How Good That There Are Conservatives! (Column 444)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
I imagine some will be surprised that, in this column, I wish to speak in praise of conservatism. Proof that life has its surprises—and that’s a good thing.
Between Complexity and Consequentialism
A simplistic view of a person or an idea judges it as a whole without noticing the different facets within it, which sometimes pull in opposing directions (see, for example, Column 30). A good person can have negative sides, and vice versa. A bad idea can have positive aspects, and vice versa. A simplistic judgment looks only at the bottom line. A complex judgment, by contrast, is willing to consider the various sides and give each its due, and only at the end—if at all—arrive at a bottom line. But I have written about this quite a bit already. Here I wanted to touch on something that appears similar but is in fact very different.
There are situations in which something mistaken yields a welcome result. That does not mean it is not mistaken, nor that I should now support and justify it; but I can at least be glad that it exists. To sharpen the point: I am not speaking about a complex view—that is, about noting its positive sides. I am speaking about phenomena that, in themselves, may be entirely wrong—such that even a complex view will not find anything positive in them—yet nevertheless they have positive consequences. One may rejoice that they exist without agreeing with anything about them. This is a consequentialist consideration, a type of consideration I routinely and vigorously disparage in many different contexts.
The Holocaust and the State
A striking example of this is the common Haredi argument (attributed to the Hazon Ish) that the State of Israel would not last more than fifty years. The premise is that a project based on false or evil values cannot endure. Conversely, religious Zionists bring proof for their stance against Haredism from the very success of the Zionist enterprise. Again, there is an assumption that whatever succeeds is presumably correct. I assume this rests on a view that what transpires in the world is the work of the Holy One, blessed be He, and He is not supposed to let criminal enterprises succeed. Therefore, if something succeeds, apparently God wishes it so.
Beyond the debate about divine involvement in the world—namely, whether everything that happens here is truly His doing—there is room to discuss His own policy. Even if He is involved and indeed brings about all that happens, there is still no necessity to say that He would never allow any person or failing/criminal enterprise to succeed and persist. It is hard to deny that people in this world commit transgressions and God does not prevent them (apparently because of the importance of free choice). And in general, the question “Why do the wicked prosper?” was not born in our day.
Still, those who hold to a view of active providence will say that even if criminal enterprises, people, and groups act and succeed in the world, there is some purpose to it. Apparently there is benefit in their actions, and that is why God allows it. This leads us to the phenomenon of problematic approaches or groups with problematic positions that nevertheless have positive outcomes. The most conspicuous example is the Holocaust, which had a not-insignificant share in the success of Zionism, the establishment of the state, and the ingathering of Jews to it. Does that mean the Holocaust was a blessed Zionist enterprise? Does that mean it was wrong to fight it and condemn it? Apparently not (a note to several important thinkers in Neturei Karta). It certainly was not a Zionist enterprise, and not at all a successful one. But still, among other things, it did have positive consequences.
We have a tendency either to invalidate the outcomes of criminal enterprises, on the one hand, or to point to their outcomes as proof that they are not criminal, on the other. These are, of course, two sides of the same coin—namely, the assumption that links our attitude toward a project or group with the results of its actions. But that assumption is false. There can be negative enterprises that have positive outcomes, or positive enterprises with negative outcomes. Each such enterprise can be opposed sharply and even fought, while at the same time one can be glad—at least in certain respects—that it exists or existed in the past.
On Conservatism
On the eve of the last Passover, someone in our circle completed Tractate Horayot and touched on the tractate’s final sugya that discusses whether “Sinai” is preferable or a “mountain-uprooter” is preferable. This is an interesting sugya for several reasons, especially regarding its broader meaning. Clearly there are sides in favor of the “Sinai” model and sides in favor of the “mountain-uprooter,” as with everything. But here the resolution seems a bit meaningless and arbitrary—or at least highly dependent on circumstances. What is the point of debating which is preferable between two good options? In some circumstances a mountain-uprooter is preferable; in others, Sinai. Even if the Talmudic disputants thought that Sinai is preferable—or that the mountain-uprooter is preferable—this is not a universal statement. For example, in our time information exists and is accessible to all (and therefore, according to the Rema, there is no longer a status of a clearly preeminent rabbi). It would seem that the weight of “Sinai-ness” should decrease.
One participant at the siyum remarked that although today the weight of knowledge has diminished because of databases and printing, nevertheless Sinai is preferable because there is value to conservatism. He said that uprooting mountains leads to excessive innovation, and sophisticated, mountain-uprooting arguments can destroy the entire tradition. I trust you understand I am definitely not there. In my view, conservatism is usually destructive and also foolish; yet here I wish to argue that this does not necessarily mean it has no positive outcomes.
By the way, the same goes for innovation. In Columns 217 and 249 I explained that I oppose any consideration of meta-halakhic policy within halakha, or policy considerations within any substantive discussion at all. Considerations of conservatism or innovation are not relevant considerations in a discussion on the merits. If a question is on the table, my position about it should be formed on substantive grounds—whether I am for or against—not through the prism of policy. Questions like: Is this innovative or conservative? Is it open or closed? Is it original or not? Is it Reform, heretical, or something else?—all these may interest the scholar of my thought but are not relevant to me myself. Even slippery-slope considerations (see Column 429) are not relevant to the substantive discussion. I am supposed to determine my position on the matter from considerations of the matter itself, and the scholar of my thought may come afterward and diagnose whether I am a conservative or an innovator, a reformer or anything else. Reality will prove whether my stance led to good or bad outcomes (the question of the slope).
What about discussing conservatism or innovation per se? One can debate whether conservatism is positive or not, and in that debate the policy consideration itself is under examination. Such debates have been held quite a bit in recent years, but in my view even that debate is unnecessary. I see no value in debating whether conservatism/innovation is blessed or not, because it has no ramifications. First, if I am a conservative, I will continue to be one even if it is not blessed—because that is my temperament, and perhaps also because it seems right to me. And if I am an innovator, I will continue to be one regardless of whether innovation is blessed. Conservatism and innovation are not a value judgment but perhaps a matter of temperament. Beyond that, as I explained above, I am not prepared at all to give myself an accounting about whether I am a conservative or an innovator, because that question is irrelevant to the substantive discussions themselves. I must discuss each question on the agenda on its own merits, not according to the labels perched above the different answers to it (“conservative,” “innovative,” and the like). Therefore I oppose consequentialism in almost every context in which it arises—and so too here.
