“With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?!”: A Look at a Talmudic Aggadah and Its Lessons (Column 320)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

More than once I’ve written here that it’s very hard to derive lessons from the Sages’ aggadot. This is mainly because in matters of thought we have a priori positions (unlike most halakhic questions), and no less because aggadot admit of many and varied interpretations (far more than halakha). I don’t think I’ve ever encountered a case of a person who thought X and, merely because there is a Talmudic aggadah pointing otherwise, abandoned his position and adopted “not-X.”[1] In the latest Ein Ayah class (Ein Ayah 23) we studied an aggadic sugya that challenges that claim of mine, and I’ll try here to analyze it and examine whether one can derive a lesson or conclusion from it.[2]

Isaiah’s Rebuke

The Gemara in Berakhot 10a brings a story about King Hezekiah, who didn’t want to engage in procreation because he foresaw, by Divine inspiration, that a wicked son (Manasseh) would come from him. The prophet Isaiah came to rebuke him and instruct him to change his decision:

[…] As it is said: “In those days Hezekiah was sick unto death; and Isaiah son of Amoz the prophet came to him and said to him: Thus said the LORD (of Hosts): Set your house in order, for you shall die and not live,” etc. What is “you shall die and not live”?—You shall die in this world and not live in the World to Come. He [Hezekiah] said to him: Why so extreme? He [Isaiah] said to him: Because you did not engage in procreation. He [Hezekiah] said to him: Because I saw by Divine inspiration that sons who are not good would issue from me. He [Isaiah] said to him: With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?! That which you are commanded—you must do; and what is pleasing before the Holy One, blessed be He—let Him do.

Isaiah argues that Hezekiah ought not abandon a commandment with which we are charged (procreation) because of future forecasts. We are commanded to be fruitful and multiply, and that’s what we must do, without calculations. The future should be left to God.

“With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?!”: An Initial Interpretation

Isaiah tells Hezekiah to ignore the vision he saw by Divine inspiration, to marry a woman and fulfill procreation. His argument is formulated: “With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?! That which you are commanded—you must do; and what is pleasing before the Holy One, blessed be He—let Him do.” Simply put, the idea is that future predictions are a shaky basis for decision-making. Even if the expected future is that the son will be wicked, it is always possible that he will choose the good and be righteous.

According to this reading, Hezekiah held a deterministic view, at least regarding what he saw by Divine inspiration. In his view, the future granted via Divine inspiration is certain and unchangeable, whereas Isaiah argues against Hezekiah’s fatalistic determinism and says he must not lose hope, for a person always has free choice.

Rejecting That Interpretation

But Rav Kook in Ein Ayah there (sec. 137) writes:

Hezekiah, as a king whose concern is the present, trembled greatly about the current state of the nation. When, by the spirit of God upon him, he saw that if he fathered sons they would be corrupters, they might greatly harm the people when seated on the royal throne. But Isaiah said, “With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?” For prophecy reflects the nation’s eternal condition, wherein the days of one generation are reckoned as nothing. Behold, with the cessation of the monarchy and the fall of the throne from the ruling family, an eternal, lasting collapse may come. The stumbling of one wicked king who will come from the seed chosen by God will pass, for in the end the throne will be established in righteousness and uprightness. Therefore, you must not rely on this to cut off the eternal chain on account of a temporary perspective, even if it came by Divine inspiration.

His last sentence says that although what Hezekiah saw was by Divine inspiration—something that must be true—he is nevertheless obligated to engage in procreation. Rav Kook understands that Isaiah is not arguing against Hezekiah’s determinism. He maintains that this determinism is correct, namely that a wicked son will necessarily come from him, and yet it is forbidden for Hezekiah to refrain from procreation. This is also implied by Rav Kook’s rationale for this evaluative ruling, to which we’ll return below.

