What Is a Mitzvah I: The Role of Intention (Column 342)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
At first glance, the concept of a “mitzvah” seems simple: that which the Holy One, blessed be He, commands. And what is the fulfillment of a mitzvah? Carrying out something that God has commanded. Still, there are borderline cases that are not unequivocal: consider, for example, time-bound positive commandments for women, who are not commanded in them. When a woman performs such a commandment, is that indeed a mitzvah? Is it not merely a good deed (or perhaps not even that)? Or maybe there is no difference at all between the two?
The question is: what, in general, is the difference between a mitzvah and a good deed? Svara (reasoning) is sometimes presented as a substitute for a command (“Why do I need a verse? Reasoning suffices!”), and therefore the existence of a verse seems insignificant. Its apparent purpose is merely to reveal to us what we would not have known on our own. For example, no one would have thought that eating pork is something bad had the Torah not told us so; therefore it commands us not to eat pork. But if so, there is truly no essential difference between a mitzvah and a good deed. On the other hand, it is clear that there are mitzvot we would have known even without the command (by reasoning), such as the prohibition of murder, honoring parents, helping others, and the like—yet the Torah nevertheless commands us concerning them. There must therefore be some significance to the command beyond its revealing that a given act is deemed worthy or unworthy in God’s eyes. Indeed, in my article on reasonings (svarot) I showed that reasoning is not a full substitute for a command. I argued there that without a command there are no mitzvot. Reasoning has a status like that found in a verse only when the reasoning serves to interpret a law that has a scriptural source. But a reasoning that innovates an entirely new law is law without a verse and therefore cannot be De’oraita (Torah-level) law. The conclusion (detailed there as well) is that for an act to be a mitzvah a command is required; reasoning alone is insufficient. That pertains to the definition of the concept “mitzvah.” Now we must ask: when is a given act considered fulfillment of a mitzvah? For example, is a mitzvah performed without intention still considered the doing of a mitzvah?
In this column I will try to clarify certain aspects in the definition of the concept “mitzvah” and in the definition of fulfilling a mitzvah—points that are rather easy to miss—by linking the two questions I raised (what a mitzvah is, and what counts as fulfilling a mitzvah). What led me to take up the matter were two sources brought to my attention in recent weeks: a column by Rabbi Menachem Navat about intention in mitzvot and a lecture by Rabbi Asher Weiss regarding sitting in the sukkah. Both touched on defining the concept of a mitzvah and presented opposing views. In this dispute I tend to side with Rabbi Weiss (even if not entirely), and in the coming columns I will try to explain the basis of the disagreement and justify my position.
Rabbi Navat’s Claim
Rabbi Navat opens his column by mentioning a directive of some rabbi who demanded that one be careful to intend to fulfill one’s obligation (to be yotzei) in the mitzvah of shofar blowing. Rabbi Navat argues that such intention is not only unnecessary but even detrimental, for it introduces an artificial component into the mitzvah. One who intends to fulfill the obligation assumes that the mitzvah is something objective that exists somewhere “out there,” detached from what he is doing here, and he directs his heart toward it. He presumes that the mitzvah has some content beyond the very performance of it now, and that intention must join the act of the mitzvah in order for us to be yotzei. But when a person blows the shofar or comes to the synagogue to hear the shofar, he is certainly doing so to fulfill the mitzvah. What more is needed beyond the fulfillment itself? The very intention indicates that fulfillment alone is not enough; this mistake adds nothing and even detracts.
As is well known, there is a dispute in the Talmud and among the poskim whether mitzvot require intention (to fulfill one’s obligation). Even according to the opinion that does not require intention, it is clear that intention is needed—only that, according to that view, it does not invalidate the mitzvah. Rabbi Navat contends that when the halakhic authorities spoke of the need for intention in mitzvot they only meant to distinguish fulfilling a mitzvah from the status of “metassek” (one who acts unwittingly). He writes that if someone happens to be walking down the street and hears the sound of the shofar, this is not an act of mitzvah but of metassek. He is not fulfilling a mitzvah at that moment—he is merely walking down the street—and the mitzvah occurs of itself without his awareness. In such a case he must intend to fulfill his obligation, and only then will hearing the shofar in the street count as a mitzvah. But when someone comes to the synagogue, he is engaged in the very act of the mitzvah, and there no intention is required.
Rabbi Navat notes that from the conception that demands an objective intention as an addition to the act of the mitzvah, the confusing (or confused) concept of “intending not to fulfill one’s obligation” (negative intention) has arisen. In his view, there is no such thing as an intention not to fulfill: either you intend to fulfill or you do not intend to fulfill. But a positive intention not to fulfill does not exist. Intention is meant to define the act as the performance of a mitzvah rather than as an accidental act—nothing more. Hence, when there is no intention the act is accidental and therefore not a mitzvah; but if the act is not accidental, no intention can strip it of its status as an act of mitzvah. This is an objective description of the act, and no intention can change it.
I will note that I am certain Rabbi Navat is aware that some of the Rishonim and many Acharonim hold that there is indeed such a thing as an intention not to fulfill. I therefore assume he is not denying the existence of such views (he is not claiming that the cited rabbi invented a new idea), but is only expressing his own stance and arguing that they are mistaken.
He then adds that, similarly, the concept of “fulfilling one’s obligation” (yetziah yedei chovah) has in our day lost its original meaning. He argues that this concept originally described the minimal threshold required to fulfill the mitzvah (like the intention required for one who is walking down the street, as described above), which also determines whether and when there is a need to repeat it (because one has not fulfilled the obligation). But today this concept has become the constitutive essence of doing a mitzvah: a mitzvah must be performed “in order to be yotzei,” and only then is it a mitzvah. In his opinion, “fulfilling one’s obligation” in its original meaning is a minimal concept that determines that the mitzvah has been performed in the most “thin” sense: I have discharged my obligation, and no more can be demanded of me (as in the contemporary idiom: “he did it just to be yotzei”). He claims that performing a mitzvah in such a fashion diminishes it rather than elevates it.
At the end of the column he explains that this change in the meaning of “fulfilling one’s obligation” stems from the now-common conception of mitzvah as a response to a categorical imperative—doing the act solely out of obedience to the command, rather than the act itself. But mitzvot also—and perhaps primarily—have meaning, benefit, and purpose. They are not merely objects of obedience. These definitions empty the mitzvot of their content and aims and shrink them into formal acts of obedience to duty alone (the essence of “Leibowitzianism”).
Critique
As is known, I hold the “thin” conception that Rabbi Navat describes. For me, the entire meaning of the term “mitzvah” is that there is a command regarding it. This does not mean that mitzvot have no aims and meanings of their own (benefits they seek to achieve or harms they seek to prevent), but the obligation to perform them stems solely from the command. Consider, for example, crossing at a red light. There is no doubt that the legal prohibition of crossing on red has meaning, a goal, and internal logic (so that we do not get hurt). Still, were there no law duly enacted about it, there would be no obligation to do so. Even without the law it would be entirely reasonable not to cross on red, but clearly there would be no duty. Only legislation (=command) creates the obligation.
From here follows the conclusion that every mitzvah or transgression has two aspects: (1) obedience to the command, or rebellion against it; (2) the benefit or harm the command seeks to achieve or prevent (the aim and meaning of the mitzvah). R. Elchanan Wasserman noted this in his Kovetz Ma’amarim, in the essay “Teshuvah,” where he brought a source from Derekh Hashem by the Ramchal. But there are earlier sources as well. For example, the dictum of the Sages “Greater is one who is commanded and acts than one who is not commanded and acts” is interpreted by Tosafot ha-Rosh and the Ritva (with slightly different formulations) as follows: one who fulfills the mitzvah when he is commanded both attains the benefit and obeys the command of his Creator; whereas one who does so when uncommanded attains only the benefit but does not fulfill the command.
Therefore, in my opinion, there is indeed significance to intending to fulfill one’s obligation. When a person crosses on green or refrains from crossing on red because it seems reasonable to him and the alternative is dangerous, that is a different situation from a person who does so because of the law. The former perhaps has not broken the law, but he has not truly kept it either; the latter observes the law (=the mitzvah). What confuses many is that in state law such intention is not required. The legislator does not demand of us to observe the law with intention to be yotzei, only to observe it—period. Our motives do not interest him. But that is only because, in civil law, the point is not to “fulfill” it but merely not to violate it. In contrast, in halakhah there is an obligation to fulfill the command and not only to avoid transgressing it, and therefore intention to fulfill one’s obligation (or intention for the sake of the mitzvah) is required there.
This is the reason that the Rambam writes at the end of the Laws of Kings:
Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to perform them is of the pious among the nations of the world and has a share in the World to Come—provided that he accepts and performs them because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah and informed us through Moses our teacher that the children of Noah had already been commanded concerning them. But if he performs them because reason dictates so, he is not a resident alien, nor of the pious among the nations, nor of their wise.
