What Is a Mitzvah II: Between Obligation and Fulfillment (Column 343)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In the previous column I discussed the role of intention in a mitzvah. I tried to show that the intention to discharge one’s obligation elevates the act and turns it into an act of mitzvah—contrary to Rabbi Na’avat’s view, who sees intention merely as a requirement not to be “unwittingly occupied” (mit’asek), since in his opinion the act itself is a mitzvah; therefore, he holds that intending to discharge the obligation only lowers the value of the mitzvah. I explained there that the root of the dispute is the question of what a mitzvah is and what counts as fulfillment of a mitzvah. Rabbi Na’avat implicitly assumes there is no principled difference between a mitzvah and a good deed, whereas in my view these are two entirely different notions: a mitzvah requires a command (just as a law requires legislation), and the command creates the mitzvah as a kind of external object (this is precisely what Rabbi Na’avat denied).[1] I argued that intention in fact expresses a turning toward that external object, and its purpose is to attribute my act to that object, namely to express that the act is performed in response to the command and out of commitment and the desire “to discharge the obligation” (which in Rabbi Na’avat’s eyes is a base notion that diminishes the act’s value), and not merely because of the value inherent in the act (which is apparently the meaning of mitzvah according to Rabbi Na’avat).
Along the way I noted that the underlying conceptions are legal positivism (my own view) versus natural law (Rabbi Na’avat’s view). On my account, an act becomes a mitzvah only by virtue of the command; therefore, an act that is consciously performed with explicit intention to respond to the command elevates the status of the mitzvah-act. As I wrote there, in this column I will discuss the words of Rabbi Asher Weiss, which stand in contrast to the conception assumed by Rabbi Na’avat, and I will explain why I tend (though not entirely) to side with Rabbi Weiss.
Rabbi Weiss’s Novelty
This past Sukkot a friend sent me (thanks to my friend Shmuel Keren) a fascinating lesson by Rabbi Asher Weiss given to yeshivah students in the COVID quarantine hotels. By way of preface: there is a Torah prohibition against using the wood of the sukkah for non-mitzvah purposes (see Sukkah 9a and Beitzah 30a). Another preface: when it is raining, there is no obligation to sit in the sukkah, for the rule is that dwelling in the sukkah must be “as you dwell” at home. A person does not remain in a house if rain is pouring inside; therefore there is no obligation to sit in the sukkah in such a situation. The Rema in the Shulchan Aruch, §639:7, writes that one who sits in the sukkah in the rain is called a simpleton (a hedyot), based on the principle that “whoever is exempt from something and does it is called a simpleton.” From his words it follows that this is merely a needless act but not prohibited. The well-known difficulty raised by the author of Responsa Oneg Yom Tov is how this is permissible: that person is making use of the sukkah’s wood for a non-mitzvah purpose. A similar question arises regarding women. As is known, according to most authorities women may fulfill time-bound positive commandments, including sitting in the sukkah. The question is how this is allowed, for sitting in the sukkah when it is not for the sake of fulfilling a mitzvah—unlike other mitzvot—is a prohibited act. They are not commanded to do so; therefore their sitting in the sukkah involves the prohibition of using the sukkah’s wood. One might say regarding women that it is indeed a mitzvah, only that they are not obligated—this is commonly assumed, and I will comment on it below. But with sitting in the rain, the difficulty is of course greater.
Many answers have been offered to this question, and Rabbi Weiss presents them and rejects them all.[2] In the end he proposes an original and fascinating possibility of his own to resolve the difficulty, and here I wish to focus. He argues that sitting in the sukkah is a mitzvah even in the rain, only that we are not obligated in that mitzvah (as the Gemara puts it: one who is distressed is “exempt” from the sukkah). He goes further: not only are we not obligated, but the Holy One does not want it, and our sitting is repugnant to Him. The Mishnah (Sukkah 2:9) describes it thus: “To what is this comparable? To a servant who came to mix a cup for his master, and the master poured a pitcher on his face.” And yet, contends Rabbi Weiss, sitting in the sukkah in the rain is still fulfillment of a mitzvah; therefore one cannot say that by sitting there he violates the prohibition of using the sukkah’s wood. The prohibition exists only when a person does so outside the framework of the mitzvah. With this he resolves the difficulty of the Oneg Yom Tov.
The Theoretical Significance of His Words
His position contains a major innovation about the concept “mitzvah”: in his view, the term mitzvah has some kind of objective existence. An act can be defined as a mitzvah regardless of whether it constitutes fulfillment of the Divine will. A person can perform an act that is against God’s will, yet formally still be considered as doing a mitzvah.
At first glance his conception seems very similar to that of Rabbi Na’avat. He, too, relates to the content and utility of the mitzvah and not only to fulfilling God’s will. He even radicalizes it further, since in his view it is possible that a person fulfills a mitzvah without thereby fulfilling God’s will. The act is a mitzvah simply by being performed, full stop. But this comparison is superficial and rash. First, why indeed would God not want this act if it is a mitzvah? Does He not want us to do mitzvot? And conversely, if He truly does not want it, why is it a mitzvah?
Note that in defining the term “mitzvah,” Rabbi Weiss indeed does not refer to God’s will (indeed he even ignores it), but he does refer to the command. Without a command there is no mitzvah. The mitzvah of sukkah became such only because we were commanded to sit in a sukkah on these days. A person who sits in an invalid sukkah or at another time (not on the festival) does not thereby fulfill a mitzvah. One cannot sever the mitzvah from the command—the command is what defines the act as a mitzvah. Rabbi Weiss’s novelty is that the command defines the mitzvah, and that definition remains in force (i.e., it is still a mitzvah) even if, for some reason, God does not want us to do it. Seen this way, it becomes clear that Rabbi Weiss’s approach is actually the very opposite of Rabbi Na’avat’s. In his definition he relates only to the command, not to utility and meaning. If the act had utility and meaning, God would certainly want us to do it. If He does not want it, then apparently fulfilling the mitzvah in that manner does not bring the intended benefit. When it is raining, the utility and meaning of the mitzvah are absent, and yet it is still called the mitzvah of dwelling in the sukkah. God abhors such a mitzvah and it has no benefit, yet the act remains defined as a mitzvah because there is a command.
On his view, the definition of mitzvah is ultra-formal; in this sense Rabbi Weiss’s approach is squarely opposed to Rabbi Na’avat’s. Once an act has been defined as a mitzvah, it is detached from the will of the One who commanded it. As it were, God created a spiritual world of mitzvot, and this is now a reality. Just as fire burns even if God “does not want” it to burn—because these are the laws of nature—so too one who sits in a valid sukkah on Sukkot fulfills a mitzvah even if God does not want it. There is here a reality of mitzvah. The command created this spiritual world and brought into being the reality of mitzvah; now it stands on its own and is not dependent on God’s will. This is extreme positivism: the command, as it were, creates the mitzvah, and it now has an objective existence. According to natural-law theory, the very essence of mitzvah is that the act has spiritual or moral utility (and that, it would seem, is determined by God’s will, not by the command).
