Does Every Verse Teach the Opposite of What It Says? (Column 411)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
Imagine a debate between a learned yeshiva avrech and his wife. The wife argues that the Torah itself already says, “Whatever Sarah tells you—listen to her voice,” and therefore, she claims, the husband is obligated to obey her. The husband—an experienced yeshiva bochur, as you’ll recall—keeps his cool and immediately replies: on the contrary (exactly the opposite—punkt farkert, while vigorously waving his thumb), the very fact that the Torah commanded Abraham to listen to Sarah proves that, generally speaking, there is no obligation to listen to one’s wife; otherwise Abraham wouldn’t have needed this verse. The verse is teaching that although as a rule a person need not obey his wife, Abraham did need to obey Sarah in that specific case. Thus, the verse instructing Abraham to heed Sarah actually teaches that a husband is not generally obligated to obey his wife.
As is well known, in yeshivot people say, “The opinion of laymen is the opposite of the opinion of Torah” (its source is apparently in the Sema, Choshen Mishpat 3:13: “Know that the rulings of lay householders and the rulings of learners are two opposites”). Returning to our learned couple: who is right in the debate I described—the laywoman or the lamdan?
Is every verse necessarily a “decree of Scripture” (gezerat hakatuv)?
The learned avrech’s argument rests on a mode of thinking common in yeshivot: if a given rule has a scriptural source, it apparently cannot be explained by reason alone. If there were a compelling sevara (logical rationale), the verse would be redundant (“Why do I need a verse? It is dictated by reason!”).
I’ve often mentioned R. Yosef Engel’s example (quoted in the Talmudic Encyclopedia, entry “One does not punish by derivation”), who brings three approaches to explaining the rule that we do not administer punishments learned via logical inference: (a) perhaps there is a refutation to the kal va-chomer; (b) perhaps the penalty for the lighter offense is insufficient for the more severe offense; (c) it is a gezerat hakatuv derived from “and his sister.” I have long wondered about this classification, for we don’t have three explanations here but rather two explanations and a source. Simply put, these are not three opinions but two: the source is “and his sister,” and the explanation could be either of the first two.[1] Note that this is a derash from the word “and his sister,” not an explicit verse. Below we’ll see what this implies. The reason the learned world passes over such a division with equanimity is the prevalent assumption that if there is a textual source, then the rule likely lacks a sevara-based explanation.
Every verse teaches the opposite of what it says
Notice the fascinating interpretive principle that emerges from this thinking: every verse teaches the opposite of what it states. If a verse teaches a certain principle, then apparently that principle is not true throughout the rest of halakhah; otherwise, we would not have needed a special verse to teach it in this case. Hence, such a novelty applies only to its specific context. Therefore, if a given verse yields the novelty X, we may infer that, elsewhere, principle X does not hold.
This is, essentially, what underlies the avrech’s claim: if the verse commands Abraham to listen to Sarah, then the general rule must be the reverse—one need not listen to one’s wife.
The other side of the coin
However, the term “gezerat hakatuv” is quite rare in the literature of Hazal, and it therefore seems they did not treat every law derived from a verse as a mere decree of Scripture. Moreover, as I showed in my article on gezerat hakatuv, even the laws that did receive that label have an underlying rationale. In my article on the status of sevarot I discussed the role of reason and the normative force of laws grounded in it, particularly whether such laws are fully biblical. Here I wish to focus on the relationship between reason and textual source, and specifically on whether we may apply a rationale beyond the context of its source.
The avrech’s view is of course contradicted by many Talmudic and early sources in which a principle is learned from a specific biblical context and then extended to the whole of halakhah (this is essentially the rule of binyan av). For example, the rule that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition (aseh dokheh lo ta’aseh) is learned from the juxtaposition of tzitzit and kilayim (see Yevamot 5a–b). Our avrech would likely tell us that specifically there the positive commandment of tzitzit overrides the prohibition of mixed fibers, but this would imply that, generally, the rule is the opposite—that the prohibition overrides the positive commandment (otherwise why would we need the special novelty regarding tzitzit and kilayim?). But the Gemara does not say that; rather, it assumes the novelty serves as a binyan av for all of halakhah.
We can see this from other angles too. The Talmudic rule is that “two verses that come as one do not teach” (see, e.g., Kiddushin 42b and parallels). The common explanation is that if a principle is taught from two sources in two different contexts, then apparently the principle is not universally valid. If Scripture wished to teach it as a general rule, one source would have sufficed, and we would have extended it via binyan av. The fact that the Torah needed an additional source for another legal context proves it intended the principle only in those two contexts, not as a general rule. According to this rule, applying the principle to the rest of halakhah remains undecided (you cannot learn anything from those two verses). Some expand this and write that two verses teach the reverse—that elsewhere the principle does not apply (not merely that it remains open; see, for example, here, under “Learning the Reverse”). In any case, this applies only where there are two verses. The underlying assumption is that where there is one verse, it certainly teaches for the whole of halakhah via binyan av. The same holds for “general and particular” (klal ufrat): from it we learn “only what is in the particular,” meaning we do not extend by mere similarity unless there is precise identity. The implication is that if the particular appears alone, without a preceding general, the default is to extend it via binyan av.[2]
So who, then, is truly right—the avrech or his wife? Does every verse really teach the opposite of what it states? We cannot deny that such reasoning appears in the Talmud and its commentators, and certainly in yeshivot. But, as we have seen, in most cases Talmudic inference works the other way. The right question, then, is: what is the criterion? When does a verse’s novelty remain singular—compelling us to assume the opposite elsewhere—and when does a verse serve as a binyan av for a principle that applies throughout halakhah? I will suggest a possible criterion.
A brief analysis of the source for “a positive commandment overrides a prohibition”
I mentioned the passage in Yevamot that derives the rule aseh dokheh lo ta’aseh from the juxtaposition of tzitzit and kilayim. The juxtaposition teaches that the positive commandment of tzitzit overrides the prohibition of mixed fibers; therefore, one may attach woolen tzitzit to a linen garment. The rule that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition is, of course, general—applying across halakhah. Thus, this source was indeed expanded via binyan av. Why not say the opposite: from the Torah’s need to permit kilayim in tzitzit we prove that, generally, a positive commandment does not override a prohibition?
Here the answer seems simple. Nowhere does the Torah explicitly say that tzitzit overrides kilayim. This is a derash based on juxtaposition. But juxtaposition, by itself, tells us nothing. We cannot even know for sure that it should be expounded to establish any rule of override; even if we accept that it signals some override principle, we could have learned the reverse—that a positive does not override a prohibition. What led the Sages to derive specifically that a positive overrides a prohibition? Apparently, reason (sevara) guided them. Once we concluded that we are dealing with an override rule, reason tipped the scales: it is more plausible that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition than the reverse; therefore, that is how the verse is to be expounded.
We might still ask: if there truly is a rationale underpinning this rule, why is a verse needed—“Why do I need a verse? It is dictated by reason!” The likely answer is that the rationale is not strong enough to establish the rule on its own. Without the verse, we would not have instituted such a sweeping general rule by reason alone. But once a verse cues us to derive an override rule, reason says it is more plausible that a positive overrides a prohibition than vice versa.[3] That is how the darshan decided in this case.
