A Further Look at the LGBT Phenomenon (Column 744)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

Dedicated to my dear son, Yosef,

a devoted member of Rabbi Elaluf’s community

A few days ago I was sent a lecture recording by Rabbi Guy Elaluf (interestingly, there is still no Wikipedia entry about him; for anyone interested, it’s high time). The lecture dealt with the LGBT phenomenon. Over the past few months I’ve become acquainted with this fascinating figure (he has many classes and talks on YouTube), so the lecture piqued my curiosity. He is a young rabbi (around forty), highly original and learned, a lecturer in the study of religion at Tel Aviv University, a person of impressive integrity and candor, and in particular I appreciate that he does not fit into conventional sociological boxes—and perhaps because of that I feel a certain kinship with him and his ideas. After listening to the lecture, I realized that this is also the case in the LGBT realm. I identify both with his critique of the phenomenon and with his (implicit) critique of its conservative detractors. Even so, I felt that this lecture contained many points presented imprecisely, and precisely because I value the man and identify with the lecture’s direction, I thought it worthwhile to write a detailed critique here in order to sharpen matters.

In the past I have addressed the LGBT phenomenon more than once, and I recommend, to those who have the stamina, to go back and read what I wrote in columns 497, 504, and 701 – 702 (the second deals only with halachic applications). There will be no novelties here on that topic. My aim here is mainly to practice critical thinking—somewhat about the phenomenon, but mostly about the lecture itself. This column follows the lecture in the order it was delivered. As always, I suggest listening to the lecture before reading my critique.

On Facts and Their Interpretation

In the first six minutes of his talk, Rabbi Elaluf presents two assumptions on which he intends to build his remarks:

1. The world exists. There is reality. He apparently intends to push back against extreme postmodernism and say that not everything is our hallucinations and interpretations. There are also objective facts.

Along the way he adds, almost offhand, that his remarks pertain to the material world, but here I neither accept nor understand why he needs this caveat. It implies that in what is non-material there are no objective facts. What about the existence of will, emotions, the soul? Or of God? One can also wonder about morality and values, though that is a more delicate discussion.

1. There are facts, which are solid and objective and bind us all, and there are interpretations of them that depend on each of our perspectives. For example, when you release a pen in the air it falls to the ground. This is an objective fact that cannot be denied. There is an interpretation of this fact, namely that there is a force of gravity that causes the fall. In this case it is a scientific interpretation. Rabbi Guy argues that the law of gravity is by no means a fact. He adds that the interpretation does not necessarily exist (?). At the same time he adds that this does not mean all interpretations are correct. For instance, I meet someone on the street, greet him, and he does not answer. I can interpret that he is angry with me or that he is mute. That interpretation can be wrong or right. The fact (that he did not respond) is not disputable, but the interpretation is.

Even regarding this introduction I will note a few comments. What he calls “interpretation” is nothing but facts. If that person who did not answer me is indeed angry with me and therefore did not answer, then that interpretation is a fact. The state of the world is that this person is indeed angry with me and therefore did not answer. In short, a correct interpretation is a fact.

The same holds for the scientific interpretation of the pen’s fall. If the law of gravitation is a correct interpretation, then it is a fact. There is a law of gravity in the world. One can of course claim that the law of gravity is only a description of reality and not an entity. There is no object in the world called “the law of gravity,” just as there is no object that is the speed of the car in front of me. That is a property of the car, not an object. But the law of gravity, like the car’s speed, are facts in every sense. One can further distinguish between the law of gravity, which is just a description, and the force of gravity, which is a kind of entity (at least if we are talking about the gravitational force acting between two concrete bodies at a given moment). Thus, for example, one can analyze the gravitational force and predict the existence of gravitons (the particles that carry this force, just as photons carry the electromagnetic force). These particles are already full-fledged entities, and they result from the existence of a gravitational force but not from the law of gravity. The description of the phenomenon of attraction is not supposed to be carried by particles. It is a description, not a fact. But the force is a fact, and it is carried by particles called gravitons (which have not yet been observed in the lab, because we still lack sufficiently delicate and precise instrumentation).

