Is the Torah a Guarantee of Proper Conduct (Column 356)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

In Columns 84 and 219 I already addressed the recurring problem in the writings of Rabbi Ratzon Arusi, who time and again pins the ills of our society and government on a detachment from the path of the Torah and from commitment to it. His method is always to point to a flaw in the conduct of the State of Israel today (and there are, alas, quite a few), and then to cite sources (relevant or not) in halakha that indicate the proper way, thereby “proving” that adherence to the Torah’s way would have solved all the maladies of the government and society, and that these are a consequence of detachment from the Torah. Of course, such words fall on receptive ears. What God-fearing Jew would refuse a reinforcement of the sanctity of our Torah and its absolute righteousness, and of the failures that arise in those who deviate from it? But intellectual honesty requires that even if the words are pleasant to the listener, they must be weighed on the scales of reason and not accepted merely because they fit one’s preconceptions.

Failure of the Democratic System (no less!)

Today I was sent another such “gem” from his beit midrash, this time about “the failure of the democratic system” (that’s the title), and mainly about the voting procedures in the Knesset and its dissolution. Here too, as I have shown in the past, there is no small amount of demagoguery, but beyond that these words also create a desecration of God’s name and habituate people to cling to slogans instead of thinking a bit. Therefore I saw it as my duty to once again set his words in their place—for the listener’s benefit.

His column isn’t long, so I shall quote it in full.

Hard as it is to believe, I can find in his words almost no statement that is logical. I will now try to show this by discussing the main points.

Is the comparison indeed between Torah law and Western democracy?

The most fundamental problem in almost everything Rabbi Arusi writes on these topics is fairness in the comparison he makes. He sets, one against the other, a governing system that functions in reality against some theory that has never been implemented. Democratic theory does not suffer from the flaws he listed, for those are the result of people and their practical shortcomings. And the practical functioning of the Torah on these matters has never been tested in the crucible of real-world practice.

If, for some reason, Rabbi Arusi wished to act fairly, he could have made the comparison on two different planes, in a way that does not suffer from the unfairness and methodological flaw of his comparison:

1. On the one hand, Rabbi Arusi could have compared halakhic theory to the theory of modern law and governance (a field in which he is an expert; Rabbi Arusi holds a PhD in law). I am quite sure the results would be entirely different. I am far from certain, to say the least, that in such a comparison Western law would come out on the losing end. Already the Ran in his Derashot (Derash 11) writes that sometimes the laws of the nations are more moral and more orderly than ours (because we aim to attain the matter’s divine component and not merely social order and civic repair).

Moreover, the Ran there writes that precisely for this reason halakhic jurisprudence requires, for its practical completion and implementation, the system of the king’s law (mishpat ha-melech) to remedy these deficiencies. Therefore even an ideal government conducted according to the Torah is not meant to adhere strictly to halakha. On the contrary, the role of the king is to deviate from halakha, because it is impossible to run practical life solely by halakha. The king’s law is a derivative of common sense and does not draw from the Torah. In this it resembles the royal laws of all nations, as the Ran writes. Hence, a practical government is not supposed to differ from a secular government of gentiles.

2. On the other hand, Rabbi Arusi could have compared Western-democratic rule (in Israel), which does in fact function, to a Torah-based rule that in fact functions. Admittedly such a state probably never existed, and if it did, it was in the distant past, with no detailed documentation of what exactly transpired. But if we take the events described in the Bible, we can honestly say this is not the pinnacle of morality and civic and social repair. The prophet perhaps, but the king usually not—even those kings who “did what was right in the eyes of the Lord.” Is the story of David and Bathsheba suitable as the alternative that Rabbi Arusi proposes to Western democracy? Or perhaps Ahab and Jezebel? One could say this happened precisely because the king did not obey the Torah, but that is precisely like waving the tautology that “a religious person cannot be a thief, because if he steals then he isn’t religious.” And if we are dealing in tautologies, we could just as well say that Western democracy is perfect, and the failures result from people being wicked and not behaving properly and not adhering to its directives.