We still must ask why the darshan treated this as a general principle rather than as a specific instruction about tzitzit and kilayim. The likely consideration is this: the verse by itself would not have led us to this conclusion without reason’s guidance. Hence, the rule about tzitzit rests on that rationale, not on some unique feature of that case. The natural conclusion is that the verse comes to validate that rationale (i.e., to show it is not too weak). Once we understand that the rationale is sound, it is only fitting to apply it across halakhah.
Broadening the point: distinguishing between a rule learned by derash and one from the plain sense
In our article on the Fifth Shoresh we explained that the maxim “we do not expound the reason for a verse” applies only where the source is explicit in the Torah. But where a law is derived by derash, we always examine its rationale. In practice, the darshan who formulates the law invariably relies on reason. The hermeneutic rules provide merely a textual trigger that licenses derash; they do not tell us what to derive. Reason does that. For example, when identical words appear in two different contexts, the rule of gezerah shavah tells us to draw a comparison. But we must still decide: with respect to what do we compare? Do we take the law from A and apply it to B, or the reverse? At that stage it is always reason that decides.
So too with inclusions from the particle “et.” For example, the verse “You shall fear the Lord your God (et Hashem Elokecha tira)” is expounded to include reverence for Torah scholars. Let us assume the word “et” truly signals an inclusion; the question of what to include remains up to the darshan (who, in this case, struggles mightily—see Pesahim 22b). At that point, reason tells us that the verse comes to include Torah scholars (and not chairs or pigeons). And again we can ask: if there is a rationale for revering Torah scholars, why is a derash from the verse needed? Apparently the rationale is not strong enough by itself; without the verse we would not legislate this. One could even say the rationale is entirely absent (revering anyone other than God smacks of idolatry), but the “et” forces us to include something, and reason says that if we must revere anyone, it is Torah scholars (the least implausible option).[4]
This is the state of affairs for all derashot. The hermeneutic rules say that when there is a certain biblical form we must expound it (to include, compare, exclude, etc.), but the decision about what, exactly, to derive (what to include, exclude, compare, etc.) always lies with the darshan, who has no tool for that beyond his reason. As I explained, it seems the rationale is typically insufficient to stand on its own—otherwise the derash would be superfluous. Reason guides the darshan and is supplemented by the verse’s derash. This is precisely the conclusion we reached above regarding the juxtaposition of tzitzit and kilayim.
The derash from “all fat (kol chelev)” in the sugya of half-measures
The sugya of half-measures (chatzi shiur = C”Sh) provides an instructive example. Yoma 74a records a dispute between R. Yohanan and Reish Lakish regarding one who eats less than the requisite measure of a forbidden item:
To the matter itself: Half a measure—R. Yohanan says it is biblically prohibited; Reish Lakish says it is biblically permitted. R. Yohanan says it is biblically prohibited, since it is fit to combine to a full measure—he is eating an issur; Reish Lakish says it is biblically permitted: “eating,” the Torah said—and this is not [legally] “eating.” R. Yohanan challenged Reish Lakish: I have only that whoever is subject to punishment is subject to warning; as for a koy and half-measure—since they are not subject to punishment, might they also not be subject to warning? Scripture teaches: “all fat (kol chelev).” [Reish Lakish responds:] It is rabbinic, and the verse is a mere asmachta…
According to R. Yohanan—whose view is accepted as halakhah—even one who eats less than a full measure violates a biblical prohibition; for Reish Lakish, it is rabbinic. At the beginning of the passage the Gemara says that R. Yohanan’s view rests on the rationale of “fit to combine” (hazi le-‘itztarufei). The Aharonim offer several explanations of this rationale, but they are not crucial here. Later, however, the Gemara cites a baraita deriving half-measures from the verse “all fat” (kol chelev) (Rashi explains: any amount of fat). The Aharonim debate the relationship between the verse and the rationale, but in light of the above, such pilpul is unnecessary. First, from the plain reading it is clear these are not conflicting sources but complementary; so write the Rishonim there as well. From our discussion above it is easy to see how: the verse “all fat” comes to include something, and reason teaches that it includes half-measures. That rationale is apparently not strong enough to innovate the law on its own, and so we also require the verse; yet the derash does not stand alone without the rationale.
In any case, the baraita learns two things from that verse: half-measures and the prohibition of the fat of a koy. Note that the standard view is that a koy is an animal of doubtful status—perhaps a hybrid of a he-goat and a doe. Also, fat (chelev) is prohibited only in domesticated animals (behemah), not wild animals (hayyah). Therefore, the fat of a koy is of doubtful prohibition, and the Gemara includes it from the verse (later it discusses why such an inclusion is needed at all).[5]
A question arises (rarely addressed): how can two different laws be included from the same source? Usually, we assume a single source serves to include one law. Two basic possibilities: (a) the two laws share a common core, and it is that core which the verse includes.[6] Indeed, the Peliti, “Beit HaSafek,” Orach Chayim 110 at the beginning, raises this difficulty and suggests this direction: the fat of a koy is the fat of a creature with aspects of both wild and domesticated; thus, it is a kind of qualitative half-measure of the fat of a domesticated animal, and is therefore prohibited via the rule of half-measures.[7] (b) Alternatively, we can broaden the point: the word “all” (kol) is a general-inclusive term. Rashi indeed writes that it includes “any amount of fat”—that is, anything bearing some degree of the fat prohibition. This is a “basket inclusion” that encompasses anything with some connection to the prohibition of fat. Half-measures and the fat of a koy are two examples: the former is a quantitative slice of the prohibition; the latter is an object whose species-status is connected to the prohibition. On this view, one could include many other cases from the verse, so long as they bear some relation to the prohibition of fat.
The difficulty
The question here is why the inclusion of the prohibition of half-measures is applied across the board (not only to fat), i.e., that for all prohibitions we also forbid less than a full measure—whereas the inclusion regarding the fat of a koy is specific to fat. No one learns from here to be stringent in biblical doubts generally,[8] and even the notion of a qualitative half-measure would be hard to accept as a general principle (otherwise, for every biblical prohibition we would forbid anything with the slightest connection to it, leaving the descendants of Abraham with nothing permitted!). Nor does anyone derive from here an obligation to cover the blood of a koy (since it is also a wild animal), even though the Gemara itself explicitly discusses this.
A proposed resolution
In light of what I explained about the combination of derash and rationale, it is clear why the rule forbidding half-measures is a general principle. We saw above that when a derash is accompanied by a (somewhat) compelling rationale—albeit one insufficient on its own—the result is a principle applied across halakhah. The derash shows that the rationale is valid, and we therefore apply it broadly.
Accordingly, we may suggest that the inclusion regarding the koy’s fat is not backed by a rationale (the Gemara does not present any rationale there, like the “fit to combine” offered for half-measures). In such a case, we are dealing with a law derived from a verse that lacks a reasoned basis.[9] In that situation, we cannot extract a general principle applicable elsewhere. It is a specific law about the fat of a koy. Incidentally, the sugya concludes that the koy is treated as its own species, and the novelty is that its fat is also prohibited. Here, plainly, there is no general principle to apply in other contexts—if only because this is a specific rule, not an abstract principle (as with half-measures). In the terms of this column’s opening, we could call this a gezerat hakatuv.