One can, of course, argue that a conservative starting point is good, since whoever comes to change must examine carefully the justification for doing so. One can also argue that in the absence of unequivocal considerations, the default is to leave the status quo in place (because of the wisdom of the masses or collective intelligence). I am not sure I agree, but this is a relevant argument and is certainly debatable. But as I explained in those columns, accepting or rejecting a claim merely because it is conservative or innovative is simply foolish.
And Yet, a Discussion of Conservatism
So much for my view of conservatism as a stance. Nevertheless, as a social phenomenon one can certainly point to the importance of conservatism. For example, some time ago I exchanged a few WhatsApp messages with a neighbor about the heter mechirah (sale permit) during the sabbatical year. We both lamented the Haredi folly that treats non-Jewish produce as “mehadrin-level shmita.” This is truly a lofty peak of stupidity, rare even in the Haredi world (which, as is known, suffers from not a few such “peaks”). With one hand they oppose the sale of lands—among other reasons, because of the prohibition of “lo techonem,” “do not grant them a holding in the land” (Avodah Zarah 20a)—and at the same time, with the other hand, they choose the alternative of buying fruits and vegetables from Palestinians living in the Land of Israel, thereby of course greatly strengthening their hold on the land and undermining ours. In such a policy they grant them a holding in the land precisely in order to avoid the prohibition of granting them a holding in the land. Now go explain to the greengrocer or the falafel vendor that I am careful not to eat produce that is “mehadrin shmita,” and that so it is fitting for every God-fearing mehadrin observer to do (you can’t; tried and tested!).
In the course of that discussion I wrote to that neighbor that nonetheless there is value to this foolish and irritating Haredi conservatism, because if creatures like me were given control over life and over halakha, there wouldn’t be much left of them. The changes would be so frequent that at every time and place we would conduct ourselves differently—restlessly and without continuity. Therefore, without conservatism—however superficial and annoying—there would not be much left of halakha as a framework that governs our personal and communal lives.
R. Kook wrote and said more than once that one should seek the positive side in every phenomenon. Sometimes he meant a complex view, which I discussed above. But in our context I mean looking at negative phenomena even when they have no positive side—yet in terms of their consequences they play a positive role in how we conduct ourselves in the world. This does not necessarily mean that the people and groups leading these phenomena have a positive side. Sometimes yes, but even if not—one can still see in these phenomena processes that have positive outcomes. Thus, conservatism—which in itself is an irritating and foolish phenomenon (just like innovation)—also has positive outcomes (again, as innovation does). On this the Rambam writes at the end of chapter 2 of Hilkhot Mamrim (halakha 8):
“Any court that has permitted two matters should not be quick to permit a third.”
I think the same applies to a court that has prohibited two matters. That is, the Rambam’s intent here is not specifically about a policy of stringency or leniency, but about a policy with a conservative starting point, whose purpose is to preserve the halakhic framework.
From a perspective of active providence, one might perhaps see in such a consideration an expression of the hand of God in the world. The leaders of these phenomena are irritating fools, but they are the “rod of His wrath”—that is, by means of them He leads the world to better places. Such a consideration still does not mean it is not right to fight these phenomena. As noted, God also allows negative phenomena to occur and succeed. Moreover, in my opinion the question of whether to fight or to join ought not be decided by some metaphysical-theological consideration of God’s trends in the world, but rather by the phenomena themselves (see a fuller discussion here). Even so, there is room to see the good in these irritating phenomena. This also does not mean I must become a conservative. It is only my academic vantage point on this foolish and irritating phenomenon. Therefore, this generous perspective—true though it may be—has no operative implications. To adopt a conservative stance I do not believe in merely because of its outcomes, I would have to tell “holy lies,” something I vehemently oppose (see, for example, Column 21).
Of course, from a viewpoint that does not accept active providence and divine involvement in the world, it is even clearer that this statement has no implications—except perhaps psychological. If a phenomenon is negative, we must fight it with all our might; but when we fail, we can at least take comfort in the fact that it also has positive outcomes. This is usually my feeling around the struggles against conservatism. They usually fail (“the public is stupid, and therefore the public pays,” as the songwriter put it—see there, there), but one can be comforted that this outcome also has a positive dimension. If not by providence, some will ascribe it to the “wisdom of the crowds,” but I ascribe it to luck—“The Lord protects the simple” (even a Torah scroll in the ark depends on fortune).
Once I had a conversation with R. Blumenthal (Blumen(T)zweig), the head of the yeshiva in Yeruham, about an issue of conservatism that arose in the local school. I, of course, advocated a revolutionary and radical approach, and he told me that it is easy for me to be a revolutionary when I live in a Haredi community and send my children to Haredi education (as was then the case). On such a foundation it is easy and comfortable to be a revolutionary and a reformer, because someone balances you and prevents problematic—if not destructive—outcomes that might result from your approach. But when you live and act in a non-conservative environment, you must exercise extra caution with such revolutionary statements, for in such an environment there is no one to balance you and ensure that actual conduct does not go to an overly extreme edge.
And Still, Policy Considerations
Everything I have written thus far applies to policy considerations such as conservatism and innovation—to policy considerations in general. Policy considerations are not relevant in a substantive discussion. I can, after the fact, be glad that there are conservatives, and equally glad that there are innovators; but neither type of consideration should take part in the discussion itself.
Despite all this, it is clear that at times there is room to act on policy considerations, such as conservatism or innovation. In extreme cases there is room to make decisions out of a consideration to avoid too many revolutions (evolution rather than revolution). An example can be seen in the Rambam quoted above about a court that has permitted two matters. But since these are always situations in which halakha itself tells us otherwise, one must remember that a decision based on policy considerations is a decision to deviate from the halakha.
Accordingly, such action has several conditions:
- Before arriving at policy considerations, one must weigh the halakhic considerations themselves; only afterward should one examine whether there is room for policy considerations.
- Do this only in very exceptional circumstances that justify deviating from the halakha.
- The party deciding must inform his audience that this is a ruling by virtue of policy and not halakha in its essence. Otherwise this is a falsehood; additionally, he transgresses “bal tosif,” “you shall not add.” (In Mamrim 2:9 the Rambam rules that even a court acting within its authority enacting or decreeing a rabbinic law must declare it as such in order not to transgress “bal tosif.”)