Happily, however, we still have the possibility of making this practical comparison. Take the religious/ultra-Orthodox members of Knesset and tell me whether they conduct themselves properly—i.e., are not afflicted by the flaws Rabbi Arusi described? Does conduct “according to the Torah” save them from these defects, as opposed to their wicked secular colleagues (cf. “accursed evildoers”)? Of course not. But again, I am sure Rabbi Arusi will explain this is because they do not act according to the Torah. To which I reply that the secular MKs fail because they do not act according to the norms of Western democracy. Once more we are dealing with an unhelpful tautology. And what about the conduct of the Chief Rabbinate, of whose council Rabbi Arusi himself is a member? There all the members are rabbis who all cleave to Torah and halakha, and there we surely have a beacon of justice and integrity—a real light unto the nations. As is well known, the Rabbinate conducts itself with clean hands and without tricks. All votes are substantive; there are no intrigues, no failures or defects. Joking aside, everyone understands that its conduct is far worse than that of the Knesset: no transparency, no clean hands, monopolistic heavy-handedness, no proper procedures, and more and more—all in the name of the Torah by its standard-bearers. There you have a practice-to-practice comparison; I leave you to draw the conclusion.

And again one could say it is only because they deviate from the Torah’s path. To which I reply once more that the failures in democracy stem from the deviation of wicked people from the proper norms therein. Rabbi Arusi must decide: is he focusing on theory or on practice? On the Torah or on the people who implement it? One cannot, tendentiously, take theory on one side of the comparison and practice on the other, just so the comparison will yield the result one desires.

For some reason, however, Rabbi Arusi chose to make neither of these fair comparisons, but rather to make an unfair comparison between a Torah-halakhic theory and Western-democratic practice. In this way I can likewise show the superiority of secularism over religiosity, for Rabbis Moti Elon, Berland, the rabbi from Tzfat, and a few other rabbis sexually harassed youths and women, despite being revered rabbis; whereas secular theory views sexual harassment most negatively. It (the theory) is pure and clean as snow. There you have an unfair comparison between A’s practice and B’s theory. With this you won’t get far. It is hard for me to believe Rabbi Arusi did not notice the happy fact that theories are almost always perfect, and the less happy fact that in practice, when people are involved and not theories, there are usually quite a few problems and failures.

An example from The Kuzari

In The Kuzari, Essay I (sec. 113), the Ḥaver denounces the conduct of the nations as violent and forceful—“contempt, suffering, and killing”—and as characterized by the boasting and aggressiveness of kings, and more. By contrast, we Jews are poor, humble, and modest.

The Khazar king answers him:

114. The Khazar said: That would be so if your submission were voluntary, but it is coerced; and when you find the power, you will kill.

The Khazar explains to the Ḥaver that he is making a comparison between Jewish theory and the practice of the nations. Our theory advocates humility, peace, and proper treatment of every person, but this has never faced a real test, since we have not had our own government and power, and therefore we had no option to wield them against others. It is very easy to sit in an armchair and disseminate perfect opinions and principles. The question is what will happen when this faces a practical test.

And to this the Ḥaver honestly replies:

115. The Ḥaver said: You have found the place of my disgrace, King of the Khazars. It is so: had most of us accepted poverty as submission to God and on account of His Torah, the divine matter would not have left us for such a long time…

Indeed, an unfair comparison. But I think a logical error is not the disgrace here. The disgrace is apparently the demagoguery, for the Ḥaver tried to present Judaism as superior to the nations by virtue of an unfair comparison that does not withstand the test of facts. Remind you of anything?…

Beyond this fundamental problem, there are also some local problems in Rabbi Arusi’s words, and here I will address the two main ones. As will be seen immediately, these points also connect to his fundamental flaw.

Is the decision to dissolve the Knesset disgraceful?

