More on Spiritual Solipsism – Second Follow-Up (Column 359)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In the previous column I began dealing with the issue of “We do not tell a person to sin so that his fellow will merit.” We saw there that this discussion has two axes: the degree of negligence (peshi‘ah) of the person being saved, and the severity of the outcome. Seemingly underlying these two axes are the two standpoints that are the subject of these columns: the global (outcome-oriented) perspective and the solipsistic one (negligence: why should I sin if the other is at fault?—one does not look at the world’s overall state). Most poskim think the main axis is that of negligence. By contrast, the מ”מ holds that the primary axis is the outcome.
I explained that according to none of the views here are we speaking of a wholly solipsistic perspective, nor of a fully globalist one. In this column we will enter additional discussions of the sugya and see further—and different—manifestations of those same conceptions and arguments.
Two extreme cases
We saw in the previous column that when there is no transgression whatsoever in my act (מ”ב on cooking versus baking), all poskim agree that I must act to minimize global harm (taking a cooked dish off the fire is not prohibited). The disputes arise only when the rescuer “pays the price” of a transgression for the sake of the one being saved. Conversely, when the other person has not sinned, it seems straightforward that I am obligated to act on his behalf even if there is some transgression in my deed. This can be discerned in the sugya about the obligation to commit transgressions due to pikuach nefesh (saving life), as we will now see.
Desecrating Shabbat for pikuach nefesh
In the case of slaughtering for an ill person on Shabbat, the act is a “sin” on behalf of someone who did not sin. There it is clear to all that I must “sin” to save him. One could argue that here it is not considered a sin, since Shabbat is set aside (dechuyah) before pikuach nefesh. But to the same extent, if halakhah rules that we do tell a person to sin so that his fellow will merit, that too is a halakhic directive. If so, it would seem we can infer from the pikuach nefesh sugya that according to everyone there is a globalist dimension to our considerations.
However, with respect to transgressions in cases of pikuach nefesh, the Talmud (in the sugya of Yoma 85) brings specific sources from which this dispensation is derived. That is, there is a special permit here and not reliance on a general globalist principle of “sin so that your fellow will merit.” According to this, the sugya of desecrating Shabbat is actually evidence in the opposite direction: by the principle of “sin so that your fellow will merit,” we would not have permitted desecrating Shabbat to save a life, and therefore specific sources are required to permit it.
But there the case is “sinning” in order to save my fellow’s life, not to prevent him from a transgression. This is a slightly different principle, though it obviously also stems from a global perspective. Moreover, the sources cited there could have been understood as permitting a person himself to desecrate Shabbat or commit a transgression to save himself. Yet the Gemara and poskim take for granted that the dispensation applies to everyone, i.e., there is no difference between the ill person’s desecration of Shabbat for himself and another person’s desecration of Shabbat on his behalf (as we saw in previous columns regarding slaughtering for an ill person on Shabbat). At least in this, we see a global view. The two principal rationales brought there in the sugya are: (1) Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya—“Desecrate one Shabbat on his behalf so that he will keep many Shabbatot,” which is a clearly global rationale: weighing and comparing outcomes regardless of questions of guilt and responsibility; (2) Shmuel—“and live by them” (ve-chai bahem), which could have been read as a solipsistic rationale, since it focuses on the consideration made by the person himself. Yet the Gemara nevertheless understands it as permitting desecration of Shabbat by other people as well. In other words, despite the differences, a distinctly globalist fragrance wafts from that sugya.
Furthermore, from the structure of the sugya it is evident that the law was obvious to everyone from the outset. The Gemara does not ask what the law is, but rather from where we know that it is permitted and required to desecrate Shabbat for pikuach nefesh. Afterwards various sources are adduced, and all conclude that there is an obligation to desecrate Shabbat. No one entertains the possibility otherwise. Moreover, all the sources—save the last—are rejected because they would imply that desecration of Shabbat is only permitted for certain pikuach nefesh and not for doubtful pikuach nefesh. That is, even prior to the sources, the Gemara took it as given that one must desecrate Shabbat even for doubtful pikuach nefesh. The sources serve only to buttress that directive. It is therefore hard to treat the pikuach nefesh sugya as a merely specific instruction derived from some textual source. The conclusion that naturally emerges is decidedly globalist.
