Types of Mitzvot: 2. Between Aseh and Lo Ta’aseh (Column 415)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In the previous column I discussed the obligation to fast on Yom Kippur. I dealt there with the prohibition (lo ta’aseh) on affliction on Yom Kippur, but I ended the column with a question about the positive commandment (aseh): Why is the commandment “to afflict yourselves” an aseh and not a lo ta’aseh? What this aseh imposes on us is not to eat—that is, an obligation of refraining from action—and at first glance that is precisely the definition of a lo ta’aseh (I cited there the Talmud that rejects the interpretation that this is a duty to do acts that bring suffering upon oneself; if that were the case, perhaps it could be defined as an aseh). This issue requires us to enter the general distinction between lo ta’aseh and aseh in halakha.[1]
Our starting point in this discussion is Maimonides’ words in the Sixth Root (shoresh) of his Sefer HaMitzvot.
The principle in Maimonides’ Sixth Root
The background is the principle Maimonides sets in the Ninth Root, where he explains that if there is a commandment—whether aseh or lo ta’aseh—that is repeated multiple times in Scripture, we count it as a single commandment. What determines the count is the content, not the number of times we were commanded about it. Against that background, we must read the Sixth Root, which carves out an exception for cases where there is a lo ta’aseh and an aseh with overlapping content. In such a case, the commandments are counted as two distinct mitzvot.
The heading of that Root is:
“The Sixth Root: When a commandment includes both a positive and a negative command, the positive aspect should be counted with the positive commandments and the negative aspect with the negative commandments.”
Already from the heading we learn there are two novelties: (1) We count the two commandments (contrary to the Ninth Root’s principle). (2) The lo ta’aseh is counted with the prohibitions and the aseh with the positive commandments.
Both points need explanation. The first creates an exception for the case of a lo ta’aseh and an aseh and rules that here we do count them as two. It’s not clear why this is so as long as the content overlaps. Why is this different from two prohibitions or two positive commands, which are counted as a single mitzvah? But even if we’ve carved out overlapping lo ta’aseh and aseh, why is it necessary to state that the lo ta’aseh is counted with the prohibitions and the aseh with the positives? Isn’t that self-evident?
Maimonides explains there as follows:
“It is clear that the nature of a command (tzivui) is different from the nature of a warning (azharah); they are two distinct notions—He commanded one and forbade the other. No one erred in this Root.”[2]
According to him, a command differs from a warning, and therefore they should be counted as two mitzvot. It is important to understand that we are not speaking of a case where there is a practical difference between the aseh and the lo ta’aseh, for that would not be a case of overlap. In such a situation, it is obvious we count them separately. Maimonides is addressing precisely a situation in which there is full overlap between the content of the aseh and the lo ta’aseh. He claims that from their very definition as a lo ta’aseh and an aseh we can understand that they are two different commandments, despite the overlapping content.
To the core difficulty: R. Yerucham Fishel Perlow’s (Rif”p) claims
I already mentioned in the previous column the words of R. Yerucham Fishel Perlow (=Rif”p), in his introduction to R. Saadia Gaon’s Sefer HaMitzvot, in his discussion of this Root (and also the Fourth). He explains there that in such situations Rasag counts one mitzvah and chooses between the two the one that more fully reflects the mitzvah’s content. Summarizing Rasag’s view, he writes:
“In any case it is clear that, according to our master the Gaon, the aseh and lo ta’aseh within a single mitzvah are certainly one and the same matter, since the essence of the mitzvah is one in both. Scripture wrote both an aseh and a lo ta’aseh only to increase the severity of the transgressor’s punishment; this has nothing to do with the count of mitzvot. Thus the mitzvah is but one; in counting mitzvot we consider only the actions we were commanded to do or refrain from doing. Unlike all other enumerators of the commandments—aside from the SeMaK—who also followed our master the Gaon to count an aseh and a lo ta’aseh within a single mitzvah as only one…”
Rif”p argues, in light of Maimonides himself in the Ninth Root, that two mitzvot with identical content should not be counted as two separate mitzvot. Thus, for example, the command to remember what Amalek did to us and the prohibition to forget it have exactly the same content. That is no different from two prohibitions to forget or two commands to remember.
Now the question arises in full force: All the Rishonim, except Rasag and the SeMaK, although they agree with the Ninth Root, nonetheless count an aseh and a lo ta’aseh in these cases—like Maimonides in this Root. What will they answer to Rif”p’s seemingly sound claims? We noted above that Maimonides himself sensed the difficulty and tried to explain his position by saying that a “command” and a “warning” are two different notions. Below we will elucidate these words, for the discussion here deals exactly with the distinction between lo ta’aseh and aseh, which is our subject.
Back to Rif”p on Rasag’s approach
Rif”p explains that Rasag chooses to count the mitzvah in which the essence of the mitzvah is explained more directly. It seems he means that we should examine the content of the command and see whether at its core it is an aseh or a lo ta’aseh. For example, in the mitzvah of building a parapet (ma’akeh) there is an aseh of “You shall make a guardrail for your roof” and a lo ta’aseh of “You shall not place blood in your house.” The practical directive is to get up and build a guardrail. That is, compliance with both of these mitzvot is via active doing, in the form of “rise and act” (=קו”ע), and therefore they have the substantive character of an aseh. Indeed, if we examine Rasag’s Sefer HaMitzvot, we will see that ma’akeh is counted as a positive command (Aseh 77 in his count).[3] What about the lo ta’aseh and aseh regarding labor on Shabbat? There, the matter is more fully expressed in the lo ta’aseh and not the aseh, since both of these impose upon us an obligation of refraining from action; thus in their essence they are prohibitions.
It appears that Rasag understands the essential difference between an aseh and a lo ta’aseh in terms of the physical mode by which one fulfills or violates them: what is fulfilled through action (קו”ע) and violated through omission (“sit and do not act” = שוא”ת) is an aseh; what is fulfilled by refraining and violated by active doing is a lo ta’aseh. According to him, the mitzvah’s nature does not depend on Scripture’s phrasing but on its practical character. On this view, resting on Shabbat is a lo ta’aseh, for its fulfillment is passive—by refraining (שוא”ת). Therefore, even if the Torah states there is also a positive command to rest, its intent is actually a lo ta’aseh and only the phrasing misleads us. Hence the Shabbat laws will be counted by Rasag as prohibitions, not positives. By the same token, “You shall not place blood in your house” is, in essence, a hidden aseh, since guarding against it is achieved by action (erecting a guardrail).