The Rambam says that if a person fulfills a mitzvah due to “the dictates of reason,” i.e., because it seems to him rational or moral, that is not a mitzvah but at most a good deed. Note that he writes this about the seven Noahide commandments which are, in his words, “commandments to which the mind inclines”—that is, commandments which certainly have value, meaning, and purpose beyond obedience to the command. And that is exactly my point. In halakhah, motives do matter. If a person fulfills the mitzvah not on account of the command, it is not the fulfillment of a mitzvah.[1]
A clear expression of this conception is found in the Sefer ha-Chinukh, mitzvah 69 (the prohibition of cursing a judge), which states:
For it does not suffice to mention the punishment in a commandment without a warning. This is what our Sages always say: “We heard the punishment; from where [do we derive] the warning?” The matter is that if what comes to us is only the information of a penalty, namely that “one who does such-and-such will be punished so-and-so,” it would imply that it is up to anyone who wishes to accept the penalty and not mind the pain to transgress the commandment, and in doing so he would not be opposing the will of the Blessed God and His command. The commandment would then revert to a sort of commercial exchange, as if to say: whoever wants to do such-and-such shall pay such-and-such and do it, or shall steel himself to bear such-and-such and do it. But that is not the intent of the commandments. Rather, God, for our benefit, forbade us certain matters and informed us, for some of them, of the punishment that will befall us immediately, aside from the violation of His will, which is harsher than all. This is what they said everywhere: “He did not punish unless He first warned,” meaning: God does not inform us of the punishment that will come upon us for transgressing a commandment unless He has first informed us that His will is that we not do the act for which the punishment comes.
To establish a prohibition on some act, it is not enough that the Torah states a penalty for whoever does it. In addition, the Torah must also present a warning. Why? Because if there were only a penalty and no warning, we might think that while the act incurs a penalty, this does not mean there is a violation of the divine will (or command).[2] In effect, the author of the Sefer ha-Chinukh argues that even the penalty does not bring the norm in question into the corpus of halakhah; for that, an explicit command is necessary.[3] His words sharpen the significance of the command and of an act being a mitzvah beyond its benefit and purpose, which merely express its being a good deed. The penalty (in a court; I am not speaking of heavenly punishment—see the next passage) is imposed for violating the command, that is, for an aveirah, and not for doing a bad thing per se. The same holds for doing a mitzvah: a mitzvah is when one fulfills a command, not merely when one does a good deed.
I stress that I bring here the words of the Rishonim not as a conclusive proof against Rabbi Navat (he has every right to disagree with them), but to show that this conception is far from the absurdity he portrays, and certainly not a recent invention. This is the conventional halakhic conception of the term “mitzvah,” and to me it is also very logical. There is a difference between doing something for some benefit—even a spiritual one—and doing it as a response to God’s command. Intention comes to say that I am acting as a response to a divine command.
From this we also understand why I disagree with his claims. Indeed, regarding his initial claim I can fully agree (even though it too is disputed among Rishonim and Acharonim): if a person goes to the synagogue, there is no need for him to explicitly intend to fulfill his obligation, for his very presence there amounts to implicit intention (otherwise, why is he there?). Note that all the examples brought in the Talmud of mitzvot performed without intention are indeed of the sort “walking in the street and hearing the shofar” (blowing to make music; or hearing the voice of a scribe reciting Shema, etc.), where there is no implicit intention and hence explicit intention is required. But the fact that explicit intention is not needed for shofar in the synagogue is not because intention “thins out” the performance of the mitzvah, as Rabbi Navat writes, but because in practice there is clearly intention implied. In truth, intention is meant to add to the performance of the mitzvah and not merely to set a minimal threshold. It is what turns our act into a mitzvah. In situations where it is clear there is no intention to be yotzei—for example, one who is in the synagogue because it is his ancestral custom or national folklore, but he does not believe in Sinai and in divine commands (or in the obligation to obey them)—his hearing of the shofar is not a mitzvah, even if he is in the synagogue before the ark, wrapped in a tallit and weeping with emotion.
Incidentally, it seems to me that this also follows from the halakhic distinction between “eino mitkaven” (one who does not intend the prohibited result) and “metassek.” A “metassek” is someone who acts accidentally, like a person walking down the street whose body tears leaves off a bush growing at the side (the melakhah of reaping on Shabbat). In contrast, “one who does not intend” is someone who performs an act with full intention but aims at a different goal—for example, one who drags a bench from place to place and creates a furrow in the ground (which is building or plowing on Shabbat). We see from here that intention is not merely to remove a person from the category of metassek; it is something higher. Even one who “does not intend” has already left the category of metassek, and still he is not a person who intends. What removes me from the category of metassek is awareness that I am doing the act; but intention is something higher, and in the context of mitzvah it not only removes us from metassek but elevates the act and causes it to be deemed a mitzvah.
From here you understand that Rabbi Navat is not correct in claiming that intention harms the mitzvah. When I intend, I elevate the act to the level of mitzvah; therefore, even in cases where intention is not required because there is implicit intention (as in shofar in the synagogue), if a person explicitly intends he elevates the act even further into the realm of mitzvah. Clearly, explicit intention is superior to implicit intention. Someone who explicitly intends is, by definition, more focused on the meaning of his act, and therefore his mitzvah is of higher quality. This is why several halakhic decisors (especially Acharonim) wrote that it is desirable for a person to state with his mouth that he intends the mitzvah (“LeShem Yichud”).[4] This reflects an understanding that intention is an enhancement in the performance of the mitzvah and not merely a way to remove the act from the category of metassek.
For this reason it also seems to me very reasonable (certainly possible, and by no means absurd) that if I perform an act with the opposite intention—that is, with the intention not to be yotzei—then indeed I will not be yotzei. Intention does not merely remove me from the category of metassek; it elevates my act to the status of fulfilling the command (doing a mitzvah). The dispute is whether this is indispensable or not, but there is no doubt that there is a qualitative advantage here.
It seems to me that Rabbi Navat’s error is that he misses the difference I described above—regarding the red light—between the rationale of the law and its being legislated and binding. He views the command at Sinai as mere disclosure. In his view, when God commanded not to eat pork, He merely revealed that there is a problem with eating pork. For him, the command is nothing but a descriptive statement. But that is not so. A command is categorically different from a descriptive statement. When God commands us, He adds another layer beyond the fact that the act has harm or benefit: He adds the obligation incumbent upon us to do it. Hence, one who performs a mitzvah without intention is like one who is “not commanded and does”—that is, he performs the act and attains the benefit that is in it, but without fulfilling his Creator’s command. He attains only one of the two outcomes that the act of a mitzvah is meant to express and achieve.
The statement “murder is evil” is not equivalent to “murder is forbidden.” On the moral plane one could perhaps debate the point, but on the religious—and even the legal—plane there is a very great difference between the two statements. This obviously leads to the debate on natural law versus legal positivism, which I will not enter here. Rabbi Navat apparently holds the view of Aquinas, who espoused natural law (the law obligates because it is correct), whereas I espouse legal positivism (the law obligates because it was legislated by a duly authorized institution in a proper process). For the positivist, a law may express value and a worthy purpose (and it is even desirable that it do so), but its force derives from legislation, not from the value it contains. According to positivists, legislation creates the law; it does not merely direct our attention to the fact that the act in question has value (it is a command, not merely a description). By contrast, proponents of natural law think that legislation merely ensures that we will all remember and note that the act is obligatory and that this is how one ought to behave (the law is a descriptive statement).
Indeed, in my view halakhah is nothing but a categorical imperative (in contrast to Rabbi Navat’s view): a command imposed upon us that we are obligated to fulfill. That command is what renders it binding. It is not binding merely because the command is reasonable (though that is also true in my opinion, even if we do not always understand its reason), but primarily because it is the law—that is, because God commanded us to do it (as in the red-light example).[5] The intention accompanying the act comes to say that we are doing it because it is the law (because God commanded it), and that is what transforms our act from a good deed into the fulfillment of a mitzvah.
For this reason I have often argued (see my article here) that a person who does not accept the obligation to keep mitzvot, or who does not believe in God and in Sinai, cannot fulfill a mitzvah (as follows explicitly from the Rambam above in Laws of Kings), and in my view cannot transgress either. He is, as it were, excluded from the entire system (of course, he is obligated by it, but he cannot fulfill or violate it until he returns in repentance to faith in God and the obligation to His commands), since he does not act on the basis of the command but for other reasons. His “mitzvah-acts” are not mitzvot, and his “transgressions” are not aveirot. For this reason, in my view, a non-believer’s donning tefillin in the street has no significance as a mitzvah (perhaps it has value as folklore or as a connection to the tradition of the generations). If he did so in the morning and repented at noon, and came to ask me, I would tell him that he must put on tefillin again with the full blessing, because in the morning he did not fulfill the mitzvah. Observing Shabbat from an Ahad Ha’am-style conception (that is, cultural identification: “More than Israel kept the Sabbath, the Sabbath kept Israel”) has no value as a mitzvah, because it is not done in order to fulfill an obligation.