Is this a permit to transgress?
On the face of it, the discussion in the Shabbat sugya is quite puzzling. It seems the question is whether the prohibition of rediyah (removing bread from the oven) remains in force even when the other person may incur a penalty of stoning, or not. But apparently, even if that prohibition was not formally suspended, we still have only a rabbinic prohibition on one side versus the other’s transgression that could incur stoning. Why should I not violate the rabbinic prohibition even if the Sages did not explicitly suspend it? One could permit it on the basis of a global consideration, without a special permit. This is all the more so when the “sticking” of the dough was deliberate; then the consideration is pikuach nefesh (saving the life of the one who stuck it on). [1] From the sugya it appears that if the prohibition remains in place even in such a case, the expectation is that we keep it. That is, in any case one cannot permit on the basis of a general principle of “sin so that your fellow will merit,” but only by virtue of a specific permission regarding rediyah in such a situation.
Yet the Gemara and the Rishonim do in fact compare this to other cases and prohibitions in which the principle that obligates one to “sin” to save another from a transgression is applied (as also indicated by the very language cited there: “Do we tell a person to sin so that his fellow will merit?”). If so, it is not clear whether there is truly an assumption that a special permission from the Sages is required in such situations, or whether the person is supposed to violate the prohibition even without a specific permit. [2]
From what the Sefer ha-Chinuch writes in mitzvah 490 in the name of the Ramban (his glosses to Shoresh 1), it seems that a special permit is required:
And it also seems from the Gemara that they routinely uproot their (i.e., rabbinic) words because of a biblical prohibition, as they said in tractate Shabbat (4a): if one stuck bread to an oven, they permitted him to remove it before he comes to incur the liability of stoning.
Simply read, it appears that the Sages uproot [their decree] because of a biblical prohibition, and not that there is a permission to violate [a rabbinic] prohibition even when it remains in force. This is also why he writes “routinely” (tadir), implying that it is not always and not automatically. If a rabbinic prohibition did not apply where a biblical prohibition is about to be violated, this would be a blanket rule that always applies, not something that merely happens “routinely.” Seemingly there is a non-global consideration here, for a global consideration would be a sweeping principle: we compare outcomes and choose the option with the better (or less bad) results.
The upshot of this view is that if the rescuer would have to violate a minor biblical prohibition, he would not be permitted to violate it to save someone else, or to save himself from a more severe prohibition. In rabbinic prohibitions—“they forbade and they permitted”—and only for that reason may one violate the prohibition. For a biblical prohibition we need a source to permit it, and absent such a source the global calculation by itself is insufficient. We saw the same above in the Yoma discussion of transgressions in cases of pikuach nefesh (though I qualified it there).
The מל\”מ (Mishneh la-Melekh), Hilkhot Terumot 3:17, proves that the prohibition to separate [tithes] not from adjacent (she-lo min ha-mukaf) is rabbinic:
“One does not separate the great terumah except from adjacent [produce]…” In Perek ha-Isha Rabba (Ketubot 93) they say: “So that you will learn… all the days” refers to Sabbaths and Festivals. And Tosafot there s.v. ela, in the name of R. Ḥananel, write that the verse comes to permit on Shabbat [separating] not from adjacent; and the Semag (positive command 134) wrote that on Shabbat and Yom Tov it is permitted to separate not from adjacent. But our master (Rambam) did not bring this distinction—see there in Rashi. And so too Tosafot in Perek ha-Gozeil u-Ma’akhil (Bava Kamma 115b) s.v. harei. And this law that one separates only from adjacent is from the Torah—Responsa Rashba 127. (Gloss: and so is proven from the Mishnah at the beginning of Ḥallah that one does not take from the pure for the impure, and the Ra’avad explains that this is lest he come to separate not from adjacent. Also Tosafot in Perek Kol ha-Get (Gittin 30b) write that for the great terumah the Torah requires adjacency, and for terumat ma‘aser the Sages required adjacency as a decree on account of the great terumah.)
