A Chosen People – A Look at Racism (Column 445)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

To my friends in the Religious Kibbutz movement

One Shabbat a few months ago I touched glory. I finally felt what Shlomo Artzi must feel after the third encore at Caesarea, with a full house cheering and applauding enthusiastically. I spent Shabbat in Jerusalem with members of the Religious Kibbutz movement to talk with them about being a “chosen people,” about racism, and about the relationship between the two. In Shacharit I was called up to the Torah, and after I finished and returned to my place I was greeted with heartfelt cries of “shkoyach” from all sides all along the way back to my seat. I understood that this was duly granted to me for the moving and high-quality rendition I had just performed of the liturgical call “Barchu et Hashem hamevorach.” I felt I had truly risen to the occasion this time, and no wonder I considered going back up for an encore—alas, it turned out the next oleh had already occupied the spot, so I refrained (afushei machloket lo mafshinan—one should not multiply dispute). Needless to say, his performance was weak and pale compared with the show your humble servant had delivered. As an alternative encore, I decided to dedicate to them a column that would present what I spoke about there, and I hope this column will count as though I went up for an encore.

Around the same time (who said “Divine providence” and didn’t get it?!), I was asked in the Q&A here on the site about racism, and I promised a column about it. I’ve dealt with this more than once in the past (see columns 10, 206 and more), but the overall picture I will present here will consolidate the points into a coherent doctrine that empties the concept of racism of content—to the joy of all of us (or at least to my own joy).

Racism as I Explained to My Daughter: Racism and Factual Claims

The concept of racism suffers from severe vagueness, and its broad and careless use cheapens it. Anything that someone dislikes is called “racism,” while fashionable racism (the kind accepted in “our circles”—cf. “the racism of low expectations”) of course is not. The discourse about racism is full of slogans and demagoguery because the concept itself is very elusive, and as I will try to show here, it is doubtful whether it has any defined content at all.

Let me preface by saying that in the common use of the term “racism,” race itself is not essential. Race is one parameter, but equally, a similar attitude based on a different parameter—such as gender, age, nationality, religion, skin color, height, the first letter of one’s name, shoe size, and the like—will also be labeled with this unflattering term. But for reasons of convention and simplicity, I too will speak here mainly about racism and leave to you the obvious generalizations.

I’ll begin with a simple premise, which I assume is agreed upon by all. “Racism” is a word with a negative connotation. One can speak of it as a purely descriptive term, but that is not the connotation that interests us here. When someone or some group is accused of racism, that is a condemnation. I’ll add that even if someone thinks racism is not problematic, he must still agree that the discussion about it belongs to the ethical realm (just as an atheist who doesn’t believe in God must first define what it is he does not believe in). If so, “racism” is a term that belongs to the ethical-value field. A neutral distinction between people—i.e., a description of a difference as such, whether true or false—is not racism. An erroneous distinction between people or groups is a factual mistake, not a value failure.

I assume we’ll agree that the statement that people with black skin, on average, play basketball better than whites, or the statement that LeBron James plays (not on average) basketball better than me, the pale one, are not racist statements. These are factual descriptions. Likewise, the statement that Reuven has a higher IQ than Shimon, or that on average black people have a higher IQ than whites—even if untrue—are not racist statements. These are factual claims, except that this time it’s a fact that many people (those who attach more importance to IQ than to basketball ability) consider more significant. Similarly, the statement that black people are on average shorter, or dumber, than white people is not a racist statement. These may be untrue statements, but they are factual mistakes, and as such they cannot be considered racism.