Two conceptions of the aseh/lo ta’aseh distinction
What we saw in Rif”p is the common conception of the difference between lo ta’aseh and aseh: a lo ta’aseh imposes a duty to refrain; an aseh imposes a duty to act. But that conception raises a difficulty regarding the Torah’s phrasing: Why does it sometimes describe lo ta’aseh-type mitzvot in active language reserved for aseh (e.g., to “rest” on Shabbat), and in some aseh-type mitzvot it uses passive language usually reserved for prohibitions (e.g., “Do not place blood in your house,” which on his view is really a positive command because it requires action)?
As we have seen, Maimonides and most Rishonim dispute this conception, for they count the command to rest on Shabbat as an aseh (even though it requires refraining) and “Do not place blood in your house” as a lo ta’aseh (even though it requires action). On their view, Scriptural phrasing determines the mitzvah’s character: active wording is interpreted as an aseh and prohibitive wording as a lo ta’aseh, regardless of the mode of fulfillment. In the previous column we saw that the duty to afflict oneself on Yom Kippur is phrased as an aseh (“you shall afflict your souls”), and therefore the Talmud and Rishonim assume it is an aseh and not a lo ta’aseh and seek a separate source for the lo ta’aseh.
Note that the very existence of overlapping lo ta’aseh and aseh already tells us that the definition cannot be based on performance. If the difference is performative (how one fulfills or violates—through action or omission), then an overlapping lo ta’aseh and aseh could not arise. If the content of the two commandments overlaps, that means they impose the same obligations, i.e., they are fulfilled and violated in the same way. But in such a case they would not be a lo ta’aseh and an aseh, but rather two prohibitions or two positives (depending on where the matter is more fully expressed)—precisely as we saw in Rasag’s approach.
The linguistic criterion
The Talmud scholar Aharon Shemesh, of blessed memory, in his article devoted to the distinction between lo ta’aseh and aseh,[4] notes two meanings that the aseh/lo ta’aseh distinction takes on in rabbinic literature (mainly among the Tannaim). He argues that in earlier literature, as well as in the Midrashim of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, the distinction is based on the mode of fulfillment: mitzvot fulfilled through active doing (קו”ע) are aseh, and mitzvot violated through active doing (and fulfilled by refraining) are lo ta’aseh. There the governing criterion is performative.
By contrast, in the Midrashim of the school of Rabbi Akiva and in later strata of the Talmud we find a linguistic conception that ties the difference between the two types to the Torah’s phrasing (and not necessarily to performance). From this follows the possibility of a lo ta’aseh “without an act,” i.e., a prohibition violated by omission (=שוא”ת) and not by an active deed (=קו”ע).[5] Here the linguistic criterion operates.
The partial nature of the foregoing description
In my article on Torah and science, I noted that such an explanation is characteristic of academic Talmud research: it suffices with describing and characterizing aseh and lo ta’aseh on a descriptive, scholarly level, and it engages less with questions of essence and rationale. Academics, like in the Brisker ethos, confine themselves mainly to “what?” questions and deal less with “why?”. But a traditional learner does not suffice with that. He asks himself why the Torah uses different formulations. It is not plausible that the distinction between aseh and lo ta’aseh is merely a result of wording and does not reflect some substantive layer distinguishing the two types. We must ask: if the practical content of the two mitzvot is the same, why does the Torah formulate them differently? Why are there cases where the Torah commands a prohibition in active phrasing while usually choosing the language of prohibition (“lo,” “hishamer,” “pen,” and “al”)? And similarly for aseh.
Moreover, different halakhic rules exist regarding aseh and lo ta’aseh. For example, an aseh overrides a lo ta’aseh. Another example: one must spend up to one-fifth of his assets to fulfill an aseh, whereas for a lo ta’aseh one must spend all his assets to avoid transgression. Another: considerations of human dignity (kavod ha-briyot) override certain aseh obligations but not lo ta’aseh,[6] and more. Do all these rules lack substantive basis? Is there no fundamental difference from which these halakhic consequences flow? It is very hard to accept that. Even if we say the Torah chose its phrasing specifically to teach us these consequences, that does not answer the difficulty. The question is: why are there such differences if the two are not essentially different in content but only in wording? What generates these halakhic differences?
These difficulties might seem to push us to the second conception, which sees the aseh/lo ta’aseh distinction as primarily practical. But that view is also problematic, as we saw. First, it does not match the halakhic facts—at least not according to Maimonides and most Rishonim. Beyond that, the Torah’s confusing and inconsistent phrasing remains unexplained. If so, we must search for a substantive difference between lo ta’aseh and aseh that is not necessarily rooted in how they are performed or violated (active or passive).
A substantive distinction between lo ta’aseh and aseh: Maimonides and associates
Our claim in that article is that an aseh is a verse that points to a state desired before the Holy One—i.e., a state the Torah commands us to achieve. The Torah commands us to build a guardrail because it wants the house to have a guardrail. By contrast, a lo ta’aseh points to an undesired state—i.e., a state the Torah commands us to avoid. For example, the Torah commands us not to place blood in our house because it does not want us to be in a state where the house lacks a guardrail.
Note that this is not a logical equivalence. The aseh to build a guardrail says the Torah wants the roof of a person’s house to be surrounded by a guardrail. By that definition the Torah does not directly invalidate a state in which the roof lacks a guardrail. The problem with such a state is only that it is not the desired state (of a house with a guardrail). It is not inherently problematic. By contrast, the prohibition of labor on Shabbat is a classic lo ta’aseh, because the Torah is not commanding rest but rather forbidding the state of performing melakha. The focus is on the undesired state, not the desired one. From the standpoint of the lo ta’aseh, the point is not that we enter the state of rest, but that we not be in a state of doing melakha. From the standpoint of the aseh to rest on Shabbat, there is an interest precisely in our being in the state of rest; the prohibition of melakha follows indirectly.
The Scriptural phrasing—positive or negative—indicates whether the mitzvah is an aseh or a lo ta’aseh, because it testifies to the Torah’s will: does it direct us toward a positive state or warn us off a negative state? The phrasing expresses the substantive difference between lo ta’aseh and aseh; it is not the cause of that difference.
The conclusion is that there are prohibitions that involve no act in their violation and positive commandments that involve no act in their fulfillment. These are exceptional cases. In all situations where there is both an aseh and a lo ta’aseh with overlapping content (the Sixth Root’s topic), such as Shabbat rest and guardrail, either the lo ta’aseh or the aseh is exceptional. In these situations the Torah tells us both that being in state X is desired (positive) and that being in state “not-X” is undesired (negative). Both norms are present; therefore there is no redundancy. This is why Maimonides and most Rishonim count two mitzvot in such a case.
