More on the Hierarchy between the Commandments and Life (Column 421)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In the previous column I concluded the discussion with a nuanced conclusion about the relationship between the commandments and life:
Commandments without life are not commandments, but life without commandments is not life either. It seems that the hierarchy between life and the commandments is not unequivocal.
There I noted that this connects to the tension between two rationales cited in the Yoma sugya regarding pikuach nefesh (saving life) overriding Shabbat. In this column I would like to touch further on the relationship between these two rationales and to examine that conclusion from a different angle.
The Yoma Sugya
The Talmud in Yoma 85a–b discusses the source for the rule that saving a life overrides Shabbat:
It once happened that Rabbi Yishmael, Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah were walking along the road, with Levi the arranger, and Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah walking behind them. This question was posed before them: From where do we know that saving a life overrides Shabbat?
Several tannaitic sources for this law are then brought, and at the end appears the source of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya:
[…] Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: “And the children of Israel shall keep the Shabbat.” The Torah said: Desecrate one Shabbat on his account so that he will keep many Shabbats.
At the end of the sugya the amora Shmuel arrives and proposes his own source:
Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Had I been there, I would have said my source, which is superior to theirs: “and live by them” (Lev. 18:5)—and not die by them. Rava said: All of them have refutations, except for Shmuel, whose source has no refutation…
Shmuel’s rationale receives Rava’s praise, for it alone is unrefuted. Seemingly, this is the rationale that remains as the conclusion.
The sugya ends with further praise for Shmuel’s rationale (in contrast to the others, which have refutations):
Ravina—and some say Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak—said: One sharp pepper is better than a basketful of gourds.
Shmuel’s words are like a pungent pepper seed, preferable to a heap of bland gourd seeds.
Is the Halakha Indeed like Shmuel?
At first glance there is no halakhic dispute here, only a question of the source of the law (“the import of the derivations”). Yet the poskim did find practical ramifications (e.g., whether to save a gentile’s life, someone who does not keep Shabbat, a person with only moments to live, and the like). The Talmud in Shabbat 151b explicitly brings the rationale of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya as the halakha—indeed, it brings only that:
It was taught: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: For a one-day-old infant who is alive we desecrate Shabbat; for King David of Israel who is dead, we do not desecrate Shabbat. For a one-day-old infant who is alive we desecrate Shabbat, for the Torah said: Desecrate one Shabbat on his account so that he will keep many Shabbats. For King David of Israel who is dead, we do not desecrate, for once a person dies he is exempt from the commandments; and this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: “Among the dead [he is] free”—once a person dies, he becomes free of the commandments.
Desecrating Shabbat for a one-day-old infant is permitted by virtue of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s reasoning. This is a baraita—a tannaitic source—and there they apparently were not yet aware of Shmuel’s rationale (he being an amora). In any case, the second rationale is brought here, implying that it too (and perhaps only it) is the halakha. Moreover, some commentators explained that it is no accident that only the second rationale is brought here, since the case concerns desecration of Shabbat to save an infant who does not yet keep commandments and thus does not “live by them”; therefore, for him only Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale is relevant (because in the future he too will keep many Shabbats).
So too we see in the words of the Meiri as cited in the Bi’ur Halakha, Orach Chayim 329:4, where the Shulchan Aruch rules that we desecrate Shabbat even for a person with only moments to live:
And even though the rationale “Desecrate one Shabbat so that he will keep many Shabbats” does not apply here—because it is not specifically about Shabbat; the same applies to other commandments—so wrote the Meiri in Yoma: “Even if it has been clarified that he cannot live even a single hour, in that hour he will repent in his heart and confess.”
The Meiri explains that we desecrate Shabbat for a person with only moments to live even though the consideration “he will keep many Shabbats” is not present (for he will not live to keep many Shabbats). He explains that this is because it is not specifically about keeping Shabbat, but about any commandment; even if he lives one minute, he can repent or perform some commandment, and therefore we desecrate Shabbat to save him.
However, the Bi’ur Halakha there rejects his words:
In truth it appears that all this is merely a rationale, but as to the ruling it does not depend on the commandments at all. The reason is not that we set aside one commandment for the sake of many commandments; rather, we set aside all the commandments for the life of a Jew—as Shmuel derives it from “and live by them,” and as the Rambam writes (Hilkhot Shabbat ch. 2) that the laws of the Torah are not vengeance in the world but mercy, kindness, and peace in the world. Likewise, for all those Tannaim who derive it from the altar, from circumcision, and from the burglar [who tunnels in], it is compelled that the Merciful One is concerned with human life (aside from that [source] of “Desecrate one Shabbat,” etc.).
If, in the conclusion, the source for the law is Shmuel’s “and live by them,” then there is no need to speak specifically about Shabbat or other commandments (such as confession). We desecrate Shabbat for someone with only moments to live because life has immense value regardless of its length and regardless of the commandments that might be fulfilled within it.
The Bi’ur Halakha also proves his point from the law of a foundling (Ketubot 15):
So too it is necessary according to Shmuel, who says regarding a foundling in a place where most are gentiles that we [still] do [life-saving] desecration—even though by law he would be a full gentile and would not fulfill any commandment; nevertheless, since in matters of saving life we do not follow the majority, we worry that perhaps he is from Israel. Accordingly, it is clear that even for a crushed minor we also desecrate, even though he will not keep Shabbats, will not confess, and will not reach adulthood; nevertheless, we desecrate. And likewise for a deaf-mute and one of unsound mind—although they are not obligated in the commandments, nevertheless we desecrate for them, for the fact that they do not fulfill commandments is due to their circumstances.