Sometimes there is a value failure that leads to an erroneous factual distinction. For example, you don’t bother to get to know a certain group of “others” (another race), yet allow yourself to determine their general characteristics. The final product is a factual distinction (sometimes a failed one), but it arose from a value failure. Still, if at the end of the day you are asserting a factual distinction, then even if I think you are wrong, this is not racism. In other words, I won’t claim against you that you are ethically at fault, but rather that you are factually mistaken. The arguments I will raise against you will not be labels such as “racist” or “backwards,” but factual arguments on the merits. One must understand that mistakes arise for many reasons (stupidity, inattention, indifference, hatred, and the like), but in a debate about facts it is improper and irrelevant to focus on the reasons for the mistake. One should bring evidence against the position at hand, not accuse it with value-laden labels (heretic, racist, wicked, etc.).

Implication: The Common Definition of Racism

You can now see that the common definition of racism is problematic. For example, Yehouda Shenhav, in his article, brings the following definition:

Attributing inferiority, to a person or a group, by using stereotypical traits and by formulating the difference between the groups in terms of an unchanging biological essence.

He then expands this to distinctions not based on biology/race.

Also in the Encyclopedia of Ideas, similar things are written (there too cited in the name of Shenhav):

Race is a concept that defines the difference between groups of humans in terms of differences in biological and genetic development. The biological difference between races is the result of the frequency of the appearance of a dominant gene in a given race. Racism is the expression of concrete and theoretical social practices that base their attitude toward other human beings on biological and cultural differences, perceived as deterministic foundations that cannot be converted. Turning the biological (skin color), the social (country of origin), or the cultural (eating habits) into something unchangeable (Shenhav and Yona [2008]).

Racial differences do exist, but treating their bearers on the basis of these differences and viewing them as essential foundations that cannot be changed—that is racism. According to this definition, racism is essentially essentialism. Shenhav and those who share his view think that when you treat some characteristic as unchangeable, i.e., essential, you are a racist. I will get to the behavioral component of racism later.

But the question of whether certain characteristics are essential—i.e., can or cannot be changed—is a purely factual question. And again, even if someone is mistaken and thinks that these characteristics cannot be changed while in truth they can, then he is wrong about the facts. As I explained above, a mistake is not racism. Moreover, I don’t know whence the knights of the war on racism derive the confidence that every such characteristic really can be changed. That is a factual assumption and, as such, also requires justification. The assertion that any claim about the essentiality of a trait is racism is, on its face, preposterous and certainly not well-founded.

And in general, what does it mean that some characteristic is essential and cannot be changed? Do we mean that even brain surgery couldn’t change it? And if there exists a technique for skin lightening, does the racism now evaporate because it turns out that black skin is not an essential characteristic (since it can be changed)?! That’s quite odd. Today there are techniques for changing one’s sex (at least at the biological level, and I do not rule out the possibility of techniques for changing mental and psychological sex. That is certainly conceivable in principle, even if we’re not quite there yet). In principle one could also transplant a human brain into a monkey, or augment brains with chips. Does this mean that the cognitive capacity of monkeys is not an essential trait? Is the claim that there is a difference between the intellectual capacity of humans and that of monkeys racism? And in general, is a trait like intelligence changeable or unchangeable?! In commonly used terms—no. So is any reference to someone’s intelligence racism?

Consider someone who tells black people they are intellectually inferior, and therefore must undergo brain surgery to improve their intellectual capacity. I assume people would call him a dyed-in-the-wool racist—certainly by the common definitions—even though he appeals to a trait that he himself admits can be changed (by surgery). He himself is proposing a change to the “inferior” race! Or look at essentialists who hold that sex-change surgery does not truly change one’s sex, only the external (biological) appearance. They simply assume a different definition of sex. Here it’s not even a mistake but just a dispute over definitions. Can an incorrect definition (even if we grant that there is such a thing as incorrect definitions, and further assume that this particular definition is indeed incorrect) be considered racism? That is highly implausible.

Is it legitimate to treat groups differently on the basis of belief or religious affiliation? After all, that is certainly a parameter that can be changed. A person can adopt a different faith or religious affiliation and change that characteristic. Does that mean it’s permissible to discriminate between religious groups or treat them unequally? Should such treatment not be given the ethical label “racism”?

