Jews as Human Beings: E. The Two-Story Model – Sacrifices and Divine Service (Column 750)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5.1 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

In the first column of the series I addressed the ethnic question: whether a Jew is a different kind from a Ben Noach or a species within the general human species. I argued in favor of the latter view. In the previous column we saw a similar model regarding the relationship between the halakhic system and the Noahide system. That is not a question about the Jew but about Judaism (on this distinction, see in my booklet on secular Judaism). In the third column in the series I discussed several halakhic and moral implications of this picture. In the previous column I presented the two-story picture from the perspective of the laws of personal status, and we saw that personal status after the giving of the Torah is built of two stories: the first is universal and the second particular. The first remains in place even after the giving of the Torah; this is marriage. The present column was intended to conclude the series and to present the two-story model in the context of sacrifices and divine service. This is indeed not specifically connected to Bnei Noach but to the innovation created by the giving of the Torah as opposed to the situation that prevailed beforehand. However, I have now recalled that I have in fact already devoted column 747 to this matter. In order to complete the structure, I shall briefly describe what I said there and place it in our context.

“The verse repeated it in order to make it indispensable”: the difficulty

Throughout the Torah, whenever there is a commandment, it is taken to be obligatory and indispensable (me’akev): if it was not fulfilled, we have not discharged our obligation. For example, the laws of tzitzit and tefillin are me’akev, unless there is a specific source and reason for them not to be indispensable. By contrast, in the realm of kodashim Hazal tell us in a number of places[1] that a mere commandment is presumed not to be indispensable, unless there is a special source that teaches us that it is me’akev. How does the Torah teach us that a given commandment is indispensable? There are several ways to do so. For example, if the Torah repeats the commandment twice (=it “repeated it”). From here arises the rule that in kodashim “we require that the verse repeated it in order to make it indispensable”. There are other ways to do this as well, such as writing the word “chukah” (“statute”) in the relevant passage, and so forth.

An example of this rule may be found in the first mishnah in Zevachim, which states:

All sacrifices that were slaughtered not for their own sake are valid, but they have not fulfilled the owners’ obligation, apart from the Passover offering and the sin offering.

That is, one must offer the korbanot “for their own sake”, but even if we did not do so the sacrifice is valid (it simply does not count toward fulfilling the obligation).

At first glance, this phenomenon is very puzzling. The distinctions we are familiar with between the realm of kodashim and that of chullin (for example, in the consumption of kodashim the “day follows the night”, unlike in the case of chullin, and others), are apparently related to the substantive content involved. By contrast, the rule “the verse repeated it in order to make it indispensable” is a hermeneutical rule. Prima facie, the rules of interpretation should not differ between kodashim and chullin, since the Torah is read in the same way everywhere. If a biblical commandment is meant to be me’akev, this ought to be true throughout all areas of halakhah; and if repetition is required in order to teach that it is me’akev, that requirement should apply in all halakhic areas in Scripture. Some of the later authorities have claimed that this rule is indeed valid across all areas of halakhah in Scripture.[2] But it is difficult to accept this claim against what all the commentators say. The proofs they adduce are not conclusive either, and this is not the place to elaborate. In any event, according to virtually all the commentators this rule applies only in the realm of kodashim.

Beyond the very question of why the interpretive rules should differ in the area of kodashim, what further sharpens the difficulty is that I am not aware of any source for this rule. We would have expected this to be a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai or some received tradition, yet as far as I know there is no hint in the sources of Hazal as to the origin of this rule. Seemingly this means that the foundation of this rule lies in sevara (reasoned argument), and therefore it needs no explicit source. But I have not found in the commentators any sevara that would explain the meaning and validity of this rule, and in particular its uniquely limited application specifically to the realm of kodashim.

A look at prayer not in its time

Without going into details, there I proposed an explanation of this matter, and I prefaced it with the sugya at the beginning of the fourth chapter of Berakhot. The mishnah and the gemara there deal with the times of prayer. The first mishnah in the chapter states:

The morning prayer may be recited until midday; Rabbi Yehuda says: until four hours. The afternoon prayer may be recited until evening; Rabbi Yehuda says: until pelag ha-minchah. The evening prayer has no fixed time; and the musaf prayer may be recited all day (Rabbi Yehuda says: until seven hours).

