A Look at the Othipron Dilemma in the Light of Debate (Column 457)

BSD

In the previous column I presented the argument between me and David Enoch (see HERE The recording) on ​​the question of whether God is needed as a basis for the validity of morality (or: Is without God all things permissible). In the course of the discussion, the moderator (Jeremy Fogel) raised the dilemma of Othipron, who on the face of it seemed unrelated to the discussion. After a while I was reminded of a bull 278 I have already dealt with the dilemma and its implications for the evidence from morality (the hanging of morality on God). In the above discussion I have answered the question briefly, and here I will return to this issue in order to clarify its connection to the debate with Enoch and to sharpen the distinctions I made there and in the previous column.

It is important for me to preface by noting that the concept of God in which I deal with this column is not necessarily the same as the “lean” God I dealt with in the previous column. Some of the suggestions I make here are an addition that is not part of the "lean" God required to give validity to the rules of morality. I will return to this point at the end of the column.

The Othipron Dilemma

In the Platonic dialogue A. Eitifron The following question is posed: Is the good good because the gods want it, or do the gods want the good because it is good. In other words, the question is whether there is an objective meaning to good, or whether what makes it good is the decision of the gods, but to the same extent they could decide that any other behavior is good or bad. Everything is devoted to their arbitrary will. A similar question can of course also be raised in relation to Gd, and Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman, in their book Religion and morality, Hold a very detailed discussion of the issue. Their conclusion there is that almost all Jewish thinkers advocate the latter option. I will not go into all the nuances and arguments that arise in the above book in general (I think there are some inaccuracies in it), and I will confine myself to a brief overview of the basic rationale for both sides.

On the one hand, theologically we assume that God is omnipotent and not subject to anything. there are none but Him. He created the world and established the laws that prevail in it. The implication is that he could have determined them in any other way he could have imagined. Hence there is no objective meaning to good and evil. On the other hand, if one adopts this view, the conclusion is that it is impossible to say that God is good. The statement that God is good assumes that there is a good that is defined regardless of him, and the argument is that there is a fit between his behavior and requirements and the same objective criterion for good. But if it is his decision that defines the concept of good, then the statement that God is good is nothing but a tautological definition (or analytical theorem) and not an argument. Basically it means: God wants what he wants. But this is true for all of us.

Many theologians (and even the little selfish one joins them) tend to think this is a problematic position. God is really good and could not have been otherwise. This of course assumes that the good is objectively defined and God in his own right is subject to this definition. He of course could have confused us and blinded our eyes not to distinguish between good and evil, but he could not otherwise determine the good and the bad. As I mentioned, despite the theological difficulties, it seems that most thinkers of Jewish thought hold the second approach.

Understanding and teaching

The first conception could be refined a little, and formulated as follows: We have an intuition about good and evil. The argument is that God's will conforms to the same intuition. But this intuition has been planted in us by him, so there is really no objective concept of good and evil. Thus it can be said that this statement is indeed a claim (and not a definition), but at the same time it is a claim that deals with our concepts and not the world itself. As for the world itself, the statement “God is good” means nothing (it is an empty identity, a tautology).

This is a particular case of the problem of the relationship between meaning and teaching. Taking an example that analytical philosophers often use (see e.g. HERE), The claim: The star of dawn is the star of the evening. It is what has been considered for some time as two different stars (one is seen in the evening and the other in the morning), but in the end it became clear to us that it is the same star itself. We are now asked: Is this claim an empty claim or definition (analytical theorem)? Does it have any content or is it an empty tautology? Ostensibly such a sentence says nothing, since it is an identity between a thing and itself. But our sense is that there is some novelty in this sentence. It teaches us something about our own concepts. The two stars we thought were different are the same star itself. This sentence changes our knowledge of the world, even though in terms of its objective content it seems like an empty identity.

Note that this is the case for any identity claim of the type: a is b. Assuming this claim is correct, then it actually means: a is a, i.e. an empty tautology. The analytical solution to the problem of the meaning of identity claims is the distinction between meaning and teaching. Analytical philosophers (following Frege) say that according to such an identity there is meaning but not instruction (or color). It has a meaning that is neither empty nor trivial for us, but if you look at what it points to in the world, it is a trivial identity claim.

We can now return to the Othipron dilemma. By the side that God is defining good and evil, it can be argued that the statement that he is good has meaning but not instruction. In terms of its teaching (color) it is empty since it is good by the very definition of good. Everything he would do would leave him under the definition of good, so Amira who is good is empty of content (analytical).

conclusion

But it's hard for me to accept even this mild wording. The simple feeling is that God is indeed supposed to be good, meaning that the claim that he is good is not an empty definition but a claim. If this were not the case, there would be no point in engaging in the goodness of God, and there would be no questions about it from conduct that seems to us immoral (such as the binding of Isaac, the destruction of Amalek, and the like). It should be understood that if what God wants is defined as good then there is no room for moral doubts about it. He commanded to follow Isaac and therefore the binding of Isaac is a good thing. The feeling as if there is a dissonance here between divine commandment and morality points to our starting point that God is good. Just as the existence of an ethical debate indicates the objectivity of ethics (otherwise there would have been nothing to argue about) and the existence of an ethical critique indicates the objectivity of the ethical facts (otherwise there is no room for criticism of unethical attitudes and behaviors).

The conclusion is that simple religious intuition teaches us as the other side of the Othipron dilemma that good is objectively and forcibly defined even by God. That is, God wants things because they are good and not the other way around. Only in this way can it be argued that it is good, and also criticize it (or seek explanations) for instances of misconduct. But as we have seen this approach raises the opposite difficulty, and I will now go on to address it.

Between the laws of physics and the "laws" of logic

This approach raises the opposite theological difficulty. How is it possible that God, who created everything and everything was made by his power, is still subject to an external set of laws that he did not enact? To understand this, we must return to the distinction I have made here in the past between two types of laws (see e.g. column 278). God, of course, is not subject to the laws of physics, for he created them, and the mouth that forbade is the mouth that allowed. He is also not subject to the laws of the state of course (if only because he is not a citizen of it). But on the other hand it is definitely "subject" to the laws of logic. The laws of logic are "forced" on God. He cannot make a round triangle or deviate from logic, simply because there is no such thing as a round triangle and no such animal deviates from logic. A triangle by definition is not round. This is not due to any legislation imposed on the triangle out of necessity, but by its very nature. By its very definition as a triangle it follows that it is not round and cannot be round. Therefore the inability to form a round triangle is not due to an external constraint imposed on Gd, and therefore it is also not a limitation on all its ability, or a disadvantage in it.

An omnipotent creature is capable of doing everything imaginable even in the imagination. But a round triangle is an empty concept. There is no such thing and it is unthinkable. Therefore God's inability to create such a thing is not a disadvantage in His ability. Imagine someone asking you if God can make a round triangle. I would ask him to explain this concept to me first and then maybe I could answer it. He of course will not be able to explain it (does it have sharp angles or not? What is the sum of its angles? Are all the points on it an equal distance from that point?), So the question is self-evident.

