Jews as Human Beings: A. The Segula of Israel (Column 746)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

This past Shabbat (Parashat Noach) I gave a class about the relationship between a Jew and a Ben Noach (a descendant of Noah). The matter has already been discussed here in the past, but I don’t think I have yet presented an orderly and systematic picture of it. I will dedicate this first column to clarifying the prevalent concept of “segulat Yisrael” (the special quality of Israel). This topic is discussed at length in Chapter 22 of my book No Man Rules the Spirit (the second in the trilogy).

Adam – Noah – Our Father Abraham

Our Sages (Chazal) say (Avot 5:2):

“There were ten generations from Adam to Noah, to show the extent of His patience: all those generations repeatedly provoked [God] until He brought upon them the waters of the Flood. There were ten generations from Noah to Abraham, to show the extent of His patience: all those generations repeatedly provoked [God], until Abraham came and received the reward of them all.”

Here we have three figures that mark significant milestones on the timeline of humanity’s development: Adam is the archetype, the Platonic idea of a human being. After him comes Noah, the commanded human. Hence the seven commandments are called by his name (although, as Maimonides writes in Laws of Kings, six of them were already given to Adam). From here comes the term “Bnei Noach” (Noahides) for gentiles. The third stage is our father Abraham, essentially the first Jew. This is the final stage in this development that emerged from the stage of “Bnei Noach.”

This sequence is also reflected in the first three portions of Genesis: Parashat Bereishit is Adam’s portion; Parashat Noach is Noah’s; and Parashat Lech-Lecha begins the story of Abraham. This also recalls the three Kabbalistic worlds: Beriah–Yetzirah–Asiyah (BY”A). The world of Beriah expresses the initial creation ex nihilo. The world of Yetzirah is formation out of prior matter, and its product is the world of Asiyah—the complete world (not necessarily the loftiest) that was the purpose of the whole process.

These worlds are born one from the other, and the same is true—apparently—of the three figures above. Noah was a descendant of Adam, and Abraham was a descendant of Noah. Yet in the Torah’s description there are differences between the first transition (Adam to Noah) and the second (Noah to Abraham). The Torah concludes Parashat Bereishit with a description of the ten generations from Adam to Noah. The final verses describe the choice of Noah (Gen. 6:5–8):

“The LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great upon the earth and that every inclination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil all day long. And the LORD regretted that He had made man on the earth, and He was pained at His heart. And the LORD said, ‘I will blot out man whom I have created from the face of the earth—from man to beast, to creeping thing, and to the birds of the heavens—for I regret that I made them.’ But Noah found favor in the eyes of the LORD.”

Noah is chosen from the entire chain of generations up to him because he found favor in God’s eyes and the rest of his generation did not. At the beginning of Parashat Noach the Torah likewise says:

“These are the generations of Noah: Noah was a righteous man, wholehearted in his generations; Noah walked with God.”

True, as Rashi writes, some interpret the phrase “in his generations” to his discredit and some to his praise, but on the plain level the words “righteous and wholehearted” are clearly laudatory. He is chosen because he is righteous. The parallel later on (7:1) is also noteworthy:

“And the LORD said to Noah, ‘Come, you and all your household, into the ark, for it is you that I have seen as righteous before Me in this generation.’”

Here it is even clearer that there is some qualification of Noah’s righteousness (“righteous in this generation”), but it is equally clear that he is chosen due to his righteousness.

That is the transition from Adam to Noah and from Parashat Bereishit to Parashat Noach. In contrast, the next transition—from Noah to Abraham, and from Parashat Noach to Parashat Lech-Lecha—presents a striking difference. At the end of Parashat Noach we find a description of the ten generations from Noah to Abraham, and at the beginning of Parashat Lech-Lecha we encounter a sudden command without any preface or hint:

“And the LORD said to Abram, ‘Go for yourself from your land, from your birthplace, and from your father’s house, to the land that I will show you. And I will make you into a great nation, I will bless you and make your name great, and you shall be a blessing. I will bless those who bless you, and him who curses you I will curse; and in you all the families of the earth shall be blessed.’ And Abram went as the LORD had spoken to him, and Lot went with him; Abram was seventy-five years old when he left Haran. And Abram took Sarai his wife, and Lot his brother’s son, and all their possessions that they had acquired, and the souls they had made in Haran; and they set out to go to the land of Canaan, and they came to the land of Canaan.”