One can prove this reading clearly from the continuation of the aggadah, where Hezekiah turns to Isaiah with a matchmaking proposal:

He said to him: Then now give me your daughter; perhaps my merit and yours will cause that sons who are good will issue from me. He said to him: The decree has already been issued against you. He said to him: Son of Amoz, finish your prophecy and go out! Thus have I received from the house of my father’s father: Even if a sharp sword rests upon a person’s neck, he should not withhold himself from mercy. It was likewise stated: Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi (Eliezer) +Masoret HaShas [Elazar]+ both said: Even if a sharp sword rests upon a person’s neck, he should not withhold himself from mercy, as it is said, “Though He slay me, yet will I hope in Him.”

Hezekiah asks Isaiah to give him his daughter in marriage, hoping that their combined merits will help his prayer be accepted to tear up the evil decree so that his son will be righteous.

Now note: Isaiah refuses the proposal on the grounds that “the decree has already been issued.” That is, Isaiah here actually expresses a deterministic stance: what Hezekiah saw by Divine inspiration will indeed come to pass.[3] It follows clearly that Rav Kook was right—Isaiah’s claim did not rely on the possibility that the Divine-inspiration forecast could fail; the opposite is true. Isaiah himself holds a deterministic view that if Divine inspiration said a wicked son would emerge, that is what will be. Yet he instructs Hezekiah not to refrain from procreation. From here we see that it is specifically Hezekiah who holds that one can change the future he foresaw by Divine inspiration. Thus, their positions are the very opposite of our initial interpretation.

Hezekiah’s Initial Position

The interesting question is what Hezekiah thought at the outset and what he ultimately concluded. From this exchange it appears that Hezekiah actually holds a non-deterministic position (as per the tradition from his forebears): even if Divine inspiration showed that his son would be wicked, it might turn out otherwise. Yet he initially considered refraining from procreation. How can that be understood? It seems that, in his view, it is enough that the probability is high that the child will be wicked to justify refraining from procreation. In other words, he adopts a more extreme halakhic stance than we attributed to him above: even if the future is not absolutely fixed—even if there is a chance to change the evil decree—the high likelihood of that outcome suffices to refrain from the commandment to procreate.

This is a rather extreme and puzzling approach. We should remember that the commandment to procreate is not just one of the 613; it is a fundamental value for which the world was created and for which we were created within it (whence the commandment “He formed it to be inhabited”). Yet Hezekiah allows himself to refrain from this command (thereby endangering the continuity of the royal dynasty altogether, as Rav Kook wrote) merely because the odds are that his son will be wicked. To be sure, we must recall that a wicked king of Israel is not the same as a private individual fearing he may have a wicked son; a wicked king has global significance. In any case, this is apparently Hezekiah’s view.

Note further that Hezekiah does not argue with Isaiah about Manasseh’s own choice. His claim concerns tearing up the evil decree issued regarding Manasseh even before his birth. The destiny awaiting him (his “mazal”) is to be wicked. The fact that Manasseh has choice and could choose to be righteous is not what convinces Hezekiah to bring him into the world. His contention is that the decree itself can be torn up. That is, if the decree were absolute, then even if Manasseh could choose to be righteous, that alone would not suffice to obligate Hezekiah to procreate. Only the possibility of tearing up the decree (changing the destiny into which Manasseh would be born) is what persuades Hezekiah to be fruitful and multiply. The discussion is not about the son’s own choice but about Hezekiah’s influence on his son’s expected destiny.

The Sugya’s Conclusion: Is It Really “With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?”

Finally, note that Hezekiah ultimately changes his stance and is persuaded to procreate. Moreover, in the debate between Isaiah and Hezekiah, it seems the conclusion aligns more with Hezekiah. He does not accept Isaiah’s position—the view of “With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?!”—that future forecasts are meaningless and one must simply follow halakha. From Hezekiah’s conclusion we see that had it truly been impossible to change the future destiny, he would have stood his ground and refrained from procreation—contrary to Isaiah’s view. Hezekiah agrees to bring a child into the world only because of the possibility that the destiny will change.

