“You Intended Evil Against Me”: Another Look at Divine Involvement in the World (Column 436)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
This past Wednesday I gave a class to a group of soldiers in Tel Aviv, focusing on a verse from Parashat Vayechi in which Joseph calms his brothers’ fears of his taking revenge. At first glance, the verse is puzzling, and its various interpretations touch on the question of divine involvement in events of the world.
The Negotiation between Joseph and His Brothers
After the death of our forefather Jacob, the brothers fear Joseph’s revenge, and the Torah describes negotiations between them and him (Genesis 50:14–20):
And Joseph returned to Egypt—he, his brothers, and all who had gone up with him to bury his father—after he had buried his father. And Joseph’s brothers saw that their father was dead, and they said, “Perhaps Joseph will bear us enmity and surely repay us all the evil that we did to him.” So they sent a charge to Joseph, saying, “Your father commanded before his death, saying: Thus shall you say to Joseph, ‘Please, forgive now the transgression of your brothers and their sin, for they did evil to you.’ And now, please forgive the transgression of the servants of the God of your father.” And Joseph wept when they spoke to him. Joseph’s brothers also went and fell before him, and they said, “Behold, we are your servants.”
They tell him of Jacob’s instruction that he forgive them (it’s unclear whether this is true), and Joseph replies:
And Joseph said to them, “Do not fear, for am I in the place of God? And as for you, you intended evil against me; God intended it for good, in order to do as it is this day—to sustain a great people alive.”
He divides his words into two parts: (1) He is not in God’s place. (2) They indeed intended to harm him, but in the end God turned it (or planned it in advance) for good.
Or HaChaim’s Interpretation
The author of Or HaChaim explains this as two distinct claims:
“For am I in the place of God….” Meaning: if you deserve punishment for the matter, God is the Judge; I will neither take vengeance nor bear a grudge. And the reason he did not forgive them may be that for the descendants of Noah, the matter does not depend on the victim’s forgiveness. For example, if someone steals from another and the victim forgives him, the thief is not exempt from the death penalty; or even among Israelites, if a Jew kidnaps a Jew and sells him, the victim has no power to exempt the kidnapper from death. And he further told them that there is room to judge them meritoriously:
“And you intended evil… God intended it for good.” This is like one who intended to give his fellow a cup of poison and instead gave him a cup of wine; he incurs no liability and is acquitted even by the Heavenly courts.
God will judge them for this and not Joseph. Beyond that, there is even a claim in their favor: the situation resembles someone who intended to give his fellow a cup of poison but gave him a cup of wine. He is apparently alluding to the Talmud, Nazir 23a:
“Our Rabbis taught: ‘Her husband invalidated [her vow], and the Lord will forgive her’—this refers to a woman whose husband annulled her vow and she did not know; the verse speaks of her requiring atonement and forgiveness. When R. Akiva would reach this verse he would weep: If one who intended to eat pork and it turned out to be lamb still requires atonement and forgiveness, then one who intended to eat pork and indeed ate pork—how much more so!”
That is, one who intended to eat pork but ended up eating lamb requires atonement and forgiveness, though he did not actually transgress. Still, it is unclear why Or HaChaim writes that they are exempt even by the Heavenly courts, when the Talmud explicitly says they require forgiveness and atonement.
Attempted Transgression
There is an even greater difficulty in his words. In Column 353 (see also the columns referenced there), I argued that the claim “it turned out to be lamb” does not diminish the severity of the act. Attempted murder that fails is exactly as grave as murder. True, the result did not materialize, but the offender did everything for it to happen; what prevented it was an external factor he had not accounted for. Beyond being wicked, he is inept—but ineptitude is neither a defense nor a claim for diminished culpability.
In the legal realm there may be room to distinguish between attempt and consummated offense, and even there it is far from simple (it depends on the goals and justification of punishment). But in the moral realm there is no difference. The degree of wickedness of one who attempts is precisely that of one who succeeds. Therefore it is not clear why Joseph would see this as an exculpatory argument for the brothers.
Perhaps the explanation is this. Joseph begins with the claim “Am I in the place of God?”—meaning that punishment is fitting for evil intent, not for the realization of that intent. But punishments are meted out by God, Who sees into the heart to know whether there was evil intent or not. As for Joseph, he is not in God’s place—he is not an authority empowered to punish someone for transgressions—and therefore, for him, their intention is irrelevant. But the brothers’ fear was not of judicial punishment; it was fear of revenge. Regarding that, Joseph tells them he has nothing to avenge, for in fact nothing bad ultimately happened to him. Vengeance arises only when an evil intention has been realized in practice and the victim seeks to take revenge on the offender.
Divine Involvement in the World
Note the significant difference between Or HaChaim’s interpretation and what the verse itself suggests. As we saw, Or HaChaim grounds the exculpation in the outcome. But the verse seems to mean something else: it was not you who did what happened here, but God. This is not a consequentialist claim (“the outcome didn’t occur”); it is an argument about lack of culpability. Joseph says the brothers served as God’s rod, but it was God Who orchestrated what happened—not they—and therefore the guilt lies with Him, not them. This has nothing to do with the Nazir passage we cited, which addresses realization of an outcome.
One could still wonder why this should be an exculpatory argument. The brothers intended to harm him, and only God prevented it. How does that reduce their guilt? Moreover, does God’s providence over what happens diminish the guilt of wrongdoers?! Why do we judge Sabbath desecrators or pork eaters at all—if the act occurred, apparently God willed it, and there is no guilt upon them. Such determinism empties human responsibility of content.
It therefore seems that Joseph’s intent was to say that this case is exceptional: generally, a person who commits a transgression is guilty and responsible for its consequences, but here it was different. The explanation may be that in this case the brothers did not decide at all; rather, God did. He acted, and therefore they are not culpable.