Beyond this, when it comes to species and large groups, characteristics suffer from inherent vagueness. At most one can speak of a distribution or an average of the trait in question within the group. Even if someone claims that whites are less intelligent than blacks, it is clear—even to him—that one can find black people with an IQ lower than that of some group of whites. At most he is speaking about an average. Can anyone state with certainty that the average IQ of blacks and whites is identical? From where is that datum taken? Especially if one adopts the oh-so-fashionable critique among anti-racists of intelligence tests and IQ measures. If the tests themselves are not a metric, how could one possibly know that the averages are identical across all groups, sexes, and races?

Another example is physical abilities. I mentioned the innovative claim that black players are better at basketball than white players of Hungarian origin. Is that a racist statement? It seems to me it’s a simple fact, and there is no problem stating it. And if someone says Hungarians play better (a statement that is false on average), is he a racist? Beyond that, one can of course find excellent white players and poor black players, but on average it is hard to doubt that black players are better, and I doubt how essentially changeable this is (unless we perform a comprehensive regimen of surgeries on all white-skinned people). So now I ask: is this an essential characteristic or one that can be changed? It depends on what is meant by “change” and by “essential.” In the commonly used senses one could argue this is an essentialist statement, and yet, it seems to me that it—and its opposite—are not racist statements.

Even if it were not factually true that black players play better, what’s wrong with such a statement? The same goes for a similar statement about differences in intelligence (hush—do not even mention it). These are factual claims, true or not. One can argue and bring evidence this way or that, but what does that have to do with racism?! I noted above that sometimes one reaches such conclusions because of prejudice about blacks or whites, and then there is a whiff of racism. But still, at the end of the day, there is (if anything) a mistake of fact here, and a factual claim—even if false—is not racism. In short, the principal charge against a racist is not that he is stupid (even if that is true) but that he is wicked.

Interim Conclusion

If it’s a factual claim, it should be tested against facts and observations, not against values. Values should not dictate facts. Subjecting facts to values is a fallacy—very characteristic of the postmodern era, which denies pure factuality (it was preceded by pragmatism, already disparaged here more than once). It seems to me that opponents of racism are no less, and perhaps more, prone to this than racists themselves. Both sides prefer to view reality through lenses that fit their values, and the dispute/difference is at most whether these are positive values or not. Some are comfortable seeing the world as composed of different groups, and others are comfortable identifying groups or blurring the differences between them.

Both camps speak of viewing reality through value-laden lenses (and are probably also seeing reality incorrectly), and therefore, in principle, both are wrong and misleading. We must not subordinate reality to values (that is the naturalistic fallacy). Not because it is always wrong—for necessarily one of the two opposing statements is true—but because values are not the prism through which facts should be determined. It is not reasonable to identify racism—which is a flawed ethical conduct—with views or statements that relate to facts.

Racism in the Ethical Realm: Profiling

We have seen that racism cannot be exhausted in the factual realm. A racist attitude or stance belongs to the ethical realm—that is, it is a kind of attitude toward certain groups or individuals, and not merely a factual view of differences between their characteristics (essential or not). Here we arrive at a second component (hinted at in Shenhav’s definition as well): determining an attitude toward groups or individuals according to their (essential) characteristics. To be racist requires, beyond the factual diagnosis, an attitude built upon that diagnosis. The statement that blacks are intellectually inferior to whites is not racism, but at most a false statement (or not). But giving discriminatory treatment on the basis of that statement can be considered racism. This is what is today called “profiling,” that is, determining a group’s profile according to certain characteristics (essential?), and determining a different attitude toward members of that group based on its collective profile.

But even here the path is not complete. First, we must distinguish between justified and unjustified treatment. If the treatment given to a group is justified on the basis of its profile, there is no racism. Counting only Jews for a prayer quorum (minyan) is not racism, because essentially only Jews are counted for a minyan (in my personal opinion only believing Jews count, and by that there isn’t even a whiff of racism—but even without that, it is not to be seen as racism). Admitting outstanding athletes into a competition solely on the basis of their athletic skill is not racism. The reason is that their profile is relevant to the treatment in question.

