On Peshat and Derash (Column 370)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
On Peshat and Derash
Some time ago I was asked in the Q&A (not for the first time) about the contradiction between the peshat (plain sense) of the verse “an eye for an eye” and its derash (money in place of an eye). I answered that question by way of several fundamental principles for understanding the relationship between peshat and derash, and here I wish to expand a bit more on this troubling matter. I will not take up the question of whether those who expound derash do whatever they please, or whether there are rules that govern their activity. To my judgment it is clear that there are rules and a fairly ordered methodology of derash (obviously not a rigid logic), even if it is not fully transparent to us. Still, the problematic (and at times contradictory) relationship between the midrashic product and the wording of the verse demands clarification.
Does derash displace peshat?
There is an impression (also in the questioner above) that derash is a way to bypass peshat—that is, to wrench the verse from its plain sense and put in its place the exegete’s reasoning. But one should know that in most cases the derash does not replace the peshat; it is added to it. Thus, for example, the derash from the verse “You shall fear the Lord your God”—to include Torah scholars—does not come to negate the mitzvah of fearing God, but to add to it the obligation of revering Torah scholars. The derash offers a different reading of the verse, but not a contradictory one. A prominent example that illustrates this principle can be found in the halakhic authorities cited by the Minchat Chinuch regarding “before a blind [person]” (lifnei iver).
The verse in Parashat Kedoshim states (Leviticus 19:14):
“You shall not curse the deaf, and you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind; and you shall fear your God: I am the Lord.”
And the Sefer HaChinukh, commandment 232, writes:
Not to cause the innocent to stumble on the road.
Do not cause Israelites to stumble by giving them bad advice; rather, when they ask for counsel, guide them in what we believe is upright and good advice, as it is said [Leviticus 19:14], “and before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block.” And the language of the Sifra: before one who is blind regarding a matter—if he seeks counsel from you, do not give him advice that is not fitting for him. And our Sages said [ibid.], let not a man say to his fellow, “Sell your field and buy a donkey,” while his real aim is to encircle and take it from him.
And this prohibition also includes one who aids a transgressor in committing a sin, for he thereby leads him to be tempted to transgress again. From this angle our Sages said [Bava Metzia 75b] with regard to lender and borrower on interest that both transgress “before the blind,” etc.
He mentions here two applications of this prohibition: the ban on giving improper advice and on causing another to sin. For some reason he does not mention the peshat of the verse: the prohibition on physically tripping a blind person—or a person in general. I note that the Rambam, too, in Laws of Murder 12:14, cites only these two applications:
Anything forbidden to sell to a gentile is forbidden to sell to an Israelite who is a bandit, because one is thereby strengthening the hand of a transgressor and causing him to stumble. Likewise, anyone who causes a “blind” person to stumble in a matter and gives him advice that is not fitting, or who strengthens the hands of transgressors—who are blind and do not see the path of truth because of the desire of their heart—transgresses a negative commandment, as it is said, “and before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block.” If someone comes to take counsel from you, give him advice that is fitting for him.
And in the Minchat Chinuch there, §4, he infers from here that in their view this verse is taken entirely out of its plain sense and there is no prohibition of physically causing someone to stumble on the road:
From the words of the author of the Sefer HaChinukh and from the words of the Rambam it would seem that this verse of “before the blind” is taken entirely out of its peshat; that if one placed an actual obstacle, a stone, before a blind person, he does not transgress—so it appears from the author’s opening words and also from his writing that [the case of]… And if this too were included in the prohibition, it would be an act, and if he holds that since it is possible to transgress without an act there are no lashes—he has already written many times in the name of the Sha’agat Aryeh that if in this matter it is impossible to transgress without an act, then it counts as an act and there are lashes. Still, I do not understand: since it is stated in Yevamot that throughout the entire Torah a verse does not depart from its plain sense, except for the verse “and it shall be that the firstborn which she bears” [Deut. 25:6], and the Ram ban writes that the meaning is that even the peshat is expounded, even though many things are alluded to—except for that verse whose peshat was uprooted entirely—if so, here too, though what is alluded to is true (unlike the Kutim and Sadducees, may their names be blotted out, who explain only by the peshat), nevertheless this law is also true: that it is forbidden to cause the blind to stumble on the road. Whence do we know that the explicit peshat is not included in the prohibition? I saw in the Mishneh LaMelech, Laws of Loans, ch. 4, s.v. “the Kehillot Gedolot wrote,” that he gives a reason that “before the blind” is juxtaposed to “the deaf,” and it also says “and you shall fear your God,” etc.; but “Cursed is he who misleads a blind person on the road” [Deut. 27:18] is literal. And there he further writes that since there is no act, even though he transgresses an oath—as it says, “Cursed is he who misleads,” and “cursed” is an oath—nevertheless he is not disqualified [as a witness], since there is no act; it is like one who swears to eat and does not eat. To my mind this is difficult: shall we remove the verse entirely from its peshat? And if one misleads a blind person on the road—e.g., he placed an obstacle before him—perhaps he also violates the prohibition, and the curse applies to him as well; if so, there are lashes and he is disqualified for testimony; and perhaps this applies also to a gentile if he misleads him, for the prohibition applies to him as well, as explained above. It is difficult. I saw in Torat Kohanim (Sifra), cited in the book Korban Aharon, that the Kehillot Gedolot and other greats addressed why our Sages removed this from its peshat, and he brings the points we wrote from the Mishneh LaMelech, and adds his own reasons. To me it is difficult that the baraita expounds this also, but it is not necessary to remove it from its peshat, for the peshat is also true. Yet according to what the Kehillot Gedolot himself wrote—that the term “give” (titen) is only fitting as “place” (tasim) (see there)—it seems that the peshat is as expounded; it is difficult. And see Onkelos’s translation: regarding “do not give [your seed] to pass to Molech,” he translates “give” (titen) as the Hebrew titen, whereas here in Kedoshim, regarding “before the blind you shall not give,” he translates “do not place.” It seems he holds like the Kehillot Gedolot, that the meaning of the verse is as expounded; it is difficult.
The explanations he cites are quite puzzling. For even if the Kenesset HaGedolah is correct that there is a midrashic hint in the verse that it speaks of “and you shall fear your God”—i.e., of commandments and not of tripping (and what of improper advice?)—it is clear that the midrash comes to add, not to replace, the peshat of the verse. I see no reason in the world to remove the verse from its plain sense, rather than interpret it by way of peshat in addition to derash. Moreover, there is the Talmudic rule “a verse does not depart from its plain meaning.” To the best of my knowledge there is no hint to the contrary in the words of our Sages, and I see no logic to do so. The conclusion is that these two applications come in addition to the prohibition that arises from the peshat of the verse against physical tripping. Admittedly, it remains to be explained why Rambam and the Sefer HaChinukh do not mention this.
Indeed, the Rema (Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg?) in Bava Batra 26a (s.v. “within the flow of speech”) cites this verse as a source for the prohibition to cause damage:
The reason is that although his actions did not affect the very body of the injured object, nevertheless the act itself by which his actions had effect is prohibited; for it is forbidden to cause anything from which harm will come to people—either because of “before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block,” or because of “love your neighbor as yourself.”
Clearly, he understood that there is a prohibition on physical tripping; otherwise one could not derive from here the ban on causing damage.
The relationship between peshat and derash[1]
The question mentioned above and similar ones assume that derash seeks to arrive at the meaning of the verses as such, and is bound to what emerges from their language (the verbal formulation). From here follows the question of how the Sages offer interpretations that clearly do not arise from the language of the verses and do not fit them.
But this assumption is far from simple; in my view it is mistaken. First, in those places where derash removes from peshat (like “an eye for an eye”), there it is clear that the derash does not seek to reach the peshat of Scripture. But even in other places (like “before the blind,” in my understanding) the midrashic interpretation adds, atop the peshat reading, another layer—and this added layer is not bound to the verbal peshat of the verse. It is produced within a different exegetical system—midrashic and not purely philological.
David Neshke, in a series of three articles in HaMa’ayan (1977–78), addresses the question of the relationship between peshat and derash and presents three approaches: (1) the apologetic—holding that derash is the depth of peshat; (2) the parallel—holding that derash and peshat are parallel explanatory planes; (3) the combinatory—holding that peshat and derash are two different interpretations that join together to create the full interpretation (even where there is a contradiction between them, as with “an eye for an eye”; we will see this at the end of the column).
The first approach ties derash to difficulties that exist in the peshat reading. What looks like the simple, literal meaning of the verse is difficult; hence it is obvious that this is not the verse’s peshat. According to this approach, the midrash reveals the depth of the peshat. It is a reading of the verse that also takes into account broader considerations than the verse’s literal wording; therefore, it is the verse’s true peshat. This is an apologetic approach, because it is clearly incorrect. It comes to answer the difficulties raised by those who mock the darshanim and the fact that their reading bears no relation to the verse’s language, concluding that they do whatever they want. But, as we shall see, there is no need for such apologetics. The midrashic reading is not bound to the verse’s language at all; rather, it follows a different set of hermeneutic rules (the middot of derash) that generate an additional reading parallel to the philological reading, which is the peshat.