As I explained there, what underlies the confusion is the term “law,” which is used in these two contexts in a different sense. The laws of physics are laws that God enacted in the nature of creation. This legislation is his decision to create a particular nature for the world that he created from several different possibilities. He could also have created other laws of nature. In contrast, the laws of logic are not laws in the same sense. The use of the term “law” in the logical context is borrowed. It is simply the definition of things and not something external that is forced upon them. [1]The triangle is not round neither because someone forbids it nor because it is forbidden. By virtue of being a triangle it is simply not round. Therefore it is not correct to say here that God chose one logical system out of several possible systems. There is no other logical system.[2] Henceforth in a context similar to that of the laws of logic I will use the term “law” in quotation marks.

The status of the laws of morality

The question that now arises is the status of the laws of morality: Are these laws in the sense of the laws of physics, or are they "laws" in the sense of the "laws" of logic? Those who advocate the first side of the Othipron dilemma believe that the laws of morality are similar to the laws of physics, and therefore it is God who determines and defines them. The other side of the dilemma, on the other hand, assumes that the "laws" of morality are similar to the "laws" of logic (these are "laws" and not laws), and are therefore forced on God. He could not have created a different system of moral laws. For example, he cannot create a world in which another morality will prevail (that murdering or torturing people will have positive actions). Morality by definition prohibits murder.

He can of course create a world where people will enjoy torture (would it be right in such a world to call them “torture”?), And then there might not be a moral problem in causing suffering. But where causing suffering is not unfortunate. Painting people is a bad thing in any possible world. It is about a realistically different world, i.e. a world where suffering does not cause sorrow. One can also think of a world where the teasing of people is defined as good, but it is not a world with a different morality but a world where people are blind to the rules of morality (and also the God who created it is not moral). You can change any parameter in the nature of the world and create a different world where it will be different. But given the nature of that particular world, the rules of morality are derived from them unequivocally (they are forced upon us). It seems to me that this is what underlies the well-known statement of the Ramchal, "the good nature to do good." Gd by nature should do good. He has no other option (it is forced on him).

This means that the claim "murder is bad" is analytical, just like the law of contradiction. While this is an ethical fact, it is not contingent (but necessary). Therefore there is no impediment to claiming that it is forced (or rather: "forced") on God, just as logic is "forced" on him. This is different from the laws of nature for example. Take as an example the claim of the law of gravity: any two objects with mass attract each other by a force that is proportional to the product of mass and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. This is not an analytical claim, and it can be false. There could have been a world where the law of gravity would be different (e.g. a force that is proportional to the distance in the third). Such a law is therefore devoted to God, and only his own decision has determined its content.

How it fits in with the previous column

In the previous column I argued that there can be no valid morality without God. Does this not contradict my claim here that morality is forced upon God and before him, and therefore also not a product of his will? Apparently there is a frontal contradiction here. Now I understand that this was probably what Jeremy Fogel, the facilitator, meant, who raised the Othipron dilemma in our discussion and asked me my opinion about it.

In the discussion itself I briefly explained that I distinguish between the definition of good and evil and our commitment to them. The definition of good and evil is forced on God and can not be otherwise. Even he can not determine that murder is good, or that helping others is bad. But the commitment to do good and avoid evil does not exist without God. In other words, the normative claim that murder is forbidden, meaning that there is a binding validity to the ethical fact of the murder prohibition, is not forced on God. It is derived from his commandment and is wrought by him.

Returning to the concept of 'ethical facts', we can put it this way: they may exist on their own, as David Enoch claims (i.e. not God created them), but as I argued against him even if they exist and are placed in some corner of the world of ideas (is), It still cannot be binding on me (ought). I will mention that in the previous column I distinguished between the question of who created the ethical facts (in which Enoch dealt) and the question of who gives them validity (in which I dealt). What I have described here is that while God did not create the ethical facts (they are forced upon Him), only His commandment can give them binding force.

One may now ask what obligates God himself in morality? If he is good then he too should be committed to morality (to his categorical order). Is he bound by his own commandment? This is very strange, and in fact also contradicts my claim from the previous column that an external factor is needed that will give de Dicto validity to the law.

I think it would be right to say that God is really not committed to morality, but chooses it. He does not choose what morality is (for it is an absolute and rigid statistic that is not in his hands) but he chooses to please and demand from his creatures moral conduct. This is similar to my claim in the previous column towards Ari Alon, that a person can legislate for himself whether to be moral or not, but he can not legislate the laws of morality themselves (define what is good and what is bad). If so, both man and God are bound by the laws of morality. The definition of good and evil is forced upon them and not given to them. But God can command morality and thus give these definitions binding force towards us, and man can not do that either.[3]

I will now add another tier to the image. It is difficult to talk about a temporary advance of the ethical facts (definitions of good and evil) to God, since he has always existed. Before him there was nothing because there is no time before him. There is not and can not be a world, even an imaginary one, in which God does not exist. But theoretically there may be a world where God does not command to be moral (unless we assume that his good nature forces him to do good and demand benefit). Notice that we have now learned that morality does precede the divine command, but not God. It's about the temporary advance. But to the same extent there is also a substantial forward.

Ethical facts do not rely on divine commandment, nor are they the work of God. But there is still no meaning to the claim that morality exists even without God. Assuming that God is the one whose existence is necessary (and here I am talking about the religious God, and not the "lean" one from the previous column), then it is impossible to speak of a reality in which there is a necessary existence that does not exist. Therefore even if morality (or ethical facts) exists without a commandment it cannot be said that it exists without God. Although even if both exist in parallel, the ethical facts still do not necessarily rely on God.

But now we may be able to arrive at a slightly different definition: the moral facts are a bone of God's self (it is literally "good nature to do good" literally), they exist as he exists, and as he necessarily exists and always they necessarily exist and always. And yet their validity is neither permanent nor necessary. They have no binding force without being commanded to do so.

Between serving God and Asher did not work

In the opening of the column I insisted that the concept of God discussed in this column is not the "lean" God from the previous column (the God required to give validity to moral laws and ethical facts). You will realize this when you review again the various suggestions that have been made here regarding the fact that there is a necessity that always exists, and regarding the fact that the ethical facts are perhaps part of its powers and that it is natural to do good and more. These are all additions that "make" a little "fat" the "thin" and minimalist thing I dealt with in the previous column.

This is because the discussion in the present column takes place entirely in the theological sphere, and not just the meta-ethical one. In fact, the Othipron dilemma itself belongs to the theological sphere. Without theology it would not have been a problem to claim that God defines the laws of morality (because there was no need to assume that the statement that he is good is an argument about him and not a definition), then the dilemma would not have been created. In addition, in the philosophical count also there was no contradiction to my words in the previous column. If God defines good and evil (the ethical facts) then it fits perfectly with what I argued in the previous column, and there was no need for this whole column. My purpose here was to reconcile my meta-ethical claim from the previous column with the God of the theological (Jewish-Christian) plane on whom the assumption is that he is good. This is a clear theological discussion (and not a meta-ethical one).