Connection to the performative criterion
We can now understand why, even according to Maimonides, there is a connection to the mode of performance. Usually, when we are required to reach a desired state, it demands action, and so fulfillment is through doing (קו”ע). Likewise, when we are required to avoid a certain state, fulfillment is through refraining (not entering that state). Hence the impression that the aseh/lo ta’aseh difference is performative.
But now you can see that while that is often the case, it is by no means necessary. There can certainly be cases where avoiding a negative state requires action, or where entering a positive state requires refraining. In Shabbat rest, the positive state is rest (and not merely that doing melakha is negative); therefore, even though fulfillment is by refraining (שוא”ת), it is an aseh. Conversely, “Do not stand by your fellow’s blood” is a lo ta’aseh because of the Torah’s phrasing, but that phrasing reflects a principle: being in a state where you do not save another is negative (and not merely that saving is positive—saving a friend in distress is apparently such a basic requirement that we are unwilling to consider the rescue itself “a positive state”). And yet, to avoid that negative state, what is required of us is action (jump into the river when he’s drowning or extend a rescue pole).
A logical problem
Thus far we have dealt with the substantive distinction: an aseh points to a desired state, a lo ta’aseh to an undesired state. But from this distinction a strong sense of a logical problem arises. Why is the statement “the roof must not be without a guardrail” different from “the roof must have a guardrail”? Seemingly, a double negation is logically equivalent to an affirmative statement. The command “It is forbidden for a roof to be without a guardrail” looks logically equivalent to “The roof must have a guardrail.” If so, again it is unclear whether our proposed difference between aseh and lo ta’aseh has a real basis. And if so, the question about duplication between aseh and lo ta’aseh returns: apparently it is total duplication, like overlapping between two prohibitions or between two positives.
“Stick” and “carrot”
However, this logical analysis is mistaken. To illustrate the difference between defining an aseh and a lo ta’aseh, let us define them as “carrot” and “stick.” When a person sits and does not build a guardrail for his dangerous roof, we can spur him in two ways: we can tell him that we expect him to build a guardrail—this is the “carrot” approach. We explain that the desired state (which he is not in), namely a roof with a guardrail, is better, and we thereby motivate him to attain it. Or we can tell him that his sitting idly with an unguarded roof is a disapproved state, and therefore he must leave that state—i.e., rise and build a guardrail. This is the “stick” approach. We strike him with the “stick” that declares his current state bad, thereby moving him to act (to reach a better, desired state).
The difference between the two formulations lies in the substantive content of the norm, or its purpose. What does the Torah want, really: that the roof be with a guardrail, or that it not be without a guardrail? Are these formulations equivalent? Intuitively, no. Is there a difference in implementation? Practically, both directives demand the same action (get up and build a guardrail), so it would seem there is no practical difference between them. That is why such a lo ta’aseh is, in essence, a “lo ta’aseh without an act.” But we will see that the difference manifests both practically and logically. We’ll now address those two planes in turn.
Practical ramifications of the distinction
One could have brought halakhic consequences that flow from the aseh/lo ta’aseh distinction itself. For example: if there is a positive mitzvah to build a guardrail and I did not fulfill it, I am not punished, for there is no punishment for neglecting an aseh. By contrast, if there were only a lo ta’aseh regarding a roof without a guardrail, then by not building one I would incur lashes.[7] Similarly, one could have brought ramifications regarding deference to considerations of human dignity (kavod ha-briyot)—which can override an aseh but not a lo ta’aseh—and the like.
But we are not seeking that kind of difference here, since all those are consequences of the difference, not the difference itself. Were there no substantive difference, it would be implausible that one is punished for a lo ta’aseh but not for an aseh, or that they differ regarding kavod ha-briyot. Those are results of an essential difference between these two types. It is implausible to see them as consequences flowing only from the Torah’s chosen phrasing. As I already clarified, we are seeking the root of these halakhic differences. There must be something essentially different between aseh and lo ta’aseh, from which these halakhic outcomes derive.
To demonstrate the difference itself, consider a person who was coerced (anus) and did not build a guardrail. If there were a positive mitzvah to build a guardrail, he failed to fulfill it. He is not punished—but that would be true even without coercion, for there are no punishments for neglecting an aseh. By contrast, if it were only a lo ta’aseh, then he certainly did not transgress it, since he was coerced. The core of the difference is the principle “onasa lav ke-man de-avad”—coercion can turn an act that was done into “as if it were not done,” but it cannot turn an act that was not done into “as if it were done.”[8]
Another example: someone who has no house at all. Is there any point to buying a house in order to become obligated in the mitzvah of ma’akeh?[9] If there were only a lo ta’aseh, there would be no point. But if it is a positive mitzvah, there is room to see value in buying a house so as to build a guardrail and merit a mitzvah. This holds even if we see ma’akeh as a conditional mitzvah (imposed only on one who has a house).[10] Still, if he buys a house, a positive mitzvah is credited to him. He fulfilled God’s will, not merely avoided transgression.[11]
Alternatively, suppose we have property of uncertain status—it’s unclear whether it qualifies as a “house” for this purpose. A doubt might arise whether to build a guardrail. There is perhaps room to argue that if there were only a positive mitzvah, the one who claims I am obligated (i.e., that this object is considered a house here) bears the burden of proof. To impose an obligation requires some argument; the default is no obligation absent proof. But if there were only a lo ta’aseh, then out of doubt I should be stringent and build a guardrail. Of course, even if I did not build one, no punishment would be imposed, since punishment also requires proof. But the obligation to build would exist even under uncertainty.
Between consequences and demonstrations
It is important to note that these examples are not consequences of the difference but demonstrations of it. They differ from the earlier “consequences” (kavod ha-briyot, financial expenditure, punishment) about which I argued they cannot serve as the explanation. The examples here illustrate the substantive difference between aseh and lo ta’aseh.
Now we can also understand the differences previously classified as consequences. Having grasped the essential distinction, we can explain its halakhic outcomes. Why is punishment specifically for lo ta’aseh and not for aseh? Because one who violates a lo ta’aseh is in an undesired state. He is wicked; therefore he deserves punishment. One who neglects an aseh is merely not in the desired state; in that sense he is simply not a righteous person, and thus he does not deserve punishment. The same with monetary outlay: to avoid being wicked, we must spend all our assets, for wickedness is a severe and fundamental defect. By contrast, the demand to be righteous is not as basic, and we are not required to attain it at any price; here one must spend only up to one-fifth. The same applies to kavod ha-briyot and other differences. Once we understand the essential distinction, we can also explain its halakhic consequences.