Maimonides’ hermeneutic
In the Second Principle (shoresh 2), Rambam discusses the status of laws that arise from midrashic derivations. In his view, such laws are “rabbinic” (divrei soferim) (I will not enter here into the ancient debate about his intent; see about this in the book Yishlach Shoreshav, in the essay on the Second Principle, and in Ruach HaMishpat, Gate Two), and they should not be counted among the 613 commandments. Clearly, underlying his view is an assumption about the relationship between peshat and derash. Indeed, within his words there he writes about the Bahag (Baal Halakhot Gedolot), who counted among the 613 also commandments that arise from derashot:
And their foolishness goes further still: when they find a derash in a verse that would require, by that derash, doing some action or avoiding some matter—and all of these are undoubtedly rabbinic—they count them among the commandments, even though the plain sense of the verse does not indicate any of those matters.
Counting a commandment that does not arise from the peshat of Scripture is, in his eyes, folly. Only the verse’s peshat is de’oraita and fit to be counted among the 613.
Immediately thereafter he explains the root of the mistake:
Together with the principle with which our Sages, of blessed memory, have benefited us—namely their statement (Yevamot 11b, Shabbat 63a): “A verse does not depart from its plain meaning,” and that the Talmud seeks in every place and says, “What is the verse itself speaking about?” When they find a verse, they derive many things from it by way of explanation and proof…
Rambam claims that the Bahag counted laws derived by hermeneutic rules even though the Sages taught us that a verse does not depart from its peshat—meaning, in his understanding, that only peshat is a Torah-level commandment. This is the key point in the discussion, but before I return to it, I will cite another remark of Rambam that appears there:
And perhaps you will think that I refrain from counting them because they are not true—whether the rule derived by that measure is true or not. This is not the reason; rather, the reason is that whatever anyone derives are branches from the roots that were given to Moses at Sinai by way of explanation, and these are the 613 commandments. Even if the one deriving them were Moses himself, they should not be counted.
Clearly, even laws derived from midrash are true, but they are branches that grow from the roots given to Moses at Sinai. Torah commandments are only those written explicitly in the verses—that is, the roots, not the branches. The midrashic laws are expansions of the verse’s content, not what lies within the verse itself.
It is important to note that there are two innovations in his words here: (a) the parallel approach—peshat and derash are two different readings (that is, it is incorrect that derash is the depth of peshat); (b) peshat is the only true interpretation of the verse. Rambam assumes that there is only one correct interpretation for a verse, and that is its peshat. Peshat exposes the verse’s content, whereas derash is an expansion of the verse’s content (branches growing from the roots), but not an additional interpretation of it. Therefore, in his view, a law derived by derash is not de’oraita, because it is not in the verse. Rambam holds a view similar to the parallel approach, but in fact it is a fourth view: according to him, derash is certainly different from peshat and does not purport to expose the philological peshat (“the depth of peshat”), but in his view derash is not an interpretation at all. An interpretation of a verse exposes its content and meaning; derash, by contrast, is an expansion of the verse’s content, not the exposure of its meaning.
Rambam and Ramban—A dispute
I now return to Rambam’s claim against the Bahag. We saw that Rambam proves his view from the Talmudic rule that a verse does not depart from its peshat. He assumes that the meaning of this rule is that only peshat is the interpretation of the verse, and anything else is not an interpretation (but an expansion). But this is, of course, not the accepted explanation of this rule. Ramban, in his glosses there, presents against him the accepted explanation of this rule, which reflects the usual parallelist view of the relationship between peshat and derash:
And behold, the Rabbi [Rambam] has hung this collapsing mountain by a hair. He said [pp. 53–54]: “the principle with which our Sages have benefited us—namely, ‘a verse does not depart from its peshat,’ and that the language of the Talmud searches in every place and says, ‘what is the verse itself speaking about?’” Heaven forfend! For all the midrashim that are principal in matters of commandments do not have a verse departing from its peshat because of them; rather, all are included in the wording of Scripture, even though they expand it by inclusions. And the midrash of the honor of Torah scholars from “You shall fear the Lord your God” does not remove the verse from its peshat. And likewise if we say that “when a man takes a woman” is by money, this does not remove it from its simple meaning and peshat. And not all the ets and gams and inclusions and exclusions and “akh” and “rak,” and the rest of the midrashim—all of them. Rather, the verse includes all, for the peshat is not as the words of those who lack knowledge of language, nor like the view of the Sadducees. For the Book of the Torah of the Lord is perfect; there is in it no extra or missing letter; all were written with wisdom.
He explains that “a verse does not depart from its peshat” means that even when we expound the verse, we may not ignore the peshat (as did the halakhic authorities I cited above from the Minchat Chinuch regarding “before the blind”).[2] The wording of Scripture includes both peshat and derash.
He then adds what I noted above: in most cases derash does not remove Scripture from its peshat (it does not contradict peshat) but adds to it:
And they did not find any midrash that is principal in commandments that removes a verse from its peshat, except for the derash on “and it shall be that the firstborn which she bears” (Deut. 25:6), as they mentioned in Yevamot 24a…
He then returns and summarizes his position:
And so it is everywhere that they expound by way of parable and allegory: they believe that both are true—inner and outer… And this is their intent everywhere this is mentioned in the Talmud: not that they intend to uproot the gezerah shavah and inclusions and such midrashim—Heaven forfend!—for the intent is only that they not remove it entirely from its peshat. And that is their statement: “A verse does not depart from its peshat.” They did not say: “A verse is only according to its peshat.” Rather, we have its derash along with its peshat; it does not depart from either; the verse can bear all, and both are true.
He sharpens that Rambam’s exegetical stance—that each verse has only one correct interpretation, namely peshat—is incorrect. The verse includes both peshat and derash together. This is precisely the parallel view.
Note that both Rambam and Ramban do not adopt the position that derash is the depth of peshat. Both see peshat as a parallel reading not bound to the peshat of Scripture. Therefore, it is clear that according to both there is no difficulty in the contradictions raised between halakhic midrashim and the plain sense of the verses. Derash is not bound to peshat. Not for nothing did Neshke argue in the article cited that views that see derash as the depth of peshat are apologetic. The difference between them is only whether derash should be considered an interpretation of the verse at all (Ramban), or rather an expansion of it (Rambam).
In many cases a derash is offered as a resolution to difficulties that arise regarding peshat (superfluity, duplication, imprecision, contradiction or mismatch against another biblical source, and so forth). Many commentators, especially contemporary ones, often show why it makes sense to read the verse according to its derash, since the literal peshat suffers from problems (like those listed above). This approach implicitly assumes that the contradiction between the verse’s wording and its derash requires reconciliation, and their explanation in effect sees derash as though it is the depth of peshat. In their view, since the literal peshat suffers from difficulties, it is implausible to see it as the verse’s true interpretation. The derash, they think, presents the more correct interpretation (since it resolves the difficulties that exist in the seemingly simple literal reading). At least in certain cases, according to this view it is specifically the peshat that is not the interpretation of the verse, but only the derash. As noted, this runs counter to the views of both Rambam and Ramban.
The Vilna Gaon on the parallel view
R. Menashe of Ilya brings, in the name of his teacher the Vilna Gaon, an example through which he explains the relationship between peshat and derash. It concerns an aggadic midrash on the verse in Proverbs 12:25:
“Anxiety in a man’s heart will make it stoop, but a good word will gladden it.”
(Note that the vocalization is yashchennah with a right-facing shin, meaning “make it stoop,” as opposed to the common reading yesichennah, “let him speak it out.”)
The Gemara (Sanhedrin 100b) brings two conflicting derashot:
“Anxiety in a man’s heart—let him yaschennah.” R. Ami and R. Assi: one said, “Let him remove it from his mind,” and one said, “Let him speak of it to others.”
R. Menashe of Ilya, in the introduction to his book Binat Mikra, brings the following explanation in the Gaon’s name:
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His claim is that derash does not come to interpret the peshat of Scripture (this is, of course, the parallel view). The peshat of the verse is that anxiety causes the heart to stoop (this is the reading with a right-facing shin), and this is one of the readings brought in the Gemara. But the second sage was troubled by why the initial verb form is masculine (yashchennah, “will make it stoop”). If anxiety causes the heart to stoop, then the subject of the verse is “anxiety,” which is feminine, and it should have been written with a feminine initial form: tashchennah (“will make it stoop”).[3] The Gaon explains that from here the second sage inferred that one must read the verse with a left-facing shin (from the root “to speak”), i.e., that the person should “speak it out,” and this is why the initial form is masculine (since now the subject is “man”).
