Column for Passover: Between Chametz and the Evil Inclination – Another Look at What is Necessary (Column 65)

With God’s help

Column 52 I defined the difference between a falpol and a darush. I argued there that a darush is a false inference with a correct conclusion and a falpol is a (seemingly) correct inference with a false conclusion (a kind of riddle). We are used to associating the term darush in this "low" sense with various preachers, with Hasidic vorts (From the perspective of Torah) and so on. But the sages' agga midrash are generally perceived by us as deep stories, and the assumption is that if we don't see this, then if it's empty - from us. But sometimes I have the feeling that at least some of the sages' agga are a necessity. My point is that, like preachers in our time, the sages sometimes use free associations to express ideas and do not seriously intend to attach them to the sermon's conclusion. If this is true, then it is not always right to examine their conclusion with too much scrutiny, or to explain all the details of the agga and its structure in a coherent manner. Sometimes they may just want to express some idea in a rather free way, and the links and sources are not necessarily good and valid evidence for this idea. In this post I would like to demonstrate this in relation to the prohibition of leaven.

On leaven and evil inclination

What are these words referring to? Preachers of all times (and of course in our time) often link the leaven to the evil inclination. It is almost a core belief that the eradication of the leaven is the eradication of the evil inclination and the war against it. Let it not be seen and let it not be found are universal symbols for fighting the evil inclination. The search for the leaven in holes and cracks also naturally takes on metaphorical meanings in this direction. The journey to freedom is interpreted as taking control into our own hands and freeing ourselves from the burden of the inclination.

This sermon is not a modern invention. It appears in intellectual literature, and especially in Hasidic literature, of course, but it seems that it has already been Sage They linked the leaven to creation (mainly in the Zohar and in Kabbalah books)[1]Some have also understood this way the prayer that appears in Blessings 17:1:

And Rabbi Alexandri of Ter Damtseli said, "O Lord of the worlds, it is clear and known to You that our desire is to do Your will, and who is hindering the light that is in the bondage and slavery of kings? May it be Your will that You save us from their hands and that we return to do the laws of Your will with a whole heart."

Although the connection to leaven here is not necessary, since the term "light in the dough" can also be interpreted as simply a metaphorical designation for the evil inclination. There is no necessary connection here between the evil inclination and the prohibitions of leaven. Nevertheless, this connection is deeply rooted in Jewish thought regarding the prohibitions of leaven.

Explanations about the path are needed.

A quick look at the necessary literature reveals that the connection between leaven and desire can be explained and seen in all sorts of ways. Leaven makes the dough rise, and desire (honor) also makes a person great. Desire seems to us to be within us, but in fact it is something external, just like the light in the dough. The evil desire has good and bad uses ("in the second it will be necessary"), and so does leaven (leaven is forbidden on Passover but is useful and completely permissible the rest of the year).

What all of these contents that we found in the relationship between leaven and the evil inclination have in common is that they are all self-evident to us even without the connection to leaven. If I were to tell you that leaven has good and bad uses, or that it increases a person, etc., I could say this without any connection to the analogy to leaven. This analogy adds nothing. Furthermore, anyone who disagrees with such a conclusion will not accept it even based on the connection to leaven, and anyone who does accept the conclusion will accept it even without the connection to leaven. So what does this connection add to us? We can see here the necessary signs as defined above. There is a correct conclusion here (usually even a trivial one), but the argument that leads to it is quite shaky.

Another problem with this link, which is of course related to the previous one, is that all of these explanations are explanations in retrospect. I could take them seriously if there was a clear source for the connection between chametz and the inclination, and then perhaps I would try to find what it is based on and what it expresses. But if we start the discussion with these sermons and conclude from them that there is a connection between chametz and the inclination, it seems to me that this connection is very dubious. To the same extent, I could also link the sukkah to the evil inclination (which closes us off from the world between our four walls, expresses betrayal in our own home, cuts us off from the sky, etc., etc.), the tefillin to the clouds (since both face upwards and express spirituality), and honoring parents to Australia (because just as our parents lifted us up, so Australia also moved us away. And in general, we do not understand the Aboriginal language, like the taste of tefillin). It is clear that once we decide for some reason that there is a connection between two things, we can always find a lot of sermons that pour different and diverse content into this connection ad hoc. By the way, these connections will always be trivial (i.e., self-evident), otherwise we would not accept them. After all, we have no constraint that tells us that there is indeed a connection, so why would we accept it if it is not something we knew in advance? Therefore, such connections always yield trivial conclusions (i.e., ones that we knew even without the connection).