It appears, then, that Hezekiah rules like Isaiah but not for his reasons. Isaiah argued that one must bring a child into the world in any case—even if the destiny is fixed and unchangeable (that is the meaning of the principle Isaiah states: “With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?!”). But Hezekiah does not accept that claim. If so, it is not correct to infer from the sugya the rule “With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?!” According to the sugya’s upshot, if I indeed know the hidden counsel of God, then I should refrain from procreation. The conclusion that one must nonetheless fulfill procreation and ignore the forecast of Divine inspiration is based only on the fact that the future destiny is not necessary and can change. That is the sugya’s conclusion. If so, God’s hidden matters can indeed be relevant to my halakhic decisions, as long as it is clear to me—absolutely (for example, via a prophet)—that this truly is the counsel of the Almighty.

“With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?!”: An Alternative Explanation

In the passage cited above, Rav Kook offers an explanation for why one may not refrain from procreation based on cost-benefit considerations. His claim is that it is preferable to pay the price of one wicked king for a single generation rather than sever the royal dynasty from Israel entirely.[4] In other words, these are utilitarian considerations, not a general principle instructing us to ignore the hidden counsel of God. To my mind, it is very hard to fit that reading into Isaiah’s statement: “With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?!”

It therefore seems to me that the straightforward explanation of Isaiah’s claim is not about utility but a categorical assertion: decisions a person makes in this world must be based on realistic prudence, values, and halakha—no more. Considerations that belong to God’s hidden counsel—metaphysics, future forecasts, and Divine inspiration—should play no part in our decision-making. This, in my view, is the plain meaning of the expression “With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?!”

Again, I would stress that Isaiah argues this even assuming the deterministic premise that God’s hidden counsel is clear and absolute (as we saw, this is what he himself assumed). That is, even if I saw by Divine inspiration that my son will be wicked, and even if that is certain and unchangeable, I still must not consider that information when making decisions—not because it is untrue, but because it is not relevant to our plane of discussion and decision. Nor is it because of cost-benefit calculations, as Rav Kook explained the Gemara, but because our decisions should be made solely according to our assessment of reality, together with value and halakhic considerations—and nothing else. This also seems to be the meaning of Isaiah’s continuation: “That which you are commanded—you must do; and what is pleasing before the Holy One, blessed be He—let Him do.” Leave to God what is His, and focus on what is incumbent upon you.[5]

Contemporary Implications

I have pointed out more than once[6] that in the debate between religious Zionism and anti-Zionist Haredism there is a very deep common denominator: both act on metaphysical considerations. Religious Zionism assumes that Zionism is a movement bearing the beginning of redemption (with indicators listed by the prophets: ingathering of exiles, the land’s flourishing, etc.); that is, its shapers are bearers of a Divine idea, and therefore one ought—even is obligated—to join and assist it. Their anti-Zionist opponents argue that this movement expresses the forces of the sitra aḥra; in fact, it is not the beginning of redemption but the “footsteps of the Messiah” (in which brazenness abounds and the other signs listed in Sotah 49b), hence it is forbidden to join it and one must oppose it. The considerations that each side brings to its stance include metaphysical components; that is, an evaluation of the metaphysical forces behind the process influences the decision whether to join it or oppose it.

I argue against both of these conceptions that both err in acting on the basis of considerations that are among God’s hidden matters, rather than sufficing with realpolitik, halakhic, and value considerations alone. Zionism based on considerations of nationality alone, on interest, or on the commandment of settling the Land is religiously legitimate (though it is not necessarily “religious-Zionist” with a hyphen, since such Zionism can be non-religious; a religious person can be Zionist in a secular-national sense).[7] Opposition to Zionism on the basis of considerations that it leads to religious laxity, or the prohibition of cooperation with secularists, and perhaps even the prohibition of rebellion against the nations (the “Three Oaths” of Ketubot; admittedly metaphysical, but already appearing in the Talmud as guidance given to Israel—though in my opinion this too is faulty metaphysics), or simply the assessment that it is an unrealistic movement (with little chance of success), is legitimate anti-Zionism (though mistaken, in my view). All these are considerations of realpolitik, values, or halakha. Metaphysics should not take part in this discussion; in that sense, both sides in this debate suffer from a similar flaw.

