Another Look at Conceptual Analyses: The Law of Agency (Column 454)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
About twenty years ago my son was doing prep for entrance exams to a “ketanah” yeshiva at the cheder in Yerucham. Among other things, they learned the well-known conceptual analysis (chakirah) of the Ohr Sameach regarding the nature of agency (shlichut): is it a “power of attorney” (yipu’i koach) or a “long hand” (yad arikhta)? It turned out that his teacher defined the two sides of the chakirah the opposite of what I knew. What I called “power of attorney” he called “long hand,” and vice versa. When I pointed this out, he insisted on his phrasing. At first I thought this was merely a wording mix-up: what I call “long hand” he calls “power of attorney,” and vice versa, with no substantive disagreement. But over time I realized there is a deeper dispute here that truly has two sides, and it is typical of other yeshiva-style conceptual analyses as well. Here I will try to describe the matter and, through this example, illustrate the general lesson.
The Amoraic Dispute in Gittin
The Gemara in Gittin 70b brings a dispute among the Amoraim regarding one seized by kordeyakus (a curable madness):
“If he said, ‘Write a get for my wife,’ and then he was seized by kordeyakus and later said, ‘Do not write it’—his latter words have no effect.”
A man appointed an agent to write and deliver a get to his wife, and thereafter lost his sanity. If, while not of sound mind, he retracts and says not to write it, we disregard his words. The Amoraim dispute the scope of this rule:
“R. Shimon ben Lakish says: They write and give the get immediately; and R. Yochanan says: They do not write until he recovers. The reason of Reish Lakish is that it teaches ‘his latter words have no effect’; and R. Yochanan will tell you: ‘His latter words have no effect’—meaning that when he recovers there is no need to consult him anew; nevertheless they do not write until he recovers.”
Reish Lakish holds that the agent may write the get and deliver it to the woman even while the sender is still seized by his kordeyakus. R. Yochanan, by contrast, understands “his latter words have no effect” only to permit writing and delivering the get once he recovers, without requiring a fresh appointment—but not to allow giving the get while the sender is still in the throes of kordeyakus.
The Gemara explains their dispute as follows:
“What do they argue about? Reish Lakish likens it to one who is asleep, and R. Yochanan likens it to a lunatic. And why doesn’t R. Yochanan liken it to sleep?—one asleep lacks no action (to recover), whereas here an action is required. And why doesn’t Reish Lakish liken it to a lunatic?—a lunatic is not ‘in our hands,’ whereas this one is ‘in our hands’ (there is a cure), like red meat on coals and wine on the lees.”
Reish Lakish likens kordeyakus to sleep (since we have a remedy; it is not the status of a classic lunatic), and therefore sees no bar to the agent delivering the get in that state. R. Yochanan likens it to lunacy (because, unlike sleep, recovery requires an act).
Note that both agree that if the husband is a full-fledged lunatic, one may not deliver the get; their disagreement is only whether kordeyakus counts as lunacy or as sleep. Our interest here is the case of a lunatic husband; consequently, the discussion from here on does not hinge exclusively on R. Yochanan’s position.
The Halachic Ruling: Dispute Among the Rishonim
All agree that the halacha follows R. Yochanan (as usual in his disputes with Reish Lakish). Thus the Rambam, Hilchot Gerushin 2:15, rules:
“If he said while healthy, ‘Write a get and give it to my wife,’ and afterward he became deranged, we wait until he recovers and then write and give it to her; there is no need to consult him again after recovery. But if they wrote and gave it before he recovered, it is invalid.”
According to him, a get given while the husband is seized by kordeyakus is invalid. Note that in 2:7 the Rambam writes:
“What is the difference between ‘invalid’ and ‘void’?—Wherever in this work a get is called ‘void,’ it is void by Torah law; wherever it is called ‘invalid,’ it is invalid by rabbinic decree.”
