Notes on Hiddur in the Hanukkah Lamp (Column 430)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In a question that reached me today I was asked about hiddur (enhancement) in the Hanukkah lights. I answered briefly, and in honor of Hanukkah I thought to bring here a more expanded version of what I wrote (the source is here).
Hiddur Mitzvah
The Gemara in Shabbat 133b (and parallels) brings a derashah regarding hiddur mitzvah:
It was taught: “This is my God and I will beautify Him (anveihu)”—beautify yourself before Him with mitzvot: before Him a beautiful sukkah, a beautiful lulav, a beautiful shofar, beautiful tzitzit, a beautiful Torah scroll, and write it for His sake with fine ink, with a fine quill, by an expert scribe, and wrap it in fine silks. Abba Shaul says: ‘anveihu’—be like Him: just as He is gracious and merciful, so you too be gracious and merciful.
Both views are ruled as halakha, though walking in God’s ways is generally associated with another verse, “and you shall walk in His ways.” See Rambam, Hilkhot De‘ot 1:6 and in Sefer ha-Mitzvot, positive commandment 8. These matters are brought in the Talmud and poskim regarding “threads that do not invalidate” in circumcision (Shabbat there), the rule of binding the lulav (according to the opinion that lulav does not require binding; Sukkah 33), and more.
People think hiddur mitzvah is voluntary, but it is not. Plainly, the rule of hiddur is a full obligation, a biblical positive commandment. However, the hiddur does not invalidate the mitzvah; meaning that even if one performed the mitzvah without hiddur, he fulfilled the obligation of the mitzvah. But he has nullified the commandment of hiddur.[1] A similar confusion exists regarding tekhelet. The Mishnah in Menachot says that tekhelet does not invalidate the white threads, and therefore people think tekhelet is voluntary. It is not. The mitzvah of tekhelet is a positive commandment; it simply does not invalidate the white. A simple proof is that the continuation of the Mishnah there states that the white does not invalidate the tekhelet, and the white is certainly obligatory. The rule in halakha is that every mitzvah is obligatory unless there is a clear source that it is not (as opposed to the realm of kodashim, where the default is that a detail does not invalidate unless there is a source that it does—for example, it is repeated or it says “chukah,” etc. See my article here for the reason).
The Gemara in Bava Kamma 9b speaks about the measure of hiddur:
Rather, R. Zeira said: with hiddur mitzvah—up to a third in the mitzvah. And further there: in the West they said in the name of R. Zeira, up to a third from his own; from then on—from the Holy One, blessed be He.
The obligation of hiddur is up to a third of the price of the mitzvah (whether internally or externally—see the sugya there).
R. Ḥananel writes there:
In the West they said: up to a third from his own—i.e., he is warned to adorn the mitzvah up to a third. From then on, if he adds more than a third, he is doing an extra measure, like one who supports a pauper and adds for him more, thereby showing favor—and the Holy One, blessed be He, does not withhold anyone’s reward, but pays his recompense: “from the Holy One,” as it is said, “He who is gracious to the poor lends to the Lord”—and this is straightforward. Another explanation: from then on—“from the Holy One,” i.e., if he wishes to enhance the mitzvah by more than a third of its cost, he is not obligated to do all this from his own earnings, for his life takes precedence over hiddur mitzvah; but if the Holy One, blessed be He, arranged money for him not from his own earnings, and he wishes to enhance beyond a third, he has permission. And one who enhances a mitzvah is praiseworthy—as we learned regarding the Hanukkah lamp [Shabbat 21b]: “the mehadrin—one lamp for each and every person; and the mehadrin min ha-mehadrin,” etc.
We see that up to a third is an obligation we are warned about, but there is also value in going beyond, as we learn from the Hanukkah lamp.
The Uniqueness of the Rule of Hiddur in the Hanukkah Lamp
The source of hiddur in the Hanukkah lamp appears in the sugya in Shabbat 21b:
Our Rabbis taught: The mitzvah of Hanukkah is “a lamp for a person and his household.” The mehadrin: a lamp for each and every person. The mehadrin min ha-mehadrin: Beit Shammai say—on the first day one lights eight; from then on, he decreases. Beit Hillel say—on the first day one lights one; from then on, he increases, etc.