Contrary to his claim, the vote to dissolve the Knesset did not have disgraceful results. On the contrary, the decision to dissolve the Knesset is the necessary outcome in our situation, in which there is no governability and no way to run the state properly. The voters did not enable the elected officials to build a reasonable coalition, and the results of the previous elections dictated most of the failures in the current situation. The reason there are four rounds in two years is the distribution of voters’ ballots that did not yield a decision, not any substantive defect in democracy. For this reason I also see no flaw in the applause in the plenum when the decision to dissolve the Knesset passed. That is the appropriate reaction to a major repair effected by that decision. The continued tenure of a government and Knesset that do not function is the failure—not going to elections.

Moreover, our elected officials are indeed not great luminaries, neither intellectually nor morally, and they act in disgraceful ways in various aspects. But this has not the slightest connection to the democratic system. It is the result of the individuals operating on the ground. Incidentally, the kings who ruled over us in the past did not look any better—far from it. The intrigues of our present-day rabbis do not seem to me essentially different from the intrigues of our secular rulers. Nor are the actions of our rabbis generally more proper and wiser than those of our rulers. In short, human nature is all of one mold.

Rabbi Arusi is right that in a regime of “our holy Torah” there is no problem of four elections in a year, simply because they do not hold elections there. We’re talking about a king born into the right family (of the House of David). If one wishes to replace the king, it is done in a far more enlightened and elegant fashion than in our failing democracy: one simply rebels against him and/or assassinates him. Indeed, not a bad system—but for some reason I nevertheless find within myself a slight preference for a situation of four elections in two years. Rabbi Arusi prays that our erring brothers will discover the Torah’s luminescence and replace their loathsome democracy with the Torah system. I must say that at least on this plane I very much prefer the failing democratic system, despite all its limitations and flaws. And thus I find myself praying that our “correct” brothers will not happen to discover the Torah and its virtues and decide to become our erring brothers and forgo democracy. May the Merciful save us from such a thought.

Abstention in voting

Rabbi Arusi asserts that according to our holy Torah there is no such thing as abstaining in a vote, not in a court and not in any judicial or governmental body. First, I do not see why this is an advantage. He somehow assumes that abstention is a terrible defect, whereas in my view it is a reasonable mode of conduct for one who has no position on the matter. Coalition discipline appears to Rabbi Arusi as the footsteps of the Messiah—as if it were one of the Ten Commandments and a foundation of universal morality—whereas to me it looks like the government’s coercion over the parliament, freezing the status of the members of Knesset and neutralizing the Knesset from its main role. Thus the government forces the Knesset to say “amen” to all its decisions (in Column 300 I explained that in our country there are in fact two branches of government, not three; the legislative branch does not exist). And in the opposition it neutralizes the positions of rank-and-file MKs relative to the party leader (who is sometimes not elected in primaries at all). But for Rabbi Arusi, everything that happens here is a failure, through and through. He turns light into darkness and darkness into light—and he does so in the name of “our holy Torah.” I am astonished!

As a rationale for his peculiar position, he brings the argument that in elections we vote for party lists and not for specific individuals. But not for nothing are the people chosen to serve in the Knesset within the framework of the parties (in the party center or in primaries, each party according to its system). Otherwise there would be no need for members of Knesset at all. Each party (who is the party if not the members? the party center?) would decide its stance on the matter at hand and we would only need to count parties, not people. We could simply shut down the Knesset. This is a ridiculous system—morally and logically—but in Rabbi Arusi’s eyes it is the ideal model, and any deviation from it is a disgrace and a failure. Turning light into darkness and darkness into light—did I already say that?

But even on the merits: whence did he derive his conclusion that according to “the holy Torah” one cannot abstain in votes, and that if someone says he does not know he is replaced? Only from his own overactive imagination. In Choshen Mishpat §18:1 it is written that if a judge says “I do not know,” two more judges are added. That is, one does not appoint a judge in his place; rather, two more judges are added to the panel to reach a decision by three. The reason is explained by the commentaries there (see the Sema, sk. 3, and more): the decision must be reached by three judges. In other words, this is not a moral principle but a rule concerning the number of judges. How does he infer from here that abstention by an MK is a moral failure? And what does this have to do with the argument he raises that in elections we vote for a faction and not for a person? Even if that argument were logical (it decidedly is not), what is the connection between it and the rule about a judge who says “I do not know”?

