Emotional Motivation and Intellectual Motivation: Between Emotion and Experience (Column 371)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
A few weeks ago I was asked by Harel how one might draw from my approach a spirit that would fill the sails of our service of God, or at least ensure that my “anorexic” approach doesn’t neutralize or extinguish a spirit entering from other directions. As I wrote in my response there, this question arises quite often (see for example here), and of course it troubles me as well. In this column I wish to expand a bit on the answer I gave there and address the question of what motivates us to various actions and the value of those motivations.
The Difficulty: Two Types of Motivation
We are built in such a way that emotional motivation acts upon us (or moves us) far more strongly than intellectual and axiological motivations. It is hard for a person to devote himself to goals that seem true to him if the value he sees in them exists only on the intellectual plane. Psychologically, emotions are a much stronger engine than truth and intellect. I do not mean here goals whose value is intellectual. I am speaking of goals of tikkun of the world and the person, that is, ethical and religious goals, and these are not necessarily intellectual. When I speak here of value on the intellectual plane, I mean that a person’s identification with these goals exists only on the intellectual level and no further. In short, this is a statement about the subject (the person), not the object.
An approach like mine focuses on the intellectual and rational component within us, and even tries to clear the screen of the emotional components that get added to it. It is therefore no wonder that it is prone to the problems and difficulties described in the question. Religious coldness is a predictable and natural outcome of such an approach, and it hinders the service of God, both on the substantive level (if we assume that avodat Hashem also requires a psychological-emotional identification) and on the instrumental level (the intensity of devotion to avodat Hashem is weaker).
The Link to the “Anorexia” of My Theology
In the second book of my trilogy I explained that my primary goal is to present a “lean” theology, meaning to clear our theological framework of superfluous accretions. These include components that are untrue or meaningless, but also components that are nonessential (and are left to each of us to decide). Following repeated accusations that my theology is not merely lean but downright anorexic (leaving no theological flesh at all), I devoted column 352 to the implications and meanings, and in fact the benefits, of my theology. There I explained what such a theology can give us (not in an interest-driven sense), though that is not an important question for me. What matters chiefly is whether it is true. The question of what we gain from it is secondary in my eyes, since avodat Hashem is not meant for our gains (that would be “not for its own sake”) but ought to be done because it is the truth (in the words of Maimonides, Hilkhot Teshuvah 10:2: “to do the truth because it is the truth”).
The question I address here touches the “anorexia” question but is different from it. Here I deal with the relation between emotion and intellect—more precisely, between emotional motivation and intellectual motivation. The sense of connection between the questions stems from some of the concrete content of the theological “diet” I recommend. In column 22 and elsewhere I explained why, in my view, emotional components in theology and in our axiological world more broadly have no value. Emotion as such is devoid of axiological meaning. If so, part of the diet I recommend is to remove emotions from the picture. That part of the diet (not the diet itself) creates the link between the anorexia question and the motivation question. As noted, without emotions it is hard to generate significant motivation in avodat Hashem.
It must be understood that, in light of the introduction thus far, the question here is primarily practical. Emotion has no value in itself, and therefore the lack of emotion is not a theological or religious problem. But practically, if we lack strong motivation, we will not be able to meet the goals that the intellect sets before us, and here a real problem arises. The question is how, if at all, one can create significant motivation within my theological worldview.
Animal Soul and Divine Soul
In several places I have discussed the Tanya’s distinction between an animal soul and a divine soul. As I understand it, a person controlled by his animal soul employs his intellect, but the ruler is the emotion. Emotion activates the intellect and harnesses it to its needs. By contrast, a person who acts according to his divine soul harnesses emotion to the service of the intellect. The intellect dictates the goals and targets, and emotion serves it in order to reach them. In the two Hasidic “intermezzos” in my book Enosh KaChatzir I dwelled on this point, regarding the Tanya’s author and in R. Nahman of Breslov’s “Turkey Prince” story.
According to this division, there is ostensibly no principled impediment to holding a lean, cold theology cleansed of emotional-psychological elements while at the same time generating emotional engines for action. The intellect sets goals, arouses emotion, and harnesses it so that it will drive us powerfully toward those goals. In this sense, emotion is no different from any other instrument. Just as I drive a car to Jerusalem in order to fulfill the commandment of pilgrimage, so can I use emotion to carry out my tasks with greater alacrity and effectiveness.
Two Problems
However, a rationalist approach is not only alien to the emotional plane but also hampers its formation and persistence. A rationalist person usually does not have a highly developed emotional life, and therefore finds it difficult—if it is even possible—to generate an artificial emotion to help him fulfill his tasks.
Beyond that, I tend to oppose the very use of emotion as an engine, even if such an emotion could be developed (take an anti-rationalist pill). The reason is that even if we did succeed in developing such emotional engines, the resulting state would be a following after our lower (animal) part, whereas a person ought to conduct himself according to the intellect and by means of it. He ought to do the truth because it is the truth, not because he is excited by it (see on this in column 218, on the “Asperger phenomenon”). Draining the wind from the sails in my approach is not only about edge cases but about essence, and therefore even in Torah study it is hard to get “wind in one’s sails” from me. My words oppose “winds in the sails,” because the focus on the philosophical and logical is essentially an alternative to acting from psychological motivations altogether.
As noted, one might perhaps arouse emotion so that it will move us to more vigorous and devoted action, but in doing so we lower the stature of the human being. We turn ourselves into those driven by emotions and instincts rather than by intellect. Beyond that, some will see this as a kind of self-deception, since I am generating enthusiasm artificially and not spontaneously. But this particular claim I do not accept, for acting from spontaneous emotion is actually problematic. Acting from cool deliberation is far superior (only that, as noted, it is hard to do). Therefore I see no value in the authenticity of emotion. Bottom line: such use of emotion is legitimate in my eyes, certainly for those who practically need it.
So we must understand that there are two problems here: 1) The psychological—focusing on intellect hampers the development of emotion (even as a means). 2) The philosophical—a rationalist approach rejects emotional motivation, even if such could be developed.
As the questioner wrote, my aim is not to arouse enthusiasm in people. To some extent my aim is even the opposite: to cool their enthusiasm, to take the wind out of the sails, and to move them from emotional conduct (which in my eyes resembles that of animals) to action from intellectual-philosophical motivations. I certainly do not lament the absence of emotion; on the contrary—I aspire to it. The distinction I drew in my article between ontic gratitude and moral gratitude is a kind of parable for this matter, though not entirely precise. Ontic gratitude is an obligation to acknowledge and be bound to the agent who created us (regardless of the good he bestowed upon us). This is in contrast to moral gratitude, which in many cases is accompanied by a feeling or emotion of gratitude toward someone who did us good. The former is an axiological-intellectual motivation and the latter an emotional motivation. Admittedly, as I noted, the parable is imprecise because, in my view, even moral gratitude ought not to be driven by emotion but by moral duty. Emotion is only a side effect (which of course helps move us to act in that direction). Such an emotion does not accompany ontic gratitude, and perhaps that is why people sometimes do not accept this contention of mine. They identify gratitude with emotion and not with duty (ethical or otherwise).
There are, then, nontrivial costs to developing such a cold psychological and philosophical stance, as the questioner aptly described in the question that opened this column. I do not know how to bypass or minimize them. Indeed it produces coldness and motivation that is not properly fueled for avodat Hashem. But the words of the author of Chavot Yair are a lamp to my feet (who of course is only quoting): “Plato is beloved and Socrates is beloved, but the truth is most beloved of all.” Even if this truth creates difficulties, it remains the truth. And yet I wish to continue examining this picture and uncover another fold hidden within it.