Thus, “an invalid get” is rabbinic, and “a void get” is by Torah law. Accordingly, the Rambam understands that per R. Yochanan, the bar on writing/delivering a get while the husband has kordeyakus is only rabbinic; by Torah law one could divorce if the agent was appointed while the husband was sane. One might have read the Rambam as limiting this to kordeyakus; if the sender is a true lunatic (with no cure), even he would agree that a get cannot be written and delivered on his behalf. But most Rambam commentators understood that this applies even to a true lunatic: by Torah law an agent can operate in the sender’s name even when the sender has become insane, and only the Sages invalidated such an act. As noted, it is plausible that Reish Lakish would not dispute this either (their debate is about kordeyakus, not about a true lunatic).
By contrast, the Tur, Even HaEzer 121, disagrees and holds the get is void by Torah law:
“If he was healthy when he ordered it written and afterward illness seized him, we do not write it while he remains ill; and if they wrote and delivered it during his illness, it is nothing—whether he died of that illness or recovered. But once he recovers, they write it—even if during his illness he protested writing it, that protest is nothing—and they give it when he recovers, and there is no need to consult him again.”
According to the Tur, a get written and delivered while the sender is insane is void (“nothing”). This indeed is the straightforward reading of the Gemara (the commentaries there discuss reconciling the Rambam).
Explaining the Dispute: ‘Yad Arikhta’ or ‘Power of Attorney’
The Ohr Sameach on the Rambam there explains the dispute and the Rambam’s view as follows:
“[…] The Pri Hadash answers: since he made him an agent while healthy, then even though at the time the agent performs the mission the sender is no longer halachically competent, by Torah law the agency is effective; only when he dies—his marital bond ceases and his wife falls to the heirs or the yavam—does it not work.”
The Pri Hadash explains: once the agent was appointed while the sender was sound, the agency stands in force; the agent can act for the sender because he received the authority to do so. So long as the agent is of sound mind, nothing prevents him from executing the act for the sender. On this view, competency is required of the agent who performs the act, not of the sender, since the agent is the one performing it. True, if the sender dies the agent can no longer divorce the wife, but that is not a function of agency law; in that case she is no longer a married woman to him. Note what follows: even the sender’s death would not (of itself) void the agency—how much more so his insanity would not.
He brings proofs from Rashi in two places:
“So too Rashi’s language in the first chapter (Gittin 9b): ‘They should not give it after death’—as long as the get has not reached her hand she is not freed; since death preceded, the freeing is not a freeing, for she has left his domain and fallen under the heirs’ domain. He explains it is because she is now in another’s domain, as if he had ordered freeing the heirs’ slave. And at 66a Rashi writes: ‘Is there such a thing as “after death”?’—after he dies who will divorce her? The reason is that the divorcer is not alive and is not a subject of divorce.”
In both places Rashi explains that the only reason the agency cannot be executed is that the sender died and the object of the agency lapsed; the agency itself remains. [Parenthetically: later authorities do not accept this extreme formulation. For most, once the sender dies, the agency itself lapses and the agent no longer has power to act. The discussion can proceed only where the sender became insane—there is still a sender, but he is not competent. That is the case we focus on from here on.]
How can one say that when the sender became insane (perhaps even when he died) the agent may still act for him? The Ohr Sameach ties this to two conceptions of agency:
“If we say that since he made him an agent, we do not care about the sender’s state—so long as he remains within the sender’s domain—this would seem to depend on the following: if we say that only the act of the agent is considered as if done by the sender, then indeed the sender must be halachically competent at the time the agent acts, for only then can it be deemed as if the sender performed it. But if we say that the sender makes the agent as his own self, and the agent’s hand is considered the sender’s hand, then one could say that once the agent was made, we do not care whether the sender is competent.”
He proposes two ways to understand the relation between agent and sender:
- Power of attorney. The agent was vested with the sender’s authority and he is the one who performs the act (the agent is the divorcer, betrother, purchaser, etc.). Only the result is attributed to the sender (who becomes owner, is divorced, betroths, etc.); the performance itself is by the agent.