The Gemara there says that if the majority are non-Jews, the presumption is that he is a gentile; yet we still desecrate Shabbat to save him (because of the possibility that he is Jewish). If he is presumed a gentile, then in practice he will not perform any commandment (out of doubt), and yet we desecrate Shabbat on the factual concern that he might be a Jew. We see that the permission to desecrate Shabbat is not conditioned on the performance of commandments but on the value of life—evidence against the Meiri.[1]
But of course the Meiri himself is not content to leave it at that, and contrary to the Bi’ur Halakha’s remark he does find it necessary to explain the law of someone with only moments to live even according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. It seems that according to him Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale also remains in force alongside Shmuel’s, and therefore all the laws must be explained according to his view as well.
This indeed also emerges from the progression of the Yoma sugya there. When one looks at the various refutations, one sees that the refutation that ultimately strikes all the tannaitic sources is the following:
All of them we have found [to permit desecration in a case of] certainty; for doubt—from where do we know? And Shmuel’s [source] surely has no refutation.
That is, all the tannaitic sources can teach us that certain life-threatening danger overrides Shabbat, but not doubtful danger. Only Shmuel’s rationale provides a source that even doubtful danger to life overrides Shabbat. We see that the other rationales remain standing; they just serve as sources for the rule that certain danger to life overrides Shabbat, not doubtful danger. But regarding certainty, they constitute a valid source alongside Shmuel’s rationale. Moreover, if that rationale had ramifications with respect to someone with only moments to live—namely, that there would be no permission to desecrate Shabbat to save him—the Gemara should have attacked the tannaitic rationales on that ground as well. Therefore the Meiri concluded that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale also remains the halakha (as we also saw in Shabbat 151), and the law must be explained according to his view as well.
A Further Look at the Two Rationales
On further reflection, however, it seems hard to hold both rationales together, because at first glance there is a direct contradiction between them. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale is based on the assumption that the commandments are the goal, and the value of life derives from the fact that life enables the performance of commandments. Life is a means to the performance of commandments; therefore the entire permission to desecrate Shabbat in order to save a life does not stem from the value of life but from the fact that life enables observance of the commandments. By contrast, Shmuel’s rationale from “and live by them” seems to assume the opposite: there is value to life in and of itself, as the Bi’ur Halakha proves from Ketubot. One could even say that according to Shmuel the commandments are a means to life (to proper life), and not that life is a means to observing commandments, as Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya holds.
If so, there appears to be a direct contradiction between the two rationales, since they are based on opposing value conceptions about the relationship between life and the commandments and about the very value of life. How, then, can the Meiri hold both conceptions at once? As we saw, both the Yoma and Shabbat sugyot indicate that both rationales remain in the conclusion. This would seem to be precisely the basis of the Bi’ur Halakha’s view, and thus he rejects the Meiri’s words and leaves only Shmuel’s rationale.
Is There Really a Contradiction?
I think this contradiction is only apparent. To see this, let us examine the situation. Seemingly we are to compare two alternatives:
- Desecrate Shabbat and save a life.
- Do not desecrate Shabbat and do not save a life.
Let the value of a human life be X, and the value of keeping Shabbat be Y. If I choose option A I gain the (axiological) benefit X; choosing option B yields the benefit Y.[2] To determine which is preferable I must decide which value is greater, X or Y. In other words, it would seem that I must decide which is higher in the hierarchy—life or Shabbat/the commandments—and construct a scale of values. As we saw, this is ostensibly the substance of the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. I will now try to show that even if I cannot determine a hierarchy between the two values (whether X is greater than Y or vice versa), Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s reasoning can still be invoked, and the conflict can be decided according to his consideration.
In fact, I claim more than that: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya seeks precisely to bypass the need to decide which value stands higher on the halakhic scale of values. His contention is that even without ranking X against Y, the comparison yields a clear result in favor of desecrating Shabbat. His claim is based on the fact that if we save the person’s life, he will be able to keep many additional commandments that will offset the Shabbat that was desecrated to save him. We can present this arithmetically as follows. Suppose saving his life will lead him to keep many additional Shabbats (in fact, we saw that on his view it is about many commandments, not specifically Shabbat, but for simplicity I will speak of Shabbats), say their number is n. Then choosing option A gives us, in addition to the value X, also Y(n−1), for in addition to life we gained many Shabbats (and lost one that was desecrated).[3] In contrast, if we do not desecrate Shabbat, we have gained one Shabbat that we kept and that is all; that is, the total benefit is Y.
To decide the conflict we must compare the benefits of these two options. But of course, regardless of the relationship between the values of X and Y—indeed, regardless of the value of X (so long as it is positive)—we always have (as long as n>2):[4]
X + (n−1)Y > Y
If so, the benefit of desecrating Shabbat outweighs, irrespective of our value scale, because—as Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya observed—in saving we gain not only life but also many Shabbats.
