, but after all, all people recognize this difference and what is the point of taking their intuition for granted. Even if one regrets the loss of a good deed that they did not receive a mitzvah or the special feeling that accompanies its existence, I have never heard of a person who regrets being forced to violate a law due to rejection (a fundamental rejection such as wearing a tzitzit or a yibbum, or an accidental rejection such as cutting a chert during a circumcision. Incidentally, it seems that the Sages learn accidental rejection from the law of fundamental rejection, and this is apparently true), and in morality, normal people also regret having violated a moral law such as refraining from saving a kosher gentile on Shabbat.
So you explained it with a theory that in halacha the ’ He goes on to repair the spiritual damage and morally does not repair the physical damage. But how does that answer, after all, if there is no moral imperative then what do people care about the physical damage? Are they (and I in particular) simply mistaken and is there no normative tension here but only a feeling of apocalypse?
To explain, it is necessary to add that the imperatives remain forever and even when they are rejected, then each individual imperative remains. In other words, the imperative is not the practical instruction “Now do this” but the principled instruction, and instead of a conflict there is really an imperative here and an imperative there, and therefore even instead of a conflict and an explicit decision there is a problem. (But apparently, there is no need to reach various spiritual facts at all).
And this is actually what Reka says (it is indeed written in the Drush and Chidush in the celebration as you referred me to. I have not studied the celebration but only saw that it says that if someone blows the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat, then he fulfills the mitzvah of blowing the shofar and has only violated the Shvut of the Rabbis) that the commandment is not the actual teaching but the principle. I *really* do not understand this, can you explain it to me? (In the reply there you wrote that you do indeed think so). A commandment is a practical teaching, I see no meaning in the statement that on the one hand I command mitzvah A and on the other hand I command mitzvah B and in fact I command mitzvah B.
I don't understand why you don't see sorrow for losing a mitzvah. Of course it is appropriate. Like those who are not mem because they are sick. And there are well-known stories about the rabbis who reassure them and tell them that it is their duty in their situation. Beyond that, in a detestable act, it is a normal situation and people have become accustomed to it. For example, in a tsitzit of wool and flax, no one remembers that there is a shatanez there. But in a sick person, it is a rare situation and therefore they are sorry.
Of course, people care about the physical damage and the sorrow of others. What does it have to do with the fact that I acted properly. And that if a person suffers because of natural damage, I don't regret it. So when I am guilty of it (even if it is rightfully so) of course I am sorry. Poke people in an accident that they are not at fault for, and even the damage itself is to blame, how much sorrow do they have for the damage they caused.
I no longer remember what I said that you quote about the fact that the commandment exists, but I wrote about it in detail in the third book of the Talmudic Logic series. The entire book is devoted to distinguishing between the command and the practical teaching. A command is a type of reality, and the practical teaching is just a derivative of it. A literal halakhic fact. Now you remind me of that.
The ”quotation” of your words was in response to the thread there when I tried to conclude from Re”a that the commandment is not only the word of God (if only the word of God then it is not appropriate to fulfill a mitzvah in a situation that ultimately the mitzvah actually commands not to do and even prohibits doing, i.e. prohibits blowing the shofar) and you answered “I agree with the analysis that sees the basis in the perception of the mitzvah as a type of reality and not only the fulfillment of the word of God” “. Maybe I misunderstood your intention there, but in my opinion, Re”a's words still completely negate understanding. If you help me understand this idea, I would be very grateful.
Regarding sorrow, it seems to me that there is a difference between a mistake made by people out of habit (traditionalism versus the law from the books) and a real basis, since they only regret something they did not do and do not regret the tzitzit and the yibom even if they are reminded. But I am drawing this point.
And the main thing is – If morality is binding only because of the commandment, then instead of an anti-moral commandment, there is no normative problem with causing a thousand damages. What is the answer to the fact that people feel a conflict and also direct it towards God, as you described in the column? Your answer is, as far as I understand, that it is a mistake and indeed there is no normative problem at all with causing harm when God has withdrawn His moral commandment to refrain from causing harm. And the theory of repairing spiritual damages versus not repairing physical damages is only intended to explain people's feelings and not to justify them. Is it true?
This can be understood through my suggestion about the spiritual benefits. These remain even when I am not obligated to do the act that leads to them. But of course, the benefit in itself is not enough to define a mitzvah. Metaphorically, I would say that the commandment also exists forever. However, sometimes it must be transgressed because of another commandment.