And it appears from their words there that Rashi holds even the great terumah requires adjacency only rabbinically. And see in Perek Be-Kol Me‘arvin (Eruvin 32b) that R. Shimon b. Gamliel holds: “It is preferable to a ḥaver that an am ha-aretz commit a great transgression, and he himself should not commit even a light transgression,” which implies that there is at least a biblical transgression in separating not from adjacent. And it would seem to say that whenever the obligation of terumot and ma‘asrot is only rabbinic, we do not require adjacency; but we could say they instituted it akin to the Torah, as is proven from Tosafot in Perek Kol ha-Get, who ask from “ha-Mafkid,” which deals with fruit—implying it was obvious to them that in every case we require adjacency—and they hold that biblically only grain, wine, and oil are obligated, as the Rav ha-Meḥabber wrote above (2:…). And from the fact that the Gemara there asks “Were ḥaverim suspected of separating not from adjacent?” we cannot prove that adjacency is required in every case, from the fact that it does not establish it with fruit—for that is not correct, for the baraita speaks of a kor of ma‘aser, and the term “kor” applies only to wheat.
And from the Eruvin sugya cited, that R. [Shimon b. Gamliel] holds “it is preferable for the ḥaver to commit a light transgression than that the am ha-aretz commit a great one,” it follows that the law of adjacency is rabbinic—for in biblical prohibitions we do not say such a thing, as we say elsewhere: what difference between a prohibition with a mere lav or with karet? In the end he violated the word of the Merciful One.
His proof is from the fact that it is permitted to violate this (non-adjacent separation) to save the other from a severe prohibition. We see that in his view the rule that a ḥaver may do a lighter prohibition to save an am ha-aretz from a severe one is stated only regarding rabbinic prohibitions; in other words, he assumes a non-globalist principle.
However, he himself cites there Tosafot, Gittin 35b s.v. le-litrum, and Responsa Rashba I §127, who hold that separating not from adjacent is a biblical prohibition. According to them we see that the principle that a ḥaver commits a lighter prohibition to save an am ha-aretz from a more severe prohibition applies even to biblical prohibitions. Moreover, they do not appear to have any specific source for this; thus it must be a general principle directing us to decide on the basis of consequentialist-global considerations. According to them, in our sugya it is not necessary to say that the Sages specifically permitted removing the bread in order to save another from a prohibition, but rather that this is a sweeping principle: it is permitted to violate a light prohibition (rabbinic or biblical) to prevent a more severe one (biblical—and perhaps even a more severe rabbinic one).
Formal limits on the permission
One ramification of the two approaches is that if the comparison of weights is made by the private individual (and not by way of a specific permit from the Sages), then there will be no formal limits and requirements for this “overriding” (see Berakhat Avraham on the Shabbat sugya at the end of §1). For example, in the rule “a positive command overrides a negative command” (aseh dokheh lo ta‘aseh) there are various rules: some concern the severity of the negative command (whether it carries karet or death, or when there is a negative and a positive, or two negatives), and some are formal requirements (e.g., “be-‘idna”—that fulfilling the positive and transgressing the negative occur simultaneously). In our case that simultaneity is not present, for one person commits a transgression at one moment in order to prevent another’s transgression at a later time (that ultimately does not occur). Such an “overriding” stems from comparing severities, and therefore the formal requirements such as be-‘idna do not apply. Accordingly, there is room to argue that when a person confronts a clash between two negative commands, the lighter negative will yield to the more severe one even if it is not be-‘idna and the formal conditions of “overriding” are not met, because here the matter follows from comparison rather than the formal rule of dokheh.