We arrive here at two readings, both rooted in the verse: there is the philological reading, and despite its difficulties, that is the peshat. However, those very difficulties direct us to seek another reading—midrashic—which of course is not without its own difficulties (chiefly, that it does not enter neatly into the verse’s literal wording). The Gaon contends that the verse is written deliberately in a way that leaves neither reading flawless. The difficulties that exist regarding the peshat (which lead us to derash), and likewise those regarding the derash (why it was not written explicitly in the wording of the verse), are intentional—to tell us that we should interpret it both ways together.
Two remarks
From the Gaon’s proposal it follows that these two readings are necessarily not in conflict. If they were in conflict, then each would retain the difficulties that are hard for it. The only solution is that both readings are correct. Admittedly, when there are two readings in halakhic derash, there will be cases in which we cannot realize both, and at least on the practical plane we will have to choose one of them (paying money or taking out an eye). But even in halakhic derash one can remain with the notion that both readings are correct; only that one is meant for implementation (this when there is a contradiction between the readings, as with “an eye for an eye”). In aggadic derash, however, there is generally no practical dimension. It is about a conceptual insight; therefore, if both readings are true, we are left, in conclusion, with both.
I add that the picture the Gaon presents seems to fit more with Ramban’s view than Rambam’s. He essentially sets the two readings on the same footing with respect to the verse. One could perhaps reconcile it with Rambam’s view as well, by assuming that the philological reading is the peshat—despite the difficulties—and the midrashic reading is not an “interpretation” but an expansion (branches growing from the roots).
Conclusions
What follows from this for our matter? It is important to understand that the Gaon draws our attention to a point that is easy to miss. When we expound the verse “an eye for an eye”—[as] money—and suppose we can show that the philological peshat, namely the actual removal of the eye, is difficult for some reason, so we are compelled to the midrashic reading (that it is money). This is precisely the claim of those who maintain that derash is the depth of peshat. But even according to them, it is still unclear why the Torah does not write explicitly “money for an eye.” Instead of writing a verse whose peshat is literally “an eye,” but there are difficulties that force us nevertheless to read it as money, it would have been preferable to write explicitly that one must pay money.
Those who adopt the view that derash is the depth of peshat usually propose resolutions to the difficulties in peshat, but they do not explain why the Torah did not write the midrashic reading explicitly within the plain wording. Why did it leave it to a derash that removes the verse from its philological reading? A complete picture of the relationship between peshat and derash should include both the difficulties in the peshat that lead to derash and also an explanation for why the verse itself is nevertheless phrased so that its philological meaning is the peshat and not the derash. The Gaon’s view offers such a complete picture with an explanation. As we saw, he explains that the difficulties are deliberate—to direct us to interpret the verse in both readings together. What emerges from his approach is the parallel view. And so it is brought in the book Ben Porat about R. Menashe of Ilya:
He received a lesson from the mouth of the Gaon that those who labor to force homiletical derivations to align with the peshat do not act well. Even if their intent is desirable, their actions are not correct, for derash is far from peshat and the two will never converge. Though they were hewn from one quarry, the Lawgiver who set His Torah before Israel placed within them the signs to find a resting place also for derash—and when our Sages, by the Lord’s hand, knew to expound on every jot, nevertheless their pathways are different and will never unite.
The combinatory approach
Even in the case of “an eye for an eye,” where derash contradicts peshat, some have explained that the literal phrasing comes to say that it would have been fitting to take out his eye (though then we are left with the result that the peshat of “an eye for an eye” really is an eye). This is an explanation similar to the Gaon’s approach, in that it also offers an account both for the verse’s wording and for the difficulties that arise from the peshat of Scripture.
I note that Neshke, in his articles there (and as I have already mentioned here in the past), explained differently the relationship between peshat and derash in “an eye for an eye.” He argues that both readings—peshat and derash—contribute to the formation of the law itself. For example, in the case of “an eye for an eye,” there is a view in the Talmud that the damager pays the value of his own eye (and not the victim’s). The explanation he offers is that the peshat instructs us to take out the damager’s eye, and so the law is decided. At the same time, the derash tells us to take money from him instead of the eye—and this, too, is the law. Therefore, the result is that we take the value of the damager’s own eye. This is a combination of peshat and derash together. Note that if the verse were interpreted only by its peshat, we would require him to have his eye removed; if it were written only by its derash (“money for an eye”), we would require him to pay the value of the victim’s eye. When the verse is written in a way that compels both readings—and as we saw, in such a case we interpret the verse in both ways together (as we saw in the Gaon’s example)—the halakhic result differs from both prior possibilities: the damager pays the value of his own eye. This is the approach I called above “the combinatory approach,” by which the peshat and the derash are joined together to generate the halakhah.
Note that here I presented an application of this approach regarding a case in which derash contradicts peshat (“an eye for an eye”). In such cases we need a more complex construct, like the one I described here, which fuses the two conflicting readings and creates from them a superstructure that includes both. By contrast, as we saw above, in most cases there is no contradiction between peshat and derash (as we saw with “before the blind”), and in such cases it is obvious that we combine the two readings. But in those cases it is a simple combination, for the halakhah contains a simple sum of peshat and derash: a prohibition on placing a physical obstacle, a prohibition on giving improper advice, and a prohibition on causing another to sin. So too in the example of “Anxiety in a man’s heart—yaschennah.” There, too, it is a case in which there is no contradiction between the two readings (they are different, but not contradictory), and the Gaon combines them in a straightforward joining.
[1] See, for example, Column 355 and much more here on the site.
[2] Interestingly, Rambam there leaves the derash as the law, and, in effect—as we saw—leaves only it without the peshat.
[3] For some reason he ignores the word’s ending, which should have been masculine (“yashchennu”—i.e., the man, or the heart), and not feminine (“tashchennah”).
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I did not find here the possibility that there is no need to reconcile the two. Chazal changed the biblical law, which, like the laws of the ancient world, required the literal removal of an eye and turned it into a monetary fine. In a similar way, Chazal changed the biblical law as it did in other areas. The change was made with the help of interpretation. In order to refine its meaning.
Hayutha, because this is a very difficult explanation. It turns the sermons into a complete waste of time, and from the Talmudic negotiations it is clear that the Tan'ani and the Amoraim took the sermons seriously (hence all the lengthy negotiations in the dimensions that the Torah requires).
Hayutha's words are of course unfounded, since the sages believed in the Torah from heaven, and therefore did not imagine that they had such authority!
(Unless the sages used the interpretive tools and midrashim within the framework of the authority that the Torah, as the Torah from heaven, gives them - in order to give certain commandments a new interpretation in accordance with the needs of the time, and as Rabbi Kook suggests regarding the offering of plant sacrifices in the Third Temple in exchange for animal sacrifices in the previous Temples. Which certainly has nothing to do with Hayutha's words).
Not a waste of time. This is their way. The sages took many liberties and translated the written Torah for their time and era. With all the respect required while carefully maintaining the hierarchy. But their freedom was enormous. I wish we had.
Why “very difficult explanation”? This is a biased lie and should be called so.
For some reason, my response does not appear. I will write again. It is not for nothing that it does not appear, because there is no such possibility. The sages cannot determine the laws of the Torah as they wish. And if they did, they messed up. I do not work for them and I do not work for them. I hinted at this at the beginning of the column.
They did so many things as they pleased. Laws of the Torah that were in practice abolished and turned into 'demand and receive reward', changes that occurred in the laws of the Torah in various areas, which were converted to the Oral Torah in a completely different way. I assume you can give examples better than I can.
These kinds of things are found in the book by Hezi Cohen and A. Evron: The Transformation Approach: A New Method in Torah Interpretation, Jerusalem 2019.
What I thought about this sermon (and probably not the first one) and its connection to the Peshat, and this is essentially what the Nasheka says, is that the sermon essentially says that it is possible to pay ” eye-money” (that there is an option to redeem the harmer's eye). And since it is possible, then that is what is done. Just as in the case of a person who killed a person, according to the simple explanation, the owner is obligated to kill him, but there is an option (which probably depends on the will of the family of the killed person or the will of the judge to give a ransom for the life. And according to the sermon, this is always done. And so here, the sermon said that this is not only an option, but that is what must be done (and this explains both the opinion in the baraita in the Gemara that a literal eye should be taken out, and also the okimat of the gem, which according to this opinion is also not literal). A ransom for the life is a concept that is common in the Bible and probably also in the ancient world. It is also parallel to the "redemption of a soul from the hand of Saul". The option to give a ransom for the life existed in the background of Torah law, as part of the conceptual world of penal law in the ancient world, and it would have existed even if this sermon had not existed. The sermon only said that the ransom must be given and the initial option would not exist here. But It is impossible to write the laws of infidelity without writing about the death itself in the case of the killing bull or about the actual gouging out of the eye in our case.