- Whoever does this must have the authority to make such decisions. For example, sages in our time cannot rule halakha based on policy considerations at all, since if this is not the true halakha, an authorized court is required to determine that for now we must deviate from it. If the halakha is Y and some decisor instructs me to do X because of policy, there is no obligation to obey him. At most it is a recommendation. Only a body with formal (not substantive—see Column 393) authority can establish such a halakha.
Unfortunately, many decisors—not only in our day—do not observe these constraints, and examples can be found daily of decisors acting without authority. They declare prohibitions as though there were here a law from Sinai, while in truth there is a dispute, a policy consideration, a custom, or simply something they feel is useful to prohibit. For some reason, decisors do not tend to say out loud that a given decision is an outcome of policy, and they do not even bother to say when it is merely their personal stringency (because in their view “that is how one should act,” and they prohibit when a permitted course seems dangerous). I have written more than once about the damage of this policy. Its goal is apparently to strengthen the ruling, but in the long run the public loses trust in halakhic pronouncements—and rightly so.
I can, of course, be glad about the outcomes of such a policy, which in some cases helps preserve the halakhic framework; but it is still a falsehood and an act without authority, and it ought to be warned against and fought.
A Similar Look at the Am-ha’aretz
Similarly, one can relate to the phenomenon of the am-ha’aretz. As is known, it is hard with ammei ha’aretz. They are unwilling to accept any statement to which they are not accustomed. Because of their ignorance, everything they were trained in is, in their eyes, something “given to Moses at Sinai.” They are unaware of differing opinions, of the methods of debate, of how a halakhic position is formed, of the role of the decisor (the human being) in the formation of halakha; therefore every unusual statement will meet their fierce opposition (see Column 62). In discussions about the am-ha’aretz one often hears praise for their rigidity and for its importance in preserving our tradition. Righteous mothers who could not read or write protected us from various revolutionary changes; and as the Hassid Ya’avetz wrote, it was the ammei ha’aretz who kept the flame of Judaism during the expulsion from Spain (see the column there). Try convincing women—or just ammei ha’aretz—that a woman may be called to the Torah or recite kaddish. You have no chance. This total fixation also protects us from unworthy changes or from too great a flood of changes.
One must relate to the arguments regarding the am-ha’aretz on the two levels I described with respect to conservatism (the resemblance between the phenomena is, by the way, no coincidence): we must fight am-ha’aretz-ness and try to eradicate it with a firm hand, and together with that we may be glad that we do not quite succeed. Am-ha’aretz types are like weeds—very hard to uproot and they multiply uncontrollably—annoying, but there are aspects to it that are gladdening.
We must distinguish between what I have defined here as ammei ha’aretz and baalebatim. At the end of Column 62 I explained that a baalebat is a person who acts and lives outside the beit midrash and is sometimes needed to correct the crooked intellect of those inside the beit midrash (hence the need for public approval for enactments and decrees in order for them to take effect). An am ha’aretz is not a baalebat. The am ha’aretz simply has a crooked mind—period. Yet it turns out that his conservatism and fixations sometimes protect us.
Conclusion
I will conclude with this: in my youth I was sure I was right, and it was a pity about all those who were wrong (=those who thought differently from me; see here). Later I arrived at the conclusion that everyone is right (pluralism). Today I again think (but I am not sure) that I am right—but I am glad there are those who are wrong. Today I fight them vigorously and usually also scorn them, yet I am aware that sometimes, thanks to them, the world stands.
Perhaps these words expand upon the Rambam’s well-known statement in his Introduction to the Mishnah:
“One question remains. It is this: One might ask, you have already said that the divine wisdom created nothing in vain, and that among all the creatures under the sphere of the moon the human being is the most honored, and that the end of the human species is the attainment of intelligibles. If so, why did God create all human beings who do not attain the intelligible, when we see that most people are empty of knowledge and pursue desires, while the learned, abstinent person is rare and wondrous—found only as a single one in a generation? The answer: the existence of those others is for two reasons. First, to serve that single one; for if all human beings were learned and philosophical, the world would be lost and humanity would perish in a short time, since man is very lacking and needs many things. He would be forced to learn plowing, harvesting, threshing, grinding, cooking, and making the tools for all these until food is obtained; likewise he would need to learn spinning and weaving to weave what he will wear, and building to construct shelter, and to make tools for all these. Not even the lifespan of Methuselah would suffice to learn all the crafts a person necessarily needs for his existence. If so, when would that person learn wisdom and understand science? Therefore all these were created to perform those labors that the world needs, and thus the learned man exists for his own sake; thereby the world is built and wisdom found. How apt the saying: ‘Were it not for the fools, the world would be desolate.’ And there is no greater foolishness than a man of feeble spirit, frail in body, who travels from one edge of the second climate to the edge of the sixth, crossing seas in winter and deserts in the summer heat, risking himself among every kind of beast of prey so that perhaps he will earn a dinar; and when he amasses from those dinars on which he has staked his very spirit, he begins to distribute them to craftsmen to build for him a firm foundation upon virgin soil with lime and stones, to set upon it a structure that will stand for hundreds of years, while he knows clearly that not even enough of his life remains to wear out a hut of reeds. Is there any levity of mind greater than this? And so it is with all the pleasures of the world and its desires—absolute frivolity—yet thereby the world is built. For this reason our Sages, of blessed memory, called one who did not study ‘am ha’aretz,’ that is, ‘people of the land,’ meaning they were created only to build the land, and therefore they are attached to it.”
May it be pleasant to the listener.
When the Rambam spoke of the individuals versus the crowd, he included in this crowd also the (pseudo)liberal revolutionaries of various kinds (more correctly, progressives. That is, anti-conservatives. Not necessarily lovers of freedom). Reality shows that these world reformers cause much more damage than the rest of the conservative crowd whose corruptions they come to correct, and first and foremost of all is Robespierre, the father of the leftists for their generations. And they are the greatest fools and lack self-awareness there is. And also the greatest corrupt there is. Like our legal system, about which Solomon said, "The place of justice is where the wicked are." They are even more corrupt (men of lies) than the criminals they prosecute.
I am quite convinced that Rabbi Michai himself still belongs to this pseudo-liberal crowd. A matter of environmental influence. Tell me who your friends are and I will tell you who you are. At least he doesn't want to be part of it. That's also something.