Indeed, we explicitly find such a distinction in Tosafot, Pesachim 59a s.v. ati:
“The positive command of the Pesach, which entails karet, comes and overrides …”—Riva objected: at the moment the positive command of completing [the daily offering] is uprooted, the positive command of eating the Pesach is not being fulfilled, for it applies only at night. He answered that the case speaks of slaughtering the Pesach for him before they would push aside the positive of completion, for they slaughter and sprinkle for a tevul yom and a meḥusar kapparah according to all, even if he will not end up eating, since it depends upon him; and he is exempt from a second Pesach even if he did not eat. Therefore, when he offers his atonement he fulfills the positive command of Pesach, for then he is fit to eat; for if he could not offer [the atonement], he would not be fit to eat in the evening and the Pesach would be invalid. And R”Y answers that specifically with a negative command, which is stricter, we require “be-‘idna”—that at the time the negative is uprooted one fulfills the positive; but a strict positive overrides a lighter positive in any case, even if the strict positive is not fulfilled at the time one transgresses the lighter positive, as is shown in Ha-Sholeach (Gittin 38b) regarding Rabbi Eliezer, who freed his slave; and in Shilu’aḥ ha-Ken (Ḥullin 141a), that it would have overridden the positive of the metzora, which is stricter, for the positive of sending the mother bird—were it not that Scripture said “You shall surely send,” even for the sake of a mitzvah.
We see that for a positive overriding a negative, be-‘idna is required; but a stricter positive overrides a lighter positive in any case. The reason is that overriding a positive by a positive is a matter of comparison (a global consideration), not a formal “overriding” rule.
The view of Tosafot
So too in Tosafot, Shabbat there s.v. ve-chi, it is proven that they understood this as a general principle, for two reasons: (a) they do not distinguish between rabbinic and biblical prohibitions—they raise questions from the prohibition to free one’s slave, which is the neglect of a biblical positive command, and from the positive of completion, which is also biblical; [3] (b) they bring our sugya to challenge other sugyot where we do in fact tell a person to “sin so that his fellow will merit”:
“And do we tell a person to sin so that his fellow will merit?”—But in Be-Kol Me‘arvin (Eruvin 32b) Rabbi holds: “It is preferable to a ḥaver to commit a light transgression and not for the am ha-aretz to commit a serious transgression”—there it is so that the am ha-aretz will not eat tevel on his account, as he said to him “Fill this basket of figs for me from my tithed fruit.” But here, where the prohibition would not occur on his account, we do not tell him to commit even a light prohibition so that his fellow not come to a severe prohibition.
And Riva says that even for the one who stuck [the bread] himself, we cannot resolve from there to permit, for there the prohibition has not yet occurred, and it is better that he commit a light prohibition and a severe one not be committed on his account; but here the act of prohibition has already been done, and once it will be completed, he should not commit even a light prohibition actively.
And that which we taught in Ha-Sholeach (Gittin 41a): “One who is half slave and half free—we coerce his master and make him fully free,” and even though in that chapter (38b) R. Yehuda says: “Whoever frees his slave transgresses the positive command ‘They shall serve you forever,’” there the answer is that procreation is a great mitzvah, as is answered there concerning R. Eliezer, who entered the house of study and did not find a quorum of ten and freed his slave to complete the ten—a mitzvah of the many is different.
And one can also say that specifically where [the other] was negligent [do we say] “Do we tell a person to sin so that his fellow will merit?”—and then it fits what we say at the beginning of Tamid Nishḥat (Pesachim 59a), that the positive command of Pesach (which has karet) comes and overrides the positive command of completion, and the priests transgress the positive of completion and bring the atonement of a meḥusar kapparah so that he will bring his Pesach; and similarly at the end of Eruvin (103b), a priest in whom a wart was found—his fellow may cut it with his teeth even though it is a rabbinic prohibition.
And with regard to the woman half-maidservant and half-free, who behaved promiscuously, they coerced her master in Ha-Sholeach (Gittin 38b) because she was going around and making herself available to harlotry, and that is akin to those who are coerced, and it too is like a mitzvah of the many.