A more revised response:
What I thought about this sermon (and I’m probably not the first to think of it) and its connection to the interpretation, and this is actually what the Neshka says, is that the sermon essentially says that it is possible to pay “eye-redemption” (there is an option to redeem the harmer’s eye). And since it is possible, then that is what is done. Just as in the case of a bull that killed a person, according to the simple interpretation, the owner is obligated to die, but there is an option (which probably depends on the will of the family of the killed person or the will of the Beid to pay eye-redemption. And according to the sermon, this is always done). And so here too, the sermon said that this is not just an option, but that is what must be done (and this explains both the opinion in the baraita in the Gemara that an eye should be literally removed, and also the okumitha of the Gem, which according to this opinion is also not literally). Eye-redemption is a concept that is common in the Bible and probably also in the ancient world. It is also parallel to “redemption of a soul from the hand of Saul.” The option to give a ransom for an eye existed in the background of Torah law, as part of the conceptual world of penal law in the ancient world, and it would have existed (probably also as part of the unwritten Torah laws) even if this sermon had not been given. The sermon only said that the ransom must be given and the initial option cannot exist here. But it is impossible to write ransom laws without writing about the death itself in the case of the killing bull or the actual gouging out of the eye in our case.
Another example of this is the law, “Do not take a ransom for the life of a murderer who is wicked and must die (who has committed death in court) because (otherwise) death will be put to death.” This law is not at all understandable to a modern person. If a set of laws says that a person must be executed, why should it command the prohibition of circumventing the execution by paying a ransom (which, by the way, is called “bribe” several times in the Bible)? What is that prohibition at all (if someone does not listen to the instruction of the set of laws, what will be heard by the instruction of the set of laws not to circumvent it). But the Torah was a set of laws that was “directive” (as the Rabbi put it) and not “constitutive” (as the Rabbi put it). of concepts and penal laws that were a realistic background for it. Against this background, it is possible to convert a death penalty (or amputation of limbs) into a payment, called a “ransom,” of the value of the person or limb. That is why the Torah forbids this (it is absolutely not in the Hebrew language). Now, in the ancient world, you could see someone paying eye-money in a synagogue and you would ask some student standing aside: But does it say “an eye for an eye”? And he would not understand at all what you wanted (you would be someone who has problems with reading comprehension). He would answer you: “But he pays a ransom.” From their perspective, such a statement means that both options are open and the option of payment cannot be stated before the first option is stated, which is why it is written that way. It's just that there was probably a tradition that narrowed the range of options down to just the option of payment. In the time of the Sages, the ancient world was still present and still in the background in the minds of everyone who reads the Bible. It's just that in their time, due to the spread of Greek philosophy and logic, concepts and claims became more precise into unambiguous concepts (the first law of logic) and unambiguous claims. So in their time, it should be emphasized that there is a tradition that only the second option is the law written in this verse. This midrash narrows the meaning of the verse (unlike “Fear your God’ which expands it) but does not replace (or contradict) its initial meaning.
His Honor apparently once saw a book called Gemara (Bava Kama Peg, 2) where it is written that without innovations we would think that there are two options (does the harm or the harmer choose – not interpreted) eye or money, and the study revealed to us that only money:
“An eye for an eye, said the Most Gracious. Or is it a real eye? Etc.’ For he says, “You shall not take a ransom for the life of a murderer, who is wicked to death – For the life of a murderer, you do not take a ransom, but you take a ransom for the heads of limbs that do not return… He is right, whether it is for the sake of his eye or for the sake of his blood, for a beast, what does one strike an animal for a ransom, even a man for a ransom”.
Yes. But these things at the time (lesson 1) didn't mean anything to me. It was right in front of my eyes and I didn't see it. Not understanding reality makes all this gemara incomprehensible (not the Hava Amina, nor the conclusion, nor the entire discussion in general. Just a bunch of slang). And once you understand, these sermons become almost the simplified data of the Torah with common sense.
Just so you understand. From all that Gemara, I remembered that there is an opinion that says that an eye for an eye literally (and I didn't remember that this opinion is also interpreted as an eye for an eye not literally). You study and don't remember anything. Even though you supposedly understand what you read. But this is not really understanding. From the perspective of a modern person (a speaker of modern Hebrew), the meaning of the word "redemption" is money paid to save a kidnapped child in order to pay a sum of money and then be killed. Anyone who reads the Bible and Gemara understands that the meaning of the word "redemption" is a bit different there. And also understands the discussion technically. But they don't really understand reality, and then the sermon is technical. Accuracy is only in the manner of the Gemara (which really isn't). From the perspective of reason, I would compare it to a ram that wentre a man and killed him. They compared it to hitting an animal and it died. There was logic behind it.
In short, what I'm saying is that if you meant that someone wanted to curse me for not remembering an explicit gemara, then he would have come out with a blessing. Because I arrived at this a priori from purely studying the Bible and using common sense. In fact, only now is it possible to even begin to understand and study all the discussions in the name of "eye for eye, really, did you make up your mind?" Every tanna uses a type of logic that leads to a conclusion that is not really true. Simply put, what is done in this study of the teenage years is not to think about what you are learning (which is actually really learning) but to load the mind with a load of dry data and to remember masses of gemaras and poskim without really understanding the processes underlying this data. In other words, the Torah logic. And so zombies with Torah education emerge (a type of donkeys carrying books).
I meant to say that this is one of the most famous endings in the country and it is mentioned and cited over and over again, so it's just that you saw it from the first, second or third verse and forgot and then thought you thought of it alone. The idea of a heretic is in the background of the Torah and the innovation of the Sages is limited only to the negation of the direct channel (eye for eye) is kimcha tahini, and you came and added spices (interesting, but you didn't spread some bright and invisible light). In any case, it's true and I just made a footnote.
Baba Kama
May you be blessed. In any case, I was debating whether to respond again, because it might seem petty (it's a footnote as you said), but despite that I decided it was important. Well, as far as I know, in relation to myself, this is a thought that is kind of original (in our places this gemara is not that famous because we don't invest that much in studying halachic midrashim). Maybe you are from the ancient world, but for me personally and it seems to me that for many others the concept of the biblical ransom did not come with our mother's milk. As far as I can remember, I have not heard anything since my studies in yeshiva in Shiur A (when even then we only learned the chapter of the Havval only with knowledge of the evening prayer) on this subject. In any case, a bright and disappearing light was indeed shed on my personal world, and I ground, at least for myself, flour from wheat in the fields. I promise you that even if a year ago you had given me the gemara This one in front of my eyes again wouldn't have told me anything, and I wouldn't have remembered anything from it after a while. It was another midrash of precisions from other places (a murderer's atonement for the soul and the heads of organs) and comparisons to other places (what is this concept of heads of organs anyway? Did you ask yourself? Why not just organs? Apparently the expression is "main organs" like all expressions of the alternating closeness (holy people - holy people) and refers to organs that protrude outside the body like the head - that is, hands, feet, and fingers (but then what about the eyes in Didan's case? And what if he removed a kidney?)). Comparison and parsing. As far as I'm concerned, the laws of donations and tithes could have been included there as well. In short, I wouldn't really understand this midrash at all.
In fact, my brother (who is also currently studying the simple translation of the Bible and also remembers the midrash of Chazal Sh”r”i on the Torah) told me that he once told me that this midrash means atonement for an eye (he really understood. But he didn't elaborate beyond that (perhaps not even to himself - he lacked the spices, as you say)). Therefore, I also forgot what he told me, and even though I told him then that I needed to think about it. It is possible that if I hadn't gone through the entire process of my own personal understanding, I probably would never have understood it. I had to go through several chapters of Psalms, Job, Proverbs, and Isaiah for the concept of atonement to become a living concept (like the chair I'm sitting on now). Only after that could I begin to understand the Torah itself.
Personally, I'm not sure if you really understood what I said (although it seems like you did). Because you were supposed to understand it from studying the Bible and knowing the Midrash, "An eye is under the eye of money," and that's it. If you heard about it from the Gemara, then you skipped the stage of understanding - they simply told you about it and you memorized it. But understanding is seeing with your own eyes. Seeing the world through the eyes of the people who lived during the biblical period and the time of the sages. Is this what happened to you?
It really seems that your understanding is more vivid than the dry understanding I have (still), and this is probably an advantage of someone who thinks about things for themselves. I didn't know this passage of the Gemara from my nonexistent knowledge of the Gemara, but from seeing it (and the Maimonides behind it) repeatedly cited by those who mentioned the example of an eye for an eye. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, the fact that there is a possibility of a kufr for the heads of members is as explicit as in the Torah, and therefore I knew it even without knowing anything about the ancient world. Although, by the way, there is kufr today, and not just in the ancient world, I once saw a chapter in ’here’ about arbitrators in the diverse Arab society in Israel, and there one of the arbitrators explains that it is true that ‘he who kills shall be killed’ but peace is great, and therefore they do settle for an kufr.
Heads of organs is a term borrowed from the head of organs (known) in a slave and it seems that they wanted to say that even those who do not return and it is as if they had killed a plague still take a ransom. Whether a slave is freed by removing a spleen (which is something they knew in the past and knew that one could live after it) really needs to be examined in halakhic terms. [Be honest with me, Mary, but the truth is that I only see the world through my own eyes and I categorize the rest of the things in various zoological sections].