A Mitzvah Without a Command: Women and Time-Bound Positive Commandments
Rabbi Weiss’s basic claim is that one who sits in the sukkah while it is raining is like someone who fulfills a mitzvah from which he is exempt—for example, like women who fulfill time-bound positive commandments. He says that according to all views they have a mitzvah, only they are not obligated. Here we have a mitzvah without a (personal) command. True, there is a command for men, but not for women; nevertheless, women who fulfill the mitzvah are considered to be doing a mitzvah, and according to some views even recite a blessing over it.
But this is not a sufficiently good example, since in that case there is a command that defines the act as a mitzvah, and women are merely exempt (not obligated to fulfill, but allowed to fulfill). Moreover, women who fulfill a time-bound positive command are not doing anything wrong; they are merely exempt. By contrast, one who sits in the sukkah while it is raining is doing something that is not God’s will (like the servant whose master poured the pitcher on his face), and not for nothing is he called a “simpleton.” And yet Rabbi Weiss claims that even there this is fulfillment of a mitzvah.
Furthermore, for my part I never understood why the early authorities held that women indeed fulfill a mitzvah in this (the later authorities define it as a “kiyyumit,” existence-type mitzvah). Simply put, at most they do a good deed (since there is no command), but they do not have fulfillment of a mitzvah (not even a kiyyumit). Does a kohen who separates terumah thereby fulfill a mitzvah? He is not commanded and therefore it is not his mitzvah. Such a kohen is a simpleton and might also be transgressing “bal tosif” (adding). It seems to me that women’s exemption from time-bound positive commandments is not merely lack of obligation but that they are not addressed by these commandments at all. And indeed one may discuss whether, on my view, a blessing is applicable at all in such a case (for in the blessing one says “Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us,” and here there is no command). One may dismiss this, since according to some opinions one blesses even over a custom, and perhaps there is a custom that women fulfill these mitzvot; therefore perhaps one can also bless. But it seems more plausible that the early authorities understood that women are merely exempt (i.e., not obligated to fulfill), but it is a mitzvah for them as well (like a “kiyyumit” mitzvah).
At the beginning of his commentary to the Sifra, the Ra’avad writes that a woman who fulfills a time-bound positive commandment may do so even if it involves violating a prohibition—that is, for her too the rule applies that a positive command overrides a negative—even though she is not commanded. I have never understood this: even if a “kiyyumit” mitzvah overrides a prohibition, a good deed that is not a mitzvah certainly does not override a prohibition. Indeed, many disagree with the Ra’avad on this, though apparently only because when there is no obligation to fulfill the mitzvah there is no justification to override a prohibition, not for my reason. In any case, even if I retract and accept the ruling of the early authorities that this is a kiyyumit mitzvah, still the case of women does not prove Rabbi Weiss’s claim. In the case of the sukkah it does not appear to be mere exemption but that there is no mitzvah at all. Otherwise I do not understand why one who does so is a simpleton. He wishes to gain a mitzvah even though he is not obligated and even pays for it with discomfort. The Mishnah’s description and his designation as a simpleton suggest there is no mitzvah here whatsoever. Rabbi Weiss himself senses this and fends off these difficulties.
Several Difficulties
He cites from the Birkei Yosef that one who blesses over sitting in the sukkah while it is raining recites a blessing in vain. This would seem to prove there is no mitzvah.[3] As noted, the Rema writes that one who sits in the sukkah in the rain receives no reward and is a simpleton. Despite these two determinations, Rabbi Weiss repeatedly emphasizes that he maintains his position: one who sits in the sukkah in the rain fulfills a mitzvah. He is a simpleton, he receives no reward for that mitzvah, and his blessing is in vain—but his sitting in the sukkah is a mitzvah.
To explain this he says that reward is not received for fulfilling a mitzvah but for bringing satisfaction to God by fulfilling His will and serving Him. In sitting in the sukkah in the rain there is no service of God, and according to the Mishnah God is telling us through the rain, “I do not desire your service,” meaning that this mitzvah is not His will. Therefore there is no reward, yet there is fulfillment of a mitzvah. He brings, pointing to the other side of the coin, the saying of the Sages that one who intended to do a mitzvah and did not do it is credited as if he did it. In his view he receives reward as one who fulfilled a mitzvah, because from the standpoint of satisfaction and service of God, there is full service; but there is of course no fulfillment of a mitzvah (ones—coercion—does not count as action). This indicates a disconnect between whether a mitzvah was fulfilled and the question of reward. This proof seems problematic to me: even if reward is given for serving God and not necessarily for fulfilling a mitzvah, when there is fulfillment of a mitzvah I would expect reward to be given.
Rabbi Weiss also asks why the blessing is in vain and answers that blessings over mitzvot are rabbinic, and the Sages would not institute a blessing over a mitzvah that is not the will of the One who commands. Again, one can accept this if one accepts the (dubious) assumption that such a mitzvah is possible.
In the course of his remarks he formulates that in sitting in the sukkah while it is raining there exists a “cheftza of mitzvah” (an objective mitzvah-object). This is the most distinct expression of a positivist view of the mitzvah as a formal definition—that there is a mitzvah in some objective sense. That person did precisely what he was commanded, even though it was not the will of the Commander. The one who is distressed is exempt (!) from the sukkah, but it is not written that he does not have the mitzvah of sukkah. He is simply not obligated.
Two Examples
He now brings two examples of situations in which there is a mitzvah even though the Commander does not want us to fulfill it in that way. The first example is the dispute whether mitzvot require intention. He begins with what seems to him obvious as an egg that one who fulfills a mitzvah without intention receives no reward. The dispute whether mitzvot require intention or not concerns only whether there is a mitzvah here. But a mitzvah without intention is not God’s will, and one who fulfills it without intention receives no reward. For example, one who sounded the shofar as a musical performance (Rosh Hashanah 28a) fulfills his obligation. This is so even though he had no intention to fulfill the mitzvah and even transgressed a rabbinic prohibition (producing sound, playing music). Yet according to the view that mitzvot do not require intention, he fulfilled the mitzvah. He will not receive reward because there is no service of God here; he intended to make music—so for what would he receive reward? He adds that such a person will also receive punishment for the rabbinic transgression, even though he fulfilled the mitzvah and discharged his obligation (sounding again with intention will not help him, because he has already discharged it).[4] Is it conceivable that he receive reward for doing a prohibited act (a rabbinic transgression) when he had no intent to fulfill the mitzvah?! He will not be punished for neglecting a positive command, because he fulfilled it; but certainly he will not receive reward for its fulfillment.
Rabbi Weiss claims that the same applies if Persians coerced him to eat matzah, or if someone was reading the Torah and the time for the Shema arrived. In both cases, according to the opinion that mitzvot do not require intention, he discharged his obligation; and here there is no accompanying rabbinic prohibition. But to him it is obvious that even in these cases a person receives no reward for the mitzvah, because there is no act of service of God.
