A Look at Kula and Chumra and at Halakhic Ruling: A. Defining the Concepts (Column 741)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

A few days ago I was asked in the Q&A a question that concerns defining the terms “kula” (leniency) and “chumra” (stringency). This is an opportunity to conduct a more systematic and thorough discussion of these concepts and their ramifications. My basic claim appears in an article that dealt with these notions, where I showed that this has implications for understanding the role of a decisor (posek) and the very nature of halakhic ruling. The starting point is the ambiguity and lack of clarity that exist among us regarding these terms, as will be seen shortly, and this column is dedicated to dispelling that fog.

What Is a Kula: An Initial Intuition

At first glance, a ruling toward leniency is the ruling that is more convenient for the questioner (the one that exacts the lowest “price”). This raises the question of how that “price” is determined, for such a price is in the eye of the beholder. For example, it is told of the previous Rebbe of Sanz–Klausenburg that he sat in the sukkah even when it rained (despite the exemption of mitzta’er—one who is distressed), because for him it was more distressing not to be in the sukkah on the festival. If such a person faces a rabbinic doubt in which one should rule leniently, is his leniency to sit in the sukkah or to be exempt from sitting? By contrast, the Lubavitcher Rebbe did not sleep in the sukkah during the festival, on the grounds that sleeping in the sukkah with the or ha-makif (encompassing light) causes him distress. We see that there are Jews for whom their “comfort” is precisely the performance of the mitzvah; for such people, is going to a leniency to perform the mitzvah or to be exempt from it?

One could resolve this by saying that the opinions of such rebbes are nullified in the face of the average person, and the terms “kula” and “chumra” are determined by the reasonable person who certainly does not relate to things this way. If we accept that, the question shifts to the psychological plane: why does the reasonable person see refraining from sitting in the sukkah as a leniency rather than a stringency? But here I wish to address the question from a substantive angle: why is that truly a leniency? In other words, why does halakhah itself view it that way? Is this merely the psychology of the addressee of halakhah, or is there a more substantive halakhic definition here?

On Leniencies That Look Like Stringencies

To sharpen the matter, consider a passage from a story brought at the end of the first volume of the Brisk Haggadah, Beit Levi (edited by M. M. Gerlitz):

We can only imagine the reaction of that “Maskil” upon hearing these “leniencies.” But our concern here is not with stories of Maskilim; rather, it is with the interesting halakhic angle that peeks through here. In the halakhic context one may ask why the feeling that arises in us is one of irony, jest, or a brush-off. After all, the Beit HaLevi did indeed permit what others forbade. So why is it so clear to us that these are not leniencies?

Is the Definition of a Kula Tied to a Conflict of Interests Between Us and Halakhah?

The initial sense is that we ostensibly stand “opposite” halakhah, and therefore the halakhic interest is always a stringency, whereas our interest (=convenience) is a leniency. Is that really the basis for defining a leniency? To show that this is not the case, consider the laws of blessings. The rule in halakhah is that in cases of doubt about blessings we rule leniently (“safek berakhot le-hakel”; see Berakhot 21a and the poskim). Now we must ask ourselves: what does it mean to be lenient in a blessing? Is the leniency that one may recite a blessing out of doubt, or is the leniency not to recite it? All the poskim hold that the leniency is not to recite the blessing. That is, if a person holds an apple in his hand and does not remember whether he recited a blessing or not, it is forbidden for him to bless. This directive bears the heading “leniency” (“in doubtful blessings we are lenient”). Why is this truly a leniency? It would seem to be a stringency, for it forbids us to do something.

To understand this, let us consider what other options exist. One possibility is that it would be permitted to bless; another is that it would be obligatory to bless. An obligation to bless is also a stringency, since it requires something of us. We might therefore have expected that if we rule leniently in the laws of blessings, the ruling should be that it is permitted to bless but not obligatory. It would then seem that in the Gemara itself—not only among “those wicked Maskilim”—the leniency is not to perform the mitzvah; that is not just the approach of ordinary people like us who pursue comfort. The Gemara itself views exemption from a mitzvah as a leniency.