The Othipron dilemma regarding religious values

Several times in the past I have pointed out the difference between religious values ​​and moral values ​​(see for example a column 15, Beginning of my book Walks between the standing And much more). The solution I propose to the contradictions between halakhah and morality lies in the fact that these are two independent value systems. Act X can be halakhically committed (because it promotes religious value A), but at the same time morally forbidden (because it offends moral value B). Religious values ​​are immoral, and sometimes they can stand in stark contrast to moral values ​​and sometimes only in a state of conflict (when the conflict arises only in certain situations). My contention is that there is no impediment to such contradictions, and in fact it is more correct to say that these are not contradictions (there is no difficulty on the theoretical level in such situations), but conflicts (it is difficult to decide what to do on the practical level).

Following this, Tirgitz asked the following question (bTalkback To the previous column):

This means that in the next column you will also deal with the otter with regard to religious values ​​and other values, which in your opinion are values ​​by virtue of which Gd allows himself to shake off any moral obligation. And this ostensibly means that even God did not enact Himself arbitrarily.

I will explain his question. According to my method, God commands us to have anti-moral precepts in order to promote religious values. If so, Tirgitz argues, it seems that religious values ​​are also forced on him and are not the result of his arbitrary will (his sovereign legislation). If the commandments were not "halakhic facts" imposed on God but were created by His legislation, then He could have enacted them differently. In such a situation I would expect that if he wanted (and inherited) to do good he would not enact laws that run counter to morality. The existence of conflicts indicates that the laws of halakhah (or religious values, which the same laws of halakhah promote) are also forced on Gd, and therefore he is caught (or bullies us) out of necessity to these conflicts.

This is a great question, and I think he is right. Just as there are ethical facts there are also halakhic facts. These and those do not depend on God and are forced upon Him.[4] At the beginning of the third book in the trilogy I was about to compare the Kantian picture of moral behavior as honoring the categorical order with the halakhic picture I offer of doing a mitzvah as honoring the commitment to the commandment. Here we see that this analogy continues.[5]

This brings me to another question by Tirgitz, which was asked a few days earlier (see rolling discussion in the thread HERE). In the moral context it is common to think that in situations of conflict between values, then even if I had a justification to do X and go over Y, there is still a problem that I went over Y. I should feel sorrow or sadness for hurting a person or doing something immoral, even if I had to do this. Tirgitz asked whether such sorrow should also appear in the halakhic context (Q.)spoken: "Sorrow for you and sorrow for me"). That is, should I regret that because I was engaged in a mitzvah I did not shake the lulav (or that because I was sick I did not fast on Yom Kippur), just as I regret that because I went to war I had to kill people (and sometimes civilians as well). In short, his question is whether there is a difference between halakhah and morality in this matter.

I answered him there that I think there is a difference between the contexts: in the moral context even if some value is rejected in front of another value, I should still feel sorrow or dissonance for going over the rejected value (I hurt a person). On the other hand, in halakhah if there is no obligation and I have done what is incumbent on me there is no reason to regret what I have not fulfilled. It is perfectly permissible and no one is harmed.

But this distinction assumes that in halakhah there is only the commandment and when there is no commandment nothing happened. But in light of the picture that emerges here it seems that I need to come back to myself from this distinction. If we assume that the halakhic commandment came to promote religious values, then even if I violated the halakhah justly (because of another halakhah that rejected it), still something in the spiritual world was harmed by it (I acted contrary to the halakhic fact and brought spiritual harm). It seems that the picture I have presented here shows that there is really no difference between halakhah and morality in this matter.[6]

Although on further thought it can be argued that in theory if I did something allowed then the spiritual damage was also avoided (see Articles On citric acid on Passover, where I brought sources that write so). It can be said that Gd works a miracle and prevents the damage so that there will be no mishap by a righteous person like me who is faithful to the law. This of course does not happen on the moral plane. There even if I had to hurt moral value, the damage is inevitable. The difference stems from the fact that in the moral context these are physical facts and in the halakhic context these are spiritual facts. God does not change physics because he does not interfere in the conduct of the physical world, but he does change the spiritual facts (because in the spiritual world he does interfere. There it is not mechanically conducted)[7]. It is important to note that while as we have seen ethical facts are not physical facts, they are dependent on physical facts (harm or suffering to a person for example). For example, if I stole money from someone to save a life, then even if it is allowed and maybe even a mitzvah, the damage to the thief happened and there is no reason to regret it (here it will not happen a miracle that God will return the money to him).

The implication will be for cases as I described in the previous column, where the categorical order tells me that I must not do an X even though it has no negative result. In such cases it seems that if the thing is rejected for another value there is nothing to regret. This is similar to the situation in the halakhic sphere. For example, suppose I raise a thousand NIS tax to save a person's life. In such a case I have nothing to regret about tax evasion as it has no negative result (I explained this in the previous column). Beyond the problematic result that does not exist, what is here is only a transgression of the categorical order, but this of course was justified in these circumstances. In fact, it is more accurate to say that I did not violate the categorical order at all in such a situation. General law says that everyone should evade tax in order to save a life.

[1] In the previous column I explained why the law of contradiction as a logical-analytical claim does not require justification. This is the same idea from a slightly different angle.

[2] Think about the question of whether God can create a wall that is resistant to all the bullets and also a bullet that penetrates all the walls. The answer to this is negative of course, because if the ball he created penetrates all the walls then there is no wall that is resistant to it, and therefore there is no wall that is resistant to all the balls, and vice versa. The inability of God to create two such objects simultaneously does not impair his ability. Simply on the logical level there is no such reality. See HERE Implications for the stone question that God can not lift, andHERE On the question of natural evil (see also the second book in my trilogy in the tenth chapter).

[3] The conclusion is that his good (whistling) is different from ours. He does not have binding laws that he obeys, but he is the one who gives them validity. The person is bound by the categorical order whose validity is given to him, and therefore a decision must be made to act in accordance with it. God, on the other hand, is not committed, but chooses to give it validity. Ramchal will say that his nature is to do good.

[4] At the beginning of a column 278  I have discussed the concept of nehma dhakisufa, and it seems to me that the discussion there also answers this question.

[5] See articles on the categorical order in halakhah, which shows a continuation of the analogy between halakhah and morality, but this time it concerns content and not the logical structure. There I argue that the categorical order has halakhic status.

[6] I will bring up here an initial thought that still requires incandescence. I think there is some difference after all. In the moral context there is the commitment to moral values, but in halakhah there is both the commitment to religious values ​​and the obligation to obey an order by virtue of being a divine order (regardless of the fact that it also promotes religious values). The assumption here is that in morality there is no divine commandment but only a divine will that we act in this way. The categorical order does not have the status of a mitzvah within the framework of halakhah (although I claim it has halakhic status. See my articles HERE).