So it is ruled as halakha by Rambam, Hil. Hanukkah 4:1, and in the Tur/Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim §671, like Beit Hillel.
From R. Ḥananel it seems that the hiddur in the Hanukkah lamp is an additional rule beyond “This is my God [and I will beautify Him],” and therefore there is no obligation to do it; it is voluntary, from surplus funds a person has. But the plain sense of the Gemara here does not read that way. It would appear that in the Hanukkah lamp there is a special rule of hiddur beyond the general rule of beautifying mitzvot—both in its quantity and in its form. In the Hanukkah lamp there are several specific levels and modes of hiddur detailed in halakha, which we do not find elsewhere; and each level has a particular and defined form. The very fact that precisely here the Sages spelled out the form and measure of hiddur indicates a special rule. This is especially true regarding the measure of hiddur.
In Chiddushei Riz ha-Levi, Hil. Hanukkah 4:1, he asks in the name of one of the sages of the Holy Land: how is it that for Hanukkah the mehadrin (and certainly the mehadrin min ha-mehadrin) spend more than a third of the mitzvah? For the mitzvah itself is “a lamp for a person and his household” (one lamp), the mehadrin is “a lamp for each person,” and the mehadrin min ha-mehadrin is “increasing and going” (a total of at least 36 lights). That is, even the simple level of hiddur is more than a third of the mitzvah. Indeed, R. Ḥananel wrote that this is true for all mitzvot—that it is proper to add beyond a third—but the simple sense is that here there is a special rule of hiddur, in quantity and in quality. The Brisker Rav himself cites R. Ḥananel there and forces the reading; this is not the place to elaborate.
However, in the Mishnah Berurah §671:7 he writes:
And if oil is expensive, it is better to light with wax candles and to be “increasing and going,” as written inside, than to light with olive oil only one lamp each night.
Its sources are the Chayei Adam (Klal 153) and responsa Binyan Olam §34. The rule of “increasing and going” is the special hiddur of Hanukkah, and the other rule (superior oil) is from the general “This is my God and I will beautify Him” of the entire Torah. We see that the hiddur of the Hanukkah lamp takes precedence. According to R. Ḥananel this is certainly not correct, for in his view the regular hiddur is a biblical mitzvah, while the second is only optional for one who wishes. We see that the Hanukkah hiddur is a different rule, and it is apparently also obligatory (though it does not invalidate the basic mitzvah).
Explanation
In Netivot Yehoshua by my teacher, Rav Yagel, of blessed memory, vol. 1, “Kuntres ha-Mo‘adim,” §12, he explained this by first citing the question of the Pnei Yehoshua on Shabbat 21b:
There [the Gemara asks], “What is Hanukkah?” It was taught… “they defiled all the oils in the Temple… and they found only one cruse [etc.], and a miracle occurred…”—and one can wonder: what was all this miracle for? For we rule that impurity is permitted for the community (tum’ah hutrah b’tzibbur), and they could have lit with impure oil. And granted, according to the opinion that [impurity] is overridden for the community (d’chuya b’tzibbur; Pesachim 79a), this is somewhat understandable here; but according to the opinion that it is permitted for the community—even to seek out [pure oil] we do not seek, as it says in Yoma 6b—this is very difficult…
The question is why a miracle was necessary, since they could have lit in impurity. The main difficulty is for the opinion that impurity is permitted in a communal setting; for the opinion that it is only overridden, one might say the miracle came so that they could light with hiddur, with pure oil.[2] Yet even so, according to this, even for the opinion that impurity is permitted b’tzibbur it is still better to light not in impurity.[3]
Ultimately he resolves:
Therefore it seems that the essence of the miracle was done only to make known to them the affection of the Omnipresent for them—as we find that such a miracle occurred constantly (Avot 5:2), that no flaw was found in the Omer or the Two Loaves. And since a miracle occurred for them in the principal matter—that they were redeemed with a complete redemption from the rule of the wicked Greek empire, who told Israel to write upon the horn of an ox that they have no share in the God of Israel and decreed many persecutions—and now that they were redeemed and a great miracle was done for them, that they prevailed over their enemies—therefore a miracle was also done for them in the matter of the lamps, which are a testimony to Israel that the Shekhinah rests among them, as is also expounded regarding the western lamp. But after the death of Shimon ha-Tzaddik even the western lamp would sometimes go out; therefore a miracle was done for them in this very matter in those days that were an auspicious time, to make known that they returned to their former affection. So it seems correct to me.