An Example: Torah Study
I have often cited the words of the author of Eglei Tal in his introduction, who brings a common approach regarding Torah study:
“And as I speak, I will recall what I heard: some people err from the path of reason regarding the study of the Holy Torah, and said that one who studies and innovates novel insights and rejoices and delights in his study—this is not so much Torah study ‘for its own sake’ as one who would study simply, without any enjoyment from the study and only for the sake of the commandment. But the one who studies and delights in his study, his own enjoyment becomes mixed into his learning.”
The view he describes here negates enjoyment from Torah study, for study for the sake of enjoyment is study not for its own sake. You can understand that this is essentially emotional motivation versus intellectual-spiritual-axiological motivation.
But he himself seemingly rejects this conception:
“In truth this is a well-known error. On the contrary, the essence of the commandment of Torah study is to be glad and rejoice and delight in one’s study; then the words of Torah are absorbed into his blood. And since he enjoys the words of Torah, he becomes attached to the Torah. [See Rashi, Sanhedrin 58a, s.v. ‘and cleave’.] And in the Zohar: both the good inclination and the evil inclination grow only out of joy—the good inclination grows out of the joy of Torah, the evil inclination, etc. And if you say that because of the joy he has from the study it is called ‘not for its own sake,’ or at least both ‘for its own sake’ and ‘not for its own sake,’ then this joy would diminish the power of the commandment and dim its light—so how could the good inclination grow from it? And since the good inclination grows from it, surely this is the essence of the commandment.”
The essence of the commandment is to enjoy the words of Torah so that they will be absorbed in him and he will cleave to them. The more one enjoys, the better one learns. Ostensibly this describes the importance of the emotional engine. Purely intellectual study is cold study that does not “stick” to us, and therefore it is desirable to develop the emotional dimension (of enjoyment). Indeed, in the blessings over the Torah each morning we ask: “Make the words of Your Torah pleasant in our mouths,” that is, we ask to enjoy the study.
But now comes a qualification that shows us that the conception rejected by the Eglei Tal is not wholly mistaken:
“And I concede that one who studies not for the sake of the commandment of study, but only because he derives pleasure from his study—this is called study not for its own sake, like one who eats matzah not for the sake of the commandment but for the pleasure of eating; and regarding this they said, ‘One should always engage [in Torah] not for its own sake, for from [what is] not for its own sake one comes to [what is] for its own sake.’ But one who studies for the sake of the commandment and delights in his study—this is study for its own sake and wholly sacred, for the pleasure too is a commandment.”
He indeed advocates that the student enjoy his study, but he too agrees that if the study is done for the sake of enjoyment, it is study not for its own sake. That is, in his view as well, acting due to an emotional engine is disqualified. Enjoyment should not constitute the engine for learning. If enjoyment arises, it improves the study, and it is certainly desirable to study where we enjoy. But at the same time, we must take care that enjoyment not be the goal and the motivation to study. Thus, this very passage—which ostensibly favors the importance of emotion in the mitzvah of Torah study—carefully concludes by rejecting enjoyment and emotion as an engine. Our motivations ought to be the truth and only the truth. Enjoyment is an accompanying outcome.
We can better understand his words through a distinction I made in column 142.
The Brisker Experience
In column 142 I mentioned the common conception that sees Lithuanianism and Briskerism as a kind of service of God without emotion. In Jewish discourse, a Litvak, as opposed to a Hasid, is a cold, rationalist person. But I (as a dyed-in-the-wool Litvak) do not wholly agree with this description. I explained there that Briskers too have experiences, only that their experiences are aesthetic and intellectual. They are excited by intellectual harmony and by delicate, complex intellectual structures. Their awe is indeed an emotion or an experience, but it is awakened by a fine question or a good answer, or by a complex sugya—not by signs and wonders (in the land of the children of Ham) or phenomena perceived as expressions of holiness or spirituality.
It is important to understand that what I describe here is emotion in the full sense. One can see such excitement among scientists and mathematicians. When the Hasid marvels at the miracle that a bird flying over Rabbi Yonatan ben Uzziel was burned, the Litvak marvels at Rabbi Yonatan ben Uzziel’s insights (and in his opinion those are what burned the bird). A scientist is awed by a groundbreaking theory such as quantum theory or relativity—not by our lack of understanding and the limitations of our intellect, but on the contrary: by the fact that our intellect succeeded in conceptualizing and formulating these astonishing theories. So too a mathematician marvels at a complex, elegant mathematical structure.
Between Emotion and Experience
This is a kind of emotional motivation, but it is an emotion born of connection to the intellect. In such a state it is truth itself that moves us emotionally. We are not operating an artificial emotion to harness it to assist the intellect. The experience is part of the apprehension of the truth itself. I believe this is also what the author of Eglei Tal speaks about. This enjoyment is altogether different from the enjoyment of ordinary experiences and cannot be detached from the apprehension of truth. The enjoyment accompanies it naturally and is the indication that indeed we have apprehended something.
In column 109 I held a brief discussion of kitsch. There I cited Thomas Kulka’s claim that kitsch may be very high art on the technical level, but the excitement in the viewer arises from the situation depicted in the painting (a sunset and a crying child) rather than from the artistic value-added of the painter. Excitement from the art in the painting resembles, somewhat, the enjoyment I speak of here. It is an excitement that accompanies apprehension, not a merely spontaneous emotion. One may say that this excitement is part of the apprehension itself. The intellectual enjoyment of Torah study is an experience that comes from the truth in the matter and not from the content; from the content’s value-added—its being true.
There are stories about sages (such as the Vilna Gaon and R. Chaim of Brisk) who expressed immense delight at an answer that seems very simple. This delight sometimes surpasses the delight from a complex but unconvincing structure (pilpul). It is delight in the truth of the matter—a delight that I apprehend something outside myself (and not merely build a complex structure in my head), and in this case I apprehend the word and will of God (and thereby cleave to “a ‘piece’ of the Holy One, blessed be He”). This delight is not quite an emotion. Perhaps it is more accurate to call it an experience which, as noted, is part of the apprehension itself.
It is no accident that most mathematicians hold a Platonic view, according to which mathematical entities have some real existence (they are not merely fictions of our intellect). The delight and experience before a mathematical structure arise from our apprehending something outside us. A spontaneous stirring from an internal structure of ours is emotion; enjoyment that accompanies the apprehension of something external is experience.
An Analogy from Aesthetic Experience
C. S. Lewis (author of Narnia) opens his booklet The Abolition of Man with a passage taken from a book on teaching literature. The book discusses a passage from Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s story, “By the Waterfall,” which describes two tourists—one refers to the waterfall as “sublime,” and the other describes it as “beautiful.” Coleridge himself identifies with the first and rejects with disgust the second position. The authors of that book write about this:
“When the man said, ‘This is sublime,’ it seems he was saying something about the waterfall… In truth… he was not speaking about the waterfall at all, but about his own feelings. In fact, the man was saying, ‘I have feelings associated in my consciousness with the word “sublime”,’ or, in short, ‘I have sublime feelings’[1]… This confusion is present all the time in the language as we use it. It seems to us that we are saying something very important about something else, but in truth we are saying only something about our own feelings.”
At the beginning of the paragraph there is ostensibly a merely linguistic distinction. One cannot deny that what we have here is the expression of the speakers’ feelings. But Lewis attacks this passage sharply. He argues that taking sentences that speak about the world and turning them into statements about the speaker himself misses the whole point. Where do these authors err? Is their linguistic distinction not correct?
Note that in the second part of the paragraph the authors claim that when a person expresses feelings such as awe before a sight in nature or a work of art (and to the same extent, apparently, also feelings of praise or moral condemnation toward good or evil deeds), he “is not claiming anything important,” only “something about his feelings.” Here we are far beyond a linguistic distinction. This is a subjectivist-pluralist thesis, decidedly a far-reaching philosophical position. If statements that express evaluation or moral censure are only statements about the speaker, then there is no impediment to a plurality of truths. The second part of the paragraph clearly expresses a pluralist-subjectivist stance. The authors of the book conceive that there is no real dispute between the two people in Coleridge’s story. Each is describing a different feeling within him, a result of their different psychological makeups. That is all. It has no relation to anything in the world itself.