It follows that when I do not fast on Yom Kippur because I am ill, the dimension of the commandment really does not exist, since the commandment in such a situation is to eat and not to fast. So from this eating no harm has happened and there is nothing to regret. On the other hand, in the moral context, even if some value is rightly rejected, the moral obligation to maintain it remains the same (except that it cannot be obeyed. In fact, I argue that in a moral conflict it is always 'rejected' and not 'allowed'). But in halakhah there is also the consequential dimension (the correction created from the mitzvah and the spoilage from the transgression), and in this respect there seems to be a resemblance to what we have seen in the moral context. It has to do with the distinction between the existence of de dicto and the existence of de re, and so on.

[7] See note on bArticles On the Punishment of Halacha in Chapter D, where I came out against mechanistic approaches in the punishments of heaven.

80 Thoughts on “A Look at the Othipron Dilemma in the Light of Debate (Column 457)”

  1. A midwife regrets that she was prevented from fasting on Yom Kippur. In terms of the commandment it is completely covered - it is exempt. Conversely, the commandment to supervise soul and soul passes greater. But she is sorry, even though she knows full well that her mitzvah at the moment is to eat, because she has not been fasted. She lacks the day of fasting, purification and atonement. Will you dismiss these feelings as Afra Daraa, and dismiss it on the pretext of 'psychology' - arguments you do not consider? Or is there another material here that in a way resembles the grief of the moral miss?

    1. I fully understand this grief, and I also think it certainly has a place. What I have discussed is the question of whether there is an interest / obligation (not halakhic) to regret. In short, I am dealing with the normative rather than the psychological level. If people lost a football game they are sorry, then would not you be a priestess as an innkeeper ?!

        1. Not to the same extent, if at all. According to what I wrote in the column, assuming that Gd prevents the spiritual damage if someone acted lawfully, then nothing happened. And if he regrets his loss (loss of experience) - this is of course his right but it does not necessarily have value. Maybe it expresses a kind of Yarosh since sorrow shows that things are important to him. But moral grief is something beyond the expression that value is important to him. The claim that something problematic really happened here, except that I am not guilty. In the halakhic context nothing problematic happened. At most you lost an experience.

  2. I think there is no evidence from the fact that there are moral questions about God that morality is forced upon him.
    These questions only assume that God chose the command of morality as a supreme principle, and therefore ask how he might contradict himself

    1. Sharpener - the question is clarifying and not conflicting. That is, it is clear to her that there is a moral justification for this, since she assumes that morality is the overriding principle that the stomach has chosen.

      1. I did not think she collided. Besides, if she's good, then motivation is not important. But I think you are missing the melody of these questions: you present them as logical questions (about its coherence), but these questions are ethical. It is as if Abraham who commanded to obey his son would only wonder about the consistency of Gd who promised that Isaac would call him a seed, and ignore the question of how Gd might command such a thing. To you these two are similar logical questions. That is not what the poets mean.

  3. As for Tirgitz's question - this is really a good question, because the feeling is that Halacha is different from the moral duties (just as Maimonides divides between mental and auditory commandments, etc.). One way to explain this is that Gd is subject to a whole spiritual set that we have no attainment of - and then the question will naturally also be asked - if Gd is subject to such a ramified set of laws, then ostensibly this set of laws is a higher being, a kind of Spinoza God Not personal and indifferent, but in a "natural" non-physical world. It seems to me that the question of God's subordination to laws is very weak to non-existent in the matter of logical laws, as you explained (that they are not "laws"), and is a little stronger in the matter of moral laws, because you have argued - a little narrowly but a claim I can accept - that they are necessary in the same way. But when it comes to halakhic laws it's a little harder to accept, in my opinion. Because their necessity involves creating a world where they are necessary, seemingly, and on the face of it it seems unnecessary (the argument is that they are necessary at the highest possible level, but still impossible to understand them - which is a big urgency, unless the world was created together with these laws Difficulty to suppress). This is also true of the laws of morality ("" Cause pain is bad "is a claim that is only relevant to the world where there is pain - and the big question is why God created pain in the world and not why he said it should not cause pain), and yet somehow it seems stronger in the world I went where the rules seem more arbitrary. In any case, it places God in a world that preceded him and that he has no control over. By the way, there is another theoretical possibility to deal with this question, which I do not know what I think about - to say that God could choose a world where only the laws of morality are relevant as a human duty, and he could choose a world where these laws themselves are rejected against other values. Their can be anything and is subject to his choice. And he chose the second option because without such a situation, we would hardly look at these laws, they were self-evident (as Maimonides writes about the tree of knowledge and doc). According to this possibility - the existence of a halakhic world that contradicts the laws of morality is sometimes justified for some external reason, not necessary, and does not require a whole world of rules to which God is subject. On the other hand, as mentioned, the very decision to create such a world can seem dubious.

    1. I did not understand the claim. I will only comment on two points in your remarks (which I hope I understood):
      1. The laws do not apply. The definition of good and evil is not necessarily there but perhaps a fact. Therefore there is nothing to talk about the question of whether they are higher than God or not.
      2. The laws of morality are also laws only in our world. If another world had been created that was entirely different with beings built entirely differently (they had no sorrow and suffering), then other laws would have applied to it. But if they were moral laws then these were applications of those moral laws of ours to those circumstances. This is exactly what you described about the halakhah, so there seems to be no difference.

  4. “Every identity claim of the type: a is b. Assuming this claim is correct, then it actually means: a is a, meaning an empty tautology. ” - I have a hard time finding the problem here. Assuming that this claim is correct, it is logically equivalent to claim A = A, but also to claim 1 + 1 = 2 and to any other correct claim. If the meaning of the sentence is the information it adds, then no sentence has "meaning assuming it is true." If we assume / know that it is true, then to say again that it is true does not add information to us, and therefore not significant.

  5. B.S.D.

    The beautiful Uthron dilemma is for idols, who are completely unclear to what extent they are identified with morality. Rather, according to mythological stories it is clear that they are full of envy and power.

    In contrast, the God of Israel is the source of truth and the source of good. He is not 'subject' to morality and truth. He is the truth and morality in their perfect purity. We as creators that our knowledge is a small crumb. We know a little by our senses, our senses and our study, but what we know is a tiny crumb from the complete picture, which only the Creator of the world knows in its entirety and only he knows its purpose.

    Our moral difficulties about the ways of the Creator are like the difficulties of the child who does not understand why his father beats his hand when he just tried to stick a hammer in an electrical outlet, and does not understand why his father was handed over to the cruel bunch of white pebbles pulling out their knives and tearing the unfortunate boy's flesh.

    As for the human parents, we have already been privileged to understand that the blow to the hand comes to save the child from being electrocuted, and the 'pullers of the knives in white robes' perform a life-saving operation on the child. All the more so as the actions of the Creator of the world, who took humanity hundreds of years of research to understand a little of their depth - that we are allowed to give some 'credit' to our Creator, that the suffering and torment he brings us is also good for us, to prepare us in the corridor. 'Lounge', and let us know with our hearts' that when a father torments his son the 'Elkich torments you'

    Regards, Othipron Nefshatim Halevi

    1. 'Your father's morals' and 'your mother's teachings' - accepting a yoke or understanding and identification?