A clarification about the nature of negation: logical relations between norms
Even so, the task is not complete. We have seen that on the practical plane there are substantive differences stemming from aseh versus lo ta’aseh. But this still seems puzzling, since logically the statements appear equivalent: the directive to be in state X (an aseh, even if it requires refraining) and the directive not to be in not-X (a lo ta’aseh, even if it requires action) appear logically equivalent. It seems we are dealing only with double negation—but that should cancel out. How, then, can there be a substantive difference between two statements that are logically equivalent?[12] I will try to explain, at least briefly.
Consider the following phrasing, which is clearly a positive command: (a) “I command you to put on tefillin.” What is the logical negation of this statement? Seemingly it is the (lo ta’aseh) statement: (b) “I command you to be without tefillin.” But a closer look shows that (b) is not the precise logical negation of (a). The more precise negation is: (c) “It is not true that I command you to put on tefillin.” Yet that phrasing is not a command at all but a permission. It states only that there is no binding norm (neither obligation nor prohibition). Clearly, then, it is not equivalent to (b), which is a full-fledged norm. A parallel lo ta’aseh must be phrased as: (d) “I forbid you to be without tefillin.” Here too we have a norm, not the absence of one; thus it is not equivalent to (c).
In mathematical terminology (borrowed from operator theory), these two initial formulations are not equivalent. The mistake in seeing them as equivalent stems from assuming that negation and command are commutative operators. Applying negation to a command is not equivalent to commanding the negation of the original content. Therefore, in statements involving a command about a negation or the negation of a command, one must not swap the order of the command and the negation.
Incidentally, this is not unique to commands. Even in a factual statement, negation is not so simple (see more in my book Two Wagons and a Balloon, ch. 12). For example, negating the statement (1) “Moses is with tefillin” is not the statement (2) “Moses is without tefillin.” The more precise negation is (3) “It is not true that Moses is with tefillin.” The difference between the two negations appears clearly if we consider a situation in which there is no person named Moses at all. In that case, statement (1) is false—but statement (2) is also false. If there is a state of affairs in which both statements are false (or both true), then one cannot be the negation of the other. That is, between the two extreme states, which we can label (1) and (1−), stands an intermediate state 0 separating them. The negation of 1 is 0, not (1−)—or perhaps the union of all states other than 1.[13]
Returning to normative negation: phrasing (c) allows for an intermediate state (state 0) between the first two formulations, and therefore it differs from (b). Saying “It is not true that I command you to be with tefillin” means either “I command you to be without tefillin” (which is exactly (b)) or “I issue no command at all.” The minimal reading is the second; hence it is the more precise negation. For example, consider someone with no arms (to put tefillin on), or someone with no house (in the case of ma’akeh), or cases of coercion, or cases of doubt. In all such cases there is a difference between (b) and (c), which indicates they are not logically equivalent. We already noted this in the previous section.
We can now see that the positive command (I) “I command you to put on tefillin” is not equivalent to the lo ta’aseh (II) “I forbid you to be without tefillin.” Contrary to our initial assumption, there is no simple double negation here. Between the two negations stands the word “command,” which separates them, and since we cannot swap the positions of the command and either negation, the two negations in this statement do not cancel one another.
The conclusion is that there is no logical way to pass from the phrasing of an aseh to that of a lo ta’aseh using negation alone, and vice versa. The worlds of lo ta’aseh and aseh are two different worlds; they do not “speak” to each other and cannot be converted logically one into the other. One cannot formulate an aseh as a statement about the negation of an undesired state; such a formulation is, by definition, a lo ta’aseh. Likewise, one cannot formulate a lo ta’aseh without words of negation (by negating a statement of a desired state). Without the words of negation (“hishamer,” “pen,” “al,” “lo”), it is not a lo ta’aseh. You can now understand well Reish Lakish’s deliberation in Yoma regarding the lo ta’aseh of affliction discussed in the previous column.
Nozick’s paradox
Robert Nozick was a very well-known Jewish-American philosopher. Among his other exploits (the Newcomb paradox, about which I have written here more than once, was also published by him), he discussed the relation between tempting and extorting. When Reuven tempts Shimon, Reuven presents Shimon with two options: (1) If you do X, you will receive A. (2) If you do not do X, you will not receive A. For example, an employment offer X with salary A. This is entirely legitimate. By contrast, when Reuven extorts Shimon, the case seems very similar, yet it is illegitimate. In extortion Reuven presents two options: (1) If you do X, I will not take A from you. (2) If you do not do X, I will take A from you. For example, he demands that Shimon give him sum X, otherwise he will take Shimon’s car (A). This is forbidden extortion. Nozick asked: what is the difference between these two cases? In both, Shimon faces two options whose gap is A. Why, then, is the first legitimate and the second not?
Note that here too one could phrase extortion as temptation with negations: (1) If you do X, I will not give you (A−). (2) If you do not do X, I will give you (A−). That is, the amount is negative and the options are swapped. Seemingly, we could describe extortion as temptation with negation operators (negative amounts and inverted options), yet the meaning is different. Giving a person a negative amount is not giving a different amount; it is taking—which is an entirely different act. It is perfectly legitimate to give someone any sum for an action; it is not legitimate to take a sum for an action or inaction. Again, the “negation” here is not innocent; it transports us to an entirely different conceptual world: from giving we move to taking.
We can see the analogy to our topic as follows: there is a prohibition on extortion, and there is no prohibition on temptation. One cannot move from the world of prohibition to the world of permission by negations alone. Extortion is not temptation with a negative amount, and vice versa. The negation here performs a different operation (relevant also in the normative context), not merely changing quantities.
Put differently: there is a clear zero line separating cases of temptation from extortion. Positive amounts are not different from negative amounts merely in magnitude. The zero line between positive and negative cannot be crossed by negation alone. A positive amount is adding to you something to which you have no rights; a negative amount is taking from you something to which you do have rights—and that is forbidden. Things over which you have rights differ in essence from those outside your rights’ territory. So too with the states to which halakha relates: there are positive states (in which one should be) and negative states (in which one must not be). There is a sharp zero line dividing them. The relation between a positive and a negative state is not merely that one is more wanted; it is not a quantitative difference but a qualitative one. Therefore, a lo ta’aseh is not merely “more severe” than an aseh; it is essentially different. The relation is not merely stringency versus leniency but a difference in kind.