Lewis himself argues against them thus:
“Up to and including the modern age all teachers, and indeed all people, believed that the universe is such that certain emotional responses on our part may be either congruous or incongruous to it; they believed, in fact, that things are not only objects of our positive or negative opinion, of our admiration or scorn, but may even be ‘worthy’ of it. Coleridge agreed with the tourist who called the cataract ‘sublime,’ and disagreed with the tourist who called it ‘pretty,’ because he believed that inanimate nature is such that certain responses may be ‘right,’ ‘proper,’ or ‘appropriate’ to it more than others. And he believed (rightly) that the tourists thought as he did. The tourist who called the cataract ‘sublime’ did not intend to describe his own feelings about it. He was also claiming that the object was ‘worthy’ of those feelings. Without that claim there would be no room for agreement or disagreement. It would be absurd to dispute the statement ‘This is beautiful’ if it were only meant to describe the lady’s feelings; had she said, ‘I feel unwell,’ Coleridge would hardly have replied, ‘No, I feel quite well.’”
Exclamatory expressions like “sublime” are not merely descriptions of an inner feeling within the person. They refer to something outside him. They are aroused within him when he apprehends that reality, and therefore to say that I feel a sense of sublimity means there is out there something sublime (which is worthy of arousing a sense of sublimity upon seeing it). The subjective language is only a means for us here to describe the world itself and to relate to it.
This is an excellent analogy for my claim here. When I speak of experiences of the kind I described, this is not a description of something occurring within me (an emotion). These are experiences (not emotions), for they reflect something in the reality that I apprehend. I am in fact expressing that this reality is worthy of arousing such experiences. I encounter a sublime answer, and naturally it arouses in me a sense of sublimity. When I speak of a sense of sublimity, I do not mean to say something about myself but about the answer. Unlike emotion, which is purely subjective, the experience that arises within me is part of the apprehension of the answer itself. A person who does not experience this likely has not fully apprehended the answer and its implications.
Back to Us
Returning to our discussion: a person who succeeds in identifying with the truth in its cool intellectual sense usually develops a strong experience toward it. This experience is an expression that he has apprehended something (something external has connected with him).[2] Such a person can reach a state where the intellect moves him powerfully (through the experience) as if there were an emotion. But this is motivation from our higher intellectual part, not from a lower emotion that belongs to the animal soul.
I think the entire first part of the Tanya (especially chapters 3–9), which deals with the measures of love and fear and distinguishes them from other measures, aims at this distinction. The love and fear he discusses are experiences, not emotions. Some call them higher love and higher fear. These are phenomena connected to the intellect and awakened by it (not that they awaken it). The whole discussion there concerns the intellectual dimension of these measures, and it determines that they arise from the Chabad sefirot (wisdom, understanding, and knowledge) at the head, and that they themselves are the root of all the other measures. It may be that the first part of the Tanya provides the best answer to Harel’s question of how to generate powerful motivation within a theological framework that focuses on the intellectual dimensions. We must develop our connection to the intellectual dimension so that experiences (not emotions) will arise and can move us to act.
I anticipate that readers of this column will raise questions regarding diagnosis (how to distinguish between emotion and experience) and regarding practice (how to develop this). I already note that I do not have good answers to these, but I think that the distinction itself is certainly true and real, and that being aware of it is important.
[1] It is more accurate to say that he has feelings of sublimity, for it is not the feelings themselves that are sublime here, but the object toward which the feelings are directed (the waterfall). See more on this below.
[2] It is no accident that in biblical and Talmudic Hebrew the verb “to know” (yada) is used in the sense of connection, as in: “And Adam knew Eve his wife.”
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I think the rabbi does not really distinguish between emotion (emotion) and spirit (motivation, meaning). Spirit is something that is parallel to the divine soul (but it is not intellect. It is not cold). Although the same questioner said that the rabbi's writings do not create enthusiasm in him (and perhaps even reduce it – “cool down” in Haredi language), I think that the position he represents, without knowing it, is that the rabbi does not actually create (and even actually takes) spirit. I definitely claim that the rabbi takes spirit from people, and specifically not just enthusiasm (which is definitely good). Spirit is not emotion and emotion. Spirit is like what is called the “spirit of life” . When the spirit fills a person, he is optimistic and happy, but with quiet joy and not ecstatic. He is active and creative. Like the Briskies, it should be said a little (despite their melancholic tendency. But this is the background reason why they understood the importance of this spirit). The rabbi actually takes from people something that resembles the will to live. For a mahaesh (like Leibovitz) in his world (for most people) it is better to commit suicide than to live. The fact that the rabbi himself does not feel this is for two combined reasons:
1. A kind of autism
2. The main reason – that probably unconsciously this enterprise itself gives him spirit. He unknowingly draws spirit from the fact that he takes the spirit from others (this was certainly said to me absolutely with Leibovitz’ that anyone who saw and heard him could say that he was a hard and bitter person. He really did not seem like a good person. Not someone who would pick you up in a hitchhike if you got stuck on the side of the road)
Corrections:
“Quiet joy, not ecstatic…”
” Actually (like Leibovitz) in his own world….”
Emmanuel, it seems that you are talking about a general spirit of life and not a spirit related to the service of God, and it follows from your words that even a secular person who accepts the entire Rabbi's teaching on kinship and marriage will slow down the breathing of his spirit of life. But you did not explain it in one word (or half a word). In my opinion, by the way, and forgive me for saying so, but tolerating your unreasoned preaching is not a bad sign at all of kindhearted kindness.
Indeed. The work of the ’ is part of this matter. Not if we identify the work of the ’ with the meaning of existence then there is no difference. In any case it depends on which secularist we are talking about. If it is a secularist who is to the left of the rabbi then his words will actually give them spirit because their reason is even less spirit than his (they are even more autistic)
And in relation to your comment – You don't expect me to write a column here (this is Rabbi Michi's blog) and explain every detail of my words. I have no problem preaching. I am not a fake intellectual. Even all those who speak against preaching from my own experience have no problem preaching (mainly left-wing humanities lecturers of various kinds) when it comes to them personally. My preaching is directed towards those who appreciate me a little and those who don't – will not listen. I am not interested in any fake courtesy and kindness from anyone. I don't want – Don't listen and don't respond. No one asked you to suffer. I speak in a coded manner and want to draw attention to the idea and for people to think about it and try to understand it for themselves or ask me questions. I'm not a lecturer who stands and entertains an audience that sits cross-legged and smokes a cigar and wants everything to be proven and explained to them and they won't make any effort at all (to understand anything on their own) and during the break they drink coffee and listen to music like all the ridiculous lectures to the general public at universities that end with polite and empty applause for the lecturer as if he were some musician performing). I'm trying to irritate you. You're not a puppy, you're fine. Move on or ask a question and I'll answer it like a glove.
To the Gamzo Man
I will be more specific and specific. For example, I could have grown up among the communist kibbutz movement. And let's say I would “come out with a question” and write reasoned articles about why it is bad and its people are bad. But what I say about a member of the kibbutz movement, my words are not supposed to make an impression. He has a vision (that gives meaning to his existence) and as long as I don't give him a bigger vision that includes the real things that were in his original vision, he is not supposed to listen to me leave his company. At most, he can take note of the criticism I pass on to him and start thinking about what is right with them and what is not, and whether I am right and to what extent and what can be fixed. But he is not allowed to follow me and follow my path (which in fact I have no path. I have no vision, let's say in this parable). That will cause him the most damage (and this is a sign that in general I am lying to him. Even if in the details I am right). Like in chess. You always need to have a plan of action. It's better to have some kind of plan - even a bad one - than no plan at all. Because a bad plan can be corrected and improved along the way and you can learn from your mistakes. When there's no plan, you get angry and lose and don't even understand how you lost and don't correct and move forward (because you've never gone anywhere).