An example of this is the act that time caused women. Almost all the poskim agree that there is value in doing it, and most of them even see it as an existential mitzvah (Rabb”d Barish, commenting on the Safra, writes that it rejects it). But in terms of the commandment of the Holy One, women are exempt. They are not obligated to do it, so what mitzvah is there here if they did it anyway?
I think there is a normative problem with harm and the sorrow is real and not just psychological. Moral harm, unlike spiritual harm, is not erased by the Holy One, even if you did what you had to do.
The metaphor that the commandment exists forever but must be passed over illustrates the problem. This is possible when the source of validity is from spiritual facts that are silent in the corner and does not seem possible when the commandment is an intelligent being who needs to tell me exactly what it wants me to do. In the act that time caused, you are likening the commandment of permission to blow the shofar on Shabbat, where God, the Almighty, actually forbids me to blow (it commands me to obey the sages. According to your view, every normative principle is always valid from God, the Almighty, and certainly so in Halacha). I admit that the distinction is difficult to define, but it nevertheless seems to exist. To say that I am doing the commandment of God when I rebelled against Him and blew the shofar in spite of His honor, despite the prohibition, is a strange thing. Mm, if that's how he thinks about it (by the way, it's interesting to compare it to the mitzvah that comes with transgression and the discussion you brought up about R. Asher Weiss, I'll think about it too. And to the point, Reka's words are only in the rabbinical prohibition, but if a prohibition from the Torah, such as having a sacrifice to eat and having ingested the taste of pork, is prohibited by the Torah, perhaps Reka's also admits that there is no mitzvah of eating)
I didn't understand what normative problem there is with harm if in the case in question there is no commandment from God that prohibits causing this specific harm. In other words, you mean that even in morality, the commandment not to harm remains in place, but that it must be violated. If the commandment is an intelligent being that knows everything and decides what to command, then this matter is not perceived by me as such. As I said, I'll think about it, perhaps I've fallen into a square analyticism.
Regarding the prohibition of the Torah and the mitzvah, a better example than a sacrifice that became prey (did the one who ate it in the prohibition remain as food and not fulfill any mitzvah or did he fulfill a mitzvah and also commit a transgression) is the birth of a daughter to his brothers. Beit Hillel forbids and the child is a bastard. Is it possible that in their opinion, the one who gives birth to a daughter fulfills the mitzvah of Yibbum?! (It is possible to divide between rules within the mitzvah and rules in different mitzvahs. But the whole point is that it seems to me exactly the same)
There are spiritual facts, as I wrote in the column. But they have no validity unless there is a factor that legislates them and/or commands them.
There is no difference in our case between a prohibition and the absence of an obligation. You yourself admit this, and then you make it difficult. I wonder!
What is your opinion, which is based on the first argument, that Reka's words are also based on a certain Torah law that is not rejected because of a certain deed, if the deed is performed and the deed is violated, the deed merits a mitzvah and fulfills its obligation, or are his words only based on a rabbinical prohibition that nullifies a Torah mitzvah?
There is no need for arguments and a first explanation. It seems to me that there is evidence for this from the fact that a mitzvah following a transgression is invalidated. And the Rishonim already established the difference between this rule and an act that rejects a non-law. In any case, according to most opinions, when the non-law is not rejected for some reason (for example, it is not simultaneous), this is a situation of the mahba'a.
According to you, there is no need for a verse for this, since by its very nature there is no value for such a mitzvah. But the Gemara learns this from ”shona gezal be'olah”. Furthermore, according to the Toss’ in the Sukkah, the mahba'a is only from the rabbis (therefore, a verse that invalidates a stolen Sukkah is needed. Another verse against you).
I commented above about the mitzvah that comes with a sin, but I was only thinking of the example of a stolen sukkah, where the act of the mitzvah is not a sin (and there is also your discussion based on the words of R’ Asher Weiss and Azazel”M). Now I saw on Wikipedia an example of eating dipped matzah on Passover and they claim there (I did not check the source) that one does not fulfill the obligation of matzah and does not fulfill the mitzvah of matzah. And this indeed proves what you are saying (perhaps only if it is being said there when one does not have other matzah, and therefore it is clear that God, the Exalted, prohibits him from eating dipped matzah).