This is the episode I mentioned. I remember a different wording but I can't find it right now
https://youtu.be/Nqw_qBMfTTQ?t=634
In fact, today's Arabs in terms of their consciousness in general are more or less the same as they were a few hundred years ago. In general, the entire Eastern world (Asia, Eastern Europe in some sense, Africa, Latin America, Polynesia, the Eskimos) is stuck several dozen if not hundreds of years behind the Western world in terms of consciousness (although not necessarily technologically) . Therefore, the Friday infidel among the Arabs today is indeed a heretic infidel from the ancient world because they themselves are the ancient world.
Also, I probably knew the 24 heads of a slave's limbs. However, the heads of limbs in the Midrash in the chapter on the bruised did not come from these 24 limbs, but the other way around. The heads of limbs were a living concept (and not a halakhic concept) in the ancient world and in humans they counted 24 and there was a special case for slave laws. I can guess that the concept existed in a general form in animals as well and they had a different number. I tried to understand, again, what they meant when they talked about this. This was not a dry halachic definition.
I don't know much, but why do you think that the heads of organs are a living concept and not just halakhic? They did a building from the tooth and the eye that is written in the Torah and reached twenty-four of these, how is that different from every equal side that they do?
There are basic concepts that cannot be formulated in a short and concise positivist way. Regarding Shabbat, I really remember that there are opinions that first of all know that something is a ‘work’ and therefore it is forbidden, and only in the second stage do they attribute it to the father of the work that most resembles it. In other words, there doesn't really need to be a emanation from the father to the product, but every work is a ‘work’ that is forbidden in itself because it is simply a ‘work’ that is ‘important’ but in the matter of warning, etc., there is a classification of fathers of work.
But what is similar to the heads of organs, where in total (as far as I know, I haven't checked now) they did what is the side that is really acceptable, what is similar to a tooth and an eye. To a good approximation, I would also reach the same generalization today without any living concepts.
Everything is fine. Yes. But the sages did not just compare them to every organ they saw, but rather generalized and changed the heads of organs. Where did this generalization come from? The Jewish inhabitants of the land are the descendants of those who simply knew a concept that was in the background. The equal side was a generalization and not 24 analogies (I don't understand how an eye protrudes from the body, but let's stop). In the list of organs and they call them by the way - the head of the corpse, the heads of the ears, etc. (What does it mean? Do the ears also have their own legs and ears. What does it mean to cut off the head of the ear? Does it leave the rest of the ear body? When you cut off the corpse's body – and not its head – can't this corpse itself give birth to a child of its own? (: ). There is an incomprehensible concept here that is critical to understanding the law.
Corrected response (an unrelated sentence popped up there):
Everything is fine. Yes. But the Sages didn’t just compare them to every organ they saw, but rather generalized and said the heads of organs. Where did this generalization come from? The comparison was a generalization and not 24 analogies (I’m not sure how an eye protrudes from the body, but let’s say) in the list of organs, and they are called by the way - the head of the corpse, the heads of the ears, etc. (What does this mean? Do ears also have their own legs and ears. What does it mean to cut off the head of the ear? Does this leave the rest of the ear body? When you cut off the corpse’s body – and not its head – can’t this corpse itself give birth to a child of its own? 🙂 ). There is an incomprehensible concept here that is critical to understanding the law.
I already have experience. This is the fruitful approach. At first, everything I had was abstract and new, brisk definitions. Slowly, every such definition disappeared and became a living (fundamental) concept. Have you ever wondered how there is no definition for work that is forbidden on Chol HaMoed since the Gemara until today? You won't find one. Trust me. All the books of the poskim from then until today copy-paste the books that came before them in this respect. It took me years to understand that simply from the perspective of the Amoraim and the Tannaim, there was no definition for the concept of work, but rather it was a fundamental, natural concept like a horse. There was no need to define for any of the people of Haraf what a work was forbidden. They were simply told that work was forbidden and then told what was permitted (the matter of loss, etc.). This is also true for Shabbat work, by the way. Even though there are supposedly definitions there. The entire concept of Avot and Toldot is built on this understanding. Why talk about the work of a maverick as a consequence of the work of a builder? Why wasn't it called the work of a builder in the first place. There will be no merit to this terminology. After all, this is how actions that are forbidden on Shabbat are classified today (under the works mentioned in the Law).
Sorry, I accidentally commented in the wrong place (a little above).
I also answered you above in the appropriate place. And as a continuation of that, I would like to say that by the way, the 24 heads of limbs belong not only in the laws of slaves but also in the laws of leprosy. A leprosy lesion does not defile any animal, in the event that the lesion is in one of these twenty-four heads of limbs. So this is not just a generalization from tooth and eye, but something more general.
I saw it 🙂 But I have nothing to add and I need to reflect a bit.
I didn't understand.. Doesn't repentance repeat the worry (=female)? Who said that it repeats a man's heart... Worry itself renews the heart..
I didn't understand.
Is it just me that the column didn't end all the way? Something seems cut off
Emmanuel, how would you explain the sermon of Chazal in Pigol?
That it is necessary for a foreigner to go to his place?
In any case, if you meant the figul in Parashah Kedoshim, which the Midrash says that because the calculation outside its time was already discussed in Parashah Tzu, and therefore you will be interested in the calculation of eating (or throwing away its blood or burning incense) outside its place (and despite the verse that later it is not obligatory to eat it with a keret). Well, I don’t know. This Midrash is very difficult from two aspects:
1. First of all, the simple fact that there is no such thing in the Torah as figul (halakhic - that is, of thinking to eat outside of time). There is only a remnant and whoever eats the remnant (preaches the sacrifice of peace offerings) defiles the original sacrifice (which was offered two days before). That is, it causes God, the Almighty, not to accept the sacrifice retroactively. The root פגעגל apparently alternates with באחל (which is not found in the Bible but its meaning is nausea and disgust, which are the opposite of desire – and it is written פגעגול he will not desire. And this is like a virgin and no one knew or and the cistern is empty, there is no water in it) or with the root פגער which is also a carcass, like a carrion, something that is abominable for eating by the rich and certainly would not be pleasing to her’.
The entire commandment there is about the sacrifice being pleasing to her’ like the prohibition of sacrificing a person with a defect. The midrash in Parashat Tzo Doresh (by virtue of the halachic logic of the impossibility of influencing time backwards, apparently) that that Parashit deals with the idea of eating outside of its time because it is written “the one who sacrifices it will not be considered” and from this one somehow learns that only at the time of the sacrifice can it be rejected and that it is rejected because of the thought of the sacrificer. And thus the concept of “Pigol” Halachic was created. As mentioned, this is a midrash.
2 In Parashat Kedoshim this parasha is duplicated and the midrash demands that it does not speak of a computer outside its time because we already discussed this in Parashat Tzu. But in doing so we have strayed even further from the simple interpretation because even a computer outside its time can somehow enter, under classical midrashic pressure, into the meaning of the words of the verse. But outside its place, it did not even go under a twenty-ton press
3. As if to complicate matters further, in the next verse (in Parashat Kedoshim), the Torah says that one must make a kerat for eating it. Then the Midrash (based on a minority that was said in the calculation outside the time of Parashat Tzu (the soul that eats from it will bear its sin” – from it and not from its companion, that is, from the meat that was considered eaten outside its place. And apparently based on halachic logic that going outside a place is not as serious as going outside a time. Just as leaving is more serious than meat that went outside its place, but this itself (kerat in a nether) is learned from this verse) says that again this verse cannot be in the calculation outside its place but (which according to the simple interpretation would have been about what remained and certainly not about thinking outside of a place) but that in general it is about what remained here (which is surprising twice even though I said that this is the simple interpretation. Because the Midrash told us to read all these parashits as if it were about thinking outside of a time And now in one verse he took it out of the concept of outside time to the concept of outside place, and in the verse that follows, not only does he no longer continue to talk about outside in its place, but he does not even return it to the concept of outside time, but takes it out to the remainder, which is not related at all) and comes to teach us that it is obligatory to make a sacrifice (which is not explicitly written anywhere in the remainder. And this is strange because “aunna tishah” in the parasha of the commandment does not mention sacrifice, and it seems to me that we learn in an equal way from our paragraph that there the meaning is sacrifice, and it turns out that there is a circular loop of sermons and minorities regarding the obligation to make a sacrifice and the implications of this, what each verse in this parasha speaks about in the holy ones). Thus, according to the midrash, this parasha is not read in continuity at all. And not just in the discontinuity of a pigol (a discontinuity outside of place and outside of time) but in the discontinuity of a pigol and a remainder, which is a second-order discontinuity in terms of the discontinuity of a midrash. From the midrash's perspective, reading this verse as dealing with sacrifice is a sermon in itself And not simple. It's really, really strange
In short, this midrash is many times more complex than Ein Tath Ein Mamon. (It is somewhat similar in its context to the sermon “Ha Bechor Asher Tald” from which it is difficult to extract an eloquent reading of the verse in the meaning of the midrash. Here we are talking about an eloquent reading of the parshiya)
I was wrong. I remembered that the root of the word "bahal" is found in the Bible. "And my soul is sick with them" in Zechariah. That is, in the same meaning as "abomination"
In short, to summarize the difficulty level of the parsiya in Kedoshim is as follows:
1. According to the simple interpretation, it speaks of a person who is not a sinner (just as the simple interpretation that the parsiya in Tzo deals with a person who is not a sinner)
2. According to the midrash, the parsiya in Tzo here too is supposed to deal with a person who is not a sinner (just as the midrash that the parsiya in Tzo deals with a person who is not a sinner)
3. According to the new midrash, the first two verses are required as usual for a person who is not a sinner. But in the third verse (and if the food is eaten on the third day) the midrash changes and says that it deals with a person who is not a sinner (to throw away his blood or to burn incense on his body) except for its place. Although it is not included in the words at all
4. In the fourth verse, the Midrash again changes the subject and says that it is a notar (it is not possible to interpret that this verse also deals with outside the time because it is also duplicated in Parashat Tzo)
5. The conclusion that the fourth verse is a notar is based on the Midrash and not on the basis of the Pasha (which also remains as I said)
6. The obligation to pay in the case of a pigol outside the time (which is discussed in Parashat Tzo) is learned in an equal way from the aforementioned fourth verse, which deals with a notar
7. From the beginning, we said that that verse deals with a notar because there is no obligation to pay in the case of a pigol outside its place
8. From the beginning, a pigol outside its place does not require a notar because of the minority that is written in the case of a pigol outside its time (the soul that eats from it will bear its sin - from him and not from his companion) Although a pigol outside its time is a notar in itself, we learn from a notar that it itself requires a notar only because we could not interpret this verse in the case of a pigol outside its place In short, there is a kind of circular loop here that causes the same parsha to talk about three different matters – Pigol outside his time, Pigol outside his place, and Notar. Now we need to interpret how the midrash is written here in depth below the simple simplicity of one parsha that deals with one matter of Notar.