That is, the purpose of the miracle was to make known God’s affection for them.
Rav Yagel there explains that the entire miracle was that they were enabled to light with hiddur; therefore, the ordinance in commemoration of that miracle includes the element of hiddur within the very ordinance. That is, this hiddur is not from the general rule of “This is my God [and I will beautify Him],” but a special rule in the Hanukkah lamp—commemorating lighting with pure oil in hiddur.
And the fact that we still call it “hiddur” does not mean it is not an obligation. Indeed, one fulfills the basic obligation with “a lamp for a person and his household,” but that is the duty of the very lighting. Beyond that there is a duty of hiddur, and one does not fulfill it if he does not enhance. And indeed it was not possible to establish the hiddur as an absolute legal obligation—otherwise it would not be “hiddur”; and the Sages wished to leave it as an act of enhancement in commemoration of the miracle, as above. Similarly regarding the mitzvot “You shall be holy,” which Ramban explains as an obligation not to be a scoundrel within the permission of the Torah, and “You shall do what is right and good,” to go beyond the letter of the law. These two are not counted in the enumeration of the commandments (even according to Ramban himself), and simply because if they were counted, deviating from them would not be beyond the letter of the law but a full prohibition of the law itself.
And the Sages left us a hint of this by fixing several levels of hiddur—to show that the matter is not voluntary as one might think. The Sages determine a very specific form to do this, and that is a hint that it is part of the essence of the ordinance (I presented a similar reasoning in the article here regarding the measures for separating terumah and the definition of “the will of God”).
When Was the Hiddur Ordinance Enacted?
According to our conclusion, it seems the ordinance of hiddur was part of the original ordinance of lighting the lamp. But if the hiddur was in fact obligatory in the very original ordinance commemorating the Hanukkah miracle, it is unclear how Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai could dispute the hiddur (whether to increase or to decrease). Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel were not long after the miracle,[4] and in such a short span while Israel was in its land it is unlikely that such a great distortion in the tradition would occur.
One could suggest that they did not dispute the definition of the original ordinance but rather a hiddur that was added to that ordinance at a later period. When the lighting was ordained by the Hasmonean court, they did not fix a binding hiddur, and the entire hiddur ordinance was enacted by Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel themselves. Therefore it is no wonder that there is a dispute between them as to how to enhance. According to this, until the hiddur was enacted, there was an obligation to enhance only from the rule of “This is my God and I will beautify Him,” and Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel decided to add a special hiddur. In particular, if one accepts the common claim that the miracle of the cruse of oil received special status only after the Destruction (when the military victory was less central), then it is reasonable that at that stage they also decided to add a special hiddur in commemoration of the miracle of the cruse of oil.[5] This does not contradict the claim that the hiddur is a special rule, part of the ordinance of lighting the lamp. Even if it was added later, one can still say they added a special hiddur. On the contrary, the regular hiddur existed from the outset, as with all mitzvot of the Torah, and the special hiddur was added later.
Perhaps this can be inferred from the Rambam’s wording, Hil. Hanukkah 3:2:
Because of this, the Sages of that generation ordained that these eight days, beginning on the 25th of Kislev, be days of joy and praise, and that lights be kindled in the evenings at the entrances of the houses on each and every one of the eight nights, to show and make known the miracle. And these days are called Hanukkah, and eulogies and fasts are forbidden during them like on the days of Purim. And kindling the lights on them is a rabbinic mitzvah, like the reading of the Megillah.
His wording requires explanation in two respects: (a) Why does he add at the end that the kindling of the lights on these days is rabbinic, when at the beginning he already brings all the laws of the ordinance? (b) His wording is not entirely clear. One could read that the ordinance was to fix days of joy and praise and lighting of lights—yet there is a shift in his wording: he moves from describing the ordinance in the past (“they ordained that the days be…”) to the present (“and we kindle the lights”). The simple sense is that the ordinance was days of joy and praise, and we also kindle lights. Is that not part of the ordinance?