Without a verse, we would not know what is more important, that is, what God, the Exalted, actually commands, perhaps with dipped matzah, he commands to eat if there is no other matzah. I am not familiar with the matter, but stealing an olah is an apparent innovation, even after the thief has bought it and the olah is his for all intents and purposes and he is permitted to eat it for pleasure, it is still not worthy of the altar. [Apart from the fact that the idea of proving that otherwise “there is no need for a verse” is quite dubious, especially in light of the column on a verse that teaches the opposite, because we have before us interpretations here and there, and I of course admit that Shrek’a said his words, and you even think that his words are acceptable, so I certainly have no problem thinking that a verse is needed to rule out this interpretation]
In any case, let’s assume that as you say, it turns out that someone who eats matzah for immersion does not fulfill the mitzvah of matzah at all and has violated the prohibition of immersion. But someone who blows the shofar on Shabbat for Shrek’a does fulfill the mitzvah of blowing the shofar and has violated the rabbinical law.
The meaning is that in the rules of rejection within the Torah, the mitzvah “itself” is defined only for situations in which it is not rejected. But in general, the rejection of the rabbinic commandment from the Torah “remains,” except that in practice it is forbidden to keep it, and like the metaphor that the commandment exists forever but that sometimes it must be broken.
Regarding your suggestion that even religious law, or at least the values that underlie it, stem from independent facts that are imposed on God - it seems to me that instead of introducing another dimension that obliges God, and the theological difficulties that result from this, it is possible to place this on the idea of the high need for human self-development, an idea that the Rabbi also accepts. In order to maximize human self-development and choice, "God has given them many Torah and commandments", even those that are in conflict with morality. I remember you writing in one of the columns that a plurality of values certainly gives more meaning to choice, because there are more possible combinations between the values.
What I call a religious value you call human development. So how is it different? Do you mean to say that there are no goals at all in the Hapza except for the completion of manhood? From this it follows that all the laws are completely arbitrary (he could have chosen other laws and even opposite ones). But then Tirgitz's argument returns, why are there cases where he determined them against morality.
You write that religious values are imposed on God, but still, in the case of a conflict between religious values, He performs a miracle and prevents the religious damage caused by committing a transgression. If that's how I don't understand how religious values are imposed on Him - He can cancel them whenever He wants. And if He doesn't want to interfere with nature (even religious nature), why does He intervene in cases of conflict between religious values?
He is not forced to act this way. He is forced to act this way because this is the value. Even in morality, he is not forced to act this way, it is just that this is the definition of good.
Regarding what you wrote here”
“In fact, with further thought, it is possible to argue that according to the law, if I did something permissible, then the spiritual harm is also prevented. It can be said that God performs a miracle and prevents the harm so that a righteous person like me who is faithful to the law does not cause a problem. ”
If so, why doesn't He always perform miracles to prevent all the spiritual harm that people do, whether they do something permissible or not?
Because it is in his interest that the fate of the world will depend on our actions. It is like asking why give us a choice and not make us always act well without a choice (and in fact not create us at all).
The world will indeed depend on our actions, only the spiritual damages do not depend on our actions, because there, according to what you wrote, He usually intervenes. And beyond that, if God wants the spiritual damages to also depend on our actions, then why, in the case of someone who has done something, is it permissible for Him to intervene to prevent the spiritual damage? After all, it is in keeping with His policy that the world will depend on our actions.
It will depend on our actions, meaning it depends on whether we did a permissible or forbidden act.
Regarding what you wrote in this paragraph:
“I will explain his question. According to my system, God commands us anti-moral commandments in order to promote religious values. If so, Tirgitz argues, it seems that religious values are also forced upon Him and are not the result of His arbitrary will (His sovereign legislation). If the commandments were not “halakhic facts” forced upon God but rather they were created by His legislation, then He could have legislated them differently. In such a situation, I would expect that if His will (and nature) were good, He would not enact laws that contradict morality. The existence of conflicts indicates that the laws of Halacha (or the religious values, which those laws of Halacha promote) are also forced upon God, and therefore He is caught (or throws us) into these conflicts against Himself.”
It follows from your words that all the commandments and laws of halakhah are obligatory upon God, but from your argument we can only conclude this with regard to the laws and commandments that are contrary to morality. A commandment such as reciting the Shema does not contradict morality, and therefore it is not necessary that it is obligatory upon God or that it is a halakhic fact.
Beyond that, it is possible that even in cases where God commands something that is apparently immoral, it is to prevent a greater moral wrong. For example, the matter of sacrifices. Apparently God commands the killing of animals unnecessarily. But it is possible that without this commandment, people would have completely rejected religion because it did not contain an important component of religious life that preceded the giving of the Torah. In other words, the transition to the Jewish religion would have been too abrupt and this would have jeopardized this transition from happening.
