On Love: Between Emotion and Mind (Column 22)


In this week's Torah portion (and I beg) the parsha "And love the Lord your God" appears from a recitation of Shema, which deals with the commandment to love the Lord. When I heard the call today, I remembered some of the thoughts I had in the past about love in general, and the love of God in particular, and I had a few points sharpened about them.

Between emotion and mind in decisions

When I taught at a yeshiva in Yeruham, there were students who asked me about choosing a partner, whether to follow the emotion (heart) or the mind. I answered them that only after the mind, but that the mind should take into account what the heart feels (the emotional connection, the chemistry, with the partner) as one of the factors in its decision. Decisions in all areas need to be made in the mind, and the heart's job is to put in inputs that need to be taken into account but not decided. There are two possible reasons for this: one is technical. Walking after the heart can lead to wrong results. Emotion is not always the only or most important factor in the matter. The mind is more balanced than the heart. The second is substantial. When you hand over the reins, you do not really decide. A decision by definition is a mental action (or rather: voluntary), not an emotional one. A decision is made by conscious judgment, while the emotion arises for itself not out of my own judgment. In fact, walking after the heart is not a decision at all. It is an indecision but to let the circumstances drag you after them wherever it may be.

So far the assumption is that while love is a matter of the heart, choosing a mate is not just a matter of love. As mentioned, emotion is just one of the factors. But I think that's not the whole picture. Even love itself is not just an emotion, and maybe it is not even the main thing in it.

On love and lust

When Jacob has been working for Rachel for seven years, the scripture says, "And there shall be in his eyes a few days in his love for her" (Genesis XNUMX:XNUMX). The question is known that this description seems to be the opposite of our ordinary experience. Usually when a person loves someone or something and he has to wait for him, every day seems to him like an eternity. Whereas here the verse says that his seven years of service seemed to him a few days. It is quite the opposite of our intuition. It is commonly explained that this is because Jacob loved Rachel and not himself. A person who loves something or someone and wants them for himself actually puts himself at the center. It is his interest that requires fulfillment, so it is difficult for him to wait until he wins it. He loves himself and not his partner. But if a man loves his partner and his actions are done for her and not for him, then even years of work seems to him a small price.

Don Yehuda Abarbanel in his book Conversations on Love, as well as the Spanish philosopher, politician and journalist Jose Ortega i Gast, in his book Five Essays on Love, distinguish between love and lust. Both explain that love is a centrifugal emotion, meaning that its arrow of power faces the person outward. Whereas lust is a centrifugal emotion, that is, the arrow of power turns from the outside to it, inward. In love he who is in the center is the beloved, while in lust he who is in the center is the lover (or lust, or lust). He wants to conquer or win a lover for himself. About this our scouts have already said (there, there): A fisherman loves fish? Yes. So why is he eating them ?!

In this terminology it can be said that Jacob loved Rachel and did not lust for Rachel. Lust is possessive, meaning that the lust wants to put at his disposal something else that he lusts for, so he cannot wait for it to already happen. Every day seems like an eternity to him. But the lover wants to give to another (the beloved), so it does not bother him to work for years if that is what is necessary for it to happen.

Perhaps another dimension can be added to this distinction. The mythological metaphor for the awakening of love is the cross of Cupid stuck in the heart of the lover. This metaphor refers to love as an emotion that arises in the heart of the lover because of some external factor. This is not his decision or judgment. But this description is more suited to lust rather than love. In love there is something more substantial and less instinctive. Even if it appears to arise from itself without laws and rules and without discretion, it may be a latent discretion, or the result of mental and spiritual work that preceded the moment of its awakening. The mind built by me is awakened because of the way I shaped it. Thus in love, unlike in lust, there is a dimension of discretion and desire and not just an emotion that instinctively arises independently of me.

Love of God: Emotion and Mind

Maimonides deals with the love of God in two places in his book. In the basic laws of the Torah he discusses the laws of the love of God and all their derivatives, and also in the laws of repentance he repeats them briefly (as in other topics that recur in the laws of repentance once more). At the beginning of the tenth chapter of the Teshuvah, he deals with the work of the Lord for her name, and among other things he writes:

A. Let no man say that I do the commandments of the Torah and deal with its wisdom so that I may receive all the blessings written in it or so that I may have the life of the next world, and retire from the transgressions that the Torah warned against so that This one, who works in this way is a worker of fear and not the virtue of the prophets and not the virtue of the sages, and God does not work in this way but the peoples of the land and the women and little ones who educate them to work in fear until they multiply and work out of love.

B. The worker of love deals with Torah and Matzah and walks in the paths of wisdom not for anything in the world and not for fear of evil and not to inherit the good but does the truth because it is truth and the end of good to come because of it, and this virtue is a very great virtue He was loved according to which he worked but not out of love and it is the virtue in which the Holy One was blessed by Moses that it was said and you loved the Lord your God, and while a man loves the Lord the proper love he will immediately make all the matzahs ​​out of love.