      If the Creator has a complete identity between his will and the objective good, man can have a gap between his sense of what is good and what is right and the instructions he receives from his Creator. And this gap is not only 'possible' but necessary, but it is reduced as long as the person deepens and understands more the will of Kono.

      On the face of it, one could be content with accepting a yoke out of the certainty that the Creator of the world is acting in judgment even if man does not understand, but that is not enough. For the person should be not only a 'slave' loyal to Kono, but also a 'student' who knows how to decipher Kono's will even in situations for which he has not received explicit instructions.

      For 'slave' it is enough to dictate 'do so' or 'do so'. He will not take a step without receiving explicit instruction, but in order to be a 'student' who knows how to direct the will of his rabbi even when it is necessary to 'understand something from something', there must be an understanding of the meaning of things, by which he can apply the principles.

      To this end, a written Torah was given that was dictated from above by the word 'engraved on the tablets', but must also be 'oral Torah' which seeks to understand the taste and logic of Torah laws, and from understanding the depth of Torah laws - one can absorb the spirit of things .

      By the oral Torah which clarifies the law of freedom - man is freed from the 'dilemma of' Yifron ', since the will of the Creator which began as' receiving an external yoke' - becomes more and more the 'Torah Delia' with which he understands and identifies.

      Sincerely, Enoch Hanach Feinschmeker-Felti

      1. "But when sin [man in the tree of knowledge] is punished by being deprived of the same intellectual attainment… and therefore it is said 'and you were as God knowing good and evil' and not saying 'knowers of lies and truth' or 'achievers of lies and truth'.
        And in necessary things there is no good and bad at all but lies and truth ”(Mon., Part I, P.B.)
        Maybe Maimonides here is also talking about ethical facts and obviates the Eitipron dilemma?

          1. Thanks for the reference, I read, I may not have understood, but I did not see a problem with Maimonides' words.
            It seems to me that the sentence should be divided into two:

            "And you were like a God who knows good and evil" - this is about the awareness that has developed in you for celebrities, handsome and obscene, for better or worse. So now morality also seems to you good and bad.

            "And [the verse] did not say a lie and truth or those who attain falsehood and truth, and in necessary things there is no good and evil at all but a lie and truth" - here Maimonides means morality. That is, in this sense you have distanced yourself from God and lost the intellectual capacity you previously had to perceive morality in a factual-divine category that is truth and falsehood.

            It should be read as a question and an answer - and why did not the verse say "lie and truth"? Answer - because you lost it. But you will know that really, with God, necessary things (morality) are not good and bad but false and true. And here the dilemma of Eitipron is superfluous.

            1. I no longer remember the exact wording, but I realized it was only about politeness and not morality. In any case, even if you are right that there is some statement in Maimonides that does not obviate the dilemma of Eitipron. At most you could argue that Maimonides had his own position on the dilemma.

      2. Morality-compassion or morality-deterrence?

        In SD ACH Tov in Adash XNUMX

        The contrasts are not between 'religion' and 'morality' but between 'morality of compassion' and 'morality of deterrence'. Detersh, on the other hand, has the morality of deterrence to bring on the sinner a cruel revenge that will take out of the future sinner all the 'oh amen' of the recurrence of the crime.

        Here we need the 'divine order' that will give the right dose that will bring about a balance between the need for significant deterrence and the divine desire to have mercy and allow for correction.

        Thus, for example, deterrence requires eradicating from the root the peoples who developed an ideology of hatred and evil - Amalek and the people of Canaan - and on the other hand compassion requires calling them first to peace and allowing them escape by 'changing direction' by accepting the basic values ​​of faith and morality.

        Regards, Hasdai Bezalel Kirshan-Kwas Cherries

  6. Raised marble round triangle. It is something that maintains all the properties of the triangle and also all the properties of the circle.
    Something that is a round triangle is both circular and made of three straight lines.

    While this contradicts everyday logic, fortunately reality does not dance to the sounds of our logic. Otherwise, we would not exist.

  7. I do not think that the picture you described shows that religious values ​​are forced on God. By virtue of being what he is, he himself is an authority that can determine that certain religious values ​​(which he created) are important enough to reject the values ​​of morality. The fact that moral values ​​are binding does not necessarily mean that they are first in the list of priorities.

    1. It seems to me that you did not understand my (or Tirgitz's) argument. Assuming that religious values ​​are in his hands meaning that he can determine them as he pleases, there is no reason in the world to determine a religious value that contradicts morality. Why do this if he can determine the religious value in a way that suits morality? It follows that religious values ​​are also not in his hands.

      1. If so I really did not understand before, but even that does not come to mind in my opinion, for two reasons:

        1. It may not be possible to create a religious system that is completely compatible with morality (as your saying about the creation of a world without evil). This does not mean that she is forced on him, since he can give it up completely, in contrast to the situation with morality. But assuming he wants one for some reason, it must clash with certain moral values. He probably chose the one that comes true the least, and this also explains the significant correlation between Torah values ​​and moral values.

        2. God can compensate, in this world or the next, anyone who is morally harmed as a result of the existence of a Torah value. He can make sure that in the overall summary his degree of happiness will be just as it should have been without the Torah value.

        1. 1. So that means it's forced on him. If he sets the system as he pleases there is no constraint then what prevents conformity to morality?
          2. That he can compensate for a shift may be true. But there is no reason in the world to do so. He can set these values ​​to suit morality.

          1. 1. He sets the system as he pleases, but this does not mean that there is in the space of possibilities a system of religious values ​​with 0 violation of morality. He can not establish any religious system, or choose from those that harm morality the least.

            As he could choose not to create a world, but (perhaps) could not create a world with all the benefits of this world but with 0 evil. This does not mean that the creation of the world is forced on him, but that if he wants (!) To create a world with free choice then there will also be evil in it.

            1. Do not understand this insistence.
              If there is no restriction not dependent on him, what prevents him from not determining that a Cohen wife who was raped should be separated from her husband? He could have determined the opposite (give us Torah without this detail). What constraint prevents him from doing so? In the context of evil, I explained that rigid laws of nature may not exist without points of suffering and evil. There is no other system. But systems of religious laws have no constraints on them. They are arbitrary. So what in the religious context prevents him from determining only fourteen commandments without Cohen's wife?

  8. [You did what is not a winner as a winner. I just felt something vague (and it came out of your words to me too) and not in the sharp way you specified it]

    The picture shows that there is no difference between halakhah and morality when it comes to conflicts, but after all, all human beings recognize this difference and it is appropriate to take their intuition in half. Even if one regrets the loss of a person who did not gain the mitzvah or the special feeling that accompanies its existence, I have never heard a person regret having to go through a lau because of rejection (substantial rejection such as shatanz in tassel or yibum, In the case of Madin, there is a substantial rejection, and this is ostensibly Tza'a), and in morality, normal people also regret that they have violated a moral law, such as refraining from rescuing a kosher gentile on Shabbat.