From the entire run of Tosafot (and not only because they mix rabbinic and biblical cases), it is apparent that we are dealing with a broad permission.
In practice it seems there is only one conception
Moreover, this is also implied by the Gemara itself: in the discussion no one seeks historical proof that the Sages annulled the prohibition of rediyah. The whole debate proceeds on the basis of the disputants’ own arguments and general considerations, not on the basis of historical inquiry. The decision whether the Sages permitted removing the bread is not grounded on sources demonstrating that, but on sevarot (e.g., “Do we tell a person to sin so that his fellow will merit?”). Thus, already from the Gemara itself it is clear that we are dealing with a general principle, not a specific annulment of the prohibition of rediyah.
It is reasonable that even according to the מל”מ, who holds that this rule applies only to rabbinic prohibitions, the permission is sweeping—just that it applies only to rabbinic prohibitions. Admittedly, this is not the plain implication of the Chinuch we cited, and this requires further thought. Perhaps he too means that this is a general permission, but there are times when the Sages “established their words in the face of Torah words” to strengthen their decrees (see, for example, Eruvin 21b and parallels: “The Sages strengthened their words more than [they strengthened the words of] the Torah”). And perhaps for this reason he writes that it depends on whether the Sages permitted or not.
If so, according to Tosafot (and the plain sense of the Gemara), it is evident that we are dealing with a general permission—only that there are different principles defining when it was permitted and when not (e.g., whether the other person was negligent; whether the transgression has already been committed, etc.). Seemingly a distinctly globalist conclusion emerges. But note: the “globalism” here is only in the kind of considerations. The conclusion, at least in some cases (such as the dough stuck to the oven), is that we do not tell a person to sin so that his fellow will merit. True, the discussion is global in character and does not deal with a specific permit for this or that prohibition; but the conclusion is not necessarily that the global consideration always permits. So what is the decisive line? Where does the global consideration permit and where not? Here we enter the words of Tosafot in our sugya cited above.
Two directions in Tosafot
Let us preface by saying that two opposite directions rise in Tosafot: in the first, the starting point is that we do not tell a person to sin so that his fellow will merit—unless he is guilty in his fellow’s sin (and if the transgression has already been committed, as with sticking the bread, then even in such a case we presumably do not tell him to sin). In the second, the starting point is the reverse: we do tell a person to sin—unless there is a special reason to forbid—and the reason given is that the one being saved was negligent.
Direction A: when I bear guilt for the transgression
Tosafot’s basic position in the first direction is that we do not tell a person to commit a light sin to prevent his fellow from a severe sin, save for exceptions. The main exception is when the rescuer himself bears guilt in the other’s sin. For example, when a ḥaver realizes that an am ha-aretz will eat tevel on his (the ḥaver’s) account (because he understood from him that it was tithed). In such a case, the ḥaver is permitted (and it seems he is even required) to commit the light sin of separating not from adjacent (whether that is rabbinic or biblical, as we saw disputed) in order to save the am ha-aretz from a prohibition.
Simply put, this is a permit intended so that the rescuer himself not incur “lifnei iver” (“placing a stumbling block before the blind”), and not merely to spare the other’s transgression (for otherwise we would permit him in any case). This would reflect a solipsistic perspective, since the bottom-line reason he is permitted to sin is for himself and not for the other. Preventing the other’s transgression (the global consideration) does not justify sinning; only saving myself from “lifnei iver” does. The consequence would be that if I bear guilt in the other’s transgression in a “one bank of the river” case (where there is no “lifnei iver”), perhaps I may not sin to save him—even though I am at fault in his prohibition. Another consequence: when the one being ensnared acts willfully (there is also “lifnei iver” in such a case), even though he too is at fault (the rescued was negligent), since there is a prohibition upon me, an obligation (or permission) is imposed upon me to sin to save him. In effect I am sinning to save myself.
