“‘You Are Called Adam’: Reflections Following the Passing of Rabbi Shlomo Fisher z”l (Column 428)”
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
“‘You Are Called Adam’: Reflections Following the Passing of Rabbi Shlomo Fisher z”l
This past Thursday a very special Jew passed away, a great and original Torah scholar, Rabbi Shlomo Fisher z”l—without doubt one of the most remarkable figures of our generation. I was not surprised to discover that the event was not mentioned at all in the general media (apart from sectoral outlets—Haredi and religious). In a search I conducted there wasn’t a single result. As far as I know, he was not a fashion model, nor—alas—a novelist or poet, and I’m not sure he was on friendly terms with Madonna, Shimon Peres, Lionel Messi, Zehava Galon, or Oren Hazan; nonetheless, he did possess a few other minor virtues, and besides, he even held official positions. Wouldn’t we at least deserve some good or bad word about him upon his passing? It turns out I was naïve. The sect of autists confined within the bubble of folly that is somehow called “the media” did not deem it proper to mention his departure in any form.
R. Shlomo Fisher served as a dayan on the Supreme Rabbinical Court (well, nobody’s perfect; but despite that, he was a Torah scholar of stature) and as Rosh Yeshiva of Itri. He was the brother of the late Rabbi Yaakov Fisher of the Badatz. He gave classes in many forums to diverse audiences and was, to some degree, open to non-Haredi religious shades as well (among other things, he was the father of Chana Kehat, founder of the feminist women’s forum “Kolech”).
I didn’t know Rabbi Shlomo personally. Once I heard a class in his home together with all the students of the Yerucham Hesder Yeshiva, and that one-time experience is very hard for me to forget. Beyond that, I know him a bit from his writings, chiefly his books Beit Yishai (vol. I on analytic Talmudic study; vol. II on thought and aggadah), and also a bit from written and recorded lectures online. In siman 35 of vol. I of Beit Yishai we dealt at length, in our book on the logic of time in the Talmud (the fourth volume in the Talmudic Logic series).
Despite the lack of personal acquaintance, I thought it proper to say a few words upon his departure from us, and knowing his personality and intellectual integrity, I presume that even the critical remarks that appear within my words here would be pleasing to him.
The class I heard
Rabbi Shlomo was a very special Torah scholar, of vast scope in halacha and aggadah (the very fact that he engaged in aggadah is in itself unique). He frequently relied on critical thinking and always defined the halachic concepts he addressed, plumbing the depths of their underlying principles. He dealt in ideas across the length and breadth of halacha, and in meta-halacha as well, drawing his bread from varied and diverse sources. It’s hard for me to define his method of study (I also don’t know it well enough), but my impression was that he had his own path. It wasn’t yet another example of the approaches of R. Shimon or R. Chaim and their students—the standard yeshiva “raid.”
In the class I heard, I greatly enjoyed the halachic-analytic part, which dealt with the laws of damages caused by a person. I recall that he explained that a person’s property is his periphery, and a person’s body is also a periphery—albeit a closer one. This is the Talmudic statement (“A person—the guarding of his body is upon him”), in the same sense as one’s responsibility for the damage caused by his animal. His claim was that one who causes damage under duress (for example, someone who fell asleep with a stone in his lap, it fell during his sleep and caused damage) is liable for the damage his body caused just as he is liable for damage caused by his property (I later found the essentials of this in Beit Yishai, siman 76, though in the class the canvas was much broader).
He spoke rapidly for two straight hours without holding a paper or book, and his absolute command of the material was evident. I remember that at some point I asked him about a statement he attributed to the Ran in Rosh Hashanah (28a), who raises the sevara of “benefit received” (shekhen nehenah) regarding positive commandments (and not only prohibitions), and to my astonishment he tossed off, “Well, that Ran is a midrash pele’ah,” and continued the class. It is very uncharacteristic of a Haredi Torah scholar and analyst—who typically approaches the Rishonim with trembling—to dismiss the words of an important Rishon with a wave and without argument. His critical sense and intellectual honesty did not stop at the Rishonim. As for the Ran’s words, in my humble opinion they can be reconciled, and this has long been discussed.
During those two hours I sat mesmerized by the analytical force and total command of the material. The feeling was like at Sinai. Afterwards he added about another hour on aggadah, and I must say that there I was disappointed. I don’t remember the content, but my impression was that in aggadah he did not say unusual things, and his words resembled the usual vertlach.
Engagement with meta-halacha
Another of his hallmarks was engagement with meta-halachic questions. A discussion of why one is obligated to keep the commandments—such as can be found in siman 15 of vol. II of his book—is also uncharacteristic of a yeshiva analyst. In two of his sermons there (simanim 9 and 26) he addresses a question raised by R. Kook in Orot Yisrael: whether Israel is considered a different kind of being altogether, or a gentile with an added tier. He cites the Kuzari regarding the five levels (inanimate, vegetative, animal, speaking, and prophet-Jew) as a source for the former view, and others who disagree and hold the latter. This is the place to note that this was apparently his way in other cases as well—to rely on R. Kook without stating so explicitly. He was one of Jerusalem’s sages who grew up in the atmosphere that prevailed there before we were divided into today’s usual drawers of Haredi and non-Haredi, etc. Like R. Auerbach and R. Elyashiv z”l, they nourished themselves on R. Kook’s Torah and saw themselves as his students, even if they did not agree with all his ways.[1] This conduct is of course praiseworthy, but keeping it under wraps without laying it on the table deserves criticism. I expect Torah scholars not to cooperate with the mentality and atmosphere imposed by small-time operatives and their toadies.
Notes on a short eulogy I read
A few days ago I saw on WhatsApp some words of eulogy written for R. Shlomo Fisher z”l, and I thought it appropriate to comment on them. First I will bring the text itself.
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“Do you not know that a prince and a great man has fallen this day in Israel.”
Whenever I’m asked who is the greatest Torah figure today, I immediately answered: Rav Shlomo Fisher. Greatness in Torah and uprightness.
Torah greatness that led him to innovate in the weightiest sugyot (migo, admission by a litigant), and uprightness that led him to say that Amoraim disagree with Tannaim; that yeshiva boys should combine work; to teach his daughter (Chana Kehat) in-depth Torah study years before the women’s learning revolution; to study Greek philosophy when he thought it necessary.
This uprightness made him very forceful. He did not hesitate to say about a particular explanation of Rav Shimon Shkop that it was heretical; he did not hesitate to call his brother, Rav Yisrael Yaakov Fisher, “my sorcerer brother” because of his brother’s fondness for segulot; and to say about an important Torah scholar that he is “crazy—mad with delusions of grandeur.”
About eleven years ago R. Shlomo Fisher spent Shabbat in Kerem B’Yavneh. A few stories from that Shabbat:
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1. R. Shlomo Fisher opposed Chabad. Someone asked him why he doesn’t come out against them as Rav Shach did. He replied that at first he used to come out against them a great deal, but he saw that they harassed his wife, so he didn’t want to be righteous at his wife’s expense.
2. After the oneg Shabbat held with the rabbi and his wife, they were escorted to the home where they were to sleep. The fellow leading them (and the students accompanying them) erred and led them by mistake to a different apartment (to the married-students’ housing instead of the dorms—those who know Kerem B’Yavneh will understand). Once the mistake was discovered, there was a bit of awkwardness; after all, the rabbi and his wife were around eighty… The young man who led them told R. Shlomo, embarrassed, that they had taken the wrong way, so the rabbi smiled and said to his wife, “The doctor will be happy we’re getting in some healthful walking.”
3. In one of the classes he gave, he said in the course of the shiur, “I saw in the notebook of one bochur…” Later I understood that this was common for him—he would read notebooks and books even of young guys, and if he saw something that appealed to him, he was not embarrassed to cite a novelty in the name of a bochur.
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Now I will comment on these two columns, one after the other.
The right column
The first part (in the right column) points to R. Shlomo Fisher’s intellectual integrity. I certainly do not agree with the assertion that Amoraim disagreed with Tannaim (see for example my article on strained language in Mishnayot, and my article on ukimtot), I understand where it comes from, and it certainly attests to integrity.
I presume that his statement branding R. Shimon Shkop’s words as heretical referred to the discussion in Sha’arei Yosher, gate 5, regarding “the law of juridical norms” (Torat ha-mishpatim) (I believe I once heard this in his name). I will touch a bit on the matter.
There R. Shimon stands on the idea that the laws of property acquisition obtain by virtue of what he calls “the law of juridical norms,” which precedes halacha. His claim is that the halacha that prohibits theft presupposes, as the substrate of that prohibition, the laws of ownership. Without a determination of property law, it is impossible to define theft (for theft is taking another’s property).
R. Shimon’s words are quite novel. It emerges from his words that there are obligations whose force precedes the Torah and does not derive from it. To me this is obvious, but many in the beit midrash recoil from such a statement. And I presume that R. Shlomo Fisher addressed this. Because of the difficulty, many interpret R. Shimon to mean that the juridical determination of ownership precedes halacha (and is entrusted to the public and social consensus), but the prohibition against infringing on another’s property is a halachic prohibition (from “you shall not steal”). That is, there are no obligations without halacha, and what precedes halacha can only be, at most, neutral determinations that will serve as a substrate for halacha.
One can hang this understanding on R. Shimon’s words at the beginning of the gate:
“Furthermore, there is a principal rule here: when we judge about some right or acquisition of a person in an object or a monetary lien, we are not judging at all about the observance of some commandment, but about the reality—who owns the object, and who is worthy, according to the law of juridical norms, to hold the object. Accordingly, what our Sages stated as general rules of law in monetary doubt—they certainly found so by the decision of reason, that according to the law of juridical norms the law so dictates: that in an exchange of a cow for a donkey that gave birth, and it is doubtful when it was born—if the offspring is found at the time of the doubtful birth in the possession of one of them, it will indeed be in his possession; and if it was in the marsh, we follow the original owner. Now, the prohibition of theft is that one must not steal from his fellow that which, according to the law of juridical norms, is his fellow’s; likewise one must not withhold a laborer’s wage that, according to the law of the Torah, he is obligated to pay. How can it be said that one who holds the money under his hand should be concerned, according to the law of the Torah, about the prohibition of theft—if the money is his, according to the law of the Torah? What prohibition of theft could there be? For the prohibition ‘you shall not steal’ is a general prohibition forbidding stealing what belongs to another—whether by inheritance, by acquisition through sale, gift, or ownerless appropriation, or by right acquired according to the law of the Sages.”
It appears that only the determination of who owns what belongs to the “law of juridical norms,” whereas the prohibition against infringing ownership is learned from “you shall not steal.”
However, this interpretation does not fit R. Shimon’s intent. It is clear from his words that “the law of juridical norms” also includes a prohibition, and not only a neutral determination of ownership. In his view, even before “you shall not steal,” there is a prohibition to steal another’s property by force of “the law of juridical norms.” What he wrote here is only that the halachic prohibition of “you shall not steal” is also based on the property laws of the juridical norms; but beyond that, there is also a juridical prohibition of theft that precedes “you shall not steal.” There are several proofs for this from his words there. For example, he writes regarding theft from a gentile:
“And in a doubtful case of theft where there is no monetary law involved—for example, to steal from a person who is of doubtful status, whether gentile or Israelite—according to the opinion that theft from a gentile is permitted, in such a case the doubt will be treated like any Torah prohibition, for here it is not at all a matter for juridical norms. For even according to the view that theft from a gentile is permitted, he has no right or power to steal from the gentile, as the Magen Avraham writes in the laws of lulav (Orach Chayim 637:3) in the name of Sefer Yere’im (siman 422), that even according to the view that theft from a gentile is permitted, it is not ‘yours’.”