Maimonides in his words here identifies between the work of God and its name (i.e. not for any external interest) with the love for him. Moreover, in Halacha XNUMX he defines the love of God as doing the truth because it is truth and not for any other reason. This is a very philosophical and cold definition, and even alienating. There is no emotional dimension here. God's love is to do the truth because he is the truth, and that's it. That is why Maimonides writes that this love is the virtue of the wise (and not the sentimental). This is what is sometimes called the "intellectual love of God."

And here, immediately in the following halakhah he writes the complete opposite:

third. And how is the proper love is that he will love Gd a very intense and very intense love until his soul is bound to the love of Gd and is always mistaken in it such as the sick of love whose mind is not free from the love of that woman and he is always mistaken in it on Saturday From this will be the love of God in the hearts of His lovers who always err in it as commanded with all your heart and with all your soul, and it is that Solomon said through a parable that I am sick of love, and every song of the parables is for this purpose.

Here love is as hot and emotional as a man's love for a woman. Just as described in the best novels, and especially in the Song of Songs. The lover is sick of love and always errs in it. He could not distract her at any moment.

How does all this relate to the cold intellectual picture described in the previous halakhah? Was Maimonides confused, or did he forget what he wrote there? I will note that this is not a contradiction we found between two different places in his writings, or between Maimonides and what is said in the Talmud. There are two close and consecutive laws here that speak completely different languages ​​from each other.

I think one should beware here of a profit failure in complementary decoding. When you bring a parable in order to illustrate something, the parable contains many details and not all of them are relevant to the message and the parable. One should locate the main point that the parable came to teach, and not take too narrowly the rest of the details in it. I think that the parable in Halacha XNUMX comes to say that although the love of God is intellectual and not emotional, it must always be erred in and not distracted from the heart. The parable comes to teach the permanence of love as in the love of a man for a woman, but not necessarily the emotional nature of romantic love.

Example of repentance, atonement and forgiveness

I will return for a moment again to the happy period of Yeruham. While there, I was approached by the environmental high school in Sde Boker and asked to speak to the students and staff during the Ten Days of Repentance on Atonement, Forgiveness and Forgiveness, but not in a religious context. I began my remarks with a question I addressed to them. Suppose Reuben hit Shimon and he has pangs of conscience about it, so he decides to go and appease him. He apologizes from the bottom of his heart and begs him to forgive him. Levy, on the other hand, also hit Shimon (Shimon was probably the class' head boy), and he has no remorse for that. His heart does not torment him, he has no emotion around the matter. He really does not care about that. Still, he realizes that he did a bad deed and hurt Shimon, so he too decides to go and ask him for forgiveness. The angel Gabriel comes to the unfortunate Simon and reveals to him the depths of the hearts of Reuben and Levi, or perhaps Simon himself appreciates that this is what is happening in the hearts of Reuben and Levi inside. What should he do? Do you accept Reuben's apology? And what about Levy's request? Which of the requests is more worthy of forgiveness?

Unsurprisingly, the reactions from the audience were pretty consistent. Reuben's request is authentic and worthy of forgiveness, however Levy is hypocritical and there is no reason to forgive him. On the other hand, I argued that in my opinion the situation is quite the opposite. Reuben's apology is intended to feed his pangs of conscience. He actually works for himself (centrifugally), out of his own interest (to soothe his stomach aches and pangs of conscience). Levy, on the other hand, does a remarkably pure act. Although he has no abdominal or heart pain, he realizes that he has done something wrong and that it is his duty to appease the injured Simon, so he does what is required of him and asks him for forgiveness. This is a centrifugal action, as it is done for the victim and not for himself.

Although in his heart Levy does not feel anything, but why is it important? It's just built differently from Reuben. His amygdala (which is responsible for empathy) is damaged and therefore his emotion center is not functioning normally. So what?! And that the innate structure of man should take part in our moral esteem towards him? On the contrary, it is precisely this injury that allows him to act in a purer, altruistic and more complete way, only for the sake of Shimon, and therefore he deserves forgiveness. [1]

From another angle it can be said that Reuben is actually acting out of emotion, while Levy is doing the act out of his own judgment and judgment. Moral appreciation comes to a person for his decisions and not for the feelings and instincts that arise or do not arise in him.

Emotion as a cause or as a result

I do not mean to say that guilt or remorse necessarily negates the morality of the action or of the person. If Levy appeases Shimon for the right (centrifugal) reasons, but at the same time he has a feeling of guilt following the injury he has inflicted on him, the act is complete and completely pure. As long as the reason he does it is not the emotion, that is, covering the fires within him, but bringing healing to the afflicted Simon. The existence of the emotion, if it is not the cause of the act of reconciliation, should not interfere with the moral evaluation and acceptance of the request for forgiveness. A normal person has such an emotion (the amygdala is responsible for it), whether he wants to or not. It is therefore clear that it does not preclude the receipt of the application. But precisely because of this this emotion is also not important here, because it arises not following my decision but of itself (it is a kind of instinct). Instinct does not indicate moral integrity or disadvantage. Our morality is determined by the decisions we make and not by the emotions or instincts that arise in us out of control. The emotional dimension does not interfere but for the same reason it is also not important for moral appreciation. The existence of emotion is supposed to be neutral on the plane of moral judgment.