There is not even a hint as to why Abraham was chosen in particular. Not a word about his righteousness (whether “in his generations” or otherwise) or that he “found favor” in God’s eyes. Suddenly, upon reaching Abraham, the Torah pauses the genealogical narrative and begins to tell about him, focusing on him and his descendants. Later, of course, the Torah mentions Abraham’s righteousness, but it does not appear as the basis for choosing him, unlike Noah. Our Sages indeed fill in the story expansively through Midrashim (Terach and the idols, Nimrod and the fiery furnace, and more). But the difference on the plain level of the Torah cries out for explanation.

Two possible explanations

It seems this difference can be understood in two ways:

1. Noah lived in a generation liable to annihilation, and in principle everyone could have been destroyed. There was no obligation to leave anyone alive. God nevertheless decided to exempt Noah, and that requires a reason—hence it is stated that it was due to his righteousness. By contrast, the choice of Abraham is necessary: someone had to be chosen and take on the mission from among all humanity, and the one chosen happened to be Abraham. Why? Just because. It is an arbitrary choice. Note that even if he had not been righteous, God would have needed to choose someone to carry this mission forward. His righteousness may even be the result of the choice; in any case, it is not its cause. On this view it is reasonable that it is neither essential nor genetic to Abraham and his descendants. Perhaps it did not exist in him before he was chosen at all, and was created as a result of the choice and of his special relationship with God. In this picture, it is likely that Abraham’s distinctiveness is not some special spiritual or psychological “segula” inherent in his very nature.
2. Abraham, like Noah, was also chosen due to qualities of his, but these are intrinsic inner qualities and not necessarily especially good behavior. Here one assumes that he possesses special endowments embedded in him from the outset. They may be expressed in good conduct, but that is only a sign, not the cause. In this picture Abraham has special, segula-type characteristics—apparently inborn—by virtue of which he was chosen.

These are two conceptions of the notion “segulat Yisrael.” Is Israel’s “segula” an essential, innate difference from the gentile (Picture 2), or is there nothing special in the Jewish nature as opposed to the gentile aside from the mission we were given (Picture 1)? We will now see that both interpretations are found among the commentators.

The dispute over Israel’s unique segula

The Maharal, in Netzach Yisrael, elaborates greatly on the matter of the segula of Israel (he devotes several chapters to it—see especially Chapters 10–13, though also around them). In Chapter 11 he writes, among other things, as follows:

“To teach you that the beginning of the attachment was not on the basis of the individual, but this attachment is a general attachment, not a particular attachment. Therefore, when the Holy One, blessed be He, initially chose Abraham and brought him out of Ur Kasdim to give him the land, it is written (Gen. 12:1): ‘And the LORD said to Abram, Go for yourself from your land… to the land that I will show you.’ R. Moshe [Alashkar] raised a difficulty: it is astonishing that Scripture did not first note that Abraham was righteous, and therefore the Shekhinah revealed itself to him and said to him, ‘Go for yourself from your land…,’ for without this the Shekhinah would not have revealed itself to him and said ‘Go for yourself’; therefore it would have been fitting to write first of Abraham’s righteousness. Just as you find with Noah (Gen. 6:8): ‘But Noah found favor in the eyes of the LORD,’ and afterwards it is written (ibid. v. 9): ‘These are the generations of Noah…,’ it mentioned Noah’s righteousness before mentioning that the word of the Holy One, blessed be He, spoke with him.”

“But according to what we have said, it is no difficulty at all. For with Noah there was only a particular choice, and a particular choice is according to what he is—everything according to his righteous deeds. But with Abraham it was not a particular choice but a general choice in the Israelite nation, his seed. For it is written in that choice (Gen. 12:2), ‘And I will make you into a great nation’—this is a general choice, and such a choice does not depend on deed at all, nor on sin, for deed pertains to the particular. Granted that certainly the merit of the Fathers helps, nevertheless the essence of the choice is a general choice in him and his seed.”