A. In the booklet on the laws of policy considerations, you stipulated several conditions for policy considerations. Let's assume that all the conditions are correct, there is still a built-in circularity here. It seems that you assume that these conditions are a rigid framework for policy considerations. But policy considerations can also override these conditions themselves, and why not? And is there some meta-rule of principle that a framework is rigid forever? (…). This seems like an attempt to write a Shul to the laws of transgression for its own sake. If the framework were given as a text, then there would be an interpretive consideration given in order to make it rigid, because otherwise what is its power? But when the framework is explained, then there is no such interpretive consideration.
B. The body of the conditions for gnawing with the power of the carts is not clear to me.
Condition A – Let them first clarify the halachic considerations. Although one can think of several reasons for this condition, simply when one decides not to investigate a particular halakhic consideration, it means that one holds the decision even on the side that the particular halakhic consideration goes in the opposite direction to the decision. The strongest reason for this (as far as I can think of) is that policy considerations are usually simply on a larger scale than halakhic considerations. Someone trying to run away from a bear in the forest is not careful to check carefully whether he trampled on a few protected flowers. Or perhaps they are going to be harsh overall.
Condition B – Only in exceptional circumstances. It is not clear, and why would you also tell the government that it is allowed to legislate only in exceptional circumstances? One must constantly act and ensure, in simple circumstances simple and easy solutions and in exceptional circumstances heavy and difficult solutions.
Condition C – Obligation of transparency. First, I don't think anyone says about something “daoriyta” without substantiation (at least in their opinion). This term remains professional, and is quite different from the term “principle of law” in which greater freedom is practiced, and this is because nowadays even principle of law involves policy considerations that were decided by previous generations. And there is no need to add to this ”principle of law”. Second, such clear transparency is liable to undermine the acceptance of the policy.
Condition D – That there be a formal authority. The argument is that where there are no people, there was no one, and since a global authority is needed that can also consider global considerations (hence the idea of formal authority was created), then someone has to do it. To remain without authority and stand idly by in the face of significant risks is irresponsible.
My conditions are not a matter for one position or another. They are a result of the definition of the law and the requirement to tell the truth and not lie. Someone who wants to lie can say that he is ruling on a law when he does not do so, and still in such a situation he is not ruling on a law. To the same extent, a person can rule on a law from the Upanishads, and say that it is not a law, even though a sage can come and rule on a law from the Upanishads and not ask me. May he and all of us be healthy.
And this is exactly the opposite of determining a Sh”a for the laws of a transgression per se. On the contrary, it only determines when it is a transgression per se and when it is a mitzvah. What you will do with it – is your decision.
In your second statement, you accept everything as a given simply because it exists. This is a groundless formalism. In practice, it has not been accepted as a binding norm that cannot be disputed, and that is it.
The requirement not to lie, etc. If it is truly violated, then policy considerations overrode it as well. After all, why did they lie (if they did)? Because they thought it was necessary.
Not every acceptance has to be an acceptance of a completely binding norm. More flexible norms are also accepted. And the fact is that they received formal (!) *certain* authority also regarding the first and the adjudicators.
As I explained, I am not talking about a requirement at all. It is a definition. When a posak says a lie in our context, my problem with his words is not a moral-halachic one (although that also exists). The problem is that what he presents as halacha is not halacha. I pointed that out in my words. If you think it is necessary to lie and present a statement in the Torah of Shoemaking as halacha, good for you, but that does not make it halacha. The conditions in my words for policy considerations do not deal with what is permissible and what is forbidden, but with a definition. Even the ”don't add” was not said in the context of what is permissible and what is forbidden (since circumstances may dictate violating this non-law) but to show that it is not halacha. If someone adds halacha because circumstances seem to him to be binding, that does not make it halacha.
According to you, every statement by any person will be halacha because he can always lie and present it as halacha. This is not serious babbling.
Non-absolute acceptance is indeed possible, and I have said/written this more than once, but by its very definition it is not absolutely binding. I also accept to some extent the first and greatest of the poskim (of course the entire variety as a whole, not any particular one of them), but I am not willing for them to be presented as binding law as they are usually presented. Of course, if it is a lie, then the discussion is different. See above.
A. I didn't understand what the connection is with the definitions. In your condition number 3, you wrote that the poskim who applies policy considerations must clarify this to the listeners (and not obscure it under "forbidden"), and then what? If he didn't reveal it, then it's not halacha (and not binding)? And if he did reveal it, then it is binding? After all, even with regard to the question of "whether to reveal", he applied policy considerations and decided not to reveal. The product of policy considerations is also part of the halacha, at least as a temporary provision. I don't recognize the "not serious debate" that you have inserted into my method.
B. There is a gap between what you accept regarding the *formal* authority of the Rishonim and the Shul and what is accepted by almost all poskim and the public, in exactly the same way that the Gemara was accepted. I didn't understand how you justify this gap despite "public acceptance" (a concept that should be discussed carefully, also with regard to the Gemara).
A. He must make this clear to the listeners according to the halacha. And this is an indication that such additions are not part of the halacha. If an authorized body does so, it can join in the same way as a rabbinic body, provided that they inform the public. The unserious chatter is that in your opinion everything someone does is halacha. It is impossible to claim that something does not fit the halacha.
B. Kabbalah is amorphous not only in its content but also in its strength. There is no reason to disagree with it. In your opinion, does any group of people who accept something with any force obligate me with the same force and in the same form? Formalism again.
A. I don't think that from what I wrote it follows in any way that ”everything someone does is halakha”. It's hard to speak without examples, and there are none in the column either, so I'll try to offer one – Tekhel. There is a widespread hypothesis that ”the greats of the generation” do not want to mandate the imposition of Tekhel (meaning in fact they teach that there is no obligation), even if they have been largely convinced that the identification of Tekhel is correct, as a result of a policy consideration that they do not want to impose a revolutionary innovation (because a’ it shocks conservatism b’ perhaps an error will be discovered and it will erode the authority of the shepherds). But if it spreads from below, then very well and after it has already been established (both the custom and the research will be established) then they will declare it obligatory.
Questions: 1. Do you think this is a legitimate consideration? 2. In such a case, should the teacher clarify that these were his considerations, even though it would greatly affect the decision? 3. If the consideration is legitimate but the teacher of the teaching did not clarify but simply said, “There is no obligation to impose today’s Tekheleth,” then for those who know the truth, there is a (halachic) obligation to impose Tekheleth?