A Look at the Moral Act
In the third book of my trilogy (and also in part C of the fourth dialogue in the first book) I drew an analogy between the categorical imperative in morality and the mitzvot in halakhah. In both systems, an act has moral or halakhic significance only if it is done out of a motivation connected to fulfilling and being bound to the system (moral or halakhic). In Kantian moral theory (with which I fully agree, and I even think that anyone who disagrees is confusing morality with something else), an act becomes moral only if it is done out of the motivation “to fulfill one’s obligation,” i.e., to obey the categorical imperative. A person who helps another simply because he feels like it, or because he is by nature kind-hearted, is not acting morally. He is acting well, but not morally. A moral act is an act done out of commitment to the good.
And here, too, one could say that a person who gives charity to the poor is already doing so to benefit another, and therefore intention to fulfill the moral (or mitzvah) obligation would only spoil the act. But here as well, in my view, that is incorrect. When one intends to do so in order to behave morally, one elevates the act; now, beyond benefiting the poor person, it also expresses my commitment to morality. The same holds for the halakhic act (fulfilling the mitzvah).
Incidentally, in the Talmud (Pesachim 8a) we find the following statement:
It was taught: One who says, “This sela is for charity so that my son will live,” or “so that I will merit the World to Come,” this person is a completely righteous individual.
We see that one who gives charity to the poor need not do so from a religious motivation. Admittedly, this seems to contradict the very law that mitzvot require intention (and I already noted that according to all views some intention is needed; the dispute is only whether it is indispensable). Some wished to infer from here that interpersonal mitzvot do not require intention.[6] I disagree. It is quite clear that the person who gave charity to the poor did so “for the sake of the mitzvah,” only that his deeper motivation was that, in its merit, his son would live or that he would merit the World to Come. Precisely his intention, which turns the act into a mitzvah, creates the merit by which he is worthy of the World to Come or of aid for his son’s life.
So much for the discussion of Rabbi Navat’s words. In the next column I will turn to discuss Rabbi Weiss’s lecture and its connection to what I have written here.
[1] Incidentally, the commentaries wonder what the Rambam’s source is. Yesterday I thought that his source could be the midrash about Sinai, where God went around to the nations to ask if they wished to accept the Torah. They asked what is written in it and rejected the offer. By contrast, Israel responded immediately with the declaration: “Na’aseh ve-Nishma” (“We will do and we will hear”). And indeed, in Shabbat 88a it is told of a heretic who mocked Israel for this and called them “an impulsive people who put their mouth before their ears.” The difference between the approach of the nations and that of Israel is precisely this point: the nations wish to accept the Torah only on the basis of identification with what is written in it, while Israel accepts it solely because of the command (there is no need to examine what is written). In several places I explained that this is the difference between a “principle of general value” and a “principle of particular value,” and that accepting the Torah and performing mitzvot must be on the basis of a general principle, not a particular one. See the beginning of the third book in the trilogy, and also my article here. Perhaps this is the Rambam’s source—though in my opinion it is also simple reasoning.
[2] By way of comparison, in Israel’s statute books there is no explicit prohibition of theft or murder; rather, it says that “one who steals” is subject to such-and-such a penalty. Justice Haim Cohn pointed this out in his book The Law.
[3] In an article by Rabbi Dov Landau (Rosh Yeshiva of Slabodka in Bnei Brak) that I once saw in some memorial volume, he brought two examples of a situation with a penalty but no warning. The first is the law of one who suppresses his prophecy; see what is written about this in Minchat Chinukh, mitzvah 516, section 1 (which relies on the words of the Sefer ha-Chinukh cited here). The second appears in Rabbeinu Gershom’s commentary to Temurah 3b, where according to his reading the Gemara entertains the possibility that a person could swear a true oath that the Torah requires of him and yet incur a penalty (though Rashi seems to interpret the Gemara there differently). I note that in both cases such a situation is raised only as a possibility but is rejected in conclusion. In the final analysis, as the Sefer ha-Chinukh writes here, there is no case in the Torah of a penalty without a warning.
[4] The well-known debates around reciting “LeShem Yichud” deal only with its content—i.e., addressing entities other than God, kabbalah, angels, etc. I do not know of anyone who objects to the very intentionality that the recitation expresses. Were it phrased simply as: “I intend to fulfill the mitzvah in order to discharge my obligation,” or “for the sake of God,” I expect no one would object, and most would even praise it. Many explain the need for blessings over commandments in this vein—as a kind of intentional focus at the time of performance. All these certainly do not accept Rabbi Navat’s premise that intention comes only to remove a person from the category of metassek.
[5] This distinction parallels a distinction I have often drawn between formal authority and substantive authority.
[6] On this matter, an illuminating article by R. Ariel Finkelstein is about to be published in the upcoming issue of the journal of the Hesder Yeshiva in Netivot.
I haven't had time to read it yet, I'll wait for the long Sabbath. I'll just mention here that Debbie Rehmat at the end of the 17th century, about sailing on a ship to start a mitzvah, that everything is a mitzvah except traveling, and that it is done in Yisrael. And in the Frenkel commentary on Rambam, it seems to me that he expanded a lot on the same subject. It turns out that this will be useful for you in the following columns
Shabbat Shalom
I didn't understand the connection. I think you were too quick to write a comment.
After looking into it, the context doesn't really stand out, although it is certainly a place of inspiration.
I don't see any connection. By the way, in my opinion, it's not about defining a mitzvah at all, but rather about defining the permission of "necessity of a mitzvah." According to the Rabbis, it includes things that are not mitzvahs. But that's not the issue.
I'm not sure there's really a difference between what you're saying and what Rabbi Navet says beyond terminology.
What you call "intention from the past" (which is not necessarily an active intention that passes through a person's mind, but merely a stance and attitude toward the act) is what Rabbi Navet calls "intention is the body of the act."
There are clear differences. I brought up the issue of reverse intention and the issue of whether there is a virtue in intention even when there is implicit intention. This is exactly what I wrote, that although there is a practical identity with implicit intention, the conceptual foundation is completely different. He claims that intention is not needed and I claim that there is, but rather that there is.
Good week,
Thank you for the article.
I have long wanted to ask about the intentions in the mitzvah of parshat challah.
Recently, “parshat challah” initiated to pray for healing, and other various requests attached to the blessing have become common.
(Messages such as: “Looking for 100 women to parshat challah this coming Friday… for healing… are common).
Is there any additional value to the mitzvah of parshat challah beyond the obligation to parshat challah while preparing it? Is there additional value to the prayer when it is attached to parshat challah?
Or perhaps it is enough that the very status serves as a trigger to gather women for prayer.
Reminds me a bit of the initiated sending of the nest, only of course without the accompanying animal suffering. At most, there is unnecessary eating. ?
I would love to hear your opinion.
These challah offerings always seem like the stuff of idolatry to me, and I think there is usually a real halakhic prohibition in this. Women think that challah offerings have a mystical effect, and that is a real prohibition (healed by Torah words). If they just thought that these were circumstances that were more beneficial to the effect of prayer, then it is not a prohibition but simply wrong (in my opinion). But in my opinion, prayers are generally not beneficial, so maybe my opinion is irrelevant in the matter.
What do you mean, “healed by the words of Torah”?
http://www.torahbase.org/%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%A9%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%91%D7%A8-%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%A8-%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%A4%D7%90%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%93%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%94/
Strong and blessed.
Although it is not appropriate to deal with motives but with claims, it still seems to me that R’ Menachem is criticizing self-righteousness or petulant irritability and forgetting the simple things of G’, man, and the act of the mitzvah. That is, precisely because of the desire to relate to G’s will beyond the act of the mitzvah, one is likely to forget G’s will and the mitzvah He gave.
I did not write in praise of the nervousness of the dog. But the claims that there is no such thing as a reverse intention and that intention nullifies the act of the mitzvah are incorrect. As for the motives, I see no point in discussing them.
Regarding the difference between a (halakhic) command and an indication. What about the reason for the command? After all, it is reasonable to assume that the command is not arbitrary but relies on some purpose or metaphysical mechanism that has already been created, so the command is a result, and is essentially an indication that the cause exists. Is it possible in the world for two things to be identical in every respect that differ only in that one has a command and the other does not?
Of course, they could. That act before the Mount Sinai ceremony was not a mitzvah, but at most a good deed. After the commandment, it became a mitzvah.