A second example is agency (shaliach) in mitzvot. When a person fulfills a mitzvah through an agent, he certainly discharges his obligation; but to him, it is obvious that the agent receives the full reward. The sender did not serve God; there is no reason to give him reward. Reward is not given for fulfillment of the mitzvah but for the service of God involved—and here the service was done by the agent. For example, a person sent an agent to check for chametz in ten houses he owns. Is it conceivable that the agent toils all night checking for chametz while the sender sleeps peacefully at home—and the sender receives the reward for this mitzvah?![5]
He brings a proof from the Rosh (Chullin 6:8), who cites a dispute among early authorities regarding one who appointed an agent to circumcise his son, and another came and preempted and circumcised the child. The Sages fined that one who snatches a mitzvah must pay ten gold coins to the owner of the mitzvah. The early authorities disagree whether the one who circumcised must pay the ten gold coins to the agent, or is exempt. The Shach (Choshen Mishpat §382) asks why no one says he should pay them to the father (the sender). Rabbi Weiss explains that there is no reason to pay the father, because the father did not lose any reward: the sender does not receive reward for a mitzvah that his agent performed. The sender discharged the mitzvah, but he lost no reward, hence no payment is due to him.
A Mitzvah Performed Through a Transgression
But all these examples are not comparable to our case. What we learn from fulfilling a mitzvah without intention, or through an agent (a mitzvah without personal action), is that reward is not given for fulfilling the mitzvah but for serving God—and in such cases there is no service of God. But this was not Rabbi Weiss’s main novelty; that is relatively easy to accept. His bolder claim was that even an act that is against God’s will can itself be considered a mitzvah-act (i.e., fulfillment of a mitzvah). This is truly astonishing. In the two examples he brought, there is no prohibition in what the person did; rather, the fulfillment was carried out in a shallow and inferior manner. Moreover, if rainfall empties the mitzvah of its content, why retain the halakhic definition of sitting in the sukkah in such a situation as a mitzvah? If there were a problem for some independent reason, one might say there is a mitzvah though it is not the will of God; but sitting in a sukkah in the rain is not problematic in and of itself, and therefore it seems more reasonable that in such a situation there is simply no mitzvah. It is very hard for me to accept Rabbi Weiss’s novel thesis.
It seems to me that a more pointed example of Rabbi Weiss’s positivist thesis can be brought from the sugya of a mitzvah that comes through a transgression (mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah)—strange that he did not cite it. As is known, a mitzvah that comes through a transgression is not a mitzvah, and one does not discharge his obligation through it. For example, one who steals matzah and eats it does not fulfill the positive commandment of eating matzah. It would seem that we see here that a mitzvah-act performed against God’s will is not a mitzvah at all (and not merely that no reward is given). The source cited is the verse “I am the Lord who hates robbery in a burnt offering.” From the fact that God hates an offering when it is brought through robbery, the Sages derive that there is no mitzvah at all. This stands in direct contradiction to Rabbi Weiss’s assertions, for we see that God’s will determines whether a person’s act counts as a mitzvah or not.
But there is another discussion here that sheds a different light. The Gemara (Sukkah 9a)—the same page on which the prohibition of using the sukkah’s wood appears—cites a verse from which we learn that a stolen sukkah is invalid: “You shall make the festival of Sukkot for yourself” (from yours, not stolen). Tosafot there (s.v. hahahu) ask: why is a verse needed? It is a mitzvah that comes through a transgression; even without the verse one who sits in such a sukkah would not have fulfilled the mitzvah. They are forced into answers, and several solutions have been offered. But the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 325, §9) offers his own answer; I will quote him in full:
It seems to me as follows: There are two kinds of positive commandments. One is an obligation upon the person, like tefillin, etrog, and eating matzah; a mitzvah of this kind—if he fulfills it—he does the will of the Creator, for so the King has commanded him. And if he neglects the mitzvah and does not put on tefillin or did not take the lulav, he has neglected the mitzvah and acted against His will and will be punished. And there are mitzvot one is not obligated to do, such as tzitzit: the Torah did not obligate him to wear a four-cornered garment. If he wishes, he may go without such a garment and is not acting against the will of the blessed Creator. But if he brings himself into a state of obligation by specifically wearing a four-cornered garment in order to fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzit, this is the good and upright way. In general: if he fulfills this mitzvah, he does the will of the blessed Creator; but if he does not fulfill the mitzvah, he does not transgress His will—he merely fails to fulfill the mitzvah.
Up to here he distinguishes between obligatory and existence-type mitzvot,[6] and now he turns to discuss the mitzvah of sukkah:
So too this mitzvah of sukkah has two elements. On the first night of Sukkot there is a positive commandment to eat an olive’s volume in the sukkah, and one is obligated to search out a sukkah; if he does not wish to eat, it does not help, for he is obligated to eat—like matzah and tefillin—and if he did not fulfill the positive commandment on the first night, he acted against His will. But on the other nights and days, if he wishes he does not eat and does not sit in the sukkah, and there is no further obligation upon him—like tzitzit. However, if he eats, there is a positive commandment to eat in the sukkah, and he fulfills His will; but if he does not eat there is no obligation. And in these two mitzvot there is likewise a scenario in which he neglects the mitzvah and acts against His will—for example, if he wears a four-cornered garment without attaching tzitzit, he transgresses the mitzvah; and similarly, if he eats a fixed meal outside the sukkah, he transgresses the mitzvah. In general: if he performs the mitzvah, in all cases he fulfills the mitzvah and does His will; sometimes he does not fulfill the mitzvah and transgresses His will (as in wearing a four-cornered garment without tzitzit or eating a fixed meal outside the sukkah); and sometimes he does not fulfill the mitzvah and also does not transgress (as in not wearing the garment at all or not eating). This is clear.
In this passage the Minchat Chinuch explains that he does not mean a “kiyyumit” mitzvah but rather a conditional obligatory mitzvah. What characterizes it is that it has three states: if one fulfills it, he has fulfilled a positive command; if he does not actualize the circumstances that obligate, he has nothing (neither fulfillment nor neglect); and if he actualizes the circumstances but does not fulfill the mitzvah, he neglects it. Thus it is with sitting in the sukkah on the remaining days, unlike the first night, where it is an unconditional obligation.
In light of this preface, he now resolves the Tosafot’s question cited above:
It seems that the reason a mitzvah that comes through a transgression is invalid is that the Holy One does not desire it and it is not acceptable before Him, for “let not the defense attorney become a prosecutor” (Sukkah 30a), and “I am the Lord who hates robbery in a burnt offering.” Because of this it is quite proper to say that he did not discharge the mitzvah—for this is not the will of the blessed Creator—and thus he did not fulfill the mitzvah. This applies properly to an obligatory mitzvah: since he did not discharge his obligation, by definition he did not perform the mitzvah—these are interdependent, as explained. But for mitzvot that are not obligatory, such as tzitzit and sukkah on the other days of the festival, if they come through a transgression—indeed he did not fulfill the will of the blessed Creator, for this is not His will—yet nevertheless he did not neglect the mitzvah; he simply did not fulfill it. It is like one who does not wear any garment at all or does not eat at all: he did not neglect and did not fulfill. Here too: although he did not fulfill the mitzvah, for it is not desirable before Him, nevertheless he did not neglect; we cannot judge him as one who ate outside the sukkah or wore a four-cornered garment without tzitzit. Rather, it is as if he did not perform the mitzvah at all: in reality he is wearing tzitzit and eating in a sukkah, but it is not desirable before Him—it is as if he did not fulfill the mitzvah, but we cannot deem him to have neglected the mitzvah, for in reality he is performing it. Consider and understand.