If the emotion is created as a result of the conscious understanding of the moral problematic in the act, then it is an indication of Reuben's morality. But again, Levy who is afflicted with the amygdala and therefore did not develop such an emotion, made the right moral decision, and therefore he deserves no less moral praise and appreciation from Reuben. The difference between him and Reuben is only in their brain structure and not in their moral judgment and decision. As stated, the structure of the mind is a neutral fact and has nothing to do with a person’s moral appreciation.

Similarly, the owner of Tal Agli writes in his introduction in the letter C:

And from what I said in it, remember what I heard some people say from the way of the mind regarding the study of our holy Torah, and said that the learner who renews innovations and is happy and relishes his study, is not studying the Torah , But the one who learns and relishes his learning, intervenes in his learning as well as the pleasure itself.

And really it's a famous mistake. On the contrary, because this is the essence of the commandment to study the Torah, to be six and happy and relish in his study, and then the words of the Torah are swallowed up in his blood. And since he enjoyed the words of the Torah, he became attached to the Torah [and see the commentary of Rashi Sanhedrin Noah. D.H. and glue].

Those "wrong" think that whoever is happy and enjoys the study, this harms the religious value of his study, since it is done for the sake of pleasure and not for the sake of heaven (= for its own sake). But this is a mistake. Joy and pleasure do not detract from the religious value of the act.

But this is only one side of the coin. He then adds his other side:

And Modina, that the learner is not for the sake of the mitzvah of study, only because he has pleasure in his study, for it is called learning not for its own sake, as he eats matzah not for the sake of mitzvah only for the sake of eating pleasure; And they said, "He will never engage in anything other than her name, which is out of her mind." But he learns for the sake of a mitzvah and relishes his study, for it is a study for its name, and it is all sacred, because the pleasure is also a mitzvah.

That is, joy and pleasure do not detract from the value of the act as long as they are annexed to it as a side effect. But if a person learns for pleasure and joy, i.e. those are the motivations for his learning, it is definitely learning not for its own sake. Here they were right "wrong." In our terminology it is said that their mistake is not in thinking that the study should not be conducted in a centrifugal manner. On the contrary, they are absolutely right. Their mistake is that the very existence of pleasure and joy indicates in their opinion that this is a centrifugal act. It's really not necessary. Sometimes pleasure and joy are emotions that come only as a result of learning and do not constitute reasons for it.

Back to the love of God

The conclusion that emerges from things so far is that the picture I described at the beginning is incomplete, and the situation is more complex. I distinguished between love (centrifugal) and lust (centrifugal). Then I distinguished between emotional and intellectual love, and we saw that Maimonides requires an intellectual-intellectual rather than emotional love of God. The description in the last paragraphs can explain why.

When love is emotional, it usually has a centripetal dimension to it. When I feel a strong feeling of emotional love for a certain person, then the actions I take to win it have a dimension that appeals to me. I support my emotion and want to fill the emotional lack I feel as long as I have not gained it. Even if it is love and not lust, as long as it has an emotional dimension it involves double directions of action. I work not only for the beloved or beloved, but also for myself. In contrast, pure mental love without an emotional dimension, is by definition a pure centrifugal action. I have no lack and I do not prevent emotions within me that I have to support them, but only work for the sake of the beloved. Therefore pure love is an intellectual, platonic love. If an emotion is created as a result, it may not hurt, but only as long as it is a result and not part of the reason and motivation for my actions.

The commandment of love

This may explain the question of how one can command the love of God, and love in general (there is also the commandment to love the cheer and the love of the stranger). If love is an emotion then it arises instinctively that is not up to me. So what does the commandment to love mean? But if love is the result of mental judgment and not mere emotion, then there is room to team it up.

In this context it is only a remark that it can be shown that all the commandments that deal with emotions like love and hate do not turn to emotion but to our intellectual dimension. [2] Just as an example, R. Yitzchak Hutner brings a question that was asked of him how Maimonides enumerates the commandment to love Hagar in our quorum, since it is included in the commandment to love love. Hagar is a Jew and as such must be loved because he is a Jew, so what does the commandment to love Hagar add? Therefore, if I love a stranger because he is a Jew as I love every Jew, I have not kept the commandment to love a stranger. Therefore, explains RIA, there is no duplication here, and each mitzvah has its own content and form of existence.

This means that the commandment to love Hagar is intellectual and not emotional. It involves my decision to love him for such and such a reason. This is not a love that should instill in me instinctively of itself. There is nothing for the team about this, as mitzvos appeal to our decisions and not to our emotions.

Chazal's sermon on the love of cheers enumerates a collection of actions we must perform. And this is how Maimonides puts it in the beginning of the fourth verse of the Lord, but:

Mitzvah made of their words to visit the sick, and comfort the mourners, and take out the dead, and bring in the bride, and accompany the guests, and deal with all the burial needs, carry on the shoulder, and lilac before him and mourn and dig and bury, and rejoice the bride and groom, Shiur, even though all these matzahs ​​are from their words they are in general and love your neighbor as yourself, all the things you want others to do to you, you made them your brother in Torah and matzahs.