Explaining Maimonides’ two novelties
We can now understand the two novelties in Maimonides’ Root heading. Overlapping lo ta’aseh and aseh are counted as two mitzvot because the fact that they are lo ta’aseh and aseh says there is no true overlap between them. This is not like overlap between two prohibitions or two positives. We have seen that this is not merely different in content; the difference has practical halakhic implications. From this we can also understand his second novelty and why it is needed. He innovates that the lo ta’aseh is counted with the prohibitions and the aseh with the positives. It should now be clear that this is anything but trivial. According to Rasag, for example, even if we were to count two, on Shabbat we would count two prohibitions, and for ma’akeh two positives, because on the performative criterion there is no difference: Shabbat is a lo ta’aseh, ma’akeh is an aseh. Maimonides wishes to teach that the criterion is not performative; therefore, they are two distinct mitzvot—an aseh and a lo ta’aseh. Hence, in such a case we count two mitzvot (unlike Rasag). For the same reason, the lo ta’aseh is counted with prohibitions (even if it is violated by omission) and the aseh with positives (even if it is “violated” through action).
Back to the aseh of Yom Kippur fasting
We can now understand why the mitzvah of fasting on Yom Kippur is an aseh and not a lo ta’aseh. The Torah tells us that being in a state of fasting is a desired state. From the standpoint of this aseh, eating on Yom Kippur is not a directly negative act; it is problematic only because through it we are not in the desired state (of fasting). Therefore, it is an aseh.
However, according to most views (except Rasag, and perhaps also the SeMaK), there is also a lo ta’aseh on fasting on Yom Kippur, which we discussed in the previous column. Its meaning is that a state of eating is undesired (it is not merely a failure to achieve a positive state of fasting; non-fasting is itself negative). But note well: it is undesired not because we eat, but because we are not fasting (otherwise this would be an ordinary eating prohibition and could be phrased like ordinary eating prohibitions: “Do not eat”). The lo ta’aseh expresses that non-fasting is a negative state (and not merely not being in the positive state of fasting); but, as Reish Lakish shows, it is impossible to formulate this lo ta’aseh adequately (for wording like “Do not eat” would not express it well; it would be understood as an eating prohibition and not as a prohibition on non-fasting).
As we have seen, when there is both an aseh and a lo ta’aseh, the Torah tells us both that being in state X is desired (positive) and that being in state “not-X” is undesired (negative). The conclusion is that Yom Kippur fasting has both aspects: fasting is a positive state, and non-fasting is negative.
In the next column I will continue with a few further remarks on the aseh/lo ta’aseh distinction, and then we will enter the world of positive commandments.
[1] See this at length in the book Yishlach Sharashav, in the essay on the Sixth Root.
[2] In our article there (and briefly below) we noted that Rasag and the SeMaK likely did dispute the principle of this Root.
[3] In truth, the mitzvah of ma’akeh is broader than the prohibition “and you shall not place blood,” for a house lacking four by four cubits is exempt from a guardrail, even though obviously one must prevent danger. See Chazon Ish, Choshen Mishpat, Likutim §18:2, that the Torah removed our discretion to assess danger levels in the specific cases of ma’akeh, even though the danger is not necessarily greater than, say, climbing a permitted tree. This can explain R. Yehuda’s view, cited by the Mordechai (Halakhot Ketannot—Tzitzit §1544), that one who cannot make a guardrail is not obligated to demolish the house—just as one may wear a garment if he cannot attach tzitzit. It is difficult, though, since there is danger; apparently he refers to a case where the danger can be prevented another way or is not severe in itself. See also below, ch. 5, the first answer of Tosafot in Kiddushin; there too it seems the Ramban took it as full overlap.
[4] “On the Historical Meanings of the Terms Positive and Negative Commandments,” Tarbitz 62 (2003), nos. 1–2.
[5] Nonetheless, as he writes, this shift did not change the basic halakha that punishments (and sin-offer obligations) apply only to lo ta’aseh; therefore the rule was fixed that there is no punishment for a lo ta’aseh without an act (which, he claims, in earlier literature was called an “aseh,” and therefore it is clear there was no punishment).
[6] See our aforementioned article, ch. 6, where we discuss whether the distinction in the kavod ha-briyot sugya is between aseh and lo ta’aseh or between action and omission (קו”ע/שוא”ת).
[7] I am ignoring here the ruling that there are no lashes for a lo ta’aseh without an act—both because this matter is disputed, and because there are cases in which lashes are given (for example, when one violates, through action, a lo ta’aseh that is in principle without an act, according to some Rishonim. See, for example, here, §3).
[8] See Jerusalem Talmud, Gittin 7:6 and Kiddushin 3:2, where R. Yohanan and Reish Lakish dispute this; some reverse the attributions. Compare Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 2b–3a (the condition: “this is your get if I do not come”). In practice, the halakha follows that “coercion is as though it were not done.”
[9] See my essay Middah Tovah on Parashat Bereishit (2007), which deals with the distinction between fulfilling a commandment and attaining a state of exemption from it.
[10] And not a “kiyumit” mitzvah (a different definition). See the following columns.
[11] This is commonly used to explain the angel’s rebuke of Rav Ketina for not wearing a garment obligated in tzitzit—even though there is no actual obligation to do so. See Menahot 41a and Rabbeinu Yonah’s Sha’arei Teshuvah, Gate 3 §22: “Because he did not cherish in his heart the beauty of the mitzvah and its reward, to turn its obligation upon himself and take a four-cornered garment so as to put tzitzit on its corners.” Tosafot there, however, interpret the rebuke as due to seeking to evade obligation, not that one must “chase” obligation (hence some Rishonim concluded that in places where people do not generally wear four-cornered garments, there is no duty to wear one to incur obligation; see Tosafot, Shabbat 32b; Arachin 2b; and so wrote the Rosh, Mo’ed Katan 3:80).
[12] See also the end of our Middah Tovah essay on Parashat Yitro (and in the essay on Vayetze), 2007, where we detail normative versus logical negation.
[13] What is this like? If we wish to prove the claim that the current king of France is bald by way of negation: we look at the set of hairy people and find that none is king of France. Have we really proven our claim? The answer is no. At present there is no (current) king of France, and therefore of course we will not find him among the bald either.
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Yes, I appreciate the article. I ask cautiously, is it not possible to explain? Did Ras”G mean that there are no numbers of yes and no whose content is equal, or that they are not truly divided into yes and no? In other words, it is possible to say that the disagreement between the Rishonim is in the method of counting and not in the question of whether there is indeed a no or yes here (you defined that Ras”G's method has 2 yes or 2 doers)
It is possible, but unlikely. If there is a difference, why not count? Incidentally, I noted in the article on the sixth or ninth root that even the Maimonides have a situation where double commandments are not counted but are counted as two. For example, he writes that Neshak and Teravit are passed over by two Levites but only counts one.