In other words, the conclusion that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya assumes a hierarchy between Shabbat and life (that life is a means to the keeping of Shabbat) is incorrect. He may accept or reject Shmuel’s view that the commandments are a means to life and are of lesser importance than life; either way he can still say what he said. The inequality above does not depend on Y<X (indeed, it does not depend on X at all). Thus the Meiri is correct that both rationales/sources can be held together; there is no contradiction between them. On the contrary, from the fact that the halakha is like Shmuel—that is, we adopt his conception that X>Y—we can infer that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya agrees to that as well; but unlike Shmuel he contends that there is no need to rely on it, because even without it the decision is to desecrate Shabbat and save a life.
A Note on Doubtful Danger to Life
What about a doubtful danger to life? This is indeed unclear. According to Shmuel it seems the Gemara assumes that X/2 > Y. But according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, it would seem that even here we should desecrate Shabbat, for even if we erase X entirely, the comparison between the two sides of the inequality still favors the left-hand side (at least when n>2). It seems there is no refutation to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya.
Perhaps here the difference needs to enter between desecrating Shabbat and not keeping it; that is, it is not (n−1)Y but rather nY − Z, where Z is the “cost” of desecration. Still, it remains unclear why in a case of certain danger to life this inequality would decide according to him. He needs to assume something about the relation between X and Z. This brings us to the next note.
Incommensurability of Values
In analytic moral philosophy there is discussion of the incommensurability (the absence of a common measure) of values. The claim is that we have no way to compare values and determine which is more important. Consider an example Sartre gives. During World War II, one of his students in occupied Paris came to consult him about a dilemma. His elderly mother lived in Paris alone and needed help. He himself wanted to flee Paris and join the Free French to fight the Nazis. What should he do? Which outweighs which—the value of aiding one’s elderly mother, or the value of fighting evil? It seems there is no practical way to establish such a hierarchy, that is, a scale of values. Beyond the practical difficulty, the claim is that there is a principled difficulty.
Leibowitz wrote and said in several places (see, for example, the last essay in his collected writings, Faith, History, and Values, where he discusses disconnecting a patient from machines) that a value, in its essence, cannot be reduced to or grounded in another principle (reduction or rationalization). That is essentially the definition of a value. Every ethical directive is based on certain values, but the values themselves are not based on anything outside them. The first step in any ethical justification is the adoption of a value; therefore the value itself cannot be justified (otherwise we fall into an infinite regress). Leibowitz describes this as an arbitrary act, but in my view he means an act that cannot be grounded in a logical argument (which is not the same thing. See, for example, here). But if there is no way to justify or rationalize a value, then there is also no way to measure it against another value.
We can put it this way: to establish a hierarchy between two values we must ground them on a common basis, measure each of them in those shared units, and then see which one scores higher. For example, if I hesitate whether to drive fast in an ambulance—even though it endangers lives—because speed might save the patient’s life, this is a consideration entirely within the framework of saving life and the value of life; therefore, in principle, one can weigh and determine where the value of life is better served—by driving fast or slowly; the question is what will save more life. But desecrating Shabbat versus saving life, or fighting evil versus helping an elderly mother—these are conflicts between different values that have no common measure; therefore there is no way to measure them on a shared scale to build a hierarchy and resolve the conflict.
It must be understood that if indeed a conflict between values is incommensurable, then even if we find an explicit verse telling us that saving a life overrides Shabbat—or the reverse—that will not help. The problem of incommensurability is not that we are not smart enough to know the answer, but that there is no answer. If I ask you what there is more of in the world: water in the Indian Ocean or human kindness—this is not a question that is difficult to answer; it is a question that has no answer. In such a case, even an explicit verse cannot teach us that there is more water or more kindness. A verse can help when there is an answer and we lack the tools to reach it; but a verse cannot answer a question that has no answer.
Back to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya
I will not enter here into solving this problem,[5] but will only say that perhaps Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya seeks to bypass it. He rejects all the sources his colleagues bring, because a source cannot answer a question that has no answer. Instead of a source he proposes an answer based on reasoning—but a reasoning that bypasses the need to build a scale of values (for reasoning too cannot build such a scale when there is no relation between its rungs). As we saw, his answer resolves the conflict without needing to rank X against Y, even if there is in principle no way to do so.[6]
However, as we saw, if we try to explain the refutation to him from doubtful danger to life, this forces us to assume that there is a common measure—that is, room for comparison—between X and Z. That does not accord with the assumption of incommensurability, and this requires further thought.
Back to the Previous Column
The conclusion we reached here indeed dovetails with the conclusion of the previous column. The hierarchy between life and the commandments is not unequivocal—neither according to Shmuel nor according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. We saw there that without the possibility of keeping commandments there is no point to life (and therefore the commandment of procreation lapses), and at the same time Shmuel says that without life there is no point to the commandments.
[1] The Chatam Sofer in his novellae to Ketubot there also makes this point against Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. However, the Meiri in the Yoma sugya cited above writes that the reason we do not save a gentile’s life on Shabbat is that they are not bound by “the norms of the nations” (they do not keep the seven Noachide commandments to which they are obligated, which are essentially moral and human norms). It is clear from his words that regarding people who belong to nations that are indeed bound by norms (such as the Christians in the Meiri’s time—about whom he writes that their status is different; see my essay here)—there is an obligation to save their lives even at the cost of Shabbat desecration by Torah law, just like for a Jew. If so, the Bi’ur Halakha’s argument against him collapses of itself, for according to the Meiri, even with respect to a gentile who is obligated to keep his own commandments, one can apply Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s reasoning—that is, to desecrate Shabbat for him so that he will keep (other) commandments, from among his seven, many times.