He writes here that even according to the view that theft from a gentile is not biblically forbidden, it is forbidden to steal from a gentile according to the “law of juridical norms.” He repeats this later in the gate. That is, when they held that theft from a gentile is permitted, it means there is no halachic prohibition of “you shall not steal,” but there still remains a juridical prohibition, for the gentile is certainly the owner of his property.
Beyond that, in chap. 2 there (sec. 19 in the Bar-Ilan Responsa Project edition) he wonders:
“It seems to me that the matter of the lien on one’s person in all monetary obligations is a juridical law—that a person is obligated and stands to provide from his assets to his fellow such and such; that this obligation is a juridical obligation even without the commandment of the Torah—just as the types of acquisitions and the laws of ownership in assets are juridical matters, even without the warning of ‘you shall not steal,’ as we explained above: it is in no way conceivable to say that the fact we ascribe an object to Reuven is because Shimon is warned by the Torah not to steal it from him; rather, the matter is the reverse: the prohibition of theft comes after the determination of the matter by the laws defining the boundaries of ownership. Likewise, it appears that the commandment to pay a debt comes after the determination of the debt according to a juridical law: once there has been imposed upon Reuven an obligation of payment by a juridical code, the Torah added a warning and commandment to carefully pay the obligation he owes according to the juridical law. And though at first glance it is a wondrous thing—what compulsion or obligation could there be upon a person to do something without the Torah’s command and warning?—yet when we delve into the matter well, we can understand it: for the obligation and compulsion to serve God and fulfill His will is also an obligation and compulsion by the law of reason and recognition. So too the obligation and monetary lien is a juridical obligation, incurred according to the ways of acquisitions or imposed by the Torah such as damages, redemption of the firstborn, and the like; and for that we require there be an acquirer who acquires this right.”
He wonders whence there is an obligation to do something without a Torah command—and he answers that even the obligation to fulfill what the Torah itself commands is grounded in the reasoning that there is an obligation to do God’s will. Therefore reason precedes the Torah’s obligations, and hence there is no impediment for it to obligate us in additional matters as well.
Now, if his intent were that only property law is determined by the “law of juridical norms,” but there is no prohibition against stealing, then this wonder would have no place. For we would have no obligation to obey the “law of juridical norms,” since it does not set norms but only juridical facts. We are forced to conclude that R. Shimon intended to say that there is also a prohibition of theft, and about that he wonders how a prohibition can arise without a Torah command.
R. Shlomo Fisher correctly understood R. Shimon’s intent, and apparently for this reason he claimed that these are words of heresy. I have not merited to understand why. On the contrary, I would expect that R. Shlomo, who was attuned to philosophical, legal, and meta-halachic aspects, would agree with R. Shimon’s words and certainly not see them as heresy. I am not referring to the very act of attacking a halachic-analytic position by branding it heresy. It is proper to make substantive arguments and discuss whether the statements are correct or not, not to label them.
As for the remark at the end of the right column, I would expect that a man of R. Shlomo’s stature would also study philosophy that is not “Greek,” and not get stuck in ancient philosophy merely because one needs the Rambam to certify it for communal acceptance (though perhaps this is only the describer’s portrayal, since in many people’s eyes all philosophy is “Greek wisdom”).
The left column
The points brought in the left column belong more to the writer than to R. Shlomo, but I thought comments on these matters would themselves constitute a fitting eulogy for him. I suspect that R. Shlomo would himself have wished to say such things about what is said here.
- I did not merit to understand why this is a point in his favor. Just as well one could say that he feared speaking the truth because of harassment of his wife. There is room to interpret it to his discredit and room to interpret it to his credit. I do not think it proper to turn every story into saintly tales.
- Stories of saints in the style of this tale always irritate me. This is behavior I would expect from any reasonable person. Making it into a paragon of righteousness seems to testify to a worrisome decline in norms. Perhaps the intent is to aggrandize R. Shlomo’s name unjustifiably. Beyond my opposition to “holy lies” (though here it isn’t really a lie, since I presume the incident occurred), such a story has an educational price: setting such behavior as a special rung may cause people to absolve themselves too easily when they behave otherwise. This is not righteousness but the conduct of a reasonable person.
- Here, too, this is the conduct of a reasonable person, far from noteworthy piety. If you saw a fine insight in someone’s notebook—what’s wrong with citing it in his name? Was he supposed to hide the source and not attribute a statement to its author?! Who wouldn’t do that?
If we learned anything here about how to eulogize, I suspect this would be pleasing to the late R. Shlomo Fisher.
In conclusion
There are aspects of R. Shlomo’s personality that reflect problematic facets of the Haredi milieu of the Old Yishuv in Jerusalem in which he was raised and operated: concealing the connection to Rav Kook and the sources from which he himself drew; the “heresy” remark about R. Shimon Shkop; the pilpulistic approach to aggadah; and more. Yet all this can be read to his discredit or to his credit, for one can say that despite his milieu he managed to broaden his boundaries and open himself to additional directions. On the other hand, he did not entirely free himself from the problematic aspects of that milieu—and that is a pity.
Beyond all that, we are speaking of an original and profound Torah scholar, of broad scope and exceptional intellectual force and integrity. Alas for those who are gone. May his memory be a blessing.
[1] In Bnei Brak there was no such period, and therefore the drawers there are much sharper. I once saw an article by Prof. Menachem Friedman about halachic measures. He explains there that Bnei Brak is a city of immigrants, and so there was no clear tradition; the dominance of the Chazon Ish took over and became binding for everyone. In Jerusalem there was an older community, and therefore they did not change their practice to follow the measures of R. Chaim Na’eh.
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I had the privilege of hearing him several times years ago. For Enid, his main innovation was in the legend, where the enormous scope created impossible strings of crossing Rishonim, and superimposing on them Gera, Gera, innovations in Ari, and gematria. The ideas ultimately constituted a kind of philosophical ideas that always contained innovation, even if not substantial.
In Talmudic study, Enid was less impressive. He simply had an infinite scope, but he did not focus on understanding the Rishonim but rather gathered all his knowledge in the last of the last and tried to cut them ‘across’, stitching together a conceptual string from the system of several of them that ultimately constituted a kind of intellectual enlightenment, even if it was a lesson in study.
Since I do not think there is a great difference between the Acharonim and the Rishonim on the academic level, and conversely, sometimes studying the Acharonim has an advantage in clarifying the academic depth of the issue, I do not see this as a criticism. It is accepted that on the halakhic level the Rishonim have greater weight, but in academic clarification, absolutely not. I was accepted by the Maggid in my lesson in Netivot Olam that if the academic clarification should begin with the Hozo and end with the Ramban, or even end with the Hozo and not reach the Ramban, that is what should be done. And Daffah.
Beautiful things, I've been waiting for this post since the moment R’ Shlomo passed away. He was a very great man, it's a shame he lost him.
2 comments:
1) Regarding studying philosophy - I saw testimony on the Otzar Hochma forum according to which R’ Shlomo told someone who wanted to talk to him about philosophy - “If he wants to talk up to Kant, I know and let him come, from there on, no more”. If we accept this testimony, then it somewhat answers what the rabbi wrote. And as for not studying after Kant - I think the explanation is that our time on earth is limited, and we need to prioritize what to learn and what not to. There is a reasonable assumption that what lasts a long time probably has something real in it. A book that has survived for many years has passed the test of time and we will probably get something out of reading it. A book written recently has not yet passed the test of time (Nasim Taleb Banti Shabir expands on this point).
2) Regarding the rabbi's comment about not speaking out against Chabad, I didn't get to understand the rabbi's argument. Rabbi Shlomo Fisher has no obligation to speak out against anyone who is wrong, otherwise he wouldn't have had time to learn. He spoke out against Chabad, saw that it indirectly hurt his wife, and stopped. How can you call that insulting? What was he supposed to do? Continue anyway? And what to do with his wife? Hire bodyguards for her? As they say about Chabad - wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are beautiful, but you also need common sense.
Regarding the other comments, I completely agree. I'm always bothered by the stories of the ”He smiled at his wife twice a day in the first year to keep her happy” which sound more like stories of fools than stories of the righteous
Which is ridiculous
One can argue what he should have done. But presenting this as stories of the righteous is strange. On the contrary, in your opinion this is what is reasonable to do – So what's the big deal here?
I don't think there's any greatness here. I agreed with the rabbi that there is an inflation of stories of the righteous, and this is one of them. Or the narrator's intention is not to praise his righteousness, but to convey the message that a person should not only be just, but think about the consequences of his actions on those around him. In the sense of don't be just, be wise. Oh, and this isn't a great lesson either, but there are people who don't understand it, and they need to be told that this is what R’ Shlomo Fisher did in order for them to be convinced…
He did not speak against Chabad. On the contrary, he greatly appreciated the Lubavitcher Rebbe's scholarship. Moreover, he even proofread the Lubavitcher Rebbe's book Chiddushim ve Bi'yorim in Shas.
Afraid to speak against Chabad because his wife was harassed?! Do you really believe this nonsense?! Who harassed his wife?! Why did we specifically target his wife?! And why not the rabbi himself?! Of all the opponents of Chabad, we have not heard that Chabad targeted the wives of those fighting for it. And if it did happen, when did it happen?
If anything, those who are known for using brute force are the students of Ponevezh and D'L. But what? Because of his great appreciation for the Lubavitcher Rebbe, the opponents of Chabad should have mixed up the opposition to Chabad in his name, after all, to be rewarded for the slander that is received. This has been your way for a long time, and here are even people who pretend to be critical falling into the trap of baseless WhatsApp messages
“And here, if what he meant is that only property laws are determined in the “Torah of Laws,” but there is no prohibition on stealing”
I didn’t understand, what are “property laws” if not the very situation in which people understand that it is appropriate for a person’s wealth to be with them and not be stolen from them? What is the meaning of the concept of “ownership” in a society that does not recognize the need to avoid taking wealth from its owner?
The argument is that there is a factual determination that object X belongs to person Y without there being a prohibition against taking it. The prohibition comes from the halakha. But I agree with you, so there is no point in discussing it.
Regarding what you commented on my ”obituary”
Regarding the ”right column”:
1. Regarding philosophy, maybe he knew more philosophy, I heard from him in the context of Greek philosophy. This is also very unacceptable in the circles in which he grew up and lived, so I see a virtue in a person who acts and learns things that in his society are assigned due to disgust.
2. Regarding the heretical words about Rashesh”k, he said this about Rashesh”k's explanation regarding the authority of Chazal according to the opinion of the Ramban.
Regarding the ”left column”:
3. In that he did not attack Chabad because they harassed his wife, I certainly see this as appropriate behavior. They would attack and harass him for his many statements, that didn't stop him from continuing to say them because he thought it was true, but he was balanced enough to understand that his wife shouldn't have to suffer because of his truth.
4. Regarding the escort to the apartment where he had to sleep, I completely agree that there is no greatness here, but it wasn't supposed to be a greatness story but rather to show that he had a sense of humor. In the comments on Facebook I wrote another story that I remembered later, where someone asked him where it was better for him to relieve himself, in a bimd or in a room, and Reshef replied that his Rambam has the laws of Torah abrogation and not the law of Torah abrogation. Not a great story but just an entertaining story.