A. What is the difference between an act and an omission? Aharon Shemesh presented a controversy (or development) about whether they are defined by actions or by formulations. You linked this to the controversy between Rambam and Rasa and said that the formulations reflect a metaphysical difference. Now there is an issue that you explained, but I will also present the question.
Given that there is a great deal of overlap between the commandment to do good and the commandment to stand and do good. When you completely separate the two, then you need to explain how such a great deal of overlap was created. Why is eating matzah a positive state and not not eating matzah a negative state? If we look at states and not at actions, then there is no longer any reason to think that there is any connection between the action-omission relationship and the good-bad relationship.
So you explained this (in the section “Relationship to the Performance Criterion”) that “usually when we are required to reach some desired state, it requires us to do something.” I didn’t understand. Usually where? Usually in the mitzvot or usually in everyday life. Usually in the mitzvot, this is the desired assumption. Usually in everyday life, I don't know if this is true, and it is also unlikely that it is relevant to the way of the natural world. The example of the sun and the shade of the Gemara illustrates well that a person wants to avoid being in the scorching sun, it is one thing for him whether for this he should go to the shade or for this he should stay in the shade. And then there is the matter of the natural order and the metaphysical order.
Incidentally, even when you separated Halacha from Musar (and there you also transferred the distinction to the metaphysical plane) it is necessary to explain how such a large practical overlap nevertheless arose. Although between Halacha and Musar you completely cut off, while between Qum and Asa and the Mitzvot Asa you do see a fundamental common core. And about this core I ask.
B. Forced not to build a railing, you said that the Asa does not exist and also on the Na'o did not pass and this is a neutral intermediate situation. Apparently, it should be added that even if Forced did build a railing, then the Asa does not exist and also on the Na'o did not pass. But I learned from this that in your opinion he did commit the act [and perhaps specifically if he had wanted to build the rape apparatus as well]. But if so, then that requires an explanation, because if entering a bad situation through rape (against my will) does not bring me into a bad situation, then how and why does entering a good situation through rape (in parallel with my will) bring me into a good situation.
C. In terms of severity, do you see a difference between standing up and doing and sitting down and not doing. Is someone who stood idly by and did not press the button that saves his friend less serious than someone who acted vigorously and pressed the button that prevents his friend from being rescued? Is someone who did not press the button that prevents his friend from being given medication less noble than someone who pressed the button that injects medication into his friend.
[And in my opinion, on the moral level, you need a third eye to be able to see a difference. Therefore, even if there is a halakhic difference, it is a sin]
A. The continuation of the explanation regarding the relationship between the q”a will be in the next column. As a rule, here I explained that entering a situation requires action. Avoiding a situation is usually by omission. Here too, I completely disconnected (as between halakhah and morality), and only explained why an image of a connection is created (as there, because of the overlap).
It turns out that there is a significant overlap between the natural and metaphysical order. One can wonder if this is coincidental and how it was created, but this is probably the case. This is at least what comes to mind for me to explain the halakhic facts. If I am correct in my explanation, then factually there is such an overlap. I do not see an alternative explanation for the disconnect between doing and q”a.
B. Forced not to build a railing sharpens the difference between defining a norm as a halakhic or as a halakhic. If he was raped, then the act is not performed (meaning that in terms of the act, he is merely performing the halacha, but with rape), but he also did not violate the halacha (meaning that in terms of the halacha, he is performing the halacha). When the rape is over, he will have to erect a railing. When he is raped, he will have to put on tefillin when the rape is over. But if it was a halacha about being without tefillin, then he did not have to put it back on.
Regarding the raped one who did build a railing, I do not see how you drew the conclusion from my words. As stated, my example did not deal with a comparison between raping a woman and raping a man not to build, but between the wording of raping and as an act when raping a man not to build.
To the point, if he is raped to build a railing, he is performing the mitzvah, but with rape (will he not be rewarded?). In my understanding, this is indeed equivalent to raping a man not to build. The rule is that an act of rape is an act that is done, but failure to do so is not an act.
C. You are comparing two equal offenses. Pressing a button that prevents rescue is like not pressing a button. Both are false, because pressing it caused no rescue and not death itself. If you want to compare, you should compare death with no rescue. Therefore, there is no need for a third eye, I agree with you in principle. Although in my opinion there is a certain difference even in your comparison, but that is a different discussion. I did not discuss that.
D1. You are right that this is a phenomenological explanation, but it is better than no explanation at all. At least you will be able to see in it that the accepted explanation (which attributes it to the manner of execution) is incorrect. My argument is that there must be positive and negative situations in some sense to explain these halakhic phenomena. Just like theoretical yeshis. Therefore, in my opinion, it is not only phenomenological, although certainly incomplete. But it is also true of any scientific theory, which is not entirely phenomenological but not incomplete.
You are also wrong that we have gained nothing, because one still has to wonder why a certain situation is positive or negative. One must indeed wonder about this, but it is a completely different question from the one I solved. The question I was dealing with was a problem (how is there a difference between two commands with the same content), that is, there is a contradiction here. The question now is a question and not a problem (why is a certain situation positive or negative).
As I explained, there is certainly an understanding here, even if not complete. Just like in science.
Thank you
B. You wrote “The rule is that an act of rape is an act done, but not committing rape is not an act”, what do you mean?
This is a Hebrew translation of “Unsa Law Kaman Dabed”.
D1. Before that, we thought that there are commandments to which God has attached a symbol of do and some to which He has attached a symbol of do not. You say no and no, but He attached a symbol of positive condition or He attached a symbol of negative condition. How is such an explanation useful if there is no clue how to judge whether a condition is positive or its absence is negative.
D2. Does the law that He has rejected do not also stem from the model of positive and negative conditions?
Because now it's not an arbitrary symbol but an expression of two types of situations that clearly have a difference between them. But you don't have a criterion that determines which situation is this or that. So what?
Maybe I'm being naive, but to make a difference, we could say that he made a blocker of the angels of destruction from damaging the menorah in the Temple of Ma'aleh, and the Levites clean the wings of the ministering angels. Now why did he make a repeller of the Levites because cleaning the wings is obvious and he doesn't deserve credit for it, but avoiding blocking the harmful ones is a bit bad. Why should the Levites be cursed because leaving dirt on the wings is very bad.