    So you explained it with a theory that in halakhah God is repairing the spiritual damages and in morality is not repairing the physical damages. But how does it answer, then if there is no moral imperative then what do people care about the physical harm? Are they (and I in general) just wrong and there is no normative tension here but just a feeling of ignorance?
    To explain one should ostensibly add that forever until the commandments remain and even when they are rejected then every single commandment remains in place. That is to say that the commandment is not the practical instruction "Now do so" but the principled instruction, and instead of a conflict there is really a commandment here and a commandment here and therefore also instead of conflict and explicit decision there is a problem. (Except that ostensibly there is no need to arrive at any spiritual facts at all).
    And this is basically what Raqa says (indeed it is written in necessity and renewal in the campaign for the celebration as you referred me. I did not study the campaign but only saw that he says that if someone blows the shofar on Rosh Hashanah which falls on Shabbat In fact but the principle. I * really * do not understand this thing, can you explain it to me? (In the answer there you wrote that you really think so). This commandment is practical instruction, I do not see any meaning in saying that on the one hand I commandment A and on the other hand I commandment B and in fact I commandment B.

    1. Do not understand why you do not see sorrow for the loss of a mitzvah. Of course it belongs. Like someone who is not a mother in law because he is sick. And the stories are known about the rabbis who reassure him and tell him that it is his duty in his situation. Beyond that, in doing repulsive lao it is a normal situation and people have become accustomed to it. For example in a tassel of wool and linen, no one remembers that there is a shatnaz. But in a patient in the USSR it is a rare condition and so sorry.
      Of course people care about the physical harm and grief of others. What does it belong to that I acted properly. And that if a person suffers due to natural disasters I do not regret it. So when I'm guilty of it (even if rightly so) I'm sure I'm sorry. Fuck Hezi people in an accident who are not to blame for it, and even the damage itself is to blame, how much grief they have for the damage they caused.
      I no longer remember my words you quote that the commandment exists, but I wrote about it extensively in the third book in a Talmudic logic series. The whole itself of the book is devoted to the distinction between the commandment and the practical teaching. A commandment is a kind of reality, and practical instruction is only a derivative of it. A very halakhic fact. You just reminded me of that.

      1. The "quote" from your words was in the answer in the thread there when I tried to conclude from the RAA that the commandment is not just God's word (if only God's word then does not belong to a mitzvah in a situation where God ultimately actually commands not to do and even forbids to do). And you replied, "I agree with an analysis that sees the basis in the perception of the mitzvos as a kind of reality and not just the existence of the word of God." I may not have understood your intention there correctly, but in my eyes the words of RAA are still completely incomprehensible. If you help me understand this idea I would be very grateful.
        As for grief, it seems to me that there is a difference between a mistake of people out of habit (traditional versus halakhic from the books) and a real basis, for they are sorry only for not stepping on their heels and not sorry for tassel and baboon even if they are reminded. But I make that point.
        And the main thing - if morality is binding only because of the imperative then where there is an anti-moral imperative there is no shred of normative problem even to harm a thousand damages. What is the answer to the fact that people feel conflict and also turn it in front of God as you described in the column? Your answer is as far as I understand it is a mistake and indeed there is no normative problem at all to harm when God has withdrawn His moral commandment to refrain from harming. And the theory of repairing spiritual damage versus not repairing physical damage is only meant to explain people's feelings and not to justify them. is that so?

        1. This can be understood through my suggestion on the spiritual benefits. These stand out even when I have no obligation to do the deed that brings them. But of course the benefit alone is not enough to define a mitzvah. Metaphorically I would say that the commandment also exists forever. But sometimes it has to be passed because of another commandment.
          An example of a thing she did was that time caused women. The consent of almost all the arbitrators that there is value in doing it, and most of them even consider it an existential mitzvah (Rabbi Brish means that Safra writes that it rejects no). But in terms of God's commandment women are exempt. Do not have to do this, so what mitzvah is there if they did anyway?

          I think there is a normative problem of harm and the grief is real and not just psychological. Moral Damages Unlike Spiritual God does not erase even if you did what you needed to.

          1. The metaphor that the commandment exists forever but must be passed over illustrates the problematic. This is possible when the source of the attack is from silent spiritual facts in the corner and does not seem possible when the mitzvah is an intelligent being who has to tell me what she wants me to do. In doing so, you liken the commandment of authority to the shofar in Gd on Shabbat, where Gd actually forbids me to poke (commands me to obey the sages. I admit that it is difficult to define the division, but otherwise it seems to exist. To say that I am doing the commandments of God while I rebelled against him and blew the shofar in spite of his glorious eyes despite the prohibition is a strange thing. MM If so he will meditate on it (by the way it is interesting to compare to the next mitzvah in the offense and the discussion you brought on R. Asher Weiss, I will also meditate on this. And a pork flavor is swallowed in it in a way that forbids from Dauriyta perhaps also Raqa admits that there is no commandment to eat)

            I did not understand what normative problem should be harmed if in the case in question there is no commandment from Gd that forbids harming this specific harm. In other words, you mean that even in the morality of the commandment not to harm remains existing but must be passed over. If the commandment is an intelligent entity that knows everything and decides what to do with the team then this matter is not perceived by me as above. As stated I will ponder this, perhaps I have suffered from square analytism.

            1. Regarding the prohibition of Dauriyta and mitzvah, a better example of a sacrifice made prey (whether the food in the prohibition as food remains and there is no mitzvah or whether there is also a mitzvah and also committed an offense) is the trouble of the daughter to the brothers. Beit Hillel forbids and the child bastard. Is it possible that in their opinion, even those who mourn the plight of the daughter fulfill the mitzvah of mourning ?! (It is possible to divide between rules within the mitzvah and between rules in different mitzvos. But the whole point is that it seems to me exactly the same)

            2. There are spiritual facts, as I wrote in the column. But they have no validity unless there is a body that legislates them and / or commands them.
              There is no difference in our case between prohibition and lack of obligation. You yourself admit it, then barely make it difficult. I'm amazed!

              1. What do you think tends in the first instance, that the words of Raqa are also in any lau Dauriyta that is not rejected because of some deed if there is the deed and transgressed the lao won a mitzvah and went out of duty, or his words only in the Durban prohibition that cancels the Dauriyta mitzvah?

  9. No need for opinions and intelligent first. It seems to me that there is evidence of this from the fact that the next mitzvah in the offense is invalidated. And already the first insisted on the difference between this rule and made a repulsive no. In any case, in most cases, when the law is not rejected for some reason (for example, it is not simultaneous), it is a situation of the Supreme Court.
    In your opinion, there is no need for a verse for this, since the situation itself has no value for such a mitzvah. But the Gemara learns this from "he who hates a robber who ascends." Moreover, according to Thos.