In addition, it is possible that God sometimes prioritizes His own will (which is not forced upon Him) as something more important than moral harm to His creatures. For example, let's take God's will to be repaid. If for this purpose He sometimes has to harm one of His creatures, He may be willing to do so in order to advance this will, and even if He could give up this will at some point, He still prioritizes this as something more important than the moral harm. In other words, it is possible that even commandments that are contrary to morality are not forced upon Him and are not halakhic facts, and He still chooses to command them because it is more important to Him than the moral harm. And if you say that this is an immoral choice and contradicts the assumption that God is always moral, I will answer that God must also be moral towards Himself. In other words, when He gives up His will, there is a harm to Himself in this (a kind of consideration of your previous life).
Indeed, the argument deals only with anti-moral laws.
Regarding sacrifices, I did not understand the question. You are simply offering an explanation for the commandment of sacrifices. Fine. And if you mean that this is an indirect moral explanation, I think it is unlikely.
When you say that something is preferable in his eyes, it means that it has some objective purpose that is not just the result of the arbitrary will of God.
Regarding the sacrifices, I meant that there are commandments that seem anti-moral to us, but in fact, deep down, they promote morality. We simply don't understand how or why, but there may be a deep explanation behind them that contributes to promoting morality (not all anti-moral commandments are necessarily like that, but at least some of them may be like that).
Regarding priority in His sight, I mean the “personal” desires and wishes of the Almighty. That is, not something that is forced upon him from the outside, but his inner will. I'm not sure that the term arbitrary is appropriate here regarding the will of the Almighty. Just as someone's desire to be a skilled chess player is not called an arbitrary will (and is not forced upon him from the outside). It is a personal will. Perhaps the Almighty wants to “be a skilled chess player” In a certain field, and for this purpose he is willing to sacrifice moral harm to certain people at times.
Possibly.
It is difficult for me to discuss the personality and desires of God.
I am not talking about the threatened individuals themselves. I am saying that there may be some will of God, which, although not imposed on him from outside (a halachic fact), is still more important to him than moral harm to his creatures, and therefore he commands it.
If it is not forced upon him and there is nothing objective that dictates it, then it is his arbitrary decision, and the question of the duchy is difficult. Either it is arbitrary or it is forced (in the sense that moral values are forced upon us. Their validity is forced, not the conduct according to them). I do not see a third possibility.
Is it an arbitrary desire of a person to become a qualified chess player? Or is it forced upon them?
Simply an arbitrary will. If it stems from his nature then it is forced upon him.
There is the matter of the secret of work, a high need, and the will of God to be rewarded. In both, God needs us to achieve these goals. It is possible that in order to achieve these goals, there is no escape from the fact that someone will be morally harmed. Just as humans experiment on animals for medical purposes, it is possible that God uses us, even if it sometimes harms us, for His needs.
Ah, so it's forced on him. To pay off means to be more perfect, and the definition of perfection is not in his hands.
Why would it necessarily be forced upon him? He may choose it. After all, the whole necessity of saying that it is forced upon him comes from the understanding that God would not choose something immoral. But I gave an example that where there is a need, humans also choose something immoral for their own sake and rightly so (medical experiments on animals).
People do this out of compulsion. The disease is forced upon them, and so is the path to healing.
They can experiment on humans or give up the drug. In other words, there is no moral necessity or any moral fact that forces them to experiment on animals.
There is a fact that it takes experimentation to learn, and there is a moral fact that animals are superior to humans.
So why do we need to reach halachic facts that are imposed on God? We could say that there is a moral fact that says that instead of there being a conflict between God's need and moral harm to humans, there is a moral fact that says that it is better to harm humans than to compromise God's need.
The need of God is also forced upon him, or it is not a need and does not justify the rejection of moral values.
In my opinion, there is no way out of this: either forced or arbitrary. And arbitrariness does not reject morality. Every time you come from a different direction, but the answer is the same. The blanket is short, you can cover your legs or your head, but not both.
Okay, but necessity is not a halakhic fact. From what I understood from you, halakhic or moral facts are facts in the realm of ought, not is.
It doesn't matter. There are still things that are forced upon him. But beyond that, this need is a fact that creates OUGHT. The argument is that laws are forced upon him like moral values. It doesn't seem important to me whether it's forced through facts and needs or directly. I still think these are values, but why does it matter?!