5. Regarding the boy's notebook - I really disagree with you here. Usually, grown-ups don't bother to look through the notebooks of young boys, thinking that they have nothing to find there.
Even after that, to say that he read in a young man's notebook, and not just say "I saw it once" or "it was said in a yeshiva", is definitely beautiful in my opinion.
I will end with another agreement, with all my love and admiration for the PA, I am not enthusiastic about his sermons either.
Chen Chen.
As for Rash”sh, I remember hearing from him such things about his words in Shaar 5. But I would also make the same comment about Rash”sh on the Ramban.
What did the Gershon say about the Ramban?
The same thing he said about the doctrine of law. That explanation is the mother of all obligations, and therefore the obligation to listen to the sages is also an explanation and does not need a verse. This came up here in one of the comments. See section 5 here: https://mikyab.net/posts/74160#comment-56744
In the 11th of Tevet 22
I did not understand the criticism of Rabbi Shimon Shkop's words that there are things whose obligation is based on "reason". After all, the sages themselves based laws on reason, such as "whoever brings out the evidence from his companion" which is based on the reason "He who brings out the evidence from his companion"
After all, the Torah commanded all of humanity the commandment of "laws" which requires that in every society there be an authority that will set the necessary restrictions and limits for social life in accordance with judgment. And so it must be said in the opinion of the Ramban that just as in his view everyone is obligated to set limits and boundaries for themselves even beyond the commandments of the Torah (and this is included in the commandments of "be holy"), so too is a society destined to be a "kingdom of priests and a holy nation" commanded to have an authority that will set the necessary limits.
With blessings, Avigad Shmarya Dimentman-Dishon
He does not claim that property laws are a sabbara. His claim is that since society established them, it is binding. If this were a normal sabbara, then there would be no problem, because it was a component of the law of non-stealing. Sabbaras usually interpret existing laws and do not constitute a source of validity on their own. A sabbara that creates a new law is not from the Torah (see Tzalach Birchot on the blessing of the Hananin before it). But he claims that the Torah of Laws has validity regardless of stealing.
And as for the sabbara of the social order, then it was not supposed to include only property laws but the entire body of law. But he says this only about property laws, and his view is that without them the prohibition of stealing has no meaning.
On the 11th of Tevet 2nd
There are interpretations and interpretations, there are interpretations concerning the regulation of society, in which there is room for social agreement or for the enactment of a Mishnah by the leadership of the public (which is included in the universal human commandments of the Laws.
And there are commandments of God Almighty that guide His creatures in general and His people in particular, beyond social convention, commandments that bring about the completion of the human soul and bring him to devotion to His Creator, and here it is not the interpretation that creates the commandment but the commandment, which the interpretation can interpret..
With blessings, Ashdod
It is written in Beit Yishai, line, note 6.
To Rabbi Dr. Michael Avraham, may you rest in peace and may you be blessed.
It is a pity that when we are dealing with a man who was one of the greats of the generation, and not during a discussion of his method or path, when there is room for fair criticism, but when he is placed before us, and during the eulogy, your words rang in my ears. It is a pity not to mention in particular a man of independent thought, who was not afraid of opponents and persecutors.
I will add small details. The late Rabbi Fisher, the author of the philosophical book of Rabbi Hasdai Karshakash, Or Ha-Ha, which is considered the second of the Maimonides, according to the Df-R and according to the K-Y, and is punctuated (!). And it was published by his student Rabbi Doron Yitztum (from the previous one in the Torah). Out of modesty. In practical terms, the custom is a bit different (and it seems that his name is not mentioned in the book).
Regarding the attitude towards Chabad. It is worth mentioning that he was asked to edit the niddushei of the Rebbe of the Remesh, and now I don't remember exactly what his opinion was on the niddushei. I remember being told that he stipulated two conditions, a) that he be paid an appropriate salary. b) that he have permission to draft and edit as he understands. (And it should be mentioned that in Chabad there is a concept-principle of holiness, which must be repeated precisely in the language of the Rabbi, and which is forbidden to change, explain or expand. Although in practical terms, not everyone practices this, and perhaps they will say that certain rabbis were given permission.
It came to my mind now in the dead of night, when people were falling asleep.
Chen Chen. That was definitely noted. I think my words were relevant and in honor of the great deceased. But anyway, thanks for the additions.
Regarding the nonsense you wrote about his connection with Chabad.
A. First-hand evidence of his admiration for the Rebbe's teaching.
B. In Chabad, there were glosses and changes to the Rebbe's own words. Every conversation was proofread, and several times, questions and answers by the writers of the conversation with the Rebbe, there are conversations that were written several times in different versions.
At every gathering where the Rebbe said Torah innovations, they would make difficulties and ask questions in the Torah renewal files of Lebed, and at the gathering after which the Rebbe would answer.
C. The request for appropriate remuneration – In this, you harmed the honor and memory of the Rabbi. And from the perspective of the Rabbi, if these Torah words are not worthy of proofreading, the Rabbi, as a true Torah scholar, would not proofread, and if they are worthy, why was the condition appropriate remuneration?!
I will add here another safdon from Rabbi Shibi Froman that was sent to me this morning:
I once married a sweet couple and the bride insisted that a woman recite seven blessings at the wedding. I am not allergic to revolutions in this field, but I also did not feel that I had a role in leading them, so I tried to remove her from the story and sent her to talk about it with her grandfather.
“Her grandfather” was one of the most important halachic arbiters in the haredi world, Rabbi Shlomo Fischer, a great scholar and a well-known figure in the haredi Lithuanian Torah world who will certainly be at the wedding.
After two days, the lady returns and surprises: “Grandpa says there is no problem”
I did not believe it. That day I took myself to his yeshiva in Jerusalem, entered the underground study room, which was crammed with books in every direction on old, yellowing shelves, and he stood there bent over, leaning on the stand, beaming from studying Torah with his “young” companion (about 80 years old), just like in the stories I heard about him as a child.
After I dared to interrupt with the strange question about his granddaughter, he began to shower me with quotes and references like a cyber program cracking a code. I couldn’t really follow, only understood the bottom line that there was no problem, because it was all about public respect, and we are talking about a public that respects itself that way.
And so it was, the first and second blessings were given by the eldest generation of Haredi society, the seventh blessing by a woman. It’s that simple. Despite the infinite distance from the social world from which he came and even leads, he had loyalty to simple halakha, without its politics. And certainly loyalty to his family, with all its complexity.
A little later, my father passed away. After the eulogies at his funeral, we left the synagogue toward the cemetery. Thousands of people were standing outside of all genders, shades, and even religions. One honest and kind look from Rabbi Fisher, black and white in the sea of colors that was there, is etched in my mind to this day.
This week, this great and special person passed away, so I went to look back at him.
It is truly a shame that upholding the truth of the halacha without politics and without instinctive conservatism has become a special praise these days, but unfortunately it is indeed praise and the leadership is exceptional.
This goes along with my statement in the column that the obituaries these days testify no less to us than to the mourners. The more basic things become praise, the more it means that this is probably not the accepted norm, and it is a shame.
I wasn't angry for nothing and I would still be happy if you deleted my comment above. It's better to be angry about more meaningful things.
On the Sabbath day, they will arrange and recite before him the blessing of the tishch
Levi – Shalom Rav,
If R’ Yehoyshiv (Shibi) is from the Kiddushin order, then he has the ‘fitness to be a local rabbi’ as evidenced by his successful passing of the rabbinate's certification exams in the Shabbat or Shabbat purification, mourning, and Kiddushin. These exams require knowledge of halacha from its sources in the Talmud to the Shul and their tools, and it is certainly possible and appropriate to call him ‘Rabbi’. His kindness is not disqualifying 🙂
With a bright Hanukkah blessing, Yaron Fish’l Ordner
Even the words of the Torah contain both truth and sweetness, as it is written: “The judgments of the true are righteous together, more pleasant than gold and much rubies, sweeter than the fragrance of the perfume of the stars.”
With blessings, may you be beautiful.
Line 2
… And sweets made of honey and oil…
Regarding studying philosophy – I remember we asked him once (a group of guys not from his yeshiva) about studying books like a teacher of the confused. His answer was “Ancient philosophy, neither harmful nor useful”
In the field of legend I remember that he spoke in an impressive scope and in a style that was not so common, similar to what has already been commented on above me.
He was very harsh in relation to people, opinions and things, which is also somewhat expressed here
And, shamefully, even the ultra-Orthodox websites barely responded.
I get the impression that statements as if he were one of the greatest Haredi poskim (see, for example, Shibi Froman's sphaddon that I cited above) come mainly from the mouths of Mizrokhniks who don't really know him. In most of the Haredi world, he was really not a significant figure, and certainly not considered a leader. On the contrary, even those who knew him considered him half a Mizrokhnik because of his opinions and because of his openness. Kind of like the arsonist. The Mizrokhniks think that these are first-rate Haredi leaders and poskim, and not her. I'm talking in terms of their public standing in the Haredi world, not about their positions and greatness in themselves.
Where can one find a successful list of the great men of the current generation in the Haredi public perception?
For those who do not have the opportunity to converse with passers-by in Bnei Brak and Mea Shearim…
Send a letter to the editor of the relevant newspaper.
I don't know what they say on the Haredi street, but Rabbi Fischer sat with Rabbi Goldberg on the special panel of the Jerusalem Court to which the difficult anchoring cases were referred. This is how greatness in rulings is measured.
Best regards, Sh”t
‘A thousand years ago there was no one like the visionary’ said R’ Shlomo to his companions, the companions (my brother-in-law) asked him, and a thousand years ago who was like him?
R’ Shlomo answered: I do not know if there was, a thousand years ago I know there was not…
This is the kind of empty legend. How can he know what happened a thousand years ago in all places and times? This is nonsense. I understand that the prophet was great in his eyes. In my eyes too. All the other superlatives are unnecessary. It reminds me a bit of R”ach Volozhiner's introduction to the Sefer Datzniyotah where he places the Gra”a next to the Rashba”a (after the Ramban and before the Ritva”a).
And on that subject - what does the rabbi think about the very exclusion of the Gra in the world of Torah? I don't understand a bit. People talk about the power of his greatness, etc., but when I studied the Gra's commentary on the Shul, I never saw anything very special (certainly not beyond the genius evident in other aharoni, such as the famous B'Yehuda and the Hatim Sofer, etc.)
Is there some social and cultural issue here that has taken root or is it really different from the other aharoni?
Zel: The glorification. I think part of this is the testimony of the sages of his generation and his students, but there are points of genius in his words, but they are not described in complex scholarly systems but in a short and catchy note.
Just an example that comes to mind now, in Bk. 6:2 on the “Tanna Yerushalmi Yashneh Kalila Nekt”. Genius.
It seems to me that the ts fell in the box of the genius and the tsal is a strange demand for refinement in the Balma, and especially in the Gersinan. [First, he does not say there the idea, which does not have a smell in itself, that the debt rests on the ox and from it rolls over to the owner. Rather, he only explains that ’chab’ is a consequence that in fact the ox obligates the owner, and since it is a consequence, ‘at’ is missing, and the Ger’a explains that this is the lishna kalila. And according to this, almost the main point of the Gemara is missing from the book. Second, for example, in the next mishna it is written “chabati tishlumin kah kashar kohl zakahu’ It is clear that in the language of this Tanna, I committed, and not that something else obligated me.]