In Column 301, in a note, I cited the Talmud in Berakhot 9, which brings a baraita stating that the despoiling of Egypt occurred against the Egyptians’ will. This seems to contradict the verses themselves, which describe that God gave the people favor in the eyes of the Egyptians, and thus they gave them silver and gold. It seems that this baraita means that when God turns the Egyptians’ thoughts and suddenly causes them to find Israel endearing and give them of their wealth, that is not an act the Egyptians did. They were “enchanted,” as it were—but this act was against their will (even if they themselves are unaware of it). Likewise for the brothers: God apparently turned their thoughts (He “entranced” them), and thus it was not their action and not their responsibility.
Note that this line of reasoning assumes that under ordinary circumstances divine providence over human conduct and the world does not reduce a person’s guilt. In other words, transgressions that a person does willfully are the product of his decision, and the responsibility lies entirely with him. It was not God Who did it, but he. Only in this specific case Joseph thought the situation was different (perhaps by prophecy): here it was a divine maneuver, and therefore they truly bear no responsibility at all.
The conclusion is that if a person chooses to do something evil, the outcome is not “on God’s account.” If someone murders his fellow (as in a terror attack), there is no point in seeking explanations or justifications for why the victim “deserved” to die, or why God “did this to him.” The victim did not necessarily deserve to die, and God did not do it. The murderer was given free choice to do evil, and he decided to kill. He did it, not God—therefore we should not seek theological justifications for that outcome.[1]
Indeed, the Talmud in Chagigah 4b–5a cites the verse (Proverbs 13:23), “There is one who is swept away without justice,” and explains that there can be cases in which a person dies despite not deserving to die. R. Hananel there explains:
“The explanation of ‘there is one who is swept away without [justice]’ is, for example, a person whom another killed.”
We see that a person has the choice to harm his fellow even when the fellow does not deserve the harm—and even to kill him.
Divine Involvement in Acts of Inadvertence
From the picture I’ve described, it follows that if someone kills his fellow inadvertently—that can be ascribed to God. In such a case the killer did not decide to kill; if it nonetheless happened, perhaps it is indeed the result of a divine reckoning. In such a case the killer serves as God’s rod, and this is not his own act.[2]
This resolves the Talmud in Makkot 10b:
“Reish Lakish opened this section from here: ‘And who did not lie in ambush, and God caused it to come to his hand…’ (Exod. 21:13). As is said in the proverb of the ancients: ‘From the wicked comes forth wickedness’ (1 Sam. 24:14). To what does the verse refer? To two men, each of whom killed a person—one inadvertently and one deliberately. For this one there are no witnesses, and for that one there are no witnesses. The Holy One brings them together at one inn: the one who killed deliberately sits beneath the ladder; the one who killed inadvertently descends the ladder, falls upon him, and kills him. The one who killed deliberately is [now] killed, and the one who killed inadvertently goes into exile.”
Everything is orchestrated from Above. Seemingly this contradicts the passage in Chagigah and R. Hananel there, but according to our approach there is no contradiction. Our passage deals with the inadvertent killer, i.e., one who did not decide to kill but it happened inadvertently. Such an act is indeed orchestrated from Above and is not his act. But when a person decides to murder his fellow willfully, that is his act, and it can occur “without justice,” without God having decreed that the victim die.
This is also how we should understand Ramban on false witnesses (Deuteronomy 19:19):
“‘As he conspired’—and not ‘as he did.’ From here [the Sages] said: if [the falsely accused] was executed, the [false witnesses] are not executed (Makkot 5b). The reason is that the judgment of witnesses is under the decree of the Ruler, for they come two and two. When two testify that Reuven killed a person and two others come and discredit them as false witnesses, the Torah commanded that the former be executed, for by Reuven’s merit—being innocent and righteous—this came about; had he been guilty and deserving of death, God would not have saved him from the court’s hand, as it says (Exod. 23:7), ‘I will not justify the wicked.’ But if Reuven was executed, we must think that all that the first [witnesses] testified was true, for he died for his sin; had he been righteous, the Lord would not have abandoned him into their hand, as it says (Ps. 37:33), ‘The Lord will not abandon him to his hand, nor let him be condemned when he is judged.’ Moreover, the Lord will not let the righteous judges who stand before Him shed innocent blood, for the judgment is God’s, and among the judges He judges. All this is a great elevation for the judges of Israel and the assurance that the Holy One agrees with them and is with them in matters of judgment. This is the meaning of (v. 17) ‘The two men who have the dispute shall stand before the Lord’—for before the Lord they stand when they come before the priests and judges, and He guides them in the true path. I have already mentioned this in Parashat Mishpatim.”
False witnesses receive the punishment they conspired to impose. But if they are exposed as false after the accused has already been executed, they are not executed. Ramban explains that this is because if he was executed, he was presumably guilty, since God would not allow the judges to err and execute an innocent person. Here the judges do consciously and willfully decide to execute him, but that decision is based on a mistake (perjured testimony). The judges did not actually choose to kill an innocent man. Such an act is analogous to inadvertence, not willfulness. Such an act is in God’s hands; a person will not die “without justice” (i.e., if he does not deserve to die).
Back to Joseph and His Brothers
True, the brothers acted willfully against Joseph, and therefore responsibility would ordinarily be theirs. But as we have seen, Joseph perceived—by prophecy—that God had turned the brothers’ thoughts so that they would act as they did. Specifically here, it was not their deed at all, even though they outwardly acted willfully.
Sforno, in his commentary to our verses, writes:
“‘Am I in the place of God?’—Am I truly a judge in His stead, that I should adjudicate against His decrees and punish one who was His emissary to carry them out, like a court that overrules another court? For indeed you were His emissaries in this, without doubt—as in [Gen. 45:8] ‘It was not you who sent me here, but God.’”