- Yad arikhta (“long hand”). The agent is the sender’s extended hand; the sender is the one performing the act (via the agent—as if the agent is a physical extension of the sender’s hand).
Under option 2, clearly if the sender becomes insane (perhaps even dies) the agency lapses, for on that conception the sender is the performer; if he is a lunatic, he cannot perform legal acts. But under option 1, the sender’s powers have been “emptied” into the agent, who now performs the act; only the outcome redounds to the sender. In that case, even if the sender becomes insane (perhaps even dies), the agent can still act in his name.
I note already here that the Ohr Sameach’s wording is quite confusing. His second formulation—“the agent’s hand is considered the sender’s hand”—is how he describes the power-of-attorney mechanism, not “yad arikhta.” And his first formulation—“the act of the agent is considered as if done by the sender”—is actually his description of “yad arikhta.” You can see in this the terminological confusion I mentioned at the outset: linguistically both phrasings can be read either way. In any case, this is only wording; for our purposes I will continue to use “power of attorney” and “yad arikhta” as defined above. As we will see, there is some conceptual fuzziness here too, not only phrasing.
In any event, the Ohr Sameach’s claim is that this is precisely the dispute between the Tur and the Rambam above. The Rambam takes option 1 (“power of attorney”); therefore, even if the sender becomes insane, the agent can still act for him. The Tur takes option 2 (“yad arikhta”); therefore, if the sender becomes insane, the agency lapses and the agent can no longer act.
Practical Ramifications
The Ohr Sameach proceeds to bring several further ramifications (nafka minot):
“So too it appears from Temurah 10a—‘If so, we would find…’—that partners can create temurah, for example when they appointed one agent to consecrate; see Rashi (s.v. ‘If so’) that it is considered a consecration by a single person. If we say it is as if they consecrated through the agent’s mouth, then since the act is theirs and in their name, it should be called a consecration by many. We must therefore say it is attributed more to the agent, and he is the principal party; this is a sound support.”
If two partners appoint one agent to perform temurah, is this temurah by partners or by an individual? Under “power of attorney,” the temurah is done by the agent, so it counts as an individual’s act; under “yad arikhta,” the performers are the senders, so it is the act of two partners.[1]
Another ramification:
“This also explains the Pri Hadash (EH 120:1) who disputes the Ramah regarding whether a get written by the agent on his own paper is valid. He writes that since the agent stands in the husband’s place, we no longer require the husband’s paper; the agent’s paper suffices. This too depends on our issue: if only the act is considered as if done by the sender, then the paper must be the husband’s, so it is as though the husband divorced with his own paper; if it is the agent’s paper, it is like divorcing with another’s paper (not transferred to the husband). But if the agent’s very person is now, for gerushin, as the sender, one may say the agent’s paper suffices.”
Is a get written by the agent on paper that belongs to the agent valid? If the divorcer is the sender (“yad arikhta”), the paper must be the sender’s; under “power of attorney,” the divorcer is the agent, so his paper suffices.[2]
He then brings another ramification concerning acquisition by agav (movables acquired along with land):
“We can also link to this the doubt among the later authorities in the laws of chametz: if an agent transfers movables agav his own land, does the principal acquire? If only the act is deemed that of the sender, then the land used for agav must be the sender’s—so that movables and land come as one—contrary to Mekor Chaim (O.C. 448:19).”
On the “power of attorney” view, the agent could transfer the sender’s movables agav the agent’s land; on the “yad arikhta” view, he could not.
An Agent as a Witness
The Ohr Sameach now explains the Amoraic dispute in Kiddushin 43a:
“It seems this is the Talmudic dispute at the start of ‘Ha-ish Mekadesh’ (Kiddushin 43a): Rav says ‘an agent can become a witness’—we strengthen his words—while they of R. Shela’s academy say ‘an agent cannot become a witness,’ since ‘a person’s agent is as himself,’ rendering him like the principal. The Gemara then brings a Tannaitic dispute and rules that an agent can become a witness.”