Once again it seems that the mitzvah of loving love is not about emotion but about deeds. [5]

This is also clear from the verse in our parsha which says:

After all, and then, and so however,

Love translates into action. And so it is with the verses in Parashat Akev (called next week. Deuteronomy XNUMX: XNUMX):

And thou shalt love the God of thy God, and shalt keep his charge, and his statutes, and his judgments, and his judgments, all the days:

Moreover, Sages also demand the verses in our parsha on the practical implications (Brachot SA AB):

And in every state - Tanya, R. Eliezer says, if it is said in all your soul why it is said in all your land, and if it is said in all your land why it is said in all your soul, unless you have a person whose body is dear to him , To this is said in all madad.

Does love appeal to an object or its titles?

In my two cart and balloon books in the second gate I distinguished between the object and its characteristics or titles. The table in front of me has many features: it is made of wood, it has four legs, it is tall, comfortable, brown, round and more and more. But what is the table itself? Some would say that the table is nothing but this collection of features (so probably the philosopher Leibniz assumes). In my book there I argued that this is not true. The table is something else besides the collection of features. It is more accurate to say that he has the qualities. These traits are his traits. [6]

If an object was nothing but a collection of properties, then there was no impediment to creating an object from any collection of properties. [7] For example, the vegetable of the jade stone on the finger of a certain person with the square of the table next to me and the airiness of the cumulonimbus clouds above us will also be a legitimate object. why not? Because there is no object that has all these properties. They belong to different objects. But if an object is nothing but a collection of properties, then it is impossible to say so. The conclusion is that an object is not a collection of properties. There is a collection of features that characterize it.

Almost everything that is said about an object, such as the table, will constitute a statement about its properties. When we say it is brown or wood or tall or comfortable, these are all its features. Is it also possible for statements to deal with the table itself (its bones)? I think there are such statements. For example, the statement that the table exists. Existence is not a feature of the table but an argument about the table itself. [8] In fact, my statement from above that there is such a thing as a table beyond the set of features is the statement that the table exists, and it is clear that it also deals with it and not only with its features. I think that even the statement that the table is one object and not two is a statement about itself and not a description or feature of it.

When I dealt with this distinction years ago one of my students remarked that in her opinion love for someone also turns to the bones of the lover and not to his qualities. Traits are the way to meet him, but then love turns to the possessor of the traits and not to the traits, so it may survive even if the traits change in some way. Perhaps this is what the sages said in Pirkei Avot: And all love that does not depend on anything - nullify nothing and nullify love. "

Another explanation for the ban on foreign work

This picture may shed further light on the ban on foreign labor. In our parsha (and I will beg) the Torah prolongs the prohibition of foreign labor. The Haftarah (Isaiah chapter M) is also about its opposite side, the non-fulfillment of God:

Nhmo Nhmo Ami Iamr your Gd: Dbro upon hearted Iroslm and Krao Alih Ci forth Tzbah Ci Nrtzh Aonh Ci Lkhh Mid Ikok Cflim Bcl Htatih: S. Cole reader wilderness Fno Drc Ikok Isro Barbh Mslh Lalhino: Cl Gia Insa and Cl mount and Gbah Isflo and Hih Hakb Lmisor and Hrcsim Lbkah : Virtzer Majeker: Nadshading to kill him on the bedroom Irah Bzrao Ikbtz Tlaim and Bhiko Isa Alot Inhl: S. Who Mdd Bsalo water and Smim Bzrt Tcn and Cl Bsls Afr earth and Skl Bfls Hrim and Gbaot Bmaznim: Who Tcn At wind Ikok and Ais Atzto Iodiano: Whom Noatz and Ibinho and Ilmdho Barh Msft and Ilmdho wisdom and Drc Tbonot Iodiano: ay Goim Cmr Mdli and Cshk Maznim Nhsbo ay Aiim Cdk Itol: and Lbnon there is not Di Bar and Hito there is not Di Aolh: S Cl Hgoim Cain Ngdo Mafs and Tho Nhsbo to him: and Al Who Tdmion god and Mh Dmot Tarco to him: Hfsl Nsc craftsman and Tzrf Bzhb Irkano and Rtkot silver goldsmith: Hmscn The great time to go to the world Th Cdk heaven and Imthm Cahl Lsbt: Hnotn Roznim Lain Sfti land Ctho Ash: anger Bl Ntao anger Bl Zrao anger Bl Srs Bartz Gzam Same to Nsf Bhm and Ibso and Sarh Cks Tsam: S. Al Who Tdmioni and Asoh Iamr holy: Sao peak Ainicm and Rao Who Bra These are the Hmotzia In the number of their army to all in the name of the Lord he will call most of them and brave the power of a man no one is absent:

This chapter deals with the fact that Gd does not have a body image. It is not possible to edit a character for him and compare him to something else that is familiar to us. So how do you still contact him? How do you reach it or realize that it exists? The verses here answer this: only intellectually. We see his actions and from them we conclude that he exists and that he is powerful. He creates institutions of the land (created the world) and sits on the circle of the land (runs it). "See who created those who spend in the number of their army for all in the name of Yikra."