It seems that according to him, indeed the kindling of lights was not from the core of the Hasmoneans’ ordinance; therefore he adds that this law too is rabbinic, like the reading of the Megillah.[6]
So too it emerges from the text of “Al ha-Nissim” and many other sources (Books of Maccabees, Josippon, and Pesiqta Rabbati) that do not include the miracle of the cruse of oil. It follows that in the days of Mattathias and the Hasmoneans, when their text was enacted, they indeed did not ordain the lights that commemorate the cruse of oil.
However, in the Megillat Antiochus it appears in this language:
Therefore the sons of the Hasmoneans established a permanent ordinance, and the Children of Israel together with them as one, to make these eight days days of feasting and joy, like the festival days written in the Torah, and to light lights in them, to make known the victories that the God of Heaven did for them.
It implies that the kindling of lights was indeed part of the original ordinance of the Hasmoneans. However, the form of the kindling and the forms of hiddur are not detailed there; therefore, our assertion stands that the hiddur was enacted later, not the very mitzvah of kindling. Similarly, in Mo‘adim u-Zemanim, vol. 2, he entertains whether the ordinance that each person lights at the doorway of his home is not from the Hasmoneans; see there his proofs. And what he himself objects to his words, according to our approach here—that these matters speak only about the hiddur—fits well.
[1] As for why the mitzvah of hiddur is not counted in the enumeration of the commandments, see my article on the Tenth Principle, in the book Yishlach Shoreshav, that we do not count general rules that pertain to all mitzvot (like “half-measure”).
[2] However, here it was oil of a miracle, which is plainly prohibited to use for lighting; therefore one must consider why this would be preferable to impure oil—certainly according to the opinion that impurity is permitted b’tzibbur.
[3] See Column 404 (and also here and here) regarding the lack of a practical difference between d’chuya and hutra.
[4] There is broad discussion, in the beit midrash and beyond, as to how long these two schools lasted. Some wished to say that since the heavenly voice that the halakha is like Beit Hillel issued in Yavneh, therefore the schools lasted until then; but this is not at all necessary. See Dorot Rishonim, vol. 2, p. 294, where he proves extensively that the main disputes between the two schools were in the time of Hillel and Shammai themselves, and what reached the Yavneh period were only those who followed in their paths. See also the book Binu Shenot Dor va-Dor.
[5] However, see Maharatz Chajes to Shabbat 21b, who cites in the name of the Pesiqta Rabbati that the enactment of eight days was not on account of the miracle of the cruse of oil but because of eight spits they found; see there.
[6] And in the book Chasdei Avot, printed at the end of Yakhin Da‘at §17, he wrote that the ordinance of the lamp was after the Destruction. So too R. Yehuda Gershuni in Or ha-Mizrach 22 (issues 79–80), p. 43. See also Binu Shenot Dor va-Dor, where he raises strong objections to their words. Their difficulties are resolved by our words here: that the ordinance was in the time of the Temple, but later than the Hasmonean era. And indeed, in the Rambam himself, in Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Principle 1, he explicitly writes that the Hanukkah lamp was enacted in Temple times; see there.
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Shalbakha”t
A. Where does the simplicity come from that the compilation is from the Torah and not from the rabbinic reference? Perhaps true, but not simple.
B. You wrote that the compilation of the finest oil on Chanukah precedes the addition and addition because it is a general law from the Torah. That is, even in a law that is entirely rabbinic, the general compilation from the Torah belongs and has special importance because its essence is from the Torah (and perhaps a kind of prior tadir). This requires evidence (and without it it is not “of course” not as in Mishnah”b).
C. The question of the internal. I do not know, but perhaps impurity was permitted in public precisely if the people were impure (and they would impure the sacrifice after the slaughter) and not if the oil itself was impure to begin with? This also appears to be the case from the sermon Aish that will be impure, etc. That they demanded a rejected person and not a public one, that it was a rejection because of the person.
D. The language of the Maimonides. Perhaps for the sake of simplicity, it can be suggested that the Maimonides emphasizes that lighting is commanded from the words of the scribes in order to avoid the epoch of the great man. And by the way, we need a source that the Maimonides knew (and with him) in order to suggest that in his opinion the regulation of lighting is late.