He explains the need for a verse invalidating a stolen sukkah as follows: without the verse, sitting in such a sukkah would be a mitzvah that comes through a transgression; if a person fulfills such a mitzvah, he indeed has not fulfilled a mitzvah (for it is not God’s will), but he has also not neglected it. One who sat and ate in a stolen sukkah did not eat outside the sukkah: he sat and ate in a valid sukkah, only that the mitzvah he performed is not desirable to God. Therefore he would not discharge his obligation on the first night (when there is an obligation), and he would not have fulfilled a mitzvah on the other days either. But he also would not have neglected it. Put differently: his mitzvah is not God’s will, and therefore there is no fulfillment of a mitzvah by the person; but one cannot say that, in reality, he ate outside the sukkah (a defect in the object), for the sukkah is not invalid. Only the verse teaches us that a stolen sukkah is invalid in the object; hence a verse is needed.
Note that, in contrast to Rabbi Weiss, the Minchat Chinuch assumes that God’s will defines the mitzvah as a mitzvah; therefore, in a mitzvah performed through a transgression—where the fulfillment is not God’s will—it is clear to him there is no fulfillment of a mitzvah. Yet he does accept Rabbi Weiss’s idea regarding the objective definition of mitzvot, and that this is indeed detached from God’s will. Even if God does not want my fulfillment of the mitzvot, there is a mitzvah here in the sense that I ate in a sukkah. Rabbi Weiss is at least correct regarding the absence of neglect, even if not regarding fulfillment.
I note that the words of the Minchat Chinuch are rejected by almost all later authorities known to me. R. Chaim of Brisk and R. Shimon Shkop, and all who follow them (the heads of yeshivot in recent generations), refuse to accept his distinction between non-fulfillment and neglect. In their view, if a person did not fulfill the mitzvah, he has neglected a positive command: neglect of a mitzvah means simply that he did not fulfill it. I would add that, on this point, there is logic in the Minchat Chinuch’s words. His claim is that the person’s mitzvah is worthless since it is not God’s will, but one cannot say he neglected the positive command. Neglect is not mere non-fulfillment (a neutral notion), but carries something negative. The person did not eat in a sukkah, but one cannot say he ate outside a sukkah. This is precisely what the Minchat Chinuch means when he says he is like one who did not eat at all; therefore he is not obligated in the sukkah and has not neglected a positive command. Rabbi Weiss takes it a step further: in his view, even fulfillment of the mitzvah may occur against God’s will, not merely absence of neglect. That is indeed far-reaching. Note, however, that in the Minchat Chinuch’s case (a stolen sukkah) the mitzvah is performed through a transgression, whereas sitting in the sukkah in the rain involves no transgression—only the expression of God’s displeasure (as in the servant whose master poured the pitcher in his face). That is an aggadic explanation, not a halakhic definition; thus perhaps there is room even for Rabbi Weiss’s assertion that fulfillment of a mitzvah against God’s will is possible (so long as it is not an actual transgression).
The distinction made by the Minchat Chinuch here parallels the distinction I drew above between law and halakhah. I argued there that to the legislator it does not matter whether you fulfill the law; from his perspective you only need not violate it. Therefore, the legislator does not care about your intention and motivation in “fulfilling” the law. By contrast, in halakhah it matters that you fulfill the law, not merely that you do not violate it. Therefore, in halakhah intention matters (and this is not only to exclude being “unwittingly occupied”).[7] Here the Minchat Chinuch distinguishes between neglecting a positive command and merely not fulfilling it. In this terminology one can say that in state law only violation applies, not mere non-fulfillment.
Comparison to Sitting in the Sukkah in the Rain
Even if the Minchat Chinuch is correct, it seems one cannot adduce proof from his words to Rabbi Weiss’s principle. In the case of a mitzvah performed through a transgression there is a side problem not intrinsic to the mitzvah. The act of sitting in the sukkah is done halakhically and without defect; only to enable it, a robbery occurred—which is a separate matter. He does not indicate any problem in the act of sitting in the sukkah itself, but in something else. If so, in a mitzvah through a transgression there is a positive side (sitting in the sukkah) and an independent negative side (robbery). In such a situation there is room to say that a mitzvah was done even though it is not God’s will (because of the robbery).
But in sitting in the sukkah while it is raining there is no other problem detached from the sitting (as we see in robbery). Apparently God does not want the very sitting in the sukkah at that time. Therefore there are two interpretive possibilities:
- Perhaps the Torah does not demand that a person suffer rain in order to sit in the sukkah. But on that reading, one who does so is certainly not a simpleton; on the contrary, he deserves great esteem for his dedication to fulfill the mitzvah beyond what is required.
- For some reason, when it is raining there is no benefit to sitting in the sukkah; but then it is very plausible that there is no mitzvah at all in such sitting. Therefore with sitting in the rain there is no logic in saying there is a mitzvah even though it is not the will of God. If it is not His will, there is probably no mitzvah in it.
In short, Rabbi Weiss’s words are very puzzling. I think he is correct in his positivist conception that a mitzvah has an objective existence, and that such an act has the character of mitzvah solely by virtue of the command. But when the act is performed against God’s will, it is implausible to still define it as a mitzvah. Above I already noted that this is evident from the rationale for the law of a mitzvah performed through a transgression itself—especially from the source “I am the Lord who hates robbery in a burnt offering”: from the fact that God hates the act, the Sages infer there is no mitzvah-act here. This stands squarely against Rabbi Weiss’s words. Yet from the Minchat Chinuch on the law of a mitzvah through a transgression, we still see that a mitzvah has an objective existence not dependent on God’s will but on the definition created by the command. But that is only when the problem is a side issue like robbery, not when the mitzvah-act itself is against God’s will.
The Object (Cheftza) of Prayer
As is known, the Rambam and the Ramban disagree about the status of prayer. The Rambam holds there is a Torah-level command to pray, and the Sages merely fixed the text and times; the Ramban holds that prayer is entirely rabbinic. R. Chaim, on the Rambam (Hilchot Tefillah 4:1), where he distinguishes between different intentions in prayer, notes the following:
And even if this could be so without any reason, there is more to add: according to the Rambam, the obligation of prayer and its mitzvah are from the Torah; and even according to those who disagree with the Rambam, that is only in its obligation—but its fulfillment and essence are, for everyone, from the Torah…
Even according to the Ramban, one who prays has fulfillment of a mitzvah from the Torah, although there is no Torah-level obligation to pray.[8] Perhaps likewise, the Patriarchs, who prayed before we were commanded, fulfilled the mitzvah of prayer according to the Rambam (and even the Ramban). One could say that according to all views, at the Torah level there is a “cheftza of prayer,” and the dispute is only whether there is a Torah-level obligation to pray. The concept exists at the Torah level even per the Ramban. From this he draws consequences regarding the different intentions in prayer (some of which are conditions for the mitzvah and others conditions in the object of prayer).