What happens when the rationale is strong?
We saw that if a derash is accompanied by a weak rationale (i.e., one insufficient on its own), the likely outcome is that we apply the rationale throughout halakhah. We also saw that when there is no rationale at all, the derash yields a specific statute—a gezerat hakatuv—relevant only to that context. Elsewhere the matter remains open (and perhaps we should even infer the reverse).
What if, alongside a derash, there is a strong rationale—one robust enough to establish the law even without the derash? In that case a question arises: “Why do I need a verse? It is dictated by reason!” The derash seems superfluous. A reasonable inference is that the derash comes to negate the rationale—to say the rationale is not correct and should apply only in the context addressed by the derash. Here is where it makes sense to say the verse’s novelty teaches the opposite of what it states (for the rest of halakhah). It is not merely a gezerat hakatuv for that case; it can also serve to exclude the rationale elsewhere.
Back to our avrech: the difference between an explicit verse and a derash
The avrech’s wife argued that he must listen to her voice, as learned from the Torah’s statement regarding Abraham and Sarah. She is making a binyan av from that case to a general rule. Her claim assumes that the duty of a husband to obey his wife is not an overly strong rationale in and of itself; otherwise, her husband would be right. In her view it is a weak rationale buttressed by the verse, and thus a sweeping rule is created. Her husband, by contrast, apparently thinks it is a very strong rationale (that every husband must obey his wife!), and he wonders why the Torah had to say it to Abraham—concluding that the verse likely teaches the opposite elsewhere. Another possibility is that, in the husband’s view, there is no rationale whatsoever to require a husband to obey his wife; therefore, the verse is a singular novelty. Only Abraham had to heed Sarah, but generally the matter remains open. Moreover, according to him, reason shows there is no obligation for a husband to obey his wife, and that is his general conclusion.
Note that here we are dealing with an explicit verse, not a derash. The difference is that a derash must have a rationale—even if not a strong one (as we saw, without it there is nothing to expound)—whereas with an explicit verse there may be no rationale at all. For our case, that means that with respect to obedience to a wife there need not be any rationale, and both interpretations of the husband’s view remain possible.
Observe that had this been a derash rather than an explicit verse, the upshot would be that the wife believes there is a weak rationale for the husband to obey her, while the husband thinks the rationale is strong; yet their final conclusions would almost invert (the wife derives a general rule despite conceding the rationale is weak, whereas the husband—who holds the rationale is strong—would conclude the rule does not generally apply). It’s fortunate, then, that we have an explicit verse rather than a derash, allowing the husband to stay consistent without inverting his conclusion (i.e., he may hold that there is no rationale for the husband to obey, and the verse teaches Abraham is an exception; the general rule remains that he is not obligated to obey).
Beyond the bit of levity in the example, I believe the analysis itself has merit. I don’t think it covers every case, but the basic logic strikes me as sound.
[1] Incidentally, in my view the straightforward explanation differs from both: there is no direct proportion between the severity of an offense and the severity of the penalty imposed for it. See my article on punishment in the Torah (and also here and here).
[2] Several commentators on the hermeneutic rules note that the entire point of “general and particular” is to neutralize the binyan av we would have made from the particular had it appeared on its own. In the second volume of our Talmudic Logic series we elaborate on this and explain the scope of extension via binyan av and how each of the three “general and particular” rules operates (general–particular; particular–general; general–particular–general; and also particular–general–particular, which appears only once in the Talmud).
[3] Incidentally, I suspect most people you ask will say the rationale goes the other way. The commentators deal at length with understanding this rationale (see, for example, Ramban to Exod. 20:8, and more; see also an extended treatment in the third volume of our Talmudic Logic series).
[4] This is also the plain sense of Pesahim 22b, as Shimon ha-Amsuni thought it impossible to include anything from that verse, and R. Akiva proposed a forced solution merely to salvage the inclusions from “et.”
[5] You can listen to and read more about all this in classes 6–7 of my series on Yoma ch. 8 (2020–21).
[6] In those classes I gave, for example, the Rashba (Berakhot 15a), who explains how the Torah teaches two laws from the verse “Shema Yisrael”: that one must make the words audible to one’s ears, and that Shema may be recited in any language.
[7] For qualitative half-measures, see many sources and examples in class 3 of that series.
[8] The Gemara seems to reject the interpretation that this source forbids doubtful cases, but the Rishonim dispute the matter. See my classes 6–7 in that series.
[9] Even so, once an inclusion is required, the fat of a koy is the least implausible candidate—hence it was included.
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Shalom Rabbi.
A. Thank you for the very successful article.
B. I was really surprised that you did not address the issue of “two scriptures that are the same cannot teach.” That is exactly the issue, isn’t it?
I commented. It seems you read too fast.
A. Indeed, I missed that line.
B. However, I think you could have expanded the topic a lot more with the debate about two and three scriptures coming together, what it teaches and what it doesn't, and the explanations for that.
By the way, it seems to me that the diagnosis of the combination of the elements in the Darsh comes out clearly from the Scholiam to Baraita Delb (or Leb) Midot of Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Yossi HaGalili
Interesting, waiting and fascinating, thank you!
You wrote "Once we have come to the conclusion that this is a general rejection, now the explanation is decisive as to whether the act is a rejection or not or vice versa. The preacher probably understood that it is more likely that the act is a rejection than the opposite, and therefore, from his perspective, the verse can be interpreted as such."
1- How did we come to the conclusion that this is a general rejection? From an explanation?
2- If this whole matter depends on an explanation (but a verse is needed to reinforce it), it is very reasonable to learn that there should have been a dispute here on this matter (like everything in Judaism that depends on an explanation), we should have found at least one Tanna or Amora who believes that it is more likely to say that the act is a rejection, and here by chance there is a consensus to say that the act is a rejection?
1. Apparently the other options seemed less likely to the preacher.
2. On the contrary, it is precisely those things in the Talmud that are explicitly based on reason that are the things about which there is no dispute.
Of course, it is possible that this is a sermon that is authoritative and not creative, I don't know.
If the scholar knew the Torah, he would not have needed excuses and explanations from his own head, an explicit verse: To Adam He said, “Because you have listened to the voice of your wife, ‘Cursed is the ground because of your transgression; in sorrow you shall eat it all the days of your life.’
Therefore, Abraham needed a special command to listen to the voice of his wife.
Two scriptures that deny each other…
And perhaps the word "Kula" and the word "Humura" are more difficult than the word "Humura". Now go and learn what the "Humura" is here.
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%93-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%99%D7%93%D7%99-%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%90%D7%91%E2%80%8E
🙂 I completely forgot about this thread. It's good to have someone who is keeping their heads up.
In the 23rd of Elul, 15th century, the relationship between Abraham and Sarah is one of mutual listening. Sarah accepts Abraham's request to say that she is his sister so that he will not be harassed, and Abraham listens to her when she asks to bring the foreigner in. And when she complains about her, Abraham allows her to do with his slave as she sees fit.