“‘Behold, your action was in error, for you thought me a pursuer [rodef]; and had that been true, your action would have been lawful.’”
“‘God intended it for good’—He brought about this error in you for a good end.”
He begins by saying that they were God’s agents, and therefore are not responsible for the outcome (unlike Or HaChaim, but in line with the plain sense of the verses). He adds, however, that they acted inadvertently, thinking Joseph was a pursuer, and God brought about their inadvertence for a good purpose. According to him, the brothers’ responsibility is mitigated because they acted in good faith and were inadvertent; in such a case responsibility lies with God, not with them.
There is, however, a novelty here: Joseph was certainly not pursuing them to kill them. At most, he maligned them before their father, or perhaps sought to humble them (by making them bow to him). Does that, too, fall under the category of a “pursuer”? Sforno thinks so. The response permitted in such a case must be proportional; thus they were not permitted to kill him (for he was not pursuing to kill but to harm). They decided to sell him to the Ishmaelites—perhaps a proportionate response.
Are Inadvertent Acts Really “in God’s Hands”?
So far the conclusion has been that willful acts are certainly not God’s deeds, whereas inadvertent acts are. But there is room to qualify this further. It is not obvious why Ramban added that this is a “great elevation” for Israel’s judges. Can other judges execute an innocent person? If they do not intend willfully to execute the accused, then he should not die “without justice.” That should be true for any private individual, and certainly not only for Israel’s judges. What, then, is the special elevation of Israel’s judges?
It seems from Ramban that this is not a sweeping principle governing all inadvertent acts; rather, it is a principle specific to courts that adjudicate by Torah law. Inadvertent acts are also our acts, not God’s, and even there someone can die “without justice” (someone undeserving of death may die). A ruling of a court that judges by Torah law is exceptional; there, injustice cannot occur inadvertently.
This also accords with reason: if every inadvertent act were God’s, it would be unclear why an inadvertent killer must go into exile. If an inadvertent act is God’s act, then God—not the person—would be responsible. Were it not for the passage in Makkot, it would seem that even in inadvertent killing it is not God’s deed. A person can cause another’s death “without justice” even if it is done inadvertently. Only with judges, Ramban contends, can this not occur.
We thus arrive at a very limited conception of providence. The Talmud says, “Everything is in the hands of Heaven except fear of Heaven” (Moed Katan 16, and elsewhere). That is, actions with a moral dimension are not given to Heaven but to us. Here we have seen that divine involvement in human actions (matters that touch on “fear of Heaven”) exists, at most, in inadvertent acts—and from Ramban it emerges that perhaps not even there. See more on this in Rabbi Shmuel Ariel’s essay here.
A Note on Divine Involvement in General
I will not re-enter here into my own view that, at least in recent generations, almost nothing—even the unfolding of natural events—is handed over to Heaven. Nature and human beings operate by the power granted them by God, in the spirit of Deuteronomy 8:17–18:
“And you will say in your heart, ‘My power and the might of my hand have made me this wealth.’ But you shall remember the Lord your God, for it is He Who gives you the power to make wealth, in order to establish His covenant that He swore to your fathers, as this day.”
God gives us the power to achieve, but with that power it is we who achieve.
I discussed this at length in the second book of the trilogy and also here on the site in several columns and responsa. I explained that the claim that acts done by our free choice are also God’s acts is not only implausible but logically untenable. I also showed there that the claim that natural events are God’s acts is untenable, for a double explanatory scheme (a natural-scientific explanation and a theological explanation for the same event) is also logically problematic.[3]
Rashi’s Interpretation: Absolute Divine Control
Rashi on the Genesis verses offers a different explanation:
“‘Am I in the place of God?’—Am I in His place?! If I wanted to harm you, could I? You all intended evil against me, and God intended it for good—so how could I alone harm you?”
He explains that Joseph’s words are a single unit rather than two, as we understood earlier. He argues that everything is in God’s hands, and proof is that they all intended to harm him and did not succeed. Therefore they need not fear his revenge, for to the same extent he cannot take revenge unless God so wills.
This is a very radical conception, according to which a person cannot harm another unless God has decreed it. These words are very puzzling, even though this is the view commonly held by most people. It sits ill with reason and with several sources, and requires further analysis.
[1] Of course, there is still room to ask why God does not intervene. I have addressed this here more than once (the question of evil—human and natural), and in greater detail in the second book of the trilogy.
[2] On this view, the penalty of exile for the inadvertent killer is not fully clear. If he served as God’s rod, why does he deserve punishment? Perhaps the exile is intended as deterrence and to uphold the value of life—but this is strained.
[3] A cause is supposed to be a sufficient condition for its effect; logically, there cannot be two independent sufficient conditions for the same outcome.
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
You wrote "1. He is not under God," what you meant was he is under God, right?
Sorry, my mistake. It's late at night...
The opposite.
Here we see that even a deliberate person plays a role in the reality cinema. In other words, he is a puppet on strings.
When Joseph says, "I am the ass of God," he is referring to their offer to become his slaves instead of the slaves of his father's God.
And they addressed him as if he were the one who bore iniquity and crime.
After the Torah was given, matters of law were passed to us, before that it was God's business.
And in the Torah it does not appear that one should be concerned with the intentions of the person who did an act and not with the intentions of God.
A. I don't understand how you can include several different periods in the same article:
The period of Joseph, when (in your opinion) there was providence.
Subsequent periods in which it is not clear whether you know if there was providence (in your opinion).
The period in our day in which (in your opinion) there is no providence.
We'll have a salad here.
B. “This does not agree with logic or with several sources”.
Your words also do not agree with Chazal's sources, and then you give an answer of “Chazal did not have the tools to know reality, and therefore one should not draw conclusions from their words”. And when your method conflicts with the Torah you write “It is impossible to understand the intention of the Torah”.