Racism or Discrimination

So what is racism after all? Determining a treatment for group X on the basis of characteristic A when A is irrelevant to the treatment in question. For example, I do not admit black people to my club because they have a low IQ, even though the club’s activities do not require cognitive skills. Racism is when I do not allow black-skinned people into the swimming pool even though their skin color bears no relation to the activity taking place there (see here and here). But even here one can wonder: what has this to do with racism? Think of a case where I’m not allowed into the swimming pool simply because they don’t feel like letting me in, or on the basis of an arbitrary lottery (they decided that one out of every three arrivals will not be allowed in, for no reason). This is discrimination that is not based on profiling and therefore certainly not racism but discrimination or exclusion.

Is there a difference between these two types of discrimination? There is—but it does not seem relevant in the ethical realm. I don’t see a difference between discrimination based on irrelevant characteristics (racism) and arbitrary or capricious discrimination. In short, the problem with racism is not the profiling but the discrimination and exclusion. My problem with someone who does not admit black people to a club or swimming pool is not his racism and his reliance on their characteristics, but that he discriminates without justification. Why should it matter whether the discrimination is based on profiling or on a lottery? Discrimination is discrimination, and it is wrong regardless of its reasons. If so, speaking about racism—which can only relate to the ethical realm—seems quite irrelevant in that very realm. There is no moral value to “not being a racist.” The value is to avoid discrimination and to treat people equally.

At most one can say that racism in the factual realm is a source that is prone to lead to unequal and discriminatory treatment. Experience teaches that when there is profiling it often leads to discriminatory treatment, but the ethical problem is the discriminatory treatment, not the racism.

Treatment of the Individual Within a Group

There are situations where profiling is done for some group, and it is assumed that if it is correct then all members of the group are characterized the same way (this is the problem of the IDF Kaba index). For example, suppose we conducted research and concluded that the IQ of some group is lower than that of others. As noted, that assertion in itself is merely a description and therefore has no racism in the ethical sense. Now we can ask about the treatment of that group: ostensibly, in contexts where IQ is relevant one may also treat members of the group in accordance with the factual findings applicable to them (not accept them to a university, or to the IDF’s Talpiot track).

The problem arises regarding a particular member of the group who is not characterized that way—i.e., who belongs to the intelligent minority within that group. Such a person is entitled to be treated on his own merits, irrespective of his group affiliation. Treating such a person on the basis of collective characteristics can be considered improper profiling, or racism. For example, what would we say about a teacher who gives a low grade to a student of Mizrahi origin just because he is convinced that, on average, students of such origin succeed less (let us assume, for the sake of discussion, that this is factually correct)? This is profiling at its worst.

But here too I will add two qualifying remarks:

1. There are situations in which there is no choice but to rely on profiling, due to a lack of the means or resources required to provide individual treatment. For example, disqualifying an Arab Knesset member from sitting on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (or its subcommittees) can be justified if we have no tools to check his loyalty. The suspicion of disloyalty among Arabs in security matters is well-founded, and it is certainly justified to take it into account in our treatment of them. Of course, if we know of a particular person whose loyalty is clear, then there is no justification for disqualifying him. But if we have no way to check, or the check is very expensive and impractical—then this decision is entirely legitimate and involves no racism.

The same goes for security screening of Arabs at the airport (in the U.S. after 9/11, when stringent airport screenings began, there was harsh criticism of profiling. The fools wanted everyone to be checked equally. In Israel too such claims arise from time to time). But at the airport one cannot suffice with checking only the suspects, because there is not always a way to know who is suspicious, and we risk attacks that won’t be prevented. On the other hand, checking Jews is foolish because there are no Jewish terrorists (at least regarding attacks on airplanes). Stubborn opposition to profiling in these contexts is a moral confusion and reflects political correctness at its worst.