A Kula Is the Opening of the Maximum Halakhic Options

However, a closer look shows that blessings are a more complex case, because if we were to permit blessing, such guidance carries the price of a blessing in vain, which is prohibited because of “lo tisa” (“You shall not take [God’s name in vain]”). The poskim dispute whether its prohibition is biblical or rabbinic, with the verse serving only as an asmakhta. This opens the possibility that the true meaning of the rule “in doubtful blessings we are lenient” is that there is no obligation to bless, not that it is forbidden to bless (as we saw above, that is the only possibility that can be viewed as a leniency). But in this specific case, if there is no obligation to bless, then the blessing would be one we are not obligated in; therefore, if we nevertheless bless, we transgress because of “lo tisa.” That is why we are forbidden to bless. The ruling here thus consists of two layers: in the laws of blessings there is permission to bless and permission not to bless—hence a leniency in the laws of blessings. But layered atop that is a stringency in the laws of “lo tisa,” and therefore if there is an option not to bless it becomes forbidden to do so. Hence, the bottom line is that one may not bless.[1]

The conclusion from this picture is that a ruling of leniency in doubtful blessings means there is no obligation to bless, not that it is forbidden to bless. The prohibition to bless is a stringency, not a leniency; it is the result of a stringency in the laws of “lo tisa.” As noted, a ruling that one must bless would also be a stringency. What, then, distinguishes permission to bless? An obligation or prohibition to bless leaves us with only one option and excludes all others. By contrast, permission to bless opens two options for us (it excludes none): both to bless and not to bless.

The conclusion is that a ruling toward leniency is the ruling that opens before us the maximal halakhic options. In the case of doubtful blessings, the ruling is permission to bless; that is, one may bless and one may refrain. The resulting prohibition to bless is not because of the laws of blessings, but because of the prohibition of “lo tisa.” You can now see that the ruling in the laws of blessings is indeed lenient (since it leaves us two possibilities).

An Interpretive Ramification

In light of our conclusion, we can understand a puzzling phrase used by the Rishonim regarding the blessing of thanksgiving (HaGomel) in Berakhot 54b. The Gemara there deliberates whether the blessing must be said before ten, or ten of whom two are Torah scholars, or before twelve (ten plus two scholars):

Abaye said: One must give thanks before ten, as it is written: “And let them exalt Him in the congregation of the people,” etc. Mar Zutra said: And two of them must be rabbis, as it is said: “And in the assembly of elders let them praise Him.” Rav Ashi challenged: But say that all of them must be rabbis! Is it written “in the congregation of elders”? It is written “in the congregation of the people.” But say: Ten from the rest of the people and two rabbis!—The matter remains difficult.

And behold, in Tosafot s.v. “Ve’eima,” there, they ruled as follows:

And we act stringently, and even if there are not two rabbis [he should still bless before ten].

That is, in their view the ruling is to be stringent, and therefore one should bless before ten laymen even if we do not have two Torah scholars.

By contrast, Tosafot ha-Rosh there wrote:

And since it was not resolved for us, to be stringent we require both [ten and two scholars].

That is, in his view a stringent ruling means that both ten and two scholars are required.

Among the Acharonim there, some wondered how the stringency is being defined. For example, the Tzelach there writes:

Tosafot s.v. “Ve’eima: in ten and two rabbis,” etc.—“And we act stringently and even if there are not two rabbis,” etc. I do not know how to explain Tosafot’s intent: what sort of stringency is it to bless without two rabbis? Behold, in all cases of doubtful blessings we are lenient and do not bless out of doubt because of “lo tisa”… It seems this is the intent of the Rosh and the Tur, that we act stringently and require both [ten and two scholars]. But this, too, is difficult: what stringency is there—behold, he is not blessing! And even though the law is correct that in doubtful blessings one does not bless, nonetheless it is called a leniency, as all the poskim write: in doubtful blessings we are lenient.

He does not understand Tosafot’s view, nor that of Tosafot ha-Rosh. Regarding Tosafot, who instructs to bless before ten, he is troubled by the content of the ruling: this is a ruling to be stringent, which seems to contradict the rule that in doubtful blessings we are lenient and do not bless. As for Tosafot ha-Rosh, his claim is that the phrasing is unclear: his ruling is a leniency rather than a stringency, for he instructs not to bless before only ten. So why does he call it a stringency? In the end he leaves the matter as “requiring further analysis.”

But according to our approach, at least the terminology is clear. Tosafot’s intent is to be stringent in the laws of blessings (and therefore he requires blessing before ten), whereas the Rosh is stringent in the laws of “lo tisa” (and therefore forbids blessing when there are not twelve). Note that each of the two rulings is indeed stringent, for each leaves fewer options with respect to the norm under discussion (according to Tosafot ha-Rosh this is a stringency regarding “lo tisa,” and according to Tosafot it is a stringency regarding the obligation to bless), and therefore each describes its own position as a stringency.