This is what I argued in my previous response. That the fact of this necessity creates an ought, but it is an ought from the moral realm and not from the halakhic or other realm. Just as experiments on animals and not on humans are a moral and not a halakhic ought.
Not necessarily morality. Some kind of need or value, moral or not. For example, the training of the Almighty is not a moral need in the conventional sense. Nor does a prohibition on eating pork seem like an expression of a moral fact.
What I meant was that God commands anti-moral commandments out of some need that exists in Him. But before He commands, He is in a dilemma whether to prioritize His need, or to avoid morally harming people. This dilemma is in the moral sphere. Just as the dilemma of whether to conduct experiments on humans or animals is in the moral sphere.
So there is a religious value (which you choose to call a necessity) that is imposed on him, and only the decision in the dilemma between it and morality is an ethical decision. Suppose you are right, so what? Where is the debate? Beyond that, in my opinion, the decision between a religious value or necessity and a moral value is itself not on the moral plane.
As far as I understand, Rabbi Michi argues as follows:
A. God wants the good because He is good
B. A religious command is not the same as a moral command
C. In a conflict between a religious command and a moral command, one must sometimes choose the moral command
Why not claim that the conflict is only imaginary (as Rabbi Lichtenstein's approach and, for example, the prevailing approach in religious circles)?
D. In my understanding, it necessarily follows that the religious command is also imposed on God, otherwise why is it a command that is contrary to morality?
What remains to be understood is why we are allowed to choose the moral command in the event of a conflict, since God chose the religious command in that conflict?
A possible solution is that the religious command was given by God, but has since frozen in place, and we assume that in the given reality it was not a command, and therefore we choose the moral command.
All of this is according to the method of the great genius Oznou Ramadaan Shalit, faithful to his method that does not recognize God's free will (see the Science of Freedom). And Duke and Yel.
If you read the words of Gaon Ozek, you would see that I write that we are not allowed, precisely because he himself has already chosen. Therefore, there is no need to look for solutions.
This means that there is no identity between halakhah and morality.[1] These are two categories that are in principle independent (although there is not always a contradiction between them, of course). The judgment of whether an act is moral or not, and the judgment of whether it is halakhically permissible or forbidden are two different and almost independent judgments. The halakhic and moral categories are two different categories. Of course, in cases where there is a conflict between moral and halakhic instruction, it must be decided in some way (and this is not always in favor of halakhah), but the mere existence of a conflict is not problematic in itself. There are also such conflicts between two moral values (as in the example of saving a life by causing pain), and there is no reason why there will also be conflicts between a halakhic value and a moral value.
Quote from column 15. And your words about homosexuals in the interview with London. Aren't there teachers who sometimes do not fulfill the religious commandment? Could you please explain the difference to me?
I dealt with this at the beginning of the third book in the trilogy. In short, when there is a fundamental conflict, the law always prevails. For example, the killing of Amalek. The Torah itself took into account the moral cost and yet commanded it. But when the conflict is accidental, such as the protection of life and the Sabbath, there it is impossible to conclude from the very commandment on the Sabbath that it rejects the protection of life or vice versa. In such situations, one must make a decision for oneself.
And all this when the command is clear in the Torah. If it is the result of an interpretation or a sermon, then the doubt arises that this law is not correct.
I used to mention in discussions about opposing tendencies in Judaism, that your opinion is that in this case morality should be chosen over Torah, as opposed to Rabbi Riskin who makes an okimata in the Torah, and traditional rabbis who make an okimata in morality. And the custom of Israel Torah.
Just, I would really like you to clarify your opinion for me. In the case of an explicit Torah law that is in conflict with morality, is there a place to choose morality? And what about the rabbinic law? Should we make an okimata for Torah law in a way that does not contradict morality, even contrary to halakhic tradition?
I clarified. Regarding validity, of course it is possible. The gates of interpretation have not been closed.
A simple question. The fact that there is a valid morality (divine, for example) – Where is this morality written? Do we deduce it from our intuition that it is forbidden to murder and steal? That is, if it is something that is learned from human intuition or from traditional social conventions, then again it is not appropriate to force a person who has not accepted this intuition. And if it is somehow related to the Torah, then again it is a written divine law, and where is the distinction between the Torah and morality?