However, here, when Sarah demands that Ishmael be expelled, Abraham is very hesitant about listening to her, both out of his love for Ishmael, who is also his son, and out of the almost certain fear that his expulsion from Abraham's house will lead to his deterioration into a bad culture. And here there is a need for God's intervention, who tells him to listen to the voice of the Holy Spirit within him. This is not an unjustified demand that comes from anger and hatred, but from a deep insight that the stay of Ishmael – entails a physical and spiritual danger to Isaac.
The exception to the principle of mutual hearing is when the issue is the rejection of a son. from the house.
With greetings, Nehorai Shraga Psisovitz
Rebekah disagrees with Isaac's desire to give the blessing of rule to Esau, out of fear of what will happen to Jacob under Esau's rule. She does not argue with him head-on, but sends Jacob to receive the blessings in secret. But she is sure that Isaac will agree in retrospect when he learns that she initiated the move, and therefore she can assure Jacob, "Your curse is on me, my son," and there will be no curse.
.
Isaac accepts Rebekah's advice to send Jacob to marry a woman from her family in Behran. Moreover, Jacob, who gives his wives the right to name their sons, and when he is commanded by the angel to return to his country, does not "impose" the instruction on his wives, but calls them to consult and asks for their consent. This means: Even with Isaac and Jacob, the norm is mutual listening, unless there is a dispute about the place and fate of a son.
Chazal (Bam 5) instructed not to follow the wife's advice in the verses of Deshmia, but to follow her advice in the verses of Debita, and some say even in the verses of Deelma. However, in the discussion of the Gemara about Manoah who followed his wife, there is evidence that Manoah was not with the land, since he did not actually follow her, but followed her advice to ask that the angel of God return and comfort him, "What will be the boy's judgment?" This means: Even with the verses of Deshmia, there is room to accept the wife's advice regarding the way to implement the divine instruction.
With greetings, Nehorai Shraga Agami-Psisowitz
And interestingly enough, in that regard. There was a joke about a yeshivah boy who married a college student and they had a son. At night, the baby began to cry. The yeshivah said to his wife: “Get up, Uri, for your light has come.” His wife answered him: “You will get up and have mercy on Zion.” 🙂
With blessings, Nashaf
A. You wrote that the verse goes with the explanation and therefore you made it difficult for the reader to read and you argued that the hasbara is not strong enough. As for this vision, there is also in the Tosafot Shavuot 22:2, D.E., “It is not a problem for a mother to read,” ayy.
B. There is an accepted terminology for both forms – a father’s construction or “medaitztreich.” And the Gemara itself uses both. If sources were cited for both uses, perhaps it would be possible to establish the differences in a more substantiated manner (even though the entire column actually says that the hasbara directs the sources). I searched for “medaitztreich” in the Gemara and found several sources as follows. All the sources I saw are well interpreted according to what you said here.
But it seems to me, and it is not entirely clear to me from the column what you think about this, that when we make a “Maditztrich” it is not that the verse “teaches” us the opposite of it. The verse only reveals to us how we should interpret another source or what we should think of from an explanation, and at the end of the day we have another source for general learning and it would be valid even without this “Maditztrich”. In other words, if we were wise enough then we would not be required to make this discovery but would interpret the other source in this way or rely on the explanation even without the “Maditztrich”.
For example in Pesachim 21: The permission to enjoy in a nival does not teach us that in all other prohibitions of eating pleasure is included, but rather reveals to us that in fact R’ Abbahu was right that every prohibition of eating includes a prohibition of enjoyment and therefore a verse is needed for a nival. And we do not make the permission to enjoy in a nival a building block because it contradicts another teaching or a positive explanation that we have.
In Gittin to Sa’b Hillel corrected the seller of a walled house to give redemption against the buyer’s will, and from this Rava learns that Hillel held that in the entire Torah, a gift given under compulsion is not a gift (therefore, this Gittach is that if you give two hundred zuz and give it to him against his will, it is not expelled). Of course, Hillel is not the source of the law that a gift given by a husband under compulsion is not a gift, but rather the source of the law is the interpretation of the Torah, and Hillel only reveals to us what he holds that the interpretation of the Torah says.
In Kiddushin 17:2, a Gentile does not bequeath a Hebrew slave to his sons, and in Deitztrich le miuti, we learn that in other matters a Gentile does bequeath to his sons. The explanation is that the law that is wrong for a bequeath to his sons comes to us from an explanation from the Torah of Justice, and this is consistent with the fact that the Torah required a minority. Therefore, we do not study the construction of a father to go against our positive interpretation, but rather to reduce the innovation.
And on the day of the Lord. I thank You that they found a kind of teaching of a kind of explanation in accordance with the opposite teaching of the verse, so that the “Medeitztrich” itself does not teach but only reveals and integrates.
C. You wrote that when the explanation is strong in parallel with the sermon, then the rest of the Torah is taught in reverse (Medeitztrich) because otherwise the sermon is unnecessary. This is a big claim that in my opinion requires an explicit source and is not sufficient for it with a strong explanation (Smiley). I find it difficult to assume that there is a situation in which a verse actually teaches the opposite and this is the only source that exists for the opposite law. If this were so, then this would be one of the qualities of the sermon. [There is a difference between a case in which there is a strong explanation in parallel with the sermon, and a case in which the default is in parallel with the sermon. If only the default is parallel to the sermon but the explanation is quite open, then it is quite likely that they do ‘Meditztrich’. And of course, even an explanation cannot innovate a commandment but only interpret boundaries].
D. The Gemara in Kiddushin 1:2 strives to study shelihut throughout the Torah in the Av building. Tosafot 4:5 Nafka suggests studying shelihut in the Kodesh ‘Meditztrich’, with the exception of shelihut in the Pro of Aharon, Shmuel, in other Kodesh there is shelihut. It turns out that a verse for shelihut teaches that there is shelihut in the Av building, and a verse that does not teach that there is shelihut from Deitztrich. And the question arises naturally. The Maharash explains there that “the letter of the law is not valid, because we find other holy books in the books of the book of Aaron, so I will not read it in full, because I did not give it to the books of the book You asked why we don't learn from the entire Torah that there is doubt about the hump, but the Gemara concludes that a hump is a creature in itself and does not belong to the laws of spikkot (for some reason you mentioned the conclusion later only in your explanation stage).
You also asked why we don't learn the obligation to cover the blood of a hump, but how can we learn from the law of milk about the law of covering the blood and invent that a hump is prohibited in milk because it is considered an animal? We only learn the law (the prohibition of milk) and not general definitions (that a hump is a “animal”animal).
A. Indeed. Chen Chen.
B. I gave it to Mr. that you did some research that I did not do. Regarding the examples you gave:
1. Regarding the prohibitions of enjoyment, in my opinion, you are not right. After all, since the Torah revealed in the Nebla, we see that R’ Abbahu is right that every prohibition of eating also includes a prohibition of enjoyment. But R’ Abbahu's words are an interpretive explanation (for the explanation of eating). It does not have a separate source. Therefore, the revelation in the Nebla is what renews the prohibitions of enjoyment in the rest of the Torah. It does reveal the meaning of the expression “eating”, but this is not called interpreting a source. After all, almost every rule talks about sources in the Torah and the question of how to interpret them. Even ChÝsh interprets prohibitions in the Torah that they also apply to less than a certain amount (at least in the more accepted and understandable perception of Chࢩsh's law).
