On the Status of Secularists Today (Tor 721)

With God’s help

Yesterday, a question arose in one of the Third Path WhatsApp groups regarding the status of secularists today. The brief discussion that took place there prompted me to present here a systematic conceptual analysis of the matter. There are many slogans that we use in this discussion, and the feeling is that they do not really capture the real situation that prevails in our regions. Furthermore, here too, one can see the tendency of halachic adjudicators to insert situations from life into existing conceptual patterns and models, which does not always work. In short, my concern here is twofold: to present a systematic position regarding secularism, but no less so to arrive at methodological insights regarding how it is right and wrong to conduct such a discussion.

First, I will present here some of the discussion that took place there so that you can get an impression. This is just a background for what will come later.

The course of the discussion

The discussion arose following an article inTo begin with, on the words of Rabbi Dervkin (full disclosure: one of the heads of the Grodna Be'er Yaakov Yeshiva, where my son studied):

Member of the Council of Torah Elders of the Degel Hatorah party, Rabbi Dervkin on the attacks in Iran: "It was difficult for me - it turns out that God, blessed be He, performs visible miracles precisely at the hands of those who want to uproot the people of the Torah and the Torah. But just as Jeroboam ben Joash was wicked and wicked, but when there is a difficult situation and there is no one to help Israel - then even 'and Joshua was saved by the hand of Jeroboam,' this is our situation.".

Rabbi Dervkin sees those who work to recruit Haredi yeshiva students as evil and wicked (there is room for debate as to whether this is exactly what is written there. But it seems to be the spirit of the matter). I must say that this is not a very big innovation (and not really his own). In our case, we argued there against his words that he does not apply the law/concept of "captured infant" here, through which the halakha itself tells us that a person should be judged according to his own system. In other words, even if Rabbi Dervkin himself believes otherwise (and is wrong about this, of course), he still had to understand that those in front of him are not evil, and judge them according to their system.

In the discussion there, they responded to the writer on two levels: 1. Regarding the very claim that a person should be judged according to his own method, they claimed that he was writing this under my influence (see the column on this). 372), but this is not necessarily the position of the halakhah and the accepted halakhic discourse. 2. Regarding the very use of the model of a captive baby, another participant wrote:

A baby who was captured is not a completely clear solution. Many of them are from religious worlds that crossed the lines. This was Maimonides' solution in relation to the Karaites. The transformation to today is not simple..

These are Jews who left yeshivahs, and many today still receive religious education.…

Another participant wrote about this:

In my opinion, 'a baby taken captive' is the only logical solution (in terms of halakhic logic!) that can be given by a rabbi who sees halacha as the religious law of the Jewish people. The strict ones – like the Munkacz Rebbe – who see the secular as a 'goy in all his words' and the concept of the 'baby taken captive' as a fiction – do not really see halacha as the law of the Jewish people, because it is impossible to determine that the law of the Jewish people excludes the majority of the Jewish people from its sphere of application. The lenient ones – like the rabbis of Zohar [He then corrected this to the rabbis of Beit Hillel.] – who see the secular as 'your neighbor' and 'your colleague' and the concept of the 'captured baby' as arrogance and delegitimization of the poor secular – do not truly see Halacha as a legal system, because no legal system can see its lawbreakers as legitimate. Otherwise, it commits suicide. A legal system is supposed to apply to all its 'citizens', righteous as well as criminals, and is supposed to denounce the criminals and impose sanctions on them. Once they imposed a boycott on them, today the 'sanction of arrogance' is the minimum that Halacha can do to avoid committing suicide and the maximum it can do in imposing sanctions. Therefore, this is the only logical solution. As stated in the 1999 article. (And of course, the Aruch Laner and the Chazo'a do not need me and my efforts.)

And a third participant answered him:

Wow, you exaggerated your size.. There are a sea of models for defining the secular as your colleague without breaking the world of Halacha as a legal system. Even in Zon Ish, there are other options besides a captured baby.

And he answered back:

A) The question is not whether 'A Baby Who Was Captured' reflects reality or not. It is clearly fiction, but this fiction is the only logical move.

b) The Chazo'a also has (along with other statements) a formulation according to which the entire present time is the "time of the invisible," in which providence is not visible, and it is implied from his words that we are all supposedly coerced to some extent.