I have not studied the Gra and I know nothing about him, but genius should not be measured by brilliance and connections and frivolous scholarship, but by things that are convincing and seem correct. In principle, one can, for example, check in the HaZo'a how many things he agrees with the Gra in terms of law or interpretation and how many he disagrees with, and compare statistically to other recent scholars. My guess is that the Mishnah and the HaZo'a will reveal that their opinion agrees with the Gra's opinion to an extent that is unusual for other recent scholars.
In Rashi there are two interpretations, as is well known, and the latter have already extended that they disagree on the same investigation into the positives of harmful money. In my opinion, it is genius, even if you do not accept it in the Gemara itself. The direction is genius.
How do you measure genius? This is a broad question. But I think there is this kind of genius and that kind of genius. Why limit ourselves to just one type? By the way, I really do not agree with your criterion. It may be a measure of wisdom but not necessarily genius. Genius is related to lightning, but as mentioned, the discussion is pointless in my opinion.
I did not understand why the agreement of the prophet and the prophet is the ultimate measure of genius.
A. I think that the Gra was only referring to a linguistic interpretation and did not agree with the teaching that the obligation is rolled from the ox (or from the pit) because this does not appear in his words, even by implication. The Elfim also have surprising linguistic interpretations in the Bible commentaries, and in particular, in my opinion, this is required on the language of the Gemara and also gets in the way of the language of the Mishnah Lakman, which says “chabeti” (meaning a standing verb).
I know that some of the compliments to the Gra are the Mishnah, which wrote that the Gra's explanation is a peg on which everything depends, and the Hazoza, who sailed in his praises in the depth of the study and that he illuminated what had not been illuminated before. I understand such compliments as a claim that the Gra is saying the right things (in their eyes) and this can be verified in practice in their books, without resorting to the "testimony of the sages of his generation and his students" like the Hasidic stories about the Baal Shem. Stories can only be added as a spice. By the way, I once heard from Rabbi Mazuz "the Gra" that almost everywhere there is a dispute, I see "the Gra" is right.
A. It is certainly possible, and it is still an interpretive gloss.
I accidentally commented here instead of there https://mikyab.net/posts/74160#comment-56729
Tirgitz wrote:
[The statement is rendered approximately like this: “Not like the Ramban, maybe like the Harshba,” but it is known that this is an invention, and in particular there is nothing of it in the introduction to the Sefer Datseniuta. And there are some rabbis in the Chazo”a group who asked one of the leaders of the Chazo”a group whether a certain one from the Deshta group had reached the level of Chazo”a, and he hesitated and replied “God forbid, maybe like the Harshba.”]
And I answer:
I saw this in R’ Aharon Kotler who quotes this. In any case, regarding the introductions, see here: http://forum.otzar.org/viewtopic.php?t=32265
[I also remember reading in some book about the Gran that Rabbi Abramsky went on to elaborate on this statement and define what is between the Ramban and the Rashba, but I didn't see his words (and I remember this because I wrote it down to check what was there, and since then it's been like a dream). There's no link either, and in the usual introduction it only says that he was greater than several generations before him. I just saw https://www.nidberu.org/viewtopic.php?t=178#p1265 claiming (and quoting) that the source for the statement is Rabbi Epstein (and he is considered an extreme rabbi).]
A find in the distraction, this came up today on the Torah forum. https://www.tora-forum.co.il/viewtopic.php?f=45&t=25497&start=150#p420575
I misremembered. It is a book about R”H of Volozin (and not about the Hagar”A) and R’ Yehezkel Sarna (and not Abramsky).
[[[ It mainly piqued my curiosity, because although the Ramban was the teacher of the Rashba, etc., from the books and from the attitude of the poskim, from the little I managed to see, I got the fleeting impression that the status of the Rashba in their eyes in matters of halakhah is greater than that of the Ramban. So I interpreted the statement to myself as saying that the Ramban was more general, like the Gra, and also encompassed the area of the ′′ secret ′′ and also built a beit midrash as a new way. We are waiting for high-quality studies that will analyze the Rishonim thoroughly, because there seems to be a serious shortage in this department. I recently read a book by Rami Reiner about Rabbi Tam, and I feel that it is far from exhaustive in terms of the content of what Rabbi Tam innovated (and also in terms of Rabbi Tam's great power in grammar and biblical interpretation, as can be seen in Rabbi Tam's "decisions" on Donesh's findings on Menachem - decisions that I like very much - Reiner hardly dealt with, and it's not clear to me why). There is no comparison, but it reminded me a bit of a (poor) book called "Akiva" I once read about Rabbi Akiva by Reuven Hamer (Conservative), who in the introduction extols how much the character of Rabbi Akiva made an impression on him, and in the book explains that Rabbi Akiva ruled in favor of the poor, such as that a certain field is required to pay a fee, and that a field that is divided into several crops leaves a fee for each crop, and that there is a law of forgetting in olives, because Rabbi Akiva was merciful and compassionate (unlike the other pleasure-seeking rulers who ate the poor of their people to their heart's content). Then it was made difficult for him that there were also cases in which Rabbi Akiva was stricter against the poor in the amount of the poor's tithe and his friends ruled in favor of the poor? And he settles everything as a matter of course on his own terms that Rabbi Akiva "tried" to rule in favor of the poor. And the land was quiet. When you empty the discussion of its direct content and focus it only on trends and results, this, in my opinion, obscures the whole point of the matter. And it is clear that the Tanais themselves did not think of themselves that way, but rather that the ram strikes first and foremost, etc., meaning arguments in explanation and evidence, not interests and trends on the table. Trends have a distinct place when there are several equal options, and in any case there must be consistency in the principles of interpretation and perception. The Gemara never makes it difficult because someone is stricter and there is someone who is easier, because each thing is different. I have rambled on and after I have already written, I will spare this filth even though it is not relevant here. ]]]
Forgive me, but you shouldn't exaggerate with your comments.
You also say that there has never been a desecration of the ’ like the Haredim have ever done. Have you gone through a period in history to check?!
I guess not. So what empty things did you say?!
But it's clear to everyone that it was intended to praise the Chazon Ish.
This is not a running competition, but an attempt to associate people with periods.
In his opinion, the prophecy does not belong to the latter generation nor to the first generation (who are commentators), but to the period of the Ge'onim, who are still closely associated with the creators of the Talmud itself.
A. The explanation that the human body is his periphery as his property. I did not understand what the benefit of this explanation is since it is not a reduction because the laws are divided on whether one is liable for rape in his body and they do not teach this from property damages. And why is this a matter for admiration, I do not know. By the way, what is the ruling if a person put on a prosthesis and a rubber band came loose in rape and a stone fell and hit a tool? Is it property and exempt or his body and liable.
B. You wrote that there is room to reconcile the words of the Rabbi and the words are ancient. Is there anything in the scriptures? [As for the fact that he did not bother to consider his words against the words of the Rabbi, I do not see anything special in this. Even the few who fear the strictness of every Rishonim system have no problem giving a scholarly lesson that only works with certain Rishonim systems, and in particular if the words of the dissenting Rabbi are particularly harsh and ”we are not his students in this” As the saying goes, "Reject the words of the first important one with contempt and without justification." There is no contempt here, and he certainly has a well-organized and organized justification.]
C. [By the way, if we are already referring to Khozari as the source of the method that has five stages, then it is worth noting that the grammarian Menachem ben Saruk preceded him, who wrote in the introduction to his notebook: "And as he made a distinction between everything that has a soul of life in its nature and between man with the advantage of a language, so he made a distinction between his people and the nations of the earth."]
D. Concealing sources (such as Rabbi Kook) is really not a mentality and atmosphere that small businessmen and their flatterers instill, but rather it is something that begins with great greats from the Chazon Ish onward (and there are also Hasidisms in America that specialize in this very well). And they consider it an educational matter that if they give respect to a certain figure, it is likely to cause havoc that they will come to deviate after the group that is currently considered to be his followers. In my opinion, this is logical and reasonable where the realistic concern exists.
E. Bringing a quote in the column where Rabbi Shimon compares what is obligatory in the Torah of Laws to what is obligatory to obey God, namely the decision of reason. Rabbi Shimon uses the same reasoning to explain his words to the Ramban, “And just as the reason agrees to listen to the voice of God, so the reason decrees to be careful in everything that the sages have warned.” So it seems that with him it is the same reasoning itself, and therefore Mar said Hada and Sagya Mazuz above said Hada and not Plegy.
A. His fundamental claim was that man is the soul, and therefore the body is also a periphery. In my opinion, it is a very good explanation. The educational benefit is explained in the aforementioned Si’ in his book.
B. I don't remember that I have it. But searching for it there and on the net will yield you several references.
C. Nice. I'm not sure that it can be deduced from the Kuzari nor from the Didach scribe.
D. I don't recognize the vision. And the Hasidim are not evidence for anything.
E. What I meant was that my words also apply to the Ramban. Although it should be noted that the Rabbis have a disagreement with the Ramban, where the rabbis really have to disagree (as the Kosh claims in his Kondash, that if there is a Sabra, then it is from the Torah, and again, the rabbinic doubt should be a grave one. But according to my understanding of the status of Sabras in the Kabbalah).
C. Indeed
D. But what does it have to do with the pincha eaters? I read in several places that it is “acceptable” that this is how the prophet assumed. Rabbi Zucker in Rambam Frankel did not bring Rabbi Kook (nor the Lubavitcher Rebbe) and he never ate any pincha. I heard that Rabbi Kanievsky, on the path of faith, does not bring any. So the criticisms are directed at them. An incident whose details I have forgotten, where Hasidism in America (perhaps Stamer) censored Rabbi Shach and Steifler Had Gadya Had Gadya from their comments on Mehrît Elgazi.
There is a difference between not citing a source and citing things without citing the source. The evidence was omitted by Rambam Frankel (mainly on seeds) and not cited without a source. And in this case I have first-hand testimony (from an author who worked there on the project) that it was due to public pressure (it is true that it is also pressure from zealous rabbis).
Reminds me of the Rache’s instruction not to mention Leibovitz by name, and so I corrected it in my article that was published in the Midday: Prof. L (I insisted that they write a note below that this was done by the editor and not on my opinion). This is in contrast to Ben-Gurion the Tzadik who appears there in all his glory and with his full name.
You can not bring it at all, bring it with an unspecified name (“I heard” and so on), or bring it with one's own name. Bringing it with one's own name has the problem of being adorned with feathers that are not his. But with an unspecified name, what is worse than bringing it at all? The idea that one drinks from their waters and does not mention their names was not born yesterday.
The abbreviation of L. is a signal to readers about Tzohar's sectoral (and political) position, and some kind of careless attempt to shape the boundaries of the discourse and push Leibowitz's words over the fence, is evident mainly because of his political views and less because of philosophical subtleties. I think they are also quite successful at this technique (and the Haredim are also quite successful at it). And as for paternalism, it is no different from not including a certain person's books in the yeshivah library, which is common practice (and it is very likely that this is also not a decision of yeshivah businessmen but of the yeshivah heads). Ben-Gurion's abbreviation doesn't do this job and I see no room for comparison. It's not that we avoid mentioning the name of an evil person, but rather we avoid mentioning names if in this avoidance there is a signal that we want to send and an educational message that we want to convey in order to prevent influence.