E. Rabbi Yagel says that we have fixed the lighting in the quantity of candles in memory of lighting in pure oil. It must be emphasized that indeed lighting in large quantities is more honorable than in small quantities, but on the face of it the types differ in quantity and quality. Lighting in a mitzvah is a nice etrog and not an etrog and a third, and thus pure oil is a nice oil and the quantity of oil is not a matter of importance. If according to his words, then it would seem more reasonable to fix the regulation of lighting in olive oil and gold vessels. If the celebration of Chanukah is simply to celebrate the mitzvah, then it is more understandable that they did not seek a resemblance to the celebration of the purity of the oil, but rather to publicize the miracle.
Belzpa,
1. This is the accepted view. When something is learned from a verse, it is assumed to be from the Torah unless there is good reason to say that it is a reference.
2. It seems simple to me. Every rabbinical commentary is like a Torah. In any case, the Book of Revelation makes it clear that it is obligatory and in any case it is not.
3. It is also clear that it is permissible in the name. See the previous verse.
4. This is not in the law but perhaps in the Sefamat.
5. In any case, this is a kind of compilation in the publication of the miracle.
2. Which sentence in the R”ach do you mean?
4. The B”ach admits that the sages corrected it and yet it is listed as a Daorita. And I think in the Maimonides’ letter he presents this as the B”ach’s central mistake that led him to rewrite the Book of Mitzvot. Isn’t that worth a line and a half in the strong hand for complete clarification? (Perhaps I would be surprised if he didn’t bother to emphasize the Apocalypse of the B”ach)
3. I have not found any evidence. He states that a candle is always lit even in impurity, but from where is it that it is referring to impure oil and not an impure person. There is a reference to the Rambam there without a source, and we will look it up tomorrow.
A. The language of the Rambam “and the lighting of the candles rejects the Sabbath and impurity as sacrifices for which there is a fixed time, as it is said to light a candle constantly”. It is not explicitly stated here that lighting with impure oil is also permissible. And the explanation for this is explained by the author –There is no impurity in the congregation because God does not make the entire Jewish people weary of serving Him (or the argument that the congregation did not die and therefore did not become impure) and pained the son of Yirtzah. But if the products are impure (and apparently there is a source that prohibits lighting with impure oil) it is like not having sheep but camels and not being able to serve in the Temple due to the circumstances. [And what is the ruling in an exceptional event if all the priests have defects].
B1. The preceptor Yehoshua only argues that Rabbi Nachman, who believes that impurity is permitted in public, and according to the ikea, it is said in the Gemara Yoma: “Even here are there pure and unclean in that house of Av Peleg, Rav Nachman said, ‘My servants are unclean,’ meaning that one does not need to feel at all to be adorned (from the word lahzer, Aramaic) and to bring pure ones, and from this the preceptor says that one does not need to be adorned (perhaps from the word hadar, Hebrew) with pure oil. So what does Rabbi Yagel answer? That he performed a miracle for them to express their affection for something that there is no need in the world to be adorned with at all? So what is the connection between the fact that they did not find pure oil, even if they had found pure oil, he would have performed a miracle for them to express their affection. Or he would have performed a miracle for the earth to produce sheep for the perpetual sacrifice.
B2. According to the Gemara Yoma 6b above, which was cited before me in the column, which states that impurity is permitted in public, since it says that impure people in the father's household work even when it is possible for pure people (and perhaps also the first verse that if there are pure people in the father's household, then they should work; this is a stricture of the rabbis only), again I do not understand where your opinion came from that in terms of protecting one's life on Shabbat, if it is very easy to save without desecrating Shabbat, then it is forbidden to desecrate it. https://mikyab.net/posts/72809#comment-53962
A. This is the accepted view and I see no reason to disagree. I don't have time to check right now. And certainly if you link this to impurity in public (I did this in the past), then it is certainly a matter of the heftza itself. In any case, this is the internal assumption and I think that is how it is accepted to think. I see no reason to disagree.
B1. I commented on this. The miracle is to allow the gathering even for those who are permitted. There is still gathering in this and this is certainly enough to please those who, although they should not, are allowed to light in pure.
B2. Because in impurity there is really no impurity in public. But in the Piko'n there is Shabbat.