[2] In principle there is an asymmetry between the two sides of the equation: keeping Shabbat contains a prohibition and a positive commandment; therefore there is value to keeping Shabbat and a negative value to desecrating it. By contrast, saving life has a positive value, but not saving it is not a negative (for I did not murder him; there is no transgression here). Of course there is a loss of the life itself, but it seems hard to say that this has a negative value and not merely the absence of a positive value. See on this in columns 415–416.
[3] Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya ignores the fact that desecrating Shabbat is not merely the loss of keeping one Shabbat; it also has a negative value. Perhaps because of the high value of n he thinks this is insignificant. Even if we include the loss involved in desecrating Shabbat, it would not change the relationship between the two sides of the equation.
[4] Recall that n is the number of commandments, not the number of Shabbats.
[5] See my video and audio lectures on Torah and morality (there are several series on the site), and also the beginning of the third book in my trilogy.
[6] Indeed, from the very fact that X and also Y both appear in the same inequality, it would seem they share units; otherwise there would be no way to compare them. But we can read the plus sign in the inequality as a symbol expressing that beyond the advantage on the left-hand side in terms of the number of commandments/Shabbats (which suffices to decide), one must also add the value of life (measured in entirely different units). Even without assuming a common measure, one can see that this inequality is decided in favor of desecrating Shabbat. The problem arises in the case of doubtful danger to life, for there we see that the value of X does play a role in the decision; that is, there is no assumption of incommensurability. I noted this just above.
A. Even in the account of R”sh ben Manasya, there is a value measurement of Sabbath desecration and its observance. He assumes that the harm from Sabbath desecration is offset by the benefit of Sabbath observance. But this is his reasoning (and in the twilight of his days R”sh ben Manasya went astray and became the result of their rak”l). On the part of the non-Shabbat, there is no benefit in observing it, but only harm in desecration, and on the part of the act on Shabbat, there is almost no harm in desecration, but mainly benefit from observing it. All the more so according to the Meiri, which is the law for all mitzvot, R”sh ben Manasya's reasoning is that Sabbath desecration is offset by any other mitzvah (or with any sum of other mitzvot).
The Gemara states that a transgression extinguishes a mitzvah, meaning (ostensibly) the reward and punishment in the hereafter (since the reward of a mitzvah is not in any case) are calculated net, and each person has either only reward or only punishment. It really means that transgressions and commandments are on the same axis. But R”sh ben Manasya not only said that they are on the same axis but also knew how to give a price. If all R”sh ben Manasya wants is to escape from measuring values, then it is quite strange that he knows how to place commandments and transgressions on the same axis and also price them nicely (and how to price them? Equal! What is special about the point of equality more than any other point? The next column will probably have solutions).
B. Perhaps trivial. Is it true that in R”sh ben Manasya we clearly see that there are benefits and harms (metaphysical, apparently) to the commandments even separately from the commandments, that is, that there are complete reasons for the commandments and transgressions. Violating the commandment of desecrating the Sabbath is more serious than the value of life, after all, whoever desecrates the Sabbath is condemned to death, even if Elijah comes and says that he knows mysteries, that he has completely repented, and that he will never return to that sin again? Therefore, it is clear that Rabbi Ben Manasiya strives to discover that the rescuer is not commanded to refrain from desecrating the Sabbath. He goes to the bottom of his mind and discovers what he commands us to do, and not that he sits and observes outside the halakhah, sees two contradictory commands or desires, and decides in an extra-halakhic manner what Rabbi Ben Manasiya thinks is right to do. And when God Himself supposedly hesitates about what to command (whether to desecrate and save or not), then the matter of the command is really not before Him because He is not subject to His own commands, but only to the benefits and harms that arise from the command and the transgression. If all that was a command, then it is not appropriate to go to the bottom of the Holy One's mind as to what He commands in a particular situation. It is clear that according to Rabbi Ben Manasiya, in the end, the one who rescued did not commit any transgression and did not accumulate any desecration, because the command towards man is one. But the Holy One considers even before the command, and in this there is nothing to consider unless there are reasons that precede the command itself.
C. In note 1, you rejected the question of the interpretation of the halakha on the Meiri and said that the Meiri also has a gentile who is fenced off from desecrating. I did not understand. In the Gemara, it says that a newborn is discarded if he is certainly a gentile and is not desecrated. Therefore, this baby has a majority of data that comes from gentiles who are not fenced off (and there is a majority of dalitah that he will grow up like them to be not fenced off) and yet they desecrate him. And if you say that it is possible for him to grow up and fence himself, then so also in an adult gentile lest he repent and fence himself. But lest he change, not our senses, and it is reasonable that the law is the same for a child in a city that is not fenced off, where the boy will do and not sin, and we do not have to fear that the Spirit of God will begin to beat him.
And perhaps you will say that a great wrong that is not a felony and a crime is already in principle punishable by death and therefore is not saved (and apparently the same is true of a Jew who is punished by death, for example, strangling the hegel, is he supervised and then killed? You will say that he is not supervised. And in contrast to what I think I once saw, a bizarre thing in my eyes, where people sentenced to death in the US, if they are sick, are waited for to get well and are cured with all kinds of medicines and then are put on trial). Since a baby has not sinned.