In the 1st of Adar
Logic dictates that an omission that occurred on the third day – eating the remainder – will not become a retroactive sacrifice that was properly sacrificed for ’Pigol’. And the scriptures also agree well. Verses 6-7 are the explanation for verse 5: ‘At your own will you sacrifice it’. And how will the sacrifice be at your own will? When it is made so that the sacrifice is eaten on the day and the next day and not on the third day.
With blessings, Yaron Fish–l Ordner
But verse 7 speaks of a command to eat it outside its place (even though it says to eat it on the third day)
To Emmanuel – Shalom Rav,
The verse speaks of the desire for the sacrifice by thinking that it will be eaten at its time and not outside of its time. From the repetition of the things already said in Parashat Tzo – we learn in ’if it is not a matter’ that even a thought outside its place is invalid. But ‘keret’ is not here, because the words were not explicitly stated.
With blessings, Yafa”r
Again, the simple version of the verse (the simple version) again speaks of remaining.
In the fourth day of Adar, 5:1
To Immanuel, greetings,
Perhaps it should be said in a slightly different direction, according to the verse in Parashat Tzo (7:18): “And if the one who eats the meat of his sacrifice on the third day, it will not be accepted; the one who offers it will not be considered for him, he will be an outcast.” Whoever eats the remainder on the third day will not be accepted in the sight of the Lord, for (as the Rabbis say) “his reward will be in his loss.” A chef who offered it with proper intention will not be considered for him. He returned and spoiled the word of the Lord in his disgust, and distanced himself from another who came near and was not acceptable in the eyes of the Lord, even though his offering was not accepted.
And even worse than that is the one who offers sacrifice with him with this intention, that his offering will not be considered as a sacrifice at all, but will be rejected. And it is not considered a sacrifice at all (as according to Rav Sha'ar Sha'ar, "Pegol Arinou Kodesh"). The male impermissible act of eating what is not acceptable in the eyes of God is also created by eating what is left, which shows that he has now distorted his path and does not care about "making a wind for his Creator" that interests him, but that the sacrifice will be invalidated and will not be considered "it depends on the sacrificer that he intended to eat outside of its time in advance.
With blessings, may God bless him
‘He will not be pleased’ is a moral statement – The person who disregards the laws of sacrifice is not desired by the ’, even though from a halachic point of view his sacrifice is still considered his and is not ‘apostle’ because it was sacrificed according to the halachic.
Such a statement, whose meaning is moral and not halachic, is the statement ‘Any man of the house of Israel who slaughters an ox or a ram or a goat in the camp or who slaughters it outside the camp, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice a sacrifice to the’ before the tabernacle of the ’ – blood shall be considered to that man as blood shed…’ (Leviticus 17:3-4),
That certainly does not mean that he should be considered a murderer halakhically, since his punishment is ‘cutting’ and not death by human hands. There is a moral statement here, that the scripture ’indicates him’ as if he had murdered the poor animal whose blood was spilled in vain.
With a blessing, may the Lord
Even the commandment ‘you shall not go out as the slaves go out’, explained the author of ‘Or Chaim’ that there is a moral statement here, that it is not appropriate for a woman to be ‘stuck’ with her master for six years, but rather that the master should reach a decision ‘as a fugitive or an exempt’, or that he should designate her for himself or his son or that she should be redeemed and go out freely.
This is the ’first step’. In Parashat Reah (Deuteronomy 15), the Torah explains the ’retrospectively’that if they left the Hebrew mother ‘stuck’, they did not designate her nor redeem her – then she would come out at the end of six years and would also receive a grant.
In the 4th of Adar, 5:1
It is worth noting that we also found in the Torah a "life for a life" that concerns payment, and it is "and he who kills a beast shall pay life for life" (Leviticus 24).
Regarding "if men go after a pregnant woman, if there is a disaster and you give life for life" (Exodus 21), the Sages differed whether the meaning was "a literal life." Some believe it was "a literal life" because even though he did not intend to kill the woman, he intended to kill his companion. Some believed that in this case, it was also "a life for a life." Because he did not intend to kill the woman.
In any case, it is certain that the law of ‘life for life– literally’ only applies to intentional killing, and hence it is clear that in the adjacent verse: ‘eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise’ – only does one intentionally harm someone incur corporal punishment, and not unintentionally. This is also implied by the words of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mekhilta that ’eye for eye– literally’ is only intentional.
According to the parallelism of ‘eye for eye– to life for life– which teaches that only in a case proven by witnesses and with a warning that the harm was intentional – It is assumed that they treated the irreversible punishment of amputation of a limb as a life sentence for all intents and purposes, and the execution of such a punishment was almost impossible, and almost always the offender had the right to doubt that it was unintentional.
Therefore, it seems that even if in theory there is a rule of ‘an eye for an eye– literally’, in practice they feared that it was unintentional, and they also feared that it would not be possible to carry out the corporal punishment in a proportionate and precise manner, since often amputation of a limb could lead to death or much more serious damage as a result of entanglement.
Therefore, it seems that they always preferred the option of atonement, which was denied in the Torah only in the case of a murderer with his hands, but was explicitly allowed in the case of causing death by negligence, as stated in the Torah: “Whoever kills a person ‘and his owner shall be put to death, and if he makes atonement for him – and he shall give atonement for his life, whatever is made upon him. Even those who caused a miscarriage were given the option of a financial penalty ‘when the woman's husband lays a hand on him and gives him a fine’.
In short:
It turns out that ’an eye for an eye– literally’ It is only when it is proven with absolute certainty that the injury was intentional (as in ‘life for life’); it turns out that there needed to be certainty that the injury would be exactly proportionate and would not result in death or serious physical injury. And for this reason, the option of redeeming the corporal punishment with a monetary ransom was always preferred.
With blessings, Yaron Fish”l Ordner
It is worth noting that in the days of Chazal, corporal punishment and death sentences were accepted. And in cases of people prone to violence, the sages did not hesitate to apply severe corporal punishment, as Rabbi Huna said: ‘The end will come to the person prone to hitting, relying on the verse: ‘And a high arm will be broken’, and this by virtue of the authority given to the court to punish unjustly To deter.
In the Sada 5:17; Badar p.
What R. Menashe of Elijah brought in the name of the Gracious One, that worry softens (= humbles) the heart, is also stated in the Gracious One's commentary on Mishali (on the website). The translation, the Rasa, and Rabbeinu Yonah also followed this path.
The other commentators, that a person should soften (= lower their worry), also need practical guidance on how to do this? And here the Amoraim outlined the two ways: “he should soften his mind” or “he should speak to others.”
And Rashi already explained that both ways are interpreted at the end of the verse: ‘And a good word will be remembered’. It can be interpreted that the alleviation of worry will be done by distracting the mind to think about a ‘good word’. And it can be interpreted that a ’good word’ is words of advice or encouragement that one will hear from his friend, to whom he has told about his problem.