And beyond all this, how do you know that it was not Rࢩ's source Is there any explanation for it?
2. In Hillel, there is no source that the Torah reveals regarding the houses of walled cities. This is a law that we saw in Hillel and from which we learned about his method. What does this have to do with the discovery of a verse?
3. Regarding the inheritance of a Gentile, these are my words. When there is a good explanation, then the verse teaches the opposite. I did not understand what you saw here beyond that.
C. Indeed, this requires clarification and sources. But why is the permission in the Nabala not an example of this? Especially in light of my comment at the end of section 1 above. Any Maditzreich can be used as an example. Otherwise, why is there no construction of the Av Manbala there?
D. I did not understand what you wanted to learn about the issue of mission? This can also be explained according to my method. We learn in the Av building that there is mission in the holy places, and in any case the verse about Aaron's pro is local. You may wonder why the initial Av building from which it emerges that there is mission in the holy places is actually stated and not done there in Maditzreich. But they already addressed that by making a distinction between the sources, and therefore it is a regular father's construction. In particular, I would like to say that there is a weak argument there that there should be a mission in the halakhah.
E. I was talking about the Ho”a in the Gemara when they realized that there is a newness in spikot. They made it difficult for them to understand why there is a newness in spikot and did not say that this is an exception, but answered that it is a creation in itself.
Your last comment was also made by me. This is a private law and not a general one.
There are two sub-discussions here from one root.
(1) Does the verse itself teach the opposite or does the teaching of the opposite have a parallel source. You say that the verse itself teaches the opposite. I assume that the teaching of the opposite has a separate basis, and the verse only integrates with it.
(2) In the case where there is a strong explanation and it is appropriate for the verse. You say that one learns the opposite, and it follows that there is no separate basis for the teaching of the opposite. I assume that in such a case one also learns in the Av building like the verse, and Milta Datia from the explanation Tarach and wrote it to read.
And if the strong explanation contradicts the verse, it is not explicitly stated in the Torah, but I assume from your words that in such a case one learns the Av building throughout the Torah against the explanation. However, I think that one always goes with the strong explanation, and even if the verse is against it, one stays with it and says about it, rather the solid explanation from Dietrich read the new one in a special place against it.
But if there is no strong explanation like the verse, but only a default like the verse, while the explanation is open, then we do learn the opposite, and this is what happens when we study a verse that does not allow for mission, because preventing mission is a default (and the explanation is open), then we learn the opposite that mission is possible (and the real source that allows mission is an explanation that we have now discovered that the Torah expected us to believe), but to learn something about the entire Torah that contradicts a strong explanation is not possible to do ‘from Deitztrich’.
And if there is no default, but only weak explanations here and there (for example, is drinking even eating) then, as you wrote, we always go with the verse in the parenthetical structure, whether it says like the explanation or says against it.
Regarding (1), according to your words, you can do ‘from Deitztrich’ freely and you don't need to check if there is a parallel source that teaches the opposite of the verse. But according to my hypothesis, there should always be a sufficient source that also teaches the opposite of the verse. And for this I showed with several examples that it is indeed possible to say there is a sufficient source there. And my argument is that the revelation from a verse works exactly like the revelation from the regulation of Hillel the Elder, it is not a source of authority but a revelation that confirms for us another source of authority. And according to you, I asked if this is a new standard in the Torah to learn from Deitztrich?
Regarding (2) this is what I found in the inheritance of a Gentile. There the verse prevents a Gentile from inheriting, and we learn to the contrary throughout the Torah that a Gentile inherits. I understand that the strong interpretation that is wrong does inherit because it is from the Torah of justice and the nature of things, and the verse negates the local explanation and we remain in the rest of the Torah with the explanation. What you said in the reply means that you are learning the opposite, that the strong interpretation that is wrong does not inherit, and since the verse is parallel to the explanation, then from the verse itself we learn against the explanation throughout the Torah and say that a Gentile does inherit. Is that really how you learn?
C. You wrote that the permission in the Niva is an example of this. That is, the permission in the Niva is an example of studying the opposite of a verse when the explanation is in accordance with the verse, and we learn throughout the Torah against the explanation. That is, you learn that a strong explanation is that pleasure is not included in eating, and therefore the verse in the Niva is unnecessary, and therefore it teaches the opposite throughout the Torah that pleasure is included. I understand the opposite, the strong interpretive explanation is that pleasure is included in eating, and since we have a verse against the explanation, we say that it rather bases the explanation on the rest of the Torah and therefore comes to reveal a special law. And precisely because of this we do not build a father, because there is a general interpretive explanation that there is nothing more special about eating than pleasure and that there is no separation between them, so we maintain the explanation and the verse also laid it down, and therefore I will not discuss it.
D. I brought up the mission simply as an anecdote because there the problem stands out on the table, that both a verse for and a verse against mission both teach the entire Torah that there is mission. [And according to the explanation, this is a default, that there is no mission, while the explanation is open, and therefore any study is only against the default].
1. It seems to me that this is parallel to what I wrote about a situation where there is a Sabra that says X, and there is a verse that says Y in a certain context. The conclusion is that this context is an exception and the rule is X. Even if there is a source that says rule X and a specific place that says Y, this will be the case. This is with the exception of situations where something was in general and came to be taught, not about itself but about the entire rule.
2. The phrase datiya in the Sabra tarach and chetav la kara, in my opinion, is a very rare case (a last resort. After all, it presents the verse as completely unnecessary, contrary to the general logic of Chazal in understanding the scriptures).
Regarding a strong opposing Sabra, I completely agree. See my comment here in section 1.
Regarding the inheritance of a Gentile, I am certainly willing to accept your proposal. The mechanism is certainly acceptable to me, that if there is a contrary Sabra, then the verse is an exception to something and nothing is learned from it. That is not the debate.
The question is whether there are not situations in which the teaching itself teaches the opposite, as I claim. This needs to be examined in the Shas, but from the interpretation I don't see why it wouldn't be. You claim that in such situations it is said that the word "datya" in the interpretation is "tarach" and that "kakvit" is "la kara" and I say that this is a last resort and not reasonable (therefore it itself is only said when there is some external necessity), but somehow the conclusion is as I said that the verse is meant to be excluded from the interpretation. It is exactly like the dispute between the commentators regarding whether two texts do not teach or teach the opposite. In your opinion, they do not teach the opposite and perhaps they can even teach as one verse, since the second verse is in the category of a word "datya" from the first verse, "tarach" and "kakvit" is "la kara" in the verse "batra". The fact is that they do not say this.
C. Now I understand that you also claim this in the Nabala (as in the inheritance of a dead person). I am of course willing to accept it there too, with all the reservations I wrote about the inheritance of a Gentile and so on. The mechanism certainly exists, the question in our debate is whether it is necessary (is there a situation in which a verse teaches the opposite, or is it said that a word is a word that is interpreted by a writer, and a letter is written to read).