[D. By the way, you interpreted pumpkin seeds as Rashi interpreted pepper seeds. But Rashi did not interpret pepper seeds. Apparently, it is precisely hot pepper that is being referred to as seeds because that is how the fruits of the plant are (a picture on Wikipedia is worth a look), and a green pepper that has been sentenced to death in the matter of foreskin, Rashi apparently did not know whether it was spicy or not, and therefore he interpreted it as black pepper. But pumpkin is an ordinary vegetable and the seeds are useless.]
A. From the perspective of a doer who rejects and does not do (in one person and in the future, not like Rabbi Ben Menasya who renewed future and present eliminators in different eras) it is not entirely clear that there is a price. Because it is a teaching and part of the system of commandments. It is possible to see the entire Torah as one mitzvah with 33 details and limitations and all the rules of rejections are included as part of the system. So also in honoring a father, committing a transgression that is said to be obligatory upon him, apparently the intention is that the mitzvah of honoring a father itself is limited only to permissions.
A. You have already qualified the consequentialism yourself. As for your question itself, I myself asked it (in the discussion about Z).
B. Rabbi Ben Manasiya is not specifically talking about desecration of the Sabbath, but about all offenses (except for the most serious ones). As for your argument itself, I am not sure I understood it. But as far as I understood it, I do not see what is special about Rabbi Bo Manasiya. I completely agree with your consideration regarding the Holy One (and so does the Maimonides in his words that every mitzvah certainly has a reason), but I do not see why this specifically concerns Rabbi Bo Manasiya. What is more, he does not really measure the value of the Sabbath against life, as I explained in the column.
[In parentheses, I will add that in my opinion it is not necessarily true that someone who repents is punished with the punishments of the Jewish law. But this should be expanded upon, and things I have written and taught have not yet been published. And more to Alvah Milin]
3. You may be able to draw a distinction from the Gemara regarding its distinction between circumcised and non-circumcised Gentiles, but according to him, it cannot be proven from there that in order to desecrate Shabbat in order to save someone, one does not need to expect to fulfill his commandments.
As for your argument, I did not understand it. According to the Meiri, the Gemara assumes that the person in question is a non-circumcised Gentile, and therefore the Sabbath is not desecrated. This is when the person in question is certainly a Gentile. But if there is doubt about a Gentile, there is doubt about whether a Jew is desecrated. According to the Meiri, the desecration stems from the expectation of fulfilling a commandment. This can be explained in several ways. And here are two of them: 1. In the future, the doubt will be resolved, and there is a chance that it will turn out that he is Jewish and that he will fulfill many commandments. This is not about him repenting, which is not feared (a certainty of deshta), but rather that he will be proven retroactively that he has always been a kosher son of Abraham our father. 2. A non-circumcised Gentile also fulfills some of the commandments. It is not necessary that he cancels all seven of his commandments. On the contrary, this is usually the case. Therefore, even where most Gentiles are not circumcised, to the same extent you can say that the very large majority of them observe some of their mitzvot. Therefore, the question of the interpretation of the halakhic law that assumes that he is saved even though he is not expected to observe any mitzvot at all is incorrect according to the Meiri's own method.
A. I apologize. I don't know how I missed this as a reader of the letter. But a comment is not enough and it weighs heavily on the entire discussion.
C. The excuse that the doubt will be resolved exists even if the Meiri are not desecrated even on a fence, so it should be discussed separately. The excuse that a non-Gedor also fulfills something I didn't understand what is an excuse, because in the Gemara if a non-Gedor is certainly not desecrated.
C. Certainly a Gentile does not desecrate, not because he will not keep anything, but because what he does not keep outweighs what he does (and again, some line needs to be drawn. It will be examined in the next column). The Meiri's argument is that the permission to desecrate Shabbat stems from the fact that he will keep a mitzvot, but it should not be concluded from this that everyone who keeps some mitzvot desecrates him.
A1. I will return to this because it is impossible to ignore the difficulty even if it is commented on. If R”sh ben Manasya knows how to set a scale for the land and measure the desecration of Shabbat against the observance of Shabbat, and he also measures other mitzvot and offenses as a guide, and the Sages easily said that an offense extinguishes a mitzvah (and a detestable deed is also not a deed, simply put), then why think that he is unable to measure the value of life and is looking for patents. He apparently sees the value of life as something internal to halakhic law, and not that he comes with it from the outside as an explanation and sets it against an offense. It is not exactly clear to me from the column how you learn that R”sh ben Manasya perceives the value of life whether within the framework of halakhic law or not.
Why not understand his words simply as that he measured the value of life by the water and it turned out that the value of life is less important than keeping the Sabbath (from the explanation, or from the fact that the commandment to keep life is in general not to stand for the blood of your neighbor, and as is known in the book of Hasmonaeans that at first they allowed themselves to die in order not to desecrate the Sabbath), but even without importance to the value of life, one should desecrate it because of his calculation.
And yet we can also hold to Shmuel's taste and there is no contradiction in this because according to them, like Shmuel, the value of life is important and this covers everything, but on the other hand, even if the value of life is less important than the Sabbath, there is the consideration of R”sh ben Menasya. And perhaps there is an issue with this, for example, whether to save someone from being a fool or a plant, such as injecting him with oxygen, on the one hand he is alive in them and he will live even without the rescue, but on the other hand he will keep many Sabbaths if they do not save him, he will not keep many Sabbaths and is as important as dead. Besides, the Meiri does not necessarily rule on R. Ben Menasya in terms of halakhic law, but merely explains that R. Ben Menasya is also saved in the short term because the Gemara did not bring this up as you wrote.