And the gemara there (26a) asks:

And does everyone hold that [the morning prayer is] only until midday, and no more? But Rav Mari son of Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yirmiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: if one erred and did not pray the evening prayer, he prays twice in the morning; [if he did not pray] the morning prayer, he prays twice in the afternoon! – [The answer is:] he may go on praying all day.

Until midday he is given reward for prayer in its proper time; from then on he is given reward for prayer, but he is not given reward for prayer in its proper time.

In other words, until midday he is given the reward of prayer in its proper time, and from then on he receives the reward of prayer, but not the reward of prayer in its proper time. That is, it is possible to pray even after the time, but such a prayer is not complete, and therefore the reward given for it is not full.

There I cited the dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban regarding the mitzvah of prayer. As is well known, the Rambam counts a biblical mitzvah to pray (Sefer Ha-Mitzvot, positive commandment 5). All the detailed laws (such as times, wording, number of prayers, and the like), however, are rabbinic additions even according to him. By contrast, the Ramban in his glosses there views prayer, in all its details, as a rabbinic mitzvah that has no biblical root (apart from prayer at a time of distress). According to the Rambam the gemara is interpreted in a fairly simple way. On his view there is a Torah-level obligation to pray and no fixed time is set for it. Therefore, one who prays after the time fixed by the Sages has fulfilled the biblical mitzvah of prayer, though he has not fulfilled the rabbinic rules that set times for prayer. He therefore receives reward for the biblical mitzvah of prayer, but not full reward for prayer in its proper time, as one is required to pray by rabbinic law (the time of prayer is certainly rabbinic according to all views). I explained the Ramban’s position on the assumption that he too acknowledges the existence of a biblical notion of prayer (a “cheftza of prayer”), and that his disagreement with the Rambam concerns only the question of whether we are biblically commanded to pray or not. In other words, the Ramban too agrees that one who prayed before the revelation at Sinai performed an act of prayer as part of avodat Hashem. There are several proofs for this; here I shall only recall the words of R. Chaim in his novellae on the Rambam, Hilkhot Tefillah 4:1:

And even for those who disagree with the Rambam, this is only with respect to its obligation. But its existence and its essence are, according to everyone, from Torah law.

We can now ask: what did the Sages add to the biblical situation? It is implausible that, after the Torah was given, and certainly after the Sages instituted obligatory prayer, the original, natural prayer was uprooted. One who prays, in whatever form, is still engaged in the act of prayer. When the Sages added the detailed laws of prayer, they certainly did not intend to uproot our natural, ordinary prayer, but rather to establish a new obligation, such that even one who does not wish to pray (and on the biblical level, according to the Ramban, is not obligated) will nevertheless be required to do so. Accordingly, one who prayed not in accordance with the details of the rabbinic enactments is certainly not in a worse position than one who prays a biblical prayer. He certainly has not transgressed, and it is reasonable to assume that his actions have the value of avodat Hashem. If Avraham Avinu had done this, it would certainly have been considered for him exalted divine service; our situation is no worse than his. It is true, however, that for us additional rabbinic requirements have been innovated, and one who prayed after the time or without fulfilling some of them has not fulfilled those.

Now, when we ask what the status is of someone who prayed the morning prayer after its time, the answer is clear: his prayer is an act of value and certainly constitutes avodat Hashem. The rabbinic enactment has not uprooted that. He has indeed not fulfilled the rabbinic mitzvah of prayer (in this case, the morning prayer), since he did not do what they commanded, but it is clear that he did pray. Therefore the gemara says that he receives the reward for prayer, but not the reward for prayer in its proper time.

Note that all this is true both according to the Rambam and according to the Ramban. As we have seen, the Ramban too agrees that there is such a thing as prayer even prior to the rabbinic enactments. On his view there is no Torah-level obligation to pray, but one who prays – his prayer is prayer. Beyond that, as a second story, there is the rabbinic enactment to pray in the pattern they established, but the first story remains in place.

We can now return to the discussion of the rule that “we require that the verse repeated it in order to make it indispensable”.