The Gemara records a dispute whether an agent can testify about the matter of his mission (e.g., a betrothal agent serving as one of the witnesses to that very betrothal).[3] The academy of R. Shela disqualifies the agent as a witness because “an agent is like the sender,” i.e., he is identified with the principal and thus cannot testify about “his own” act as a party to it (even without personal stake, as the commentators note).
The Ohr Sameach explains this Amoraic dispute via our chakirah regarding agency:
“They argue thus: those of R. Shela hold the agent becomes as the principal’s very self (yad arikhta); Rav holds that only the agent’s act is attributed to the principal—as if done by him—but the agent remains a distinct party and is therefore not disqualified as a witness. This is clear. [See my distinction between matters of proprietary transfer and gerushin/kiddushin at 3:12; it is a correct distinction.]”
R. Shela’s academy sees the agent as the sender’s extended self; hence the agent is the principal and may not testify. Rav sees the agent as merely vested with authority yet a separate person; hence he may testify.
He continues with more ramifications, but for our purposes this suffices.
Initial Discussion
So far I presented the explanation of “an agent becomes a witness” such that if the agent is a mere power-holder, he may testify; but if he is the sender’s extended self, he may not. Yet one can present it exactly the other way around: if the agent is a power-holder, then he himself performs the divorce—he is the “husband” for this purpose—and so he cannot testify (for he is the party). But if he is the sender’s extended hand, then the performance is the sender’s and the agent’s body is like an inanimate stick the sender wields; the agent himself (his mind/person) remains an independent individual, so when he later comes to testify—a function outside the agency—he does so as an independent person and should be allowed to testify.
So who is right? It seems possible to formulate Rav and R. Shela’s academy in two opposite ways. It depends on reasoning, and I cannot decide with certainty. But note: this is not a mere terminological difference. It is not that one can call the mechanism described above “power of attorney” or “yad arikhta” at will (as I noted earlier one can see such flips even in the Ohr Sameach’s own phrasing). Rather, there is a substantive ambiguity: even if we retain the meanings defined above, the ramifications can flip. In fact, under the very same conception of “yad arikhta” one might conclude the agent is disqualified as a witness—or the opposite, that he is qualified. Likewise for “power of attorney.” Hence, this is not mere wording but genuine conceptual ambiguity, as I noted at the outset.
Is ‘Agent Becomes Witness’ Not a True Ramification of Our Agency Chakirah?
The tempting conclusion is that this nafka mina is illusory: if each side can yield either result, it is not a real ramification. Indeed, we have seen several examples of illusory ramifications in other chakirot (e.g., whether pikuach nefesh on Shabbat is “permitted” or “overrides,” discussed in column 404, and the liability-ground in damages law, discussed in my paper here, among others). The lesson—to beware of illusory chakirot and of the ramifications brought for them—has been noted more than once. Yet in our case the situation is more complex. I think this ramification is not illusory. True, one can phrase it in two ways, but we must choose one. I will clarify.
If we decide that the “power of attorney” model disqualifies the agent from testimony, then the “yad arikhta” model will necessarily yield the opposite, and vice versa. In other words, we cannot maintain that under both conceptions the agent may testify or that under both he may not—without emptying the chakirah of content. I assume it has content, as can be seen from the other ramifications the Ohr Sameach brought. Therefore, under one conception the agent may testify and under the other he may not; the only question is which is which. This is confusing, but it seems the ramification remains valid even though the sides might flip.
Methodological Approaches
Faced with such a situation, there are two principal approaches:
- Define the agent’s disqualification as a witness (i.e., the “party” disqualification) in ways that allow two different understandings of that disqualification to flip which side of the chakirah yields which result—while keeping the fact that there is a ramification (each side yields a distinct outcome).
- Propose two different understandings of the chakirah itself such that all other ramifications remain intact, yet for each understanding the “agent becomes witness” ramification comes out opposite (but still a genuine ramification).