What does this statement mean? It seems clear that for him the act of prayer has some normative status. As a matter of fact, it is clear that the Patriarchs prayed—this is uncontested. The question is whether we can view that act as a mitzvah-act when, in their time, there was no command. R. Chaim argues yes: the act has normative status even without a command. This is a factual matter, since there exists an abstract object in objective reality (independent of command), or, if you like, an idea, called the “cheftza of prayer.” Therefore, when a person prays, this is not merely a descriptive statement; the act has a normative-halakhic dimension.
At first glance R. Chaim seems to be saying the opposite of what I wrote above. Simply put, it appears that in his view there is no need for a command for there to be a mitzvah in the world—precisely Rabbi Na’avat’s position. But I think this is a mistaken reading. First, he assumes the positivist premise that a mitzvah indeed has some objective existence (a cheftza of mitzvah), and that it is not merely the act itself. It is plausible that what turns it into a mitzvah is the intention, not the mere action (especially in the absence of a command). As I mentioned, R. Chaim himself derives from this distinction conclusions regarding intention. Beyond that, R. Chaim is not speaking of a cheftza of mitzvah but of a cheftza of prayer. In his view, prayer is a pre-halakhic concept that belongs to reality itself. Therefore, from time immemorial, one who prayed indeed performed an act of prayer that has normative meaning, even though there was no command. But he does not dispute that only the command at Sinai turned it into a mitzvah. The proof is that if not, it is unclear what changed between pre-Sinai and post-Sinai according to the Rambam. If even before the command it was a mitzvah, why was a command necessary? It is thus clear that the Rambam holds it became a mitzvah only after the command; R. Chaim’s claim is merely that even beforehand it had a normative status of “standing before God,” though not a mitzvah.[9]
In conclusion, I have no doubt that R. Chaim—although he spoke of a cheftza of prayer even before the command—would not accept Rabbi Na’avat’s claim that an act of prayer as such is a mitzvah, and that intending to discharge the obligation only harms the prayer rather than benefiting or elevating it. Intention is what turns a proper and worthy act into a mitzvah, for now it is done in a focused manner to discharge the obligation of the mitzvah. And as noted, even where intention is implicitly present, one who succeeds in acting with explicit intention elevates his act to a higher level of service of God.
[1] At the end of the previous column I noted that even in a moral act, intending to do it as a response to the moral imperative elevates it and is certainly not superfluous. I assume Rabbi Na’avat would not agree with this either.
[2] For some reason he does not address some of the answers. For example, there are views among the poskim that the prohibition of using the sukkah’s wood exists only if one physically removes materials from the sukkah. Passive use is not prohibited. This apparently depends on the nature of the prohibition (the Gemara analogizes the sukkah to the festival sacrifice; the question is whether the prohibition is like using consecrated property, or is a standalone prohibition. With consecrated property, passive use is also prohibited—for example, it is prohibited to enjoy sitting in the Temple’s shade).
[3] True to the ways of contemporary learners, he assumes his words must fit the Birkei Yosef (he could have said he disagrees and that in his opinion it is indeed not a blessing in vain). Moreover, all the later authorities who offered other answers to the Oneg Yom Tov’s difficulty certainly disagreed with his foundation, so why presume that the Birkei Yosef does not hold like them? Perhaps the difficulty is merely a setup for the answer.
[4] This point can be discussed in light of the Ra’avad cited by the Rivash, who says that if a person betrothed a woman through an agent, he should betroth her again himself (since “a mitzvah is greater when done by oneself than by one’s agent”), even though she is already betrothed to him. We also see this in the Sha’agat Aryeh and in Beit HaLevi on tzitzin she’einan me’akvin, who cite the Gemara in Menachot regarding one who brought a sin offering and then found another animal of the same kind, that he should bring it as well. The discussion there concerns the well-known case attributed to R. Chaim of Brisk: one has before him a particularly beautiful etrog that is of doubtful validity, and another etrog that is valid but not as beautiful— which should he take first? It is reported in R. Chaim’s name that he should take the beautiful one first, because if he takes the valid one, he will certainly have fulfilled the mitzvah and there will be no point in taking the beautiful one afterwards. From my remarks here it follows that R. Chaim is not correct, but this is not the place.
[5] Perhaps he will receive reward for the effort of appointing the agent, and if he paid him then also for the expenditure—but not the reward of the mitzvah itself.
[6] Note that the mitzvah of tzitzit is not a kiyyumit mitzvah; this is a common mistake. It is a conditional obligatory mitzvah. With a kiyyumit mitzvah there is no possibility of neglecting it (there is no “neglect of a positive command”), but with tzitzit one can neglect the positive command if he wears a four-cornered garment without tzitzit. Therefore it is an obligatory mitzvah (one must attach tzitzit), only the obligation is conditional upon certain circumstances (wearing a four-cornered garment). But this is no different than Birkat HaMazon, which is conditional upon eating to satiation. Does anyone think Birkat HaMazon is a kiyyumit mitzvah?!
[7] In the third volume of my series on Talmudic Logic (which deals with deontic logic), I explained that in a modern legal system there are no positive obligations (aseh) but only prohibitions (lo ta’aseh). I showed there that the duty to pay taxes or serve in the army is a “negative that arises from an implied positive,” not a positive command. The legislator does not reward one who does these things; he complains only about one who fails to do them. One implication is that intention is not required in complying with the law, because one is not demanded to fulfill the law but merely not to violate it. For a prohibition, no intention is needed.
[8] The distinction between saying that someone discharged his obligation and saying that he has fulfillment of the mitzvah is discussed in my essay on Parashat Vayeshev in Midah Tovah (5767), later included in the book La’asot Mitzvotekha, regarding the levirate marriage (yibbum) of a minor. See the examples I cited there—all of them deal with situations in which there is fulfillment even when there is no command.
[9] See a halakhic and interpretive implication of this determination regarding the rule “Scripture repeats something to make it indispensable,” in my essay here.
Ignoring comment 2, Rabbi Nevat can argue that there is no such thing as a sin, someone who sits in a sukkah in the rain also uses the sukkah's wood for no mitzvah purpose and the ram's not thin.
By the way, at the time I checked and the only place where it appears that we are not sacrifices is only a sukkah.
I didn't understand what difficulty you were trying to solve, and how it was solved.