In the above Wikipedia entry, critiques of the Kaba assessment are listed, all focusing on whether the parameters by which the Kaba score is determined are relevant and whether they are biased. But the main critique—oddly not presented there—is entirely different. Let us assume, for the sake of discussion, that these parameters are relevant and not biased on average. Let us assume that residents of development towns or people of Mizrahi origin are on average less talented, less educated, or have weaker leadership skills. Any sensible person understands that in such large groups (Mizrahi, or residents of the periphery) whose members received a low Kaba score by virtue of being such, there are outliers. Are there not talented people with leadership skills who live in a development town or are of Mizrahi origin? Every person deserves treatment fitting him specifically, irrespective of his group profile. There is no justification for determining a person’s fate solely according to his group profile.

This critique is very apt, and it isn’t even guilty of political correctness. Still, in light of what I have explained here, if it is very difficult to check individual suitability directly, there can be justification for using a metric like the Kaba. Moreover, because people’s futures are at stake (in our society, military service is a gateway to many things later on), resources should be invested to try to circumvent the need for a Kaba (i.e., to test abilities individually). And indeed, a few months ago (August 2021) the IDF changed the Kaba parameters.

2. Even if improper treatment is given to a person because of collective profiling—and in a case where this is unjustified (because he has exceptional traits)—the ethical problem in such treatment is not racism but discrimination and exclusion (as I have explained above). Therefore, even such a case still fails to establish a moral claim of racism. True, here one can see the significance of racism as an infrastructure for discrimination. Profiling expresses treating a person within a collective framework, and therefore it opens the door to discrimination and unequal treatment of individuals within the group. As I explained above, even in such cases racism is not an independent moral failure, but an approach that can lead to moral failures.

Interim Summary

The conclusion so far is that there is no moral/ethical flaw in racism. At most, it is an intellectual infrastructure that can lead people to discrimination and exclusion—or to inequality—and these are indeed moral flaws. Taking the name of racism in vain stems from the sensitivity created by the Holocaust and the discrimination of black people in the U.S. (as well as Mizrahim in Israel). Sometimes this is done innocently, but my sense is that sometimes it is a deliberate manipulation that tries to create an unconscious identification between discrimination and Nazism. Hence the widespread use of racial terminology, though discrimination is problematic on any ground (and even with no ground at all—arbitrary discrimination). This fallacy—beyond being a fallacy—is also a shot in the foot of the struggle against discrimination (as often happens in politically correct discourse), for if the charge against me is that I am a racist, it suffices for me to show that I am not a racist in order to escape the criticism. The relevant discussion should revolve around whether I treat people equally and without discrimination, not around whether I am a racist.

The conclusion is that “racism” should be removed from the DSM of our negative values. There is and should not be such a value there. Accusing a person or an approach of racism is a useless misdirection, and in most cases even harmful. There is no place for such a moral accusation; its use is a mistake at best and demagogic manipulation at worst.

I will now try to demonstrate this briefly through several different contexts. I have dealt with most of them here in the past, and so I will touch on them here only briefly, to illustrate the analysis offered above. Already now I note that the last example (the essentialist claim about a “chosen people”) is the only one that comes close to reflecting an ethical problem of racism—and even there it is at most a whiff of racism, not something truly solid.

A. The Nazis

Well, you could have guessed the first example would be Nazism. That’s where it all begins. The fact that the Nazis based themselves on a racial theory does not mean that racism is reprehensible—or even that it is untrue. If Jews had in fact been corrupt and harmful and greedy, would it then have been permissible to annihilate them in camps and crematoria? And if their racial theory is untrue, is the problem that they were mistaken and held a false doctrine? The problem lies in what they did on the basis of that racial theory. There is no doubt that the racial theory helped them internalize their doctrine and act upon it, but ultimately the Nazis’ moral problem was not racism but that they were unjustified murderers. What was exceptional about them was not reliance on racism but the systematic nature, form, and scale of the extermination.