B. Accepting the authority of the Rishonim and the Shul with Nu’ak is indeed more amorphous than accepting the authority of the Gemara, but even what it does contain, and which has much merit in the books of the Poskim, you undermine and weaken. After all, your fundamental arguments are against the Poskim, etc., since they attributed weight to the ancients and the Shul with Nu’ak. Do you think that all your words regarding the authority of the Rishonim and the Shul with Nu’ak are true? Are they merely a description of what is generally accepted by the jurists and the public and nothing beyond that?
A. This is completely out of your words. After all, you claim that it is impossible to establish rules (shul) about anything. Any rule established in any area of halakhic law and by anyone can absorb the same criticism from you.
B. I explained that weakened Kabbalah does not have a correspondingly weakened status. By the way, I really do not think that my words are fundamentally different from the accepted approach. I am just putting things on the table in a sharper and more explicit way, which others do not tend to do.
As for the blue, it is indeed a clearly illegitimate position. There is a blue obligation, and anyone who says there is not is a liar. At most, you can say that there is an obligation but you recommend not observing it (of course, no one would dare to say this, and rightly so). The policy of lying has simply become so simplified and internalized that people are no longer moved by these lies.
And of course there is a complete obligation to impose blue regardless of what these or other poskim say. Whoever did not impose a nullity did, and these poskim went ”before a blind man”. Absolutely clear.
I didn't understand why it was so illegitimate? Because public leaders today are not even allowed to consider policy considerations and it is their duty to cast a vote?
There is a positive commandment to cast a blue stone. Is anyone authorized today to abrogate this commandment? Does anyone seriously claim that they have the authority to do so? The Great Judge can uproot something from the Torah. In my opinion, it is also possible to freeze laws, but a broad consensus is needed for this.
The question that looms over the matter is why – to the best of my limited knowledge – all the great public leaders did not order the obligation of Tekhel. Not among the Lithuanians, not among the Sephardim, nor among the Hasidim. Only rabbis with a non-dramatic public impact impose and teach, etc. ’ and until they say there will be a broad and profound impact, another decade or two will pass. It is difficult to explain this phenomenon and I understand between the lines that you also have no explanation for it (and according to the above common hypothesis, this is very understandable). Of course, it depends on whether all those with the impact were too lazy to investigate the matter or if they all held the opinion that the identification is not convincing enough, because there is no method of study and thinking that is common to all the impactors.
The question of the conservatism of poskim is an old one and does not arise only in relation to this question. For the most part, they do not bother to test new ideas with all sorts of strange reasonings such as “We have no tradition on this”, “Science has no standing in halakhic questions” etc. These reasonings clearly show you the folly of their method.
I find it hard to believe that you will find an important poskim who will tell you that he has tested and indeed it is a blue thread and yet still instructs not to put it in a garment. I have heard of one or two who have said this nonsense, but it is a negligible minority among poskim.
So there is a phenomenon called “conservatism of jurists”, and according to you it is also ancient, meaning it includes many senior jurists, and this phenomenon on its face seems to be in direct contradiction to the law, and you simply put it aside, believing that there is no basis for a great study of their behavior and moving on?
[For an explicit clarification that this is the policy in Teshelet (“the identification is correct and yet you will not impose it”) I do not think there is room even if this is truly the policy. Because even such a clarification has considerable costs. But that is another matter]
Indeed. Everyday actions.
If there is no such clarification regarding Tekhelet (for justifiable reasons in your opinion), then on what basis do you assume this is the policy?
From two indications and one reason. The reason is that it seems logical to me to act like an insurance company to preserve strict adherence to the halakha. One indication is that there is a factual gap between the most influential poskim and the rest. And a second indication is that the identification seems too convincing to me. And the lack of clarification and transparency in this type of considerations does not prove the opposite, of course. If there is an alternative explanation without policy considerations, then of course I would prefer it. But the alternative you suggest is to leave them in the lurch.
Since all the reasons you raised are painful in my opinion, then at most there is pain for both sides.
A. But what I argued is that it is impossible to determine for policymakers who consider policy considerations (which have the power to override halacha) when and how to consider these considerations and how to present them, because these considerations by their very nature are capable of overriding halacha (and therefore also the conditions you set).
B. “I explained that weakened Kabbalah does not have a correspondingly weakened status”. Do you mean that it does (T”S)?
I did not imply that in your opinion you are essentially describing the accepted approach (and not disagreeing with it). Either I did not understand your method (that there is no formal authority for anyone except the Gemara, only substantive authority. And in the language of the propaganda that prevailed in my time: “He who disagrees with the Rishonim is not evil but stupid”) or I am not at all aware of the accepted approach, or both (too bad).
A. What I argued is that it is possible to establish such rules. An authorized institution can use policy considerations, and then it will become rabbinic law. Alternatively, policy considerations can be used to choose between several legitimate options that exist in a particular situation (and there too, one must discuss whether there is an obligation to obey the posk, but at least his right to assert it).
B. It has a weakened status, but not in accordance. In other words, it is not that I am obligated to it in a weakened way, just like the full obligation to fully accept. It is also possible not to accept.
I do describe the accepted approach, but I put things on the table. There are differences of dosage but not of substance. In my writings, I have cited sources for my approach from the great Rishonim and Aharonim, and this is indeed their approach. And as for my claim that no one has formal authority except the Gemara, this is indeed the prevailing approach. Who disputes that?
A. Then in Azah, put a gap between the herd and the herd.
B. Why? What the public accepted, the public accepted, and if it accepted weakly, then there is a strong and habitual commitment to the weak acceptance. Whence and why do you establish rules for the public's acceptance that it must accept only things that are as rigid as iron.
Everyone disagrees on this and we don't know what the difference is. The differences in dosage are exactly the critical point and this is very essential. Allow the clearly great to disagree – and that too not too much – about the ancients who are better than them, and this where they have really good reasons. This is not only a substantive authority (which by its nature is usually not one hundred percent) but also a formal authority. It is true that there is a saying that “He who disagrees about the first is not evil but stupid” Which essentially means that the first do not have any formal authority, only substantive authority, but for you to say that this is also what the Poskim have held throughout the generations, as mentioned, is something I did not understand and quite puzzles me.
B. Because something weakened means that there is no acceptance and not that there is a weakened acceptance. The fact that it is customary to give weight to something does not obligate me to give it weight (and certainly not the same weight as is customary), even if absolute acceptance is accepted by me as binding. Otherwise, everything that the public is accustomed to doing automatically obligates me, and this is not reasonable.