Two verses together can also teach the opposite, but an explanation and a verse together, in my opinion, cannot teach the opposite, that is simply not a standard in the Torah. If we discover that in all the places in the Dietrich there is no strong explanation that goes with the verse, this would seemingly be confirmation of my words.
Regarding the trouble and the letter that was read, the question is what is the alternative. To introduce a law that directly contradicts the explanation that is strong enough in our eyes to establish laws by virtue of it, or to purr with pleasure that the verse is consistent with our explanation.
Now I thought about the opinion of Hezekiah, who disagreed with Rabbi Abbahu. According to him, the prohibition of eating does not include pleasure. You might say that he disagrees with Rabbi Abbahu's explanation, but those who are inclined to disagree do not. So he also agrees that eating includes pleasure. But there is a permission in the navel. So it seems that he came to exclude from the explanation. Rebel, if the strength of the explanation is weak, then there is no need to exclude from it (because without another source we would not go with it anyway). Apparently he believes that the hasbara is strong, and the verse came to exclude from it, that is, to teach the opposite. Although here the verse is against the explanation and not parallel to it.
I remember that it once occurred to me that in the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, there is a disagreement between Toss and Rambam, whether the permission in the navel is the source (as it appears from Toss there) or whether he supports the explanation (Rambam). So in my lessons on Pesachim.
I opened the issue and it seems that right at the beginning there is conclusive proof of your words that the verse itself teaches the opposite and not that there is a parallel source.
The Gemara says in Shlomo that R’ Abbahu Eliva Dr’ Meir there is a blanket permission for enjoyment in nivala and from this we learn, on the contrary, for the entire Torah that enjoyment is included in eating (from the verse itself, or from R’ Abbahu's interpretive explanation), but R’ Abbahu Eliva Dr’ Yehuda that there is no blanket permission for enjoyment in nivala, so from where all prohibitions in the Torah are prohibited in enjoyment.
It is proven to the Hadiya that in order to prohibit enjoyment in the entire Torah, a special teaching from nivala is needed, and if this teaching is not there, then an interpretive explanation that eating includes enjoyment is not sufficient.
If it turns out (to my delight) that this is not sufficient evidence, then I will discuss your evidence from Hezekiah. And if this is indeed sufficient evidence, then the Maimonides' opinion is correct, as you said in his words that the permission in the Niva is not the source.
Rabbi Mikhi himself said that the Sabra and the Scripture, which come together, teach the opposite. But the Scripture and the Scripture, which come together, there is a system that is just not taught. Yatziv in Ara and Giora on the wings of eagles?
Indeed. And in my lessons there and in my articles on prohibitions from historical sources I explained that the Rambam probably did not rule as such at all. This is seen from many details in the sugya that are ruled in reverse by the Rambam (regarding some of the things I linked it to the sugya of the egg). For example, at the beginning of the halachah we see that in his opinion the prohibition of enjoyment does not arise from the prohibition of eating, even though the Rambam Abba the sugya there tells the Hadiya that it does. There are several other halakhic gabervatah that he rules in reverse from the sugya there.
Regarding your last comment, it is easiest to rely on the dispute as to whether two texts teach the opposite or not. But perhaps it is possible to say without this, that in fact the sabrah adifa mikra is understood, since the sabrah is said in a specific context (but it can be expanded in the construction of ab lekhat), but the sabrah is general in nature.
I accept. But why isn't a verse that teaches the opposite a separate teaching?
I didn't understand. You're asking why it's not listed in Rish? It's already been stated that there are many qualities that aren't listed there. For example, two scriptures that come together. Especially since it's a type of parent building.
Wonderful column, thank you very much!
If we have already reached a point of mockery, it is argued that the dispute between the husband and his wife depends on the changing times.
In Abraham's time, there was no reason to assume that a husband had to obey his wife, at most from the law of the peace of the house. Perhaps in Sarah's case, there is an opinion that she also has the Holy Spirit and is an important woman, so the verse joins the opinion and teaches the father of the entire Torah.
However, in our days, when it is clear that the wife is wiser and the interpretation requires listening to the wife, the verse comes and teaches us that, on the contrary, there is no need to listen to the wife, and her correctness is found to be corrupted.
And if we ask how the teaching changes, it is not a question of questioning, for if a court has demanded a sermon, another court is permitted to demand a different sermon, even if it is less wise and in number.
To the honor of Rabbi Y”h:
The Rabbi commented on the ”waffling” that the latter have barely managed to get between gezia”k and sabrah on the issue of half a lesson. However, the Torah, the Old Torah, and the Ren discussed this on a website. The Old Torah were pushed aside in the plain language by virtue of this difficulty, and from the words of the Torah and the Ren it appears that sabrah does not operate solely in the scope of the prohibition and not in its fundamental meaning, 27 ibid.
The Rabbi wrote that according to his explanation of the issue of Ch”sh, it is understandable why the law of Ch”sh applies “in all areas of the Torah”. However, in the opinion of the Rambam (Shabbat, 12, 19), it is proven that the ששׁ is permitted from the תאת in the prohibitions of Shabbat, the Rân (Shavuot, 23) states that there is no prohibition at all in the ששׁ in the laws of Shavuot, the sage Zvi (Zu) The Shacha and many later ones have gone to great lengths to prove (among other things, according to the interpretation of the Mishnah Barish Misa Bitza) that there is no law of Chas in the prohibition of "bel yara", the Rashi (Kiddushin, 51) brought 11 that there is no law of Chas in prohibitions whose punishment is a decree, and in the king's hand On the Maimonides (Theft, A, B) and the Rabbi of Brisk (B, S) disagreed on the Rabbi (ibid.), who believes that the law of the Rabbis prohibits theft. According to the Rabbi's understanding of the issue, there is no room for dividing this law according to the type of punishment, etc.
With the blessing of a new year.
I don't think they were pushed aside. In any case, they assumed for granted that there were no conflicting sources here.
The law of chastisement applies to all areas of the Torah, regardless of opinion. The one that restricts it to the chastisement of an act or only to forbidden foods is a side restriction. No one restricted it only to milk, and that is the point. As for those who restrict it according to the punishment, I don't see any contradiction in my words. The basic premise is refuted by the difference in punishments. What is the problem?
Late ignition of my sins.
Something here doesn't add up for me at the level of terminology. You say that instead of a strong argument, one always learns from the verse the opposite.
If the verse contradicts the strong argument, then one learns the opposite (from Deitzerich) and the strong argument remains. For example, a wrong strong argument is bequeathing and there is a verse that a Hebrew slave does not bequeath to his sons, then one learns the opposite, in other things a Gentile does bequeath and like the strong argument.
And if the verse is suitable for the strong argument, then one learns the opposite (the argument and the following scripture are the same) and the strong argument is invalid. And here I thought that one learns the construction of a father and the strong argument remains.