I, the little one, also had the privilege of hearing lessons from him in his room at the Itri Yeshiva. We went there with some Abrechem from the Har Etzion Yeshiva nearly thirty years ago. He left a great impression on me of his love of Torah and modesty. I remember once someone harshly criticized one of the last. He smiled and said, "And the last ones, 'I am him.'" May his memory be blessed.
It should be noted that in Drosh 15, in his well-known remarks on validity, he did mention the book Adar HaKhirah, which claims exactly what he was trying to prove. Although, of course, without mentioning Rav Kook's name (and it is to be assumed that the average reader of Beit Yishai does not know what Adar HaKhirah is).
Take comfort, even on ultra-Orthodox sites the mention was quite minor.
Regarding whether the Amoraim can disagree on conditions:
The rabbi writes in several places under the title of the Kesef Mishnah (Memarim) that the Talmud requires that the people of Israel accept it upon themselves.
The Kesef Mishnah there writes that this is the reason why the Amoraim do not disagree on conditions.
In the column, you criticized the R.P. for this (even though he himself accepted the principle of Israel accepting the Talmud).
In the article on validity, the rabbi commented that in the opinion of the Meiri, the Amoraim disagreed on conditions even without regard to validity. There is indeed some good evidence for this (both in the Meiri himself and in other places, besides, there are several rishonim who expressed themselves in such a way that the Amoraim disagree on conditions without regard to validity, for example in the response to the Rishonim). And the rabbi did not write why this claim of the Meiri is incorrect, apparently because of the assumption that Israel's acceptance is binding and then there is no need to justify it.
I would like to note that Maimonides did not accept the entire Talmud just because all of Israel accepted it, but rather it is clear from his words that there is an additional condition, which is that the laws that appear in the Talmud were ruled upon in a court that ruled several years before the signing of the Talmud. And it seems that Maimonides believes that the Talmud is only a protocol that transmits to us the discussions and laws that were ruled upon (or not finally ruled upon) in the court. Therefore, we see in his words that he distances himself from the study of the Talmud because the study of it is complicated and it is difficult to distinguish between the essential and the trivial.
My main argument is that it is not certain that the acceptance of Israel alone has the power to bind from a formal halachic point of view and that the court is also necessary. Therefore, it is very possible that the Amoraim disagreed on the conditions by definition.
I didn't understand the comment about the kes”m.
The fact that Amoraim do not dispute the Tanâ'im is proven by the fact that in the entire Talmud, when there is a dispute about an Amora from a Tanâ'im source, his words are rejected. If an Amora can dispute a Tanâ'im, then why is he excited by difficulties from Tanâ'im sources?
I didn't understand your statement about Rambam at the end. Which Rambam do you mean? All the laws that appear in the Talmud were decided in the Great Council? This is absurd.
The Amoraim assumed that the Tannaim were greater than them, and therefore they were excited to hear that their words disagreed with the Tannaim. Just as when I discover that I disagree with the Rambam, before I say, “This is my opinion,” I will try to examine where my mistake is and how it is possible that the Rambam was wrong, and I will find excuses and justifications or I will be convinced and retract. This is natural and logical. And in extreme cases, I will say, “So what the Rambam said, then he was wrong.”
Regarding the Rambam, in the introduction to the Mishnah Torah he wrote:
“And the great court of seventy is invalid from a few years before the compilation of the Talmud.”
Not all the laws in the Talmud were decided in a court, but rather the laws that were decided in the Great Court are binding, and not all the laws in the Talmud, see the article by Professor Yair Loberbaum, "Is it true, according to the Maimonides, that the Babylonian Talmud is the book of law because all Israel agreed on it?", which clarifies the Maimonides' words further in the introduction that it is not the "Talmud" that is binding, but only the "decrees, regulations, and customs" (excluding "laws") established by the sages that are cited in the Talmud, which according to the Maimonides is a protocol of a seminary that also includes binding rulings that were decided in a court that existed until shortly before the Talmud was signed.
See also Dr. Hagai Pelai's article "The Validity of the Talmud and the Quality of the Mishnah Torah According to the Method of Maimonides: A Revised Study" (in: Dini Yisrael, Vol. 34, 1981, p. 240). There he wrote that Israel's acceptance of the Talmud is a necessary condition for its authority, but not a sufficient condition.
And also in the book Tal Chaim (Rules of Instruction, Section 3 - The Validity of the Babylonian Talmud, Section 2).
And in Shlomo Zalman Havlin's article "On the Literary Signature as the Foundation of the Division into Periods in Halacha" (In: Studies in Talmudic Literature, Seminar on the occasion of Shaul Lieberman's eightieth birthday, p. 170) Discusses the matter and cites the Chazon Ish's reservations about R. I. Caro's explanation and also cites R. A. Wasserman's words on this issue.
This not only returns the matter to the Amora's further consideration, but also solemnly rejects it by stating: "Tyuvta." This means that the Gemara generally ignores the possibility that the Amora disagrees with the Tanna, meaning that he can disagree as he pleases, but that is of no interest to anyone outside, except for a few who are Tannaites and deviants.
Is there also a source in the words of the Rambam or just references to various articles? I highly doubt whether this has a source in the Rambam.
On the 19th of Kislev, 5772
I was present twice when Rabbi Fisher gave a talk on the occasion of Independence Day.
The first was at the end of the lecture he gave every Friday afternoon to students from the Western Wall Yeshiva (in his home at 11 Salant Street on the outskirts of the Mea Shearim neighborhood). At the end of the lecture, Rabbi Fisher spoke a little on the occasion of the upcoming Independence Day, and invoked the verse in Isaiah: ‘Woe to me, the traitors have betrayed and the traitor has betrayed the traitors’, and said: ‘Traitors have betrayed– These are the Zionists who broke the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven, but also ‘Treachery of traitors’ – Whoever betrays the Zionists is considered a traitor to the Jewish people.
Perhaps the words are close to what is said about Rabbi Chaim Ozer of Vilna, who opposed the boycott initiated by the Zionists on goods from Nazi Germany out of fear that it would only increase the persecution of Jews, but when asked why he did not publicly oppose the boycott, the rabbi replied: "Just as we were commanded not to rebel against the nations, so we are also forbidden to rebel against the Israeli nation." (These words are quoted in the introduction of Rabbi Yehuda Henkin to his book "Response of the Children of Men: In the Name of His Grandfather, Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin).
The second time was on Independence Day night in the "Torah Cohanim" yeshiva. (now Ateret Cohanim) near its foundation, when it was in the Mughrabim House on Ma'ale Chaldia Street (now Yeshiva Shuvo Banim). Rabbi Fischer brought the well-known hint of the 1st of Passover. That Passover falls on the day of the week on which Tisha B'Av falls, that Monday of Passover falls on the day of the week on which Shavuot falls, etc.
And here Rabbi Fischer comes to the letter Z, and everyone expects him to continue that on the 7th of Passover, Independence Day, falls. But Rabbi Fischer continues: Z of Passover is parallel to the ’woods’, the day of the offering of the wood on 15th of Av began on the day of the week on which the seventh of Passover fell.
Everywhere Rabbi Fischer voiced the least expected idea in the same place. In his home on the outskirts of Mea Shearim – he gave a ‘Zionist sermon’ that those who betray the Zionists – betray it’, and not before the ’Zionist Yeshiva’ he refuted the reference to Independence Day, thereby expressing his independence and non-affiliation with any sector.
With greetings, Shࢭz
Rabbi Yair Haralp (grandson of Rabbi Haralp) quotes from Rabbi Fisher's words about Rabbi Haralp in his article "The gaon who beat Torah all over the country" (on the Channel 7 website).
Rabbi Fisher said that he attended Rabbi Haralp's funeral, and there were people who opposed Rabbi Haralp because of his connections with Rabbi Kook, and asked the deceased for forgiveness.
Rabbi Fisher said that his father Rabbi Aharon (who was a member of the ‘ultra-Orthodox community’ admired Rabbi Haralf’s prayer, and whenever he learned that Rabbi Haralf was going to pray at the Western Wall, Rabbi Aharon would also go to the Western Wall to be with Rabbi Haralf during his prayer. Rabbi Fisher also said that people who heard Rabbi Haralf’s ‘reciting the Shema’ were awakened to repentance.
Rabbi Yair Haralf says that he hosted Rabbi Fisher several times at his home in Mevaseret Zion (when he studied at the Rabbinical School of Meretz), and he would ask him about matters that were only covered by the students of the ’Kollel’ and the Rabbi Fisher wrote long and detailed responses.
It appears that his questioners have many responses, comments, and Torah innovations that Rabbi Fisher gave to his many questioners. It seems to me that it would be appropriate to collect these writings and publish the most important ones (in coordination with his family).
With best wishes, Sh”t
And the lack of mention in the media is not at all surprising. The media will be interested in a rabbi, only if he has political influence (or is suspected of criminal offenses. 🙂 And since the rabbi Fischer dealt only with the Torah of God, which was his passion day and night, he was not heard of by the media.
And I remember that the media were amazed at the funeral of the rabbi Auerbach, which was attended by about 300,000 people, and asked: How come we didn't hear about him until his last day?
For many years, the Israeli television building was on Torah Mitzion Street, and those seeking records said that after all, it is the true mission of the television to spread the Torah in the world. But unfortunately, the media have not yet internalized this mission. But do not despair. The redemption of Israel is coming, little by little, and in time the vessel will be filled with its contents.
With greetings, Hanoch Hanach Feinschmecker-Palti
On the 21st of Kislev, 5772 (the year of the Gershwin Frank)
On the Shabbat, a large article was published, "desirable to most of his brothers," in which his family and students shed light on interesting points in the path and method of the Gershwin Fischer.
Among other things, his daughter Hanna Kehat says that he made her a Zionist and gave her the writings of Rabbi Kook. She says that her father sharply criticized the non-mobilization of yeshiva students in the IDF, and that is why she decided that she would only marry a yeshiva student who served in the IDF.
She says that Rabbi Fischer would say a full Hallel on Jerusalem Day as a thank you for the rescue, but he did not say a Hallel on Independence Day, because on that day the great danger had just begun, as the next day all Arab armies invaded the land, and only after a while did victory come and one could breathe a sigh of relief. She said that the rabbi's "Zionist fervor" moderated somewhat after the Oslo Accords and the Intifada.
The article also discusses his admiration for "Chazon Ish", his connections with "Baba Sali" (when he was the rector of the Negev Yeshiva in Netivot), and the encouragement and guidance he gave to the founders of "Hamakom" who deal with distant relations in Tel Aviv.
With greetings, Hafs Palti
The problem of Independence Day being set on the day the war broke out and not on Victory Day was addressed by the eminent Rabbi David Shloush, the rabbi of Netanya, who was also known for his immense genius and original and independent approach. In his response to Independence Day (in response to Hemda Genuza), Rabbi Shloush says that it was appropriate to recite the Hallel for the salvation in the War of Independence on the third day of Sivan, when the “first truce” began, when it was discovered that the “wheel had turned” and the invaders, who seemed to be winning easily, found themselves forced to ask for a “time-out.” Therefore, Rabbi Shloush recommended that the Hallel of the Shavuot also commemorate the miracle of salvation in the War of Independence.