With greetings, Yafa’r
In paragraph 3, line 4
… advice or consolation that will be heard…
‘ישהנה’ (in the right-hand sin) has been interpreted by commentators from the phrase ‘swim to the dust of our souls’, bent and thrown.
It occurred to me to suggest another direction, that ‘ישהנה from the phrase ‘swim’, as it were ‘throw the worry into the pit’. Or perhaps from the phrase ‘יחיה’, in Aramaic ‘ריצה’ (Like: ‘Dmati Lia Behad Shihiyya’.Shabbat Kez), who will drive the worry from his heart
With blessings, he will be blessed
Where did we hear the interpreter say that the tongue is pleased. Rashi means that the swimmer leans down quickly to catch the animal before it escapes. In Aramaic, Ohi means speed but without the word "sh".
In Tz”G – A Got Tag,
Rabbi Hananel interpreted Betzay 24: ‘Bachd shechiya – Interpretation: Such as one run, which does not need to be between the two’. It is possible that R”achd shechiya ’ was interpreted as meaning that one does not need to stop in the middle of the run in order to be between.
R”i there did not mention the issue of running at all, but interpreted: ‘Bachd shechiya – Once he swims over it to catch it, he may not slip away from it’. According to this, it would seem that in order to catch the animal, it is enough to bend down and not to run after it, and this is a different interpretation from R”ach's interpretation.
Even from the Meiri it seems that there are two interpretations here: ‘Dmati Lia bahhad shihiyya, R”l that reaches him in one bend, and some hold: “bahhad shehiyya” meaning that they reach in one run’. But on Shabbat Kav it seems that R”yi combined the two interpretations: ‘shihiyya – satisfied, that he swims to catch him’.
According to what you brought that ’ohachi’ is ‘quick’, it is possible to say that ’shihiyya’ in the sense of ‘running’, is derived from the form ‘shfael’ of ‘Ohi’. The letter ‘Ohi’ is apparently not a root, but belongs to the construction ‘Ephael’, and the root is ‘Yachi’, to which is added the ’Shin’ of the construction ‘Shefal’ (like ‘Shabad’ derived from ’Abd’, ‘Shechla’ from ’Clal’, and ’Shcen’ from ’Knae’.
With greetings, Menashe Fish’L Zuchmir (Maf’Z)
So it turns out that the only source for interpreting the word "shechiya" as "swimming" is from Rashi on Shabbat Kav: who wrote "swimming" as "swimming to grab it" and I said that Rashi did not mean to interpret the word "swimming" as "swimming" (even if he did not state it in the Gemara Rahit) but rather to qualify that it is of course a fast swim to hunt and not a slow swim. What he meant was that the beaver is not really small so that the animal cannot move at all and it can be caught casually, but rather that its maneuverability is limited and therefore a quick reach of the hand is enough to catch it. After all, Rashi interpreted "shechiya" as "swimming to grab it," and how can two different interpretations be combined?
Therefore, there is no reason to arrive at the idea that you wrote that "shechiya" is the one who acted (and I also intended to imply this) but rather that it simply means to swim and bend over, and it is interestingly close to bowing down.
By the way, what you suggested above, that even the Amoraim understood that a person should talk about the worry, but they added practical guidance on how to do so (and yet, "he will talk about it in his mind" is not an interpretation of the word "yeshahana" but simply used a loose phrase), I also suggested this in another post below, section c2.
And Rach”i Kahut (the complete translation is Shea) suggested according to the Arabic word ‘ashaah’, which means: throwing, throwing. According to this, it will be explained well: ‘worship in the heart of a man yishachna’ = ‘ishachna’..
In the blessing ‘warpet akw el yach, lerant Torah nach on nachࢩ, from פאז
If a person kills an animal, he shall pay for the life of the animal. This is a different story. There it is clear that death is not meant even in the plain language. There the intention is to replace the life of an animal for a person for the life of the animal that you took from a man. To pay means to replace. That is, instead of what you took from him. And he used the words life for life because at the beginning it says, "If a person kills an animal, he shall pay for the life of the animal." Then he must compensate by paying life for life. The fact is that later it says, "And if a person kills an animal, he shall pay for it." And that is it. In short, it is a matter of paying for damage (damages) and not of expiation (damages). This is like the case in the Mishpat case of the harmful ox, "And if a man's ox gores his neighbor's ox and it dies." He shall pay ox for ox, and the dead one shall be his." There, too, there is an ox for the ox, and it means money. This is similar to Jacob's words to Laban: "I did not bring you any prey; I will take it from your hand, you shall demand it." Whatever is a sin (lack) he must make up for. And also in Job: "Your servant shall make restitution." In short, payment is always damage. In ransom, it is written giving. And also in punishment (fine) it is written giving: "Punishment, the husband of the woman shall be punished and given," and they shall punish him a hundred pieces of silver and a young woman's son to the father of the girl." Payment is in objects. Completing the lack (the burning, field or vineyard, ox). Money (ransom or punishment) is given and not paid.
And in the first chapter, in relation to whom is this the same one in which it is written: "And the dead shall be his"; there is a dispute there. It seems to me that the Gemara provides evidence for one of the sides, as it says, "Do not call me Yashlomna, but Yashlomna."
Contrary to the words of the Rambam, I believe that from the Rambam's commentary quoted, "You may think that I am avoiding calling them untrue, and whether the ruling issued to that extent is true or untrue, this is not a reason." Of course, they are indeed not necessarily true, but this is not the reason that they are not Torah (but rather that they are not the root, not the plain meaning of the Scripture). It is clear that they are not true, since a later Sanhedrin could interpret them differently.
I didn't understand the comment. Maimonides himself wrote that they are true. The fact that it can be disagreed with and interpreted differently doesn't mean it's not true. And that a simple interpretation cannot be disagreed with? What's the connection? This is the truth as far as I can get a handle on it.
I think that by "true" he means a message from the "Ma" (such as the simplistic interpretation of the CBS) that is certainly true.
On a similar matter, I still have a beautiful saying that I tell people in your name. Rabbi Michi said, "What is the difference between falpol and darsh?" Falpol is correct logic with a wrong conclusion, darsh is incorrect logic with a right conclusion.
Inaccurate wording. There's a column about that.
That's fine and dandy, but the fact that no scripture is beyond the literal meaning does not mean that the literal meaning of a scripture is the literal interpretation. "You shall not put a stumbling block before a blind man" can simply mean not to give advice that is unfair, etc., meaning that there is a level of meaning that is so strict in the words that it can negate the literal interpretation. It's like "You shall not curse a deaf person," in which even the literal meaning of a scripture expresses that no one should be cursed, even without him hearing.
True, if you understand "literal interpretation" in a very narrow way. But there are metaphors and various means of expression that are part of the literal interpretation.
The main part of the column is nice and requires some comments along the way. It turned out to be quite long, but I would like to ask for your answer at least regarding section A.
A. The words of the education minister. The speaker's words (followed by the p.d. of the Lord) are understandable, and they are not according to the understanding of the minister, and your conclusions that the explanations are puzzling, etc. will also be confirmed. The speaker says there that "cursed is he who makes a mistake and turns away on the road" deals only with a physical obstacle, and therefore one who makes a mistake in a prohibition and passes by "before turning away" is not "cursed" and therefore is not disqualified as a witness. But certainly before the ayur also includes a physical obstacle (and the one who violates this is disqualified from testifying). And just to explain why the Sages expanded “before the ayur” to include prohibitions and advice, and on the other hand did not expand “the error of the ayur”, the speaker comes and suggests that before the ayur it is written and fear your God, that is, a matter of a mitzvah or advice that is not fair since it is given to the heart (as in Rashi in the Pentateuch) and therefore they do not require it only as it is, but also expand it. [And by the way, also from the perspective of the sermon itself, since there is advice that is not fair, then certainly a physical obstacle is also included in it]. And everything falls into place peacefully.
[ B. After explaining the controversy between the Ramban and the Ramban, you wrote that many commentators, especially our contemporaries, etc., see the sermon as if it were the depth of the simple. This is essentially the apologetic approach (and not the fifth approach), and I have never seen a commentator in our time who holds to it. ]
3. The words of Rav Menashe of Ilya seem weak to me.
31. He said that the words of Rav Kahana in Shabbat 63 are an opening to try to interpret every verse according to its depth. I see no connection, and the intention of the Gemara in Shabbat is known and is not like that. There they deal with the verse “gird your sword on the thigh of a hero, your glory and the path” and insist that it is a parable about the words of the Torah. But of course, the parable itself must also be correct, and therefore it follows from the verse that even an ordinary sword is glory and honor for a hero. When one interprets that the verse is a parable and demands a parable, then of course the parable also remains true, since there is nothing to be said about something that is not true. If one compares the enemy to a lurking bear, then it is understood by the way that a lurking bear is a dangerous thing, and one should not compare the enemy to a bleating sheep. This does not at all contradict the sermon, but rather, it stems from the correctness of the sermon. Therefore, there is no room for any effort here, etc. (And one should consider what Rav Kahana thought in general).