Viewing science as subjective descriptions rather than facts characterizes an approach in the philosophy of science that I have previously called (following Ze’ev Bechler—see, for example, the article this one and many others) “actualism” (as opposed to “informativism”). But this approach is untenable, and I showed there why it cannot be true. Ironically, this approach is itself part of the same intellectual nihilism that Rabbi Guy opposes in these preliminaries, what is called “postmodernism,” or “the New Critique.” He is essentially expressing a positivist position, one willing to recognize only the existence of material objects observed by the senses or logically deduced, with unambiguous definition, from sensory observations. I have written more than once that, despite the scientistic appearance of this view, in essence it is precisely this view that underlies the “New Critique,” which undermines science as a “true” description of reality and heralds postmodernism (just as Hume’s empiricism heralded such skepticism in an earlier era; see columns 494 – 496).

I assume that Rabbi Guy’s intention here was to say that there are facts that are directly present before our eyes and about which there is no dispute, and there are facts subject to interpretation and about which there are disputes (but only one side is right—what he calls a “correct interpretation”). That is closer to the truth, but even that statement is not entirely precise. One can argue about what the senses show. There are illusions of sight (like a Fata Morgana), hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Moreover, there is an approach called “philosophical idealism” (or solipsism), which denies the existence of an external world and sees our senses as a kind of subjective (or inter-subjective) imagining. Therefore, the trust we place in the senses is itself the result of interpretation and not a pure fact. True, regarding that interpretation there is far broader agreement than for most other interpretations, but I think that regarding the law of gravity and the laws of physics there is almost the same breadth of agreement (at least among those who have studied and understand them).

Rabbi Guy concludes his introduction with another example of a fact that should not be disputed, which begins to hint at the direction of his argument to come: the biological division of human beings into male and female is a fact. He clarifies that this is not only about reproductive organs (a person may be born with different or missing organs—this is a disability, like any other organ that might be missing). Primarily he is talking about the genetic aspect, that is, genes found in every cell of the body, XX or XY (which also have typical hormonal expressions: different body structure, the capacity to give birth, hairiness, physical strength, height, and the like). This is a fact that should not be denied.

Sexual Orientation, Gender Dysphoria, and Gender Identity

He now moves to the distinction between sexual orientation and gender identity. Sexual orientation (to whom you are attracted) is a fact. Already here I must note that this does not fit his definition above. There is nothing material or tangible here that can be examined empirically. You rely on the person’s report and your trust in that report. By his definitions above, this is interpretation, not fact. For example, there are not a few rabbis who deny this fact. In their view, this orientation is an evil inclination, not a biological fact, and one can overcome and neutralize it. I disagree, but the very existence of such statements indicates that this is not a fact according to Rabbi Guy’s own definitions. Unlike him, I do think it is a fact, since it is what he would call a “correct interpretation.” That a person has a certain sexual orientation is a fact (psychological, not material), even if none of us has direct access to that fact, only through his report. It is a fact like the force of gravity or the anger of the person who did not answer me.

Another fact he presents is gender dysphoria, i.e., a mismatch between a person’s sex and their gendered feelings. This is a person born male who feels female, or vice versa. According to Rabbi Guy this too is a fact (which fits my view, but not his).

Already here I must point out an important point arising from this description. Dysphoria presupposes that there are feminine and masculine feelings; otherwise there would be no room for the phenomenon of dysphoria. Once there are feminine feelings, if a person whose genome is XY feels feminine feelings, we can define this as gender dysphoria. In other words, if you think dysphoria is a fact, then gender is also a fact. The feelings and experiences characteristic of males are male gender, and those characteristic of females are female gender. Later he denies that gender is a fact, but to my judgment that does not cohere with his claim that gender dysphoria is a fact.

My claim is that recognizing gender mismatch as a fact essentially means there are two kinds of facts—sex (genetic) and gender (feelings)—and that they are logically independent (though of course there is a very high correlation between them). In my columns I noted this distinction and described it in terms of eight groups spanned by three axes: sex, gender, and sexual orientation. In this description, each person is represented by a length-3 vector, each component of which can take one of two values. Thus, for example, {1,1,1} can describe a female who feels gender-wise as a female and is attracted to males (a regular straight female). By contrast, {2,2,2} is a straight male (one whose sex and gender are male and who is attracted to females). These two are cis-gender heterosexual groups. Of course there are eight such groups (I explained there that this description is binary, but I have no problem with the claim that there are groups beyond the ones I described here. For ease and clarity of discussion I use these eight). Any group where there is a mismatch between the first two components of the vector describes gender dysphoria.