I wrote to the Hadiya that I think there are reasons for the commandments. What does this have to do with the discussion?! There is a reason for the prohibition of running a red light, and there is still no obligation as long as there is no law prohibiting it.
A. The evidence from before the giving of the Torah seems weak to me because there is a difference in time and recipient.
B. As for the claim itself (“of course there may be”) – This means that the reason for the commandment is not ‘sufficient’ but an additional (not necessary!) decision by God is required. So I will ask this: Are there sufficient reasons for the commandments? I understand that in your opinion the answer is no. Did I understand correctly?
C. The example from the law does not seem relevant to me because as you noted (note 2) the law is merely a description of the punishment system. Prohibitions exist only in halacha and morality.
A. Just a difference in time. The recipients are the entire Jewish people, so only the difference in time remains. I don't see why that makes any difference. Very good evidence in my opinion.
B. It is clear that they are possible in principle. But when there is a reason for God to command, He will probably also command. Like with a red light.
C. An excellent example. The law also deals with prohibitions, and punishment is only a consequence. But there are no positive commands in it. It was explained in detail in my aforementioned books.
B. How is it so clear? Are you assuming here that she has free will and that he doesn't always do the right and good thing because he is simply good. If there is a reason for commanding, then why is it only "probably" that she won't command? Why doesn't it make more sense to think that there are *sufficient* reasons for commanding? The point here is unclear to me.
I got the unnecessary word "no". Well, if there is a reason to order, then why only "probably" order?
I lost this chatter. God can theoretically not command what should be commanded, but He does so in practice. A human legislator also has the choice not to command what is right, but he usually does so. That's all.
Contrary to Tosafot Rash and Ritva, there is no contradiction between the teachings and Rav Nabat. The teachings only claim that there is a fundamental prohibition in Leviticus, and not just fear of punishment. If it were to be shown that there is a law for which we know there is no punishment, it would still be forbidden because God revealed to us that it is forbidden. And if a person refrains from doing it because God has forbidden it, he will receive a reward for it. This does not require an intention to prohibit it, but only an understanding that the act is forbidden.
Regarding putting on tefillin, from my experience with those who put on tefillin, those who put on tefillin know that it is a commandment of God and they put them on in accordance with the Torah of commandment.
Education sharpens the argument that it is the commandment that defines the offense.
Regarding putting on tefillin, it is clear. I also wrote that (implied intent).
Even according to Rabbi Nebat's method, mitzvot require a mitzvah; otherwise, he would hold that mitzvot do not require intention and a person fulfills his obligation even by engaging in such activities as singing and the like.
I thought that the Rabbi's requirement for intention had a recursive element (I intend to intend to intend to intend to intend to intend...) and perhaps this is what bothers Rabbi Nebat.
It is clear that a mitzvah is needed, but it is only in the background. In his view, explicit intention diminishes the virtue of the act because it expresses that there is something in the mitzvah beyond the mere act.
I see no regression in my approach.
On second thought, education actually helps Rabbi Nebat. If the point of the commandment is to do the will of God, as the Rabbi elaborates in the second column regarding the method of Rabbi Asher Weiss, it would be possible to be satisfied with punishment alone, from which we would conclude that the act is wrong in the eyes of God. The warning added to the punishment reveals to us that not only is it wrong in the eyes of God (which is why He punishes the one who does it) but that the act is forbidden from the side of truth.
It seems to me that the essence of Rabbi Nebat's method is to do the truth because it is the truth. And any additional dimension that is not from the side of truth is wrong even if it comes from a place of religious obligation. I admit that I strongly identify with this position and sometimes think that this is the power of secularism and secular people who do things not even because of the desire to be good or religious, but because it is the right thing to do on their own part.
It is difficult to draw conclusions from the teachings, because they contain a contradiction. On the one hand, he says that if only the wearer were there, we would not know that the act was not in accordance with the will of God. On the other hand, the Gemara is difficult everywhere: We have heard a warning from the Minyan, meaning that when it sees a punishment, it is obvious to it that there is also a warning. Ostensibly, according to the teachings, when the Gemara sees a punishment, the Gemara should conclude that here it is not against the will of God, but only a conditional punishment. The evidence I presented is from the very explanation of the teachings, which requires a warning in addition to the punishment. According to Rabbi Navet (see also my response to his response here) the command is nothing more than the transfer of information about the will of God to me. The command is intended to reveal to me that it is forbidden to murder if I did not know on my own. He does not see the command as a function separate from the instructions (descriptions). This is frontally hidden from the teachings.
So in your opinion, the law that prohibits running a red light or the commandment that prohibits eating pork has no meaning. Our situation without the commandment would be the same (except for the information that it is a problematic thing). This is absurd.
Regarding the fulfillment of a mitzvah by someone who does not recognize the obligation. Is he different from someone who does it when it is not a mitzvah? It is true that the one who does the mitzvah and does it is greater, but from this rule it follows that even someone who does not perform the mitzvah has value in the deed, and apparently this is the value of the mitzvah that exists even without the commandment.
For someone who is not a mitzvah, there may be value in this (I have dealt with this), but it is not a mitzvah.
Why did the Rabbi determine that someone who does not perform a mitzvah and does it (there is value in this) how is it not a mitzvah?
The Gemara itself calls him only as a great one (one who performs a mitzvah and does it from someone who does not)
Only a great one? After all, his friend did not perform a mitzvah at all. (Because he was not commanded to do it)
So also the Toss in Kiddushin and the Ravivan wrote that he is considered great because he has no inclination that prevents him from performing it,
After all, the difference is that he does not perform a mitzvah at all (despite receiving a reward for it)
Another thing, according to your opinion, someone who does not perform a mitzvah does not perform a mitzvah,
After all, we found that even for something that is not a mitzvah and he does it, he can recite a blessing (‘and its tzitzit’)
Like a woman who performs the mitzvah of tzitzit,
And she also recites a blessing for a positive mitzvah that is time-consuming.
Again, if there is no mitzvah here, why should they bless?
I did not understand the question from the Rishonim. After all, I wrote myself that this is how some of them wrote, but I am not inclined to agree.
Regarding the Gemara, it does not mean that a non-mitzvah fulfills a mitzvah, but that there is value in his actions. Therefore, the mitzvah is greater and does what is also a mitzvah.
Furthermore, in the Gemara and Rishonim, all of this is said about mitzvot that there is someone who is commanded to do them, but who is not a mitzvah fulfills them (such as a woman, a foreigner, or a blind person). But in the case of Didan, we are talking about a rain gathering where there is no one who is commanded to do this.
I answered your second question both here and in the column.
I meant to say that the Gemara does not mean that someone who does not perform a mitzvah has no mitzvah at all
because otherwise they would not define the mitzvah only as ‘great’. Since this (who does not perform a mitzvah) does not perform a mitzvah at all
The attempt to explain that here we are only talking about the great value of the deeds of the mitzvah and that he does not
– is correct on the assumption that someone who does not perform a mitzvah ‘certainly performs a mitzvah’ and therefore the Gemara is looking for subtle differences of this and that.
As we found in Rishba (Bak”38) who was surprised that the Gemara there compares a gentile who engages in Torah
to a high priest ‘that if so, what did we allow for the mitzvah and does’
What did we allow? He (the gentile) did not perform the mitzvah at all.
I explained. I see no point in repeating it again.
According to the teaching, what is the validity of the Noahide commandments? For example, regarding murder, it is not said, "You shall not murder," but rather, "Whoever sheds the blood of man by man, his blood shall be shed," which is a punishment and not a command.
Interesting question. It seems that according to him, the Bani Noah method is really a sanction and not a prohibition. Unless they do not have a condition that there be a warning, or they had a warning that was not in the Torah. I don't know.
The Gemara requires the 7 commandments from the commandment of God to the first Adam (And the Lord said to the man from every tree), so it appears that the Gemara was already a commandment to the first Adam (at least according to some opinions, there are opinions that the first Adam was only commanded with fewer commandments), but it was not written in the commentary (but apparently by word of mouth to the first Adam or one of his descendants).
Indeed, I really thought later that not all the commandments of the sons of Noah are mandatory. It turns out that the Gemara assumes that there was a mandatory command. The question is according to the Maimonides (Sup. Mahalach Malachim and Pihamash Sup. Dechulin) who requires action by virtue of the mandatory command in the Torah, and explicitly writes this in relation to the sons of Noah.
