On the Controversy over Rabbi Melamed (Column 410)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

In recent weeks there’s been a minor storm in the frum crowd over Rabbi Eliezer Melamed. Rabbi Matanya Ariel published a column in which he criticizes Rabbi Melamed for changing his fundamental positions on public issues, and mainly for “sliding” toward liberal directions, heaven forfend. A few days later he published another column explaining his motives for publishing and adding more personal fuel to the fire. The matter also reached the site here, where I was asked my opinion about Rabbi Melamed and his positions. As I wrote there, for many years now I have found myself highly esteeming Rabbi Melamed, even though a significant portion of his positions (especially in the past) run counter to my own. Long before his recent “decline,” I saw in him a courageous person who forms positions on various issues honestly and independently (the indication being that it’s hard to predict in advance what he will say). I’ll add that I don’t know him personally nor his conduct in different areas (unlike Rabbi Matanya, whom we came to know when my son studied at his yeshiva); I rely on what he writes. Therefore my remarks deal mainly with his thought, not with him personally (the critiques addressed both planes).

What is this about?

Rabbi Matanya’s words revolve around several rulings and steps that Rabbi Melamed has taken in recent years. I haven’t gone through all the material and won’t survey it here since that’s not my purpose (one can see a report here). I’ll just briefly note that he published liberal opinions (most are not halachic rulings) on various public matters such as women’s prayer and Reform worshipers at the Western Wall, the status of women, the attitude toward LGBTQ people, ending boycotts of Reform and Conservative Jews, meetings and cooperation with them, budgetary equality, and more. Rabbi Melamed has not retreated from his positions even in the face of criticism, and he continues to meet with other religious groups, to the displeasure of conservative critics and the delight of liberals.

These publications are received in the Hardal (nationalist-Haredi) world with heightened shock in light of his conservative past. Beyond being the son of Rabbi Zalman Melamed (head of the Beit El Yeshiva and founder of Arutz 7, which is headed by his wife, Rabbi Eliezer Melamed’s mother), in his youth he was among the founders of the separate youth movement “Ariel.” He consistently and forcefully advocated refusal to obey orders and opposition to hearing women’s singing in the army, without fearing sanctions (as you may recall, Ehud Barak, as defense minister, closed his yeshiva because of these positions). Add to that his series of halachic books, Peninei Halakha, which spread widely among the public and turned him (in my estimation) into the most prominent and influential religious-Zionist halachic decisor today.[1] One can gather that he is certainly perceived among the Hardalim as “one of us,” and it’s no wonder their public can’t quite digest what has been happening to him in recent years. One focus of criticism, beyond the criticism of the positions themselves, is the dynamism and extreme changes that have occurred in them.

Intellectual independence

It seems to me they are missing something that could have been seen long ago. His autonomous halachic decision-making and intellectual independence have been evident for quite some time, not always in the liberal or “lenient” direction (an unfortunate expression, since this isn’t about leniency and stringency). Therefore, although his directions differ from mine, in this sense I find much kinship with him. He has written more than once that a rabbi should express his positions as they are, whatever they may be, and not be afraid of mockers and opponents, even if they are important rabbis. Shlomo Piotrkowski aptly wrote in his recent response a few days ago that in his critique Rabbi Matanya Ariel didn’t bring even one example of Rabbi Melamed changing a position. He pointed to conservative rulings and approaches in the past, and to more open and liberal rulings and approaches in the present, but not necessarily on the same topics. Apparently he cannot digest what intellectual independence means. I will now try to clear some of the fog, as a public service.

I have written more than once that labels such as conservative, innovative, lenient, stringent, open or closed, deep or shallow, are the sole concern of the scholar. The rabbi and decisor himself should not rule or express a view because he decided he must be lenient or stringent, conservative or innovative. A decisor endowed with intellectual independence should not make sure to align his rulings and opinions with a particular ideological direction (even one he himself believes in), but should decide each matter according to how it appears to him. Sometimes that may come out conservative and sometimes open and liberal—everything depends on the case. Afterwards, scholars of his thought can come and discuss or determine whether he was conservative or liberal, if at all.