In terms of the previous section it can be said that Gd has no form, that is, it has no characteristics that are perceived by us. We do not see it and do not experience any sensory experience in relation to it. We can draw conclusions from its actions (in the terminology of intervening philosophy, it has action titles and not object titles).

Emotional love can be formed towards an object that sells to us directly, that we see or experience. After the experience and the direct sensory encounter the love that arises can turn to the bones, but this requires the mediation of the titles and characteristics of the beloved. Through them we meet with him. It is therefore difficult to argue that there is an emotional love towards an entity that we reach only through arguments and intellectual inferences only, and we have no way of making direct observational contact with it. I think that the path of intellectual love is open to us here mainly.

If so, it is no wonder that the parsha and the haftarah deal with the abstraction of God, if the parsha brings the command to love him. When one internalizes the abstraction of God, the obvious conclusion is that love for Him should and can be only on the intellectual plane and not on the emotional plane. As stated, this is not a disadvantage since as we have seen it is precisely the purest and most complete love of all. It is possible that this love will also create some emotion of love for him, but this is at most an appendix. An insignificant part of the intellectual love of God. Such an emotion cannot be the primary trigger since it has nothing to catch on to. As I mentioned, an emotion of love is perceived in the image of the beloved, and it does not exist in God.

Perhaps another dimension can be seen here in the prohibition of foreign labor. If one creates a figure for God, tries to turn it into a perceived object with which one can form a direct cognitive connection, then love for him can become emotional, one that has a centripetal character that puts the lover rather than the beloved at the center. Gd therefore demands in our haftarah to internalize that there is no way to imitate it (to make it into any character), and the way to reach it is philosophical-intellectual, through inferences. Therefore, the love for him, which the affair deals with, will also have such a character.


I think there are quite a few shards of foreign work in the religious perceptions of many of us. People think that cold religious work is a disadvantage, but here I have tried to show that it has a more complete and pure dimension. Emotional love usually clings to some figure of God, so it may suffer from its foreign worship accessories. I have tried to argue here in favor of the thesis that the love of God is supposed to be rather platonic, intellectual and emotionally alienated.

[1] It is true that if Levy's amygdala is damaged, it will be very difficult, and perhaps impossible, for him to understand what he did. He does not understand what an emotional injury is and why it hurts Simon. Therefore an injury to the amygdala may not allow him to understand the meaning of his action, and he will not think he should apologize. But it is important to understand that this is a different function of the amygdala, which is less important in our case. My contention is that if theoretically he understands that he has hurt Simon even if it does not torment him, the request for forgiveness is complete and pure. His feelings are not really important. It is true that technically without having such feelings he might not have done so because he would not have understood the seriousness of the act and its meaning. But this is a purely technical matter. It may be related to my opening that it is the mind that makes decisions, and it takes the emotions as one of the factors to be considered.

It reminds me of a lecture I once heard at TED from a neurologist who was brain damaged and unable to experience emotions. She learned to mimic these emotional actions technically. Like John Nash (known for Sylvia Nasser's book, Wonders of Reason, and the film that followed), who experienced an imaginary human environment and learned to ignore it in a completely technical way. He was convinced that there really were people around him, but he learned that these were illusions and he should ignore them even though the experience still existed within him in full force. For the purpose of our discussion, we will think of Levy as an amygdala with no emotional empathy ability, who has learned to understand intellectually and coldly (without emotion) that such or other actions harm people, and forgiveness must be sought to appease them. Assume also that the request for forgiveness is as difficult for him as for a person who feels, otherwise it could be argued that such an act should not be appreciated if he does not charge mental prices from the one who does it.

[2] See this in detail in the eleventh book in the Talmudic Logic Series, The Platonic Character of the Talmud, Michael Avraham, Israel Belfer, Dov Gabay and Uri Shield, London 2014, in the second part. 

[3] Maimonides in its roots states that double mitzvot that do not renew something beyond the mitzvah of another subscriber should not be appointed.

[4] And it is not the same as the commandment to love the maturity in which. See our remarks there.

[5] Although these are commandments from the words of scribes, and ostensibly the commandment Dauriyta is yes on emotion, but he who performs these deeds out of his love for his fellow man also fulfills in this the mitzvah Dauriyta. But there is no impediment to the language of Maimonides here to understand that even the Dauriyta mitzvah that actually deals with the relationship to praise can be mental and not emotional as we have explained here.

[6] As I explained there, this distinction is related to the Aristotelian distinction between object and case or matter and form, and in Kant's philosophy to the distinction between the thing itself (the nuumana) to speak as it appears to our eyes (the phenomenon).

[7] See there the examples I gave from the genius story of the Argentine writer Borges, "Ochber, Telen, Artius", in dunes translated by Yoram Bronowski.