Note that in Rabbi Guy’s view (with which I fully agree here) all these are facts not to be disputed. There is an implicit critique of LGBT opponents who deny some of these facts. But Rabbi Guy devotes his lecture to an explicit critique of the LGBT phenomenon, while accepting all these as agreed facts—and here too I am with him. He explicitly labels only two of them as facts (sexual orientation and sex), but his remarks on dysphoria implicitly presuppose that gender is also a fact (even though he later denies it); therefore, in essence, there are three facts in his words: sex, gender, and sexual orientation. These distinctions are important for what follows.

He now continues and says that although these two (actually three) are facts, they do not in any way touch what is called “sexual identity.” In practice he focuses on LGBT identity or community. His claim is twofold:

1. That there is a fusion there of entirely different things, so it is implausible to see this amalgam as a single identity. What connection is there between a homosexual and a transgender person? What do they share that can forge a common identity?

I think the answer is very simple. Both oppose the conventional social cataloging in these domains; that is, they argue there are eight groups and not just two, and they work for equal rights for the (six) additional groups. Why can that not constitute a shared identity basis? Why can communism, which works for equality for weaker strata, be an identity, but LGBT—which works for equality for these groups—cannot? Naturally, those who work for equality are mainly those who possess these traits, but they certainly invite others to adopt a queer identity. Queer identity seeks to blur the importance of prevailing distinctions and stand against male or female identity (and of course one can also argue that those are not identities).

1. Beyond that, Rabbi Guy also claims that sexual orientation, even if shared by different people, is not a parameter that can establish their group identity. That is, not only is there nothing common among queer identities, but each one individually is also not a relevant parameter for generating identity. It is not reasonable to create an identity of people 1.70 meters tall, or those wearing yellow pants, or irritable people. In his view, homosexuality is a similarly random trait.

Here too I disagree, for several reasons. First, he does not offer a definition of what can constitute identity. Why do nationhood, or a religion such as Judaism, constitute identity? Presumably because they occupy a significant share of the group members’ thought and activity. That is also true of LGBT people, at least in a world where their rights are not yet equal to other people’s. In an egalitarian world, communism would not be a relevant identity either, but as long as equality is lacking and the group works to achieve it, that is an identity parameter. So too for queers. In the present situation they produce queer literature, queer films, queer art, queer groups, clubs, and various organizations—so why is it not correct to say they have an identity of their own?! He himself says that being a Gur Hasid justifies identity (why? because I wear a spodik and behave in primitive, foolish ways?), but Mozart aficionados do not. Yet immediately afterward he notes that if there is a community for whom Mozart is the essence of their existence and occupies a significant portion of their time and energy, there would be room to define them as an identity-based community. So why not the LGBT community?

He further argues that sexuality is usually an intimate matter and therefore cannot serve as the basis for a public, communal identity. But that is precisely the claim of queers. They build an identity that makes sexuality visible (and much of the criticism against them revolves around this). So why should the fact that sexuality is intimate in existing identities invalidate the claim that one can fashion a different identity on a sexual basis? That is roughly like claiming that religion is intimate and therefore one cannot build identity on a religious basis. There are religions that are personal and intimate—and that is certainly their right—but one cannot invalidate other religions that want to fashion a public, collective religious identity. Even on the purely logical plane, I would wonder whether, in his view, one can fashion an identity for a group that acts to make sexuality private and banish it from the public square. Perhaps we could call it “the ascetic identity.” I assume that is possible, since it advances intimacy. But that too would be an identity based on an attitude toward sexuality. Is it reasonable that the identity of sexual modesty is legitimate but that of sexual display is not? That sounds almost oxymoronic to me.

In short, I heard in Rabbi Guy’s words no proposal for a substantive definition of traits that can or cannot constitute identity. All you will find there is the claim that not every trait constitutes identity. That is, of course, true. But he has neither definition nor criterion for traits that do deserve to constitute identity. Therefore it is unclear on what basis he argues against queer identity. In my view, this discussion is, at best, ill-posed—and actually, I think it is empty. There is no point in conducting it.

He then distinguishes between the community’s demands for communal rights and demands for individual rights. He mostly opposes the LGBT community’s collective demands. In his view, they demand recognition as a community, not just personal rights. But here he errs twice: First, as I explained, I see no reason they cannot define themselves as a community and demand collective rights. If they are a community, collective rights may be due to them. One can, of course, oppose that for various reasons, but one cannot say the demand is logically absurd. Second, in practice, they do not actually demand collective rights. They work for personal equality, not communal equality. They want recognition as a married couple, the ability to adopt and use surrogacy, recognition of sex-reassignment surgeries in the health basket, and the like. All these are personal rights. It is clear that in order to achieve these personal rights they create a movement, clubs, activities—and these require recognition and funding of their own—but those are instruments, not ends. This is not about a community’s collective rights. At bottom, their goal is to achieve personal rights, and the communal organization is a means to that end.