It is very important to remove intellectual independence from that list of features. Unlike conservatism, innovation, leniency, or stringency, independence is a trait that should guide the decisor himself (and not just the scholars of his thought). Without it, he is not a decisor but a repository of halachic information. Maintaining intellectual independence and integrity is a consideration within the very process of ruling, unlike innovation, conservatism, leniency, or stringency.

Implications for expressions of support and criticism

For this reason I’m also not very enthusiastic or impressed by expressions of support Rabbi Melamed receives from liberal or secular quarters (and likewise regarding similar expressions of sympathy that I myself sometimes receive from such quarters). Such support is worthless and doesn’t say much, since it comes from liking the bottom line. They are pleased with his liberal ruling or opinion because it suits them. A statement like “So-and-so is a ‘courageous’ decisor” almost always means he rules in the direction I (the liberal) like. I haven’t seen expressions of admiration from those quarters for his courage in expressing a stringent or conservative stance (such as refusal of orders, women’s singing, or founding the “Ariel” youth movement).

My appreciation and support for Rabbi Melamed do not stem from there. I disagree with him on quite a few issues on their merits. It’s true that in recent years he has been moving closer to the path of truth (in my view because he is a man of truth and a straight decisor), but I express support for him because of his intellectual independence, irrespective of the bottom line. Even when his independence leads him to positions and rulings that are squarely opposed to my directions, I will value him for that independence (if indeed the ruling in question expresses independence) and oppose his ruling or opinion. This is support that is not conditional on anything, for it concerns his mode of operation as a decisor and not the bottom lines he issues.

It seems that Rabbi Matanya, for some reason, recommends that a rabbi or decisor decide in advance what the agenda and the “party” affiliation require him to say, and only then rule or opine. In this sense, his critique is very similar to the expressions of support from Reform and liberal organizations, even though ostensibly they are on opposite sides of the barricade. What both sides share is that they support or criticize the bottom line, according to whether it aligns or does not align with their path and worldview.

I too have been accused more than once in the past of being Reform, conservative, Zionist, Haredi, heretical, liberal, benighted, feminist, chauvinist, and the like. I’ve often been asked whether I am conservative or innovative, and which ideological stream I belong to. I try to explain to such a questioner that affiliation with any stream or outlook should, if at all, be determined only retroactively. It should not be a consideration on which the decisor himself relies when forming and expressing a position on any issue. When my future scholars (the “Kurzweils”) come along, part of their job will be to characterize me and my rulings.

To avoid misunderstandings: it’s clear to me that a decisor’s worldview plays a role in his rulings. My claim is that it should not be conscious, and should not change his positions and rulings in cases where it seems to him that he should express a different position than expected. A Zionist decisor will certainly rule in accordance with his worldview, and so will a Haredi decisor, a Hasid or a Mitnaged—and that’s perfectly fine. That is their stance. But when he does not allow himself to say what he thinks because it is not Zionist or not Haredi, then we have a problem. When such outlooks are conscious for him, he is liable to take them into account in the ruling process, and then this problematic tendency is likely to appear.