Popper's criterion for demanding

In fact, I would try to set a criterion here similar to Popper's criterion for a scientific theory (he hinges it on being open to refutation). Can the connection between leaven and the evil inclination predict something that we would not have thought of without accepting this connection? In other words: can the claim about the connection be put to the test of refutation? After all, it is very easy to show and explain such a connection ad hoc (see examples above). Popper teaches us that sometimes what is more important is to define what needs to be found in the sources (and where) in order to convince us that there is no connection between leaven and the evil inclination. Is this even possible? It is clear that at the level of freedom and association that is used to establish and explain such necessary connections, they are certainly not refutable (see the examples I gave above).

And what about Chazal?

What is confusing is that sometimes commentators manage to show in a seemingly convincing manner that some Talmudic issue really intended to link leaven to the evil inclination.[2] The first question we must ask here is whether this is indeed a real basis or evidence that is presented ad hoc (after we assumed that there is such a connection)? Couldn't we prove other connections in this matter? But even beyond that, another question arises here: Even if we are convinced that the Sages did indeed intend such a connection, it is not clear where the Sages themselves learned this from? Did they have any basis for this connection? The Holy Spirit? Tradition from Sinai? Unlikely. Is there a hint of this in the Torah? Even connections made by the Sages are not without criticism.

And so, after I began to reflect on the connection between chametz and the evil inclination and had difficulty finding a reasonable anchor or basis for it, I began to think that perhaps the Sages were actually presenting a false teaching here. Perhaps they have a goal of preaching a war against the evil inclination, and they choose to express this through an associative and speculative connection to chametz. They do not really intend to say that this is what the prohibition of chametz is intended to express.

But if this is indeed a sermon, it is not clear how important and significant it is to go into all the details of the legends and issues in order to show this connection and learn its meaning. Perhaps the lesson is actually only the obligation to fight or not to give in to desire, and the inference that leads to this conclusion does not really stand on solid grounds. As we have seen, this is the nature of a sermon even today. Would anyone have thought to begin examining the inference of a sermon in Sheva Berakhot and analyze its validity and whether it is necessary and truly follows from the sources he cited?

A priori, it is reasonable to assume that the Talmudic sages also acted like the sages of our generation. Sometimes a sage spices up his moral or ethical lesson with a cute sermon that does not really pretend to deduce anything serious from the text on which he is based. It could be word games, gematria, or just analogies and free associations. Of course, it is possible that the Talmudic sages did this, but the editors of the Talmud filtered out and did not include the necessary material, but only serious and binding material. But is it possible that this is not the case? Isn't it possible that such sermons also entered the Talmud along with all the halachic discussions and along with the more serious and binding sermons? The Talmud is full of all kinds of different and strange material (strange medicines, demons, and other scum of the earth) and I am not at all sure of the validity of this assumption regarding its editing. I do not mean to say this about all the legends, I am just wondering if it is possible that some of them are like that? As every student knows, the structure of the Talmud is very associative and quite free (I am not convinced by structural arguments that try to explain the structure of the Sugiya and why and how each section and each part of it were placed). So why assume that sermons that are structured by free association were not also included there?

Example: What about Esther and Sarah?

Take as an example the legend narrated in Esther Rabbah (1:8):

Rabbi Akiva would sit and teach, and the students would doze off, and when he heard this, he would ask, "How did Esther deserve to reign over one hundred and twenty-seven states?" Otherwise, the Holy One, blessed be He, said, "Esther, the daughter of Sarah, who lived one hundred and twenty-seven years, will come and reign over one hundred and twenty-seven states."

The Midrash explicitly states that this sermon was only said to awaken the sleepy students. Yet this has not stopped many commentators from sailing into in-depth interpretations of this comparison. Some of the interpretations are very interesting and most of them trivial (as mentioned above), but the important question is whether they are correct. Or does the a priori assumption that there is a connection once again yield results as it would yield with respect to any connection whatsoever.

One might assume that this is precisely what the Rabbi was trying to do. He brought up a connection between two things that were outwardly similar, and challenged the students to come up with possible associations and "explanations" as their creative imaginations allowed them. The goal was not to uncover real explanations for a real connection, but to provoke them. As mentioned, he could have done this with a connection between honoring one's parents and Australia. You can ask all the populist scholars in modern beit midrash who take one legend or another, put it together, and sail through its interpretations by free association. The results can certainly be creative and interesting, even fascinating. And yet the question remains whether these results are an interpretation of that legend or simply using it as a source of inspiration (as they usually declare in the commentary, that for them the Talmud is a source of inspiration and not a source of authority).