Often the difference between these approaches is not sharp, and sometimes they come together (defining the “party” disqualification goes along with sharpening the agency mechanism, which determines whether the agent is a party). I will now briefly illustrate these approaches, just to sharpen the phenomenon.
First Formulations
We might formulate our chakirah thus: is it the agent’s body that is an extension of the sender’s body (“yad arikhta”), or is it the agent’s mind/personhood that is identified with the sender’s (“power of attorney”)? If the agent’s body is an extension of the sender’s body, there is no bar to the agent’s testifying, since as to his personhood he remains an independent individual; when he testifies he is not a limb of the sender’s body. But if there is an identity of personhood between agent and sender, then one may disqualify him from testifying, as if the sender himself were testifying.
A few remarks. First, the link between this phrasing and our chakirah is not obvious. The first side is “yad arikhta,” but the second is not necessarily “power of attorney”; identity of personhood could reflect another reading of “yad arikhta.” Check this against the other ramifications (recall, we want those to stand). It seems that the get may be on the agent’s paper because he is identified with the sender—that indeed resembles “power of attorney.” But when the sender becomes insane, it is not clear the agent could act; still, there is room to argue yes, so we can leave this open. For temurah, the ramification seems to remain (though one must discuss whether identity of personhood might still produce “two persons”).
Second, even if there is identity of personhood, why can’t the agent testify? For the agency he is identified with the sender, but not for testimony. One might counter: since the testimony concerns the giving of the get, the identity in giving the get disqualifies him from testifying about it. Moreover, even if they are “identical,” which direction does the identity run—does the sender become the agent, or the agent become the sender? On the first possibility, perhaps testimony is allowed (though not obvious). Again, you see we can preserve this option, but it depends on further premises. True, the view of R. Shela’s academy—that the agent cannot testify—can be understood only on the second side (even if, as we saw, that side does not necessarily lead there; it is necessary but not sufficient).
This was a proposal for re-formulating the sides of the chakirah (option B above). As noted, one can also work in parallel on the definition of “party” disqualification (option A). I noted above that here we are discussing a “party” who has no personal stake: the agent has no material interest in whether the divorce/betrothal takes effect or not.[4] If a party without stake is not disqualified (some Rishonim and Acharonim suggest this is the point of dispute; see Rivash §82; Avnei Miluim 35:1; Kovetz Shiurim Bava Batra §107), then even under “yad arikhta” the agent could be a witness.[5] But that would untether the outcome from our chakirah, since the ruling would no longer depend on whether agency is “yad arikhta” or “power of attorney.” Perhaps we can propose that a non-interested party is disqualified only if he is the party himself, whereas an agent is merely treated like a party; such a one, absent personal stake, is not disqualified. Then under “yad arikhta,” which posits identity, he would be disqualified; under “power of attorney,” he would not. (Here you see a possible linkage to the earlier approaches.) But then again, why not view the identity between agent and sender precisely under “power of attorney,” where the agent effectively stands in for the husband (he “is” the divorcer)?
Summary and Lessons
I will not continue enumerating possibilities for defining the chakirah and the dispute. My aim was only to present a picture of the network of premises on each side and, through it, the ambiguity that accompanies the chakirah. What seems, at first glance, crisp and clear, upon further look turns out to be not very crisp and not very clear. The possibilities blend and sometimes even invert. In each formulation, some ramifications switch sides while others do not; some may disappear, others remain.
The main lesson is that we must define the sides of a chakirah carefully and not settle for an intuitive first sense that “there’s something here.” Even if the phrasing does not change the fact that there is a ramification, sometimes the sides will flip; sometimes some ramifications will cease to depend on that side—or even vanish.
[1] Note Temurah 51a:
“And in the public domain, how do you find a pit of two partners? If they both appointed an agent and said, ‘Go dig for us,’ and he went and dug—there is no agency for a transgression.”