In addition, at least according to Rabbi Yosei (cited in Sanhedrin 56:2), it is clear that the law of not punishing unless warned also applies to the sons of Noah:
Rabbi Yosei says that everything stated in the section on the sorcery of the son of Noah is warned about (Deuteronomy 18:10): There shall not be found among you one who makes his son or daughter pass through the fire, a sorcerer, a sorcerer, a sorcerer, a sorcerer, a conjurer, a medium, a medium, a medium, a spiritist, a seeker of the dead, etc. And because of these abominations, the Lord your God will drive them out from before you and will not punish them unless warned.
https://he.wikisource.org/wiki/%D7%A1%D7%A0%D7%94%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%A0%D7%95_%D7%91
(I don't know if it is explained anywhere when Rabbi Yossi believed the warning for this commandment was, perhaps to the first man in the first century)
See my previous response.
Thank you for the response and for increasing the Torah. I wrote a response column and will copy it here.
Some time ago, I wrote a column here in which I expressed my opinion on the halakhic issue of intention in mitzvot. In that column, I made several claims: A. There is no need for positive intention to intend to perform a mitzvot, for example, to be in synagogue and hear the shofar and in addition to intend to fulfill the obligation of blowing the shofar. My claim is that the very existence is the intention. I am here to fulfill the mitzvot of the shofar, not for any other purpose. B. I argued that not only is such an intention not necessary, but such an intention even detracts from the mitzvah, because it diverts the mitzvah to another place. The basic mitzvah is supposed to focus on the shofar, while this intention diverts a person's consciousness to something else, to responding and obeying the commandment. C. I argued that the entire halakha that says that mitzvot require intention (according to this opinion) is only to exclude the one who engages in a mitzvah, that is, someone who performs a mitzvah randomly, without any awareness of the mitzvah, will not be released according to this method, but as soon as I do not engage in it, I am released. (And these are also the examples in the Talmud, the one who sings a song and paves the way for Persians to eat matzah, and he would read the Torah and there came a time when he heard that the rabbinic authority placed it in the reader’s hands to pronounce it.) D. I argued that there is no such concept as intending not to leave when I perform a mitzvah act – even though certain scholars have spoken of such a concept. Since there is no external object of intention that I can negate or obligate, the intention is simply a thing, the act of the mitzvah itself performed as a mitzvah. E. In addition, I argued against the restrictive concept of “obligatory performance” which has gone from a concept that defines the minimum of a mitzvah to a concept that defines the essence of the mitzvah. F. And in the end, I argued that this was widespread because of perceptions that perceive Halacha as a categorical command, and therefore as one in which the value is obedience and not the content of the mitzvah itself.
At the time, many commented on my words, but I did not have the leisure and time to respond properly. Now, Rabbi Michael Avraham has posted a column on his website regarding these things (link in the first response) in which he expresses his opinion on the subject, disagreeing with my words. This is an opportunity to both respond to his words and to respond in large part to the various claims that arose at the time.
I will briefly summarize Rabbi Michael Avraham's words. His main argument is that the meaning of a law is expressed precisely because it is a command. Things can have value without the command, but it is the command that gives the mitzvah its validity. For example: It is clear that it makes sense not to run a red light even without the law, but only the legal command gives it binding validity. And if so, one must distinguish between the meaning of the mitzvah in terms of the legal dimension of it and the command in terms of it. Because of this, Rabbi Avraham argues, when the law requires intention, it requires an intention that matches the command, since this is the essence of the mitzvah, namely the intention to fulfill an obligation.
Continuing his remarks, Rabbi Avraham argues that this is also the case with morality, and he identifies with the Kantian position that identifies morality with the intention of the commitment to do good.
In addition, various arguments have been raised regarding the issue itself, and I will also try to address them briefly.
Regarding Rabbi Avraham's remarks. It is clear that I accept the fact that there are two parts to a mitzvah, the part of the purpose of the mitzvah and the part of the command, the one that obliges me to obey. This is unnecessary, since it is clear that if we were allowed to decide for ourselves what is right to do and what is wrong to do, we would not determine this precisely according to the laws of the Torah. There is a gap between what is natural to us and what the Torah requires, and what bridges this gap is the command.
For me, the question is not this division itself, but the question of the essence. What is the essence of the mitzvah and what is the focus. To me, it is clear that the meaning and purpose of the mitzvah is the significant thing in performing a mitzvah, not the surrender to obedience (I wrote an article about this on the website “Needs to Study” called “This is the Law of the Torah”, link: https://iyun.org.il/article/%D7%96%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%94/?fbclid=IwAR0dVqpx7skk40qpt_pJKnw2H4RL77HAHhvztFb77-YIvEsjWmuLsZVJtgo ).
The obligation is merely an instrumental tool to bring us to the meaning and the purpose, but it is not the purpose itself. This is why I think that the concept of “fulfilling one’s duty” is a minimum concept, not because I disagree with the distinction and claim that a mitzvah has nothing but its purpose and meaning and there is no need for a command, but because I claim that the command is the lower part, the essence of the mitzvah is its inner meaning.
However, mainly, from this division there is a leap to the concept of intention, and this leap is not self-evident. It is clear that the dimension of duty and command is necessary and essential with regard to mitzvahs, the question is what is meant when we talk about “intention” in mitzvahs. And here I will add a few things.
The concept of “intention” can be understood in different ways. A. Intention, concentration and dedication to the act (which is the special intention required in prayer, for example, and in similar mitzvahs). B. Intention for a specific content (for example: accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven in the mitzvahs of K”sh). C. Active intention to fulfill a duty, that is, the intention to do the mitzvah and to do the duty. D. Intention in the sense of deepening the content and meaning of the mitzvah and ”connecting” to it. E. Intention for various contents that accompany the mitzvah, each according to his own view (for example: to single out God Almighty or to repair the higher worlds), intentions that are common among Kabbalists. I accept intentions A’ B’ and D’ as significant intentions, on the other hand, intention C’ (to go forth) and intention E (intention for other contents), it seems to me that they take the mitzvah to another place and disconnect from the meaning of the mitzvah.
What is important here is the discussion of whether mitzvahs require intention. In my understanding, the entire discussion about mitzvot requiring intention does not belong to any of these categories, and especially not to the category of active intention to perform a mitzvah. The intention in the law of mitzvot requiring intention is related, in my opinion, to what we call today awareness. Awareness of performing the mitzvah. If this were not so, then any performance of a mitzvah not for its own sake would be considered a mitzvah without intention, which is certainly not true. If someone goes to synagogue to hear the shofar blown in order to please his father and not to perform a mitzvah, it would be considered that he is not performing a mitzvah, which is absurd in my opinion. It is clear to me that even though he goes to please his father, he still has awareness that the action he is about to do now is an act of a mitzvah, and that is exactly what is needed. What is not considered part of this? Intention to sing. That is, a person whose awareness is to speak something completely different. He is not currently performing a mitzvah but is playing a musical instrument. From the point of view of the mitzvah, there is only the technical action here without any awareness. That is the discussion here.
Intentions of type A B’ and D’ (to concentrate more, intention on the content of the mitzvah, deepening and connection), are intentions that add to the mitzvah and do not detract from it, because they deepen the mitzvah. In contrast, an intention to fulfill an obligation reduces the mitzvah to a technical fulfillment. However, there are mitzvahs in which active intention is discussed, first and foremost in matters of sacrifices and pigol, but there are examples of this in other subjects such as making matzah and making tzitzit, things that depend on the opinions of the Rishonim and are an issue in the Pneum”tz and therefore I will not go into it here.
I will now return to the main point. In mitzvahs there are indeed two parts, the content and the commandment, but the commandment is only an instrumental tool of the Torah so that we can reach the content, it is not the content itself, and therefore, when we discuss an intention we should discuss the content and not the commandment. From the fact that the commandment is a necessary thing and without it there would be no mitzvah, it still does not follow that the meaning of the commandment is only the commandment, these are two different discussions.
(I do not want to enter here into the question of ethics and Kant's deontological morality, which is a completely different discussion. I will only make two comments: Intention in Kant is an element related to the definition of the law and the way in which I relate to the law, on the other hand, in the Torah the law is given to me, intention in the Torah is something else. Second, the intention required in the commandments, in contrast to the law, is required because it is a work of God, that is, in worship, and not just a utilitarian act such as not running a red light, where there is clearly no need for intention. So in my opinion the ethical discussion of intention and the halakhic discussion of intention are two different discussions.)
Rabbi Avraham cites the words of the Maimonides, who divides the descendants of Noah between those who do the seven commandments because they obey the Lord, who are followers of the Lord, and those who do so out of the "decisiveness" that they are "not followers of the Lord nor of their sages." From this he cites evidence that the meaning of the act of the mitzvah is precisely in obedience to the command. First, this version of the Maimonides has already been proven incorrect. The true and correct version is: "not followers of the Lord but of their sages." This means that we are dealing here with a different category, the category of a sage and not of a follower, and certainly the Maimonides says this in the affirmative and in appreciation, not in the negative. Second, the discussion in the Rambam is related to the general decision to fulfill the things and not to the dimension of intention. The discussion of intention and the discussion of the decision are two different discussions. Of course, I fulfill the Shul because I have taken upon myself the Shul, but when I fulfill it I do not “intend” to fulfill the Shul. This is the main point of my argument: the question of decision and the question of intention are two separate questions (and as I also said regarding Kant).