[8] I have shown there that evidence can be brought to this from the ontological argument for the existence of God. If the existence of the thing is his attribute, because then the existence of God can be proved out of his concept, which is unlikely. Although see a detailed discussion of this argument in the first notebook on the site. There I tried to show that the argument is not unfounded (even if not necessary).

16 Thoughts on “On Love: Between Emotion and Mind (Column 22)”

  1. Isaac:
    What does 'intellectual love' mean, after all love is emotion?
    Or is this a mistake and does it actually mean a reference and connection to another - and in 'mental' the intention is not for analytical understanding but for intuition that is the right thing to do?
    And as for the parable from love, it may not mean that love is emotional, but the essence of the parable is the fact that a person 'can not' not always err .. and not just a positive that at any moment will achieve… Maybe it is the fact that this intuition 'conquers' the whole person Does she sparkles…
    My contention is that it is not. Emotion is at most a sign of love and not love itself. Love itself is a decision of discretion, except that if the emotion arises then I have probably decided.
    I do not see what it means to be analytical. This is a decision that this is the right thing to do, as Maimonides wrote in the second verse.
    If the parable does not come to clarify my duty, what is the point of it? He tells me what will happen to me from himself? He probably came to describe what it was my duty to do.

  2. Isaac:
    Apparently there is a difference between 'work from love' in which the rabbi dealt with the post, and 'mitzvot ahavat ha' (in which Maimonides deals with the laws of Yeshuat)….
    In the Halachot Teshuvah Maimonides deals with what brings Eden to worship the name - and indeed the words of the rabbi are convincing…
    But by virtue of being a mitzvah, the mitzvah of the love of Gd does not deal with what brings a person to work, but is incumbent upon him to develop (like the words of Hagli Tal - joy that develops half of the duty)… Observing creation
    Totally agree. This is indeed the relationship between the fundamental laws of the Torah and the Teshuvah. And yet in H. Teshuvah he identifies love with doing the truth because it is truth. What's between that and the emotion? It is likely that the love with which both places are engaged is the same love. In the elementary Torah he writes that love is achieved by observing creation (this is the inference I have been talking about), and in the Teshuvah he explains that its meaning in the matter of working from love is doing the truth because it is truth. And they are my words.
    The concept of awe is certainly different between the Yeshiva and the Halachot Teshuvah
    This is very strange logic. When talking about working to make money and talking about buying something through money, does the term "money" appear in different meanings? So why when you feel love or when you do something out of love, the term "love" appears in two different meanings?
    With regard to awe, the relationship between the awe of exaltation and the awe of punishment must also be discussed. If the same concept is used it should have the same meaning, or less with enough connection between the meanings. In both cases the awe is the same, and the difference is in the question of what evokes the awe, the punishment or the exaltation.

  3. Yosef:
    The interpretation in Halacha C sounds a bit narrow to me.
    It is difficult to detach the experiential dimension from the words of Maimonides and say that he only warns of "abrogation of Torah." It certainly seems to describe a profound experience of the God-lover that the only thing in the world that concerns him is the love of God. I do not agree at all with the assumption of the article that an emotional experience puts the lover at the center and only alienated love puts the beloved at the center. It seems to me that there is a level above the cold alienation and it is when the will of the lover merges with the will of the beloved and the fulfillment of the will of the beloved becomes the fulfillment of the will of the lover and vice versa in "do your will as he wills". In this love, it is not possible to talk about a lover or a loved one in the middle but about one common desire for both. In my opinion, Maimonides speaks of this when he speaks of the desire of the lover of God. It does not contradict the doing of the truth because it is a truth that can stem from a desire for the truth.
    Hello Joseph.
    1. To me it does not seem so difficult. I commented on the correct treatment of parables.
    2. The assumption in the article is not that the emotional experience puts the lover at the center, but that it usually also has such a dimension (it is involved).
    The matter of this mystical association is very difficult for me and I do not think it is practical, especially not towards an abstract and intangible object like God, as I have written.
    4. Even if it may not contradict the doing of the truth because it is true, but it is certainly not the same for him. Maimonides identifies this with love.

  4. Mordechai:
    As usual, interesting and thought-provoking.

    At the same time, the meaning in Maimonides is not just 'a little distressed', and not even a great urgency, it is simply a distortion (in forgiveness). Maimonides did his best to describe an emotional state, and you force him to say that it is still something rational and alienating (as you define it) [and the comment on the 'failure' in relation to parables is not convincing at all in our context, because here is not just ignoring parables ].

    As for the general question as to the essence of emotion, it should be noted that every emotion is the result of some mental cognition. The fear of a snake stems from our knowledge that it is dangerous. A small child will not be afraid to play with a snake.
    It is therefore inaccurate to say that emotion is merely an instinct. Is an instinct that is activated as a result of some perception. Therefore a person who is not brain damaged, and no emotion arises in him following his injury to someone else, it turns out that his moral perception is defective.