On the 24th of Kislev, 5772
In his lesson (on the Torah of the Hebrews) (on the Yeshiva website), the Rabbi brings the words of Rabbi Tzadok in explaining the Midrash that the Land of Canaan is a land of prakmatia, which refers to spiritual goods. The Rabbi says that they are as hard as iron because they have a backbone, and therefore their Torah is not the mitzvah of learned people. They are not fixed, but are open to hearing a different opinion in an attempt to understand its reasons. In this way, the Rabbi explained the words of Rabbi Aharon of Karlin: ‘I exalt you’ because you have made me an open door’ to receive a different opinion from other sages.
Listening to all methods enables a scholar to reach a more well-founded decision. And his openness leads him to firmness when he has reached a decision. Here, two seemingly opposite qualities come together: ‘hard as iron’ and ’pleasant to each other in Halacha’.
And these things are close to the words of Rabbi Kook in the Book of the Law, who said that peace is multiplied in the world, that precisely through the multiplication of opinions and the debate between them – peace is strengthened, which comes from a mutual understanding of the point of truth in each opinion, and their complementing each other This.
With regards, Hanoch Hanach Feinschmecker-Pelti
Elsewhere I suggested that ’education’ is derived from ’inauguration of a house’ which is the final stage of the building – placing the door. Education gives a person the tools to listen and also to the opinions outside of him, while making an informed decision whether to open the door to them or to close it.
Unfortunately and to the sorrow of all the students and the family of the PA, the entire article in B’Besheva is full of lies. One could say that the whole, but the entire article is one big lie. And even the little that is factually correct was only brought forward to establish the conceptual lie of the article and was found to be suitable for that, but if it had not worked out, they would have also turned the correct facts around for themselves, just as they did for what did not suit them.
Some of the things were maliciously distorted as follows, and some were misunderstood (for example, what is described there about a certain wedding that was also mentioned here in the comments above, Ayyash, and they did not know and did not understand that his consent was given as the lesser of two evils and that too only so that they would accept his opinion on other matters that they wanted to do there or in general, which are essential to the actual consecration or to matters of Judaism and so on).
For those who did not know, I must state firmly [those who did know do not need me]: The PA did not teach his family Zionism! Neither he nor she were Zionists. Yes, she was not a Zionist at all until she got married!! [The author herself almost married an ultra-Orthodox and Hasidic anti-military man, if not for the fact that they would have rejected her at the last minute or her father had them removed because he thought they were not suitable for her level of education and Torah knowledge. In the end, she married an IDF graduate with no choice - and until they were married, they kept the PA from her father because he certainly wouldn't have let it come up at all - just because she couldn't find a match in her community, and it would have been a great blow to the PA, as the family knows], and the fact that he went along with her errors was only to avoid alienating her even on the right, lest perhaps there might be hope that her descendants would return to the path of the PA.
Also, God forbid, to hang on the PA Buki Sariki as if he said Hillel on Jerusalem Day, and as if he would also say it on Independence Day if not for a side reason. This is such shallow nonsense, doesn't everyone know how much he spoke against the fantasy called independence when the state can't do anything without coordinating with the UN or America, and even more, he was a jerk and an idiot who was there to mock the PA's independence celebrations.
But may he not have said all this in front of the writer so as not to offend her, but all his tens of thousands of students know this, as well as his attitude towards Zionism and 'Mizrahi'. How stupid and malicious it is to present as if he had something in favor of Zionism and still write 'Lesotho'?!!
And let alone that he was not in favor of conscripting Jews into the army!! After all, everyone who participated in the symposiums that were held at every Heder Yeshiva that the PA hosted on Shabbat heard from him how forbidden it is to go to the army. However, in these places, he did not state the various and well-known reasons that he actually had in his mind, but preferred to say in the manner of ‘to your taste’, including your opinion and opinion on the army, how can you hand yourselves and your sons over to generals and commanders who make decisions based on personal interests and are willing to sacrifice the lives of others for personal advancement and intrigues, etc., and he would go on and on listing countless examples of cases that actually happened.
And there are other things in the article that are distorted as necessary to present the PA as the writers want and to present his image according to their needs. But am I slow as a cheap and cheap peddler? Is what I wrote enough for everyone to know that not a single word of what is written there should be trusted.
And I will only add that precisely about that article and the writers, the PA wrote a will, and this is the only will he saw fit to write and not about anything else, and this was read during the funeral, in which he forbids publishing things he said or wrote or that were recorded from him without obtaining the permission of his sons. With an emphasis on his sons and not his daughters. And so on.
Wow, what slander is being directed at the R”P Z”L. You present him as the last of the foolish dark ones. If he really was like that, then the feeling of reading these things is really unpleasant.
I did not know him and I do not know what the truth is in all these points. What I do know is that for some reason, after a more open Haredi rabbi dies (like R’ Gedaliah Nadel), a war begins to distort his legacy, and for some reason his family members take care to hide the inappropriate aspects of his words. And Z”L.
You wrote - After that he added about an hour more in the legend, and I must say that I was disappointed there. I don't remember the content of the words, but my impression was that in the legend he didn't say anything unusual and his words were similar to the accepted verses.
Regarding the sermons
it seems impossible to separate them from his deep understanding of Kabbalah and all the literature of thought, etc.; something that is evident in the book and in the text, it gives the possibility of seeing the sermons as just a platform for something more substantial
and in general – how is it possible without emphasizing the control of the revealed and the hidden together, which is not a broken vision
It is worth emphasizing that the rabbi was an extreme example of a man who had nothing to do with, neither desires nor dislikes. He lived his entire life according to what he thought the law and reason required. In the Eti yeshiva he had fierce opponents because of his opinions, but they also admitted that the rabbi was (as his fierce opponent defined it) "from the world of nobility". If he did not do something because of his wife, he considered it his duty.
In Atbash, the Rabbi was wrong. And by a huge margin.
After all, the Feast of Tabernacles was known throughout all generations, yet they didn't write it down.
So it's not true, it's not serious.
(Not significant enough)
And maybe they thought it was a holiday that belonged to a redemption that was to come, or maybe not.
But they didn't choose to fill the square with tree sacrifices…
We can agree that independence is the square (redemption from Egypt - redemption from the enslavement of kingdoms) (redemption that begins at the hands of man, Nachshon-Ben Gurion) (redemption that is only the beginning of the growth of our redemption and not a complete redemption, an exodus from Egypt and their rule and not yet an entry into the land that was promised and I gave it to you, I am the Authorized One - only an exodus from the enslavement of kingdoms, the Holocaust and the destruction of the Jewish people, the gathering of exiles and not yet the Temple and complete redemption) We can also argue.
But putting up a scarecrow instead of a man is already funny.
To answer
In the book of the 15th of Av, the 15th of Av is not a ‘dahlil’ in relation to Independence Day. ‘Thu B'Av is remembered in the same breath as Yom Kippur, as days of unparalleled good for Israel, and as explained in the Gemara, its affairs are great.
‘Thu B'Av is the day that ‘Mati Mabtar’ was decreed, and in this the Israelites received a hint from above that the punishment for the sin of the spies, the sin of the slanderer in the land of pleasure, was lightened. See also Nathaniel Allinson's article, ‘The Wine Festival at the Vineyards of Shiloh’ (on the website ‘Mosaf Shabbat – Makor Rishon’), that the joy in the vineyards is connected with the joy of the harvest that occurs during this period. Tu B'Av, when people rejoice over the new fruits – is a correction to the weeping on Tisha B'Av that came from a lack of belief that the land is very, very good.
On Tu B'Av, several events occurred that express the strengthening of the unity of the people of Israel. On this day, all the tribes were allowed to marry each other, on this day the tribe of Benjamin was allowed to come in the congregation, and on this day the guards that prevented the tribes of the Kingdom of Israel from going to Jerusalem were lifted. The ‘Berlin Wall’ which tore the people of Israel into two rival kingdoms – The 5th of Av collapsed and the consciousness returned that ’we are all sons of one man and rested’.
5th of Av is the beginning of the journey of restoration of the people and man. After the mourning of ‘times between Egypt’ – we begin nearby ‘Sheva Danechama’, in which hope and anticipation of salvation are emphasized. ‘Thu B'Av is also the time of addition in Torah study in the sense of ‘adding and going’.
The love for the Land of Israel and the anticipation of renewing the connection to its land and of bringing forth its holy fruits, and the desire to be built in it according to the Torah – It was the basis for Jewish immigration to Israel, while establishing new neighborhoods and settlements, an aspiration that led to a situation in 1988 of ‘sixty thousand’ Jews in the country. ‘A critical mass’ that made the Jewish settlement in the country a factor that cannot be ignored.
The tens of thousands of Jews who immigrated to Israel during the Ottoman period and expanded its settlement – starting with the members of the old settlement in 1988, who established the first neighborhood outside the walls, and continuing with the first colony of the new settlement of Rishon LeZion, which was founded on 15th of Av 1982 – They were the ones who made the Jewish community a factor that could not be ignored, and thanks to them, the League of Nations decided in San Remo on the 5th of Iyar 1981 to adopt the Balfour Declaration, which designated the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, a decision that “removed the fear of the Shavuot” (in the words of Rabbi Meir Simcha HaCohen) and was realized twenty-eight years later, on the 5th of Iyar 1981.
The miraculous unity of the tribes of Israel was also expressed in the 5th of Iyar (the 5th of Av is its subject). On this day, all the currents, from the Israelite Association to the Communist Party, managed to unite, and agreed together on the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, a state whose gates would be open to any Jew to immigrate to. On the 1st of Av, the “proselytes” that prevented Jews from immigrating to Jerusalem were lifted, and on the 1st of Iyar, the “proselytes” that prevented Jews from immigrating to the land were lifted.
Great victories on the battlefield also occurred on the same day. In Jerusalem, the Jews captured the territories of “Bovignard” that the British had evacuated, and the Jews were given military control of the city. Jaffa was also captured on the same day. By the Etzel fighters. This means: the Jews gained full control over the two major centers of the country, and from there they could go into battle to expand their control over a large part of the land.
In conclusion:
Thu B'Av symbolizes the aspiration to maintain Jewish life on the land of Israel from the unity of all the tribes, while Bay Iyar symbolizes the beginning of the fulfillment of these aspirations, aspirations that will be based on the vision of "Bring it and taste it on the mountain of your inheritance," a vision that was set forth in the Song of the Sea on the seventh of Passover.
With greetings, Amioz Yaron Schnitzel
Perhaps the connection between Tul B'Av and the seventh of Pesach also stems from Tul B'Av being a time for finding a match, which Chazal considered to be the "parting of the Red Sea". In every pairing of two people with different personalities and their connection to one being, there is something miraculous. Its success depends on the willingness of the two to "jump into the sea", to go into the unknown with the faith that it will be good.
The two days chosen to engage in finding a match - Tul B'Av and Yom Kippur - are days on which the sin of not accepting a new reality is corrected. Yom Kippur, on which we received the second tablets, expresses the correction of the sin of the calf, because of which we lost the first tablets. Tu B'Av expresses the correction of the sin of the spies, which caused the generation to lose the land
When the heart is opened to receive the Torah and receive the land, the heart can also be opened to bring a new partner into life
With blessings, Simcha Fishel Halevi Plankton
On the 7th of Kislev, 5722
In his book ‘Peri Tzadik’ between Parshiyot and Etachanan and Ekeb, Rabbi Tzadok HaCohen expands on the concerns of Tu B'Av. He advances the explanation that at the time of the Temple, Tu B'Av was the beginning of a seven-day holiday, the seventh day of which was Tu B'Av, on which Israel rejoiced that they had been granted the privilege of entering the Land of Israel.