This discussion reflects several very common assumptions in the halakhic discourse on this painful issue, and I would like to address them here systematically. First, it is clear that the definition of a captive infant, from the point of view of the debaters, is a matter of lack of knowledge. Second, there is an argument for the arrogance involved in using this model. Third, there is a reliance on halakhic sources that expand the ancient concept and adapt it to our times. Fourth, the question arises here whether it is correct to apply this model to a situation in which most of the Jewish people fall into this category. Fifth, they asked whether it can be dispensed with (the implicit assumption is that the only alternative is pluralism of multiple truths) without undermining the commitment to and loyalty to halakhic law (the secular is essentially just like a gentile. What is the difference?). And in my opinion, the background to the entire discussion there was the question of whether this is the best model (even if it is somewhat fictitious) within which to discuss secularism in our time. I will not include here the response I wrote in the discussion, as the purpose of this column is to detail and expand on it. It will be included at the end.

Methodological Introduction: On Models and Fictions

It is very common to think that everyone understands that this is a fictitious model that is not really appropriate for our time, but this is the most logical way to introduce the appropriate attitude towards the secular into the framework of the discussion and concepts of halakhah. Note that we assume here that we actually know how to properly relate to the secular, and the use of the concept of 'captured infant', which of course involves its expansion and modification, is just a way to introduce this into the halakhic framework. There is an impression that poskim do this more than once, when in fact they are acting as they should, and the halakhic terminology (which is sometimes deliberately distorted and distorted) serves them only as a justification after the fact.

I will begin my remarks here with one of the messages I wrote there in the discussion:

By the way, in general I'm against rigid models that people are put into. It's better to just treat reality as it is. Models give directions, but they're not reality.

I really don't like this cynical approach, and I don't believe in it either. In my opinion, a poske who comes to formulate a position regarding some phenomenon should examine it as it is, and not force it into a conceptual framework that doesn't fit it. After all, if 'captured baby' was a concept written in the Torah, then perhaps we would have to adapt ourselves to it, even if only barely. But this is a concept developed by the sages as a response to a situation they encountered in their place and time. Why should we force its use and impose it on the reality of our time (if indeed the assumption is that it doesn't really fit it)?!

In general, models are a very important issue for our thinking, especially if we want to think systematically (as we do in scholarship and science). But precisely because of this, we need to be very careful not to become their prisoners. Models give us directions for thinking and distinguish between different hypothetical situations. But when it comes to formulating a position on reality, we need to carefully examine the application of the models, and not be enslaved to them.

onMy articles on sustainability I argued for the Platonism that is so inherent in scientific thinking and theories. I explained there that a scientific theory does not deal with the real world but with a hypothetical-Platonic situation. Understanding our real world is aided by theory, but this is not done by imposing it on reality. The world is not a specific model or realization of a scientific theory. I will not go into this here, but I bring it up because I feel that discussions like the one I described above assume that reality must fit into one of the models as it is, or at best it is nothing more than some combination of them. But reality is reluctant, and does not necessarily agree to insert itself into our rigid conceptual frameworks. Sometimes the conceptual framework needs to be expanded and not insisted on the existing one, and in particularly complex cases, perhaps a conceptual framework in its strict logical sense needs to be completely abandoned. My argument is that our discussion of secularism should be conducted in exactly the same way as those sages who themselves created the concept of the 'captive infant' discussed it. They too did not use existing concepts or subordinate their thinking to them, but rather tried to formulate a position towards reality as it is, and for this purpose created a new conceptual system (see another example of this in the discussion on courts in Syria, in the column 448).

In short, if you know how to properly relate to secularists and secularism, say so directly. Why distort existing halakhic concepts so that the attitude that you somehow decide to formulate toward secularism will be applied to them and done through them?!

It is true that there are fictions in halacha as well. Sometimes sages use concepts in a fictitious manner, and here I will only briefly explain why in my opinion this is not relevant for us. In the column 95 I discussed the concept of halakhic fiction, and some examples of it. Among other things, I spoke there about the law of 'shlichiyot', according to which non-affiliated judges can judge despite the halakhic prohibition on appointing such judges, because we see it as if the adjacent judges in the Land of Israel in the past had appointed them as their emissaries. This is a problematic argument. First, such a blank appointment is not really halakhically valid. In addition, it is factually quite clear that there was no such appointment status. I compared it there to Rousseau's fiction regarding the 'social contract', which supposedly all human beings signed and thereby created the moral and legal obligation. Such a signing status, of course, did not exist and was never created. Similarly, the law of 'sworn and standing at Mount Sinai', which suspends our obligation to observe a commandment on an oath that we supposedly swore at Sinai, is apparently a fiction.