We see that when partners appoint an agent to dig a pit, the Gemara calls it the partners’ pit (were it not for the rule “there is no agency for a transgression”). One could say the passage refers to ownership of the pit, not to the act of digging.
[2] One can ask whether under “power of attorney” it is also possible to divorce with paper that belongs to the sender.
[3] The early and later authorities dispute whether this refers to testimony of kiyum (serving as one of the two witnesses to the act) or testimony of birur (later court clarification). I will not enter that here.
[4] Of course, if she becomes divorced or betrothed, she is permitted or forbidden to him accordingly—but that is true of any witness to betrothal, even one who was not an agent.
[5] This raises the question whether, after carrying out the agency, the agent still remains a “party,” and thus perhaps the dispute applies only to testimony of kiyum (at the time of the act) but not to birur (afterward). The sources cited discuss this (see also Avnei Nezer EH §362:5; Torat Gittin to Shulchan Aruch EH 141:4).
Very nice.
The requirement at the end – define well – can sometimes be defined to the point of being ambiguous”m. That is: “The messenger is a limited agent in such a way that he is only able to do what the sender is able to” or “The messenger is a proxy in such a way that he is only able to exercise the power of the sender” as opposed to “The messenger is a proxy in such a way that he fills the place of the sender and can also do what the sender does not have the power to do”.
This is because human language is too flexible – or not well defined enough – to describe in a well-defined way the reasoning and logic at the basis of a legal mechanism.
Is this a correct statement?
Defining it to the point of being meaningless drains the whole thing of its content. The whole idea is to define two sides that will be the outcome. Otherwise, everything is ad hoc.
In the S”D”A”K;Tov in the A”R. P”B
The concept that the messenger is the ‘yida erika’ of the messenger belongs both in the mission to the mitzvah and in the mission to confer. In contrast, ‘giving of yupfiyy as a kha’ can only be said in matters of jealousy. In the mission to the mitzvah, we can define this side (that the messenger is the doer and not just ‘yida erika’) in such a way that the act of the messenger relates to the messenger.
A nefek”m will apparently be about the intention of the mitzvah, that if the messenger is only ‘yida erika– then the required intention is that of the messenger. But to the side that the act of the messenger relates to the messenger – The messenger must direct the intention of the mitzvah. And therefore Bezalel would have known how to direct the intentions of the construction of the Tabernacle, since he is the doer.
With blessings, Gabriel Haftsadi Zweidinimovsky
The concept of ‘yda arikhta’ is perhaps alluded to in what Chazal demanded about ”va vetilesh ’ematha’ that the maidservant of Pharaoh’s daughter was stretched out, which is simply ‘ematha’ – her maidservant, but the maidservant had no good intention of saving, and the maidservant was nothing but a ‘long hand’ of Pharaoh’s daughter.
Ostensibly, there is a simple test to check whether the opinion between Rav and Rav Shila is in accordance with the Tur and Rambam's dispute. Let's examine how each of them ruled on the issue of a messenger becoming a witness. If both ruled as Rav or as Rav Shila, at least one of them understood himself differently or understood the dispute between Rav and Rav Shila differently. If both ruled according to their own opinion, then there is evidence for the opposite, and if both ruled the opposite of what the rabbinic court expected, then there is evidence for your opposite proposal.
(This is in contrast to the other opinions that were not explicitly discussed, and therefore they can be excluded from the rabbinic court's scholarly proposal)
It is not always possible to check because there is not always a ruling on the subject of nefm. But here I make a fundamental comment. Even if you find out what Maimonides or the Tur meant, the ambiguity in principle still remains.