One can qualify this and say that if all other considerations are neutral—i.e., there are no halakhic, value, or realpolitik considerations—then one may also take metaphysical considerations into account (e.g., convening a court or performing various magical rites to bring the Messiah, and the like). But where there is a halakhic price (as in Hezekiah’s case—there is a commandment like procreation which he was commanded, and because of metaphysics he annuls it), or a political price, there one must not consider metaphysical considerations: “With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?! That which you are commanded—you must do; and what is pleasing before the Holy One, blessed be He—let Him do.”

It is interesting here to cite Nahmanides’ well-known words about Joseph.[8] Ramban asked why Joseph, after being appointed viceroy in Egypt, did not inform his father that he was alive, and he explains (on Gen. 42:9):

And so I say that all these matters in Joseph were due to his wisdom in interpreting dreams. For one must wonder: after Joseph remained many days in Egypt and was an officer and a ruler in the house of a great prince in Egypt, how did he not send even a single letter to his father to inform and comfort him? Egypt is about six days from Hebron; and even if it were a year’s journey, he should have informed him for the honor of his father, the precious redemption of his soul, and ransomed him with great wealth.

But he saw that the bowing of his brothers to him—and his father and all his seed with them—could not take place in their land; and he hoped that it would happen there in Egypt when he saw his great success there, all the more after he heard Pharaoh’s dream, which made clear to him that they would all come there and all his dreams would be fulfilled.

Joseph’s reason for not notifying his father was his desire to realize his dreams. Many have attacked Ramban on this, since the realization of dreams is God’s concern. For example, the author of the Akeidah writes:

Let the One who gives dreams bring their fulfillment. Indeed, it is utter folly for a person to strive to realize his dreams, for they are things that are done without the owners’ will.

Joseph should have fulfilled the commandment to honor his father and not weighed metaphysical considerations—especially since here this is not a neutral step. Failing to notify is a severe injury to the commandment of honoring his father, and no metaphysical consideration justifies such harm. Again we can formulate it thus: “With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?! That which you are commanded—you must do; and what is pleasing before the Holy One, blessed be He—let Him do.”

What Did Hezekiah Think?

We must now re-examine what Hezekiah thought. Let me remind us that the sugya’s conclusion is not Isaiah’s claim but Hezekiah’s stance. In light of what I’ve said in explaining Isaiah’s words, we must return to Hezekiah and ask: did he favor mixing metaphysical considerations into decision-making? We saw that his conclusion was like Isaiah’s, but not for his reasons. That is, he accepts Isaiah’s position that one must not transgress halakha based on metaphysical considerations, but conditions this on the metaphysical consideration being certain. If the future forecast can change—if there is a chance Manasseh will not be wicked—then one must not consider God’s hidden matters. But if the forecast is certain, it seems he remains of the view that one should not engage in procreation. We must thus slightly update the sugya’s conclusion: there is room to consider metaphysical factors in decision-making, but only if they are certain. If there is a chance they are untrue, we must carry out what is incumbent upon us without “calculations.”

The question is how certainty can be reached in such matters. Seemingly this is metaphysics to which we do not have direct access. And indeed, in the debate between religious Zionism and anti-Zionist Haredism there are positions to either side. Here it is unlikely that either side can honestly regard its stance as certain. Therefore, in this case neither side is permitted to mix metaphysical considerations into decision-making and position-forming regarding these processes.

It would seem the only way to attain certainty regarding a metaphysical interpretation of reality is via a prophet. A prophet receives from God an authorized interpretation and is commanded to convey it to the public. A decision based on metaphysical or future information received from a prophet is permitted (though a prophet’s halakhic ruling cannot instruct transgressing the Torah—except perhaps temporarily). But when we have no prophecy, no matter how convinced we are of our interpretation, it is not appropriate to consider it in decision-making.