To conclude this section, note that Rabbi Guy’s claim here presupposes that the discussion concerns facts. That is, he implicitly assumes that identity is a fact; otherwise, how can he claim that it is improper to forge identity on a queer basis?! The queers interpret the concept of identity differently, and if it is not a fact, what is the problem?! He can, of course, argue that the claim that religion can ground identity but LGBT cannot is not a fact but a correct interpretation of the facts—but earlier I explained that this distinction is empty, and substantively these are synonyms. Bottom line, he asserts that there is a right and wrong here, and that is what matters. He is essentially telling them they are inventing ex nihilo something non-factual—but his claim that it is non-factual is itself factual. Very odd. Even if I adopt his terminology and assume he claims it is an incorrect interpretation, I did not see in his words a criterion or a good argument explaining why the queer interpretation of identity is incorrect. On the contrary, it seems to me to pass all the tests I can think of.

A Historical Look at LGBT Identity

Now (minute 19:00) Rabbi Guy moves to a historical description of the emergence of the LGBT community (not of homosexuality). In his view, it arose from a (lethal) combination of two ideas prevalent in the twentieth century: 1) Postmodernism—a view that advocates that there is no single truth. We each live within our own narrative. Therefore, everyone has the right to define themselves as they see fit, and there is no right or wrong. 2) Marxism—a stance that always seeks subversion and hidden interests behind people’s moves and statements and refuses to accept the explanations and positions presented openly. Behind them always stand power relations and the desire to seize positions of control. Marxism expanded into a worldview that sees everything as an expression of relations between oppressor and oppressed. The oppressor disciplines the oppressed. On Marxism and its implications see columns 178 – 183.

Judith Butler applied these approaches to the world of gender. In her view, gender is a social construct and has no basis in reality itself. It is a tool of the powerful to discipline the oppressed. The prevailing conceptual system is also a tool for this purpose. This is an expression of those two twentieth-century currents, which naturally lead to the queer world. In Rabbi Guy’s view, this is the mode of thinking that currently dominates the academic world of gender departments and other “junk studies.” It has essentially become a religious dogma not to be questioned or doubted.

An A Priori Critical Examination

Before turning to Rabbi Guy’s claims, I must recall a distinction I made in my columns (mainly in column 504) between sober queerness and extreme queerness. Sober queerness says there are eight groups (or more) in terms of sex, gender, and sexual orientation. The view that there are only two groups is factually incorrect. Extreme queerness says there are no groups; each person self-defines at will. We have neither permission nor basis to criticize a person’s self-definition. Note that only the second view is the fruit of those two intellectual currents. It is important to sharpen this point.

Postmodern thought begins with a critical deconstruction of prevailing thought and conceptual world. It exposes their presuppositions and sets alternative possibilities against them. Up to this point there is nothing new, since analysis of concepts and principles of thought has been a tool of rational thinking since forever. Ideas did not begin to develop in the twentieth century, and conceptual and philosophical analysis is not necessarily postmodern. What characterizes postmodernism is not the question (“Who says you’re right—there is an alternative?”) but the answer: you are indeed not right, because all alternatives are necessarily equal to one another. That is postmodernism’s novelty. Therefore, deconstructing concepts and re-defining concepts like gender and sexual orientation are not, in themselves, postmodern. They are also not based on the assumption of power games, etc. They are simply legitimate, logical conceptual analysis—and in my view entirely correct. It revealed to us something we had not been aware of until now. That is sober queerness, based on postmodernism’s question (which, as noted, contains nothing postmodern in itself), a question I fully embrace. Extreme queerness goes with the postmodern answer. In its view, there are not eight groups but infinitely many. Moreover, no such group is characterized by any objective or subjective attribute; a person’s self-declaration alone suffices to determine who and what they are. Regarding sex and sexual orientation I think this is less blatant, since there everyone agrees there is an objective truth (not always easy to diagnose). This comes up mainly with respect to gender, which is seen as something to which no outsider has access and which is a matter of a person’s inner feeling about themselves. Yet, as I explained above, those feelings do exist, and so here too we are dealing with a fact. Even if none of us can diagnose the inner contents of another’s consciousness, there is nonetheless a consciousness there. Therefore this too is a fact, though it is not accessible to us (as I explained above). This is what the debate between sober and extreme queerness is about. It is important to understand that many queers ostensibly assert the extreme claim but actually mean the sober one. They demand that I respect another person’s self-definition, but not because it is arbitrary; rather, because I must trust his report about himself. It is a matter of respecting the other person. A perfectly legitimate demand in my opinion. Because they are not sharp in their thought, they tend not to be precise and to couch this in the language of extreme queerness: “Who are you to decide? Each person decides for themselves. Disciplining by the powerful,” etc. But in many cases they actually intend sober queerness.