So in conclusion: You speak in a coded manner, preach, try to create intellectual stimulation, and the one who is supposed to listen to you is one who already appreciates you and then you will grant him a great vision. But you are not a guru yet and there are no followers of yours here (as far as I can see) who will demand your words from the top of their heads above reason and knowledge until they find a way to connect with them with devotion according to their strength and knowledge. Why don't you focus on specific arguments when God has blessed you instead of essays about the world and its entirety mixed with incessant psychologization. You target everyone who gets in your way with the claim of "lack of awareness", let me tell you that you also have a slight lack of awareness. You are probably sure that you have revealed deep, powerful and clear sublime truths and built yourself large speculative structures tile on brick – but apparently not everyone on the outside sees it that way. And when things go public, the legal currency is orderly reasoning and careful inferences, that's the way of the world.
I was silent for many years and didn't care about the outside world, but I no longer have the strength to be silent (because I too am hurt by other people's lack of understanding. And I am willing to pay the price for speaking in code, even though I have no followers. Wittgenstein didn't have any, and he spoke in code, and just as Wittgenstein didn't need approval and grades from those around him, I don't need grades and approval from you or from outside. Even if I look stupid in front of everyone, I don't care. The main thing is that the things sit on the heart like seeds and in a few more years or whatever, they will bear fruit. I am actually well aware of how I look, but as I said, I don't care what people think, because the vast majority of people don't think at all. They have instincts. Provoke, react, provoke, and react. Therefore, there is nothing to care about.) Therefore, the public domain is worth nothing to me. I despise empty intellectuals. I don't have the patience to become a guru, and I don't see any honor in it. There is no honor in being a shepherd of sheep and goats, and that is what gurus do.
And I don't understand, in a follow-up response I already detailed and explained. Isn't that enough for you? Was something not clear? I'm really losing the patience that I didn't have much of to begin with.
And if it bothers you how I compare myself to Wittgenstein. Then I really don't need to. Because if I'm really like that, I don't need your approval for this comparison (and even if I'm not like that, I don't need your approval for this), and I don't need to compare myself to him at all, because then he's not that great (because then he's about my height and maybe he should compare himself to me). And if I'm not like that, I just wanted to give an example of how someone can speak in a coded way without having any followers beforehand and that the content of his words should be considered despite their coding. In short, if you feel that there is something in my coded words, go ahead and ask (and I think there is, since you asked something in the first place) and if not, and I'm kind of puffed up in my own eyes (all humans are like that, even without knowing it), move on.
Emanuel, your determination is truly a phenomenon.
Only regarding Leibovitz, you are simply wrong about the facts. In his personal life he was a truly charitable man. He received every person and hosted every rich and poor person and talked to them. He went wherever they invited him, and spoke politely and attentively with everyone. His public image was different. Another example of the assertions you are spouting into space without any familiarity with the subject.
Regarding the diagnoses to me, I thank you. You saved me the first payment to a psychologist (I already have a diagnosis).
I've heard many of these. I'm not impressed at all. I've heard him speak more than once or twice. I'm surprised you're even impressed by it. There's nothing charitable about it. A man who is a spiritual person likes to talk. That's the meaning of his existence. He's not doing anyone any favors by going to speak somewhere. He needs it more than the people who heard him. People of his type (and you and I belong to them) need the students more (even the deaf and dumb, although apparently he's not supposed to have any patience with them.) than the students need them (more than the calf wants a link and so on). No one tells even a fraction of a story about him like the stories that are told about Rabbi Kook and Rabbi Auerbach. These are charitable people. To say that Leibowitz was charitable is an understatement of this concept. At most, he was autistic. And again, I'm not the only one who would say that.
Regarding the assertive. I don't care. I'm a person of judgment, but to a certain extent. I see the infinite (supposedly) judgment you are extolling here as a fake. There is a limit to how much I will not trust my feelings. The vast majority of the people around you are afraid of being made a fool of because they are afraid of what people will think of them. I am not afraid of anyone and I do not care what people think of me (but I do care about the truth. Sometimes I am even provocative to see how people will react and to check whether what I believe or know is really true). I do not see what is involved in separating the public and private persona here (which I have great doubts about, as mentioned - I heard from someone (I did not check the rumor, but it would not surprise me at all because it fits the type) that even to people close to him he was a heartless person and hated everyone (this was said by someone who claimed to have been to some class with him)). I am not an easy person myself, but at least I have self-awareness. And that is the point. My main argument against him is not his evil, but his lack of awareness of him. And it's time for the Rabbi to open one like this too.
To Emmanuel – Greetings,
I think that for Leibowitz, the definition of a ‘warm person’, with a hot and stormy temperament, is more correct. A hot temperament also leads a person to an attitude of compassion and encouragement towards the troubles and the views of the ‘simple person’ who comes to seek his advice. And that same hot temperament leads him to ’ritcha da'orita’ and to a furious attitude towards those in an influential position and their methods that he believes are distorted.
I think that Ramada is also a ”warm person’, with a stormy temperament, who also has two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, immense patience (usually) towards every questioner, and on the other hand, a sharp and repeated expression towards influential personalities and methods that he does not like. Apparently, Ramda's frequent preoccupation with the struggle against emotionalism also stems from the high dose of emotionality in his personality, which arouses the fear that he will give it legitimacy - it will get out of control.
Rabbi Kook (and Rabbi Auerbach) were also "fraudulent" people, but they managed to process their turbulent temperament into "contributions", to contribute the raw qualities, and to extract the appropriate essence from them. Rabbi Aryeh Levin testifies that the Rabbi Kook was a zealot by nature, but through hard mental work he succeeded in transforming the zealous fervor into a fervor of explanation out of understanding and respect.
Rabbi Ari Yitzhak Shevat (from the Rabbi's house) compared the drafts of the Rabbi's proclamations with the published proclamations, and one sees eye to eye that the mental turmoil that leads to harsh expressions in the draft proclamation is gradually being moderated, gradually refined until the version submitted to print is more "pleasant paths" than "a stick of ropes". The draft expresses the mental turmoil of the writer, while the printed version is the processing of things into a pleasant and acceptable form.
With blessings, Yaffo
Even the sages describe the transformation in Esther's soul, who in her turmoil is ready to point to the king and turn him against her: "a wicked and enemy man," but the angel, the rational mind, points the accusing finger at Haman, so as not to burn the bridges with the king.
Paragraph 2, line 3
… sharp and sharp towards…
Ibid., line 5
… the fear that he will give…
The difference between a thermi and a thermi in your language is the whole point and it is a world of difference. What you call thermi is intellectualism in the service of the ego. It is the difference between a person who is driven by anger (whose anger is released like in a nuclear bomb. And he is like a cat) and a person who transforms anger into positive and constructive energy (productive nuclear energy – like in nuclear reactors) – a person who is redeemed – who fights evil and not evil people. By the way, I also accuse Rabbi Michi of this, although much, much less. And I myself suffer from quite a bit of hatred of people (but to my credit, it should be said that I am aware of this and know that I need correction and redemption – which the Rabbi has earned) and I said that my main problem is not so much with this reality but more with the lack of awareness of it. Don't be impressed by the "compassion and encouragement" for the common man. This is actually pity that stems from a lack of respect (in English, pity). This is all the compassion that the left is constantly blabbering about when it is clear to you that there is no compassion for anyone but pure modeling. This is the worst thing there is. Respect is a basic and necessary condition for love. I am sure that most of those who have ever been exposed to Leibowitz have been exposed to his contempt for common people (religious people who did not make the pilgrimage to see his face and be inspired by his wisdom).