So I don't understand – that your method does not agree with the sources – Everything is fine.
That methods that are inverse to Shech do not work with sources – that is a problem for these methods.
All the best
You really are making a big mess, but the mess is your own doing.
A. I clearly said that I am not talking about my method here, but about the methods of the commentators I cited. None of them distinguish between periods.
But also in my opinion, in the biblical period, God was involved, and it is still clear that what a person did of his own choosing was not done by God. The logic that says that if I do something, it is me and not God was correct even then. However, in my opinion, back then there were cases when God took the reins and deprived man of choice, and today there probably are none.
B. When someone wants to develop a method that will fit the sources, then they must examine whether it fits them or not. That is what the commentators try to do. I am not trying to fit because I think they were wrong.
Furthermore, in my opinion I claim that the sages were wrong about science, since today's science is more developed. But if I want to say the same thing to Rashi, who believes that everything is in the hands of God, that is, if I claim that the sages who said otherwise were wrong about it in his opinion, then this is a statement in the opposite direction: they were simply wrong in perception and not wrong in science. Interpreters usually do not say this (although in my opinion there is no reason to do so either). In any case, they are not close to each other.
You have tomatoes one way and cucumbers another.
In the second of Tevet 15, the second of Tevet 15, the second of Tevet
We must see a parallel to Jacob's answer to Rachel, "Am I the one who is called to ask for the fruit of the womb?" which concerns: "I am not the one who is called to ask for the fruit of the womb, but you must ask for it from God."
Joseph also says to his brothers: "It is not from me that you should ask that I bear your transgressions, for I have "come out in safety" from your actions, having risen to greatness and having been granted the privilege of "reviving a great people." Your sin, with your evil intention, was between man and God, and therefore before God you must purify yourself and ask forgiveness for having transgressed His will.
With blessings, Yaron Fishel Ordner
The brothers are now in the stage of ‘repentance from fear’ because the request for forgiveness from Joseph comes from the fear that Joseph will punish them for their sin.., as they say ‘If Joseph wrongs us and returns, he will repay us what we have repaid him’.
Joseph shows them the path of ‘repentance from love’ which will lead to a state of ‘God intended it for good’, in which malice itself becomes a virtue due to the high degree to which man has reached in his repentance, a degree that only the fall could have brought. When a man repents out of love, his thought not only becomes nullified by the will of his Creator but also identifies with the will of his Creator, and just as God intended it for good’ man also thinks for good.
To the stage of ‘repentance from love’ The brothers will arrive only after Joseph's death, when they will no longer be dependent on him. If then, when the Lord visits them and disappears from Egypt, they remember their promise to Joseph and take him up with them - it will become clear that their response was complete, out of full recognition of the brotherly covenant that cannot be separated. Then it will be revealed that they also think well.
With blessings, Amioz Yaron Schnitzel
The beginning of the ‘respondence out of love’ was in Judah's willingness to give up his life to get Benjamin back. Except that it was still for Jacob's benefit. But the commitment to get Joseph back – marks a step up: dedication to his brother on his own part.
With greetings, Ya'far”r
In his article "How Evil Turns Into Rights" (on the "Tzhar" website), Rabbi Ronen Neuwirt (according to Rabbi Soloveitchik and Rabbi Kook) says that repentance from love uncovers the root of goodness in a person whose distorted form caused sin. When we locate that strong desire that was expressed in sin, and find positive channels for it to act, "evil" is transformed into a right. That powerful desire that erupted in a negative form will now erupt in a positive and corrected form.
And so we can say that God found in the brothers' minds the good element: ‘to revive with many’, not to accept the dominance of an individual to which all are reduced. But to see the leader as a messenger and a public servant who fulfills his role ‘to revive with many’.
When Joseph and the brothers understand that they are not in a competition of ‘one against each other’ but in a mutual complement of ‘one for all and all for one’ – the picture becomes clear, and from now on, the strengths that the parties developed in the struggle will be utilized for love and joint action.
With greetings, Eliam Fish”l Werkheimer
In the 19th of Tevet 2
And perhaps the wickedness of the one who repents out of love is considered good and becomes a right, because there is a measure for measure here: Just as he is willing to accept his sufferings with love and see them as necessary steps on the path of purifying correction, so too, in a measure for measure, God considers his failures and falls as steps on the path to the correction of his soul.
By learning a lesson from a mistake, a person reaches deeper and stronger insights than in conditions of peace. The pain of the fall strengthens and internalizes in a person the attachment to goodness.
Joseph does not spare his brothers the torments of the soul for their sin. On the contrary, he turns them to God, who alone can forgive them. But in learning his right to their sin, Joseph shows his brothers the way to “accept suffering with love,” a way that will lead them to the exaltation of “repentance from love.”
With greetings, Hanoch Hanach Feinschmecker-Palti
In the Purim Defrazim P.B.
And perhaps this matter of the ability of repentance from love to turn evil into rights is implied in the words of Chazal: ‘What obliges a person to be absorbed in the fruitfulness until he does not know between the cursed Haman and the blessed Mordecai’, for when one returns by being absorbed in love, from the ‘sip that brings the distant ones closer’ – then even Haman's evil deeds are transformed into rights.
It turns out that ’at the end of the day’ all of Haman's evil intentions did not bring any harm. On the contrary, thanks to him, Israel reached a lofty and exalted height. We corrected the defect of being scattered and separated’ Go and gather all the Jews, and the defect of the king [king of the world] who do not do the law, they corrected for the generation that received it in the days of Ahasuerus.
Haman's evil intentions, despite his anger and wrath, only brought blessing, restored unity to Israel and brought about the receiving of the kingdom of heaven anew, a return to the status of Mount Sinai. Everything that he thought was evil, God turned into good!