Now regarding the discussions that have arisen on the subject of intention not to leave. I will say briefly. In the Rishonim there is a well-known discussion regarding the issue in the blessings that discusses one who began to bless over wine and finished over liquor, and there is a long discussion in the Gamma and in the Rishonim when the Rishonim ask why intention delays and turns the mitzvah into a bad mitzvah because of the mitzvah of intention. One of the explanations given in the Rishonim (and see in Toss and the disciples of Rabbeinu Yonah and others) is that everything that is commanded by a commandment is not intended except when he does not intend it, but when he intends the opposite intention, even this opinion will not be helpful. The Rabbi disagrees with these methods and believes that even if a commandment is standing, there is no concept of the opposite intention. According to my words, is there no place for these things? No. The issue in this issue is different: This is an issue that deals with the question of a blessing whose entire meaning is that it is directed towards something (in the sense of intentional intention, which psychologists talk about, Brentano, Husserl and others). It is clear that there is room to say that if it is directed towards something else, it is a bad blessing, since muttering does not help here, the blessing must have a direction. In any case, this is not about an active intention not to go out, but rather about an intention that designates the blessing for something else, and in this it is certainly appropriate to say that it is not helpful. And his words are not directed towards that.
There is another discussion in the Rishonim in the Rashba’s reply, which writes about the counting of the Omer, that the audience hearing from the Sha’tz can recite the blessing for the counting of the Omer because they do not intend to depart from it. Again, this issue is not relevant to our issue either. All of these discussions pertain to the issue of me performing a mitzvah and, in a certain sense, I want it not to be a mitzvah. The Rashba’s reply, on the other hand, speaks of a completely different situation, in which the Sha’tz recites the blessing. It is clear that if I do not want to join in, there is no problem doing so (and after all, the intention of the hearer and the hearer is required), so this discussion is not relevant to our issue. On the contrary, in another reply, the Rashba’s reply clearly states, as I have said, that the entire meaning of the law of the mitzvah requiring intention is nothing other than to expropriate someone who is busy.
Although in the latter it already comes to discussions about the intention not to leave, which refer to the mitzvah that I perform in its entirety, with a condition or intention not to leave, and in truth, in relation to these concepts, I disagree. But I don't remember such a discussion from the former.
Thanks for the response.
I'll start at the end. Regarding the opposite intention, you yourself cited Rabbi Yonah Berakhot 12:1, who cited this in the name of Rashba, and there is no hint there that it is specifically about berakhot. He says this as a general rule that mitzvot require intention, and that is how everyone understood them. But even according to your view that it is only about berakhot, one can ask why the berakhot is required. You yourself explain that it is intended to create an intention of the act towards the mitzvah (intentional intention), so this itself contradicts your view, since you claim that it is not necessary. It is enough that he does the mitzvah, and why is intentional intention required?!
At the beginning of your words, you wrote:
Regarding Rabbi Avraham's words. It is clear that I accept the fact that there are two parts to a mitzvah, the part of the purpose of the mitzvah and the part of the commandment, the one that obliges me to obey. This is unnecessary, since it is clear that if we were allowed to decide what is right and wrong to do on our own, we would not determine it exactly according to the laws of the Torah. There is a gap between what is natural to us and what the Torah requires, and what bridges this gap is the command.
And so you wrote later:
I will now return to the main point of the matter. In the mitzvot, there are indeed two parts, the content and the command, but the command is only an instrumental tool of the Torah so that we can reach the content, it is not the content itself,
But this is exactly what I explained in my words: the command is not just a revelation of a fact that is worthy in the eyes of God, but it has a dimension that turns a good deed into a mitzvah. We do not agree with this. The purpose of the command is not only to bring to our attention something that we would not think of on our own. The command not to murder, for example, is not completely understandable according to your view. Therefore, contrary to your words here, you definitely disagree with the dimension of the command that is in the mitzvah. You claim that an imperative verse is an indicative verse, that is, a verse that describes and not a verse that commands. If I had known that this was God’s will, there would have been no need for it. Would you also say this in the example of the red traffic light? I wonder! In the eighth root of the Rambam, you can see this for a reason, that the imperative is a different type of verse (and not just a descriptive-indicative one). It seems to me that this is where the focus of our dispute lies.
The concept of intention as I explained it is not a leap (as you write here) but a necessary consequence of this distinction. If indeed the essence of the mitzvah is compliance with the command (= fulfilling an obligation), it certainly makes sense to require explicit intention and not to be satisfied with implicit intention. Even if one fulfills an obligation with implicit intention, explicit intention elevates the act to the level of a mitzvah. All five meanings you brought to the concept of intention are irrelevant to our discussion. It deals only with the meaning of c.
Therefore, it is also not correct to say that intention is required only to remove you from the category of busybody. This is absurd (and even if a person does not intend and is busy, you can see that this is not true, as I explained in the column). If this were the case, then being in the Beit Shemesh when you hear the sound of the shofar is not useful for the law of intention. After all, this presence only says what your motivation is (what I called an implicit intention) but you can still be busy (not paying attention to the fact that you hear a line to the shofar). So according to your opinion, there is no implied intention here.
The version in the Rambam is indeed “but from their sages”. Now I saw that it is indeed printed here in the accepted version before us, but that is only because I copied from the Shulchan project. In my explanation, you can see that I versioned it as it is written here. Therefore, I claimed that it is a good deed (an act of wisdom) but not a mitzvah (an act of chassidism). I elaborated on this in my articles and in the third book of the trilogy.
I did not write anywhere that the meaning of the mitzvah is only the command. On the contrary, I wrote that the Hadith has value in itself. What I wrote is that what makes it a mitzvah is the command. And I do not see how one can disagree with that.
Ultimately, things are really going from bad to worse.
It seems that my words were not explained properly. When I wrote that I accept the division, I meant to say that I accept the fact that a commandment has its own value, because every legal system has its own value, just as the legal system in the State of Israel has its own value and therefore tells me not to murder, even though, without any connection to the law, I am forbidden to murder because murder is an immoral act. Every commandment has its own legal dimension and its own essential dimension. We can have the same discussion regarding civil law. My argument is that although there is a category of law that prohibits me from murdering, if the only reason I do not murder is because the law prohibits me from doing so, in my opinion, this shows moral deficiency. The law is here to enable existence and collective order, (without going too far into different perceptions of the law, at least according to theories of social contract and the like), and it is here as a system that has an internal and meaningful logic of its own. But personally, what should interest me more is personal morality, not murdering because it is a bad thing. And so it is with the laws of the Torah.
My argument is that when we move to the laws of intention, we need to ask what the role of intention is, whether it is tied to my compliance with the legal system or whether it is tied to meaning. I think that if the whole point were obedience, there would be no value in intention, there would be no point in intending to obey because such an intention has no meaning and no added value. From the perspective of the law, what is important is simply that I obey it. If there is a requirement of intention, it is only because there is value not only in my compliance with the law, but also in my intention and identification, that is, as in the example of the law in the country, there is value in identifying with the prohibition of murder. This identification is an identification that is “natural”, it does not need an “act” intention, the very act of willingness is already intention. That is my argument.
I certainly do not claim that the Torah is only concerned with revealing values or realities, on the contrary, the Torah also legislates, but this law has a creative function, it is interested in bringing us to a certain place and not just leaving us at the level of compliance.
Regarding intentional intention, I mean that intentional intention defines the act itself and determines the possibility of the act itself acting as a right act. I cannot bless the Creator of the fruit of the tree and eat bread, that is a wrong act, in the same way intentional intention also causes the act to be wrong, this is different from general intention which is concerned with the addition of identification with the act.
Hello.
The fact that every law also has its own value is completely agreed upon. That is not what the discussion is about. The question is what makes it a commandment/law? In my opinion, it is only the imperative. Therefore, intention has value beyond the expropriation of the gender of the one doing the deed. This elevates the act to the work of God (beyond being a right act).
The question of whether it is also important to create identification with the act and its goals is a different question. I am certainly willing to agree that it is, and it is still not correct to say that intention is detrimental and that there is no opposite intention. It is important to understand that Kant also does not intend to say that one should cleanse the heart of pity and act as if one had frozen a demon (mechanical compliance with the categorical imperative). He only claims that the moral act should be done for both reasons: compliance with the imperative and moral benefit. In logical terms, this means that each of these reasons is sufficient for doing the act. In other words, I would do it even if it were not beneficial and I would do it even if there were no imperative. This is the perfect action, as it achieves both goals: the service of God and the spiritual/moral benefit. Therefore, intention is required, since without it the dimension of the service of God in it is missing.