This is indeed what the poskim have held throughout the generations. I also cited many sources in my article on autonomy. There are more, of course. One can argue about dosages, and see section B.
We are repeating ourselves.
With your permission, my Lord, I will return to section A, and only in section B will I read Shemita Ha-Ha.
A. You wrote that considering policy considerations requires an authorized institution (condition D in the column) and even then only to choose between several legitimate options (a new condition that did not appear in the column, and perhaps it summarizes conditions A-B to clarify the halakha first and in exceptional circumstances).
A1. Condition D means ruling out the category of policy considerations altogether. This is very difficult (for me) to accept because it means that even where policy considerations are necessary to prevent great harm, you are saying that the public is as good as an ox to the slaughter of a jubilee and will observe one halakha even if there is a fear that at the bottom of the slope a ruin of sorts will produce a collapse and damage, and many halakha will be violated.
This is not about rabbinic laws that require a different minyan to be allowed, etc., but rather about instructions for a time when it is time to do something. Therefore, it seems very difficult to me to cancel the root of the authority.
Are you claiming that from the explanation it is not at all clear that there would be such an authority, or are you claiming that although from the explanation and the very consequences it is requested that there would be such an authority, but what can be done and God has decreed that there will be no such authority and there is no advice, etc.?
[A2. The remaining conditions (to clarify the halakhah, in exceptional circumstances, only within some legitimate framework) impose halakhic restrictions on considerations that have the power to override the boundaries of the halakhah. Of course, in everything, one must weigh the merits of a consideration against its demerits, but such a categorical restriction still seems paradoxical to me and the answers have not been absorbed in my mind. I have repeated what I wrote without any innovation or refinement, and it is obvious that there is no need to respond to this again, and with it the s.r.].
I didn't say that. What I wrote are two independent conditions: either there will be an authorized institution, or there will only be a choice between legitimate options (even in an unauthorized institution, but I wrote that here it is a matter of obligation to obey. But it is permissible to instruct).
After all, an authorized institution can amend a regulation that uproots halacha (such as abolishing the blowing of the shofar on Shabbat) or adds to it. But these options do not exist today (unless there is a large consensus that will actually restore the ordination at least de facto).
I also raised the possibility of a freeze, which requires a large consensus. Ironically, these options have raised allegations against me that I am a reformist and not loyal to halacha, when the alternative is to scornfully tweet about halacha and instruct falsely in its name.
The tragedy of the lack of an authorized institution does exist and I have written about it more than once (the historical accident).
Isn't a halakhic tragedy a strange thing? If there is a tragedy and there is a partial solution available (which will develop in its own generation and, if necessary, apply policy considerations even against a particular halakhic law), then what greater explanation do we have than that God does not desire tragedies and that we should listen to God's word, but rather that the core be preserved wherever possible.
If there was a danger to the very existence of the people or the law, fine. And even then, not every posk can do this. But that is not the case and posks just do whatever comes to mind. See Nadav Shnerb's “The Jewish Ark of Lies”.
This also reminds me of Reiner's words in his book on Rabbeinu Tam, which I got the impression that there is nothing he likes more than to present Rabbeinu Tam as a great Tachman (with strange tongue twisters).
In chapter 11, he (Reiner) really brings a disturbing example in which Rabbeinu Tam interprets a Sugya in a very narrow interpretation (and the rest of the Rishonim, including one of his great students, followed suit) and then also adds a regulation from Deliya in the same direction. In other words, Rabbeinu Tam took two steps from the ruling that was before him - one step as an interpretation of the Gemara and the second step as a regulation that Rabbeinu Tam corrected.
I will try to sort out the matter tonight and raise it in a response. But apparently a priori, there may be several directions: A. There is no connection between the innovative interpretation and the regulation - the interpretation from interpretive considerations and the regulation from social considerations. B. Rabbi Tam “did something in his head” and distorted the interpretation intentionally for his own purpose. C. Rabbi Tam had an understanding that guided the interpretation and also gave rise to a regulation. Direction D. is probably the correct direction, but I do not know which one yet and will await your response on the subject.
Additional words regarding formal authority. According to your theory, you undermine all authority except the authority of the Talmud, for example the authority of the corpus of the Shul (not just the Shul of the author and the Rema). I wish I knew why. And in particular why your root of soul, when it appeared during the period of the Gemara, did not fight vigorously against the acceptance of the Mishnah. In the Lakman argument, I tried to separate the parts of the arguments into small sections that join a general argument, and each of them was a question of whether it was correct. I refer to formal authority as one, whether in matters of interpretation and halakha or in matters of decrees and customs.
A1. The authority of the Gemara is attributed to your theory of public acceptance. And what kind of acceptance are we talking about? It is not clear that all the great men of Israel gathered together and decided at once that this is the Talmud book as it will stand forever and will not be shaken by any upheavals, but that the acceptance has spread and expanded over time until it has become established. So, to the same extent, subsequent generations try to create additional agreements, that is, they lead a position to accept a certain authority in order to form a broad front that will give this authority the power of public acceptance.
A2. Although the additional ruling authorities are given weaker power because the supreme authority of the Gemara is in the picture (and because it is assumed that the authors of the Gemara aimed for greater truth), and they also leave room for future generations if they find particularly strong arguments, it is still an authority and has weight.
A3. Now, it seems very reasonable that in order to form such an agreement (for example, to accept the Shul as an authority), it is obligatory for the thinker who needs to form such an agreement to act according to this thing as if it had been agreed upon. In other words, the one who supports the acceptance of the corpus of the Shul should act and instruct according to the acceptance of the Shul, and not wait until the campaign is successful and public acceptance actually occurs before he instructs according to the Shul. Because this is the only way to form such agreements.
A4. Therefore, there is no point in accusing the potential authority of lacking authority during the process, but only in deciding whether one wishes to accept this authority as authority or not.