Therefore, Haman was worthy to restore to the people of Telithai the ear that heard and received the Torah from Sinai, a Torah in which there is a black fire on top of a white fire. Like a black poppy in a white envelope, and its taste is like the taste of manna. Cheers, may it be known, cheers!
With the blessing of ‘Aivtsumi of Raanana’, Hasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kavas
Haman was also blessed, from whose seed emerged the great educator Rav Shmuel bar Shilat (Sanhedrin 177, according to the version of R’ Aharon Heiman), who was known for his devotion to his students, so that even thirty years after his ’retirement’ – his students did not lose their minds.
This is so true that I wonder where we get the confidence that in the past there was divine intervention in what was happening in the world. There is a ‘one who brings out the evidence’ in the context of a fundamental change that was made in the nature of the world. A change that on the surface seems absurd.
Moreover, the concept of divine involvement often comes with ignorance and lack of knowledge. The more we have been exposed to science, the more we have abandoned outdated concepts about incurable diseases given by God, etc.
Isn't it reasonable to assume that all the divine interventions described in the scriptures are the result of ignorance and an attempt to give a plausible explanation for things that we did not know the meaning of?
In the Torah itself, there are passages that describe prophets and prophecy. Those prophets tell us about supernatural events. The parting of the sea does not seem like something that has a natural explanation. I do not think that scientific knowledge makes a difference in this matter, since in most cases these are phenomena for which we do not have an explanation even today.
In the 2nd of Tevet 2nd
To Moses, greetings,
In the whole story of Joseph, there is no deviation from the natural order and the natural conduct of the world. As is the way of the world, the strong defeat the weak. The brothers throw their younger brother into a pit and send him as a slave to Egypt, a situation where he has no natural chance of freedom. Potiphar's wife "burys" Joseph in the prison, from where he has no chance of getting out.
And behold, this is a miracle, it turns out that all the attempts to "bury" the weak only brought him closer to fulfilling the destiny that God had assigned to him. Joseph's becoming a slave is what brought him closer and prepared him for power. As a slave, Joseph understands that he must put his dreams aside and devote himself to fulfilling the dreams of others, and thus he becomes a ’de facto ruler’ everywhere. With this insight, he will become deputy to the ’principal of the prison’ and from there he will advance to become the de facto ruler of the Egyptian power.
But the revolution does not come without divine intervention that directs it. The ’working souls’ do not receive prophecy, but through dreams (which are also natural scenarios) God hints to people and directs them to their destiny. The dream is not an ‘decision of fate’ that cannot be challenged. The dream sets a goal for a person, and the vicissitudes of his life will teach him, with quite a bit of ‘trial and error’, how to act to fulfill his dream.
Hence Pharaoh's admiration for Joseph's solution. Not like the Harutim who saw in a dream a ‘destiny’ that there is nothing to be done about it. They say: ‘You give birth to seven daughters and bury seven daughters’ and there is nothing you can do. And Joseph says: God shares His plans with you so that you can do something with this knowledge and prepare provisions during the seven years for the years of famine.
And the lesson:
If a person thinks that his strength and efforts will determine his fate – ‘ He who sits in heaven will play with him’ and show him how all his forces and actions will achieve the opposite of what was expected in the way of nature. But when a person adapts his actions to the divine plan – then there will be a blessing in his actions and it will be fulfilled in him: ‘All that he does ’ He will succeed in his hand’.
With regards, Eliam Fishel Werkheimer
Other stories in the Bible also display the ‘divine humor’ in which God shows those who think they are the ‘master of the house’ how all their actions have achieved the opposite. Pharaoh orders every Hebrew child to be thrown into the grave, and by his very decree a Hebrew child grows up to be a leper in his palace; Haman seeks to eliminate Mordecai, and his efforts bring about the complete opposite: Mordecai rises to greatness and Haman falls.
I didn't understand what the Rabbi found in Rashi's radical view?
Rashi simply means that in this case they clearly saw the hand of providence that surrounded everything,
and that by throwing him into the pit he finally became a king to revive them.
And this is what he told them, that in this case "here" there is a clear intervention of God, as you all thought and others.
Now they understood that their story beats every possible prediction,
and why would Joseph try to harm them when they saw for themselves that God had prevented everyone from harming him.
Rashi writes that just as the brothers failed in their plot, Joseph himself cannot succeed (and not only is there no reason for him to try, as you suggest). We see that everything is in the hands of God, the Almighty.
1. Regarding Rashi - it seems that Joseph does not think that it is impossible to harm anyone at all, but that in certain situations it will not work. Perhaps he means by the words all of you and I alone in the context that all are sons of Jacob and with the majority he cannot uproot the minority from the tribes of Israel, let alone the reverse.
That is, Joseph assumes that harming his brother is against the will of God more than simply doing a bad deed, just as God did not want harm to come to him even though in the natural way this is what was supposed to happen.
2. Regarding the punishment of an unintentional murderer (note 2) - his punishment is for not being careful. God does not have a much more serious consequence than his own deed, for which he is not punished. It is true that the condition that he reveals is that someone dies, but this is a condition and not a reason.
“One could also wonder here why this is an excuse. The brothers intended to harm him, and only God prevented it. How does that lessen their guilt?”
I don't quite understand. Do you treat someone who tried to murder and failed the same way as someone who tried and succeeded?
Illustration: A person will tell you that in his youth he was a real extremist and threw stones at random Arab vehicles in Judea and Samaria with the aim of killing. Today he has normalized, etc. Most people will accept him as normal (because today he is normal). But if you find out that once he succeeded and did kill a family with a stone, he will no longer be so easily accepted back into the fold of normality.
The difference is in something that does not depend on him - he succeeded and he did not succeed.>
I would like us to focus on the example - is there no difference in your feelings of morality between a teenager who tried and a teenager who tried and hurt?
I wrote very clearly: there is no difference. And if you have a feeling of difference, it is just a psychological bias.