Don't you see the pattern here? It is a normal ego that all humans have who see themselves as defenders of the weak and oppressed against the "evil oppressors" (in his case, the "fascist Judeo-Nazis") . In a certain sense, this is also what I am doing here in these responses to Rabbi Micha… A”a to escape from it. You really need redemption. But first of all, you scream self-awareness). I also once happened to hear a recording of him in a private place and he, with great emotion (which is a slur) said that his whole tendency in the world is to fight idolatry… But you see that Rabbi Kook had the self-awareness to notice this paradox and this forced him mentally – and not for reasons of moral modeling – to develop further. This, by the way, happened to all great people, not just the seer. And this is what distinguishes a great person from an empty intellectual.
On the 7th of Adar, 5771
To Emmanuel, – Shalom Rav,
The hot and stormy temper, ‘tramyot’ in my language, does not necessarily mean that there is arrogance here for egoistic reasons as you claim. After all, there are situations of ‘Hai Tsurba Ravanan Dartach – Orita ka Martaha Liah– as Rava describes (Ta'anit 4’).
There certainly is the situation of a person who is driven by great ideals, and therefore is full of anger at a reality that does not align with the great ideals that he expects to be realized. Not only in Babylon did they agree with this view. In the Land of Israel, they also demanded the verse ‘Aretz asher abniya barel’ On the ‘builders’, the disciples of the sages who must be as hard as iron in order to build and shape the world in the proper way and not leave it in its miserable state.
However, Rabina concludes there that although there is a place for ’ritcha da'oriyat’, nevertheless ‘the way of ‘softening the soul in a gentle way‘ is preferable. Rabina, as the seal of the Talmud, teaches us how to channel justified anger, by formulating it in a style that will be considered ‘dabar hanshema’. And so the sweetened and processed anger will lead to a rebuke in a pleasant way and in a form that is accepted and has a positive effect on its listeners..
With blessings, Simcha HaLevi Fish”l-Plankton
Moses begins his journey in Ritcha. He sees an Egyptian beating a Hebrew and strikes back; he sees a Hebrew beating his fellow and rebukes him for the beating. Even when he flees to a place where he lives in a foreign land, he does not hold a grudge and rises up against the people of the place in protest of the injustice they have done to those who are weaker than him.
This is a good foundation for someone who is supposed to be a savior, but his zeal must be fulfilled with a lot of patience. Moses understands this when he sees that his people, whose quarrel he came to settle, do not accept it with love, but rather defy him: “Who made you a ruler and judge over us?” And he realizes that the people still have a long, deep process ahead of them until they are worthy of redemption.
Deep processes of correction are not done in a flash. He will need decades of "internship" with his father-in-law, the great revolutionary, who went to study all the religions of the world and was disappointed by all of them. Yitro, the great understander of the human soul, is the only one who imagines that the Egyptian dressed in royal robes who dares to "make an order" firmly in another country is himself a refugee in exile who needs to be invited to "eat bread." A revolutionary recognizes a revolutionary.
Yitro not only offers his guest to "eat bread," but outlines the path for him to "bake and cook." To start a family, and to practice leadership as a shepherd of sheep. Only after about sixty years. At the age of eighty, Moses will be ready to return to Egypt and redeem his people.
Moses will be sent to redeem precisely when he feels that he is not the right man, and that perhaps there are better and more deserving ones than him. Here Moses faces the second test of leadership. A leader does not only need firmness and courage, but also patience and humility.
Later on in his journey, Moses will combine both qualities, firmness and patience, when he descends from the mountain and sees the calf and the dancing around it. He firmly breaks the tablets and severely punishes the instigators and the wrongdoers, but with the same courage and firmness he uses his request to his God to act with humility and forgive the people for the great sin they committed. And he knocks on the table and says: "And if not, please blot me out of your book which you have written."
The leader of the people must be his great educator. On the one hand, he must know when to rebuke and rebuke harshly, and on the other hand, he must also be filled with infinite patience, and teach his people justice even if it seems that they have exhausted all their resources.
With best wishes, Amioz Yaron Schnitzel
I don't understand what you want. The ideals that Leibowitz and Rabbi Michi are motivated by are not high ideals but childish ones. There are a million people who are so angry in name that reality doesn't work out for them, but they are completely infantile. And the main point of my argument is that they are not aware of themselves (which causes them to be prone to paradoxes and madness - to hate their own people and love their enemies), not about the anger itself. Leibowitz. He is not a rabbi. The Amoraim were people of understanding and could resurrect the dead. And he is not. He is an empty intellectual. There are a million of them, and it is not the Torah that makes them angry, but their childish ideology. Many Haredi rabbis are also motivated not by the Torah's anger, but by childish anger, and that is it.
Every word. There is a tendency to turn every asshole into a righteous person who comes to “fix the world”, the vast majority of them are seeking respect at best, or desperate for a fast at worst.
In the 19th century, Badar P.A.
It is possible that a distinction should be made between emotionality on both sides and emotionality that is expressed only on the negative side. It should be assumed that someone who is prone to emotionality will express his emotionality both in enthusiasm for positive things and in anger over negative things. On the other hand, equanimity towards positive actions, while being excited only towards negative actions, is a less sympathetic trait.
And perhaps the attempt to suppress and deny positive emotion in the work of the ’ – is what leads to directing emotionality only to the realm of the night. After all, emotion is an inseparable part of a person's personality, and when it is not channeled into the positive channel, it will only show up in the negative realm, which is a shame.
Best regards, Yaron P. Corinaldi
Emotionality is a Hebrew name for emotionality. It stems from immaturity (immaturity in itself is not bad. Getting stuck in it is bad). Emotionality on each side actually increases emotionality on the other side (the opposite of what you said. That is, someone who expresses “positive” emotions; that is, enthusiasm, will not reduce his “negative” hatred, anger, etc.)
Emotionality is an impulse and a person should not be driven by impulses (like a passive wind) because then he lets the horse inside him lead him. On the contrary, he should choose what the Hasidim call “equality” in which a person is moved by goals (the person inside him who rides the horse inside him is the leader). Equality is pure intellect. But it is not indifference or even coldness. It is something else. It is a kind of silence that has power. A silence that stems from caring, not indifference.
On the 12th of Adar, 5771
To Emmanuel, greetings,
The fervor of youth is the ’engine’ that drives man to innovation and creation. To believe that the world is fundamentally good, and that it is directed towards the better. We just need to ‘move our feet’ and act vigorously.
The fervor of youth burns with a two-way emotionality. An uprising against evil and the distorted, and great joy over every advance towards good, even if it seems small. As the poet said: ‘You must see evil in order to fight it. You must preserve the good in order to be comforted by it’.
The fervor of youth is the ’engine’ The energy flows, and with it is combined the wisdom and experience of old age, moderation and composure, showing the way to give all conflicting desires the appropriate and balanced dose.
Best regards, Yaffo”r
Yes (I know the ruling by Rabbi Kook). But this youthful fervor is an ego (being). It is in fact something that gives the boy a sense of importance (and therefore his social status in his own eyes also rises). There is a meaning to his existence. He is one of the world's regulators compared to the weak, compromising, and busy old men (whose complexity of reality overwhelmed the boy). The problem with the beggar is that he does not serve the meaning (the goal. the ideology). Rather, the goal and meaning and ideology serve him. Therefore, as soon as there are many fighters for the same goal (and especially if they betray him) the spirit leaves his sails and he becomes old and indifferent. This is in contrast to a true water chief who is a chariot for the Shekhinah and is not driven by ego but rather he purifies his ego which never withers
“And the youths will faint and be weary and the young men will stumble. And the lines of the ’ will replace strength and rise a limb like eagles. They will run and not be touched, they will walk and not be hurt.