32. The HaGal interpreted the verse as simply saying that worry speaks to the heart, and said that it is urgent because a woman will bathe in a bath, etc. But it is not so at all. It is simply that a person needs to speak out about the worry, and there is no pressing need (a worry in a person’s heart is something he will speak out about). And it really remains unclear why the Amoraim went out to preach sermons and on the right, which is the left. Or perhaps they just resorted to a fallacious language and explained how one communicates concern by diverting one's mind or by blaming others (and then it has nothing to do with urging and double interpretations, etc.). [And by the way, the Gemara does not contain the reading that concern communicates the heart].
C3. In any case, I do not understand why the Gra would resort to such a weak example, since in every sermon of the Sages there is some linguistic or interpretive reason. It is clear that in every sermon of the Sages they had some reason for inventing a sermon and did not just jump in to preach. Therefore, what the Gra found special here I do not know. An example of someone who sees a forest and says, "Look, here is a tree." [Here I am looking for, for example, "Do not read." In the tractate of Blessings on the Seder: ‘Blessed is the man whom you have chastened, O Lord, and from your Torah you have taught us’ Do not call us, teach us, but teach us from the Torah, learn what the Holy One, the Exalted, desires, oppresses us with afflictions, etc. That is, they interpreted chasten us as the language of afflictions and suffering, and then it became difficult for them to understand what afflictions are in the Torah, and they interpreted what they interpreted. ‘Whose name is Shemot in the land’ They demanded Shemot, and we were because it does not say desolation or soul. ‘There is no holy one so’ because there is no waste of you’ They demanded that there is no waste of you, not like the measure of flesh and blood, whose works of his hands waste it. And that is because in the Bible there is no word ‘biltî’ with a conjugated pronoun (baltuh baltem baltach) but only here ‘biltach’ which is strange and therefore they interpreted it as a verb biltui and then the pronoun biltach is added as usual as with any verb].
D1. The general idea of parallel interpretations from problems that each side has on its own is apparently already found in the Gemara explicitly “shemât mina terti” (in some of the appearances. And perhaps it is even the Maimonides”s comment that he called the body and more in the Midrash Bi'ah). In a search, I saw several examples of cases where each of the interpretations has some wrinkle in it and therefore both interpretations are valid.
D2. In translation, because by nature he cannot add linking and explanatory words (such as ‘and perhaps it should be interpreted differently’ and so on), then there are cases where he loads two interpretations and it seems that he intends to combine them as one. For example, Onkelos' translation in Genesis 11:11: ‘Forbidden to the vine of the city’; translated Yisrael to Carthage, etc.; Yehon Tzedikiya Sahor Sahor Liya. And Rashi wrote there; Onkelos translated in the King Messiah, they are the vine, Israel is the city, this is Jerusalem, and they translated in other ways, they are the vine, which righteous ones, etc. (and so in the following verse there). And Jonathan's translation, for example, in Jeremiah 23:10: ‘And their desire was evil’ Translated and on the word "for the evil of their souls" in Yishta Tithi Elahon, meaning that they ran (ran) of their own free will, evil will come upon them, a double interpretation of the word "in their running". And so in my opinion in Isaiah 22:18, "the crown of your head is a crown", translated by Yedai Minach, "the crown of your head" and "the crown of your head" and "the crown of your head" is a double interpretation of the matter of the crown, one as it is written in Ezekiel, "Take off the crown and lift up the crown"; and another that the enemies will surround him like a crown that surrounds the head, as the commentators wrote in "Keter" and "Keter" the language of the circle, "I will surround many bulls, the knights of Bashan, my crowns"; "Saul and his men will crown David". And the translation of the scrolls in Lamentations 1:1 "It was for the Mass" Translated Hadrat to Mehuy from Kicha and Mitan as Raga to Hun, a double interpretation of the word tax (the principle is the same but the word has two shades of meaning). And there 3:1a ‘Eini Olella לנפשי מכל בונטשי מכל בנות ירי’ translated on the destruction of all the fields of my people and the wicked in the land of Diroshalm I have come (yes to pepper). And there are other examples. This is a feature that I think is unique to translations and I do not know that they have emphasized it.
A. I did not examine the text in its entirety. My words dealt with the method presented in the Minach, according to which there is no prohibition of stumbling over a physical obstacle.
But now I have seen it in its entirety, and this is its language:
And it is possible to say that the author of the text read the word "dmsga" literally and not in a way that would lead to a prohibition, and that I read "delpani" literally because "hiksha" means "dharsh" because it is written "and fear your God" and as the commentators wrote because "he did not demand it as a stumbling over a blind person" but in a way that would lead to a prohibition.
From this it seems that the Minach is right. The author truly understands that "preni aivur" does not deal with stumbling over a physical obstacle at all (they did not demand it as a stumbling over a blind person) but in a way that would lead to a prohibition.
B. I have seen many like that. Mainly from the Gush rabbis who seek the depth of the Peshat. I think that Rabbi Shilat also follows this path. They try to show from comparisons and other broader considerations that the written Peshat is to take out mammon and not ein. You can see this through their method that justifies the Harash solely through difficulties in Peshat. In my opinion, this is not necessary (although it is possible, as we see in Gera). For example, if there is a Geshat under-under (eye under eye), then we can learn from it that it is mammon even without any difficulties in the Peshat interpretation and without comparisons to other places. And this is where your comment in section C3 was rejected (where you assumed that there is always a difficulty in Peshat that leads to the Harash. It is absolutely not necessary).
D2. Interesting.
A. Okay. But I understood this language as I wrote that it is not only required as it is (like the error of Ayor) but also expanded. Because in order to explain the Maharit there, the M’lam has no need to get to the point that before Ayor does not also deal with the failure; it is enough for him to say that the error of Ayor deals only with the failure. So why would the M’lam volunteer to invent unnecessary innovations for no reason?
In B2 I am not dealing with the qualities of the sermon but with the other diverse studies of the Sages. Not that I understand much, but wherever I remember that I happened to see a sermon, it was quite easy to find some wrinkle that led the Sages to it. I would rather be very surprised to see a collection of sermons without a basis.
I mentioned the Gezash. For example, La-La is a translation for a woman, and so are most of the other Gezash sermons. Incidentally, even the Kuch and Bnei then do not stem from wrinkles in the plain language, but from a similarity or hierarchy between the one who teaches and the one who teaches. It is true that there, in general, it is not a question of an interpretation parallel to the text, but rather a conclusion drawn from it (and indeed, why is this included among the qualities of the sermon).
Is there no difference between the halachic merits of the sermon and the rest of the sermon studies of Chazal? The merits of the sermon, including the textuality, are a world in themselves, but even the rest of the studies (which are both very diverse and do not necessarily follow tradition) are not always supposed to start from some problem in the verse? (Like ‘El Takri’ that I mentioned or all sorts of sermon interpretations ‘Veitve Lahishme Meshur Par’ – Mushofer, because what is the duplication of Sor Par). And this is of course not the apologetic approach but still parallel, the difficulty does not indicate the correctness or exclusivity of the sermon but only indicates a problem in the text itself.
By the way, I did not find a way to systematically scan sermons of Chazal that are not merits of the sermon, so I settled for searching ‘El Takri’. But I remembered that in one of the articles in Mida Tova that I read recently, your (great!) idea appeared to establish a general repository of all the sermons of the sages, categorized and cataloged. Has this progressed? Perhaps there is some institute that is interested in establishing such a Wikipedia?
I don't think there is a categorical difference between them. Furthermore, there are also other sermons that I think are not based on a crease but on a sabrah (for example, multiples, such as and shilach and shilcha regarding a messenger). I think that ’al takri’ is usually not really a sermon but a hint or a paraphrase, and as far as I remember there are definitely instances of it that are not based on creases (al takri bneich alala bonich, in the Midrash Aggadah. In my opinion, there is no difficulty in the plain meaning).
You are probably right (I need to get to know you better).
In ’Rabbi Shalom Benayech’ it should be said that the entire context deals with the building and therefore the sermon, it is not really a difficulty but rather that the sermon ties the verses together.
There are the four books of Ez Melamed, which, as far as I remember, collect all the sermons of Chazal, Tannaim, and Amoraim. But it is not sorted, of course.
A comment that for some reason was not commented on here
Many have commented that regarding corporal punishment (for example, the point of her paw) it is said, "Do not close your eyes," and it is surprising that this would be said about a financial obligation.
In the book of Mabuar, "She and Held," it is about a way that endangers his life, in which case he can be saved by cutting off his paw. Here, there is saving the persecuted, not punishment.
With best wishes, Yafa'r
What should have been noted? This is another excellent example, one of many, of what I wrote (that the sermon is not bound by the language of the verse).
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See the article on the website Daat
This is a link to a file on your computer. To access it, you need a link to a website or the title of the article to search.