It is written on the tablet of our hearts. The Torah instructs us to do what is right and good, but it does not tell us what it means. It assumes that everyone understands the meaning of the moral commandment (it is written on the tablet of their heart). The content of morality is learned from moral intuition, but the obligation to act according to it is by virtue of the divine will. As I explained in the column. If there is a person who does not have this intuition, he is a sick person and there is nothing to be done with him. Just as there is nothing to be done with a blind person who does not see.
The difference between halakha and morality is in the command. The commandments in the Torah deal only with halakha, and morality is not under a command. This is divine will without a command and therefore it remains outside of halakha. Therefore, its content does not appear in the Torah but within us. In contrast, in halakha, the content is also written in the Torah. Therefore, “and do what is right and good” is not counted among the number of mitzvot for anyone from the multitude.
That is, there is an assumption that ”right and good” is something that is understandable to every human being in his basic intuition, that is, the things that are accepted by us like murder and rape, but the same question that you asked atheists – what would you say about a mercenary who thinks that his work ethic is to kill. You have proven from this that there is a moral system external to man, divine, but again, this system does not interpret what is included in its ”right and good”, and again we will ask you what you would say about a mercenary who believes that killing is right and good. In short, I would be happy to clarify what problem you are solving with the assumption that morality needs God.
You are mixing up levels. I asked a question not about someone who doesn't understand that murder is forbidden, but about someone who understands that it is forbidden but doesn't feel obligated to do so. That's a completely different question. Someone who doesn't understand is blind. What do I have to say to him? What I say to a blind person who doesn't see reality and denies the existence of colors, for example.
What I asked them was what, from their perspective, is the source of validity for morality, not what the moral laws say.
Without God, I too, since I feel the validity of the moral laws, would not be obligated to them. I would dismiss this feeling as an illusion that was made clear to me that has no real validity. Only God can give it validity.
I understand. You are essentially saying that what is included in morality – it is known to every human being, it is inherent in us that murder and rape are immoral. And you are also essentially claiming that this morality must be fundamentally acceptable to everyone, despite changes in cultures and eras. The difference between an atheist and a believer is that the believer also explains why this morality obliges him. Did I understand correctly?
Exactly. I think I explained this both in the column and in the original discussion.
thanks
I just have a few questions:
1. In order for there to be a fruitful dialogue and interaction between believers and non-believers, can you define in some way moral laws that do not use religious terms (God, commandment, halakha, etc.) (such as, for example, "What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor."
2. Do you think it is permissible for a believer to harm a non-believer who has committed a religious offense that does not involve harming anyone else? Full disclosure: Maimonides, the Shulchan Arukh, and the Mishnah Berurah think so, and so does God).
1. I don't understand what kind of discussion you want to have? As I explained in column 456, in my opinion there is no place for valid and consistent morality without belief in God. On the other hand, I do not use the definition of moral laws in God in any way. Moral laws are universal and should not change from person to person and from society to society (except for disputes of course). There is no such thing as Jewish morality or halakhic morality, etc. There is morality.
2. God does not think so (even though you, as someone who does not believe in Him – according to your testimony – represent Him faithfully), and as far as I understand, neither does the Maimonides and the Shulchan Arius. And neither does my little self. I am of course talking about someone who innocently violates religious laws, not someone who believes and yet violates them, who is liable to punishment as in any legal system. Beyond that, a person who violates religious laws does harm others, at least in the accepted religious perceptions (I will not repeat here the parable of the hole in the ship).
And I will just add a counter-disclosure (which happens to be true, unlike yours): There are various legal systems and societies that operate this way, and until not long ago most of them were like that. See the attitude towards homosexuality, and to this day prohibitions on incest and marital relations between relatives, polygamy, and more.
God calls for stoning those who violate the Sabbath without distinction as to whether they believe or not. The Rambam calls for killing those who say there is no Torah from heaven - that is, those who do not believe - without trial, without witnesses, and without warning. The Shulchan Aruch holds the same opinion. Regarding harm, I am talking about harm that is agreed to be harm to the non-believer as well (therefore, I would very much like to formulate moral principles that are acceptable to both sides). The claim that there is no place for valid and consistent morality without belief in God is very strange. After all, Muslims also believe in God, and I am not sure that you are willing to accept their or Christians' morality as it is. As a vegan, I am also very offended by anyone who eats meat because, as far as I am concerned, he is eating my friends. However, I cannot have a fruitful dialogue with such a person, and although I would very much like to punish people who harm my friends, I feel that in the current state of affairs, this is unacceptable. Beyond that, there is a huge leap between believing in some higher power and believing in ancient writings that say that this higher power created the world in six days, brought the flood, and chose the people of Israel and gave them the Torah. Your reference in all places is not to the general God but to the limited one described in these ancient writings called the Bible, which it is not really clear who wrote. This is a huge logical leap that you do well to obscure.