To Emmanuel – Hello,
Indeed, the sense of ’I’ is very important. A person's feeling that ’If I don't have me –Who has me?’ is what brings him to great deeds out of the feeling that ’It depends only on me’
But as a person awakens to action – he discovers that ’When I am to myself –What am I’, and in order to succeed he needs to connect to the whole, out of the understanding that he is only part of a comprehensive picture, whose greatness and beauty – in the mutual completion of all its parts.
Therefore, each person gives ‘half a shekel’, to teach that without his special part – the whole is not complete; But his part is only a ‘half’ that needs connection and completion with the other. The ’I’ of the individual – expands and becomes the ’we’ of the whole.
With greetings, Amioz Yiron Schnitzel
Paragraph 3, line 2
… which, except for its special part…
In the Sada, they will take a donation from me, 5771
The article on the proclamations of Rav Kook, to which I mentioned in my response, ‘Donation or Termi?’ is: ‘The Zeal and Obedience of Maran Rav Kook, Zch”l, in the Editing of His Proclamations”, by Rav Ari Yitzhak Shevat and Rav Tzuriel Halamish, ‘HaMayan’ Tammuz, 5771 (can be viewed on the ‘HaMayan’ website).
With blessings of Shabbat Tava, Padhatzur Fish”l Peri-Gan
I stopped responding to this site a long time ago, mainly because I found the arguments with the site owner exhausting and unproductive, and I have several other things to do. (I also don't have time to read all the columns, I read some of them at random).
But when I came across this, I was amazed, because I remember reading somewhere in the site owner's sacred writings that he admitted that he had never met Leibowitz and did not know him personally. Well, I met him several times and knew him. Adam "Torumi" is not the last thing that can be said about him – simply because it cannot be said about him at all. True, he was not a thief, nor a murderer, nor a rapist (as far as I know) – but did they despise his glory?
In everything that concerned man to his fellow man, he was a vile and despicable man. I saw it with my own eyes and heard it with my own ears. He simply enjoyed abusing anyone who disagreed with him, shouting, humiliating, running over and trampling, usually without any real justification but with cheap theatrical gimmicks. The weaker his position was compared to that of his mentor, the more rude and humiliating he was.
The assertion that he went wherever he was invited is also incorrect. He carefully chose his stages, and avoided as much as possible appearing in places where he feared he would be challenged. For example, he regularly declined invitations from the yeshiva where I studied (Ma'ale Adumim), where his sister, Nechama Zel, stayed, taught several classes, and did not shy away from defending her positions in front of the Rambam and the students. Yeshayahu knew that nonsense like "the Messiah does not have any place in the thinking of the Rambam" He can only say this in front of admiring female students at the Hillel House, but in a meeting with the Tel Aviv University, the words will be met with a burst of laughter.
Well, so it turns out that this is the second time in a row that perhaps the rabbi is the one who doesn't know what he's talking about, not me. It was also the last time in Ruth Dayan's column. I was talking about the type I know well and not necessarily about her. Although I suspect that she's no different from all of them. In the end, if she's not crazy, (which then she's not an example of anything. That is, she can't be considered a good person anyway) then it's okay to say that she's a good person. You have to understand how the two opposing qualities coexist. And one is a fake. It's okay to just stay in a complex assessment of reality and not move on - you have to make some kind of decision, even a rough one. I thought to myself what would have happened if Arafat had personally killed, God forbid, one of the rabbi's children. Would the rabbi and his wife have continued to be her friends? I don't think so at all (and if so, then you're crazy yourself and I have nothing more to say). So what's actually happening here is that the blood of Jews you don't know is not important to you. I'm not blaming. It's not something you're born with. But it's still the reality. And you still have to at least fake it because after the actions, hearts are drawn (Fake it 'til you make it). This is actually the reality of this type of left. Simply, the blood of Jews is not important to them. They got used to it from exile. They are in a society of gentiles (whose Jewish blood is probably not important. A legacy from their ancestors. Part of the global collective consciousness) and then they look at themselves the way those gentiles look at them (the influence of the environment)
And also with Leibovitz ‘ , beyond ridiculous in my opinion, claiming that the man was kind enough to answer people who asked him questions (which otherwise, in the end, no one would really care about) makes him a “consecrated” (When he listens to people like the Lubavitcher Rebbe listened to ’ we will talk), I can also collect stories about Nasrallah (and also that one of the spiritual leaders of Hamas who was eliminated about 15 years ago – I don't remember his name – the one sitting in a wheelchair) who is eliminated and how he helps the poor of his people. But in the end it is clear to every Jew wherever he is that he is not only an enemy - he is a bad person (a human animal).
Let's just say I would rather walk than hear him yelling in my ear the entire trip?
Shalom Rabbi. There may be an echo of your words in the words of Rabbi Kook, Eight Books (1, RLD): ” In honesty of mind and good virtues there is more faith and devotion to God than in verbal faith and emotional imagery”
Maybe. It's hard to extract a clear meaning from his recommendations.
A strong sentence that I didn't know. Thank you!
Since the discussion here is about reason, emotion, and experience, I can only speak for myself.
In the past, I would certainly enjoy studying the Gemara, and later also reading the rabbis' books.
However, after years of engaging in applied science, I have lost this pleasure.
Similar to your friend Prof. Schnerb's criticism of psychology, it is difficult for me to be impressed by a quibble that depends on assumptions that are not well defined in advance. Can the soul be divided into three parts, thirty, or three hundred... How can we even know that we are aiming for any truth?
And as you honestly remarked at the end, which I appreciate, you too have no such answers.
In other words, we know in advance that we are dealing with something that anyone with rhetorical talent can sketch out however they please.
Anyone looking for such pleasure will find it in the various sciences, especially the applied sciences.
The same flaw exists not only in theology and psychology, but also in most of philosophy.
Therefore, whoever seeks intellectual pleasure should seek it where it exists in its truly anorexic form (after a merciless shave by Occam's razor).
Whoever seeks morality should leave the books and help his wife with the children.
And whoever seeks spiritual experiences should follow his animalistic soul to Breslov Hasidism, Chabad, or Kook (Chabad of the Jews).
And whoever, in addition to all of these, is afraid to get vaccinated, should go to Rabbi Ashrov.
And yet, and despite everything, I still enjoy reading the words of the rabbi:)
The Knesset based on things I didn't say. It's not true that anyone in these fields can scribble as they please. There are many scribblers, but people with common sense will notice this quite easily. See my series on philosophy.
On the Day of the Lord, the Order of Gold, Silver, Copper, Blue, and Scarlet 5771
It warms the heart to read on a cold and snowy day about the importance of emotional stability in the work of the Lord 🙂 This week's parshas, and the one that follows it, which deal with the building of the Tabernacle and the priestly garments, teach about the importance of nurturing the emotional world of the servant of the Lord. Admiring the beauty of the gold, silver, blue, and scarlet is a powerful tool to inspire a person to serve the Lord. Man by nature seeks emotion and experience, and if he does not receive it in a positive context, he will seek it in negative places.
Suppressing emotion is out of the question, but what is important is the balance of the emotional world. And so, alongside the splendor and splendor of the Tabernacle, A balancing expression is also given to the opposite emotion, to cleanliness and simplicity.
The splendor and grandeur of the tabernacle are concealed within. Only the priest entering the sanctuary saw the blue and scarlet gold. From the outside, only a black covering of goatskin sheets was visible, placed on silver bases, made from half a shekel, in which the hand of all the people was equal, the rich not much and the poor not little.
Even the priests' garments were made of simple white linen. Only the sash preserved the splendor and grandeur of the blue and scarlet gold. The person who approached the tabernacle to serve it came with a feeling of simplicity as a "light creature standing in a small way before the King of kings", but he was girded with strength and valor in the magnificent sash that expressed his pride in the divine mission that had been entrusted to him.