1. In my opinion, part of the confusion in the investigation was created because they limited the investigation to the fixed framework of two explanations, while there are at least 3 options:
A. The messenger is acting and the messenger is ineffective towards him like a stick
B. The messenger is acting and the messenger is ineffective (the hand of the UN)
C. Both are partially in the picture
According to A, the messenger is made a witness, according to B, not (assuming that the C touches) According to C, it is unclear - the question is what is the messenger's part and what is defined as a party
Therefore, part of the lesson in my opinion is not always to divide into two options, even though this is the natural tendency
2. The mental structure of "according to their method" gives a clearer picture here and saves part of the problem of undefined investigations:
If we take as a principle that a sane messenger is needed and also believe that a messenger was not made a witness - it is clear even to the Rambam that the messenger is "erased" And one does not have to be sane, a messenger is not made a witness.
And vice versa - if the Rambam says that a messenger who was sent as a minister of the dau, a messenger is made a witness, let alone a messenger who was made
This is a simple way to show that the Nafka is a real Mina.
I agree, but there are more than three options (as I have shown). That is part of my argument.
On that day the mountains will drip with sap and the hills will flow with milk. The column provokes several thoughts (some of them mournful) and I still haven't been able to absorb it all.
A. Apparently what you wrote in Two Carts to add another stage of why after the investigation or the law seems to solve this problem. When something is understood with an independent intellectual understanding and not as some kind of abstract and mysterious formal principle, then such problems cannot arise at all. [I myself *very* limit the possible answers to ’why’, and ’legal reasoning’ or to create a new and independent principle that does not advance any goal that is acceptable to me are not acceptable to me as an explanation. But it is clear that it is impossible to successfully study the Gemara this way].
B. Regarding the matter of a messenger being made until, it seems that the tables have turned (somewhat ironically). The Happy Light says that ”a messenger is not made until” It is appropriate for the Rambam that the messenger is derived from the Torah, and this is the possibility that you described as “it is also possible to present the exact opposite.” Although, as it turns out, this does not matter, as the two opposite possibilities still remain the same, it seems to me that the Light of the Light is right and his presentation is the most plausible.
The Light of the Light investigates whether the messenger only gives his mechanical action for the benefit of the matter and nothing else, meaning that everything around, such as the messenger’s paper and the messenger’s ground and the messenger’s sanity are not relevant to the messenger (the messenger’s sanity is a side condition), or whether the messenger brings with him everything he has (he is like the messenger’s body, i.e. replication and expansion) and therefore can use his own paper and his own ground and his own sanity is enough. Then the Light of the Light says that if the messenger does not bring what is around, then he does become a prophet and vice versa. The opposite possibility that you presented says that if the messenger is a hand (the messenger is a nullity), then he is ineligible to testify because “he is a hand” and is in fact the messenger, and if the messenger is a proxy (the messenger is a valid proxy) then he is eligible to testify because he is independent. This does not seem logical. “To be a hand” is a borrowed and figurative expression that is irrelevant to infer from it the laws of testimony, and to reason that it is eligible to testify based on the “independence” of the messenger. This is not at all understandable to me.
[C. In note 2, you wrote that according to the concept of a proxy (the messenger is a valid proxy, and the messenger can expel with his own paper), it is necessary to discuss whether it is possible to expel with the paper of the messenger. Although there was room for reflection on this, I would not conclude that anyone would know such a strange innovation. It is clear that this is not the case, and it is also possible in the letter of the envoy, and the investigation should be formulated around this. And the reason is perhaps that the power of attorney is an extension of the envoy, also with regard to everything around it, and certainly does not contradict it. Even in the body of the column in presenting the investigation, you wrote that in the power of attorney, “the powers of the envoy were emptied to the envoy” and this is also too strong a formulation.
D. In the exchange of partners discussed there, if partners sent a messenger to dedicate a sacrifice for them (perhaps theirs or his), then the one making atonement is certainly the partners, but the one making atonement, i.e. the messenger, is an individual (so argues Rava), and there is a verse that partners do not make atonement, but the doubt is whether in general, whether the one making atonement is the one who has the power to make atonement, and so here the one making atonement is an individual and makes atonement, meaning that if the messenger tries to convert, then he and his exchange will be holy, or in general, the one making atonement is the one who has the power to make atonement, and so here the one making atonement is the partners, and there is a law that partners do not make atonement. In a pit that a messenger of partners dug in public property, if there is a messenger to commit a crime, then it seems clear that it is a pit for which the partners are also responsible for the act of digging, and not only for the ownership of the pit that they made, which is written in their possession, because he is their messenger, because in a pit, unlike a exchange, there is no condition of ‘not being partners’ And there is no special law regarding partners, but only a technical problem that in a well in the public domain, the one who opens it is the one who is liable.]