No one would dream of prohibiting characterizing groups by shoe size, even if the Nazis had chosen to murder by shoe size. I suppose no one would coin the term “shoe-ist” for anyone who discriminates against others on some basis (or on no basis at all). The Nazis also wore trousers while murdering, and even used rifles. So now is it forbidden to wear trousers or to use rifles (for justified purposes)? Is anyone who shoots a deer and kills it (which is certainly not okay) now a Nazi, or perhaps a racist? The hysteria about the Nazis is understandable, but precisely because of it, drawing conclusions about everything that concerns them is riddled with deep fallacies.

B. The Haredi Attitude Toward Mizrahim

In column 206 and also here (I also recall a column about Emmanuel and now couldn’t find it), I addressed the discriminatory attitude of the Haredi sector toward Mizrahim. A clear example is the Emmanuel girls’ affair. It is well known that admission of Mizrahi boys and girls to “Ashkenazi” institutions in the Haredi sector (only there do “Ashkenazi” and “Sephardi” institutions exist) is problematic. Usually this is justified on substantive grounds (television at home, a different study style, a different halachic tradition, a different culture, different role models, and the like). One may like or dislike (mainly dislike) the division of institutions and communities in the Haredi world, but given that division I do not see a special problem in such relevant distinctions. An institution that chooses to educate its students that Rabbi Shach is the greatest in the universe and all others are naught, or that educates toward the Lithuanian ethos and voting for Agudat Yisrael and not otherwise, without television and without Western culture, with Hasidic songs and not Mizrahi ones, and so on—such an institution is indeed expected and reasonable to refrain from admitting Mizrahi students. This is a completely substantive distinction, with not a whiff of racism. The choice to see these parameters as important—defining the educational direction—is of course odd to me and I don’t like it, but at most it is foolishness, not racism.

One could certainly argue that if students were checked individually it would turn out that there are Mizrahi students who meet the relevant criteria (revere Rabbi Shach, listen only to Hasidic music, and learn Torah in the Lithuanian way), and that a decision based on a collective profile is problematic. But here too one must consider the qualifications I outlined above: how much can be checked, what the price of missing is, etc. Moreover, usually in such institutions they do admit Mizrahi students, only in smaller numbers—and that is in fact an excellent indication that there is no racism there at all. Since on average these distinctions are correct, an objective assessment will yield a majority of Ashkenazi students for entirely substantive and relevant reasons.

In significant parts of the Ashkenazi Haredi world, there are many false stereotypes about Mizrahim, and here one can see a problem. But that is a mistake, not a value failure. Only if they adopt the stereotypes while knowing they are false could that perhaps be seen as a problem. But I don’t think that is the usual case. The failure to bother checking is laziness and mental rigidity—but again, not racism. After all, even if there are unjustified discriminations in admissions, the problem is discrimination and exclusion, not racism.

One may expect affirmative action in admissions to give Mizrahim a chance to “advance” (in their terms. The Mizrahim who so want to be admitted to that institution apparently also think this is advancement). But such a demand is beyond the letter of the law, and certainly a refusal to comply is not racism. Just as a university that does not admit weak students merely to give them a chance to advance is not accused of racism. The criterion of ability is relevant for university admission, and the criteria of Mizrahi/Ashkenazi are relevant for admission to an Ashkenazi institution.

C. Psychometric Exams and University Admissions

Very similarly, one can speak about the claims regarding university admissions thresholds—for both students and faculty. People point to the small number of Mizrahim in Israel (does that still exist?), blacks in the U.S., or women (?), but that difference in itself does not indicate racism or even discrimination. The difficulty of admission for weaker populations is substantive. Again one could demand individual examination of each applicant and not adopt collective profiling, but it seems to me no institution truly conditions admission on collective criteria. The differences are the result of substantive policy (which can, of course, be criticized). Do people expect other criteria to be instituted merely to achieve artificial equality? If so, then alternative criteria should be presented, not merely pointing to the numerical difference. I recall an interview years ago on the radio with a Tel Aviv school principal who proudly declared that he had canceled the computer science track because he saw that girls were weaker than boys in this field. Back to our point: even if there is a problem with the admission criteria, this is not a question of racism but of error. And the moral problem is discrimination—not racism or sexism.