    1. I commented above on the next mitzvah in the offense but I only thought of the example of a looted sukkah where the act of the mitzvah is not an offense (and there is your discussion on the words of R. Asher Weiss and Ezal). Now I saw in Wikipedia an example of eating a matzah dipped in Pesach and they claim there (I did not check the source) that they do not go out of their way to perform matzah and do not observe matzah matzah. And this indeed proves as you say (perhaps only if it is there when he has no other matzah and therefore it is clear that Gd forbids him to eat the matzah of baptism).
      Without a verse we would not know what is increasing, that is, what God actually commands, perhaps in dipped matzah he commands yes to eating if there is no other matzah. I do not know the matter but robbery in the alleged immigrant The novelty is even after the robber has bought and his immigrant for all intents and purposes and is allowed to eat it for appetite is still not worthy of the altar. [Besides, the idea of ​​proving that otherwise "there is no need for a verse" is quite dubious and especially in light of the column on a verse that teaches the opposite, because we have opinions here and there and I of course admit that RAKA said his words and you even think his words are acceptable I have a problem thinking that you need a verse to get out of this explanation]

      In any case, suppose as you say it turns out that whoever eats dipped matzah does not observe the matzah commandment at all and has violated the prohibition of dipping. But whoever blew the shofar in the Bar on Shabbat for the Ra'akah did have a commandment to blow and went through Shabbat Durban.
      This means that in rules of rejection within the Torah the mitzvah “itself” is defined only for situations in which it is not rejected. But in the rules of rejection from Durban the mitzvah Dauriyta “remains” except that in fact it is forbidden to keep it and like the metaphor that the commandment exists forever but sometimes it has to be broken.

  10. As for your suggestion that religious law, or at least its underlying values, derive from independent facts imposed on God - it seems to me that instead of renewing another dimension that binds God, the resulting theological difficulties, this can be put on the idea of ​​high need for human training. In order to maximize the training and choice of man, "God has a lot of Torah and mitzvos" for them, even those who are in conflict with morality. I remember you wrote in one of the columns that it is precisely the multiplicity of values ​​that gives more meaning to the choice, since there are more possible combinations between the values.

    1. What I call religious value you call human training. So how is it different? Do you mean to say that there are no goals at all in the object other than the completion of the man? It follows that all the laws are completely arbitrary (he could have chosen other and even opposite laws). But then Tirgitz's argument returns, why are there cases in which he has ruled against morality.

  11. You write that religious values ​​are forced on Gd, yet in the event of a conflict between religious values ​​it works a miracle and prevents the religious damage caused by committing a past. If I did not understand how religious values ​​are forced on him - then he can cancel them whenever he wants. And if he does not want to interfere with nature (even religious nature), why does he interfere in cases of conflict between religious values?

  12. Regarding what you wrote here ”
    "Although on further thought it can be argued that in theory if I did something allowed then the spiritual damage was also avoided. It can be said that Gd works a miracle and prevents the damage so that there will be no mishap by a righteous person like me who is faithful to the law. ”
    If so, why would he not always do miracles to prevent all the spiritual damage that people do, whether they do something allowed or not?

      1. The world will indeed depend on our actions, only the spiritual damage does not depend on our actions, because there according to what you have written it tends to intervene. And beyond that, if God also wants the spiritual damage to depend on our actions, then why in the case of someone who has done something is allowed to intervene to prevent the spiritual damage? After all, it is clothing for his policy that the world will be dependent on our actions.

  13. Regarding what you wrote in this paragraph:
    “I will explain his question. According to my method, God commands us to have anti-moral precepts in order to promote religious values. If so, Tirgitz argues, it seems that religious values ​​are also forced on him and are not the result of his arbitrary will (his sovereign legislation). If the commandments were not "halakhic facts" imposed on God but were created by His legislation, then He could have enacted them differently. In such a situation I would expect that if he wanted (and inherited) to do good he would not enact laws that run counter to morality. The existence of conflicts indicates that the laws of halakhah (or religious values, which the same laws of halakhah promote) are also forced on God, and therefore he is caught (or bullies us) out of necessity to these conflicts. "

    It means from your words that all the mitzvos and laws of Halacha are forced on Gd, but from your argument this can be deduced only with regard to the laws and mitzvos that are contrary to morality. A commandment like reciting Shema does not stand in opposition to morality and therefore it is not necessary that it is forced on Gd or that it is a halakhic fact.

    Beyond that, it is possible that even in cases where God commands something that is seemingly immoral, it is to prevent a greater moral injustice. For example, the matter of the victims. Apparently God commands killing animals unnecessarily. But it is possible that without this commandment, people would have completely rejected religion because it would not have contained an important component in the religious life that preceded the giving of Torah. That is, the transition to the Jewish religion was too sharp and it would have jeopardized this transition from happening.

    In addition, it is possible that God sometimes prioritizes His will (which is not forced upon him) as something more important than moral harm to His creatures. For example, let us take God's desire to be rewarded. If for this purpose he sometimes has to harm someone from his creatures, he may be willing to do so to promote that desire, and even though he could give up that desire at some point, he still prioritizes it as something more important than moral harm. That is, it is possible that even commandments that are contrary to morality are not forced upon him and are not halakhic facts, and yet he chooses to command them because it is more important to him than the moral harm. And if you say that this is an immoral choice and is contrary to the assumption that God is always moral, I will answer that God should also be moral towards himself. That is, when he gives up his will, there is an injury to himself (a kind of consideration of your predecessor life).

    1. Indeed, the argument deals only with anti-moral laws.
      As for the victims, I did not understand the question. You totally offer an explanation of the commandments of the sacrifices. Okay. And if you mean that this is an indirect moral explanation, in my opinion it is unlikely.
      When you say that something is better in his eyes, it means that he has some objective goal that is not just the result of God's arbitrary will.

      1. As for the sacrifices, I meant that there are commandments that seem to us anti-moral, but in fact in their depth they promote morality. We just do not understand how or why but there may be a deep explanation behind them that contributes to the promotion of morality (not all anti-moral commandments are necessarily so, but at least some of them may be).

        As for priority in his eyes, I mean the "personal" desires and desires of God. That is, not something that is forced upon him from without, but his inner will. I am not sure that the term arbitrary is appropriate here regarding the will of God. Just as someone's desire to be a certified chess player is not called an arbitrary desire (nor is it forced upon him from the outside). It is a personal desire. Maybe God wants to "be a certified chess player" in a certain field, and for that he is willing to sacrifice moral harm to certain people sometimes.

          1. I'm not talking about the threatened personalities themselves. I say that there may be some will of God, that although it is not forced upon him from without (halakhic fact), it is still more important to him than a moral injury to his creatures, and therefore he commands it.

            1. If it is not forced upon him and there is nothing objective that dictates it then it is his arbitrary decision, and the draa kushya to the duchy. Either it is arbitrary or it is forced (in the sense that moral values ​​are forced on us. Their validity is forced, not the conduct according to them). I do not see a third possibility.

                  1. There is the matter of the secret of the work a high need and the desire of God to pay. In both, God needs us to achieve these goals. In order to achieve these goals, it is inevitable that someone will be morally harmed. Just as humans do animal experiments for medical purposes, it is possible that Gd uses us even if sometimes it harms us, for His needs.