The question is what Talmudic terminology (even if there is currently no specific example) is used to describe this mechanism that both the argument and the following scripture teach the opposite. The term “from Deitzerich” is no longer appropriate. The term two scriptures that come together is also not appropriate.
From a regular dietitian, it is because the verse contradicts a strong interpretation that it is proven that special study is *needed* to undermine this interpretation, and Shema Mina in other places is correct.
But in the interpretation and the scripture that come together, what is said, because the verse is required to tell me something that I already know, it is proven that what I know is not true? This does not “prove” that the interpretation holds, but rather teaches by its own power. And if so, it does not prove anything to us. And why would they say that a decree is equal to her “prove” that a slave goes out on a bill just as a woman goes out on a bill?
This too can be included under “Meditztrich”. From the fact that the verse must be said, it is proven that the strong interpretation is incorrect.
We have been proven wrong or there is a reverse teaching.
Throughout the article, you repeat that there are considerations that lead us to apply the verse or sermon only in the context in which they are addressed (such as if there is a strong explanation with the verse). What about a verse that has no context but is simply a teaching for our entire lives? For example, the commandment of charity, here there is a verse and also a strong explanation, and the question in my opinion, a. Why don't we apply it to a specific context, since there is a strong explanation with the verse? b. To what context should we apply the verse, since it has no context but is general?
The first question arises regarding any commandment from a verse that has a strong explanation (such as most of the commandments between a person and his fellow man, even if they were stated in a specific context, but we are obligated to fulfill them in any case); and the second question arises regarding any commandment from a verse in which no context is stated at all.
I didn't understand the question. What is the dilemma regarding the commandment of charity? What does it mean to apply it locally and not generally? It doesn't seem relevant to me there. If you see room for discussion, give an example, and suggest how to apply it locally and what is done in practice.
In other words, after understanding me (!) well, the question I wanted to ask is:
How does the Gemara ask why is it considered a sabbarah to me, since without the sabbarah there is no command here! Maybe because of the sabbarah you have to observe X, and if you observe it, then you are a wise and consistent person, but without the verse there is still no command to do X! As you always say, the verse adds a religious and halakhic dimension to the observance, so what is the meaning of these why is it considered a sabbarah to me?
I have expanded on this in a good article on explanations.
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A1%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%99
In the process of demanding, the explanation is involved. And so throughout the entire Torah, the sages tried to understand it through their own reasoning, and only in the absence of any other choice did they determine that there was a decree of the Scripture or something like that.
This means that in principle it is possible to understand the Torah.
But it sounds a little strange to me. As you explained, the commandments of the Torah are intended to achieve religious goals and values (and not moral, human, etc.). And so, it turns out that a person has the power to understand these things. He has the ability to understand religious things and higher values of the upper worlds, etc.
This surprises me. I thought that a person could only understand things that belong to the human level. No?
We also have intuition in spiritual matters that do not belong to our world. See how we study sacredness and purity. There are also perceptions and intuitions there. This does not necessarily mean that we can understand the goals and values, although that is also possible. But there is a sense of what is right and what is wrong.
When studying Gemara, we are not faced with beliefs and discussions surrounding religious values. We are faced with logical beliefs that belong to the real world as we see it, and not beliefs that attach things to religious values, etc.
In Pesachim 22, Shimon Ha-Amsoni demands all the atim in the Torah. He reaches a certain "atim", finds no sermon, and then withdraws from all the atim.
Why did he do that? Why didn't he just say "in this case"? Why is this case supposed to have implications for the rest? Especially if a demand is a matter of conjecture and not just the mechanical and technical application of a rule (which would then make me understand that either the rule applies in all cases or it applies in none of the cases, meaning that the rule is incorrect).
I explained this at length in the second book of the Talmudic Logic series. My argument is that the world of sermons began with Moses' study with God, who read the verses with him through the method of the Peshat and the Sermon, but did not explain to him the rules (the principles of the Sermon). He learned the language of the Sermon as a baby learns a language, naturally without rules. Over the generations, there was forgetfulness, and in order to reproduce the Sermon, rules were created that try to bring the Sermon closer, but of course they do not always hit the truth. That is why there are several different Sermon systems (each one reproduced in a different way). The Rabbi proposed a rule that "you" comes to include, and when we tested it on the examples, we came across an example in which it could not work (because it is impossible to include something that would be similar to God). This is not a difficulty but something that seems impossible. Therefore, this is proof that the rule that "you" is The inclusion is not correct, and therefore Shimon Ha-Amsoni decided to abandon this sermon altogether.
R”A disagrees with him, and in his opinion there is something in the inclusion even if it is not completely similar. But Shimon Ha-Amsoni remained in his opinion even after R”A's reply (because on the issue of Pesach we see that there is a Tannaitic disagreement in this, and the Gemara says that they disagree in the dispute between Shimon Ha-Amsoni and R”A).
I came across an interesting Tosafot speech related to what was said in the column and I am bringing the things here that will nevertheless be preserved.
In the column and in the comments there is an argument that where there is a strong explanation, the verse always teaches the opposite of itself. If the verse is parallel to the explanation, then it is unnecessary and comes to make us hear the rest of the Torah the opposite of itself and the opposite of the explanation. If the verse is contrary to the strong explanation, then it is as if it came to exclude what is discussed in the verse, while in the rest of the Torah the explanation exists, and this is like teaching the opposite of the verse and in accordance with the explanation.
In Gemara Kiddushin 13:1 the language is as follows: And she bought herself with a divorce and with the death of her husband. The death of her husband is mentioned. The explanation is that he forbade her, he served her. And it is not adultery that is forbidden to him, and not that he is a servant to him, etc. But from the word "read lest he die in war and another man take her." So. That is, there is a strong argument that a dead woman permits any prohibition arising from the consecration, but that a virgin is proven against this argument, since his father's wife after his father's death is forbidden (Rashi), and therefore a revelation from a verse is needed lest he die in war, and a widow is permitted to go to the market. And the Tosafots there brought that the Sanhedrin teaches from a verse that a dead woman does not permit, and the Tosafots wrote that we were supposed to learn from a widow to go to the market in the building of a father for virgins that a dead woman permits, and therefore the verse is needed for virgins that a dead woman does not permit.
This is a case in which the Gemara explains that there is a strong argument (he forbade it, he served it) like the verse (she will die and another man will take her), and the Tosafots write that we would learn in the building of a father for virgins that a dead woman also permits. And apparently in such a case, according to what is explained to the righteous in the column, one should learn the opposite and say that the nakedness of a dead person does not permit (and there is no need for a verse on nakedness for this, and the verses there are unnecessary), and why not learn in the context of a father about nakedness.