Although throwing stones is not an act of murder because there is a significant chance that the person will not die. But let's talk about people who shot and did not hit, or shot and had a weapon stop. Exactly the same thing.
Well, I think there is a difference. And you don't live as if there is no difference either. I mean, theoretically I could agree, in practice no one lives like that on a daily basis, it's very counterintuitive.
People look at their phones while driving (negligence with a no small malicious motive), there are a lot of people who do it. Some of them have killed through negligence, but most of them haven't. Do you treat the less careful drivers you know as if they killed?
There is no difference. People have a tendency to consider the outcome, but it is just a psychological artifact (when a person dies it has a severe impact on us). The difference is only in the responsibility of the offender, because if there is no outcome, he has no obligation to make amends. But the guilt is the same in both situations. I have written on the site several times about the difference between guilt and responsibility, and you can search.
On the 19th of Tevet, February 2
Ramada, a – Shalom Rav,
It seems that the Torah also has a ‘tendency to consider the outcome’. Someone who wanted to eat milk and came across kosher meat needs atonement, but is not required to be flogged or cut off. It seems clear that a successful attempt to sin requires a much more severe punishment than an unsuccessful attempt.
With blessings, Nissan Fish”l Mztali
There is no connection. As I wrote, it depends on the theory of punishment, that is, what is the justification for the punishment. But the degree of guilt and wickedness is the same in experience and in action.
Is someone who tried to eat milk and failed considered a ’evil demon’ and disqualified from testifying?
Best regards, Nef”m
Every wicked person is disqualified from testifying, and not just a wicked person who is a devout Jew. But a wicked person is defined as one who commits an offense that requires flogging. Indeed, several rabbis wrote that even if he did not actually commit flogging, he is disqualified. Evidence to the contrary.
And above all, the disqualification of a wicked person is based on a very specific definition of wickedness, and this is not what we call wickedness.
But all the discussion of the sources is unnecessary. Why did he call me?! It is understandable.
If we are discussing someone the Torah calls “wicked,” then there is no invalid testimony as “wicked” except for someone who has actually committed a crime (even if he did not actually commit it), and if he is accused of “what we call wicked,” then this is a subjective matter.
With blessings, Nefm
I already answered that. But just for the challenge, find me evidence that someone who thought about eating pork and ended up with lamb was not disqualified from testifying. I bet you won't find any.
A discussion of the words of the ’Or Chaim’, in the lesson of Rabbi Asher Weiss ‘We intend to transgress a prohibition if atonement is needed (57”3)’. In his opinion, if we intend to eat pork and eat lamb – then this is a complete offense for which a punishment of rebellion is required (letters a-b) and the one who assists him – transgresses ‘before the skin’ (letter c), but it is permissible for him not to be disqualified as a witness (letter e).
Therefore, one should side with someone who spoke and did not succeed – he is not disqualified as a witness 🙂
Greetings, Nissan Fish”Mtshil
Paragraph 2, line 1
… He who gambled and lost…
I asked for evidence, not an opinion.
By the way, the one who wrote the stencil on the issue of a monk claims that he intended to eat pork and ended up with a lamb, committing a Torah offense (but not a defect), and in his opinion, it is likely that he was disqualified from testifying.
And look further at Dr. Gabriel Hazut's article, "Between Deed and Intention in Halacha: A Look at Deontology and Teleology," on his website.
In fact, one must ask if the brothers' sin was that they had committed "and stole a man and sold him," then there is a complete offense here that is punishable by human law, not just "attempt."
Therefore, I suggested (above) that Joseph tell them, "Am I under God to bear your crime? For the serious offense you committed, you have an "account" with God, and you must ask Him for forgiveness. But for the harm you have done me, you do not need to ask me for forgiveness, for you have done me a great favor."
With blessings, Yaffo
It is interesting that the brothers do not ask for forgiveness for the sale itself, but for the ungrateful acts ‘because evil is weaned’. Joseph comes to inquire after their welfare and they throw him into a pit and sell him as a slave.
This may strengthen Rashba”s argument that in reality it was not the brothers who sold Joseph, but rather the Midianites who were passing by noticed him and took him, and therefore they do not ask for forgiveness for the sale but for the ungrateful behavior of throwing him into the pit.
And perhaps it is because they did not see a prohibition in the actual sale, because they believed that just as in the law of the sons of Noah a father is permitted to sell his son as a slave – so the older brothers are permitted to sell their younger brother as a slave who does not treat them with respect. But for the ungrateful acts they saw a need to ask for forgiveness.
Shchel,
“Dr. Hazut’s article” is an article I wrote that appears here on the site.
However, the evidence of ‘God intended it for good’ is a deviation from the ’law’, which is not supposed to forgive the offender because of the good that resulted from his unintentional act.
This is a superhuman evidence, the magnanimity of the injured party who is ready to forgive his brother for the prolonged suffering of many years because of the good that came out in the end. We admire the piety of Joseph ‘his brother's monk, and try to achieve his piety in some way – but we cannot demand that an entire society behave with such extreme piety. A normative society is founded on commitment, not on unlimited indulgence.
Therefore, the ’legislator’ Judah was chosen because he knew not to give up on himself and brought about the correction of sin by his willingness to admit his failures to give up his life for the fulfillment of his promise to his father. He who can demand of himself – can also demand of the ’sheep of his flock’ to maintain strict ‘rules of the game’.
With best wishes, Hanoch Hanach Feinschmecker-Pelti
And what about the story of the ten royal martyrs as punishment for selling Joseph?
It seems to me that beyond the historical story of the government's excuse to kill Jews, the sages also take this seriously.
I didn't understand the question.
I would love to hear insights into this. Ostensibly, I support the view that there is indeed guilt here despite the good outcome and despite the divine guidance. But, is this some kind of collective punishment? Why after so many generations? Why these people in particular?