He compares Abraham to Noah and notes the difference in Scripture’s description of their selection. One could understand his words in either of the two ways I presented above: either Abraham was chosen arbitrarily, or he was chosen because of segula-type qualities he possessed. From the context there it appears he intends to say that the choice of Abraham was due to an essential segula found in Israel (and not due to Abraham’s deeds, unlike Noah).

This also follows from the well-known division in The Kuzari into five levels found among beings (Book I, §§31–43; quotations and explanations here):

31. The Ḥaver said: In the natural realm, nutrition, growth, and reproduction and their powers and all their conditions follow as due consequence, and in this plants and living creatures are distinguished from earth, stones, minerals, and the elements.

32. The Kuzari said: This is a general statement that needs detail, but it is true.

33. The Ḥaver said: In the psychic realm, all living creatures are distinguished, and from it follow motions, desires, dispositions, and manifest and hidden senses, and the like.

34. The Kuzari said: This also is undeniable.

35. The Ḥaver said: In the rational realm, the speaking being [man] is distinguished from the rest of the living creatures, and from it follow the correction of character, and afterwards the ordering of the household, and afterwards the ordering of the state, with customs and laws of conduct.

36. The Kuzari said: This too is true.

37. The Ḥaver said: And what level stands above this?

38. The Kuzari said: The level of the great sages.

39. The Ḥaver said: I seek only a level that differentiates its possessors by an essential distinction, as the plant differs from the inanimate and man differs from the animal; but the difference of more and less has no end, for it is an accidental difference and not a level in truth.

40. The Kuzari said: If so, there is no further level among the sensibles after man.

41. The Ḥaver said: If a man be found who would enter the fire and it would not harm him, and he would stand without food and not hunger, and there would be before him a light that eyes cannot bear, and he would not fall ill nor would his strength weaken, until when he reached the end of his days he would die a death of choice, like one who lies down to sleep on a known day and at a known hour, in addition to knowledge of the hidden—of what has been and will be—would not this be a level essentially distinct from that of human beings?

42. The Kuzari said: But this level is divine, angelic—if it exists—and this belongs to the divine realm, not the rational, not the psychic, and not the natural.

43. The Ḥaver said: These are some of the descriptions of the prophet, which none dispute, through whom the union of Divinity with the people was seen by the multitude; that they have a Master who governs them at His will—and according to their obedience and their rebellion as well—and He revealed what is hidden, informing how the world was newly created, and the lineage of mankind before the Flood and how they trace back to Adam, and afterwards the Flood, and the lineage of the seventy nations to Shem, Ḥam, and Yaphet, the sons of Noah; and how the tongues were divided and where they dwelt; and how messengers [governors] arose and states were formed; and the count of the years of the world from Adam until now and from now on.”

He emphasizes that the prophet has a distinction from other human beings (Bnei Noach) similar to the distinction of man from animals, and that this is an essential (not accidental) distinction. Rabbi Shilat, in his article, expands on the Kuzari’s view and demonstrates it from additional places in the book. He also explains that according to the Kuzari this quality exists in all Israel (not only in prophets), for they have the potential for prophecy. It is realized in practice by a prophet who actualizes that potential, but it is present in every Jew.

He then notes there that Maimonides’ approach differs from the Kuzari’s. Although Maimonides, too, ties prophecy to inborn, special psychic traits, in his view such traits are found in certain gentiles as well, not only in Jews. Moreover, in his view these traits are not present in every Jew but only in those prepared for prophecy. Thus it appears that Maimonides does not accept the claim of an essential difference between Jew and gentile. At most there is a difference between those who possess these traits (Jews and gentiles alike) and those who lack them (Jews and gentiles alike).

It seems these early authorities read the first three portions of Genesis in the two ways I described above. The Maharal and the Kuzari understood the transition from Noah to Abraham as due to a unique segula existing in the people of Israel, while Maimonides understood it as an arbitrary transition.