But of course there is another possibility: I am acting for the other (and not for myself), but my permission to sin to improve his state is only because I am at fault in his sin. Otherwise I would have no permission to sin even for the sake of improving the other’s (and perhaps the world’s) condition. This is a consequentialist-global view, which we saw in the column before last: if each person focuses on improving his own state and “territory,” the global state will also be better. Therefore justification is required to sin—even if I am preventing a greater sin by another. The obligation to maximize the “spiritual outcome” should focus first and foremost on me. The consequence of this approach would be cases where I am guilty in the other’s sin but without “lifnei iver,” or when I could have prevented his prohibition and did not. In such cases there is no issue of saving myself from a prohibition, but there is my own guilt—and the question is whether that allows me to sin. If yes, then this approach should not be seen as solipsism.
Indeed, the author of Berakhat Avraham here infers from Tosafot ha-Rosh that the obligation to sin exists even when my “guilt” is only that I failed to prevent the transgression. That is, of course, a global perspective focused on preventing sin, not on saving myself from “lifnei iver.” But then why is my guilt in the other’s sin relevant at all? Seemingly the global consideration of minimizing transgressions suffices to permit. It seems we have a combination of the two principles, as we saw in the previous column in the מג\”א: the basis is preventing transgressions, which is what permits my sin; but the obligation upon me to sin in order to prevent the transgression arises because of my guilt. According to this, when the other acts willfully (so there is no absolute guilt on my part, though there is “lifnei iver”), I may be permitted to sin but not obligated. And when I am guilty in the other’s sin but not in a way that entails “lifnei iver,” then there is an obligation and not merely permission, because there is a consequential (global) interest in my sinning. Admittedly, Tosafot ha-Rosh’s language is that I am obligated to save the am ha-aretz from eating tevel, for if he eats, it is as if I myself were eating; thus again there is a flavor of solipsism (that the permit is in fact for me).
The weight of the averted prohibition: the UN Secretary-General or God?
Further on, Tosafot write that freeing a slave was permitted because the mitzvah of procreation is important:
And that which we taught in Ha-Sholeach (Gittin 41a): “One who is half slave and half free—we coerce his master and make him fully free,” and even though in that chapter (38b) R. Yehuda says: “Whoever frees his slave transgresses the positive command ‘They shall serve you forever,’” [we answer:] procreation is a great mitzvah, as is answered there concerning R. Eliezer, who entered the house of study and did not find ten, and freed his slave to complete the ten—a mitzvah of the many is different.
This answer is not clear, for in all these cases the averted prohibition is more severe than the one committed. What is special about procreation or a communal mitzvah?
Regarding a communal mitzvah, one can say there is a global consideration (saving as many people as possible from a prohibition differs from the comparison of severities of a single prohibition). But regarding procreation it is unclear. Perhaps procreation entails a multiplication of people, each of whom can perform mitzvot throughout his life, and is thus different from another severe prohibition (granted these are people not yet in the world—akin to the rationale of saving a life so that “he will keep many Shabbatot”). [4]
It seems to me that here a slightly different nuance of the globalist conception arises. The global consideration is not the sum of the world’s transgressions, but concern for all the people in the world (the spiritual state of as many people as possible, not improving the “spiritual state of the world” per se). Until now I presented the global consideration as the perspective from God’s point of view: the question is what my step does to the world, and thereby for God. Here we move to the question of what my step does to the spiritual state of other people. This brings us to the law of arevut (mutual responsibility) for other people’s spiritual state, instead of improving the world’s state in itself. In some sense we have moved from a duty between man and God to a duty between man and his fellow. One might say this is the viewpoint of the UN Secretary-General instead of that of God.