Now that I read the words that Joseph says again, it seems that perhaps he is even hinting at some future punishment from God that awaits. I mean, that's none of my business, forgiveness is irrelevant and the story is probably not over..
Something creepy
The inclusion of the Ramban as a witness in this process does not go down well in my opinion. The judges are not fools when they rule based on two witnesses. They are busybodies/rapists. They are not unintentional murderers. They are not murderers at all. The murderers are the witnesses and they are of course not accidental murderers.
I don't think so. The witnesses are the ones who commit murder at most. The one who commits it and turns it into a murder is the court, and even if the witnesses choose to mislead them, God Almighty will not allow them to commit an accidental murder.
This is unlike anything in a blind man's case where a person misleads his friend into committing a crime, where the misleader has the choice and the ability to do so.
But if the court itself murders intentionally (ruling death without evidence, simply because they chose to murder), then God Almighty can sometimes allow this.
A. There is no exemption for false witnesses – and if they did not kill, they will be killed. It is not to say that they were killed for lying, but rather that death is certainly for the attempted murder that did not succeed, as you wrote in the article “A failed attempted murder is just as serious as murder” it is unlikely that the death penalty is for the crime of lying.
B. Even if we accept that ”the witnesses are at most the perpetrators of murder” it still does not mean that the court is an accidental murderer and not a rapist/interferer. For example, someone who throws his friend at a baby and the baby is killed is the murderer and not the one thrown, and if the thrower threw in a false way, will the thrown friend become a murderer?!
And in general, does someone who intentionally murdered someone with a grave (such as conspiring with someone to kill them with another force) already intervene here because he is no longer an intentional murderer, he is a “murderer at most”?!
It seems to me that the issue of grave does not belong at all to the issue of intentionality and responsibility for murder. Grave is some kind of exemption from punishment, and witnesses who are complicit were excluded from this exemption just as witnesses who are complicit were excluded from the exemption of someone who attempted to murder, which is as serious as a murderer. A murderer with a grave in terms of responsibility/guilt is a complete murderer.
It seems to me that you are repeatedly mixing up different levels of discussion. I am not dealing with halakhah (why is a certain person exempt or liable, or what is the halakhic definition of the act - unintentional, intentional, or meddling). My arguments are on the theological level, not halakhic.
From this you will understand that the distinction between accidental and intentional is irrelevant. The argument was that everything that is not intentional is done by the hand of God, and there is no one who perishes without trial. Only by choosing to be intentional can one kill without trial.
The same is true regarding the exemption of conspiring witnesses on the part of a person who is a murderer. Who spoke of granting exemption to witnesses? I said that they are only a murderer and not murderers with their hands, and therefore their plot does not necessarily succeed even though they are a murderer. The reason for this is that there is a God on the way and God protects them so that no mishap occurs on their part.
And the fact that the executioner is also a witness is not true (by the way, according to the Torah, the executioner is the witness: the hand of the witnesses will be on him first to put him to death). I was precise in my words that the executioner's ruling makes him a gebra katila, which is not true regarding the witnesses. The moment the executioner pronounces his sentence to death, he is a dead man. Beyond that, the Ramban says that there is special protection for the executioner so that no mishap occurs on their part, and this does not exist regarding the executioner's messenger on his part. But even if the executioner were only a witness, it is not relevant to the discussion. There is still protection for them so that no mishap occurs under their hand.
And regardless, although it is not relevant to the discussion, the witnesses do indeed kill in the execution. Just like sending the burning to a foolish and small deaf person, which is one of the cases of execution in the case of the executioner in the rabbinate. When you send an unintentional or mindless person to commit a crime, you have caused a crime, and are obligated by the laws of heaven. So sending the bystanders who are unintentional (not knowing that you are lying and thinking that they are doing their job), is a crime. The bystander is indeed acting here as a meddler or as a rapist, but the witnesses are the ones who kill in the crime (sending the bystander to kill the meddler/inadvertent).
In short, I will conclude that it seems to me that the discussion is just getting ridiculous. My argument in the opinion of the Ramban is that if the bystanders had decided to kill intentionally, they certainly could have done so even without the defendant deserving of death. What the Ramban says is only in a situation where the bystanders rule innocently based on testimony, and then they are not acting as meddlers (and it does not matter if they are unintentional, meddler, or rapist). Therefore, there he assumes that if they had killed the defendant, it would probably have deserved it. And what the witnesses deliberately plotted is not a matter of concern, because the protection is for the Bid that they will not fail inadvertently even if the witnesses try to thwart them.
You might wonder what the difference is between the Bid and every person? After all, I argued that in every person, when he acts inadvertently, he carries out the will of God, and then there is no death without trial. So what is special about the Bid that acts inadvertently and no fault comes from them? Apparently, it is like that in every person. Your answer to this is in the body of your question: the Bid was thwarted by people who plotted to kill intentionally (the conspiring witnesses), and in the case of an ordinary person, this could have succeeded. But in the case of the Bid, the Ramban claims that there is special protection that no fault will occur on their part, and therefore it does not happen by chance, and if it did happen anyway, then he probably deserved to die.
I will try to focus my words (apologies that this is still a bit long):
Let's assume that the Ramban disagrees with the Rabbis and believes that the Holy One intervenes both intentionally and unintentionally, and we will see if this is settled.
Of course, the question immediately arises as to why every murderer is obligated, since he is an instrument in the hands of the Holy One, to kill the victim who committed a capital offense in the past – and the simple answer on the other hand is that it is not in heaven and there are no heavenly accounts in the law.
Now, according to the Ramban:
The Ramban asks, "They are two and two" – that is, why (when the person in question was not killed) do we believe in the latter?