As you said, staying neutral and not transgressing the Levites is obvious and not a light commandment, but staying neutral and not fulfilling the act is a light offense. And the Levites are cursed because the negative situation is very bad.
Not to leave dirt in the wings but to put it there.
The debate was expected and will probably remain this time too. 🙂
Leave, why put. Keeping the law cleanses and violating the law stops the cleansing.
Please enlighten me as to what was expected. I asked about the arbitrary entities (what is positive what is negative) with the arbitrary properties (entering into a very bad negative. Not entering a neutral negative. Entering into a very good positive. Not entering into a slightly bad positive). Why is this similar?
This is exactly what I corrected in your words. You distinguished between leaving and doing, but I wrote that this is not the distinction between doing and not doing. The distinction between doing and not doing is between leaving and putting.
This was expected because you have already written several times that you do not see a difference between passive and active causation (death or failure to save).
It has already been clarified, but I will write just in case you correct me if I am wrong.
When I ask, I assume that I choose both the entities and their hierarchy and properties. So I choose what is the observance of the law (to clean) and its violation (to leave dirt) and choose what is the observance of the act (blocking) and its cancellation (enabling). Then I choose the hierarchy – violating the law is much worse than punishment. We were not excited about observing the law. Observing the act is very good. Canceling the act is a bit disturbing. Therefore, people are punished and spend more money on the law. Therefore, canceling an act is worse than observing the law.
Whereas your answer is that this hierarchy is not an arbitrary choice but a natural consequence of identifying the entities as positive/negative. And this is actually a matter of facing a lie. Therefore, after I have chosen the entities, I am not in a position to determine the hierarchy, and it is determined by discretion.
It seems correct to me (although I'm not sure I fully understood about cleaning dirt and the like).
And another small question in the Mota. When you explain that there are no defects, do you mean that the descent into a negative state is defective (and that there is no defect in not rising), or do you mean that being in a negative state is defective (so it is clear that there is no defect in not rising). Is the punishment for the action or for the situation? Apparently these are two completely different types of punishment.
Above I explained that there is no connection.
There are two types of no: no about action and no about result. As far as I am concerned, in no about action the negative situation is the action, and in no about result the negative situation is the result. In both, it is being in a negative situation and being afflicted.
This issue is very dear to me and is at the forefront of my mind, so please allow me to dwell on it some more, and I apologize for the amount. Even if in your eyes everything is ground up and repeated over and over again, I have not reached this level.
In terms of explaining the halakhah, I now think that your entire structure is enlightening and reveals the truth. But in terms of whether all of this is reasonable - here we need an external explanation.
Ostensibly, a demand to improve seems just as important as a demand not to deteriorate (in the matter of a deed that is repugnant to the law). And deterioration is no worse than no progress (in the matter of whippings and wealth).
But you also hold that, in terms of general plausibility, it is indeed reasonable. You believe that deterioration is indeed worse than no progress (therefore, for the sake of non-deterioration). And you believe that no praise is due for not deteriorating, and no reproach is due for not progress (therefore, canceling the deed and maintaining the deed is altogether bad). This is already your extra-halakhic explanation. And I think it would be better if you also derived it from the halakha or if it was with you from the beginning.
Incidentally, I have always wondered about the custom of sellers to give a “discount” to friends. On the other hand, I have not heard of a custom of buyers to give a “honor” to friends. And what about them? If by virtue of the discount I, as a seller, gave you five shekels, why not give me five shekels as a token of appreciation, as an alternative.
It's hard for me to assess whether my explanation was formed from the halakha or not. My feeling is that it wasn't. It seems to me that there is simply a difference between drowning someone and not saving them from drowning.
You say that punishment is for being in a negative state, not for moving to a negative state. Therefore, punishment does not apply to a neutral state that prevents moving to a positive state. Does this mean that the punishment is for atonement, not for deterrence and encouragement?
It doesn't have to be. A person who enters the negative state knows that he is being punished for being there, and this deters him. So in my opinion, the question of the purpose of punishment remains open. As I wrote in the article on punishments, I truly believe that the punishments of the Torah are not for warning (at least not only for deterrence), but there is no evidence from this.
So why is there no punishment for undoing a deed? Well, if the punishment only atones for the situation, then only in a negative situation does punishment belong. But if the punishment also tries to influence the person's behavior, then why shouldn't they punish for undoing a deed?
We can also ask why there are more severe and less severe punishments. Even if punishment is a deterrent, there are still proportions. And there is no punishment at all for a deed. Certainly if it is about atonement (=cleansing the sin. Canceling a deed does not taint us).
Do not do in terms of states means the following: You have two options: A. Enter a negative state and a positive state. B. Not enter both. The question is whether the offset is perfect and then there is no decision or not. The rule says that there is a decision and option A is preferable. The explanation is probably that not entering a positive state is a minor offense (= canceling a do), but not entering a negative state is not a minor commandment but a neutral state in itself. Therefore, in option A there is an offset and the overall benefit is 0 (symbolic of course), but in option B the overall benefit is a small negative one.
But I suggest that we leave that for the next stage, where I will deal with the types of positive commandments.
D1. I thought I would leave this point until I understand the previous points, but let's not.
You are looking for a fundamental explanation between a doer and a non-doer that would be able to explain the halachic differences between them. And you find the difference in the situation in question – whether to bring about the positive or to beware of the negative. For example, having the showbread arranged in its place is positive, and having the sufshan on the ephod and not spilled is preventing the negative.
There is a ‘simple’ explanation here with theoretical entities that explains the entirety of phenomena (and therefore there is good reason to assume that these theoretical entities do exist). But what is the explanation for the appearances of the theoretical entities themselves? Without such an explanation, we are still left with a kind of phenomenology. Why is a certain state positive and an unknown state negative?
Perhaps you treat this like the question of why a physical constant is at a certain value – and answer this way, may God bless his wisdom. But there is still no understanding. So what have we gained? Instead of wondering why a particular positive commandment is characterized by such and such a set of halachic properties (the properties of positive commandments), we now wonder why a particular situation is positive (and not that the complementary situation is negative) and why a particular situation is negative (and not that the complementary situation is positive). Are you looking for an explanation for the positive/negative choice in terms of the ta’ama dekra, or can the Torah choose in every commandment whether it will be positive or not and we will accept in silence.
Abduction without explanation is of course the study of science par excellence (because in science all that is interesting is to know what will happen in such and such a situation) but in my opinion it is not really the study of Torah. The laws are known even without it. There is no understanding even with it. So what is there here? In another column you saw the construction of such and such a theory as the pinnacle of Torah study. And when I suggested that in Torah study there is a layer of “understanding” whereas in science I remember you saying that there is no difference.