“The verse repeated it in order to make it indispensable”: the explanation

What is special about prayer such that specifically with regard to it we say that even if one does not fulfill the details one nonetheless discharges the obligation? Why should we not say this about every halakhic requirement? My claim was that prayer is avodah she-ba-lev, service of the heart: “What is the service of the heart? This is prayer.” Thus, for example, we find in the Rambam, Sefer Ha-Mitzvot, positive commandment 5:

And the fifth mitzvah is that He commanded us to serve Him, may He be exalted, and this command has already been repeated a number of times. He said (Exodus 23:25): “And you shall serve the Lord your God”, and He said (Deuteronomy 13:5): “And Him shall you serve”, and He said (Deuteronomy 6:13): “And Him shall you serve”, and He said (Deuteronomy 11:13): “and to serve Him”. And although this command is also one of the general commands, as we explained in the fourth principle, it has a particular aspect, namely that He commanded regarding prayer. And the language of the Sifrei is: “‘And to serve Him’ – this is prayer.” And they also said: “‘And to serve Him’ – this is study.” And in the teaching of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose HaGelili (parashah 12, p. 228) they said: “Whence do we know the essence of prayer among the mitzvot? From here: ‘The Lord your God you shall fear, and Him shall you serve’.” And they said (Midrash Tannaim from the Midrash HaGadol, parashat Re’eh): “Serve Him in His Torah; serve Him in His Temple” – that is, to go there to pray in it and toward it, as Solomon, peace be upon him, explained (I Kings 8; II Chronicles 6).

Thus, what distinguishes prayer is that at its root it is “service” before the Holy One, blessed be He (more than all the other mitzvot, which are of course all part of His service). We can now understand that avodat Hashem derives its value from the very fact of our standing before Him and serving Him, independent of any command. Even if a certain command is given, it certainly does not revoke the value of the service that existed beforehand. If this is an act of value, then one who does so has done something of religious value.

The fact that prayer not in accordance with the Sages’ guidelines is nonetheless prayer (albeit not perfect) rests on the assumption that avodat Hashem is an objective reality and not merely the result of a command. If a person serves God, then he has served God. This depends only on his intention, not on his actions. The detailed practical guidelines in halakhah were not meant to uproot the natural service, but to channel and direct it – at most to add to it, but not to replace it. Therefore the detailed laws of the mitzvah of prayer were not intended to strip the name “prayer” from a prayer performed as it was before the command, but only to add to it.

Later in that sugya (at the beginning of chapter 4 of Berakhot) the gemara itself states that the prayers were instituted corresponding to the sacrifices. And indeed, what was originally called “avodah” was the sacrifices. Prayer is a substitute for them and therefore also falls under the category of “avodah”. It is not for nothing that the Rambam’s book dealing with the sacrificial service is called “Sefer Avodah”. It is therefore very reasonable that what we have seen regarding prayer holds for the realm of sacrifices in general. If some command is given in this area, it does not come to revoke the value of the sacrifice as it was offered by the Patriarchs; it comes to add an additional story that was created after the giving of the Torah. But the first story remains in place. Clearly, one who offered a sacrifice in the manner of the Patriarchs did not offer it in a perfect way, for the Torah commanded us to do it in a specific way and he did not fulfill that command. Yet we cannot say that he did something devoid of value. If a person offered a sacrifice intuitively, out of his natural religious feeling, there is avodat Hashem here. Even if he did so not in accordance with halakhah, in the end of the day a sacrifice was offered and service was performed. We may call this a “cheftza of avodah” (just as there is a “cheftza of prayer” according to the Ramban). In actuality there was avodah here, even if not exactly in accordance with the rules. In light of the gemara in Berakhot, we may conclude that he will receive reward for the act of sacrifice, even if not the reward for a sacrifice in all its details and fine points.

The conclusion is that when the Torah determines detailed laws concerning sacrifices, it does not come to uproot the natural avodat Hashem. Long before the command was given, the Patriarchs (and non-Jews as well) were already offering sacrifices to God, just as they prayed before the Sages’ command. In both cases the halakhic command does not come in place of the simple natural stratum, but in addition to it. Therefore, even if a person acted not in accordance with the details of the halakhah, in reality there is avodah here, and he will receive reward for it.