He also states that in the future the Temple will be built on Tu B'Av, and his source is the words of the Mishnah on the Fast: ‘There were no good days for Israel on the fifteenth of Av and Yom Kippur’ The concluding verse ‘And so he says: The daughters of Zion looked upon and saw King Solomon in the crown that his mother crowned him on the day of his wedding and on the day of the joy of his heart. On the day of his wedding – this is the giving of the Torah; and on the day of the joy of his heart – this is the building of the Temple’.
Rabbi Tzadok interprets that just as Tik is the day of the giving of the second tablets – so Tuk B’Av will be the day of the building of the Temple in the future, and as explained in the Pesikta that the future Temple will be built in the month of Av, and from the words of the Mishnah on fasting he understands that the building of the future Temple will be on Tuk B’Av.
The reasons mentioned in the Gemara and the Midrashim, express, according to Rabbi Tzadok, the correction of the sins that caused the destruction – Jealousy, lust and honor – as Rabbi Yoel Friedman briefly stated on behalf of Rabbi Tzadok, in his article ‘There were no good days for Israel like Tu B'Av’, on the ‘Torah and Land Institute’ website.
With blessings, Yeruham Fish’Tel Noach Kortman
In the medieval piyyut ‘Yotzer Tu B'Av’, Tu B'Av is described as a day of forgiveness, on which ‘it is good for the mother of sons to rejoice, this day is for joy, for it is a day of forgiveness ready to be a release for the nation from the bondage of Noah’, and this explains the parallel to Yom Kippur.
Even in Hasidic literature, Tu B'Av is noted as the day on which preparations begin for the days of mercy and repentance. And the Rebbe Rabbi Chaim Elazar of Munketch explained that Tu is forty days before the creation of the world (Wikipedia entry ‘Tu b'Av (Moed)’, note 21).
Schnitzel and Plankton.
Indeed, Tu Bab is wonderful.
And he is charming, he is special, he is unique, he is the root, he is the foundation, he is everything, and everything depends on him.
Wonderful.
The idea is frightening.
It's just that it was known in all generations and in any case they didn't attach it to Etbash…
So it seems a little funny, the escape to the sacrifice of trees…
And on the contrary, if it really belongs to the beginning of redemption and he is the foundation and he is the root..
What did the Rabbis gain when he ran away’ what did he do to Tob Bab?
I think it turned out even more unsuccessful
…
Have you gone through all the Torah literature of the last few centuries and can you say with certainty that the idea of Z – ‘Etsim’ did not come up or was mentioned in any book? Rabbi Fischer was immensely knowledgeable and immensely sharp. Perhaps he found the idea in a book that was somehow remote, and perhaps he renewed the idea in its simplicity even before 1988?
Or perhaps he simply wanted to challenge the students with the opportunity to propose a new solution outside the familiar box? And as his rabbi said, he predicted that scholarship is also the ability to deviate from the usual illustration.
With greetings, Hanoch Hanach Feinschmecker-Palti
Paragraph 1, line 3
… and perhaps he renewed the idea with his sharpness…
Paragraph 2, line 2
… to deviate from the habitual thought…
In the Wikipedia entry "Tzofen Atebash", the two explanations for "Zechariah" and "Atzmaut" appear without citing a source. For "Zechariah" I found it on the Facebook page of the Minister of Religious Services Matan Kahane, who mentioned the book "Natevi Am" by Rabbi Amram Avorbia, who was the rabbi of Petach Tikva, who wrote it. Regarding "Thu B'Av", I still need to search.
In any case, I have already shown that the 15th of Av, when we celebrate love for the land and unity among the people of Israel, is parallel to Independence Day, when we once again realize these values, and the fact that the two dates fall on the same day of the week beautifully expresses this connection.
With greetings, Hafs Palti
By the way, Independence Day almost never falls on the 15th of Iyar, because on the 15th of Iyar, the 15th of Iyar does not fall, and when the 15th of Iyar falls on a Monday, it is postponed to a Tuesday (so that Shabbat is not desecrated during the events of Memorial Day). And when the 15th of Iyar falls on a Friday or Saturday, it is postponed to a Tuesday. It is brought forward to Thursday (so that Shabbat is not violated during Independence Day celebrations). Only when the 1st of Iyar falls on the fourth day of the week, Independence Day remains at its original time.
However, I think the rabbis understood that even when Independence Day is brought forward or postponed, and it is not celebrated on the 1st of Iyar, they still mark the 1st of Iyar by not reciting Tachanun (as was the custom of Ben-Gurion, who did not recite either Hillel or Tachanun on Independence Day 🙂
And after we went to clarify the hint in the Itav of the days of Passover, Pesach Gav, to clarify what would happen on the ‘D”K’ which is ‘Kiriat HaTorah’, we would celebrate Simchat Torah in the Diaspora starting on the second day of Shemini Atzeret. But in Israel, we celebrate Simchat Torah on the previous day?
And here I found a solution: K’ we would celebrate ‘Kuk’, that on the fourth day of Passover, – it fell on the 1st of Elul, the day of the passing of Rabbi Kook, the late Rabbi, and from now on we have a full Itav for the people of the Land of Israel as well! Since the 3rd of Tishrei is my birthday, it can also be said that for my children, the 1st of Passover is also parallel to the 1st of Kortman 🙂
With blessings, Yeruham Fishel Noah Kortman
Rabbi Yitzhak Ginsburg found another clue to the 1st of P, which is also the 1st of the Torah, the 1st of Omer, starting on the same day of the week as the sixth day of Passover.
Paragraph 2, line 3
… D’ DPassover is also parallel…
I'm pretty sure he didn't have a tendency to hide ‘Rabbi Kook’, and many sources are not explicitly mentioned in his lessons. In any case, I wouldn't base anything on condemning him based on the impressions of one lesson
In any case, I was in his class on Friday, Elul, and he said things in memory of ‘Rabbi Z”L’ and he composed Yesod in ’Orot Teshuva’ according to his opinion on the matter of ‘Bekah vab Poel’.
On the 2nd of Kislev, 2nd of February
Ltavā – Yoma Teva,
Ramada–a's question that the Rabbi does not mention Rabbi Kook regarding the investigation of whether the people of Israel are a fifth type or a "desert" with an additional level is not a start, since this discussion has existed for centuries before the Rabbi, and as the Rabbi brought sources for this, and there are probably additional sources that the Rabbi did not mention.
With greetings, , Aisha
This question has also been discussed extensively in Chabad thought. Summary and sources in the pamphlet of Rabbi Yoel Cohen's "Rev. 1: The Essence of Israel," which is attached to his book "Issues in Hasidism."
http://forum.otzar.org/viewtopic.php?f=19&t=58001&start=40#p736446
Things that Rabbi Meir Dorfman (I don't know) wrote about Rabbi Fischer.
On that occasion, he expressed his criticism of the publication of Shabtai Frenkel, which, along with the sources, ignored the writings of Rabbi Kook. ‘Wouldn't it have been appropriate to include “Shabbat Ha'aretz” in the laws of Shemitah and Yuval, for example?’ He also mentioned the well-known incident of the Abreech who worked in the editing of books for the ‘Yerusalem Institute’, who refused to cite sources from Rabbi Kook, and was fired by the director of the institute, Rabbi Boxbaum. The avrach sued the director of the Institute for Torah Jurisprudence before Rabbi Elyashiv, who completely justified the director of the Institute. “After all, Rabbi Elyashiv and his family were like one family of Rabbi Kook,” said Rabbi Shlomo, “and how did this attitude change? Do you really want to know what the great men of the world thought of Rabbi Kook? Let them read the “Letters to the Lord,” letters that the great men of Israel sent to Rabbi Kook, with what lofty titles they crown him. But who? The zealots say: Whoever wrote him letters needed his help with finances, obtaining a certificate, and so on, and therefore they wrote to him in such a respectable manner. And to that I say: In this they added sin to sin. Have all the great men of Israel, in their eyes, become a sect of flatterers?
To the Tz – Shalom Rav,
Rabbi Shlomo Fisher followed the method of his predecessor, who recommended studying the books of Rabbi Kook in Halacha, but the R”P also consulted the books of Rabbi Kook in thought. Above, I mentioned the words of his daughter Hanna Kehat, that it was my father who gave her the writings of Rabbi Kook for study. Her words were quoted in the article ‘Ratsoi Rabu Ahiyu’ (on the ‘Rats 7′ website)
The same article also quotes the words of Rabbi and Cantor R’ Meir Dorfman about his predecessor, who encouraged him in establishing the Center for Jewish Studies ‘Hamakom’ in Tel Aviv, and told him that today those who are far away are considered to be secular, since many of them are already third generation secularists. The PA warned him not to demand that visitors wear a kippah or dress modestly.
With greetings, Yafa'r
In the same article, it is said that the Rash”p visited the Chaz”a in his youth and asked him for advice on perseverance in learning. The Chaz”a advised him to study with those who were weaker than him. It seems that its origin is in the words of Chaz‘l and Malmidei more than all, that the need to explain to someone who is weaker than him – brings the learner to sharpen his understanding, and as a person's study is clear and orderly – his desire to learn increases.
With best wishes, Yaron Fish”l Ordner
To Feinschmeicker.
The Atbash is mentioned countless times.
Nowhere is the wood mentioned until the date of the Haresh.
And even if it is found in some remote source, it itself says "Darshani"
Why only some remote source and not everyone said yes?
Apparently it is not a serious wood offering
And if in any case he said yes before 556 (I don't think so) and in 556 something renewed from the guides of honesty, he had to retract it and say in accordance with what we have seen.
To summarize, it seems more like a fashel .
Regarding the words of Rabbi Shekap, his words are puzzling in every possible way
A. Ostensibly, when Rabbi Shimon Shekap speaks about the law of reason and cognition, he is not speaking about the tool and instrument that identifies the obligation of natural human morality = the moral sense.
That there is no reason to say that there is some sense of justice here that identifies the boundaries of ownership even before the giving of the Torah
He is not speaking about the tool to identify the value that must be served by God, but about the very source and root of that obligation,
And it is clear that the reason for the obligation is God Himself and not the human mind, the human mind is only the tool with which I encounter the reality of God, and in the feeling that His reality obliges me to keep the commandments, and therefore his words are a basic philosophical error
B. As for the body of his words, Rabbi Shimon came to say that the distinction between mammon and prohibition in the laws of doubt stems from this, that is, according to human reason, there is no need to be strict in place of doubt, and therefore, although according to the Torah or revelation, it is always appropriate to be strict in place of doubt, it nevertheless fails to organize and define and change the moral obligation itself not to steal and give it such material,
That is, it seems to understand that God cannot change the perception of what is moral, which is necessary only according to reason and knowledge, and He can only command to observe these moral laws,
Or in other words, the reason that I do not steal is not related to her but to the friend, and therefore it is not strict to prohibit doubt, and in any case it has no relevance to her To be stricter than my conscience demands against the friend himself
And we see there in chapter 1, that he understood that from these laws of reason and knowledge, the theft of a shilling is also forbidden, and this is the innovation of the Torah and the king's decree to permit them, that is, he does not unite morality with revelation, to create from it a single obligation between man and his fellow man, which reason and God together teach and draw its boundaries, but rather creates a rupture and dichotomy between the law of morality and reason and knowledge, which are separate, and the Torah, which is separate and there is a king's decree to prohibit spiking,
And one of the hypocrites in the yeshiva I taught was already indignant and asked, since the Gemara explains that a wrongdoer buys with attraction and a Jew with money, does the law of reason and knowledge also reveal this or is it indeed an innovation of the Torah, and what is his attitude towards that imaginary law of justice?