The Mishkan does not call for the suppression of emotion, but for its balance, by cultivating powerful emotions on both sides: the humility and simplicity that befit man before his Creator, and together with it the pride and joy in our connection with our Creator who chose us to be His messengers to sanctify His name in His world.
The emotion of love is the ’engine’ that encourages man to act, while the emotion of awe is the ’brake’ that awakens man to beware of perverse actions. Reason, both natural reason and the guidance of the Torah – give man the ability to navigate through turbulent emotions. By guiding reason, man knows when to ‘give gas’ and when to ‘apply brakes’.
With greetings, Simcha Halevi Fish”l-Plankton
In paragraph 6, line 3
..t. To navigate through the turbulent emotions…
[And perhaps it is still correct to say: ‘To navigate through the turbulent emotions’, because when there is proper harmony between the opposing emotions, there is an ornament here, the ornament of a complete picture whose parts all match and complement each other].
Best regards, Yaron Fish”l Ordner
Indeed, the intensification of emotion in the Tabernacle Parshas – comes after the Parshas of Jethro and Mishpatim. After the Mount Sinai ceremony, which was intended to instill fear in the hearts of the people: ‘That His fear may be before you, so that you may not sin’, and after the Ten Commandments, most of which, like all of them, are ‘What not to do’. After the warnings not to enslave yourself to ‘gods of silver and gods of gold’, but to serve the ’ with simplicity and modesty; and after the Parshas of Mishpatim, which obligates a person to keep a close eye on all his ways of life so that ’nothing comes out of it’ for himself and others– then can come the Tabernacle Parshas, which deal with cultivating the emotional world of the worshipper of the ’.
With blessings, Yifau”r
And even in the work of the Lord during the days of Purim, only after the spiritual remembrance of the deeds of the Lord by reading the Megillah evening and morning, and after the practical cultivation of brotherhood and responsibility for others by sending portions to one another and gifts to the poor– – only after the mental preparation and the cultivation of social responsibility, can one give free rein to the enthusiasm of the feast and the joy.
In the 13th of Adar, 5771
In the din of the ‘Triple Purim’, the distinction between the intellectual and emotional motivations in the joy of Purim is expressed. The intellectual insight that we arouse in reading the Megillah – is unified when Tu– falls on Shabbat, when all the Jews of the world, both Perezim and Okfim, unite in reading the Megillah.
On the other hand, on the side of the ‘emotional motivation’ of feasting and joy’ – the Perezim and Okfim cannot be mixed up. While the joy of the Perez is the existential joy of saving his city from death to life – In the joy of the besieged, the existential salvation is less prominent, since in the walled city the personal danger was less.
The joy of the besieged is a more refined and profound joy. Not for personal salvation from danger, but for raising the nation's voice by doing a 'root cause treatment' to the central focus of hatred that was in Shushan the capital. This joy is first and foremost a national joy for long-term salvation, and therefore it should not be blurred by mixing it with the joy of the private salvation of each city, but a unique 'day of joy and feasting' should be set aside for it.
All of Israel shares in the 'intellectual motivation' of reading the Megillah, but differs in the 'emotional motivation'. These celebrate the personal salvation of their city, and these celebrate the general salvation that occurred in the ’center of affairs’.
Best regards, Yaron Fish”l Corinaldi
Just a note about Hagali Tal:
In Hagali Tal's words, you claimed: “He does advocate that the learner will enjoy learning, but he also agrees that if learning is done for pleasure, it is learning for no other reason. That is, in his opinion, too, action due to an emotional motive is invalid.”
In my opinion, you are making an unnecessary leap here that explains a lot about the controversy. Hagali Tal claims that this is learning for no other reason, not invalid. Moreover, he adds “And they said that a person will never engage in such things for no other reason than…” precisely to argue otherwise – This is not the aspiration, but not that it is invalid, but that it can certainly be a step in the right direction.
He does not deny pleasure as a motivation, just as he explains that it is not the final destination.
And why is this very essential to the whole debate in my opinion?
Because those who disagree with you claim priority in the partial state. Even when you agree on the ideal situation, the question is what is the easiest route to get there. By denying emotion even as an intermediate step, you leave more people in the dead end you are in (igniting emotion) than people who will remain in the dead end after reaching the intermediate stage of emotional motivation without intellectual motivation.
So I can understand if you disagree with Hagley Tal, but bringing him in as support seems like a surprising move to me.
I didn't understand. You yourself explain it exactly like me and then say that my dependence on it is puzzling?!
I didn't say that such study is devoid of any value. At least instrumentally.
After all, he says that it is study not for its own sake, and that is exactly what I said too! Furthermore, the value he sees in study not for its own sake is only because it comes from him to study not for its own sake, in other words, he is even more extreme than I am: there is no real value in study not for its own sake.
Strange…
Isn't invalid worthless? Usually invalid is a term that is worthless, not something partial.
Then you misunderstood.
Hayuta drew my attention to these two articles published in Akadem. Both of them touch on the question of emotion and religious fervor in the educational aspect:
1. Rabbi Brandes' review of Arendt's book:
https://bmj.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/11.17.Brandes.pdf
2. Arendt's response that addresses this point in more detail:
https://bmj.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/13.13.Ahrend.pdf
The discussion is typical, as it deals with the implications of emotional versus intellectual and restrained education and conduct, but ignores the very problematic nature of emotional conduct. Not because of the results that can be problematic, but because of the very fact that it is emotional.
By the way, the bottom line is that I don't think there is a real debate between them. This is similar to many debates on such topics.
I don't know about spirit in the interpretations of the work of God, but I personally received a general spirit. I entered two carts in a very confused and agitated mental state, and the process of persuasion at the focal point of the book stabilized and calmed me. If this is not spirit, I don't know what spirit is.
[By the way, I heard from you not long ago that you did a survey based on what you had on hand and found that mathematicians hold a Platonist position. Since then, I have managed to ask (by the way, and briefly, without delving too much into clarifying the concepts) several researchers in computer science myself (one of them is world-renowned) and they all actually converged on mental fictions. In the end, I asked each one “Do you think the function x squared exists in the world itself? Yes or no” The answers I collected are: “No”.]
Rabbi Michael Avraham of Two Carts and the rest of the Quartet, as well as Elohim Playing Dice and the Humanities and Emet and Yaziv, is not the same Rabbi Michael Avraham of the trilogy. These are two different people. The first undoubtedly gave spirit
Chen Chen.
The last survey I conducted was at a seminar I gave in the Mathematics Department at Bar Ilan. The answers were unequivocal, and the members there also claimed more generally that this is usually the case with mathematicians. In my opinion, some people are not aware of the exact definition of the question and therefore may not answer accurately. For example, a quadratic equation is not really a mathematical entity. Any number, a circle or a triangle, are mathematical entities (and I do not mean a concrete triangle or circle but rather ideas). A group is a mathematical entity. A vector space, or a field, are mathematical entities. Ron Aharoni, for example, is probably not a Platonist.
I am also not aware of the exact definition of the question and I did not understand what the difference is between a certain equation and the rest. And even if an equation is a statement and not an object, why is a function (like x squared) different from a group? What is there in a group (as opposed to just a group) other than a collection of objects with a function of a certain type. [And maybe all I see is just the “smart miracle effect”]
To Tulginus – Greetings,
I was horrified by your claim about the Platonism of mathematicians. See the following poem:
‘There is no poetic world, like a mathematical theorem,
Open your eyes to see, and you will find wonders of wonders in it
Wonderful sights like, X multiplied by itself,
And if you wish, it will immediately be multiplied by A
And now my friend, be encouraged, and look at the lonely X
But do not worry, my dear, for it will immediately be multiplied by B
And now we have reached the peak, here stands the C
There it will stand alone, in all its glory and glory
But how terrible, oh! They are A X in a second
Plus B X and plus C, oh! Total zero
With the blessing of ‘Preciousness and Stagnation’,
, The Frozen Thuliginus, from the street number named after Ker-Li-Bach
Plato will fall and wonders in their place
He who reveals a faithful secret will delight.