I did not hear Rabbi Weiss's lecture, but it is clear that the exemption for regret is different from exemptions for other mitzvot. Rav Yosef left a sukkah in which thin toothpicks fell out even though the makhab did not fall off, because regret is a subjective matter. And a person who does not have a roof, and if not in his sukkah, sleeps on the street in the rain, it seems that he is not exempt from sleeping or sitting in the sukkah, and for him it is probably a mitzvah. (This is also clear from the opinion that was ruled in halakhic law that sanctification is performed in the sukkah on the first night even when it rains). And if a person deceives himself or truly convinces himself that he is not regretting (or that the joy of fulfilling the mitzvah cancels his sorrow about the rains), it seems that he does not have the right to regret the rain. Therefore, it cannot be said of anyone who has already entered the sukkah that he has not fulfilled the mitzvah in retrospect. Therefore, it seems that in the sukkah in the rain (an exemption that does not exist in any other mitzvah) it is only that there is no obligation in the mitzvah, and not actually that it is not being fulfilled.
Even if you were right that the excuse of regret is subjective (and in my opinion it is not always so. In the rain, it is an objectively determined measure, to the point of the stench of the freezing rain that perhaps varies between people), what does that have to do with our discussion? When you are personally sorry, you are not fulfilling a mitzvah. Even if you claim that there is a mitzvah in it, like Rabbi Weiss, it has nothing to do with the subjectivity of regret.
A. As soon as it is subjective, a person can continue to impose an obligation on himself, claiming that he is not actually sorry. Therefore, someone who has already sat in the sukkah will be treated as someone who is not sorry (which you cannot do in other places where a person is exempt from a certain mitzvah).
(How would you treat a person who sleeps in a light rain in the sukkah, as is known, regrets are easier regarding sleep, on the other hand, it is clear that there are many people in light rain who would prefer to continue sleeping in the sukkah).
B. Again, how do you get along with the opinion that one must sanctify and eat a keziz in the sukkah on the first night in the rain? (You don't necessarily agree with her? That's the controversy?)
C. Additional examples: A person who engages in a mitzvah that is exempt from a mitzvah and fulfills the second mitzvah? Would it be conceivable that he is not considered to be fulfilling the second mitzvah? (Again, perhaps this is the controversy whether the exemption is only in a place where one cannot fulfill both or everyone who engages in the mitzvah? Also according to the Torah, if a person managed to fulfill both, he has not fulfilled a mitzvah?)
D. A personal example: Rabban Gamliel, who recited the K”sh after he got married, did he not fulfill the mitzvah of K”sh and so on today when everyone recites? It is quite clear that he did (at least to me, is that what his students claimed?) – Again, an example of a subjective matter, are you able to direct or not? We will not say that someone who continues to impose an obligation on himself has not fulfilled the mitzvah.
These are examples of commandments that are defined based on the elusive "psychology" of man - what to do?
You are not answering what I asked. When the subjective conditions are met for that person, and it turns out that he is sorry. Why is there a mitzvah for him here? How is this different from the situation where being sorry was an objective law? And if the conditions are not met, then he simply is not sorry, and again I will ask how is this different from a regular sukkah yeshiva?
I did not understand your questions. I did not say that when a person is exempt, he never fulfills a mitzvah (although that should also be discussed). I wrote that here we are talking about the absence of an obligation and not about exemption. Certainly according to the Rema, who wrote that he is a layman. Rabbi Weiss also speaks according to the Rema.
He who performs a mitzvah only because of the commandment and does not understand the good is a fool.
So we can say that in the beginning it is legitimate to be a fool for educational reasons, but he who has grown up and still does it without understanding is just an idiot. And it is okay to be an idiot, but you should not come and spread your stupidity to the general public. He is a fool anyway.
Do you understand the good? What is the good in tefillin? Sukkah? All I've heard so far are pretty lame explanations, goals that could have been achieved much better in other ways.
Wait, are you positivist in general or is it specific to this topic?
No. Only on this subject. Positivism is a much broader position than the foundations of law. I have written quite a bit against it.
I did not understand why a mitzvah following a transgression is a problem according to the positivist view of mitzvot.
At a basic level, it can be argued that the verse teaches us that a mitzvah following a transgression does not create an objective act of mitzvah, as in other cases that do not meet the boundaries of the mitzvah.
But more than that, in the positivist view of mitzvot, it is possible to discuss whether transgressions also have an independent existence and thus impair the objective creation of the mitzvah following a transgression, and not because there is no will of God in this at this moment - unlike the case of rain in the Sukkah, where there is indeed no will of God in this, but there is an act of mitzvah (Malach Melitz Yosher, Hacham Hidded).
According to this, we can perhaps look at the words of Rabbi Chaim a little differently.
Prayer is a person's direct influence on that spiritual plane where there is an objective existence for the mitzvot (adding power in the higher worlds, according to his grandfather). The question of whether this effect is a mitzvah in itself is a matter of dispute among the Rishonim, but according to R’ Chaim, everyone agrees that a person has the ability to do this and create an object of prayer.
(Which contradicts your entire concept of prayer. But that is not the topic of this column, so let's leave it at that.)
The problem is not the law of the mitzvah that follows the offense itself, but its source. The verse “I hate robbery in the oleh” does not mean that there is no mitzvah here, but that He hates such an act. But the sages conclude from this that there is no mitzvah. According to Rabbi Weiss, the fact that God hates does not mean that there is no mitzvah here.
Incidentally, you are mixing two levels here: the question of whether there is something realistic (purpose, benefit, defect, or harm) at the basis of the mitzvahs or offenses is agreed upon. The question of whether the fact that an act is a mitzvah is a statement about objective reality or is it just a normative statement.
Regarding prayer, I did not understand what you added. Incidentally, it is also not contrary in any way that I can see to my perception. But that is not the topic of the column, so let’s leave it at that.
Isn't this the concept of "Who asked this of you, Ramos Hatzri?" There too, there is a mitzvah performed in all its details and grammar, and there is no room to say that it is not a mitzvah. But with that, God Almighty does not want it because of the context in which it is performed. And as the Maimonides says in the laws of repentance.
It is not similar. There is no flaw in the mitzvah itself, but rather in the surrounding atmosphere.
In the 24th of the month of Chashon, 5751
According to the rabbi, both R. Michael and R. Menachem are right.
The work of God begins with a feeling of accepting a yoke, a feeling of being a 'hero of power, doing His word, listening to the voice of His word.' But later comes the feeling of pleasure in 'making the Creator happy,' in carrying out the divine destiny that performing the mitzvah leads to, and in the very act of drawing near to the Creator in doing His will.
A person begins like Abraham, who stands the test and fulfills the will of his Creator even when he does not understand, but ends with the vision of the commandment of God: 'Your consolations shall delight my soul.' When a person is willing to fulfill the commandments of God, even in sorrow, he will be judged at the end of the day, “This will comfort us from our deeds and from the sorrow of our hands.”
With blessings, Sh’ts [= Both are right]
And apparently it must be proven that the mitzvah actually has its own value even without a command, from what the Sages said that our forefather Abraham kept all the mitzvot even before he was commanded.
With blessings, Sh”t
Only the mitzvah of circumcision could not be kept by Abraham without a command, for circumcision is the making of a covenant with G-d, and a covenant requires both parties and cannot be made unilaterally.