There are some confusions here. When I talk about God as the basis for valid morality, I am talking about belief in a general God, without any connection to this or that religion. The fact that I believe in the Jewish God is irrelevant. Without God, there is no morality. Who is the God you believe in? It could be anyone. So you are better off seeing a blur where there is none.
As I wrote to you, there is no Muslim, Jewish, or Christian morality. There is morality. There are different laws for each religion, but this does not concern morality.
You decided that God commanded that anyone who violates the Sabbath be stoned without distinction, but the law says otherwise (even an accidental one is not stoned, certainly a forced one who does not even bring a sacrifice). So if you choose to describe God in such a way that you can hate him, good for you. But don't put your words in my mouth. You don't build questions from unfounded assumptions.
The rest of your assumptions are just as unfounded.
I have no problem with the general God. He has never said a word, and if He shows His power, it is in nature - in thunderous silence. This God shows Himself, among other things, in terrible natural disasters that consume people and animals and bring destruction without any discrimination. Such a God cannot be the basis for morality without speaking in His name and reducing Him in one way or another. The Jewish God is the creation of man - and even more so, the creation of Jewish man, just as the Muslim God is the creation of Muslim man. It is not the God that I hate, it is different parts of the Jewish human creation that display boundless cruelty. What is the point of killing every living thing on earth in response to man's sins in the flood? What is the point of killing all the firstborn of Egypt and all the firstborn of animals in response to Pharaoh's sins. And so is stoning a man for chopping wood on the Sabbath - that is cruelty. This is not God – these are the writers of the Bible and their commentators. The verse itself does not mention rape or mistake. What you are quoting is already a softening of the work of man.
And – Maimonides” in Hilchot Memariam, Chapter 3, Halachah 2, says what I quoted:
And those who say there is no Torah from heaven, and those who are moralists and those who are moralists, all of whom are not in Israel, and there is no need for witnesses, warning, or judges, but whoever kills one of them has committed a great mitzvah and removed the obstacle.
And the Shulchan Aruch tomorrow holds that Maimonides (Yoreh Deah 198, paragraph 2):
And the heretics and those who disbelieve in the Torah and prophecy from Israel used to kill in the Land of Israel. If he had the power to kill with a sword in public – they killed him. If not, he came to him with lies until he had the means to kill him.
These are not unfounded assumptions - it is written in black and white, and if there is a softening of these things, it comes only years later by people like you and me who interpret the Maimonides and the Shulchan Arba. We have no shortage of Yigal Amirs - what the Maimonides and the Shulchan Arba write permits the shedding of people's blood. I am angry about this, and rightly so.
You are sailing from one question to another freely, and it is impossible to conduct a discussion like that.
There are many commentators and they do not interest me very much. Both secular commentators of morality and religious commentators of the Torah. Both can reach all sorts of conclusions, and I do not see why you think I should represent any of them.
The question of evil has been discussed extensively in several places here on the site, and I see no point in returning to it here. And I certainly see no point in repeating things I have explained. If you do not agree, that is of course your right. But what is the point of going around and around here. Create a God for yourself as you wish so that you can hate him (= the non-existent God) for your pleasure, and come to Zion, a Redeemer.
I will ask a question here related to the previous column with Enoch because it seems to me to be an important continuation of it.
Enoch conducted a debate on the Yedaya Institute YouTube with Moshe Rat and asked him a question that I think could also arise regarding your approach.
You admit that the difference between you and Enoch is that for you the source of moral positivity is not the existence of necessary ideas that command the good; rather, to the extent that those ideas of the good in existence are ”floating” at most, so that there must also be a thin God in the background – a being with will – who commands to act morally like them, the principle of Ought.
He asked him about this, why do you see will as a factor that can create a normative imperative? It is nothing more than a fact! For example, the fact that you want to be rich does not create value for you to do so. The same thing if someone else wants you to do something does not create a normative obligation for you to do it. So why should we argue that we need a weak God with will?? Will does not add any normative obligation, if you stop at the ideas of good and that's it. And in general, from his point of view, the existence of good does not require any more explanation than the existence of the number eight.