Segulat Yisrael as a principle of faith

In the book cited above I noted that the essential (or segula-type) difference between Jew and gentile is perceived by many as a principle of faith, usually called “segulat Yisrael.” Its meaning is that something in our biological genes—or in our spiritual genetics—differs from all the inhabitants of the world. You will not be surprised to hear that I incline to Maimonides’ conception, if only because I see no evidence—neither by reason (and observation) nor from Scripture—for the Maharal’s and Kuzari’s view that there is something essentially different in Israel as opposed to gentiles.

More than once in the past, when I argued against this conception, people looked at me as though I had said something utterly unacceptable (heresy in a principle). In their view, segulat Yisrael is a self-evident axiom given to us directly from Sinai, and anyone who argues otherwise seems to them to have gone out of bounds and denied a fundamental. After all, we are a “chosen people,” aren’t we?! (See more on this below.) Generally, statements opposing this conception are perceived as illegitimate foreign influence of egalitarian values and as a fashionable opposition to racism (progressivism, heaven forfend). Therefore I prefaced with the above analysis and sources, from which it emerges that both pictures are possible.

I see a need to add a necessary remark here, because I anticipate the objections that will arise in the talkbacks. The discussion I conducted here on the basis of Scripture is not meant to prove one conception or the other. In my opinion, it is not even possible to learn from it that we must adopt one of the two pictures I presented. A person can say that in his view the choice of Abraham was due to his good deeds—neither arbitrary nor segula-based—just like the choice of Noah. No fear; he can reconcile this with the verses in several ways. I did not check, but I am quite sure that among the commentators you will find such approaches. As is well known, in my view it is difficult to derive any normative conclusion from Scripture; people project onto it their own conceptions and insights. I do too. Therefore, the discussion here should be seen as mere illustration. My claim in favor of the “arbitrary” picture is based on rational considerations, not on exegetical ones, and I will now explain them.

Point of departure

For me, statements that posit essential differences between human beings require justification (see Column 123). This is not only for ethical reasons—the concern about racism lurking behind them—but also on the philosophical-logical level: a position that asserts an essential difference between people bears the burden of proof, because in the absence of good arguments there is no reason to assume such differences (beyond accidental ones, of course). If someone were to tell you that there is a group of people that has no inclination to do good or evil, or that they are devoid of emotions, I assume you would expect some sort of justification. The default, the simple presumption, is that every person has the same tendencies, even if in differing measures.

It is important for me to stress that I do not necessarily regard such statements as racist (for if the difference truly exists, it is a fact. Factual claims are not a matter of bias and so are not racism. Nor is there any moral duty to conceal or deny facts. See Column 445 and many others). But I definitely expect those who make them to substantiate their words in a significant way, philosophically and ethically. As we saw there, in many cases people and groups tend to hide racism under factual-sounding statements.

Therefore my starting point is that those who argue for the segula conception bear the burden of proof. And I also claim that they have not met it. I am not aware of good arguments in favor of this conception—certainly not on the factual level, and not even on the exegetical one. In fact, the claim about segulat Yisrael, in my view, suffers from a double problem: conceptual and empirical, as I will now detail.

The empirical problem

Simple observation of people around me and in the world at large yields a fairly clear impression that there is no fundamental difference between a typical Jew and a typical gentile, beyond the differences that exist between any two people or any two groups. There are good and bad Jews, cruel and non-cruel, short and tall, righteous and wicked—just as among gentiles.[1] Of course there are differences between individuals and groups, but here the claim is to a fundamental, essential difference that exists between groups and not between specific individuals. That is, the segula claim is that there is something present in all Jews that is absent from all gentiles. This is a stronger claim, and my starting assumption is that it is not true until proven otherwise.

The conceptual problem

Beyond that, I already hinted that this claim also suffers from a conceptual problem. The claim of a uniquely Jewish segula is not well defined. What exactly does such uniqueness mean? What is intended by asserting its existence? It is hard to ignore that there are collective character traits that distinguish and typify different peoples—and of course nations. Belgians are not Italians, nor are they Moroccans, Chinese, or Tanzanians. True, these are not rigid traits found in every single individual, but as generalizations there is no doubt that such collective traits exist. The older and more isolated the ethnos, the more unique traits it will have. In this trivial sense it is quite clear that there are collective traits that typify the Jewish people as well. It is very reasonable that shared ancestry and genetics (for Jewish marriages have largely occurred within this ethnic community), as well as our many travails and shared history, our culture and especially the Torah we received, have left their mark on us. But, as noted, such differences exist between any two nations, and thus they are insufficient to support talk of segulat Yisrael in a genetic-essential sense. These differences are the product of circumstances that influenced us and our cultural development; therefore it is hard to show they are built-in and essential (=segula).