Ironically, in our story Isaiah was a prophet. He came to Hezekiah and delivered his metaphysical assessment of reality: “The decree has already been issued,” yet Hezekiah decides not to accept it. In the final analysis, Hezekiah chooses not to accept Isaiah’s assessment of reality, but he does accept his practical directive; and as we saw, that is apparently the sugya’s conclusion. Note, however, that the sugya presents Hezekiah as also endowed with Divine inspiration, and it seems he too had access to metaphysical information (though he relies on a received tradition from his forefathers and not only on direct metaphysical sight). In any case, it seems the sugya’s conclusion is that a metaphysical assessment (at least so long as it is uncertain) does not play a role in decision-making and position-forming. According to Isaiah (note—precisely Isaiah, who was a prophet, maintains that prophecy does not change the halakhic directive!), this is true in any case; according to Hezekiah (who was not a prophet), such a consideration might be possible only if the metaphysical forecast is certain.

It would seem that this sugya actually leads us to a conclusion; contrary to what I mentioned at the beginning of the column, it seems one can draw a lesson from it and learn something. Practically speaking, of course, one may point out that most of the public and most rabbis do not think this way, for they rely on metaphysical interpretations of events to form positions and act. Let us look more closely.

Another Reading of the Sugya: Can One Reach a Conclusion from an Aggadic Sugya?

We must recall that Rav Kook offered another interpretation of the sugya. In his view, Isaiah is not making a statement about avoiding metaphysical considerations but a pragmatic weighing of outcomes (a bad king for one generation versus cutting off the monarchy altogether). Even according to him, though, it seems one must say that Hezekiah does not accept this; in his opinion, even the price of one wicked generation of kings may decide the matter, and therefore refraining from procreation is justified only if it is clear there will indeed be such a generation.[9]

It is no wonder that this is the reading Rav Kook chose (although in my estimation the straightforward reading is as I proposed), for in light of his approach to the Zionist process one can see that metaphysical considerations are, in his view, legitimate in decision-making. No wonder he reads the sugya in a different direction. Needless to say, Ramban himself also supports his approach. From Ramban’s words about Joseph it emerges that he too did not understand our sugya as I propose (though some dispute this even regarding Ramban). I will add and recall Rashi’s explanation of “the decree has already been issued,” which also apparently does not accept my reading of the sugya (at least in part). Still, this seems to me the plain sense of the sugya, and it is no wonder Ramban was attacked for his interpretation. Ironically, I would say that anti-Zionist Haredi opponents would join Ramban and Rav Kook in understanding the sugya this way, for, as we saw, both sides in this debate agree that metaphysical considerations are legitimate in decision-making. It seems they, too, read the sugya along the lines Rav Kook suggested and not as I have proposed.

Thus, even in this sugya—where it would seem one could extract an ideological and conceptual conclusion for our lives—this does not happen. Each (those commentators and myself) adopts the interpretation that fits his conception; once again we see that philosophical and ideological conceptions do not change in light of the conclusion of a conceptual sugya.

On second thought, there is no need to say these are tendentious readings. Perhaps the direction is the reverse: perhaps it is because of Rav Kook’s and the Satmar Rebbe’s interpretation of this sugya (maybe that is how they understood it on its own terms) that they formed their metaphysical stance regarding Zionism and the weight of metaphysics in life. And for me as well—perhaps, since this is the straightforward reading of the sugya in my view, from here arose my position that one must not mix metaphysical considerations into decision-making.

As for myself, I can attest that I very much doubt I would change my metaphysics-skeptical outlook in light of the conclusion of this sugya—or, conversely, if I were convinced that the sugya concludes differently, whether I would change my position that is wary of metaphysical considerations in real-world conduct. Still, I truly think my reading is the most reasonable in this sugya, and therefore I don’t even have a dilemma.[10]

Yet it remains important and worthwhile to ask what the plain sense of this sugya is. In my estimation, the plain sense is what I have proposed (we saw that this is also precise in Isaiah’s wording). If I am right, then the necessary conclusion is that the interpretations of Rav Kook and the Satmar Rebbe are indeed tendentious. They assumed that metaphysical considerations carry weight in decision-making, and apparently from there they derived their interpretation of the sugya. Moreover, I allow myself to surmise that if this was their stance so firmly and with such significant life implications, it is not based only on some particular reading of a sugya. A brief perusal of the Satmar Rebbe’s VaYoel Moshe will show you the consistent and pronounced tendentiousness he adopts in interpreting every source to fit his view.