I answered this along with the answers to your questions in your previous message.
Two comments on the paragraph of "A Fundamental Distinction Between Not and Doing: The Rambam's Method and Its Support":
1) You wrote that a positive commandment is a verse that indicates a state to which the Torah wants us to reach, and therefore the commandment is to have a railing and not to actually make a railing itself. While this is true for commandments of consequence, it is certainly not true for commandments of action in which the commandment is the very act of doing it?!
2) You also wrote about a railing that the problem in the situation where a railing was not built is only that it is not the desired situation (of a house with a railing), and that it is not a problematic situation in itself. But, kl, while it is true in an existential commandment that if you fulfill it, it is better if not, it is not terrible, but in a positive commandment, when you do not fulfill it, you are in a negative situation of nullifying the action!
1. A state can be active or passive. Even in the commandment of action, the action is a state. If there is a deed to build a railing, the state can be the construction of a railing or the existence of a railing. And if it were only a no, then there would be no value in building or existing, but it would be avoiding a state of not building or not existing.
2. I will address this in the fourth column.
According to what you explained in the paragraph "Returning to the RIP's statement on the RSA's method," I find it difficult to understand why RSA's law enumerates the obligation to fast as an approach even though it is fundamentally a no because it is observed in a state of disobedience?
And now the question arises in all its severity: In the previous column, you explained that "according to RSA, the commandment to fast is indeed counted as an act because of its formulation in the Torah, but essentially it is a no and therefore there is a keret and sin," so what determines whether to count as an hour or not is the wording, and in this column the opposite emerges, that what determines is the element (although when there is a wording of yes and no, but not above, it turns out to say that when there are two wordings, what determines is the element and when there is only one wording, what determines is the wording itself; why not say that what always determines is the element and we have fulfilled our obligation)
This is a mixture of methods. My explanation was stated in the method of most of the early ones. Ras””G disagrees with this.
Not true. In the paragraph "Back to the ripoff" you explain that according to the R'sag one must examine the basis of the mitzvah and see whether it is a negative or a positive commandment (which does not depend on the wording). But in the previous column you offered an explanation according to the R'sag, according to which the mitzvah to fast is counted as an hour even though its basis is a negative. I have a feeling of a contradiction here, which raises the difficulty I raised in the last response (why is fasting a positive mitzvah even though its basis is a negative).
The words of Ras”g are a mystery in any case.
He says eighty according to what the matter of the mitzvah is explained in more detail, but it is not clear what he means. Simply put, he means the performance criterion. After all, his entire question about Maimonides is based on the assumption that there is no essential difference between doing and not doing, but only a performance difference. Therefore, it is reasonable to me that he understood this way.
But the question still remains why torture is considered to be doing and not doing in his eyes, and for that I offered a local excuse. It is also possible that he understood that fasting is an active action because you create a state of torture in your body (just as putting a person in a river and holding him inside is active murder even though he dies from lack of oxygen and I am only causing it). But I do not have a systematic method in Ras”g's opinion.
I will comment even more than that, you wrote "Therefore, even if the Torah states that there is also a positive mitzvah to rest on Shabbat, its actual intention is not, and only the wording misleads us. Therefore, the prohibitions of Shabbat are listed by the rabbi as a rabbi and not as an act." But the truth is that in the Book of Mitzvot for the rabbi, the rabbi lists resting on Shabbat as an act. See rabbi 34: "Keep Shabbat, you. And your sons. And your servants. And your livestock shall rest on it."
If so, this reinforces the difficulty I described above.
You have further explained, according to the perception of the R.S.G. and the R.P.F., why the Torah describes certain commandments not to do in active language that is reserved for doing and vice versa. But it seems that the R.P.F. himself explains this when he writes vezl and did not write rahmanna in vezl and velat, except to increase the severity of the punishment of the one who violates it. So what remains difficult?
Why didn't he write "two"? When do you write "two" (as in "interest") and when do you write "no" and "yes"?
1. In the paragraph "A fundamental distinction between not and do" you write from the outset that "there is no logical overlap here, etc., etc." Are you just explaining this in more detail in the last third of the column, or are you already giving a different problem from the paragraph "Logical problem" and in the last third you offer an interpretation of this problem? Because after you wrote at the beginning "there is no logical overlap here, etc." I didn't understand the problem in the paragraph "Logical problem," is it the same problem?
2. I really tried to understand the difference between "implications of a distinction" and "demonstrations of a distinction" and I didn't understand. I would be very happy to clarify it with other words or a simpler example.
3. Negation of the claim "I am hungry" = "It is not true that I am hungry" or simply "I am not hungry"?
1. The rest is just a detail. Here I explained intuitively and then showed that there is no overlap on the formal logical level and I discussed the implications.
2. There are implications that cannot in themselves constitute an explanation for the difference between non-action and action. For example, it is the same that only one-fifth of the wealth is spent on action, and everything is spent on action. Action is rewarded and punishment is received on action. This is not a difference but a consequence of the difference. Because there is a difference, the consequence is that different amounts are spent. The difference between a positive and a negative situation is the difference itself. Examples of this are, for example, a commandment in it more than in its sending, rape, when there is no home, etc. All of these are expressions of the essential difference that sharpens it itself. The implications are a result of the difference.
3. In plain Hebrew it looks the same. But as I wrote, if I do not exist at all then it does not exist that I am hungry and it does not exist that I am not hungry. But it does exist that “it is not true that I am hungry”.
Regarding norms, it is clearer. There is a clear difference between it is not true that there is a mitzvah to put on tefillin and there is a mitzvah not to put on tefillin (a prohibition).
« The distinction between the two formulations of negation can appear clearly if we look at a situation in which there is no person named Moses in the world at all ». Of course, if you ignore the assumption of existence of Aristotelian logic, you will have problems with the claims. That is, there is an assumption of existence of what is denoted by the terms appearing in the claim, then Moses exists, so according to the square of opposites that two claims are contradictory if and only if there cannot be a situation in which they both have the same truth value, indeed the contradictory claim (i.e. its negation) of "Moses with tefillin" is "Moses without tefillin."
The question of whether the assumption of existence is true or not is not relevant to the discussion, except perhaps for my example. This assumption is a formal convention (you may or may not assume it). For my purposes here, it was enough for me to show that if we adopt this assumption, just for the sake of discussion, a difference is created between the two types of negation. This already means that these are two different types, and this is regardless of whether you yourself actually accept this assumption or not.