People often point to scientific achievements (the number of Jewish Nobel laureates) and the unique history of the Jewish people (survival, return to the Land)[2] as evidence of segulat Yisrael. But it is no less reasonable—indeed, quite natural—to attribute such achievements to historical circumstances (distress and hardship) and to the culture itself (the vision of return to the Land and the mitzvah of settling it; the strong emphasis on the commandment of Torah study and on learning in general). All these are collective traits that shape a public’s character and conduct and its culture, and they need not imply anything about each individual person, much less a spiritual-genetic property embedded in every Jew from birth. If Italians are hot-tempered, it still does not follow that this is an inborn segula, and still less that it is present in each and every one of them. Empirically, when I look at individual human beings I do not see an indication of something essentially different in the individual Jew compared to the rest of humanity, apart from cultural differences that, as noted, exist between any two peoples.

Interim summary

When we speak of an essential difference between Jews and gentiles we are asserting at least three claims:

1. There is a difference between Jews and all other peoples, and it differs in kind from the differences between any nation and another.
2. This difference exists in every single Jew (it is not merely an average trait of the Jewish collective).
3. The basis of this difference is inborn. It is an essential difference, a kind of spiritual genetics.

I explained that anyone who asserts all this bears the burden of proof. As I argued above, I do not know of good evidence for any of these three claims (especially the latter two, but also the first).

I will add that even in the sources—whether Scriptural or in Chazal and the commentaries—I see no necessity for any of these claims. Any statement about Jewish uniqueness can be interpreted as cultural, not “genetic.” Beyond that, it is not clear whether such statements speak of a uniqueness different from the uniqueness of every nation vis-à-vis others. Finally, even if Chazal (as opposed to Scripture) were to say so, in my opinion they had no way to know this. At best it is an impression, and their impression is worth no more than mine. Moreover, the gentiles they knew behaved in inhuman and immoral ways—primitive and idolatrous. In such a situation it is easy to gain the impression that there is something essentially inferior in them. In recent generations the differences have blurred greatly, both morally and intellectually, which calls Chazal’s conclusions into question—certainly the claim that we are dealing with something genetic-essential. Even if we accept that in Biblical and Talmudic times there were marked differences between Jew and gentile, how could anyone know whether these are inborn, built-in differences that cannot change, or acquired differences rooted in history and culture? To my judgment there is no reasonable way to determine this, and even if Chazal thought so, it lacks solid basis. In any case, I have written more than once that I do not accept Chazal’s authority in matters of fact. They have authority in halakhah, and no more.

There are three fundamental issues here that require clarification: (1) How is an essential (segula-type) difference between Jew and gentile defined at all, as distinct from the difference between, say, a Belgian and a Tanzanian—or between two Belgians? (2) How can it be empirically discerned (to know that it is not an accidental difference but an essential segula)? (3) Are there authoritative sources (i.e., explicit Scripture—not the product of ordinary human observation and inference or human interpretation of Scripture) that indeed show this? Let us now examine these three planes one by one.

Defining an essential difference

As noted, it is hard to propose a definition of an essential difference as opposed to a cultural-acquired one. Even the meaning of the claim about an essential difference is not entirely clear. Are we speaking of different genetics received from Abraham? If so, then every person has unique genetics and each person differs from every other. The same is true regarding spiritual-psychic structure. What, then, is meant by the essential difference at stake? Which differences deserve to be called essential? Mark well: my claim here is not that it is hard to distinguish between essential and accidental differences, but that it is doubtful whether there is any difference between these two at all. Is there any meaning to the term “essential difference” (or “segula”)?