This is the explanation I proposed for the rule that “we require that the verse repeated it in order to make it indispensable”. A command in the realm of sacrifices (kodashim) deals with avodat Hashem, and therefore it is clear to us that it comes to add a story on top of the natural avodat Hashem. One who offered a sacrifice without fulfilling this particular detail has nonetheless effected the sacrifice, albeit not perfectly. He has fulfilled story A without story B – just like a non-Jew or one of the Patriarchs who offers a sacrifice. Accordingly, no scriptural source is required for this rule, since it is obvious to the Sages by sevara. When one thinks about it, this is indeed a simple sevara. Has someone who today prays before God in free-form language or not at the time fixed by the Sages not done an act of value in avodat Hashem? Of course he has. No verse is needed for this, just as the Patriarchs and the non-Jews before the giving of the Torah did not need verses and commands in order to sacrifice and pray; they understood by their own reasoning that this is how one ought to serve God. For the same reason, the Ramban understands that prayer has value on the Torah level even without a command, even though he has no halakhic source for this (there are the acts of the Patriarchs, but they themselves did so without a source).

See in that column and in the article to which I referred there for halakhic ramifications of this explanation. Here I shall mention only one, and this time a stringency (whereas “we require that the verse repeated it in order to make it indispensable” is a leniency). Avodat Hashem in its natural sense has no meaning without intention. What is the significance of mumbling the words of the prayer if there is no intention here to serve God and no command to do so? For this reason R. Chaim apparently writes (in Hilkhot Tefillah there) that the basic intention of standing before God is indispensable to the prayer according to all views (even according to the view that mitzvot do not require intention). Without the basic intention of avodat Hashem this is not avodat Hashem but merely lip movement. This is the other side of the coin we have seen: the fundamental definition of avodat Hashem is not determined by the command. It has value by virtue of our standing before the Holy One, blessed be He. Therefore, if we have stood before Him, our actions have value even if they are not perfect from the standpoint of the commands; and at the same time, if we have not stood before Him (but merely mumbled), there is no value to it. And this too is not by virtue of a source or command but by sevara.^[3] For the comparison to the requirement of “for its own sake” (lishmah) in sacrifices – see in that column and article.

Summary of the series

Here I have merely summarized the points in order to complete the picture. My aim here was to present another angle of the claim I have been making throughout this series, namely that the giving of the Torah did not create a new world ex nihilo and did not fulfill the verse that says, “We will destroy the old world down to its foundations”. As a rule, the Torah comes to add an additional story on top of the existing world, not to destroy it and build another structure in its place. Therefore, if there was religious significance to the world before the giving of the Torah, it necessarily remained afterwards as well (apart from certain areas where the Torah itself informed us that this is not so, such as in the details of the laws that are indispensable in the realm of kodashim). These are fields such as social arrangements (like marriage), avodat Hashem (sacrifices and prayer), morality (upon which halakhah is given to us), and so forth. In all these, there is indeed a two-story structure, because all these spheres had natural value even without the command.

Of course there are also spheres in which the Torah establishes a new world rather than directing the existing one, because there truly was no first story there. In areas such as forbidden foods, purity and impurity, and the like (the “chukim”, as opposed to the “mishpatim”, or the obedience-based mitzvot versus the rational ones), our actions have no natural significance unless they are done by virtue of the command (see on this, for example, columns 71, 631 and others).

Note that in some of those areas that belong to the world of natural avodat Hashem (the “mishpatim”), a command was nonetheless given on top of them. For example, “You shall not murder”, “Honor your father and your mother”, and the like. So too with kiddushin on top of marriage. In all these, after the giving of the Torah a two-story structure was created: the fulfillment in its original sense retains extra-halakhic value (moral, avodat Hashem, and so on). The command given on top of it operates on the religious plane (and is directed toward the attainment of religious goals and values), and there the act acquires religious value only if it is done out of commitment to the command.

We have seen the ramifications of this complex picture throughout this series.

[1] See, for example, Zevachim 23b and the parallels.

[2] See, for example, Chazon Ish, Nega’im, siman 12, se’if katan 20, s.v. “ve-zeh de-be’inan”; Kehillot Ya’akov, Zevachim, end of siman 5, s.v. “hashta”.

[3] Admittedly, such a basic intention can also be obtained via the mechanism of “stam le-shemah”, as in the sugya at the beginning of Zevachim, and this is not the place to elaborate.