Direction B: where the other was negligent
Later, Tosafot bring a second direction, in which they assume that in principle one is permitted to sin to save one’s fellow—unless there is a special reason to forbid. The reason given here is that the rescued party was negligent. But when he was not negligent, one certainly “sins” to save his fellow. This is a globalist perspective, for the rule is that one should transgress a light prohibition to prevent another’s severe transgression, with negligence potentially limiting the duty. [5]
Here a globalist conception is presented, and therefore a person is permitted to sin to save his fellow. Yet justification is still required to impair my own spiritual state in order to do so, and therefore “guilt” is required. If I am responsible for my fellow’s impending transgression, the responsibility to prevent it falls upon me. Thus, this is not pure globalism. In addition to the global consideration of minimizing transgressions in the world, justification is required for my sin (namely, that I am responsible for the transgression liable to occur). Again, it seems we encounter the conception that this is a duty toward saving the fellow (and not toward God), and saving the fellow does not necessarily justify impairing my spiritual state (“your life takes precedence”); hence my guilt is required to justify it.
Is this principle based on arevut?
Seemingly, the permission to sin to save one’s fellow from the UN-Secretary-General perspective is based on the law of arevut (mutual responsibility). As noted, this is not a duty toward God but toward the other’s spiritual state. I do not mean to claim that one who is not part of arevut (such as women, according to some poskim) would have no obligation to save. But according to the conception that the perspective is God’s, the obligation to save is clearly unrelated to the contours of arevut. The duty is not to the fellow but to God.
The Mishnah Berurah, §655:3, writes:
And if his fellow has no lulav and it is outside the techum, if he has no money to buy one for himself, it is permitted for this one to send [a non-Jew]. But if he could have purchased and was negligent and did not purchase, we do not tell a person to sin so that his fellow will merit.
This, even though at the beginning there he wrote that for oneself it is permitted to tell a non-Jew to bring [it] from outside the techum.
And in the Sha‘ar ha-Tziyyun there, note 5, he asks:
Magen Avraham and Ḥayyei Adam: I do not understand what “sin” applies here; for we are commanded by virtue of arevut to see that our fellow Jew fulfills the Torah’s commandments, and if he lacks it, it is as if I lack it; and on this basis we can discharge one another in Kiddush and the like, as the Rosh wrote, Berakhot ch. 3. Granted that my fellow first sinned in not purchasing the four species on the eve of the Festival so that he not need to transgress a rabbinic shev ve-al ta‘aseh on the Festival, nevertheless after the fact, since he did not buy, he is himself obligated to send via a non-Jew to procure it. Consequently, just as he is obligated to procure it, so I am obligated to provide it [though he should pay for the messenger]. How then does “sin” apply here? It can be somewhat resolved, but the matter requires analysis.
Apparently he hinges this on the law of arevut, i.e., he understands that we are speaking from the viewpoint of the UN Secretary-General and not that of God. But according to our approach this is not necessary, since we have here a combination of two considerations: guilt and global utility. The global consideration does not look to justifications and does not distinguish between me and others, for this is God’s vantage point. But arevut is a duty toward one’s fellow—the Secretary-General’s vantage point, not God’s—and then justifications relevant to me also enter, and from the standpoint of arevut I am certainly not in the same standing as another person. My obligation to another is not at any price (“your life takes precedence”). In contrast, in global utility considerations—from God’s vantage point—it truly does not matter who commits the transgression.