As is known, even in the taxonomy of plants and animals the decision when we have a different species and when the same (or the same genus) is to a great extent arbitrary. Criteria are chosen (e.g., whether they can reproduce with one another), and on that basis the kinds and species in nature are classified. Classification is always arbitrary. In our discussion the difficulty is deeper. As I wrote, every two nations differ in various collective traits. The question is not whether we have different traits—essential or otherwise—from other nations. The question is whether we have a uniqueness as against all other nations in a way that is different from the uniqueness you could find in any nation compared to others.

To sharpen matters: I do not wish to slide into postmodern skepticism that denies differences altogether. I am certainly prepared to regard the difference between animals and human beings as essential and inborn (not only because they cannot interbreed; for purposes of the discussion I set aside the question of evolutionary development, which also calls even that difference into question). But clearly the difference between groups of human beings resides in a grayer area, with evident difficulties; hence the burden of proof lies upon one who claims such a difference exists.

Despite the definitional difficulty, I am prepared—at least for the sake of discussion—to accept a situation in which one can point to such a difference and regard it as essential. But we still face the second difficulty: empirical observation.

Observing the essential difference

Despite the definitional difficulty, when we observe an essential difference (as between man and animals) we recognize it. The next step is to ask whether there is such an essential difference between a typical Jew and a typical gentile, akin to that between humans and animals. Do I truly see such a difference?

There were those who told me that they do perceive reality that way, but it is very hard for me to accept that. I suspect that one who says this is not speaking of his direct observation of reality but of conclusions he infers from sources that, in his opinion, obligate such a conception. Because he believes Chazal and the Rishonim hold this, he concludes it must be true. Such a person views reality through agenda-laden lenses, and his conclusions follow from his prior assumptions rather than unprejudiced observation.[3] Of course, it is possible to subject the matter to empirical testing—for example, to present him with the behavior of various people and test whether he can determine, with high significance, who is a Jew and who a gentile (something like a Turing test). And even if he were to pass such a test—which I highly doubt—still we would not have proven that we are not dealing with cultural-acquired differences rather than essential ones.

Sources for an essential difference between Jew and gentile

Let us assume, for the sake of continuing the discussion, that the question has a clear meaning. I remarked that, in my view, positions that believe in “segula” in its essentialist sense begin and end with presuppositions that themselves derive from sources. If so, we must now move to the third difficulty: what sources do we have from which the existence of such an essential difference emerges? Are these sources well-founded and authoritative?

An interesting and unique source on this matter appears in the halakhic decisors at the beginning of Even Ha-Ezer. It is unique and interesting mainly because it appears in a halakhic context and is therefore taken as binding. The Tur (Even Ha-Ezer §2; similarly in the Shulchan Aruch there, se’if 2) writes:

“Maimonides wrote: Although all families are presumed fit and one may initially marry from them, [if there are] two families that constantly quarrel with one another, or a family that is prone to strife and contention, or a person who multiplies quarrels with everyone and is exceedingly brazen—we are suspicious of them and it is proper to distance oneself from them, for these are signs of disqualification. Likewise, anyone who constantly disqualifies others—such as one who casts aspersions of blemish upon families or individuals and says they are mamzerim—we suspect him that he may be a mamzer. And if he says of them that they are slaves—we suspect him that he may be a slave; for whoever disqualifies [others], disqualifies with his own blemish.”

“And one who exhibits brazenness and cruelty and hates people and does not perform acts of kindness—we suspect him that he may be a Gibeonite (Nethinite), for the signs of Israel, the holy nation, are that they are bashful, merciful, and doers of kindness. Anyone who is called ‘mamzer,’ ‘Nethinite,’ ‘chalal,’ or ‘slave,’ and remains silent—we suspect him and his family, and one should not marry women from them without investigation.”

And the Beit Yosef there brings a source from the Talmud (see also Kiddushin 71b):

“Regarding what he wrote about brazenness and cruelty: In the chapter ‘Ha-’arel’ (Yevamot 78b): David decreed concerning the Nethinim, as it is said (2 Sam. 21:2): ‘And the king called the Gibeonites and said to them—now the Gibeonites were not of the children of Israel…’ He sought to appease them but they would not be appeased. He said: Three signs are in this nation [Israel]: they are merciful, bashful, and doers of kindness. Whoever possesses these three signs is fit to cleave to this nation.”