There is no evidence here. Who said that this was a fulfillment of a mitzvah and not just a good deed?! On the contrary, in my opinion it is quite clear that these were not mitzvahs (and R’ Chaim also wrote what he wrote only about prayer and not about mixing dishes).
And I haven't even mentioned that the Sage description that Abraham kept all the commandments is a Midrash legend and not a historical description. Of course, it is still possible to argue that the Midrash came to teach this itself, that keeping a commandment is necessary even before the commandment. My comments on this are mentioned above.
It is clear that this was considered a “mitzvah” for Abraham, since this is required by the verse: “Because Abraham heard my voice, my commandments, my statutes, and my teachings.”
With blessings, Sh.
In the book of Proverbs, I will also ask you to read the words of the prophet Micah (perhaps his friends called him Micah) in his trilogy, and he says: "A man has told you what is good and what the Lord requires of you, and you will be satisfied with it, both with good on your part, and also with the observance of the commandments of the Lord."
Indeed, the three elements that the prophet Micah establishes include not only the fulfillment of the obligation to "do justice"; But also the entire structure of the personality, on the one hand, ‘love of kindness’, not only doing kindness, but doing it out of love. And on the other hand, ‘modesty in walking with your God’, not to come as a result of the blessed activity of ‘doing justice and loving kindness’ to a feeling of pride, but to remain humble and modest towards the Creator, who is the source of justice and the love of kindness in our hearts.
Even with Rebecca, there are two aspects. On the one hand, she fulfills the thirsty man's request to give him water, and on the other hand, she notices that there are camels that she was not asked to water, but on her own initiative she takes care to quench their thirst, and not only to water them with the remains of the man's drink, but to draw again and again until they drink all they need.
Even when she is asked, “Whose daughter are you?”, Rebecca answers more than she is asked, and she mentions not only her father, but also her grandparents: “I am the daughter of Bethuel, whom Malka bore to Nehor,” and in this she explains the source of her generosity of heart, for she is the granddaughter of Malka who bore Nehor eight sons, the one who recorded the Book of Genesis at her birth.
With all her virtues, Rebecca behaves modestly, and when she meets the man who is destined to be her husband, she covers her face out of modesty and respect.
With greetings, Othipheron Nafishitim
The statement “Drink and I will give your camels a drink too” that Eliezer expects can also come from another direction, out of concern for health. Eliezer expects that a clever girl will not bring home the remains of a jug from which a stranger has drunk, from whom who knows what diseases he may be carrying, but in her cleverness a girl will behave with “tact”, will not pour the remains of his drink in his face, but will offer them to his camels.
But Rebekah “goes a step further”. If she had watered the camels only out of politeness, Rebekah would not have drawn water for the other camels again. The willingness to draw water especially for the camels indicates that there is not only “tact” here, but a sincere desire to do kindness to the guest and his camels. Eliezer found not only prudence, cleverness, and politeness, but also ‘loving kindness” at its best.
With greetings, Yaron Borlai Halevi Werkheimer
The clever combination of prudence with ‘tact’, Rivka will discover later on when she organizes Jacob's escape to Haran, without Isaac knowing the real reason – Esau's plot to kill Jacob. A man who rightly trusts people and their dignity – needs a woman who knows how to protect him from those who abuse the trust placed in him.
On the distinction between a mandatory mitzvah and a mitzvah of permission and the degree of chassidism in the case of Balama, see the response of the Ge'onim https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=1365&pgnum=71
Good luck. The reference is very interesting, and should be discussed carefully. Ostensibly, he is dividing between a positive and an existential mitzvah, but in reality it is implied that he is dividing between a mitzvah and a matter (or a degree of chassidism). As far as I understand, he means, as I do, that there is really no mitzvah here (nor an existential one) but a matter. It is true that one receives a reward for it, as Rabbi Weiss wrote that reward is received not for fulfilling the mitzvah in the formal sense but for the work of God (just as one receives a reward for other things that are not a mitzvah, moral conduct, and the like).
No. He distinguishes between a mandatory mitzvah and a mitzvah of permission (such as evening prayers) and between a mitzvah of permission (such as evening prayers when one has not untied his belt) and a measure of chassidut in the form of alms (such as reciting shirk and tishabhot or evening prayers when one has untied his belt!) He did a good job.
And what is explained there that when he loosened his belt, the mitzvah (even of permission) was no longer there, and there is only the degree of chassidut to pray as one who stands at midnight to say shirt and teshabhot is evidence against Rabbi Weiss Shalit”a. Which means that since there is exemption, there is no mitzvah at all here, even though there is work done by Hashem here (and he has a reward) and when it comes to the mitzvah of a sukkah when it rains.
I don't see a shred of evidence against Rabbi Weiss (what you write here is a repetition of Rabbi Weiss's words and not anything against him), but I don't have time right now to delve into the answer there.
In blessings no: The Gemara writes that whoever fasts on Shabbat has a seventy-year-old turban torn from him, and yet he is forgiven.
Interestingly, Rabbi Hai Gaon on this Gemara (Otzar HaGeonim) had difficulty with the above verse:
“If it is a mitzvah (to fast on Shabbat), there is no punishment for him! And if there is a punishment for him, it is a mitzvah in transgression… there is nothing that has both a reward and a punishment, in the same way”.
And he concludes that “Ha said, we are forgiven from it, except for the whole matter” and these words should not be torn apart.
If only he had read the verse or at least heard the lesson of R’ who did not erase words from the Talmud…
To Rabbi Michi
Peace and blessings!
I read the last two columns and enjoyed them.
A. Your approach, which is contrary to that of Rabbi Navet, is consistent with the last columns (according to his approach). Since, in your understanding, there is no concept of Jewish values, there is no reason to assume that a Jew who does not murder because of the moral value of this abstinence will be defined as fulfilling a mitzvah compared to a gentile. All the lofty values that the mitzvot lead to, and may be their goal, still do not define the act as a mitzvah and the one who fulfills them as an observant Jew. Only someone who fulfills the mitzvot out of a commitment to God’ and not to Kant, Jesus, or any other god – can qualify for this definition.
B. I agree with you that logically (reasoning) there is no reason to assume that a good deed required by reason alone will be a mitzvah as long as there is no commandment. At most, it can be said that the mitzvah commanded us to do every deed that is good from the perspective of the understanding, and if we do this deed out of a commitment to the mitzvah, we elevate the good deed and make a mitzvah out of it. (And one should inquire whether a kind-hearted person who gives charity to the poor, and intended to do so out of a commitment to morality, and out of a commitment to the mitzvah, has fulfilled both, or whether both have failed, or whether only one of them has. And one should consult J )
3. I thought of proving otherwise from the words of the Gam’ in Megillah, page 14, a: Our rabbis gave forty-eight prophets and seven prophetesses who prophesied to Israel and did not diminish or omit anything written in the Torah except the reading of the Megillah. What is needed, said Rabbi Hiyya bar Abin, said Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha, and what is slavery for freedom? They said that singing from death to life is not much better.