B1. ? But the Gemara says (at least according to the second chapter) that even if it is easily possible for the pure in the father's house to serve, it is not necessary to honor them.
A, B2. In my opinion, as Mishnah says.
Regarding the Gemara on Yoma, there is no necessity. First, there is a disagreement about this in the opinion of the Rabbis. In addition to the fact that only when it is difficult is there no obligation, it means that when it is easy there is an obligation, even though it is permitted. And this is according to my opinion. In addition, even when it is easy there is no need to make a compilation, the meaning is that the obligation of the mitzvah is fulfilled, but the obligation of the compilation is not (although according to this, when it is easy and the compilation is not performed, it also delays the mitzvah itself, otherwise what is the disagreement? Perhaps this is a case of a Sukkah, if one does not do as the sages say, one does not fulfill the Torah).
Indeed, but this is not the case with the Hadith. To my mind, it is not necessary to bring pure ones from another patriarchal household, and therefore it is more likely that the party that requires pure ones from the same patriarchal household would only be a rabbinical stricture (like something that has permissiveness, which I also hold, of course, that relying on a majority and eating is an absolute permissiveness, as is evident in my opinion from drinking milk, which is entirely dependent on the majority).
When you say that we do not fulfill the obligation of compilation, do you mean that in fact for the ko”a (and in your opinion that compilation is from the Torah) it is a duty from the Torah to bring the pure ones, and the Gemara in Yom Ya'akov deals only with the law of the mitzvah itself and this is not a practical halakha? (So then I vaguely remember that in the issues of the HaZebu Ha'arach, the Ha'arach vigorously argued in the 2nd ed. on the Ha'arach).
1. Is the composition from the Torah, I searched and wondered. Here https://tinyurl.com/2p9b2apv the opinion of Tosafot Minchot and Ritva and the Rabbis is presented that the composition is rabbinic and it is stated there that this is the ruling in the Shulchan Arba. And besides their halachic considerations, another “good reason” to say that this is a reference is that it is impossible to learn obligations from the Torah from the song of Moses and the children of Israel. One can deduce the obvious that it is a good measure to enjoy oneself before the Lord in the mitzvot (and even without the mitzvot, such as singing before Him or dancing before Him), much less from a king of flesh and blood who gives him the finest of things, but it is impossible to deduce a positive mitzvot from the Torah at all. (And by the way, there is no reason to say that the Rabbis disagree with the Mishnah.)
I didn't see a Shul there. But now I really see that there is a dispute about this. The view that it is from the Torah seems more reasonable to me. First, in my opinion, the Hidor also delays the mitzvah, but it does not delay the mitzvah but the Hidor (as I wrote in the column). And this is where the view of the Ritva fell. Furthermore, for Abba Shaul, who learns from this to walk in the words of the Holy One, which is certainly a law from the Torah (which in law we learn from ”and walk in His ways”).
The Shulcah further cites section 3, which states that one-third of the law is to be read aloud (and not to be recited) because the rabbis doubted the lenient view. How is it reasonable to learn a Torah law from a song?!
Why not? It is a law that comes from the Torah. Although it is not necessarily a literal positive commandment because it is not written as a commandment, it is written in the Torah. It is certainly no worse than the law of the sinew of the thigh, which is written as a description of the custom of the sons of Jacob, or half a lesson learned from a commentary (a lyatstrophic chezi) or from the multiplication of “kol halev”, and so are all the sermons. And so is the will of the Lord in the Teruma lessons in the article I referenced in the column.
Incidentally, a doubt with a third from legio or malbar is not necessarily a doubt from Torah even if the law of compilation is from Torah. It is possible that there is a law of compilation from the מאתן, and the Sages assigned a rate of one third to it.
The comparisons do not seem strong. In the Ganid Hanesha, they assume according to Maimonides that he returned and was forbidden at Sinai (and this was probably accepted in tradition or the meaning of the verses in the Torah, therefore they shall not eat, etc.). Regarding the matter of Hezi to the Istrofi, you certainly do not say that every good deed that is worthy of being followed from the interpretation is also an obligation from the Torah. I did not understand the comparison to the Teruma lessons, because in the compilation we discuss the obligation itself and not the lesson, and you did not come to generalize from the will of God in the Teruma lessons that every good deed from the interpretation is an obligation from the Torah.