A note from the Tashbetz
In Lesson 19 we cited the Tashbetz who discusses slaughtering for a sick person on Shabbat. He brings the view of the Ran, who prefers slaughtering over eating a neveilah (non-kosher carcass), because with a neveilah each olive-size is a transgression; and he raises two challenges: first, that this introduces variability (it depends on how much meat the ill person needs); and second, from our sugya:
“And the second difficulty: if the prohibitions of Shabbat and of neveilah would both be done by one person, one might say that it is better to push aside a capital offense by stoning than many lashes; but in our case it is not so, for the prohibition of neveilah is borne by the sick person himself, and the prohibition of Shabbat we push aside for his sake. It would be preferable that he push aside the lesser prohibition of neveilah himself to save his life, rather than that we push aside Shabbat for him. For that which is said in Eruvin (32b), ‘It is preferable for a ḥaver to commit a minor transgression and not for an am ha-aretz to commit a major one,’ applies specifically to that sort of case; but that a ḥaver commit a major transgression by desecrating Shabbat so that the ill person not commit a minor transgression by eating neveilah—there is no one who says such a thing. Even according to that Rav (the Ran) who says that many olives of [neveilah], which are many lashes, are more severe than one capital offense by stoning, still there is no one who would say that Reuven should commit even a minor transgression so that Shimon will merit—as we say at the beginning of Shabbat (4a) regarding sticking the bread to the oven: ‘Do we tell a person to sin so that his fellow will not die?’ Likewise in all similar cases they asked in Perek ha-Tekhelet (Menachot 48a) and in Perek ha-Ish Mekadesh (Kiddushin 55b). And that case of the ḥaver they already resolved in Tosafot: it was stated only in a matter where the am ha-aretz’s prohibition comes about through the ḥaver; but in another case we do not tell a person to sin so that his fellow will merit, or so that he not die. If so, on account of the multiplicity of the ill person’s lashes for neveilah, it would not be proper to permit others even a single negative command.”
He argues that even according to the Ran, there remains weight to the fact that I perform the slaughter and the ill person himself eats the neveilot. Better that the ill person himself commit several minor transgressions than that someone else commit one severe one. Seemingly he indeed introduces the solipsistic consideration. And the Ran, who did not hold so, apparently does not differentiate between whether I or someone else performs the transgression—he is a globalist. Again, here we are not dealing with arevut but with a global calculation (from God’s vantage point), and we already saw that in such a calculation there truly is no distinction between me and another (unlike with arevut).
Another kind of global consideration
Another source that addresses global considerations is in the קה\”י (Kehillot Yaakov), Berakhot §10. He discusses the permission to transgress on account of human dignity (kavod ha-beriyot). The general rule is that one may transgress by way of shev ve-al ta‘aseh (inaction) in order to preserve one’s dignity. The debate there is whether I may preserve my dignity by a shev ve-al ta‘aseh when, because of that, another person will come to a transgression by kum va‘aseh (active deed). A dispute is cited regarding the claim that another person’s kum va‘aseh is like my own kum va‘aseh. The assumption is that if another person commits a transgression by kum va‘aseh, it is as if I myself committed it by kum va‘aseh (similar to what we saw above in Tosafot ha-Rosh). Admittedly, there the discussion is not exactly a consequentialist-global calculation but about a kind of fusion between people: whether it matters to God who commits the kum va‘aseh transgression, so as to permit me on account of my dignity.
[1] In that sugya it is not clear whether the permission to sin is in order to prevent the other’s transgressions or to save his life. And even if it is to prevent the other’s transgressions, the question remains whether this is done out of a global consideration (minimizing the world’s transgressions) or as an obligation toward one’s fellow (to save him from the punishment he faces for those transgressions). There is evidence both ways in the commentators, but I will not enter into that here.
[2] See Column 351, where I brought Tosafot’s note in the sugya: they write that it is unreasonable to forbid the person himself to remove the bread, because he certainly will not listen to us (if he does not remove it, he is liable to die by stoning). There the case is that he will not listen due to his desire to live; here we have a similar situation where a person will not listen because he wants to save his fellow from a transgression (a global consideration) or his fellow’s life.
[3] True, in both of those situations we are dealing with positive commandments rather than negatives, but regarding the distinction between biblical and rabbinic, it is clear these are biblical laws, and therefore the notion “they said and they said” (i.e., the Sages may suspend their own decrees) does not apply here.
[4] Admittedly, each person begets only a few children, but they too have children, and so on ad infinitum—this amounts to very many mitzvot. Beyond that there is the categorical imperative: we judge every act as if it were to become a universal law (see Column 122). According to this, if we do not obligate everyone to strive for procreation, the global outcome will be problematic.
[5] In Tosafot, Gittin 41b s.v. kofin, they bring only this direction.