What could be the basis for a relationship?

If we were to find in the Torah or oral tradition a source that links leaven to the evil inclination, there would be room to propose different interpretations of this connection. In that case, our demands for the validity of these suggestions would not be very high either. After all, the connection is known and now we only need to explain it. But if these explanations are the source of the connection, I tend to regard them with some suspicion.

Although I mentioned that the main connection between chametz and the evil inclination is found in Kabbalistic sources. Such Kabbalistic connections can be based on some mystical tradition or various revelations (for those who believe in this), then perhaps the connections there can be freer. When Kabbalists say that there is a connection between chametz and the evil inclination, it may be rooted in tradition or in revelations or mystical experiences that are a possible source, and if it is justified to assume that there is a connection, the aforementioned explanations can be freer. But even if we accept this regarding the secret literature, in Hasidic literature it seems to me that it is more difficult to see things this way. It seems to me that, with the exception of ardent Hasids, most of us do not really believe that the Rebbes experienced revelations from Elijah the Prophet, or received private traditions that are unknown to all of us. They speak on the basis of the arguments and material that is available to all of us. So if the analogies and connections are convincing – so be it. But the mere fact that such a connection is made in some Hasidic book does not seem to me to be a sufficient basis for adopting it.

The vow of the 'Peni Yehoshua'

thepenny He is one of the greatest of the last Talmud commentators. He is unique in that he does not waive any of the Hoi Amina in the Gemara, Rashi, or Toss. He examines every step of the issue in detail. Surprisingly, you will not find any reference to the legendary parts of the Talmud in his book. He consistently skips over them. In his introduction to the book, he explains this.penny There he tells about a disaster that befell him when an earthquake struck his city:

And one that I have taken upon myself as a duty and vowed in the time of my distress on the day of the wrath of the Lord, Tuesday, Kesliyo, 573 AH, in the city of Lviv, I was peaceful in my home and refreshed in my temple with my friends and students listening to my voice, and suddenly, suddenly, the city was turned upside down like an instant, no hands were touched by it, and we did not hear the sound of a roar, but the sound of a fire came out in parts, and the sight of a great and blazing fire that rose in our palaces and windows by several large and terrible barrels filled with powder that was used to kindle fire until the houses were destroyed from their foundations. Several large houses and buildings with walls up to the sky were reduced to dust. They were completely destroyed in them and about six hundred and thirty holy souls from Israel were killed. And among the dead, even the ones who were killed in my house were my first wife, my mother, and her mother's father. Until he reached Zeret, my daughter, my youngest daughter, was the only one who was loved by her mother and was even more beloved by me. I too was one of the Nephilim, from Igra Ramah to Bira Amikata, and I came to the depths of Mezula in the lower land, right inside the winepress, because of the weight of the waves that fell on me, and the beams of our house were more than the springs of the winepress, and they did not give me rest. My hands and limbs are not in my possession. I said, "I am cut off by the blood of my days. I have counted the rest of my years. I will no longer see a man with the inhabitants of iron." And I was afraid that my house would become a grave for those who were cut off and burned, killed and suffocated. All four of them were on me as one, and the sentence of four deaths did not abrogate me. This and more, because the beams of the house, its furniture, its wood, and its stones were like complete witnesses to me. I said, "Lest they harm me, for the hand of the witnesses against me was the first to kill me." Indeed, by God's mercy on me, I did not God let evil happen to me, and after about a third or a quarter of an hour the sound of the crash had quieted down and the roar of the crash had subsided, only the sound of the tumult of the crowd, thousands and tens of thousands, was still raging, the trampling on the roof and the earth was splitting apart at their sound. And many more were killed by their trampling than at first, even though it was not clear that their intention was to save and open the floodgates. After all, I had already gone beyond the limit, and the danger of life was beyond doubt. Then I said, still in the floodgates, if God were with me and would bring me out of this place in peace and build me a faithful house for an unlimited increase in students, I would not refrain from the walls of the Beit Midrash and from studying the issues of the Shas and the Poskim and from spending many nights in the depths of Halacha, even spending many nights on one matter. And in this, my soul longed to follow in the footsteps of my ancestors, the late, famous, great-grandfather of my mother, the late Rabbi Maha"ga Mohar"r Yoshua zt"l, who was named among me by the Av Beit Din and Ram D"k Karaka, who wrote the book Magini Shlomo to resolve the questions of the Tosafot on Rashi z"l and to resolve what the Tosafots state in the text. And at that time, we had not yet received the light of the aforementioned book, only what our ancestors told us and upon hearing it, my soul yearned to follow in his footsteps:

Before I could speak the words to my heart, the Lord heard my humble voice and gave me steps between the pillars as if a path had been made for me, and I came out in peace without harm, and no harm came to me. Then I knew for sure that the Lord had spoken in a place where there was no escape. And from then on, I took it to heart that the main focus of my studies would be on the subject of halakha, on the issue of Shas and poskim, and that I would not put anything in writing about matters of necessity or other studies that are far from the center of learning the truth, if not far away.Only as long as I learn anything new about the issue of the Gemara or Pirshi and Tos, and it seems to me that it is on the side of the true path of study according to the path of our ancestors and rabbis, I will choose it and write it in the Book of Remembrance:

While trapped under the rubble after many of his family members died, he vows not to engage in legend but only in Halacha, since legend is usually not pursued and therefore does not reach the truth.[3] It should be noted that the assumption here is the opposite of the one I suggested above. He assumes that the legends are not necessary and that they have a serious and deep meaning. His argument is simply that people who study legends do not invest serious effort in it and that the interpretations are wort (necessary). In other words, it is not the legends that are necessary but our interpretations of them. Indeed, in recent generations, a greater and more systematic effort has been invested in the interpretations of the legends (starting in academia and continuing in yeshivot as well), and still in many cases my feeling is that these are ad hoc proposals and interpretations that do not stand any objective test.[4]

So if a lion like thepenny Admitting that like many others he does not strive for or reach the truth in studying the legend ("if not rarely"), what would the wall mosses say? When I see a broad and sweeping failure in some field, it prompts me to think whether it is not a failure at all, or whether it is a necessary failure.[5] Perhaps the lions are also not successful when it comes to interpreting legends because there is nothing to be successful with. Perhaps the problem is in the basic premise (that there is a serious interpretation at all) and not in the seriousness and method of the learners. And again, I do not necessarily mean all legends (since nowadays there are indeed serious and more successful attempts to interpret legends), but it is possible that some legends really do not have a serious interpretation since they are a matter of doctrine and not serious study, and if so, it is no wonder that people do not find a committed and systematic interpretation for them. In many cases, even in places where I get the impression that the interpretation of a legend is more serious and committed, there is still the feeling that it is an ad hoc interpretation (as can be done for any connection between two things, or for any story) and not really an interpretation that stands up to serious critical scrutiny.

By the way, this thesis can be put to an empirical test (we once thought of doing such a test for modern, or postmodern art). We can give literary experts fabricated legends to interpret them and offer them a systematic and serious analysis. I believe that in many cases you will see beautiful interpretations of these "legends", and it will be difficult to distinguish between them and real legends from the Talmud.[6]

What is learning: between poetry and prose?

I suppose the question now arises as to why such associations are not a study? Could the legend really be interpreted in this way? Many will tell you that the legend is similar to a poem while the halakha is to prose. The poems should be interpreted like a poem while the prose is interpreted like prose. So, even if I am right, does this detract from the value of studying the legend? Is associative interpretation not true? Especially if we adopt the deconstructivist thesis that the interpretation of a work is the impression it leaves on the reader (and not the author's intention), then this is exactly what is happening here.

I personally completely reject deconstruction, and I won't go into it. Here I'm just saying that if we adopt it, we can study in the same way every discussion, every event, and every object we encounter. Every telephone pole can evoke fascinating associations in us. So what's the difference between it and a Talmudic legend? After all, the impression that arises in me is not related to the author's intention, so what is Torah? Why is the inspiration that arises in me from a Talmudic legend fundamentally different from the inspiration that arises in me from a work of art, a person or a cat that passes me on the street, or the weather?

Study is the striving to understand the source being studied. In this sense, free associations cannot be considered study. They can of course be considered study, but it is the sharing of the name. If we give this the value of Torah study, I don't see why an interesting impression from a telephone pole is not entitled to be called Torah study?