A2. And if he is measuring defilements and existences, where did you get the assumption (which is expressed in an equation) that one defilement against one existence results in a perfect offset. What appears in his words is only that the duration of existences is greater than one defilement.
A1. Beyond the difficulty about Z that has already been discussed, I did not understand your statement. After all, the inequality shows that the decision does not depend on the value of life (X). The result is obtained only from considerations of Y without any connection to the value of X (at least as long as it is positive and n is above 2). So why claim that R”sh ben Menasya assumes something about the value of life? There is no hint of such an assumption in his words. That is all I am arguing here.
A2. You are right. In principle, there does not have to be a one-for-one offset, but R”sh ben Menasya's words do suggest this. He compares the desecration of one Sabbath to the observance of many Sabbaths. This means that the decisive parameter is quantity.
A1. Because the assumption that there is something immeasurable is a bit strange given that everything else that moves within the halakha was measured and he himself also measures existences and desecrations. So I assume that he does measure, and since he did not say that life is rejected, it means that in his opinion life is rejected because it was measured and found to be cheap with regard to Shabbat (a well-known opinion as stated in the Hasmoneans). In any case, if this is also a possibility that is acceptable to you, then oh well.
See the beginning of the third book regarding the measurements of values.
Beyond that, I explained that no measurement of life versus Shabbat can be inferred from his words.
Regarding the reply in the B’d of Meta, it turns out that part of it was published in column 91 https://mikyab.net/posts/4735 and in the links therein (and there you concluded, “But according to this, we still need to study the words of the Mishnah in Beatitudes 13 and Rashi and Ramban, where it clearly appears that a reply is not useful in the punishments in the B’d of Meta”; and then you stated in the Okimta that only a formal reply is not useful, as opposed to a substantive reply. I did not go into the depth of your question there, and we need to carefully examine whether the reply is a press-house reply or a wind-up reply).
I didn't remember.
B. (An attempt with improved wording) I tried to conclude from R”ash ben Menasya that there are reasons for the commandments. Because after all, R”ash admits that the end of the matter is that whoever defiles in order to save has not transgressed any commandment. If he had asked G-d, He would have told him, “He has desecrated.” And so the point of his calculation (which calculates desecration against existence, as the neglected z says) is to calculate the reasons or benefits of the commandments.
You said that there is no such thing as the Maimonides’ opinion and your opinion. However, evidence from a halachic gemara still has value.
You said that there is nothing special in R”ash. But I felt a difference – Those who discuss boundaries such as whether pickled or cooked are dealing with the boundary of cooking and are not really concerned with taste (and the parallel in Rashbam with benefit), since Rashbam did not find an internal boundary in either desecration or existence (again the z) but rather considered all of them, and this is impossible except from the standpoint of assuming the existence of benefits and measuring them. Now I thought that this is exactly what you said - whoever measures two commandments from a reason assumes something in common that they are measured by, and from this it is reasonable to assume that there is something prior to the commandment that the commandment came from or that it is intended to improve. This means that Rashbam in particular assumes benefits for the commandments.
I understand. Nice comment.
By the way, regarding section A. I hinted that if the Lord had been their result, then it is clear that he would have offset the desecration of Shabbat with its observance. But of course this is not necessarily the case. In parallel, their result does not necessarily price suffering and pleasure on the same axis. For example, with all my consequentialism, when I came to the venerable story “Those Who Turn Their Backs into Umlas” https://www.sf-f.org.il/sf-f/old_site/story_1155.html I began to hesitate. There the happiness of many is conditioned on the enormous suffering of an individual. And in this my heart does not allow me to have one girl suffer enormous suffering and the others make a mess of me. If the enormous suffering of an individual saves enormous suffering for many, then it is necessary for the law to cause the individual enormous suffering with the hands of a great mitzvah. But suffering versus pleasure is a different opera and in this it is difficult to price and I, for example, do not know what to say. There is probably some small amount of suffering for an individual that is “worth less” than some other large amount of certain pleasures for many, and for example, someone’s house being demolished to make way for a road for many, although it is common today to say that a person’s house is woven into the fabric of their life and that their pockets are filled with gold is a great sorrow, but setting a price for this is truly a very problematic matter.
In the book of Ishak and there was a blessing 5722
From the discussion among the Tannaim on the study, it seems that the very law of the Pikoon rejecting Shabbat was agreed upon and accepted by all, and the discussion is only about the meaning of the demand. From the fact that there is no dispute here about the scope of the law, it is understandable why the Tannaim does not reject Shmuel's words on the grounds that it is not within the authority of the Amora to dispute the Tannaim.
The law requiring the desecration of Shabbat for the sake of Pikoon was not easy to observe for a Jew who was accustomed to the fact that keeping Shabbat was a severe commandment of the most severe, and the discussion is educational, how to convince him to desecrate Shabbat. This was particularly difficult in the generation of Shemad. Where Jews were accustomed to devotion to the observance of the Torah's commandments, and the Tannaim sought arguments that would convince the public to comply with the halakhic requirement to postpone the Sabbath for the sake of Piku”n.
As I also noted in the previous column, it is difficult to assume that the ’tastes of the commandments’ intended to arouse motivation – reflect real differences within the boundaries of halakhic law.