Regarding [c-d] I may have missed the train and it is already too late to get into the details of the example and not the body of the idea, and then it is a shame. And it is seemingly trivial. Mm, the idea in the column here is a kind of glasses that must be worn and over time to see what you see with them, and it is not easy and sufficient to think about it directly and in conjunction with one discussion, and from now on I will see what will be revealed.
I will only comment on the issue of a pit of partners. The Gemara notes that we did not find a pit of partners, meaning that the discussion is on the question of whether a pit of partners would be permissible.
Isn't this just a matter of terminology? In tort, there is no difference between partners and individuals (there are certainly partners), unlike in tort, where there is some kind of law that depends on the question of whether the dedicator "is" an individual or partners.
That is, if two people sent a messenger to dig a hole in a village and one of the messengers committed a crime, then it is clear that they are liable as partners, and there is no party in the investigation of the messenger or in the obligation to pay the hole payments that would exempt them, and therefore the Mishnah rightly calls this a joint-partner hole. However, in return, where Rava invents some (rather strange) idea, regarding the special restriction that partners do not make a return, then if a meditator makes a return, and if the meditator is a single messenger, then this is not included in the teaching that prevents a joint-partner return.
And not a question of terminology. The question is how the concept of mission is understood. When an act of two people is done by one messenger, is it the act of the messenger or of the messengers? In this matter, it does not matter that consideration does not belong in partnership, and since liability for damages belongs in the partners.
In the column, you presented a phenomenon of an investigation that is vaguely defined so that the terms for describing the fundamental aspects are reversed among different researchers, and you demonstrated it by investigating on a mission. On the Otzar Hochma forum, there seems to be another example of this regarding fundamental terms in Kabbalah. http://forum.otzar.org/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=10258&p=149043#p95800
In the article titled "The Rebbe of Monastries," he claims that the terms "swift hal almin" and "fill hal almin" are reversed among the members of the Palugta regarding the implication on the tzimtzum, and claims that the entire dispute is semantic.
And I will quote without understanding: [Page 5 of the pdf pages] “And the difference between them is only in the terms they used, that the Rabbi of the Tanya calls the infinite aspect to which the reduction does not apply, the one that surrounds every world, and the infinite aspect that is reduced calls the one that fills every world, and the Rabbi of the Halshem calls the one that fills every world, and the aspect to which the reduction does apply, the one that surrounds every world and is the one that constitutes and sustains the worlds”.
And further on [page 7 of the pdf pages] he says that the words of the living soul are exactly the same as those of Rabbi Baal Halshem, and therefore Rabbi Desleker was right when he wrote that there is no essential difference between the opinion of Rabbi Baal HaTanya and the opinion of the living soul “and he already stated this in the book Yam Hochma (Er”5 5767, page 2) that the change between Ba”t and the living soul is only in terminology, that what one calls "sowb kohl almin" the other calls "mell kohl almin", and so on.
I do not understand the matter in order to express an opinion whether he is right (that there is no essential disagreement), but from the quotes he cites there it really does seem that there is at least a reversal in the "sowb/mellam tzitzum/non-tzitzum" drag. Does this seem to you like another example of the phenomenon in the column?
Absolutely. And I think I also commented on this in the second book of the trilogy. It's the problem of transcendence and immanence and the question of pantheism. A lot of undefined language. We have to remember that when we consider a reduction not as simple as it is a baseless thesis that says nothing, it can be interpreted in all sorts of ways to give it meaning.