But there is a big difference between all these cases and our case. First, in those cases, fiction is necessary. Without it, we could not have a valid legal system, and there would be no obligation to observe the commandments. Beyond that, fiction also gives us a model within which we can discuss the boundaries of halakhic obligation and the scope of the authority of the 'shluchim' to discuss. We can even say that from our perspective, there really was such an implicit appointment or oath. In other words, it is clear from the theory that we all actually commit or appoint those who are needed to manage our lives, and the innovation is that such an implicit appointment can be halakhically valid. But this is a technical innovation. In contrast, in our case, today's secular people are flesh and blood people and we know them. They have characteristics and circumstances within which they operate, and the attitude towards them is dictated by these facts. The system of concepts that has been created over the generations is nothing more than a description of types who operated in a world where other circumstances prevailed. There is no need to use that system specifically. It is not that it has any special validity, nor that other concepts will not have validity if we do not conceptualize them through an expansion of the existing conceptual system. Nor do we need the old conceptual system to have a model within which to deal with secularists. We can formulate such a relevant model ourselves, a model that will be faithful to the real reality and the current circumstances of our lives, and will be no less valid than the previous models. In short, as they say to pathological liars, do not fall in love with a lie. Sometimes the truth is also an option.

The conclusion is that there is no need to use fictions here, except for the attempt to work on conservatives and present a false representation as if we have not changed anything and are fully continuing in the path of our holy sages. I have already stated this more than once (see, for example, the series of columns 475 – 480 on Modern Orthodoxy as well as in the series on Dynamic Tradition, in the columns 622 – 626) That we do indeed continue the path of our rabbis in this way, but not because we use their principles as they are and apply them to our reality, but precisely because we do not do it that way. In the above columns, I showed that midrashic conservatism is the more authentic and correct continuation of the path of our rabbis, and the perception that commitment to halakha distills simplistic conservatism, that is, that tradition is necessarily static, is a mistake. There is no need to surrender to it and play by its rules.

Addressing lateral and tactical considerations

So far I have argued that if the concept of 'captive baby' is not appropriate for describing our reality today, then there is no reason to use it. On the other hand, if the concept of 'captive baby' were indeed the appropriate concept, then the fact that it is arrogance really does not interest me. This is the truth, and whoever is uncomfortable with it should take a pill. What's more, I do not see any arrogance here. This is a simple and clear argument: If I am right, then anyone who thinks otherwise is wrong, and I am actually praising him for having some reason for his error. He is not guilty of it. Note that I am not saying that he is wrong because he is stupid, but because he is captive to something. What is the problem with that?! I am also not willing to take into account considerations such as how many secular people there are today? If it turns out that the majority of the public is in the category of captive babies, then that is what will come out.

All of these are considerations that are not relevant to the matter, and in my opinion, this is the other side of the same coin that I described above: If we are not trying to reach the truth but rather to build a model that will make things easier for us in various ways, then there is room for considerations of popularity, what is worthwhile and what is not, arrogance, etc. I generally try, as here, to deal with what is right and not with what is beneficial and makes things easier. Therefore, such irrelevant considerations are not relevant in the discussion.

First-order ruling

So far I have explained why you will not find many sources and precedents in my remarks here, nor a review of the existing approaches and the controversies regarding them. As is my custom in many cases, here too I will argue that conceptual analysis and common sense bring us directly to the promised land. This is actually another example of first-order jurisprudence. So much for the introductions, and now I begin the analysis itself.

On 'A Baby Who Was Captured' and What's Beyond

The term 'captured infant' in its literal meaning deals with someone who grew up among Gentiles and therefore knew nothing about Judaism and Torah. Already in the Talmud, there is a reference to such types, and they are somewhere between the accidental and the rapist (there are various disputes and distinctions, and this arises in several issues. There are also serious contradictions in the rulings of Maimonides on this matter. But I will not go into details here). Those who claim that even a baby who grows up in a secular society devoid of any connection to the Torah in the religious sense is a captured infant are right, even if he was not captured among Gentiles but among Jews (in previous columns I spoke of the Haredim as babies who were captured by themselves. This was not a metaphor. I meant it literally). If this is the case, then this is a trivial extension and there is no fiction here. The same is true if the majority of our society is like this. Even then, it is still justified to use this term in its essential meaning, even if not literal.

In my opinion, the fundamental problem with using this term towards secular people today is completely different. The assumption of Chazal and the Rishonim was that such a baby, when exposed to the relevant knowledge, would certainly understand that he was mistaken and would "return to the firmament of the Torah" (as Maimonides put it). In other words, it is a lack of knowledge and educational deprivation, nothing more. Indeed, in the ancient world this was probably the reality. It was clear to everyone that there was a religious obligation. It was clear to everyone that their obligation was supposed to be to the God relevant to the society to which they belonged. What remains is only knowledge: who that society is, and what its God wants from it. From this comes the conclusion that the moment the baby becomes aware of the missing information, he will immediately return to the firmament of the Torah.