Such impressions and associations can be very important, of course. The analogy between chametz and the evil inclination can help people cope with the evil inclination or understand its modes of operation (it doesn't really help me, a littoralist like me. But no one is perfect). And yet, at most, there is a valuable activity here, a means to achieve a worthy goal, but not Torah study. Torah study is an attempt to understand the Torah and its contents systematically and critically. When studying a text, the goal is to learn its content and understand it, and not to be freely impressed by it. Freely impressed is not studying the text but at most personal work and self-discovery. The result of the study must stand the test of reasonableness so that we can assume that we have indeed reached the desired result. It is difficult to regard the casual kneading of a text in order to extract from it what our hearts desire as Torah study. Again, we must not confuse the bottom line with the conclusion. The bottom line can be correct and even valuable, but for the study to be study and not just anecdotal, the conclusion and the details are also important. Study is not just about reaching a correct bottom line (and especially not a conclusion that was clear to all of us in advance), but at least anchoring it in the sources being studied, and it is also desirable that this study have new conclusions that were not understood and known in advance.

And finally: So what is the basis for the prohibition of leaven?

Okay, so if leaven is not a symbol or expression of the evil inclination, what can be said about the basis for the prohibition of leaven? I think that on this question there is no need to resort to the rabbis. The Torah itself tells us (Exodus 13:3):

And Moses said unto the people, Remember this day, in which ye came out of Egypt, out of the house of bondage: for by strength of hand the LORD brought you out from hence: and no leaven shall be eaten:

And so it is here (Exodus 13:6-8):

Seven days you shall eat unleavened bread, and on the seventh day is a feast to the Lord: Unleavened bread shall he eat seven days, and no leaven shall be seen of thee, neither shall any worm be seen of thee in all thy coasts: And thou shalt shew thy son in that day, saying, Because of this the LORD did unto me when I came out of Egypt:

The prohibition of leaven and the obligation to eat matzah are part of the remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt. Our ancestors left Egypt and did not eat leaven, but only matzah because their dough did not have time to ferment. Therefore, we are also commanded for generations to remember the Exodus from Egypt, both in the story that happened to us there and in the prohibition of leaven and the commandment of matzah. This is the simple explanation and I see no need or reason for all the requirements regarding the evil inclination and the like. The prohibition of enjoying, eating, and having leaven are all a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt and not because of the obligation to chase the inclination and dig through the cracks of the heart.

I have no choice but to refer the reader to my article here, in which I show the things using pure halakhic tools. It seems to me that although the interpretation is renewed (halakhically. Conceptually it is trivial and anchored in the biblical plainness of course), it is difficult to say that this is a sermon. To the best of my judgment, the arguments are systematic and compelling. The reader will read and be impressed.

Another methodological conclusion can be drawn from this. Systematically anchoring the conceptual conclusion in the details of the halakhic law can certainly strengthen it. Thus, the more systematic halakhic method can contribute to strengthening the loose legendary method. A kosher and happy holiday to all of us.

[1] See for example Zohar Parashat Ba'ot Ka'ach and more.

[2] Rabbi Yaakov Negan's article cited above is an example of a better analysis than the conventional sermon. I suggest the reader go through it, and then think about how convincing the arguments there really are. I tend to think not. To the best of my judgment, these are ad hoc arguments that could establish almost any connection you want, as I described above. He essentially assumes the connection between chametz and the creation and does not prove it. As mentioned, after we have equipped ourselves with such an assumption, we can always "prove" it with signs and examples from the structure of the subject, from comparing the meanings of phrases and words, and the like.

[3] I remember once reading a similar story about Rabbi Shlomo Cohen.

[4] I assume that some readers will say here that this is also the case in halakhic and Talmudic scholarship. My feeling is different. There are of course speculative proposals even in the theoretical halakhic context, and still the feeling is that there is a more systematic, controlled and well-founded method there (cf. 'Peni Yehoshua').

[5] See for example inColumn 27 On the signs of Elul.

[6] In passing, I will add that something similar can be done with fictitious halakhic issues and with some degree of success (due to the forgery of a responsa). Head perfume and of the Jerusalemite on Kadshim), but I think the situation there will be different in several aspects. It is a fact that these compositions were ultimately recognized as forgeries, and not only for reasons of sources and text but also for reasons of content. It is difficult for me to see a similar determination about a legendary text (i.e., a determination that it is a forgery because of the content and not for reasons of philology, history, or text). I will not go into that here.