With greetings, Hanoch Hanach Feinschmecker-Palti
There is a similarity between Rabbi Yishmael's argument here, that he who refrains from desecrating Shabbat for salvation is like helping the persecutor, and the reasoning that Rabbi Yishmael ironically puts in the mouth of those who enforce the prohibition to marry during the decree, that the purpose of the prohibition is that the seed of Abraham our father be completely complete. Rabbi Yishmael's opinion is that there must not be a situation where the excessive grammar of the commandments leads to an existential risk for the public or the individual.
In the blessing of Shabbat Tava, Chap. Palti
And with the importance that Rabbi Yishmael attached to preserving the soul, when it came to his own, Rabbi Yishmael stood firm and prevented his nephew Rabbi Elazar ben Dama, who had been bitten by a snake, from being healed in the name of Oha, and when Ben Dama died, Rabbi Yishmael praised him: “Blessed are you, Ben Dama, who departed this world in peace and did not break through the barrier of the sages” (Avoda Zara 27:2).
With blessings, Chaf’sh Palti
There are those on Wikipedia who identify Rabbi Yishmael Samael (the great Tanna whose laws are numerous) with Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha (from whom we found no laws), as you say, but this sounds quite strange to me (because of the aforementioned difference).
And his words (of Rabbi ben Elisha) regarding the seed of Abraham are quite the opposite, that one must be careful with the mitzvot even if there is an existential risk, and how you turned his words from one end to the other and said that he said it ironically.
For a good Friday
Isn't it a halachic saying that the reason for the halachic saying 'that Abraham's seed would be a complete and absolute one' is said ironically?
With blessings, Hafs Pelati
In particular, that these things are said in the baraita of the Aggadah, in which the words of Rabbi Yishmael are conveyed in celebration in his full name and initiation. This is not a routine halachic statement.
In my previous column, I also suggested another direction, that the statement ‘And the seed of Abraham was found to be a self-evident marriage’ is the opinion of the Hasidim, who live without doing the will of God’ are worthless, and therefore we must be prepared to ‘protest against the sanctification of marriage’.
Rabbi Yishmael tells them: ‘Even according to your theory, that the entire nation of Israel should follow the paths of the Hasidim and give up their lives not to marry– I am sorry to say that even if according to you the entire nation of Israel is acting unlawfully, one should refrain from rebuking them for this, since ‘it is better for them to be a shuggin and not to be a zizin’
Rabbi Yishmael, son of Elisha himself, believed that the existence of the Jewish people was a "high necessity", and therefore when the Rabbis asked him: "Yishmael, son of Barakni", Rabbi Yishmael blessed his Creator to have mercy on his people, for the existence of the Jewish people is a blessing to his God.. And for this reason, it appears that he would not agree with the Hasidic view that there is room to "reprove the sanctification of God" where the Torah did not require it.
With a blessing, may you be blessed
It also seems that Rabbi Yishmael, who knew the political reality, understood that the Romans had no problem with the existence of the Jewish religion per se, since there were countless different and strange religions in the empire. What bothered the Romans was the proselytizing influence of Judaism, and their decree was more for their own pleasure than to pass on the religion, and when we return to this, the decree regarding the Jews will be repealed, as indeed happened in the end.
A. [What makes you think that Rabbi Ishmael is Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha? Isn't it strange that Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha is cited for legends and customs, while Rabbi Ishmael is rumored to be in every corner of the law? The character of the characters is portrayed completely differently]
B. If the decrees were specifically about the Jewish religion (not sure) they can be explained by the raids that uprooting the unifying ethos of the Jews would disintegrate them and prevent rebellions. In a successful revolt, the Jews would certainly unite. I didn't understand why when the Romans realized that they were afraid of a proselytizing influence, they would revoke the decrees. It is likely that after they saw that the situation had calmed down and Roman peace had returned, they no longer saw the benefit of exerting effort in suppressing their subjects.
On the 13th of the month of Ashkenaz 5781
Lt. 3 – Shalom Rav,
There was ‘Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha, a high priest’ who was killed by the Romans during the suppression of the revolt together with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (Sotah 44:2; Avot Darbi Nathan 38:3). And it is likely that he was the one who entered to burn incense before and after’ (although some speculate that his entry to burn incense was during the brief period of the renewal of Temple worship during the time of Bar Kochba. Wikipedia, entry Rabbi Yishnael, note 13).
But there was R’ Yishmael ben Elisha’ He was a prisoner in Rome and was redeemed by Rabbi Yehoshua and said, “I am assured of this that the instructions are preserved in Israel” (Gatin 9:1). Likewise, Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha said, “I will read and not delay.” And he read and delayed and wrote on his notebook that when the Temple was rebuilt, he would bring a sin offering of seven (Shabbat 12:2). He was certainly after the destruction, and at the same time in Yerushalmi (P”a 5:3) he is mentioned by the name “Rabbi Yishmael” simply.
It is certain that Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha who speaks about abstaining from meat and wine after the destruction is not the High Priest from the time of the Temple, since he was killed at the time of the destruction, but rather he is Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha the Elder, who was also a priest, since they said of him, “a priest assisting a priest.” R’ Avran Heiman, in his commentary on the ’History of Tannaim and Amoraim’, assumes that he was the grandson of the High Priest.