Incidentally, his former disciple and ḥasid, Rabbi Yissakhar Teichtal, in his Em HaBanim Semeiḥah, takes issue with his master and supports Zionism,[11] and he too does so with some tendentiousness—though far less than his master’s. Both sides recruit here all and sundry—midrashim, aggadot, and halakhic approaches—just to reach the desired conclusion. I have tried here to present my conception through (I hope) a straightforward analysis of the sugya itself, and the matter stands for the reader’s judgment.

In any case, as a matter of fact it truly seems that no one actually changes his position after studying the sugya. Whether one can and should draw a clear conclusion from the sugya is another question (that of the parties’ interpretive integrity). In my opinion, in this case the answer is yes. If so, at least in my view, this is an aggadic sugya that is exceptional in this respect, for it has a clear conclusion for our lives.

[1] See also in columns 134–5, 138, 242, 272, and more.

[2] The main points can be found in the recording of Ein Ayah 23 on the site.

[3] I assume here that the decree Isaiah speaks of is that the son would be wicked (and we also know this indeed came to pass with Manasseh). This also follows from what comes next, since Isaiah’s statement that a decree has been issued is presented as an answer to Hezekiah’s request, who is trying to ensure that the son who will be born will nevertheless be righteous.

Rashi here, however, explains that the unchangeable decree was that Hezekiah would die (and not that the son would be wicked). Perhaps what led Rashi to interpret this way is the premise we saw above (in the first interpretation) that Isaiah rebukes Hezekiah for his determinism. But then it is unclear why determinism regarding the decree of death itself is acceptable according to Isaiah (see also the Maharsha here who explains this). Moreover, it is not clear why Isaiah addresses this as a response to Hezekiah’s request that he give him his daughter so he might beget a righteous son. What is the relevance of the death decree (Hezekiah doesn’t necessarily want this to escape death, but to fulfill Isaiah’s halakhic directive)? Furthermore, according to Rashi it is unclear why Isaiah needs to discuss Hezekiah’s proposal at all. Whether or not a death decree has been issued, Hezekiah wants to fulfill the commandment and beget a righteous son. Why does Isaiah refuse on the grounds that a death decree has been issued?

Therefore, in my remarks above I assume the plain sense of the Gemara—that Isaiah means a decree that Manasseh will be wicked. Interestingly, according to the Baḥ’s version later in the Gemara, Isaiah indeed gives Hezekiah his daughter, and from them come Manasseh and Rabshakeh. Manasseh is indeed wicked, but at the end of his life he apparently repents (see overviews, for example here and here).

[4] Incidentally, even this is not categorically true, but only given the assumption that in the future the kings will return to the right path. But if the forecast were that all the kings would continue in Manasseh’s way, then Isaiah too would not have advised him to engage in procreation.

[5] This is, of course, a paraphrase of the well-known expression in its Christian context: “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s.”

[6] A clear expression of this can be found, among other places, at the end of the second book in the trilogy, and even more in my daughter Bruria’s seminar paper, which appears on the site.

[7] If the basis is halakhic, then perhaps it is religious-Zionist. But if the basis is interest or national considerations, then it is not.

[8] For a review, see for example here.

[9] From Rav Kook’s words in the cited passage it appears he explains this weighing in Isaiah’s words and ignores the fact that the sugya’s conclusion does not accept that claim. It seems that, in his view, the dictum “With the hidden matters of the Merciful—what is it to you?!” remains the conclusion (as many writers appear to take it), and this requires further inquiry.

[10] For me personally there is another problem in deriving conclusions from aggadic sugyot, since I do not see myself bound by them. Even if I were convinced that the sugya supports metaphysical considerations, I would not necessarily accept this.

[11] But see the introduction to the new edition, where the Lubavitcher Rebbe praises the author’s grandson for clarifying that his grandfather was not, God forbid, a Zionist.