A5. And why not accept this authority, even if we assume that it does not currently exist (because public acceptance has not been achieved according to a set of strict conditions that you are apparently demanding), I do not know what your reasons are for this, but we can try to guess: Reason A’ You do not want additional authorities at all because this might be contrary to Torah truth in your opinion (a somewhat strange reason because no one hates the Mishnah and the Gemara). Reason B’ The concrete additional authorities are not loyal enough to you to have been targeted by Torah truth (a reason that is not so relevant, because formal authority is not conditional on targeting Torah truth). Reason C’ Such authority is usually restrictive and strict, and I am a bird, I fly, a sparrow, a winged bird, for everything is permitted except what is forbidden. Reason D: You do not see a way in which the public will actually accept new authority (what is the public and what is called accepting – needs to be clarified) as a result of the general political situation within the religion, and therefore there is no point in making an effort for this authority. If not these, then what are your reasons for not accepting the authority?
A6. The reasons for achieving public acceptance of additional authoritative sources are the same constant reasons, such as the need to simplify the halakhic tangle, and the tendency to unify behavior (as written in the column), and to shoulder the burden of avoiding fears of harshness at every corner (and also that there will be no openings for a voice at every corner).
The truth is, if we were like the Amoraim - meaning we understood how they think - because they also knew how to teach halakhic lectures like the Tannaim and we have no idea how to do it - then we could also disagree about the Talmud. They had our intuition, which we don't. Maybe (my intuition says that this is indeed the case) it is somehow related to the fact that they also had our spiritual level. The Gemara indicates that the Amoraim could resurrect the dead (and there is even the story of the Rabba who slaughtered Rabbi Zira on Purim. And the story with Abaye in the bathhouse who saved 100 people who floated into the air with him when the bathhouse floor collapsed while they were there). The Kabbalah of the Talmud occurred against the backdrop of a real generational decline that created our lack of understanding of their way of thinking (I don't even understand why they took it upon themselves not to disagree about Tannaim). The Kabbalah created authority. But if we really return to their level, I don't think their authority will bind us. It is a conditional authority (although this is never explicitly stated)
Correction: ” …This is somehow related to the fact that they also had a spiritual level that we don”t have.
A. You write that the Gemara has substantive authority and this is one of the reasons it was given formal authority (this is the prevailing opinion). I am very curious about substantive authority and am also not convinced by this concept called formal authority as a result of “public acceptance”. [In asking Rabbi Mikhi, I asked him whether his opinion is that accepting the Gemara is not the same as accepting the rest of the poskim, not in terms of the content of the Kabbalah but in terms of its spread throughout the public at large].
B. Is accepting the Gemara a vow that cannot be broken or is it possible to stop it at some point? I also agree with your opinion that in principle it can be stopped (the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted). Is this related to closing the substantive gap? I am not at all sure, but it requires a systematic treatment of the question of halachic truth and what is the purpose of observing the mitzvot.
C. I have a feeling that in their time they generally thought that the Messiah would automatically come, at most a matter of a few hundred years, according to various interpretations of the Book of Daniel (which is a highly questionable book and it is incomprehensible how it infiltrated the Bible), and no one there had any idea that now the Jews were being bound in the shackles of the words of the Amoraim for two thousand years. Although not tight shackles, as Rabbi Michi observed, who gave authority to a flexible and rich text that is subject to interpretation and not to diligent halachic rulings, but still shackles, and it is very possible that today the Gemara has already fulfilled its role and the prisoners are told to go out and confirm in the darkness the exiles said a righteous man, for it is good that they will eat the fruit of their deeds.
Oh, you're getting old, they'll still be there for you.
It is perhaps worth referring to Assaf Sagiv's division between orthodoxy and conservatism (not in the religious context). While the phenomenon of orthodoxy advocates knowledge of the absolute truth brought to us by the ancients, the conservative does not know how to say absolutely what the truth is, as he quotes Oakeshott at the beginning of his article "The Strange Case of Radical Conservatism": "It means to prefer the known to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, the fact to the mystery, the real to the possible, the limited to the infinite, the near to the far, the sufficient to the superfluous, the convenient to the perfect, the contemporary laughter to utopian joy." In addition, you presented it concisely, but a very central thing about the Conservative is precisely the look at natural intuition as a starting point, and the Rabbi himself also seems to use a much more conservative method than the casual one. Also at the level of the direction in which one can strive to change, changes must be made within the existing system, which even a Conservative can do, and there is a change in the structure of society, which requires greater pretensions.
These are semantic games and are not interesting to discuss. When I talk about conservatism in this column, it means accepting some claim simply because it is conservative. Conservatism as a starting point was mentioned by me, and the summary is indeed quite sufficient for our purposes.
Perhaps the rabbi could take the opportunity to write about conservatism as a starting point?
Many have written about this, and I don't see what needs to be added.
“In the Torah of Rabbi Meir, they found it written, “And behold, it is very good” (Genesis 1:3) – “And behold, death is good”
The author said:
“In my youth…. And today I again think (but not sure) that I am right but am glad that there are those who are wrong. Today I fight against them with great vigor and usually also despise them”.
And I wondered – If you are not sure that you are right – then the ”wrong” are not wrong – and why do you despise them?
How did you draw the conclusion (that those who are wrong are not wrong) from the assumption (that I am not sure I am right)? Your logic is beyond me.
Because if you just think you're right (but aren't sure) then how do you allow yourself (usually) to despise others? Just based on a thought?
First of all, you didn't just ask about contempt. You said that those who are wrong are not wrong. Second, I am not sure about anything and in any field. A responsible person takes into account the possibility that he is wrong. And yet I despise anyone who talks nonsense. When he proves me wrong, I will take it back. 100% confidence is not enough to talk nonsense like that.
Depends on what nonsense you define as ”proven”.
Is it, for example, an argument about providence or proven nonsense?
And besides, if it is proven as nonsense, i.e., there is no providence, why don't you have 100% confidence
I can't understand.
I have elaborated on these things in several places (I have also written books about them). My basic argument is that there is no complete certainty about anything on earth, including faith of course, as well as science, philosophy and other vegetables. And yet there are things that are clearly nonsense on their face (obvious nonsense, literally translated: nonsense on their face). The theory of gravity, for example, is not proven (because no scientific theory is proven), and yet if a person comes along and just pretends that it is not true, I will not despise him and say that he is talking nonsense. What is so difficult about that?
When I say that something is clear to me, I do not mean 100 percent, but rather the certainty as far as a person can have in something.
Regarding providence, the contempt is not because this is complete nonsense, but because the people who talk about it themselves do not really believe in it and do not act as such. As I have shown here more than once.