I recall an anecdote from the time I was a member of the management council of “Noam” High School (first in Pardes Hanna, later in Kfar Saba). There was a period, after the retirement of Rabbi Yagel of blessed memory, when the head of the yeshiva changed almost every year. The council convened each time to choose a head, and after he resigned or was dismissed we convened again to choose a new one, and so on. At some point there was an intense effort by some council members and various surrounding parties (including parents) to select a religious-Zionist rabbi. They felt that the lack of a clear “color” was what was harming the school. As part of this, they approached me as well to try to persuade me to join the campaign. I told them I saw the situation exactly the opposite. Institutions with a clear ideological color already exist—and unfortunately they are as numerous as the sand on the seashore. What characterizes Noam is precisely that it doesn’t make a big deal of political ideology, and that it employs teachers and rabbis of all shades, who even argue among themselves before the students (with the administration’s encouragement, of course). In my eyes this is a welcome and unique situation, and I told them I would very much like to preserve it. I added that in my view this is the main justification for the school’s existence in today’s educational landscape. Ironically, the parents, who were not permitted to participate in the selection process or be members of the council, asked that time to present their position before the council members. When two parent representatives entered to speak, one of them—a woman who didn’t look very “frum”—expressed the parents’ firm position in favor of choosing the… Haredi candidate. It was a wonderful sight in my eyes, and a great reinforcement of the position I supported.

Forming a position according to what is expected from one’s ideological camp is a serious malaise common in our circles. Still, it is strange to me that precisely someone who does not act that way finds himself under harsh criticism. Instead of directing criticism at those who form a position based on what is expected of them and on what their ideology dictates—that is, at those whose every word is predictable and known in advance (so there’s no need for them to open their mouths at all)—it is precisely the one who displays intellectual independence who is showered with criticism for it. Essentially he is criticized for daring to be a decisor rather than a repository of halachic and ideological information (a hollow conduit who “draws and pours from the Torah of his teachers”), as expected of him by the “authorities.” I am astonished!

So much for a general introduction. I will now turn to several more specific points in Rabbi Matanya’s critiques.

On changes in a rabbi’s positions

Rabbi Matanya opens his first column by saying that recently changes have occurred in Rabbi Melamed’s positions, and then writes the following:

Among rabbis of the liberal and “lite” public, these developments arouse joy, expressions of satisfaction and sometimes even excitement. In contrast, to my taste these developments should arouse shock and a sense of contempt for one who has abandoned his values. My sense is that these are the feelings of many rabbis in the national-religious public. Despite these polarized reactions, I feel there is broad agreement: Rabbi Eliezer Melamed underwent, or is undergoing, a very significant, radical, and far-reaching change—a phenomenon that has almost no precedent in the rabbinate.

This neatly describes the consensus I outlined above, whereby both sides relate to Rabbi Melamed’s positions in a non-substantive way. Indeed, as I explained, there is broad agreement on this on both sides of the divide—but in my eyes this is a matter for reproach, not praise.

He then turns to the point of change in positions. He explains that it is legitimate for a rabbi to change his positions due to age and changing circumstances, but here the changes are, in his view, too extreme. He asks:

I suggest the reader not be misled by contorted explanations that will try to square the circle and explain why there has been no change in his views. From conversations with several of his students and residents of Har Bracha it also emerges that this is indeed “not the Rabbi Melamed we knew.” And therefore the obvious question arises—what happened to Rabbi Melamed? Where is the mistake? In what he thought in the past, or in what he thinks today?

One can of course raise this wonder about any small change in views. I don’t see why the quantitative matter (a big change) is relevant to this odd argument. There are two possibilities: either now Rabbi Melamed thinks he erred in the past, or the circumstances have changed and therefore today he believes one should act differently even without changing fundamental positions. I see no problem with either situation. Even if he erred in the past—does that not happen to every sage, including the Sages? Did sages not retract their opinions? Is intellectual honesty and a willingness to acknowledge error a stain on a sage or decisor? Very odd.

Another argument could be raised here, namely that if the same person changes positions then perhaps we shouldn’t rely on him. And indeed Rabbi Matanya writes further on:

And if for so many years Rabbi Melamed was in darkness, why should we rely on him now? And perhaps in a few years he will discover a new light, or return to the former darkness? So maybe we should simply wait until he decides definitively, and only then listen to his opinion? For while a person is entitled to undergo far-reaching processes between himself and himself, there is no justification for such processes to affect the general public.

Rabbi Melamed does not necessarily think that in the past he was “in darkness.” As I explained, either he erred in the past or the situation then was different. Either way, this isn’t about darkness and light but about a completely legitimate change of position, and here Rabbi Matanya is putting words in his mouth.