In column 504 I explained the logical folly of the second view, for it effectively empties the very concepts it uses of content. According to that view, when a person defines themselves as a woman, they can do so with no dependence on what is happening within them. It is entirely arbitrary and entrusted solely to them. But in that case, what does the term “woman” mean? What does the person mean when he says his gender is “woman”? What is supposed to be in his mind? Nothing. It is merely an empty word. Therefore, the demand to recognize a person’s self-definition cannot be presented within the picture of extreme queerness. It is empty verbiage using contentless concepts. Such a demand can be presented only within a picture of sober queerness. We saw that this is essentially the crux of the marvelous film “What Is a Woman?,” which simply tries to clarify the meaning of the expression “woman” in the queer world. It shows various confused queers (academics in gender studies—unbelievable!) who could not answer the question and in fact did not even understand it.

Rabbi Guy’s Critique

Rabbi Guy now turns to a critical examination of queer identity. Sex is a matter of fact (XX or XY). Beyond this fact, until not long ago all humanity agreed on another claim concerning gender: males are men and females are women. For a long time it has been understood that these two are not the same (this is genetic, that is phenotypic), but the prevailing view was that they go together. It is this view that the LGBT community challenges. It claims that “man” and “woman” are fictions, social constructions, but there is no impediment for a male to see himself as a woman and a female to see herself as a man.

Already here it is important to note that it is unclear whether he means sober queerness, which merely asserts a factual claim, or whether he means extreme queerness, which asserts nothing at the factual level (except that there are no facts). From his phrasing it seems he means the extreme queerness that I already explained is self-contradictory. But he ignores the possibility of sober queerness, which, as we have seen, can assert very similar things.

He brings several absurd consequences of queerness, such as a male-female (a male who identifies as female) entering women’s restrooms, women’s sports competitions in which males participate, and the like. All these are consequences of extreme queerness (and even there this is a totally deranged extremity that applies its conceptual nihilism not only to gender but even to sex and sexual orientation). Sober queerness would not demand that male-females compete in women’s sports or enter women’s restrooms—or at least it is not necessary there. Even extreme queerness should not demand that unless it ignores sex and sexual orientation as facts and sees them, too, as social constructions and power games (i.e., that power games and constructions changed a person’s genome and phenotype). You understand this is a laughable minority within the queer world, to which some confused sober queers are attached, unable to understand that they themselves do not actually think so and are swept along to extreme formulations, as I explained.

He summarizes by saying that transgender people (he apparently means the ideologues of queerness; not all trans people are such) claim there is no link between sex and gender. But this is an incorrect summary. Only very extreme queerness claims that. Moderate queerness says there is a link, but they are not identical, and therefore there may be people for whom dysphoria arises. They do demand that this phenomenon be accepted as normal (not in the statistical sense but in the normative sense), but that is a normative demand that does not challenge the facts. There is no principled problem with that demand, even if someone disagrees with it.

Rabbi Guy now arrives at the claim made in the film “What Is a Woman?” But I must emphasize that this claim applies only to extreme queerness, not to the sober kind. He essentially argues that gender exists—woman or man—whereas queerness denies it. But that is true only of extreme queerness, an esoteric, albeit loud, minority among queers. Note that here gender is perceived by Rabbi Guy as a fact, whereas earlier he treated it as interpretation. It seems he now intends the visible traits of women or men, which he considers facts, whereas when I say gender I mainly mean their inner experience (which in my view is also a fact, though inaccessible to others—and in his view, apparently not).