We see that bashfulness is a sign of Jewishness, and cruelty arouses suspicion of foreign lineage. It seems the decisors view the Talmudic statement as essential and eternal, and in effect as an essential sign with empirical significance for a person’s Jewishness. Admittedly, the decisors do not explicitly say this is an essential sign; one could understand it as a cultural trait. Yet at least from the wording of some it appears to be about essence—and certainly when they bring it as a halakhic criterion relevant to all generations and places. Traits like compassion and cruelty are found among people of various nations worldwide, and the claim that their presence or absence is a legally binding sign regarding a specific individual is a far-reaching assertion.

If we take this criterion and apply it today, I think there are not a few Jews presumed fit who would require more than a smudge on their record. We have not heard decisors raising comparable doubts about the lineage of every murderer, rapist, robber, thief, or person who displays cruelty of one sort or another. Conversely, I do not know of a judge or decisor who would forego the giyur of a compassionate non-Jew and a great doer of kindness and recognize him as a Jew merely because he exhibits these signs.

In general, how could Chazal have known that Israel’s basic nature is such? How did they arrive at the scientific conclusion that the opposite traits, even when found in Israel, are of external origin? In any case, my observations today teach me that the situation is different, and therefore even if there once was such a difference, it is not reasonable to regard it as essential and built-in. It is more reasonable that even back then, when the Sages established this criterion, there was a mistake to begin with: they saw prevalent, average cultural traits and (in my opinion mistakenly) diagnosed them as inborn segulot. Alternatively, they did not actually intend to regard these traits as essential at all—only as an average statement that can create a suspicion and nothing more. On that reading, even this halakhah does not express essentialism.

The Scriptural source: “Am Segula”

We can return to the verses that speak of us as an “am segula” (treasured people). Do they not state that this is a unique trait of Jews, a kind of spiritual genetics? I will do what Maimonides—who, as we saw, apparently does not accept “segula” (at least in its essentialist sense)—would likely do with these verses: let us examine them and see if that is really what they say. The source for the segula conception in the people of Israel is usually drawn from the term “am segula,” which appears in four places in Scripture.

The first (Exodus 19:4–6):

“You have seen what I did to Egypt, and how I bore you on eagles’ wings and brought you to Me. Now, therefore, if you will indeed heed My voice and keep My covenant, then you shall be a treasured possession to Me out of all peoples—for all the earth is Mine. And you shall be to Me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation. These are the words that you shall speak to the children of Israel.”

Here it is explicitly presented as a mission, not an essential diagnosis. If we keep God’s commandments, we will be a segula to Him—a kingdom of priests and a holy nation. There is no assertion that we are inherently a segula people by nature; rather, a goal is set before us to become God’s treasured people.

The second source (Deuteronomy 7:6–8):

“For you are a holy people to the LORD your God: the LORD your God has chosen you to be for Him a treasured people out of all the peoples upon the face of the earth. Not because you were more numerous than all the peoples did the LORD set His affection upon you and choose you—for you are the least of all peoples—but because of the LORD’s love for you, and because He keeps the oath that He swore to your fathers, the LORD brought you out with a mighty hand and redeemed you from the house of slaves, from the hand of Pharaoh king of Egypt.”

Here one could read an essentialist statement, but it is certainly not necessary—and, in fact, it is not what is written. On the contrary: the verses say that God chose us because of the oath He swore to our fathers and His love for us. Is the basis an essential difference? At most that is a possible (and somewhat forced) interpretation; as we saw above, it could also be an arbitrary choice (or based on the deeds of our fathers).

The third source (Deuteronomy 14:1–2):

“You are children of the LORD your God; you shall not gash yourselves nor put a bald spot between your eyes for the dead. For you are a holy people to the LORD your God, and the LORD has chosen you to be for Him a treasured people out of all the peoples that are upon the face of the earth.”

Again, the verses allow both interpretations: we may be a holy people because we were chosen to be so, and not necessarily because we were born so.

The fourth and final source (Deuteronomy 26:16–19):

“This day the LORD your God commands you to perform these statutes and judgments; you shall observe and perform them with all your heart and with all your soul. You have declared the LORD this day to be your God, to walk in His ways and to keep His statutes and His commandments and His judgments, and to listen to His voice; and the LORD has declared you this day to be for Him a treasured people, as He spoke to you, and to keep all His commandments; and to set you high above all the nations that He has made, for praise, for a name, and for glory; and to make you a holy people to the LORD your God, as He has spoken.”