Secondly, if God whispered in your ear that he did not exist, what would be your attitude towards morality?
(If you continue to act as usual, does this not show the lack of necessity in that hypothesis?)
God's authority creates obligation. It is not IS but OUGHT. I am not obligated to your will, but that is not because the will is IS but because you have no authority for me. Just as according to Enoch ethical facts are not IS but OUGHT. I agree with him on this, only arguing that there are no binding ethical facts without God.
In fact, according to you, every command is an Ought. The question is, what is its level of authority?
Because it would have seemed to me that Moses Rett accepted Enoch's claim that the command of an ordinary person is this. Only God, who is the Creator of the world and defined a role for the world, is different.
I don't think you agree with him that in ethical facts the term ”ought” is used, but that their obligation follows the command.
At least that's what you wrote in this column.
Obviously. That's my argument with Enoch. I pointed out that Enoch's own method has the same problem.
Today I was thinking about an example and a difficulty with your words.
On the one hand, in honoring parents (who have will and authority), you seem to see their words as a statement with normative validity.
So we see that there is a power for “will” to constitute a normative claim. (Which I vehemently deny).
The problem is that it can be said that this comes from the understanding that one should honor parents.
On the other hand,
According to you, commitment to God also comes from ontic gratitude.
And not something self-contained, if so it is a real contradiction.
We would expect you not to look for a second-order reason why one should listen to God.
I thought of the excuse that authority comes from facts (like ontic gratitude) that are usually related to the level of the moral ideal “that preceded God”, but commitment comes from will.
—-
Also, you didn't answer the question that I think has a lot in it,
which is if God whispered in your ear that he doesn't exist (despite the absurdity), or that there is no factor that commands morality, what would be your attitude towards morality?
(If you continue to act as usual, doesn't that show the lack of necessity in that hypothesis...?) And that there is no reason to make distinctions!?
Enoch does not necessarily deny this. He merely argues that it is not necessary to reach this point because ethical facts have validity even without it.
It is not the will that creates an obligation, but the authority of the willer (that which he wills in itself can be considered a fact). This is not a reason but the definition of the thing itself. Just as obedience to morality does not stem from the obligation to obey morality. It is the obligation to obey. It is a description, not a reason. The claim is that I have an obligation to the one who created me. It is not a reason but a description.
The last question is meaningless. The question is not what I will do, but what I will be obligated to do. Perhaps I will behave morally even then because it suits me. But the obligation to do so will not be without God. Just as an atheist behaves morally even though in his doctrine the moral command is invalid (and if he thinks so – he is wrong).
First, after hearing the argument with Rhett, I am almost certain that he does not accept that will is related to a normative statement. He sees it as an IS like any other IS.
Anyway,
If will is not a condition for normative commitment, but the only thing that is relevant is only authority, there is no reason not to accept Enoch's words and stop authority from establishing morality without God.
Second, as far as I know you do not necessarily connect the God of morality with the God of creation. (But use Occam's razor to argue this).
If so, the statement that you have an obligation for the one who created you is only a description and not a reason, it is not incorrect.
Regarding the second question, I understand.
PS
From the debate,
I think that around minute 35 you can see that will is never a normative statement for him but is always an is like all the iss in the world.
We repeat ourselves. An idea has no authority of its own. It is an object and that is it. What do I care if it tells me to do or not to do something? The Creator has authority.
I would be happy to clarify what is meant by the fact that morality has no validity “without commanding them”. Is it a command within the framework of halakhah (which you define as a separate system), a “commanding” that stems from the moral intuition that is ingrained in its creatures, or a commanding in some other way?
Also, following your conclusion that ”halakhic facts are also binding on him”, I would be happy to clarify Chazal”s statement that “commandments are void for the future”. Should we conclude from it that “the future” is also binding on “halakhic facts” (Or some of them – depending on the precise interpretation of the ”cancellation”) and in any case also on him?
When I think about it, I suppose it can be said that the binding effect will be abolished for the future, but the halachic facts will remain the same.
I didn't understand the question. You stated that in my opinion morality and halakha are two independent categories. So what are you asking? Was there a Mount Hermon situation where we were commanded to obey morality?
I don't know about the future. It doesn't have to be that the sages are right. But there were no mitzvot before the giving of the Torah, so there is no reason why they won't be in the future. Your two formulations seem similar to me.
If I understood you correctly, the validity of morality stems from God's command. My question is, where were we commanded about morality?
In the conscience planted in us