[Illul Tosafot I thought of settling it this way (with a somewhat blind, mechanical approach). In the Sanhedrin, there are sermons for the prohibition of a father's wife after death, from a verse that says, "The nakedness of your father's wife" (for Rabbi Yehuda) or "The nakedness of your father" (for the rabbis), they looked for something to learn from it and decided to learn "The nakedness of his father's wife after death." And here is this sermon that is against a strong argument (he forbade it, he served it) and against revealing a man's wife to the market (she dies and another man takes her) and since, as explained in the column, it was a sermon with a free scope to the world, there is a reasoning in it, so it is a bit strange that this is the "least unreasonable" thing that the Tanais found to include. Therefore, it seems that in fact, from the permission of a widow for a man's wife for a market, we learn the opposite of what is taught in the rest of the Torah, such as in the case of adultery, death does not permit, but the verse in the case of a widow for a man's wife for a market is not a verse of command, but rather a word of custom, lest he die in war and another man take her. Therefore, it is impossible to learn from it, in addition to the rest of the Torah, a warning for one's father's wife after death. However, it does have the power to teach us that this is what is expected to happen, and therefore when we find a verse that addresses it, we immediately jump to attach it to one's father's wife after death.
Regarding the issue of a detestable act, the Tosafot throughout the issue insist on the tension that the column deals with: the relationship between explanation and sermon from the verse, and when do we demand a general principle in the construction of the father and when do we demand that the law is true precisely in the place where it is stated and hence that the general principle is the opposite.
Regarding the question of why it is demanded from the closeness between hybrids and tzitzit that a detestable act is not done and not vice versa, the Tosafot write (Yevamot 4:14; 4:5; and so do the rest of the Rishonim) that without the verse our starting point would really be the opposite – do not do a detestable act (because not doing is more serious – Rashba–a) – and therefore we must study the Midrash of the Near Ones to the contrary because otherwise the closeness is unnecessary. And because of this, we do not learn that he who does something reprehensible shall not do anything that has a kerat, since in this regard he has not renewed the opposite, and therefore we remain with the initial assumption that he did something reprehensible.
And these things are explained in the Gemara (ibid. 7:1):
“Hadar said: I said, "Do something reprehensible, you shall not do anything," or, "You shall not do anything more serious than it, and I did something reprehensible and I rejected it? What is a small matter to me, and what is a great matter to me” – That is, the Gemara makes it clear that the basic premise is that a person who does not do will not reject a "do not do" because he does not do a more serious thing (because of the syllogisms concerning him – Rashi” and because he commits a transgression with his hands – additional explanation in Meiri), but nevertheless there is a verse that teaches that a person who does not do a "do not do" rejects a "do not do" and therefore the Gemara believed at this stage that since the verse contradicts the original premise, we learn from it that our belief is not correct at all and that a person does reject even more serious prohibitions than that, and therefore we learn that a person who does not do a "do not do" rejects even a "do not do" that contains a "kerat". Although the Gemara rejects this understanding in conclusion, it nevertheless distinguishes between a "do not do" that does not contain a "kerat" and only teaches that it is rejected because a person does, and we do not teach this regarding a "do not do" that contains a "kerat" that is more serious.
On the other hand, later in the question, other cases are presented, in which we learn from the verse that it is true only in the place where it is stated, but the general principle is the opposite. Thus, when the question suggests sources for the statement that an act that is not done is not done, but it is not done, which is not done, such as honoring parents does not do away with Shabbat, and the death of a court of law does not do away with Shabbat, and hence the general principle is the opposite, because otherwise the verse is unnecessary. Here the Tosafot explain this (although regarding the death of a person between two dynasties, the Tosafot offered an additional explanation, and I will add) by saying that the law presented in the verse is consistent with our starting point, since as stated, the basic premise is that an act that is not done is not done, but it is not done, which is not done, since the act is easier, and therefore the posk is seemingly unnecessary, and therefore we must say that he came to teach that the starting point is true only in the place where the verse was written, but in other places the law is the opposite.
It has been found that the principle is that by default the law learned from a verse is supposed to be applied as a general principle throughout the Torah in accordance with the degree of construction-father, but in cases where if we demand in this way a situation is created that the verse is unnecessary, since even without the verse the principle presented in it would be known to us as a basic premise, we must say in these cases that the verse teaches the opposite – that precisely in the place where the principle is stated the correct principle is true, but in other places this principle is not true.
It is clear, as you write, that the meaning of the words is not that every verse is a ‘scriptural decree’ without logic and reason and even contradicts the explanation, but even if there is an explanation, this explanation is, as you define it, a ‘weak explanation’ or tenuous, that is, an explanation that is not necessary so that even if it is logical we could not use it as having halakhic validity without a verse that teaches it and therefore the verse is needed to give validity to this explanation. For example, in the matter of a deed that rejects a non-deed, it is true that there is indeed a reason for the deed to be rejected, as the Ramban cites, that the deed represents love, as opposed to the non-deed that represents fear, or as the other reasons cited by the commentators, but these reasons are not necessary halachic reasons, and therefore without the verse we would follow rigid and halachic reasons – that follow the severity of the prohibition, so that the non-deed will reject the deed that is lighter than it, and the verse is needed to give halachic validity to the logical reasons for the fact that the deed will nevertheless reject the non-deed.
Therefore, it seems that even if it turns out that the verse supposedly teaches the opposite of the explanation, it is more correct to state that the verse teaches the opposite of the premise. In other words, even when there is a logical reason and reason for the verse, without it we would not be able to follow these reasons because they are not necessary and absolute, and therefore our premise – if it were not for the verse – The one based on rigid and absolute halachic beliefs was the opposite for these reasons, and the verse removed the initial premise and gave validity to the logical reasons. Thus, it is found that even though the verse contradicts the initial premise, it is certainly with reason and logic.
This can also be seen in the issue of “one who engages in a mitzvah is exempt from the mitzvah.” The Ritva believes that the exemption is valid only when it is not possible to fulfill both mitzvahs, but he has difficulty in doing so, why is there a need for a verse to teach this? It is simply that when there is no choice but to fulfill one of the mitzvahs, one cannot be required to fulfill both. And the excuse is that without the verse, we would say that a person needs (or is allowed, and even more so) to stop the mitzvah in order to fulfill a mitzvah whose time is passing or a more severe mitzvah, and the verse teaches that the mitzvah that is being engaged in must be continued even though its time is not passing and it is lighter. On the surface, here too, at first glance, it would be possible to understand that the verse contradicts the explanation, since the logical explanation is to stop the mitzvah for the sake of a passing or more severe mitzvah, and the verse teaches, as a “scriptural decree,” and contrary to logic, not to move on to the other mitzvah. But it really seems that this is not accurate, but there is certainly a point and logic in the verse that teaches that the mitzvah that is being addressed should not be stopped even for the sake of a passing or more severe mitzvah (and as reasons for this can be found in the first and last verses), but these reasons are not necessary and therefore would not have halakhic validity without a verse that would give such validity, so that without the verse we would have to follow as a starting point the necessary and strict reasons – according to the measure of a passing mitzvah or of the severity of the mitzvah, and the verse derived from this starting point and gave validity to the opposing reasons.
Well done. You've written a real essay here. I remember that in my classes at the Yambat, I really discussed this point at length. The Toss' words are difficult to understand logically, and I offered a few suggestions there.
I will add that on the issue of Shabbat Kav, two sources are cited for spoiling in the habalah and the irarah, and they are in diametrically opposed logics. In the word, the assumption that the verse teaches the opposite, and in the irarah of Bat Cohen, the assumption that it teaches the rule itself. I mention this in the current series of columns on the topic of reading.