However, the question of how one can rely on someone whose position is not yet formed is indeed a good and stronger question. Ostensibly it would be preferable to wait until his position crystallizes and then rely on him and accept his directives. I too have written more than once (see for example here) that an indicator that a person has reached the level of issuing rulings is when he finds that his positions are formed (when he returns to the same sugya after a span of years and in most cases reaches the same conclusions). This, however, has no necessary connection to agreeing with the majority of decisors, contrary to what Rabbi Matanya writes at the start of that paragraph (in a sentence I will discuss in the next section). Even so, I must make several important remarks about this claim.

First, I explained that it’s not certain Rabbi Melamed changed his positions. It’s possible the rulings/positions changed because the factual and social reality changed.

Second, as I wrote in the introduction, Rabbi Matanya did not demonstrate any change of position by Rabbi Melamed. He showed that in the past he had Hardali rulings and positions in certain issues, and now he expresses more liberal positions on other issues. Perhaps he always thought one should act differently toward Reform Jews or LGBTQ people? How does that contradict his past positions in favor of a separate youth movement or the prohibition of listening to women’s singing in the army? Again it seems that in Rabbi Matanya’s view the general agenda should dictate the particular rulings—but that is not so.

Third, even if Rabbi Melamed’s positions in certain issues have changed, what is the threshold beyond which it is no longer fitting to rely on him? After all, Rabbi Matanya himself writes that any decisor may occasionally change positions. And who decided that these are the important issues (so that the scope and intensity of his change are high)? Are issues in the laws of Shabbat not more important?! (Shabbat prohibitions carry the penalty of stoning, and one who is an apostate with respect to Shabbat is like an apostate to the entire Torah.) Hardali rabbis tend to see political issues—especially those that are contentious—as the core of the Torah. In my eyes these are questions whose importance is usually marginal. They have social significance, but much less in the halachic-Torah plane.

Fourth, why does anyone need to rely on Rabbi Melamed and his positions? He expresses positions as he understands them and provides reasons. Whoever wishes and is persuaded—accepts them; whoever doesn’t—doesn’t. No one needs to rely on what any given decisor says. If anything, I would join Rabbi Matanya’s call not to rely on any rabbi (and certainly not on a rabbi who does not change positions). I permit myself to suspect that he won’t quite join that call.

Fifth, his words here assume that the decisor is the ultimate path to the one and only halachic truth, and only for that reason do people rely on him. But a different attitude is possible: a person may want a shoulder to lean on—i.e., he wants to ensure that a certain stance is legitimate (not outright nonsense), even if it isn’t the pure halachic truth. For that he may suffice with the fact that Rabbi Melamed expresses that stance, even if later he recants. Perhaps it was not the truth, but it is worthwhile to rely on Rabbi Melamed in pressing times (when a person does not know how to act). I say this as an avowed halachic monist (one who believes there is a single halachic truth).

The significance of a majority

At the beginning of the paragraph I just quoted, Rabbi Matanya raises a claim from the angle of the majority:

What happened that suddenly Rabbi Eliezer discovered the light? And what caused the other rabbis not to discover the light and remain in darkness?

The demagoguery in this argument is blatant. Is a person forbidden to hold different positions, including minority positions? Would a Tanna, an Amora, or any decisor throughout the generations, simply abandon his opinion whenever he was in the minority?

Rabbi Soloveitchik, in his Five Addresses, in his essay on the “Joseph of 1906 (5666),” deals precisely with this question: how he, who was vice-president of Agudath Israel in America, crossed the lines and stood at the head of Mizrachi. Isn’t this a central issue (the attitude toward Zionism)? Surely more central than the order of prayer at the Western Wall or meetings with Reform rabbis, no? Rabbi Soloveitchik changed his stance from one extreme to the other, and even explained cogently that this is what a rabbi and spiritual leader must do if he indeed concludes that the situation has changed or that his positions have changed. He goes against the majority, as Joseph went against the majority of his brothers.