    In my opinion, this is also Maimonides' intention. As a person's awareness of the truth grows, so does the feeling of love in his heart. It seems to me that things are clear later in the chapter (Halacha XNUMX):
    It is a known and clear thing that the love of God is not bound in a person's heart - until he always achieves it properly and leaves everything in the world except her, as he commanded and said 'with all your heart and with all your soul' - but with an opinion he knew. And according to the opinion, there will be love, if a little bit and if a lot a lot. "
    Explicit here: a. Love is an emotion that binds in a person's heart.
    B. The commandment in the Torah is about emotion.
    third. Since this emotion is a result of the mind,
    The meaning of the commandment to love God is to multiply in the mind of God.
    Hello Mordechai.
    I did not see in the words of Maimonides here that it is an emotion. It is a consciousness but not necessarily an emotion. You also ignore the relationship between the B and C that I stood for in my remarks.
    But beyond all this, I have no problem in principle with your words, for even in your method still the task incumbent upon us is the cognitive task, to know and know, and not emotion. The feeling if it is created as a result - will be created, and if not - then not. Therefore emotion arises in the end without our control. The information and learning is in our hands, and the emotion is at most a result. So what is the difference between what you offer and what I have written?
    A CPM for a person whose brain is damaged and unable to love. Do you think such a person can not keep the commandment of God's love? In my opinion yes.

    Finally, if you have already quoted the halakhah in question at Rambam, why did you interrupt it? Here is the full language:

    It is known and clear that the love of the Blessed One is not bound in a person's heart until he always achieves it properly and leaves everything in the world except it, as he commanded and said with all your heart and soul, "The Blessed One does not love Little and much much, therefore man must together himself understand and be educated in the wisdoms and intellects which inform him of his cono as the power that man has to understand and attain as we have seen in the fundamental laws of the Torah.

    It is clear to us that this is an opinion and not an emotion. And at most the emotion is a product of the mind. The duty of loving God is not on the emotion but on the mind. And NPM for the brain-damaged.
    And how is it possible not to end with the words of the Rabbi in achieving it there:

    Something known and clear, etc. AA is the folly we did not know why it is a thing of direction, and we interpret it in two matters the language of a poem as a folly to David, and another matter for her love will achieve in your affairs that you will not pay attention to them

    So far so good for this evening.
    1. In my opinion the phrase 'bound in a person's heart' is more appropriate for emotion than consciousness.
    2. The relationship between the B and the C is of cause and effect. That is: the mind leads to love. Love brings work to its name (it is not love but 'work from love', i.e .: work that stems from love).
    Seder in the words of Maimonides is related to the subject - his subject is not the commandment of the love of God (this is the subject in the foundations of the Torah) but the work of God, and when he comes to explain the excellent work he explains its character (its name - II) and its source ), And later explains how to reach this love (Da'at - HV).
    This is explained in the words of Maimonides at the end of Halacha XNUMX: Then in Halacha C explains what proper love is.
    3. The difference between our words is very substantial. In my opinion, the observance of the mitzvah is in emotion, that is: the emotion is very central and not some marginal and unnecessary product. He who observes' Platonic and alienated 'love of God' does not keep the mitzvah. If he is injured in the amygdala he is simply raped.
    4. I did not understand what the quote from the continuation of Maimonides' language added
    (The words "does not love the Blessed One [but in opinion…]" do not appear in the Frenkel edition, so I did not quote them, but the meaning is the same. Love ”as the wording of the patterns, but it was only for the sake of clarity, and here too the meaning is the same)
    1. Good. I'm really not sure about that.2. I agree with all this. And still do the truth because it is a truth does not seem to me to be related to the emotion of love but to a cognitive decision (perhaps the emotion of love accompanies it, though not necessarily. See my previous post).
    3. So I keep asking why to team us up for something that arises on its own? At most the mitzvah is to deepen the knowledge and intellectual work, and the love that naturally arises after that (blessed is the believer) is at most an indication that you have done it. Hence the one whose mind is damaged is not raped, but fully obeys the mitzvah. We have no sign of this, but God knows and is the best.
    4. The quote from the continuation of Maimonides' language speaks of an identification between love and knowing, or at most that love is a side effect of knowing.
    It seems to me that we have sufficiently clarified our positions.
    Just about your recurring question: things are very simple.
    God commands us to feel. Yes!
    But what is the way to do it? To multiply opinion.
    Scholarly style: observance of the mitzvah - emotion, act of mitzvah - multiplicity of opinion.
    (The words of Rabbi Solovitchik regarding some mitzvos are published: prayer,
    But and answer, that the observance of the mitzvah is in the heart).
    If you are willing to accept its theoretical possibility 'care about emotions
    Ours and not just from our actions and opinions, so things are very understandable and not at all puzzling.
    Then the emotion is not just an unnecessary 'by-product', but the body of the mitzvah.
    (And related here are the famous words of the Rab'a about not coveting.
    There he uses the same principle: If your consciousness is straight,
    In any case, the feeling of covetousness will not arise)