And if he has found or invented – some things
That experience in changing clothes.
For the matter of realism is difficult to achieve
And it may be nothing but discourse and slander
And even if the matter is true
The implication for it is not when it is examined.
Also a topic for a column. When I get there. 🙂
From what I have learned, emotions will always be expressed in physical sensations and, in fact, emotions are experienced as pleasant or unpleasant because of the physical sensation they create. The experience, as described here, is on a higher, less physical plane, and perhaps there is an opening here for identification between the two.
Conceptual note:
The term animal soul means the psychic force that enables and drives movement. The root is ‘animation’, movement, and hence ‘animal’, having the power of movement, as opposed to a plant.
Contrary to what is accepted, or to the first association of the term, they did not come to say any derogatory statement about this, but it is first and foremost a mere factual catalog.
It is true that animals also have a ‘motivating soul’, but the Ramban (in eight chapters on the animal soul) claims, and so does the Ramban (in his discussion of the soul whether it is made of parts or of one piece), that when it comes to a person, this psychic force also takes on a different meaning. And since we know nothing about the power of life, about the bones of the soul, this is seemingly beyond debate, except for dealing with the sources.
The use of the term animal soul as something that stands on a low level, which the Rambam apparently uses in the Teaching of the Bewildered, regarding mothers, in the matter of sending the nest), also does not come to condemn this impulse but to determine its place, and to determine with it that this is not the intention of the Torah.
The fact that emotion can also receive inclinations that are opposite to everything that is the glory of man, does not deny emotion as something sublime, human and unique, and even divine, in the style of the Song of Songs, on the part of God Himself. It is difficult to determine that God only “accepts” our intellectual experiences as something sublime. Everything depends on how we do it. It can be fundamentally different from instinctive animality that has no self-awareness. When it is instinct, without awareness, it is a completely mechanical matter, neither good nor bad, neither low nor elevated. When a person who has a soul acts mechanically, it is defined as obscene. But emotion is not necessarily mechanical either.
Why assume that emotion cannot be elevated to its highest levels, and why assume that it then surpasses intellectual experience, which in the end is difficult to know whether it is itself not one of the types of emotion, but rather its elevated form?
As is probably known, the very matter is a matter of debate in Hasidism between Karlin and Chabad, and within Chabad itself, between the middle Rebbe and the student who retired, Rabbi Aharon of Straschele.
The concept of the animal soul is brought into disrepute by the author of the Tanya, and this is when the animal soul is what leads man. The fact that it exists is certainly not disrespectful, and no one says otherwise. Man also has a body and the ability to move. This is a simple fact. This is also my argument regarding emotion. There is no disrespect in it in itself (nor any virtue). The disrespect is when emotion leads man.
Regarding the question of why I do not see value in emotion, I have expanded on it in several places in the past. And this has nothing to do with the potential of emotion to take man to low places. My argument is that the very act of acting according to emotion is obscene, even when it takes me in “positive” directions.
By the way, the opposite of instinct is not awareness but choice/decision. Awareness can also be a completely deterministic and instinctive creature.
Agreed. That's what I meant.
Whoever wants experiences and emotions should take psychedelic drugs at music parties.
Whoever thinks that he can simultaneously do something significant when he has a goal to achieve an experience (that is, the goal is not the act itself) is just a pig and should be hoped that he will achieve nothing.
One must distinguish between conduct based on emotion, and harmonious conduct, of a complete personality.
The Kabbalists who speak of the mind in the dimensions and the dimensions in the mind came to indicate the possibility of harmony, and the points of connection, which are the emotional mind and the intellectual emotion.
My question is, when and if, the emotion does not ‘take me’, but I use it just as I use my car, which clearly does not ‘take me’, but I drive to a good place, what is wrong with using it, why insist on going specifically using the mind alone, without the help of the legs or the car?
If you can make sure it's like a car, then oh well.
I just want to point out that one of the possible motivations for your Torah is anger and protest at the ignorance of most sects in Judaism. Focusing on an enemy that supposedly needs to be fought is a very good method of inciting people.
1. You are not interpreting Hagli Tal correctly in my opinion. Only someone who studies purely for pleasure is not lishma. The novelty in his words is that a person who studies also because he enjoys is called completely lishma. He is not here to negate only the basic mistake that must be tolerated in learning, but also the deficiency in the engine of joy. Simply, someone who enjoys a mitzvah in the context of an orcha is called completely lishma (by the way, in my opinion there is only one place where there is a problem with enjoying even in the context of an orcha, and this is Yivom, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, who believes that a halitza is preferable).
It's just getting around the problem. What does it mean that he studies for both reasons? Suppose one day he doesn't have pleasure, would he study? If not, it's studying for no reason, simply.
Perhaps the interpretation of learning because of both reasons is that both reasons are necessary but neither is sufficient?
He might not have learned without the pleasure, but he also wouldn't have learned without the mitzvah and solely because of the pleasure.
Because according to your way of negation, he also doesn't learn for the pleasure, so what is learning that is not for its own sake but also not not for its own sake?
And perhaps Hagali Tal doesn't think that the attempt to make a reduction to a person's motives gives a true answer:
A person doesn't always know what would have happened otherwise. Maybe on a day when he is without pleasure, he studies because he knows that pleasure will return? Since the future cannot be predicted based on a specific event, then when a person's motives are mixed, he cannot always (or perhaps at all) answer what would have happened in a parallel universe where one of the motives did not exist for him. A person only knows about his current situation in which he has two motives, and about which he must make a self-judgment and decide whether he is in an optimal situation or not – and to this Hagali Tal answers yes.
I see no point in arguing about the validity of Hagali Tal. Simply put, it seems to me that he meant what I said, but even if not, then I say this on my own behalf. When a person learns for both reasons, what determines whether he would have learned it also because of the mitzvah separately. If so, then it is learning for its own sake. If not, then it is not. If it is a combination of both, then the mitzvah in itself does not motivate him to learn, so it is not learning entirely for its own sake.
2. And regarding the entire article, I say, based on the same logic, that a person who is motivated by the power of the animal soul to do good, and not only by the divine soul, is a righteous person who is above average, even though according to your logic he is worse because he acts from a lower motive.
Perhaps you claim that it is unrealistic to use emotion and not be led by it, but it is precisely rational people who have such a chance, if they nevertheless develop enthusiasm for doing good.
What can be done, some have received a car without brakes and some without a battery…
And to that I will answer you the same as above.
Shalom Rabbi,
You may find interesting the statement of the Lubavitcher Rebbe on the 12th of Shevat: Reason and wonder are two worlds: a cold and settled world, and a boiling and frightened world. And this is the work of man to unite them to become one. Then the panic becomes aspiration, and reason becomes a guide in a life of work and action.
You write that if it were possible to swallow an anti-rational pill, you would not recommend it because it lowers one's stature.
I don't fully understand this. Even when I walk to the Temple to perform the mitzvah of pilgrimage, I use my body just as the Shepher Hashemim beside me does. If I take an anti-rational stimulant pill so that I can perform the mitzvah with agility and devotion, and all this because in my mind I understand that I am supposed to do it, I am not doing the mitzvah because of emotions, but because of the mind through emotions. Am I missing something?
I myself made this comparison. And there is still a difference between someone who is motivated by their emotions and someone who uses other tools. When you give yourself over to emotions, they can take you to all sorts of places on their own. It's a kind of loss of control.