Even if singing about slaves to freedom is a plausible and ethical action, it is clear that there was no command here. And if so, how can one demand anything less (also a supposition) from an obligation that is not based on a command?
It can be said that indeed, even the regulation of reading the Megillah is not a command, and the elders of that generation were not obligated to correct the Megillah reading, but rather that they felt a logical need to do so. The commandment commanded us to obey what the elders of the generation say, (and it turns out that this obligation also applies to them to obey their own regulations) and if we read the Megillah out of a commitment to the elders' command, we are fulfilling a mitzvah.
We find that to a certain extent there are two conflicting values here in fulfilling the commandment of reading the Megillah. While on the one hand, we feel a moral and logical need to praise the one who redeemed us from death to life (the so-called value of gratitude), in order to elevate this action to the level of a mitzvah (something for which we receive a reward), we must ignore the aforementioned obligation and perform it only out of a commitment to the commandment of the Lord to obey the elders. Complicated, isn't it?
In any case, I don't think this is Chazal's intention there. It seems more likely that it is the explanation itself that defines the action as a mitzvah, and because of that, their words are indeed puzzling to me.
D. It is possible that every good (and moral) deed is a mitzvah, but this is precisely when a person does it out of a commitment to the general commandment of the mitzvah to do good things. In doing so, a person deprives himself of the possibility of being moral, and chooses to be religious. According to this, any action that is logically G-d's will, and I do it because I want to please Him, I thereby fulfill a mitzvah.
E. According to this, even a mitzvah that is time-bound for women, since the explanation says that it is a good deed even if there is no commandment regarding them, when they do it they fulfill a mitzvah. Because the mitzvah commanded to do good things, and that is what they do. Even though they are not obligated.
And speaking of which, I really think that Rabbi Weiss has introduced an incomprehensible innovation here. I don't understand why a mitzvah action that is against the will of God would be considered a mitzvah, and this seems to me to be a logical contradiction.
I would resolve the difficulty he addresses in a different way.
The prohibition on using the trees of the sukkah does not initially refer to the actions with which the mitzvah is performed. Since eating, sleeping, and staying in their company are the actions in question, they were excluded from the prohibition on using the trees of the sukkah, and therefore, even if he does not fulfill a mitzvah (a fool, for example, who I think even Rabbi Weiss would agree that he does not fulfill a mitzvah by eating in the sukkah), he does not violate the prohibition on enjoying the trees of the sukkah.
With blessings
This is less likely in my opinion, but there are other excuses and there is no need to push. For example, what I wrote in the comment that only using the sukkah trees themselves (taking them from the sukkah) is included in the prohibition.
Where did you find a command to say Hallel on Passover?
I know of one reliable source (Gm. Pesachim 127:1) which is obviously nothing but a supposition, and not just a supposition, but of the type that is “unthinkable”: And this Hallel, who said the prophets among them who ordained for Israel that they should say it for every chapter and every tribulation and every trouble that would not come upon them, and when they were redeemed, they say it for their redemption. The R”M would say all the praises that are mentioned in the Book of Psalms, all of them David said, as it is said (Psalms 44:20): “All the prayers of David the son of Jesse, do not extol them, but all these Hallel, who said?” Rabbi Yossi says, “Elazar the son of Jesse said, “Moses and Israel said it when they came up from the sea and his companions spread out over him,” to say that David said and his words are evident from their words. Is it possible that Israel slaughtered their Passover lambs and took their loins and did not say a song? The statue of Micah stands weeping, and Israel says, “The image Hallel:
At least according to Rashi (in Megillah 14a) the song sung at the departure from slavery to freedom is the song of the sea, which certainly did not come by command.
If I am right in this, the chatter has returned to its place.
First, the ko”ch is only the explanation of why the Sages determined the reading of the Megillah. The halakhic validity is the determination of the Sages and not the ko”ch. See Ramban in his interpretations of the root of D, who wrote yes. This is regarding Rashi's method, who wrote that it is about the song of the sea. But the Torah flouted it and claims that in the song of the sea it was from death to life and not from slavery to freedom, and therefore explained that it is about the Hallel on the night of Passover. This is a regular law, which is not from the Torah according to most opinions, but neither is the reading of the Megillah from the Torah.
And regarding the righteous and good doer.
I thought you were moving on to a broader discussion of the mitzvot. It is clear to all of us that there is no obligation to be good. In other words, when I do not do good properly (morally speaking), I cannot be defined as someone who does not observe the mitzvot. But I certainly think that between the opinions you presented in the column, namely, Navet's opinion that a mitzvah has its final value regardless of the obligation to God, and your opinion that a mitzvah is the performance of an action for which I have received a command, there is also room for the opinion I expressed (although I am not sure that this is my opinion), that a mitzvah is the performance of any action that I believe to be the will of God, and as such, any moral action, out of a desire (even if not an obligation) to fulfill His will. There is a huge difference between what I said and what Navet said, because while according to him the ultimate goal (in the mitzvah of performing acts of kindness, for example) is that I will be a good and moral person, according to me the ultimate goal is that I will be a person who does the will of God, which happens to be identical with moral values.
This is not an intermediate definition. Every moral act is like this.
I didn't understand the educational offering. If a sukkah is a conditional positive mitzvah (on other days), then when the circumstances are met (he eats), he must eat in the sukkah, meaning he is obligated to eat under the sukkah, otherwise he has nullified a positive commandment.
In other words, a conditional positive mitzvah when the circumstances are met = a positive mitzvah.
If so, when he sits (on other days) to eat in a stolen sukkah, why don't they say that he nullified the positive mitzvah he was obligated to do?
Who said no? Simply put, if one eats outside the Sukkah on the other days, it is the same as on the first day. Unless you say that on the other days it is a positive prohibition (it is only forbidden to eat outside the Sukkah and not a conditional obligation to eat in the Sukkah).
The Hanach argues that the verse is necessary, because if it were not for the verse (i.e. only from the ruling on a mitzvah that comes with a transgression) I would say that in order he does not fulfill a mitzvah, but nevertheless it is not the same as if he ate outside the sukkah.
Therefore, on a Sunday, when there is a positive mitzvah, meaning that fulfillment is done and the nullification is a matter of law, if he does not fulfill it then it does not nullify, just as on a Sunday if he eats in a stolen sukkah he nullifies the mitzvah.
But on the other days, the Hanach says that since there is no obligation then even if he does not fulfill it, it does not nullify. Therefore the verse is necessary.
But the Hanach says that if it were an existential mitzvah with a virtuous ethic, it does not fulfill it but it also does not nullify it because he ate under the sukkah, and yet. But if in these circumstances (when he comes to eat) it becomes a positive mitzvah (because it is a conditional positive mitzvah and not an existential one), then when it does not have an existence (because it is a stolen sukkah) he also manually nullifies the mitzvah that was upon him, it is as if he ate outside because the mitzvah was not fulfilled and therefore he nullified what he did.
I explained. This is because he mistakenly thinks that if there is no positive mitzvah, the only option is to see it as a positive prohibition (not one that follows from a positive rule). But this is not true. It is a conditional positive mitzvah.