If the compilation is from the Torah, then why and from what source do we think that the lesson is a rabbinical one and not like other lessons, the halakha of Moses from Sinai. They cite there that the Shadach raises this possibility, and I did not mention it because I thought it was implausible.
Did the Sages assume following the Rambam? This is a dispute over Tannaim in the Gid Hanesha. Still, by all accounts, there is no command here except for this verse.
Indeed, everything that is explained is from the Torah in a certain sense. This is not rabbinic. Although there is no command here in the full sense because there is no command, it is still a law from the Torah. I compared the Chs to the Darash.
And by the way, this may also explain why they allowed a kull (as appears in the Shulchan), even though it is not really rabbinic.
Just as in prayer there is a duty from the Torah and the details of how to do it are from the rabbis. And just as in a donation of one grain of wheat exempts the sheaf, the rabbis determined a shiur (according to the accepted view that it is rabbinic).
I was not familiar with what is said in the chapter Gid Hanesha.
If it is explained without reference to the verse, it is Eli and Anuhu, then ah”n.
See P’ Gid Hanesha Mishnah 5 and Piham”sh there.
I do connect this to the verse. The verse is not a command, but it shows that there is value in it. This does not detract from the explanation that we learned ourselves.
Is there no confusion of concepts here? This is Eli and Anuho, the name of the compilation, the language of Hadar, the language of beauty, where the discussion is that up to a third is obligatory, and here the language of Mehadrin means those who are re-enforced, and as Rashi wrote, “and the re-enforced are those who are re-enforced according to the commandments,” and it seems that this is taken from the language of Mehadrin in Aramaic, where perhaps there is no obligation.
And the most severe of the severe is the most severe of the severe? Rashi only intends to explain why the language of compilation belongs here. This is the law of compilation. Is it the usual compilation or not? That is what I dealt with in the column.
I think I saw Rabbi Yitzhak Adler (from America) linking one-third of a rab or one-third of a lah in the question of whether the compilation is part of the mitzvah (from lah) or in the nah (from lah). If I'm not mistaken, he mentioned Rabbi Soloveitchik in this.
Sounds like a play on words to me.
In the second part of the mitzvah, Chanukah is considered to be a part of the mitzvah, and it is necessary to limit Chanukah to the holiday of Sukkot, which is also eight days long, during which the Hallel is recited. The four species that are taken on Sukkot also have a boundary of ‘hadar’ which is one of the conditions of the main mitzvah. Perhaps it should be said that ’hadar’ is especially important in the four species that are designated ‘and your joy before ’ your God’, and so in the Chanukah candles, the decoration is important in order to enhance the joy, because candles are a clear expression of joy.
On the holiday of Sukkot, there is the commandment of the Sukkah, which is a house, “You shall sit as a tabernacle,” and even on Hanukkah, the commandment of lighting it is “A candle for each one of you.” However, on the holiday of Sukkot, there is also an emphasis on the personal action of each one in taking the lulav on the first day, when each one is commanded to take his own, and thus on Hanukkah, the Mehadrin lights a candle for each and every one.
Also, on the holiday of Sukkot, there is a marking of the counting of the days, expressed in the serial number of each day, which is expressed in the fruits of the holiday, which express the fact that the peak of joy is “on the first day.” In which the victory over the Magi is celebrated, and thus the B’s believe that the main joy in Hanukkah is on the day of the victory over the Greeks, which is the 25th of Kislev.
But in the holiday of Sukkot there is also an element of looking to the future, of praying for rain, which intensifies precisely towards the end of the holiday of Sukkot, on the Day of Arava and on Shemini Atzeret, which are the culmination of the prayer for rain. And in this way, the B’s emphasize more the aspect of looking forward and praying for the future, which intensifies with each additional day. If in Sukkot we ask for water, in Hanukkah we ask for light, the light of the Torah that will increase day by day.
With a blessing for a bright Hanukkah, Yaron Fishel Ordner
And perhaps the disagreement between B ” B ” B ” B ” B ‘ Best regards, Amioz Yaron Schnitzel
The elegance of the ’Mehadrin’ is not an elegance built as a’pleasure before him in the mitzvot’, but an elegance of ‘many with the honor of a king’. Each of the members of the bright house – adds ‘many with the honor of a king’, after all, in this house there are ‘many who do the mitzvah’.