                    1. Why it will inevitably be forced upon him. He may choose it. After all, all the necessity to say that it is forced on him comes from the explanation that God will not choose something immoral. But I have given an example that where it is necessary, human beings also choose something immoral for their own sake and rightly so (medical experiments in animals)

        1. So why should one come to halakhic facts that are forced on Gd. It can be said that there is a moral fact that says that instead of a conflict between God's need and moral harm to human beings, there is a moral fact that says that it is better to harm human beings than to compromise God's need.

          1. God's need is also forced upon him, or is not necessary and does not justify a rejection of moral values.
            In my opinion there is no way out of this: either forced or arbitrary. And arbitrary does not reject morality. Each time you come from a different direction but the answer is the same. The blanket is short, you can cover your legs or head but not both.

              1. It does not matter. There are still things forced on him. But beyond that, this need is a fact that creates OUGHT. The argument is that the laws are forced upon him like the values ​​of morality. It does not seem to me important whether it is coercion through facts and needs or directly. I still think these are values, but why is it important ?!

                1. This is what I argued in the response before. That the fact of this need creates ought, but it is ought from the realm of morality and not from the realm of halakhic or otherwise. Just as experiments on animals and not on humans are morally ought and I did not go.

                    1. What I meant was that God commands anti-moral commandments out of some need that exists in Him. But before he commands he is in a dilemma whether to prioritize his need, or to avoid moral harm to human beings. This dilemma lies in the moral sphere. Just as the dilemma of whether to do experiments on humans or animals is in the moral sphere.

  14. So there is a religious value (which you choose to call a necessity) that is forced upon it, and only the decision in the dilemma between it and morality is an ethical decision. Suppose you are right, then what? Where's the argument? Beyond that, in my opinion the decision between a religious value or a need and a moral value is itself not on the moral level.

    1. To the best of my knowledge, Rabbi Michi claims this:
      A. God wants the good because he is good
      B. A religious order is not the same as a moral order
      third. In a conflict between a religious order and a moral order, the moral order must sometimes be chosen
      Why not claim that the conflict is only imaginary (as is the approach of Rabbi Lichtenstein and in favor of the prevailing attitude in the religious districts)?
      D. It is my understanding that it necessarily follows that the religious order is forced on God as well, otherwise why does he command contrary to morality?
      What remains to be understood is why are we allowed to choose the moral order in the event of a conflict, since God chose the religious order in that conflict?
      A possible solution is that the religious order was given by God, but has since froze on his guard, and we assume that in the given reality he was not a mitzvah, and therefore choose the moral order.
      All this according to the method of the genius of our son, the Ramad Shlita, is faithful to his method that does not recognize the choices of God's will (and see the science of freedom). And doc and il.

        1. This means that there is no identity between halakhah and morality. [1] These are two categories that are in principle independent (although there is not always a contradiction between them of course). Judging whether an act is moral or not, and judging whether it is permissible or forbidden halakhically are two different and almost independent judgments. The halakhic and moral category are two different categories. Of course in cases where there is a conflict between the moral and halakhic teaching then it has to be decided in some way (and this is not always in favor of halakhah), but the very existence of a conflict is not problematic in itself. There are such conflicts also between two moral values ​​(as in the example of saving a life by causing pain), and there is no denying that there will also be a halakhic value and a moral value

          Quote from column 15. and your remarks on gays in an interview with London. Are not teachers who sometimes do not keep the religious order? Can you please explain the difference to me?

          1. I dealt with this at the beginning of the third book in the trilogy. In short, when there is a substantial conflict the law always prevails. For example, from the Amalekite. The Torah itself took into account the moral price and yet commanded it. But when the conflict is accidental, like mind control and Shabbat, there it is impossible to exclude from the very commandment on Shabbat that it rejects Pikun or vice versa. In such situations you have to make a decision for yourself.
            And all this when the commandment is clear in the Torah. If it is the result of an interpretation or a sermon then the doubt enters here that this rule is incorrect.

  15. I used to mention in discussions of opposite tendencies in Judaism, that your opinion is that in this case morality should be chosen over the Torah, as opposed to Rabbi Riskin who does okimata in the Torah, and traditional rabbis who do okimata in morality. And the custom of Israel Torah.
    Just, I'm really happy for you to make my opinion clear. In the case of an explicit Daurite halakhah that is in conflict with morality, is there a place to choose morality? And what about Halacha Durban? Has Okimata been made into Dauriyta halakhah in a way that does not contradict morality, even contrary to halakhic tradition?

  16. An innocent question. The fact that there is a valid morality (divine, for example) - where is this morality registered? Do we infer from our intuition that murder and theft should not be allowed? That is, if it is something learned from human intuition or traditional social conventions, then it no longer belongs to force a person who has not accepted that intuition. And if it is somehow related to the Torah, then again it is a written divine law, and where is the distinction between the Torah and morality?

    1. It is written on the tablet of our hearts. The Torah teaches us and you have done right and good, but does not specify to us what is meant. She assumes that everyone understands what the moral order means (it is written on the tablet of his heart). The content of morality is learned from moral intuition, but the duty to follow it is by virtue of the divine will. As I explained in the column. If there is a person who does not have this intuition it is a sick person and there is nothing to do with it. Just like there is nothing to do with a blind person who does not see.
      The difference between halakhah and morality is in the commandment. The commandments in the Torah deal only with Halacha, and morality is not under commandment. It is a divine will without a commandment and therefore it remains outside the law. Therefore also its content does not appear in the Torah but within us. On the other hand, in Halacha the contents are also written in the Torah. Therefore, "and you did what was right and good" was not included in the numerator of the mitzvos in any of the masses.

      1. That is, there is an assumption that "honesty and goodness" is something that every human being understands in his basic intuition, that is, the things we accept as murder and rape, but the same question you asked atheists - what would you say about a mercenary who thinks his work ethic is murder. Proof that there is an external moral system to man, divine, but again, this system does not interpret what is included in its "righteousness and goodness," and again we will ask you what you would say about a mercenary who believes that murder is righteousness and goodness. In short, I would love to hone what problem you are solving with the assumption that morality needs God.

        1. You mix planes. I asked a question not about someone who does not understand that murder is forbidden but someone who understands that it is forbidden but does not feel a commitment to it. This is a completely different question. He who does not understand is blind. What do I have to tell him? Which means for the blind who do not see reality and deny the existence of colors for example.
          What I asked them is what is for them the source of validity for morality and not what the laws of morality say.
          Without God I too, for feeling the validity of the laws of morality, would not have been bound by them. I would dismiss this feeling as an illusion understood in me that it has no real validity. Only God can give it validity.

          1. I understood. You are basically saying that what is included in morality - it is known to every human being, it is inherent in us that murder and rape are immoral. And you are also basically arguing that this morality at its core must be acceptable to everyone, despite the changes of cultures and periods. The difference between an atheist and a believer is that the believer also explains why this morality obliges him. I understand it right?

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