D. Torah Study for Women

Regarding Torah study for women, there is (still?) a debate (I mean outside the “Har HaMor sect”). Usually it is pinned on the question of whether women are less suited for Torah study (“their minds are light,” “their wisdom is in the spindle,” etc.). Such and such, and the question of essentialism arises (which we saw above is usually linked to the question of racism), for it is a claim that the female nature is ingrained and structured and cannot be changed. The debate is usually conducted in the factual realm. Women are offended by this distinction, and men subject to political correctness are ashamed to say it and even persuade themselves it is untrue. I have written more than once that, at least from the facts on the ground, it appears that women have not yet reached high levels of Talmudic erudition. There may be many justified reasons for this, but this is the fact so far, and anyone who denies it is simply burying his head in the sand (as political correctness commands). Anyone who dares to say such a thing immediately gets brickbats (speaking from experience). In the common case, they will deny the facts or explain to you, with fine seasoning, that “I actually know Ms. So-and-so who is truly a prodigy” (cf. the “law of small numbers”). Others—men and women—explain that this is racism; i.e., they attack the claim in the ethical realm. But in light of what I have explained so far, these debates are irrelevant.

If this characterization is correct, then there is no sexism and no fault—just a correct factual description. And even if it is incorrect—then there is an error that may lead to discrimination. Either way, the question of essentialism lies in the factual realm and should be discussed there (not easy to decide, of course, and even defining the sides is quite hard; this is not the place). I haven’t even mentioned the odd fact that one who claims there is a difference in abilities between women and men is repeatedly required to bring evidence, but the claim that there is no difference is taken by many as self-evident and requires no proof at all. At most they explain that there are circumstances that justify it (their exclusion at a young age, lack of time to invest, absence of study institutions at older ages, etc.). But the fact that there are justifying circumstances does not mean that women have identical abilities to men. At most, it can be argued that there is no proof of the opposite claim. In these debates, facts are blatantly and explicitly subordinated to agenda and ideology. But regardless of all this, the question is factual and has nothing whatsoever to do with ethical questions (racism).

In any case, even if there is a problem with these distinctions, it is clear there is no claim here under the ethical heading of racism/sexism. At most, it is an error—and perhaps one that leads to discrimination. I already noted that making ethical claims when the discussion is factual is a shot in the foot of the struggle. One must confront that factual error (assuming it is one) in the factual realm, not reject a factual claim on the basis of ethical arguments. Reality is not subordinate to values (it was here first).

As someone who has engaged for many years in women’s Torah study and to whom this is important (but who refuses to allow desire and agenda to overshadow his view of reality), I find these debates foolish and am doubtful whether the two sides in the debate are even defined. What does “essential” mean? What counts as “unchangeable”? Does brain surgery count or not? And despite all this, I certainly see a problem in excluding women from study—but that is unrelated to claims about their abilities. I will now explain this on two levels.

The fundamental problem with that policy is not the quality of the distinction (whether it is true or not), but the treatment of an individual according to a collective profile. Even if we accept the premise that in the collective profile women are on average weaker than men in their abilities for Torah study—so what? We are speaking of a huge group, about 50% of the world’s population. Clearly there are women who are not weaker than all men, and I am sure there are also quite a few who are prodigies in their scholarly abilities. So at least let those women study Torah. Here one can already smell a whiff of an ethical failure—but as noted, the failure is discrimination and exclusion, not essentialism and racism. Essentialism can lead to discrimination and exclusion, but the ethical problem is the discrimination, not the essentialism. The question of essentialism is factual and should be examined honestly in the factual realm.