For example, at minute 38:30 he declares that sex is a fact and gender is not, and therefore once queers want to sever the link between sex and gender, they render gender entirely empty. His claim is that you cannot speak of gender if you do not base it on sex, because only sex is a fact. But that is, of course, incorrect. Gender is also a fact, except that it is an inaccessible fact (the bundle of experiences, such that whoever experiences them is a man or a woman). Hence, even if one severs it from sex—as I, for example, think—this does not empty it of content in any way. Its content is that experiential bundle, whether or not it is connected to sex. And in general, why, if it is connected to sex, can one speak about it? Seemingly that is just another name for the same phenomenon, no? If you accept that the term “gender” signifies something, then whatever it signifies exists even if entirely detached from sex. In short, there is no impediment to thinking that a person with an XX genome may experience male experiences and have a psyche akin to men’s psyches. This is simply a logical error on Rabbi Guy’s part, stemming from the misunderstandings I described at the start of the column. It shows the discussion there is not merely semantic. It has consequences—at least for the arguments that arise in the discussion. Incidentally, he repeatedly conflates this (mistaken) argument with the (entirely correct) conceptual argument of “What Is a Woman?,” and they are not the same. These are two entirely different arguments: the first is wrong, the second right. The mistake arises because he ignores the possibility of sober queerness.

A Note on Psychology

Incidentally, the very existence of gender dysphoria means that a person is troubled by a dissonance between sex and gender. That means he himself understands that there should be a match between sex and gender, and the mismatch bothers him. Defining dysphoria as a disorder itself seemingly supports Rabbi Guy’s position. But to me this is not a disorder—unless, for some reason, it disturbs the person. This is not a matter of philosophical conception but of psychology. Some people are disturbed by buttons, or by hats, and some people are disturbed by male sex with female gender or vice versa. This does not necessarily indicate their philosophical or conceptual position.

This seems to me similar to OCD. A person who is meticulous in every halachic detail is considered God-fearing and worthy of respect. But it can also stem from an obsessive disorder, which causes him to fear he has not fulfilled his duty and therefore chase every detail. I once asked a friend who specializes in treating OCD (and who has often sent me his patients with obsessive questions in belief and halacha) how he distinguishes between fear of Heaven and OCD. How do we know that the Brisker Rav was God-fearing; perhaps he had OCD? He answered that there is no way to tell, and the clinical criterion is whether it interferes with functioning. Note that well. Here too there is a tension between the evaluative-philosophical conception and psychology.

Critique of Religious Conservatism

Within his remarks now (minute 33:00 and onward) he inserts two critical comments about religious conservatism, with which I fully agree: 1) Even if gender is a fact, that does not mean we must coerce those of a given gender to anything. There are exceptions, such as women who are more masculine. There is no reason to force them into feminine behavior (not to study Torah, or to wear high heels) in the name of gender factuality. 2) If someone has a contrary sexual orientation (toward members of the same sex), that is a problem—but it exists, and we are obligated to respect and assist them. This is a religious problem no different from desecrating the Sabbath or eating non-kosher food.

He does, however, qualify that this pertains only to assisting the individual, not to supporting LGBT identity, etc. Of course I disagree—even if only because the two are one and the same—but I noted this above.

He adds (minute 39:00) that a person may refer to himself however he wishes. That is part of freedom of expression. But he cannot demand that others refer to him accordingly. If they see him differently, it is their right, just as it is his right to speak and think as he understands. As I have written more than once, I fully agree with that as well. He also likens this to a person in Israel today who would demand that others treat him as a German prince of the Middle Ages. That is absurd, and the demand is unacceptable. But that comparison is problematic. Here we are dealing with a factual error and an arbitrary assertion, whereas regarding gender we are dealing with a true claim (that male truly experiences female experiences). Therefore, even if I accept the claim that another person may refuse to accept his testimony and not respect his claim about queer identity, it is very different from the claim that I must respect someone who says he is Napoleon. In the latter there is a clear factual error, which is not the case in the former (and in my view it is not an error at all—gender can indeed be detached from sex). In equating the two, Rabbi Guy again falls into the same fallacy that ignores the possibility of sober queerness.

Surgery for Trans People

From minute 43:00 Rabbi Guy argues that if a person does not want his hand (there is a psychiatric phenomenon in which people do not see a certain limb as part of themselves and do not want it), no surgeon will agree to amputate it. From here he wonders why, regarding genitalia, this is acceptable. Why do we operate and change the sexual organs of one who suffers from gender dysphoria?