To this the Ramban replies: "Because I will not justify a wicked person" – If the first witnesses were truthful, the Holy One would have delayed the last witnesses so as not to justify the wicked (who was a survivor on behalf of the Holy One without any decrees and accounts from Heaven), hence the first witnesses are the liars.
Here the question arises, after all, this is a heavenly reckoning and no heavenly accounts are calculated in the law – for this reason the Ramban begins, “the decree of the ruler is.” Certainly the Ramban does not intend that this is the decree of the Scripture without reason, since immediately afterwards he brings a reason, but rather there is logic that it is a heavenly reckoning. But the “decree of the ruler” is needed to rule out the rule that no heavenly accounts are calculated in the law.
Of course, if the last witnesses arrived after the death of the defendant, then the calculation is incorrect, because if the defendant were clean, God would not leave us in his hands and would not convict us in his judgment. And furthermore, may God not allow the righteous judges who stand before Him to shed innocent blood, and even if it turns out to be the case, the first ones are the faithful ones, as the Ramban writes, “But if Reuven is killed, we will consider that everything the first ones testified about him was true.”
So what is not settled in the Ramban if he disagrees with the R.
Furthermore, according to your explanation of the Ramban, according to the R.’s method, the first witnesses are truly liars, but they are not killed because they testified against Bar Katla, who in heaven knows that he deserves death for another offense he committed. But this is not what is written in the Ramban – the Ramban says that the first ones were faithful when they killed.
I don't think you understood my move. The whole move is the other way around. It's possible that the Ramban disagrees with the Rabbi, the question is whether it's necessary (because in my opinion it's clear that the Rabbi is right, so I prefer to reconcile the Ramban with him). My argument is that it's not, because he speaks inadvertently and the Rabbi spoke on purpose.
Your answer that there are no heavenly accounts in the law doesn't mean anything. If God did do it, then He can't be punished for it. What use are slogans like this to me?
According to my explanation, the former are telling the truth. After all, there are both true and false here, and the latter are usually preferred. But if he is killed, then it turns out that the former are telling the truth here. And it's clear that in such a situation, not only are they not being treated as they intended, but they are also not disqualified from testifying.
Thanks for the syllable, I did understand you the other way around.
Regarding not making heavenly calculations in law – It does not mean anything theologically, it is a legal rule. And according to the system that God intervenes even in the willfulness of the murderer, the punishment is for his bad choice. And even if we introduce heavenly calculations in law, no murderer will be liable to death by a court of law and the punishment will become a dead letter and will not deter murder.
But there is no need to be deterred. Murder is only when God decides, so there is no problem with murder. And my intentions are also an event in the world, and if everything that happens is caused by God, then so are my intentions. There is no difference between a mental and a physical event.
But I think we have exhausted ourselves.
And by the way, I assume that the judges don't hang themselves, there is an executioner who does the work, so the judges are no less "cause of murder for everyone" than the witnesses.
I answered above.
Hello Rabbi, I didn't understand the logical fallacy you described in ”A cause is supposed to be a sufficient condition for the cause, and logically there cannot be two independent sufficient conditions for the same result.” Can you expand?
Sounds pretty logical…
Reminds me of Kishon's sketch about Abba Eban: “How beautifully he spoke, I didn't understand a word” (Abba Eban had an extremely fine English language).
As for the body of your words, my wording was really not accurate, unfortunately.
To say that A is a sufficient condition for X means that if A occurred, B necessarily occurs (i.e., it is enough to know that A occurs to infer B). If we assume that there is another independent sufficient condition, C, which is also sufficient for B, then if A occurs or C occurs, B will occur. There is no problem in this picture on its own.
What I meant to say was that if theology is a sufficient condition, it means that the existence of theological conditions is sufficient for the event to happen, even if the physical conditions do not, and vice versa. This does not fit our perception of science or theology. If the physical conditions are met, the apple will fall regardless of theology, and if they are not met, it will not fall. This essentially means that science is a necessary and sufficient condition. In conventional understandings, theology is also necessary and sufficient.
Joseph uses his father Jacob's expression to his mother Rachel before Joseph was born when she demanded sons from him, "I am the son of God," as a reference to his brothers, "I know what my father said to my mother before I was born. Do you think I believe you when you tell me, "Your father commanded before he died?"
I understood the words of the Lord themselves as being based on the fact that they were mistaken, because it is unlikely that he completely ignores the issue of the sin of pork and lamb, and it turns out that he relies on the issue of offerings regarding the sin of someone who intended to fish on the Sabbath (accidentally) and managed to save a baby.
You have written more than once about how from a moral point of view we must judge a person according to his own system, and from a practical judicial point of view we judge a person according to our own system.
It certainly turns out that Joseph would say this to his brothers: If you had succeeded in doing evil in your time, I would have punished you from a practical point of view as wrongdoers even if you thought that you were right. But since God intended it for the best, just as your evil thought was also justified in your view, there is no reason to hold you accountable.
Someone who intended to hunt fish and ended up with a baby is just like someone who intends to eat a pig and ends up with a lamb. He too must make atonement.
What you mean is impossible. If they were mistaken, then they would not have intended to eat a pig.
Not true in my opinion.
Someone who wanted to eat pork thinking it was permissible, and ended up with lamb meat, does not necessarily need atonement. The sugia in vows speaks of someone who wanted to do something bad, and did not succeed, the sugia in offerings speaks of someone who wanted to do a neutral act, which in our view is a bad act, but did not succeed in doing it in the ’bad’ way, and therefore really does not need atonement (however, according to what is halachically correct. There is disagreement whether to follow his actions or his thoughts)
He who thinks of doing evil unintentionally is not considered to be thinking of doing evil. Oh’h is talking about someone who thinks of drinking the cup of death, and that is like someone who thought of eating pork and knew that he would eat it, and someone who thought of hunting fish on Shabbat thought of hunting on Shabbat. I don't understand how you want to imply that this is a neutral thought.