The elegance of the ’Mehadrin from the ’Mehadrin’ is also related to multiplicity, emphasizing the multiplicity of the days of the holiday, which clarifies the fact that this is not a one-time event but an ongoing process – whether a process of remembering the past as God or a process of looking forward to the future as God.
The connection to the past and the future creates a “multiple people” on a much higher level. Not only do the members of the household gather here to worship the “God”, but the entire “timeline”, all the generations of the people of Israel, past and future, gather together for an infinite “multiple people”.
Best regards, Aisha
According to the explanation that the dispute between B’Sh and B’B is whether to light candles against incoming or outgoing days, a parallel can be found to the dispute between Shammai and Hillel regarding preparation for Shabbat.
According to Shammai, from the beginning of the week, man’s tendency is toward Shabbat, which is the purpose of the week, while according to Shabbat, “Blessed be God every day,” each weekday also has its own value as a step on the path to Shabbat, which is built layer upon layer of weekdays, with each day “adding and going” to its predecessor.
With blessings, Padhatzur Fishel Peri-Gan
To Padadzur Fishlit, I'm sure you know that Rabbi Zvin has already preceded you in his well-known article on the methods of B'Sh and B'H.
I did not go into the questions of 'power and action' and 'deed and intention' that Rabbi Zvin discussed in the light of the halakhah. What I suggested is regarding the relationship between the path and the goal, where the rabbis focus on the final goal, while the rabbis emphasize the importance of each step along the way.
I have now found that Rabbi Zvin went along this line in a Hasidic article in which he suggested that the rabbis view the Hanukkah candle as 'fire' that completely eliminates evil, while the rabbis view the Hanukkah candle as 'light'. The rabbis view the Most importantly, God has done good.
Best regards, PPG
“It is true that this is a miracle oil that is simply forbidden to be lit, so why is it preferable to impure oil, certainly for a method that impurity was permitted in public”
Why did you decide that miracle oil is forbidden to be lit?
Because you need olive oil.
See for example here: https://www.yeshiva.org.il/midrash/29937
The need for olive oil in a Hanukkah candle is not a matter of *This is to me and to us*
Wax candles burn with the same beauty and quality..
What is called for in the Hanukkah prayer is *This is a remembrance of the miracle in the Temple*
In any case, your question is clear from the Mishnah
There are all kinds of decorations in Halacha. Not all decorations are physical. There is Halachaic decoration. The decorations for tying the Lulav or burning the leaven stick (a practice that has no Halacha equivalent). And the decoration on the level of a memorial to the Temple is also a decoration.
(By the way, I did not make it difficult for the Hebrews or the Hebrews)
B”D D’ Dachanuka P”B
Lar’ Zeira Dachanuka - Shalom and Rav,
Bgm’ (Shabbat 23) means that the preference of olive oil is because of the sound of the Nahoria Tefi’. The poskim added the reason that the miracle was performed with olive oil, and the nefq”:m is for a wax or sterin candle whose light is clear. Either way, it is only a matter of decoration.
With a blessing of Chanukah, Hasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kvas
And according to the Maharal of Prague, a wax candle is not defined as a candle at all because a candle is a vessel filled with a burning substance. Although today there are heating candles in which the wax is placed inside a vessel.
Best regards, Chabad Dakik
To our Rabbi Shalita – You wrote about the words of the Mishnav *The law that continues and continues is the law of the composition of Chanukah and the second law (choice oil) is the law of “This is to me and to him” of the entire Torah.* And this is not true for wax candles
Wax candles are clear and perhaps even better than olive oil
*And the composition on the level of a male to the Temple is also a composition* To include this in the law of the Torah because *This is to me and to him* sounds a bit Hasidic…
For dessert
A benefactor once came to Rabbi Padwa from London to ask about the kosherness of an etrog when the Rabbi answered that it was kosher – The benefactor added and asked if it was also beautiful because of the composition – He told him that, ask your wife, she understands beauty more than I do
I know what I wrote. There is no problem here. I repeat again that this is a compilation law. Your story only proves it.