C. For what reason does R/’ Shimon needs to go this complicated way, what is not simple and clear in the argument that the M'ha applies only to money because indeed a discourse of rights can influence the laws of sfikut and permit prohibitions, and precisely in the same plane in which a presumptive right influences and permits the conduct of sfikut, so the power of possession can influence and cause me not to be enslaved to lose my side of loss in order not to enter the other's boundary.
And that this reasoning defines the laws of conducting sfikut and also succeeds in permitting prohibitions, except that in this case this reasoning belongs and exists only in money
And in particular, in the law of bari in prohibitions in the first place in the Ketuvot it is proven that a 'claim' that concerns a reason and a claim of loss of the right, can permit a captive prohibition to become a priest.
So why would Rashesh draw up two separate sets of laws, one of which commands us to observe the laws of the other? All his words are nothing but heresy, even if they are not heretical.
To answer your question, your words are puzzling in every possible way.
A. He is definitely talking about a tool that recognizes the will of God, except that it is not done through the Torah but directly. Philosophically, without God there is no moral and legal obligation. I see no reason to say that Resh disagrees with this. Incidentally, there are many secularists who believe that there is validity for a moral obligation even without God. I do not agree with them, but even if you were right Resh in a good philosophical society. But as stated here I am with you.
B. Not true. According to human reason, we also need to be stricter about spiking. However, according to human reason, the money should remain in the hands of the holder and the laws of spiking do not apply here.
Incidentally, regardless of this, God cannot change the rules of morality. He cannot determine that murder is good any more than he can determine that 2+3=7.
The distinction between morality and law is simple, and those who disagree about it are very wrong. I have elaborated on this in several places (for example, in column 15).
Please inform the indignant Rabbi that everything the Torah establishes is law. The Sages do not establish the Torah of Justice. If according to the Torah of Justice a Gentile buys with money, then his purchase will be valid even without the law of Justice. The law only establishes that according to the law, he does not buy with money. In any case, the purchase of a gift and money is an innovation of the Torah (which Rabbi and Rabbinical scholars disagreed about), so that here there is no argument at all.
3. From where you came from: The assumption that it has a source in the Torah, and in your opinion, why is this necessary? And if it is necessary, then the assumption that there is no source will not have a status as a halachic explanation. This is an argument that is as strong as it is false, and according to Rabbinical scholars it belongs to the Torah of Justice.
By the way, it seems that even the Rabbis of Bashan and the Tomi who sat on the bench of the laws of spiky money did not think like that indignant Rabbi Didach, for whom all this is simple and unnecessary.
By the way, in my opinion, the innovation of the Rabbi is as simple as a statement and therefore there is no reason to twist and turn and ask why it is necessary. It is not necessary but simply correct. Therefore, we rely on the Torah in the matter of money and therefore in money everything follows the custom and according to the law of Demalchuta and so on and so on. And so do the Fearful and the Magi regarding property stolen from a Gentile (with regard to the law of “yours”).
Again,
A. You seem to think that R’ Shimon came in his reference to the question of why one should listen to the L’, only to answer the question of how we permit prohibitions by virtue of reason, and therefore you did not understand what was painful for R”ash Fisher, and it is really not understood, after all the Gem’ already says ‘L”al read the L”ash he’, so what did Rash come to tell us new? Why are things simple?
However, no one who reads Sha’ar 5, Chapter 1 in Sha’ar Yosher will think that this is why R”ash Sh’kap extended it,
and why should all the law of jurisprudence determine according to reason, why is it not enough to simply say that what was difficult for R’ash Shimon is the source that reinforces the issue of not stealing from one's fellow man, and according to Rash, this is human morality, called the law of reason and recognition. Human morality comes in a dichotomy with divine command, and not as a contradiction to the revelation at Mount Sinai of course. And there is a basic philosophical fallacy here.
Indeed, Avi Sagi, in his book Judaism as a Religion for Morality, put the words of Rash on his head, as a thinker who believes that religion is distinct from morality, religion not in the sense of specific laws that originate in revelation, but in the sense of the general attitude towards God.
B. It is very difficult to argue with what the Rabbi writes, since his approach is indeed unclear, it is not clear why he needs such a radical approach to define a settlement of such a simple problem, which the Tomi and Kontras have already answered with the correct excuse, except that it was written in the language of 18th century Rabbinic Judaism.
But after all, Rabbi Shekap founded the doctrine of jurisprudence to clarify the question of tax, not the questions of the enjoyment of the Torah or the property of a Gentile by theft.
The question of property by theft by a Gentile does not seem to arise, since there is property belonging to a Gentile according to the Torah as well, since a Gentile is forbidden to steal from a Gentile, and the permission of a Jew to steal does not give him entitlement to the money, it is found that the money still belongs to the Gentile in relation to a third person, even when it is in the possession of the Jewish thief.
Apparently, the problem that is difficult for Rabbi Shekap to Shimon is that since according to Chazal, a buyer steals and only if there is an obligation to return it does not buy (as explained regarding Kim Lia in Darba Minya, Sanhedrin Eb, and more), and a Jew does not have an obligation to return it, it is found that there is no obstacle to what he buys, and then Rashesh answers that indeed according to the imaginary jurisprudence, a Jew is obliged to return what he stole from a Gentile, but he is not obligated to do so by the Torah!
Indeed, impressive Lithuanian sleight of hand, but conceptual confusion, oh my! (There is probably also a scholarly problem in this process because, in simple terms, the obligation to return even the object in kind is a loan written in the Torah)
C. However, if the context of jurisprudence is gentile theft, it is found that there is an interesting idea here. There are therefore 2 sets of rules, the first is from the gentile interpretation of the owner and the thief is obligated to return, and there is another set of Torah rules, in which a Jew is allowed to steal
So first of all, it is difficult, how does a Jew violate the commandment of the first system, and the idea that when the Torah commands to break the moral law, one does not have to obey it, even though one does have to obey it where the Torah does not command otherwise, namely a kind of rejection of the prohibition that does not reveal that in fact the entire source that also validates what one does have to observe is necessarily a commandment of God.
.Or as Shai Wesner has already explained very well that R”ash probably refers to this system as rules of definition and not as rules of behavior, and therefore the rules of this definition do not need to be expressed in the practical question, but that according to R”ash's entire move is conceptually problematic.
But what is more difficult is, why should the Rabbis give the role of the first system to reason and not to the Torah? Why is it impossible to talk about 2 such Torah systems? If not because of some strange understanding that in Torah law, the law is not supposed to come out of the law?
D. You claim that the move is clear and correct to explain why there are stipulations in the Torah and in the law of the kingdom, and I did not understand the connection, since it is clear to everyone why there are stipulations specifically in matters of wealth and not in matters of prohibition: because apparently there is no interest in the Torah that the property will be applied specifically in a way that is not in accordance with the enjoyment, since in women, the Torah has an interest in how you will see women (On the contrary, a contemporary scholar who has not connected to the Chaziva of Chazal will find it difficult to understand what it means that the Ḥitna functions as a force that uproots the regular Ḥallot, why is there even an order of regular Ḥallot that requires a force to uproot it? If a woman wants to be consecrated and not receive the rest of the Ḥast, then this is the transaction she is making, and why should she Ḥallot 'go away' and 'confiscate'?
, since Dina demalkhuta is a force that succeeds in confiscating money like a beggar in a court of law, what did we answer here?
E. I did not get to understand what you answered to the question about money and withdrawal, you claim that according to R. both do not buy according to the Torah of Justice and the Torah has renewed that he buys, meaning that someone who bought only with money is not an owner according to the Torah of Justice? Or vice versa according to all the Torah of Justice Owners and the Torah, did the expropriation of one of them? It is found that the Torah intervenes in the Torah of Justice in the principles of monetary laws in a permanent manner, and does not only permit the prohibition of theft of a non-Jew, and the entire course of the R”sh is not a start, and is pointless.
F. The distinction between morality and law is a fact. Some people are committed to morality and some people are committed to law. The question is from the perspective of someone who is committed to law, whether he recognizes his obligation to morality as a separate system or not. And yet Jewish thinking throughout its generations has generally not separated them, and if theft of a non-Jew is permitted then it is permitted, unless it is prohibited for external reasons that can also be called religious, although one can hear the other direction and with great difficulty find references for it, as Avi Sagi tries to extract from the words of R”sh Shekap in his book.
However, since even when there is a moral question, there is a tendency for a person to rely on Wise people, there is no reason to rely on the Torah for this question, so we can see the Torah as revealing a distinction between a Gentile and a Jew in the way of property.
But it is indeed simpler to determine that this is legislation of the Torah, but legislation that also affects morality, like
any legal system of a country that affects the moral consideration that corresponds with it in its decisions.
In the Sada, this is Chanukah P.B.
The Gemara also means that the law of “whoever brings evidence against his fellow man” is “reasonable,” as the Gemara says: “He who brings evidence against him shall be punished.” The Torah enjoins upon every person the seven commandments of the children of Noah, including “the commandments of law,” which obligate every society to observe a system of laws and regulations that will bring about the regulation of society.
In terms of the regulation of society, the plaintiff must prove his claim so that he can acquit his neighbor. A situation in which a person cannot be sure of his ownership of his property and be subject to constant sufficiencies is an impossible situation, and therefore everyone agrees that society should be run in a way that ‘My home is my fortress’ and the Torah also recognizes this.
In contrast, with the commandments that the Torah has imposed on man – he must be responsible for carrying them out to the fullest extent, since this is the right of his soul and therefore he must be strict in suffica da'oraita. But with the wealth that was decided upon his ownership according to social agreement – there is no doubt here.
With regards, Eliam Fishel Werkheimer
Paragraph 3, line 1
In contrast, in the commandments that the Torah…
I remember that in a class at the Beit El Yeshiva, he said as guidance to yeshiva students not to study the Rishonim but only the Aharonim. His reasoning was that there was no point in struggling to understand the words of the Rishonim and it was better to go straight to the Aharonim, which are analyzed. Of course, I don't know how much this fits into his general instruction and method. This is what he said in that class.
I just saw the post. I know that His Eminence is a little too generous with titles for various rabbis.
As someone who heard many lessons from Rabbi Fisher, there was always a feeling that he was a “Tanna” of his generation. Striving for truth (“fighting” with commentators who he thought were wrong), an alarmingly quick perception, and a phenomenal memory.
Regarding the story with the student and the path, I assume that the intention of the student was that Rabbi Shlomo Fisher seemed strict, perhaps because of his unapologetic attitude towards learning and Torah, and therefore he was surprised by his humanity to an ordinary student.
I must mention that I, the little one, also saw his humility towards all the students and that he did not hold power for himself (carriages, mashabakim, etc., etc., as is customary in our districts)
I heard from his student that he was most influenced by Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, who compiled the collection of lessons in his youth as a student at Yeshiva Mir.
May he be a guide to honesty for all of us.