The halakhic question regarding Tosafot still remains: why do they rule stringently here despite this being a case of doubtful blessings? It may be that this is not a ruling out of doubt. For some reason Tosafot determines the halakhah like the view that ten suffice and therefore rules accordingly. Indeed, in the language of Tosafot ha-Rosh it is explicit that this is a ruling out of doubt, but not so in Tosafot. Likewise, the Rambam and, following him, the Shulchan Arukh rule that one should bless before ten of whom two are scholars; they do not require twelve. That is, they too issue a ruling that does not align with the rules of doubtful blessings. Beyond this, it may be that the debate about how it is best to bless does not imply that if one blessed before a different forum it would be a blessing in vain. After all, one was saved and the blessing is needed and appropriate. Perhaps because of this, Tosafot hold that here there is room to be stringent and require blessing even before a more limited forum. In doubtful blessings we are lenient, and therefore in principle one may bless and may refrain. But in either possibility there is no “lo tisa” issue, and therefore they rule, out of doubt, to bless.

In any case, irrespective of how this fits with the rules of doubtful blessings, according to our approach to understanding the terms “chumra” and “kula,” the phrasing of the two positions is entirely understandable.

The Relation Between Kula and the Fulfillment of Interests (Convenience)

When we speak of a ruling toward leniency, this is a relative matter, not an absolute one. One can only ask the comparative question of whether ruling A is more lenient than ruling B, or not. In such a comparison, the definition of the more lenient ruling is that ruling which allows more halakhic options—that is, which imposes fewer constraints—whether those are options to perform or options not to perform. Opening options for action is a leniency just as much as opening options for inaction. Adding an option that permits something is a leniency, but adding an option that forbids something can also be a leniency.

If we now return to the story about the Beit HaLevi, surprisingly our conclusion is that indeed that list consists of leniencies. In all those cases he rules that it is permitted to bless or to pray; he does not rule that one is obligated to do so. These are leniencies that allow performance rather than inaction, but as noted, these too are leniencies, for they open options that the alternative ruling would forbid. The reason such leniencies are not beloved to someone who stands “opposite” halakhah is that if there is indeed an option to perform the mitzvah, it is reasonable to assume that God expects (and perhaps even commands) us to do so. If there is an option to fast two days in a doubt regarding Yom Kippur, it is reasonable to assume that halakhah expects us to do so to discharge our obligation. Thus, in practice the opening of an additional option results in the creation of an obligation to fast another day, which in the bottom line appears as a stringency. But as we saw in the context of the laws of blessings, here too this is a side effect and not the direct consequence of the lenient ruling. The very ruling that it is permitted to fast two days is indeed a leniency, for it opens another option that the alternative ruling would forbid.

As an aside, I note that a situation in which more options are open to us is indeed more convenient for us, also on the psychological plane. Not necessarily because we like not doing mitzvot, but because the absence of constraints is indeed an objective leniency. This does not necessarily stem from our seeing ourselves as standing “opposite” halakhah—that is, that our interests are opposed to its interests. As we have seen, sometimes the options that open up allow us precisely to perform some mitzvah, and even so it is a leniency. Thus, the halakhic ruling toward leniency is in no way set against the halakhic interest, and it is not correct to identify a leniency with convenience and personal interest or with fear of Heaven. If there is a person who prefers convenience over performing mitzvot, then if two options are open before him (to perform or not to perform a mitzvah) he will prefer not to perform. But that is a trait of his and not a direct result of the lenient ruling. The person’s decision about what to do with the options opened before him by the lenient ruling reflects his spiritual tendency. But that belongs to the psychological sphere of the discussion. The classification of the ruling itself as a leniency is not connected to questions of convenience and interest or to fear of Heaven; it lies entirely in the objective halakhic sphere.

Up to this point I have defined the terms “kula” and “chumra.” In the next column I will address the ramifications of this definition for halakhic ruling and its meaning, and for the role of halakhic decisors.

[1] There are poskim who hold that the prohibition of an unnecessary blessing (berakhah she-einah tzerikhah) is not biblical, and therefore they permit blessing in such a situation, since the doubt concerns a rabbinic prohibition. See, for example, Nishmat Adam, §624, Klal 5 §1, in the view of Tosafot Rosh Hashanah 33; and Penei Yehoshua Berakhot 12a; and Drisha, Orach Chayim §29, note 1. There are, however, those who maintain that even though this is a rabbinic prohibition, it is nevertheless forbidden to bless, on the grounds that this rabbinic prohibition is more severe. See Sha’ar ha-Tziyun §215:21, and Ha’amek She’elah §53, Parashat Yitro, in the view of the author of the She’iltot.