But leave Rabbi Soloveitchik aside (for he too is off-limits to the Hardalim, except where he suits them, like his words about the presumption “tav le-meitav”). Rabbis who supported the Zionist movement were—and still are—a small minority (also in quality, at least in the view of the Hardalim who defer to the Haredim, and rightly so; according to their parameters for greatness in Torah there’s no comparing the magnitudes). How did Rav Kook and his disciples allow themselves to go against nearly all the great sages of the generation? How do today’s Hardalim allow themselves to do so? In Rabbi Matanya’s phrasing: what did they see that all the other great sages of the generation (including the Chafetz Chaim, R. Chaim Ozer, R. Meir Simcha, R. Elchanan Wasserman, R. Chaim of Brisk and his son, the Chazon Ish, as well as Rabbis Elyashiv and Auerbach, Wosner, Nissim Karelitz, and many more)—some of whom were Rav Kook’s own teachers—did not see? And note well: here I’m not speaking about changing positions (as with Rabbi Soloveitchik—that was discussed in the previous section), but about the very claim that a rabbi and decisor should align his positions with the view of the majority of leading sages/rabbis. And perhaps Rabbi Matanya himself is about to abandon his support for Zionism. He should update us before such a dramatic change in his positions; otherwise his students (among them my son) have been relying on him and his directives until now in error.

Who are the great rabbis and leaders of the generation?

Rabbi Matanya also assumes, mainly in his follow-up column, a very specific identity for the “great rabbis” with whom Rabbi Melamed was supposed to consult. Conveniently, these are exactly the Hardalim and their associates (including Rabbi Druckman, who always gets included—and about whom I have said what I have said more than once; see, for example, column 271). This is a typical Hardali case of begging the question: those who do not hold these positions are by definition not great rabbis; therefore anyone who goes against these positions is acting against the view of the great sages of the generation. By virtue of this begged premise, that group of rabbis also appoints itself as leaders of the religious-Zionist public. Moreover, unlike Rabbi Melamed, they crown themselves explicitly with that title—or at least allow the media to repeat that nonsense again and again.

Rabbi Matanya protests that Rabbi Melamed is appointing himself as a leader of the generation and issuing directives in public matters. But as far as I have seen, he did not appoint himself to this, nor is he issuing directives; rather, he is expressing opinions. He did not tell anyone to accept his view. Is a rabbi, however small, forbidden to express an opinion on public matters? I see no reason for that. On the contrary, Rabbi Matanya’s concern stems from the great weight given to Rabbi Melamed’s opinions—even though here that weight does not derive from his appointing himself a leader, but from the fact that the public sees him as a spiritual leader and one of the great figures of the generation, rightly or wrongly. That is, unlike those who have appointed themselves leaders for no good reason, he is actually considered by many to be such—and by a broad, varied, and large public (larger, in my opinion, than the public that stands behind those whom Rabbi Matanya speaks about—but that’s only my impression). But as noted, this entire discussion is ridiculous in my view; I conduct it only according to Rabbi Matanya’s approach.

As for consulting others—here I really don’t know whether to laugh or cry. The very rabbis Rabbi Matanya speaks of do not listen to or consult others; they speak and publish positions and opinions in the name of the entire public and in the name of the Torah, without makeup or hesitation, as if they have a daily meeting with the Almighty—with the backing of the entire religious-Zionist public. To direct such criticism specifically at Rabbi Melamed isn’t even funny.