Here too it appears that we were chosen to walk in God’s ways, but it is not clear whether the basis of the choice is a different essence or whether the choice produced the difference. If anything, the plain sense is that our segula consists in our being chosen to keep the commandments and serve God.[4]

Thus, as we saw at the outset, even from the verses that speak of an “am segula,” two distinct conceptions of “segula” can emerge: (1) an inborn segula unlike that of other nations, by virtue of which we were chosen to keep God’s commandments; (2) segula as a goal attained through keeping the commandments—the result of the choice, not its cause. This of course parallels the two pictures described above.

Some have proposed that the special segula resides in the nation as a collective and not in the individuals. The individuals indeed resemble individual human beings from other nations, but our nation is different (essentially). This is not the common belief; in any event, the verses do not compel even this conception, for the segula can be an outcome, not a cause. Moreover, all the earlier difficulties arise here too in the collective version (first, every collective differs from other collectives; and second, how can one know that the difference here is essential?). Admittedly, here one can also observe a significant difference on the level of collective history and conduct, and yet I cannot determine that it is essential rather than the expression of acquired traits resulting from our history and culture.

Is sin in Jews essential or accidental?

One claim common in Jewish thought is that there is a difference between Jew and gentile regarding sin: both sin at times, but for a Jew sin is external and not essential, while for a gentile sin is of his essence. I feel discomfort (not moral but intellectual) in merely writing these strange sentences, but I think there is no longer a need to belabor the pointlessness of this discussion. What does it mean that sin is essential in the gentile? That it stems from constraints imposed upon him? If so—he is coerced. Perhaps the reverse is true: precisely for the Jew, whose sin is from an external source, it is he who is coerced by an outside force to sin—and then he is an anus (coerced); whereas the gentile sins of himself and therefore is deliberate and liable?

From here we see there is a problem in the very definition of the terms (“essential” and “accidental”), in understanding the content of the claims (the relation to coercion), and certainly regarding the question of source (whence do they know whether sin is essential or accidental? What observation yields such a conclusion?). These are the planes on which Jewish thought fails in this topic—and not only here. Take in hand almost any work from the school of Rabbi Kook’s disciples, and you will find a bounty of discussions and claims of this sort: whether the nation’s character is like this or that; whether this trait is essential or accidental. Everything is couched in vague terms that can be read this way or that and, in effect, assert nothing clear. Above all looms the question of source: from where do they draw the “information” that our “segula-nation” “distinguishes itself (so to speak) with the sparks of its light”—and what does any of this even mean?

Concluding note: Dan Ariely on a “chosen people”

As it happens, right while writing this piece a short article by Dan Ariely (whom we have encountered here more than once) came into my hands, dealing with the question of our being the chosen people. Ariely says there that gentiles are offended when told we are the chosen people, and that antisemitism even ensues. Ariely himself wrote that he actually agrees that we are a chosen people—but that this also entails duties, not only rights. I assume he does not mean “am segula” in the essentialist sense, but rather in the sense of special traits and special culture. Behind the distinction between duties and rights, however, one can also discern the very distinction discussed here. The segula conception sees the Jewish people as something inherently exalted—and one might derive from that special rights, and perhaps also duties. By contrast, the “arbitrary choice” conception, which sees uniqueness in culture rather than in essence, places duties, not rights, at the center: we are a treasured people because we have special missions, not because we are endowed with loftier qualities. These missions are obligations imposed upon us—and that is the essence of our segula.

[1] See my article, “A Gentile Whom Halakhah Did Not Recognize.”

[2] See my book The First Cause, in the fifth conversation. There, too, I attributed these matters to purpose and mission, not to genetics or inborn traits embedded in us from time immemorial.

[3] See my article cited above, “Gentiles Whom Halakhah Did Not Recognize.”

[4] This is precisely Euthyphro’s dilemma: Are we a treasured people because we were chosen, or were we chosen because we are a treasured people?