  5. B':
    You are in fact claiming that a person who acts according to the intellect and not according to the emotion is only a free man, for example, the love of God is intellectual and not emotional, but seemingly it can be said that just as a person who prevents his feelings is bound to them and not a free man so can a person who acts according to A mind that is bound to its mind and not a free one, you also specifically claim about love that emotional supreme love is emotional because it is the intellect that turns to the other not in order to support the emotions (yourself) but this intellect also sustains yourself how are you difference in egocentrism between the two cases?
    I remind you that once we talked you enjoyed the discussion and you told me that you should write about the subject that only a person who conducts his life according to Halacha is a rational person, and about the uniqueness of Talmud and Halacha to take abstract ideas and process them into practice.
    It can be said that the mind and emotion are two different functions with equal status. But in a mental decision the will is involved while the emotion is an instinct that is forced upon me. I have extended this in my Freedom Science books. thanks for the reminder. Maybe I'll write a post about it on the site.
    I think it will interest you http://davidson.weizmann.ac.il/online/askexpert/med_and_physiol/%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%93%D7%94-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%A8%D7%92%D7%A9-%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%99%D7%92%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9F
    There are many more such discussions, and most of them all suffer from conceptual ambiguity (do not define emotion and mind. Anyway, it has nothing to do with my words because it talks about brain activity and I talk about thinking. Thinking is done in mind and not brain. He does not think because he does not decide to do so and he does not “consider it.” Neuroscience assumes that brain activity = thinking, and this is what I wrote that according to this also running water engages in thinking activity.

  6. Two comments:

    In the next section of the alleged article, T.S. I will indicate in square brackets:

    “That is, joy and pleasure do not detract from the value of the act as long as they are attached to it as a side effect. But if a person learns for pleasure and joy, i.e. those are the motivations for his learning, it is definitely learning not for its own sake. Here they were right "wrong." In our terminology it is said that their mistake is not that they thought that the study should not be conducted in a centrifugal manner [= centrifugal cell]. On the contrary, they are absolutely right. Their mistake is that the very existence of pleasure and joy indicates in their opinion that this is a centrifugal act [= centrifugal cell]. It's really not necessary. Sometimes pleasure and joy are emotions that come only as a result of learning and do not constitute reasons for it.

    2. The "contradiction" in the two adjacent laws in Rambam regarding love, seemingly settled simply as the words of the beading dew that you brought yourself later and explained them in the TotoD. This is exactly what Maimonides said here about the love of God. It has a mental cause, and an emotional consequence. He also explains the love he talks about in the Basic Laws of the Torah P.B. Observing the creation and recognition of God's wisdom and virtues. The factual-conscious / mental cause - produces [also] an emotional result. And that's exactly what he said here as well.

  7. 'Free love' - on the part of the object and not on the part of its titles


    In light of the distinction proposed here between love on the part of the bone and love on the part of the titles - it is possible to understand the concept of 'free love' coined by Rabbi Kook.

    There is a situation where a person's character or leaderships are so outrageous that no good trait of him can be felt that will arouse the natural feeling of love towards him.

    In such a situation, there can only be 'love on the bone', love for a person solely by virtue of being a 'favorite of a person created in B'Tselem' or 'a favorite of Israel called boys to the place', who even in the lower duty of 'corrupt boys' are still 'called boys', Most 'fatherly pity' exists for his sons.

    However, it should be noted that the father's love for his children even in their poorest condition is not just 'free love'. It is also nourished by the hope that the good that is hidden in boys by force - will also come to fruition. The strong faith of the father in his children and of the Creator in his people - may radiate its good influence, and therefore 'and returned the fathers' heart to sons 'may also bring the return of the sons' hearts to their fathers.

    Sincerely, Shatz

    It is worth noting here the renewed explanation proposed by Bat-Galim Sha'ar (mother of Gil-ad XNUMX) to the concept of 'free love'. According to her, 'free love' is 'their love of grace'. Finding the positive point in others - can arouse the faded love and breathe life into the relationship.

    And of course things are related to the words of Rabbi Nachman of Breslav in the Torah Rafev on 'Singing to Elki while I', when rejoicing in 'a little more', in the little spark of good, or more correctly: the little that seems left in man - and 'little of light - repels much of darkness'.

    1. I did not understand the question. The distinction between these two feelings is unrelated to my words. Everyone agrees that it is not the same. These are two different emotions. Lust is a desire to take over something, to be mine. Love is an emotion whose center is the other and not me (centrifugal and not centrifugal). I here distinguished between emotion and perception (emotional and intellectual love).

  8. "But if love is the result of mental judgment and not mere emotion, then there is room to command it."
    But still, how can I be instructed to understand something ??? If you explain to me and I still do not understand or disagree it is not my fault!
    It's like teaming up on someone living in the 10th century to understand the heliocentric model, if he understands health but if not what to do!
    Unless you say that the mitzvah to understand God means at least to try to understand and if you did not understand not terrible you are raped

  9. Is to say the function of the object before it a statement about its bones? For example, to say that a table is "something that allows things to be placed on it" is a feature of it or it is its bones?

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