If you do the mitzvah only out of compliance with the commandment without internalizing and identifying with the spiritual benefit, there may be grounds for you to claim that this is a disadvantage, but that is not what the discussion is about. But from the data I have, it is a misunderstanding. I am not sure that I agree that there is importance for internalization beyond compliance with the commandment, at least with respect to the non-intellectual mitzvot. The words of the Maimonides in the sixth of eight chapters are well-known, which also emphasizes this very point. He writes there, despite his words in the Book of Kings that the mitzvah must be done out of compliance with the commandment, that in the intellectual mitzvot there is also importance for mental assimilation (identification). And in the verbal mitzvot, no (I will not do anything, and I will not do anything, and I will not do anything). And he really means what I say here, that in the verbal mitzvot, one must do by virtue of the command, but it is important that there is also identification (note, both and), and in the verbal mitzvot, only responding to the command is important.
The intention that I am referring to is not intended to express that it is about obedience. The fact that the main thing that turns an act into a mitzvot is obedience, is the explanation why the intention has its own importance (and not just to get someone to do it). The intention is to declare and instill in me that I am now doing the will of my Creator. Just as you wrote in the (incorrect, in my opinion) distinction between mitzvot and berachot. There you wrote that berachot are intended to do exactly that. And I argue that this is the purpose of the intention. I sit in the sukkah or hear the shofar, and say loudly and clearly that I am doing it out of commitment to the command and in order to fulfill my obligation (not in the minimal sense that you attribute to this expression). I don't see how it can be argued that such a manner of execution elevates the act to a higher level of work.
Regarding the role of the law/mitzvah, whether they are intended to bring us somewhere, I tend to agree. But that's a matter of interpretation. The halakhic boundary is that the commandment must be fulfilled (and then we reach the higher level), and therefore this has no bearing on the importance of intention. On the contrary, we will reach the higher place only if we are directed to fulfill our duty and obey the commandment.
The intention in question in mitzvot requires intention is the intention to fulfill our duty. I see no connection to the question of the blessing of the Creator of the fruit of the tree on bread and the law of engaging in preoccupation.
Finally, I repeat what I already noted earlier. According to your view that intention only takes us out of the preoccupation, someone who hears the sound of the shofar in the synagogue still needs to intend, since he may still be engaging in preoccupation (he is currently not even aware that he is engaging in a mitzvah). In my opinion, the intention deals with the motivation of the person and not with his consciousness/awareness at the time of existence. Whoever hears the sound of the shofar intends implicitly, and therefore there is no need for intention (in order to come out of the prayer. But of course, explicit intention is also required for him).
[By the way, as was just mentioned here in Talkback, the Rabbi of the Hebrews explicitly states that in discussing the opposite intention, he is not only dealing with blessings but with mitzvot in general. Although this is also true in the issue of blessings 12, as I wrote]
I missed something in the course of your speech.
You compare the law with the halacha and claim that in the law the point is not to keep it but only not to transgress it, contrary to the halacha where there is an obligation to keep the commandment and not only not to transgress it. Hence the basis for the rest of your speech.
My question is - what is the basis for this distinction between the law and halacha? What prevents you from defining the halacha as one that only requires “not to transgress it” similar to the law?
The basis is empirical. The fact is that the law is not interested in your intentions and motives, but Halacha is.
Regarding the tefillin that are placed on the street.
A. You wrote that if he repents in the afternoon, tell him to put them on with a blessing - it's not a threat, it's good for a Jew to put them on as long as he can, it's another mitzvah and of course one should say a blessing.
B. I think the Chabadniks assume that whoever comes to put on tefillin believes that there was a Mount Sinai ceremony and that he is obligated to do one thing or another, but he hasn't investigated enough for himself out of fear of obligation, laziness or just lack of awareness.
A person who doesn't believe that he is obligated and doesn't believe in the Mount Sinai ceremony will not do such a ridiculous thing and waste his time just to please a Chabadnik missionary.
A. Are we playing at hand-holding? Who threatened? I brought this up to sharpen my argument that he did not perform a mitzvah.
B. I agree. And if it is indeed a person of faith, I have no disagreement with them. But from the correspondence between the Lubavitcher Rebbe and Rabbi Hutner, you can see that according to them every Jew is like that, and here I disagree. Beyond that, in my opinion, what determines is what is conscious in the person and not hidden points in his heart (the point of inner faith for the atheist).
Some notes:
1. Evidence for Rabbi Navet's view is from the issue of the Rabbinical Council 28:17; that even for the rabbinical council, mitzvot require intention if the one who benefits from them fulfills his obligation and is lawfully engaged in milk and broth [this is true for some of the first scholars].
This is strong evidence that the law of intention in a mitzvot is not to be engaged in a mitzvah, hence the parallel between the law of one who does benefit from them and the law of one who intentionally enjoys the mitzvot.
2. In some of the rabbinical councils [Ran A'ar 7:] in the issue it is explicitly stated that the discussion of intention not to fulfill one's obligation is in the mitzvot and not only in blessings. This does not contradict what I wrote in the previous note, because the law of intention for a mitzvot is different from the law of intention for a mitzvot, which is an intention and a commandment.
3. Interesting evidence that a prohibition is possible without a commandment is from the view of the Rabbis and the Rabbis that it is forbidden to abrogate a prohibition from the outset from the Torah. Even though there is no hint of this in the prohibition itself [since at the time he eats it is already permissible and then certainly no prohibition is violated]
1. First, I will preface what I once heard from Rabbi Fisher, that this Rabbi (who connects the law of dealing with milk and arith to positive mitzvot) is a Midrash Plia. But even if it is true, I do not see why it supports the opinion of Rabbi Navet. This is a position that requires explanation according to all the methods. According to his method, this was supposed to be the case in all mitzvot, not just in milk and arith. And regarding the connection to dealing with, I have provided clear evidence from the law of not intending versus dealing with, which is incorrect.
2. Our discussion is that mitzvot require intention, and therefore this comment is irrelevant (and in my opinion also incorrect). What we decide for this method is also true for the second method, but it does not prevent it. Incidentally, from Rabbi Navet’s perspective there, it clearly appears that Rabbi Navet is wrong. I just want to bring the evidence regarding the commandments and not just the blessings, but the whole process there shows that intention is a requirement at the level above which is being discussed.
3. I did not understand the evidence. If you are talking about a prohibition without a source, that does not mean it. It is possible that the hasbara expands the prohibition, and thus one who eliminates milk in meat from the outset violates the prohibition of meat in milk (and not the prohibition of eliminating a prohibition from the outset). After all, there are many interpretive interpretations in the Shas. A prohibition without a command can only be where the hasbara renews a renewed prohibition and does not interpret an existing prohibition, such as the blessings of the Nahannin, and there it is clear that this does not create an obligation from the Torah.
Here is the place for the response to this thread:
1. I didn't understand. I said this: The application of the concept of "because he enjoys" that a person is engaged in a mitzvot, in the law of intention in mitzvot, proves that the law of intention itself. It means doing a mitzvot that is not engaged in a mitzvot. In any case, in mitzvot that involve pleasure
such as eating matzah, then even if they forced him to eat matzah and not with the intention [he ate while engaged], it would be because the pleasure covers the disadvantage
of 'engaging in a mitzvot'. But in mitzvot that do not involve pleasure, such as blowing the shofar, the kash, and so on, if not intended, we would do the deed
by the way and the busybody did not fulfill his duty.
All of this is understandable only if we say that the need for intention is to remove the busybody from a state of action. It seems to me to be good evidence.
2. How do you know that the meaning of ‘intention’ in something that is not intended is the same as the meaning of ‘intention’ in the law of intention in mitzvot??
3. What you said “by the way” was exactly what I meant.
4. My view of abrogating a prohibition from the outset requires expansion and there is no room here
My comments:
1. Not necessarily. Indeed, the one who enjoys it can perhaps solve the problem of intention in the same way that he solves the problem of the busybody. First, let us understand why the problem of the busybody is solved in this way, and then we can discuss. Conversely, all the first and last who did not accept the opinion of the Rabbi are evidence to the contrary, because what troubled them was precisely this distinction.
2. The term is the same Term, and this is a good indication. If you prove otherwise, of course, you can consider it. But this is the starting point. Regarding the ”by the way”, it's clear. I just repeated what you said.