This comparison is problematic for several reasons. First, being without a hand is an objective disability in the most straightforward sense. By contrast, being female or male is not a disability (even the neutralization of the capacity to procreate is not a disability for one who does not want to procreate or give birth). Second, why indeed not amputate his hand? If it were clear that this would improve his mental state, I would fully support amputating it—provided we ascertained that this is indeed the case. That is true for sex and for other organs. It is no different from other cosmetic surgeries and is even more necessary (since there it is just a desire to look good, whereas here it is a dramatic change in mental state).

At minute 44:00 he continues with the example of a person who wants to die, and the law does not allow us to assist him. His claim is that sometimes we know better than you what is good for you, when it comes to facts. That two hands are better than one is a fact; therefore we do not accept your request to amputate. A very strange claim. Two hands are more useful than one for various functions. But “better” is a matter for the person. His mental state is no less important to his quality of life than the functioning of his hands. What is good for me is by no means a fact in Rabbi Guy’s sense; it is the person’s subjective assessment about himself (and in my view that is an inaccessible fact). Even the “fact” that living is better than dying is not truly a fact. Even Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai debated and concluded that it would have been better for man not to have been created. And surely there are people who suffer greatly and would prefer to die (there is a philosophical issue here discussed, for example, in column 270 and elsewhere—but I will not go into it here).

He concludes with the claim that the procedure is irreversible and that it is hard to determine its benefit (perhaps the person will regret it later and we will not be able to help; certainly if it is a child). Even scientifically, what is accepted today may change tomorrow (see the example he brought regarding the theory of eugenics). I agree in principle, and yet two comments: 1) An adult is still entitled to take the risk. 2) This is a technical claim. Assuming I can indeed determine the benefit of this procedure, there is justification to perform it. Our discussion here is only at the principled level. In general, reliance on science is a very sensible rule, even though our scientific knowledge may change. We have no better tool. And in general, the decision to let a person continue to suffer lest he regret the intervention or lest it fail to help is problematic, for the current state also carries a price. On the contrary, the minimal cost is certain and the fear that the benefit will dissipate is doubtful—and a doubt does not overturn a certainty (see the previous column on minimal-cost considerations).

A Forecast for the Future

At minute 51:00 Rabbi Guy expressed firm confidence that the LGBT phenomenon will fall, since facts have the annoying property of refusing to submit to our dictates. He claims that facts will always win, and there is no way to derive gender except on the basis of biological facts (sex). He of course assumes there is a factual problem here, and, as he says, these are biological facts. But again he falls into the same fallacy. Sex is a biological fact, but sexual orientation and gender are non-biological facts (and by his definition perhaps interpretations), and they are certainly not derived from sex. The fact that in the past gender was derived from sex is a scientific error we learned about in recent generations. Therefore his claim may be true regarding extreme queerness, which denies facts (and even it usually does not deny biological facts), but certainly not for sober queerness. On the contrary, precisely because of his consideration, it is clear to me that sober queerness will remain with us, since it is entirely based on facts (albeit not accessible—at least for now). This queerness is nothing but an addition of factual knowledge that had eluded us until a few decades ago.

On Facts and Shouting

From minute 58:00 he explains why LGBT literature and art arise. His claim is that if you are cut off from facts you must shout loudly, and the greater the disconnect from facts, the more you need storms and commotion. This is already a very poor derash. As I explained above, queerness is not cut off from facts. On the contrary, it is based on facts. The need for institution-building, literature and art, and LGBT identity is rooted in the lack of recognition of those facts. For that purpose one founds a movement, a community, and an LGBT identity, which, as I explained, serve the goal of achieving equality for individuals. In his concluding lines he ignores the fact that equality is still far from here, and therefore refuses to accept that the collective identity arose to achieve it.

In conclusion he says that the facts are that a man and a man cannot reproduce. A fact is unchangeable, and no shouting will change it. These are of course biological facts that no one denies, and he returns to them repeatedly instead of focusing on the facts regarding gender that are at the heart of the dispute. Beyond that, this categorical tone seems to me astonishingly rash. Who can guarantee that medicine will not find a way for a man and a man to reproduce? Even today we can create offspring with two fathers and a mother, and so on. Even today there are experiments that can indeed lead, in the end, to men being able to give birth and women to beget. In our turbulent era it seems odd to me to insist categorically on facts that are in the midst of great change. I see no necessity that science will succeed in turning a man into a woman in every respect. But, as noted, this is only a side remark. The argument is not here, for in my view even if biological facts are indeed unchangeable, that says nothing about the factuality of gender and of queerness (in the sober sense).