At the end of his follow-up column Rabbi Matanya reassures readers by claiming that he is not among the “Kav” rabbis. But that really doesn’t matter for two main reasons: first, one should discuss matters on their merits; who the speaker is does not matter. Second, if he already bothers to say this, it should be noted that this is throwing sand in the eyes. The questions discussed here are in no way connected to “the line” (Ha-Kav) but to the Hardal camp. As is known, the Kav is only part of the Hardal (its messianic part). The discussion here does not deal with whether the State of Israel is the realization of redemption and the footsteps of the Messiah, or with the appropriate attitude toward the prime minister, the flag, and the president (the question of mamlakhtiyut, with the accent on the first syllable), but with questions concerning the attitude toward different groups in the population. If so, the relevant classification here is precisely affiliation with the Hardal camp and not with the Kav.

A bit about the form

In his follow-up column, Rabbi Matanya opens with describing his deliberation over whether to take his critique public. He ostensibly uses very polite and respectful terminology and leans on great rabbis with whom he consulted (in many cases Hardalim behave like Geviha ben Pesisa—sending the critique by the hands of students. “It didn’t pass the rabbi’s review,” sound familiar?). But immediately afterward he moves to harsh personal slurs about Rabbi Melamed’s character and personal conduct: arrogance, insensitivity, bossiness, unwillingness to hear other views, unwillingness to receive people for a meeting,[2] including those greater than he, and more.

As noted, I have no acquaintance with Rabbi Melamed and therefore no ability to contend with these claims. Perhaps they are true and perhaps not, but in my view they are irrelevant. It’s important to stress that, here too as in many other cases, people are stricter about manners and style than about content. In my eyes that is an inverted priority scale. I often mock people and positions, but I try to ensure that this is only a matter of style, while the content should contain substantive arguments. Those who protest my style have often received that explanation from me. I have no problem with people laughing at me, speaking ironically, and mocking—so long as that is only the manner of expression of substantive argumentation (and not personal and irrelevant). Personal arguments under a veneer of politeness are hypocrisy and sanctimony in my eyes. Incidentally, I also see no problem in airing matters publicly, including harsh criticism, and even without first directing it to the subject of the critique (unless factual clarification is needed). Therefore, in my opinion there is no need to apologize for that. But if already Rabbi Matanya thinks one must be careful about it, it seems to me he did so in a highly problematic way.

Finally, for some reason the personal critiques of Rabbi Melamed and of the conduct of Arutz 7 (which is managed by his mother) are emerging precisely at the timing when his positions do not suit Rabbi Matanya’s taste. In all the years before, it seems that Rabbi Matanya and his like-minded colleagues got along quite well with Rabbi Melamed’s conduct and even with Arutz 7’s policy. It is possible that the change in his character and in Arutz 7’s conduct occurred simultaneously with the change in his positions, but I find that hard to believe. In any case, to me this looks like a tendentious personal attack.

[1] In my eyes this series is truly a masterpiece. It combines presentation of the conceptual background with primary sources and also practical, up-to-date guidance for our times. The books contain determinations based on his own reasoning on the various topics (and not merely summaries, as is common in such books), grounded in an understanding of contemporary reality and the correct application of halachic principles to it. Although the series addresses the general public (and even students and children), it presents an excellent and comprehensive picture of the subjects at a very good level, and it covers almost all relevant areas of halacha. It is a mighty undertaking, and indeed it also contains an element of innovation.

[2] I saw someone point to a column by Rabbi Amichai Eliyahu as evidence that these are not Rabbi Melamed’s traits. It describes how just now (following the criticism) he readily received for a conversation a group of rabbis who oppose his positions. I’m not convinced, because this happened after Rabbi Matanya’s critique, and it may be part of public relations rather than a real change in conduct.

But to the point: it’s entirely possible that Rabbi Melamed is a busy man and cannot receive for a meeting everyone who wishes to come. It’s also possible he thought the conversation would not be useful because these are un-listening people who sharply oppose his positions and would not be willing to listen. I don’t know—and I’m not sure Rabbi Matanya knows—whether this is his general policy regarding meetings with people. In any case, a person chooses whom to meet, how much, and when. It’s hard for me to see what could provide a sufficient factual basis for such decisive criticism of Rabbi Melamed’s character.