Regarding footnote 1, which deals with the source of Maimonides' statement that the laws are kings. Today, it is quite clear that the source is in the midrash from the year of R. Eliezer, chapter 6, which is given below:
The difference between the righteous of Israel and the righteous of the nations. The righteous of Israel are not called righteous until they do all the Torah, but the righteous of the nations, since they do the seven commandments that the children of Noah were commanded to do, and all their grammar, they are called righteous. In the Bible, when they do them and say, by the power of what our father Noah commanded us from the mouth of the mighty one, we do them, and if they do so, then they will inherit the world to come like Israel, even though they do not keep the Sabbaths and the festivals, for they were not commanded to do them. But if they did seven commandments and said, "We heard from so-and-so," or from their own knowledge, that this is the decisive opinion, or they shared in it, "If they did the entire Torah, they do not receive their reward except in this world."
It is quite clear, also from a linguistic point of view, that the Rambam made use of this midrash, although he also made clear changes here that are part of his method. For example, he replaced "by the power of commanding Noah" with "Moses informed us of the commandment to Noah," and also the matter of sharing in idolatry and akmal.
Indeed, I have already seen references to this midrash, and it is also evident from its language that it was probably the source. In the comment, I only intended to refine my interpretation of the midrash and show that it could be a source for Maimonides, because that is what it says.
The explanation for the “because we enjoy” statement is as follows:
The problem with the busybody is not the lack of awareness per se, but the disconnect created by it
between the ‘deed’ and the ‘person doing’. Instead of ’I’doing, the deed is done by my body.
In other words, the person, the personality, is not present in the deed that is done.
When there is pleasure, the lack of awareness fails to create this disconnect, since pleasure does not
occur in the space of technical physical movement, in contrast to action that does not involve pleasure.
[I think there are others who have explained in this direction, but I don't remember now]
I don't see an explanation here. You could just as easily explain that the one who engages in it is not considered to be performing a mitzvah, and the one who enjoys it considers it to be a mitzvah. Therefore, this also affects the intention. But as mentioned, it doesn't matter.
On the observance of the mitzvot of atheists, see Ginat Voridim, Part 1 of the Orach Chaim Clause, which discusses whether there is any concern regarding a child whose parents are both converts and who is unlikely to grow up as a Jew:
And regarding the second doubt, we will first investigate the great research of the great laws of the heart on the observance of the Torah and the mitzvot, whether the successes and happiness that come from them are due to the fact that nature was imprinted with these mitzvot and this virtue is found in them, and everyone who observes them will necessarily have that happiness and success, even if he does them without the intention of the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, only if he follows the will of his heart, or is it a dilemma? The essence of happiness and success is in doing them with the intention of surrendering to do the will of God, knowing what they said. What does it matter to him, O Holy One, whether he slaughters from the neck or from the nape of the neck, etc.? And here, for the second of these two reasons, they are not satisfied that if the mitzvot are specific and nature is imprinted as eating the triyak, then there is a problem with this because there is no difference between one who fears God and one who does not, and it is possible for him to have seven abominations in his heart and he is dressed as a trick of the mitzvot, and this is not a way to get out of sin.
And if we say that everything follows the correct intention, that when he does the mitzvot, he shows himself to have surrendered to do the will of his Creator, and that these mitzvot do not inherently bring any praise or happiness, then our actions in them would be like the action of emptiness, like a king who decreed that his servants be filled with water and emptied into the garbage, and that when his servants did his bidding, they were found to be fond of the king's words and submissive to his discipline. And this is also difficult, as it is said that these mitzvot have no virtue or benefit in them. And if the Holy One, blessed be He, had commanded to tie a strap to the horns of a cow, it would be equivalent to the mitzvot of prayer, which He commanded to tie to the arm. And if so, everything depends only on the intention of the heart, even though he was sitting and completely idle. Therefore, they raised the fact that this and that a woman should bind herself to her sister, she should not move or separate from each other at all. That these mitzvot are specific and natural, and that happiness and success will come to the one who does them. Indeed, they will not have this specific attribute in them only when they do them by decree of a king who has thus decreed upon him, our Father in Heaven, that in doing these mitzvot without this intention, there is no specific attribute in them at all. He works in vain and is touched by panic. He looked a little further into the Book of the Binding of Isaac, and heard the verse 45:33, and this is his interpretation: Blessed is he who labors in the Torah, and the labor of the Torah is not sufficient for him in his work in the Torah and in his observance of the commandments, but he must also have a good intention attached to him, who does so in order to bring peace of mind to his Creator. And about this the Scripture says: And to the wicked, God said: What have you to do with me, to recite the laws, and to take my covenant upon your lips, since he walks in the will of his heart and has no fear of God before his eyes? What profit has he in performing the commandments and studying the Torah? And even more so the Epicureans and the hypocrites who perform the commandments and engage in the Torah, except that they do not receive any reward for this. Behold, they add iniquity and wrath to their iniquity, and about them the Scripture says in the word of God: What shame and wisdom do they have? And this is like a boaster who wears royal robes to announce to creatures that he is one of the great men of the kingdom, who have submitted to his discipline and submitted to the service of a king, and he is a rebel in the kingdom, for he will be punished for these tricks with which he adorns himself.
And according to these things, the words of the column of the late Rabbi Israel, who wrote /Yo”d/ at the end of the verse, will be understood correctly, and he who was educated and married an Israelite and had a son by her, will not be punished on the Sabbath, and we do not hold him to have gone into bad culture because his mother was an Israelite, therefore.
And these words are from the answers of the sages, and here is his explanation: If the father and mother are both converts, there is no hope for that child, because his father is a Jew and his mother is a Jew and a Jew, and what is the benefit to him, since he has become a Jew and has been brought into a bad culture, which is why it is appropriate to prevent him from the commandment of circumcision. Indeed, when his mother is at least a complete Israelite, there is hope for that child, whose mother will guide him in the way of God and he will not go out into a bad culture. This is the explanation of the column without a doubt.
Hello Michael, my name is Assaf Zeiderman and I teach a series of classes in preparatory schools and midrashim on Israeli Judaism, and I find your position fascinating for all sorts of reasons and excellent material to pass on to my friends. I wonder if your position on the essence of the mitzvot (categorical command, etc.) is actually the same as that of Rabbi Hirsch on the subject (for example, in his introduction to Horeb). It seems to be the same. Is it? Also, have you written anywhere in a more comprehensive way about your understanding of the essence of the mitzvot, and have you written about the difference between your understanding of the mitzvot and that of Yeshayahu Leibowitz? Sorry for all the questions - it's interesting and curious! Thanks in advance!
Hello.
I don't know Rash”r's position.
My view is very similar to Leibowitz's, but as usual he took it too far. The fact that the obligation to observe a commandment is based on a categorical imperative and the obligation to obey it does not mean that they have no reasons or benefits. Just like morality: the obligation to act according to its rules does not stem from the benefit that such behavior brings. See for example here in column 122 and more.
My position regarding halakha is described in the third book of my trilogy, Movements Among the Standing.
As a rule, I do not engage in comparisons. I assert what I have to assert, and do not engage in the question of whether it is similar to the teaching of so-and-so or the claim of an unknown. Nor do I usually engage in theological secondary theologies of such and such thinkers.
Sorry, but if you don't deal with theological mishnahs of others, why should others (we) deal with your theological mishnah? Did you formulate a mishnah like inventing the wheel without learning from the works of others? There was once a rabbi who wrote a book of ramblings on the Gemara and wrote in the introduction that he didn't study the Acharonim. He brought it to some great rabbi, the great rabbi flipped through it, then closed the book and told him, "I don't study the Acharonim either."
Who asked you to engage in my Mishnah? If it's not beneficial to you, don't engage.
It is natural that he does not obsessively engage in comparisons and cataloging theological minorities…
It does not mean that he does not know them at all…
Whoever says that he is performing a mitzvah so that the Holy One may mate with the Shekhinah (for the sake of uniqueness) is certainly committing the serious offenses of idolatry and incest, and a number of other serious offenses.
The only intention should be what the Israelites said: And all the people answered together and said, "All that the Lord has spoken, we will do."
Then it is forbidden to mean a specific mitzvah, but only that it is part of: "All that the Lord has spoken."
Therefore, we should first make it clear that all that the Lord has spoken, we will do and we will hear, and first we should fulfill it, and then we should ask questions, clarifying intentions and clarifying reasons.
One must do the mitzvah because God said so, and not to "fulfill an obligation," because such an obligation is a fiction and does not exist.
Following the Rambam, you claim that someone who fulfills a mitzvah because it is a good deed and not because there is a commandment, he indeed performs a good deed and is pious and moral, but he does not fulfill a mitzvah.
Why don't you also say the opposite, that someone who fulfills a mitzvah (i.e. a good deed) because it is a mitzvah and not because it is good is indeed righteous and a strict servant of God, but he is not a good and moral person?
I do argue this about morality as well.
So what is better? To fulfill a mitzvah because it is a mitzvah and to be righteous, or to fulfill a mitzvah because it is a good deed and to be moral/chassid/wise?
Sustain because of both. Why choose just one?