Regarding conservatism, I do despise people who raise irrelevant arguments in formulating their position on the issue. And this does not mean that there is no possible basis for conservatism that I have not thought of. When it comes up, we'll talk. Gravity may also turn out to be wrong (it's already happened, actually).
There is no certainty or certainty in anything?
There is no certainty that an oxygen molecule is made up of two atoms?
There is no certainty that I did not shoot Rabin or Arlozorov?
Please answer these two questions in detail.
In addition, I just want to be sure – Do you define providence as pure nonsense and utter nonsense?
To the extent that in your opinion, the one who claims that there is providence is like the one who claims that there is no gravity at all?
Apart from that, I will just point out – People who say that ”everything is from Him, the Blessed One” and on the other hand “make every possible effort” (there is no shortage of such), are not really evidence against providence.
Just as people who really think that there is providence and really behave that way (there is no shortage of such) are not evidence in favor of providence.
The evidence for or against supervision should be examined objectively, and not based on how this or that person behaves.
Well, I've exhausted it. Everything has been answered to the point of bloodshed and you simply don't read. If you want to see what I think, the website and the trilogy are here. It's been explained well several times.
If you define a conservative as someone who sets a path just because it is old and an innovator as its opposite, then life is really easy.
But conservatism is essentially suspicion, suspicion of innovation that claims to create a new world and, above all, to destroy the old world.
And by the way, a characteristic of these innovators is their contempt for conservatives. (Am I wrong?)
I remember the contempt for the opponents of Oslo and also for Churchill in the 1930s.
And as for the policy vote, "It's time to do it," is this politics or halakha?
In my hearing, Rabbi Michael Avraham spoke about the Maimonides’ ruling on those who earn their living by studying Torah and
the words of Rabbi Yosef Karo on the matter.
According to Rabbi Michael Avraham, if Maimonides had agreed with the assumption that it is impossible today to
engage in both Torah and work, he would also have agreed that it is permissible to study (and teach) for a fee.
Is the explanation that ”sometimes the abrogation of Torah is its existence” not from the Torah?
You are probably a truly entertaining Jew if you remember the contempt in the 1930s. 🙂
Anyway, you repeat what I wrote in the column: conservatism as a starting point because it is a legitimate position. That is why I am not clear about the question mark that comes from your words.
“Time to do for the Lord” is a policy argument that enters into the halacha because it was determined by an authorized judge. Just like I wrote in the column (about the action of an authorized person who makes policy considerations).
And what does that have to do with the Rambam? I did not understand. To study all day or not, this is not halacha but entirely policy. It does not concern us in any way that I can discern.
Maimonides wrote a halacha. That it is forbidden to make a living from the public.
You claimed that if we accept the assumption that money matters – Maimonides too
may admit that it is permissible to make a living from the public. Halacha is not policy.
If everyone who has a need must study all day, that may be policy – but
today, Torah greats will not emerge if they have to make a living from medicine – like Maimonides.
Conservatism is not “legitimate” it is necessary. Otherwise we will get “re-education”
(Nehemiah Strassler wrote during the Oslo Accords that the public needs to be re-educated.
Exactly in these words).
So here, allowing people to study all day (at least for the elite) is policy –
or the existence of Torah. I claim that there is no other option – You can be as modest as
Zachariah ben Avkols and claim that we do not have a court that will allow us.
With regards
mozer
P.S. – In the booklet ” No Ele Nidaf” Professor Livni explains the reason for his withdrawal
from the Conservative movement. If you wish, I will look for the exact quote
I didn't understand how the white man got in here. His resignation was because of the appointment of women as rabbis (completely insane. Of all their nonsense, it was precisely an act that had no problem with it that caused his resignation).
Maimonides did not write halakhah, but rather recommendations and guidelines for policy. There is no halakhic prohibition against making a living from the public. And I still don't understand how this is related to our discussion.
A. The white one is really unrelated. I saw that you discussed this and I thought I would find
the reason. As far as I remember, I haven't located the booklet yet, he wrote
that we don't decide that a certain law is not suitable for us and we change it.
He claimed that this is not the way to change the law (or custom) and he disagrees
with the statement that women can teach Torah.
B. This time you surprised me. The Strong Hand – is this not a book of law?
Here is his quote from the commentary on the Mishnayot:
“I already wanted not to talk about this commandment, since it is explained (=clear)… Know, because it has already said: Do not make the Torah a spade to dig with, that is: Do not consider it a tool for livelihood, …
the commandment – as the law says.
How can this be interpreted as policy?
I did not write that it was about women studying Torah. It was about their priesthood as rabbis.
Maimonides is a book of halakhic law. I did not write that it was not. I spoke about the statement that it is forbidden to earn a living from the public. This is his decision and there is no halakhic source for this, Daurrita or rabbinic. Without a source, there is no halakhic prohibition.
This one has blasphemed the Name and defiled the Torah and extinguished the light of religion and caused harm to himself and took his life from the next world. Since it is forbidden to enjoy the words of the Torah in this world.
At least blasphemy is from the Torah (and they shall not blaspheme my holy name).
It seems, then, that according to the Maimonides, it is from the Torah.
Of course, one can determine that there is no blasphemy in this (like in our day when the public
spends money on feeding cats), but according to the Maimonides,
it is certainly forbidden.
In the same lesson that I heard you talk about the money in the Mishnah, you said
that even his own opinion was not comfortable with the answers he gave to justify the situation
and then he added the argument of “time to do it’)
If you bring blasphemy into the game, you have eliminated it completely. It's like "love your neighbor as yourself" or modesty. These are basket items that each person puts into them whatever they want and think. It has no meaning for our discussion.
A word was omitted. “Maybe” they are not wrong.
You also think they may not be wrong. And why despise them.
In my opinion, the problem stems more from below than from above. Ultimately, the status of a Mera Datra or any Posk (except for a Beit Din, as you said) is determined by the power that the audience gives him. Because the audience does not demand too much from the Posk, and it gives the Posk the power to decide even on matters outside his jurisdiction - that's how he does it. I agree that the Rabbi also needs to understand his status, but in my opinion it is more important to clarify to the audience that they also have a position on the Halacha ruling.
The opinion of Rabbi Chaim Kanievski, may God be pleased with him, if it is clear that it is Tekhel
https://www.techeiles.org/library_main/harav-chaim-kanievski/
Do you intend to prove otherwise than the fraudulent hypothesis I presented above?
I didn't get into the whole argument. I just brought it up. You can do whatever you want with it.