And altogether, what alternative does he propose? Does Rabbi Arusi expect that a member of Knesset who truly has no clear position should nevertheless vote? Or should we replace him, for this specific vote, with another person? How will we choose him? Will the party leader pick someone suitable for this specific vote? Is that a serious proposal? To say that these are “astonishing” words would be the understatement of the century. Or perhaps Rabbi Arusi expects, as we saw earlier, that decisions will not be made at all by the members’ votes but rather by the weight of the faction’s collective position—period—without votes? Beyond the fact that this is nonsense on both the moral and practical levels, does he think this alternative fits the laws of the Torah? Where did he find this mechanism in the Shulchan Aruch?

And beyond all this, how does he expand this rule, said with regard to a judge in a court, to votes in governmental institutions? Did he read this by skipping letters in the Torah, or between the lines of the Talmud? And even if halakha indeed stated this explicitly, in Choshen Mishpat §17:22 it is written that a community can accept invalid witnesses—head-on against Torah law. Can it not establish that abstention is also permitted in votes? Rabbenu Tam, for example, holds that decisions in a community must be accepted unanimously (we do not follow the majority). That is, the rules for court votes do not necessarily apply to votes in communal bodies. Is the impossibility of abstaining a mandatory rule that cannot be stipulated otherwise even in communal institutions? Many poskim wrote that in communal institutions decisions can be made without the minority’s presence. Yet when one voter abstains, Rabbi Arusi claims the decision cannot be made.

For the difference between majority rule in court and majority in communal enactments, see the explanation in Columns 66, 69, and 79. I showed there that these are two entirely different realms that do not intersect. Needless to say, on this plane a vote in the Knesset is not similar to a vote in a court (does Rabbi Arusi propose to disqualify women from serving in the Knesset because they are disqualified from judging?! And perhaps, by his logic, there should be no votes or deliberations at night?), but rather to a vote in communal institutions.

And beyond all that, even if we were to find that in communal enactments there is an absolute rule forbidding abstention, that rule itself emerged from the sages’ common sense and not from a halakhic source (as with all rules of communal governance). If so, Rabbi Arusi is in fact criticizing the democratic system on the basis of common sense and not on the basis of the Torah. One can of course argue about what common sense dictates, but in any case there is certainly no contrast here between democracy and the Torah’s system. In general, in Column 164 I showed that communal enactments are not part of halakha and that halakha has nothing to say about them. The presence of these topics in the Shulchan Aruch is the unfortunate result of a historical accident, nothing more—certainly nothing that pertains to Torah jurisprudence, and still less to “our holy Torah.”

And here we return to Rabbi Arusi’s fundamental flaw. We saw that his main failure is to compare democratic practice with Torah theory. We now see that the “theory” in question is not a Torah theory at all but simply common sense (in his view). And thus the circle closes. Note the logic of the move:

1. Rabbi Arusi claims: Our holy Torah says one must not abstain in a vote.
2. I ask him: How do you know?
3. He answers: Because that is what common sense dictates.
4. I reply: Then the democratic system dictates it as well.
5. And he of course asks: How do you know?
6. And I answer without blinking: Because that is what common sense dictates.
7. So he asks: But in practice this does not happen?
8. And I ask: And in the Torah world does it happen in practice? It does not happen there because there is no regime that actually operates on the Torah system.
9. goto 1.

And at the margins of the discussion I wonder: In the municipalities of Bnei Brak, Beitar Illit, Kiryat Sefer, and the like—there is no possibility of abstaining in votes? Needless to say they conduct themselves in the most enlightened and proper fashion, in full adherence to “our holy Torah” in every aspect. So surely one cannot abstain there either, right? It would be worthwhile to inform them what “our holy Torah” says on this matter.

It is hard to believe these words came from the pen of a learned person, a rabbi in Israel, a PhD in law, and a member of the Council of the Chief Rabbinate (actually, it is not that hard to believe). And it is even harder to believe that someone bothers to print these words and read or listen to them seriously. And so I have written what seems correct in my humble opinion.