Up to now I have argued that there are talented women and therefore they should not be prevented from studying Torah. But my principal claim is much broader. Even if we assume that all women are less talented than men (there are no female prodigies at all), it is still unclear why they should be forbidden to study Torah. Is someone who is not talented in some field forbidden to engage in it? If he wants to—he has the right. This is the principal claim regarding Torah study for women, and it renders all debates about profiling and the reliability of the factual distinctions underlying the discussion unnecessary. It also sharpens the disconnect that must be made between the factual realm and the ethical realms.

E. A Chosen People

People protest statements that “we are a chosen people” on the grounds that this is racism. They mean the essentialist interpretation of the statement—that is, the assumption that we are a people endowed with special qualities (unique spirituality, etc., as attributed to the Kuzari with its five levels). I personally think that factual claim has no evidence, but to examine it one must define the concept “chosen people,” which is very difficult and, in my opinion, almost impossible (in the second volume of my trilogy I devoted chapter 22 to this). But even without entering those difficulties, the claim that we are a chosen people in the essentialist sense should be examined in the factual realm. If it is true, then there is no impediment to asserting it and there isn’t a whiff of racism. And if it is not true, then one can and should debate it—but that debate is in the factual realm (showing there is no difference in average behavior, etc.), not the ethical realm. At most it is an error, but it has nothing to do with a value failure. In my personal understanding, as I explained there, “chosen people” means a people chosen by God and given a mission, not a people with essential qualities different from other nations and human beings.[1]

The conclusion is that profiling—even if spiritual—should be examined factually (is it true or not). However, the conclusions drawn from it (e.g., treating non-Jews differently, such as disqualifying their good deeds as if they do not truly come from goodness and morality) are the closest thing I know to an ethical failing of racism. This is the canonical example of ethical racism, and it differs from all the examples brought above. Here we are dealing with a non-practical attitude that stems from racism, and therefore it cannot be subsumed under another value (such as discrimination or exclusion). But again, at its root this is a factual question, and therefore—even if there is a problem here—it is not a problem of racism but of error. I definitely think that the difficulty of arguing about it (again, from experience) stems from built-in racism. That racism causes people to see and interpret facts in the world selectively and with an agenda. When you bring them evidence of non-Jews doing good deeds and Jews doing bad deeds, and even bring statistics, they will brush you off (among Jews it is essential, among non-Jews it is a superficial side—Heaven knows what that means). But in the end we are speaking of a mistaken worldview, not a moral defect. If they were to reach these conclusions without the racist basis behind them, there would still be a factual and perhaps even ethical problem—and it would be the very same problem. The background racism is not important to the ethical discussion. Moreover, if no behavioral consequences are derived from this outlook, there is no real moral problem (though there is a whiff—for viewing a person and judging him morally are matters of ethical significance). And if unjustified behavioral implications are derived, then again the problem is not racism but the implications: discrimination, exclusion, or unequal treatment.

It seems to me that the attitude of many in the religious public toward non-Jews—without speaking of practical implications (improper treatment of them) but only about the interpretation given to their character and motives—is the closest thing I can think of to an ethical failing that could be called racism. It is a racist failing because here there is no practical discrimination and no practical implications at all, and therefore there is no other ethical problem. For those who nevertheless see such an attitude as an ethical problem, this is the closest thing I can think of to an ethical defect that can be termed racism. Yet even here it is mainly its scent rather than its substance.

[1] My claim is that this election can also be arbitrary or based on a cultural and moral difference (Abraham who educates his descendants to do righteousness and justice), and there is no need to hang it on essentialist traits. Such an election, even if arbitrary, is not discrimination. Assuming God must choose some people, even if there is no difference at all between the nations, the choice must be made (see, for example, Maharal, Netzach Yisrael ch. 11 onward). And certainly as long as this does not grant the chosen people privileges, there is no ethical problem.