With greetings, Hasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kavas
According to many scholars, the decree on circumcision preceded the Bar Kochba revolt. Circumcision was considered castration, which was considered a severe prohibition, and was forbidden to all peoples. The purpose of the prohibition was to prevent the proselytizing influence of the Jews, which reached a situation described by Roman historians as ’there is no house in Rome that does not have a Jew’.
One of the reasons for the Bar Kochba revolt was the decree on circumcision, and with the suppression of the revolt, the decrees on the Jews were tightened and prohibited the observance of the general commandments. With the calm, the attitude of the Romans toward the Jews moderated. Not only were they allowed to observe the commandments – But they were also given permission to circumcise their sons, while the prohibition of circumcision remained in full force for the Gentile citizens of the empire, preventing the legal conversion of Gentiles.
I asked where you got the idea to compare Rabbi Yishmael the great Tanna, friend of Rabbi Akiva, uncle of Ben Dama, to Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha. You said that Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha was, but you did not argue in favor of the above comparison.
And why do you compare? You said that one after the destruction said he would bring a sin offering and one was a high priest before the destruction. What is the evidence here, after all, a person lived for a period of time. It is certainly possible that one Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha was, before the destruction he was a high priest and the Romans came and destroyed him and then said he would bring a fat sin offering and after a few years the Romans killed him.
Regarding the decrees and the rebellion, it seems you are right.
To Tig ” Shalom Rav,
Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha, who said (Shabbat 12) that he would bring a sin offering of fat, is called in the Jerusalem equivalent simply ‘Rabbi Yishmael’. He is certainly not the High Priest who was killed with Rashba”G during the suppression of the Holocaust Revolt.
With blessings, Chabad KI”K
In the same way, ‘Rabbi Akiva ben Yosef’ is usually called ‘Rabbi Akiva’, and Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai, is called simply ‘Rabbi Yehuda’, and Rabbi Yossi bar Halfata – ‘Rabbi Yossi’, etc’ etc’
Regards, Shtzel ben Shde
According to the Meiri method, the reason for “one Sabbath is profaned on him so that he may keep many commandments” also applies to a Gentile.
And since a Gentile who violates the Sabbath is liable to death,
one can say regarding a Gentile:
one Sabbath is profaned on him so that he may violate many Sabbaths.
Good News
The value of life is your invention. (And not only that, but it explicitly talks about the life of an Israeli and you omitted that and added the invention of the value of life).
Live in them means that the laws and judgments are supposed to sustain the life of a person and if they do not desecrate the Sabbath then it will turn out that the laws led to the death of a person contrary to what the Torah said and live in them. And not because of the value of life.
And how do you see that life has no value? There are many laws that punish a person with death for breaking laws.
And what if they did not believe the voice of the first Posk – and believed the voice of the last Posk.
And what if they did not believe the voice of these two Poskim as well?
Rather, apparently the ”last Posk” meant what is called in Hebrew the “ultimate Posk ” – and this is debatable.
The “last Posk” writes: “The laws and judgments are supposed to sustain the life of man” –
This is the meaning of “human life has value ” – otherwise – why ” sustain the life of man ”?
In the 13th chapter of the Book of the Law,
Even from the mishna in the Horiyot that the priest is before the Levite, the Levite before the Israelite, and the man before the woman to revive (while the covering and redemption of the woman precede) it seems that the level of obligation in the mitzvot determines the value of life. However, there is room to say that in terms of the value of life, there is no room to say that the blood of one is flushed with the blood of his companion, but rather that with regard to the obligation to save, the one who saves has priority in his honor (just as his father and his rabbi precede).
It should also be noted that in the opinion of the Maimonides, ‘to revive’ means to provide, and even in this he did not rule as in the mishna in the Horiyot, which is according to the opinion of the Tikvah in the Ketubahs that from the properties of the sons are to be provided for according to the obligation to learn Torah. However, the halachah ruled by the Rabbinical Council that in cases of limited assets, the daughters shall be supported and the sons shall return the fathimah, and the same applies to “to support” meaning “to provide for” the woman takes precedence, because it is not a woman’s honor to return the fathimah (see the supplement to the commentary of the Mishnah by Rabbi Elbeck on the Horiyot).
The halachah also made it difficult for the Mishnah on the Horiyot of the Gamma in the kettubots that the halachah ruled by the Rabbinical Council that the daughters shall be supported and the sons shall return the fathimah, and they added that there is a distinction between supporting with food, in which the woman takes precedence (as in covering) because of her honor, and “to support” in the sense of “to save,” where the man takes precedence because he is obligated in the superfluous mitzvot.
Best regards, Nahorai Shraga Agami-Psisowitz
I have a theory, to the best of my ability – that the law of first aid in rescue was stated only because of the explanation
of “from the dead a law is a law of first aid”.
So that a person would not be like Buridan's donkey, and would not save anyone, we gave him an immediate criterion
so that he would act immediately.
Good news
The priority in salvation is derived from the rule of R. A. Sha’chai Qodmin, and therefore the one you owe more honor to before the one you owe less honor to, and therefore T. A. H., a priest or the one who is most obligated by a commandment comes first.
According to Ben Petura, “Let no one fear the death of his friend.” There is no room even for “your life is your predecessor.” Interestingly, the Rambam did not decide the dispute between R. A. and Ben Petura, and he also does not say anything about priority in salvation, since he interprets “to revive” in the sense of “to kill.”
With blessings, Nasha’f