The indication of this is that in the distant past it was clear to everyone that if someone sins or does not fulfill a commandment, they do so for the sake of appetite or to anger. This is clearly the advice of the instinct, for there is no doubt that deep down inside they know what is incumbent upon them (assuming they have the relevant information). This was the situation that prevailed when the term 'spoiled baby' was coined, and when the patterns of how we should relate to this phenomenon were formed. But in our time, this is absolutely not the case.

A person who grows up today in a gentile or secular society is not exposed to relevant knowledge. This is of course still true. But someone who thinks that this is only a lack of information, meaning that as soon as he fills the knowledge gap he will immediately return to us – does not live in our world. Basically, this is a person who thinks differently. Even if he is exposed to all the relevant knowledge in the world, in many cases he will still maintain his position. Furthermore, my argument is that this is not just the advice of instinct but a different perception. This is how he really thinks.

I do not ignore the influence of education on the way we think. It is clear that a person born into a religious home and raised in a religious society has a much greater chance of becoming a religious adult than someone raised in a different home and society. And yet all of this shapes who he is. Bottom line, he is who he is, and his perceptions are these. We can of course talk about influences and biases, but who among us doesn't have them?! In practice, a person has perceptions, which are also a pattern of the landscape of his homeland, that is, the result of innate and acquired elements, passions, influences and biases, and also discretion and free choice (I add this as a libertarian). Bottom line, this is the person and these are his perceptions. He is secular or atheist because in my opinion there is no God and no Torah was given. This will not necessarily change even if you take him to thousands of seminars and feed him endless information.

Despite the differences, the prevailing religious perception sees reality this way. In its view, all of these are biases. The argument is that if I do indeed think that faith is correct and that halakhic and religious commitment is binding and valid, then anyone who observes reality and facts in a sober manner must be religious, and anyone who is not religious is necessarily because of passions and biases. This may be true, but it ignores the fact that this is the case with all of us. It ignores the fact that this totality is the human being. Attributing everything to passions and biases is an excessive reduction of reality. Two people who look at the same set of facts and the same considerations can reach different conclusions, and this will not necessarily be the advice of the passion. These are different perceptions that draw different conclusions from the same set of arguments and facts.

The other side of that mistake is to think that my position represents substantial pluralism. That widespread religious perception tends to accuse those who hold a position like mine of lacking commitment to halakha, or of seeing secularism as a valid option like the religious one. As mentioned, this is the other side of that mistake. I am a monist, and absolutely not a pluralist. Therefore, in my opinion, in such a debate, one side is right and the other is wrong, and of course, I think the religious side is right and the secular side is wrong. And yet, I maintain that these are two authentic perceptions of people, and not necessarily a matter of reason versus instinct.

It is important to understand that the description I have given here hardly existed in the distant past. This is a new cultural and social situation, and we must relate to it and not to situations that prevailed here in the past. If this is indeed the picture before us, we must now ask ourselves whether the term 'captured baby' is appropriate for it? Is it correct to use it, or its fictitious extension, as the term relevant to our situation today, which, as mentioned, is fundamentally different from what it was in the past?

Please note, I claim that a Datlash who took exams for rabbinate and dayaonite, has mastered all the Talmuds, Babylonian and Jerusalem, by heart, and currently serves as a leading lecturer in the field of Halacha, a person who knows all the relevant details better than you or me, despite all this can still be a 'captive baby'. He is like that because after all the information, it is clear to him that none of this obligates him. From his point of view, it is like studying Native American culture, and even if he knew all the details and became a world-renowned expert on Inca or Apache culture, it would not occur to him to dance around a fire to stop a drought. But now the question arises whether it is correct to use the term 'captive baby' for him? It is more reasonable to give it another term. 'Secular' or 'atheist', for example.

What is new today compared to what prevailed in the distant past is that you can be equipped with all the information and yet not feel obligated. The secularist of today is not necessarily someone who lacks information, but sometimes someone who simply thinks differently. What he lacks is not the information but the understanding that this information binds him. Therefore, even if he is a great scholar and scholar, he can be a captive infant.

One can, of course, insist on continuing to use the term 'captured baby,' but now it really ceases to be successful. No one outside captured him. He simply thinks differently. To claim that anyone who thinks differently is a captured baby means problematic determinism or fatalism. In essence, it undermines our ability to demand that a person act correctly regardless of circumstances. The claim is that a person's environment deterministically determines their perceptions, thus emptying the value of a person's decisions. They can decide whether to act correctly, but they cannot decide what is right. The circumstances and facts in their hands dictate that to them.

Note that it is precisely the picture I propose here, a picture according to which a person is not deterministically driven by the circumstances of his life and upbringing, nor by the knowledge he possesses, that allows us to demand that he act correctly. He has the ability to decide and formulate a different position, even if it contradicts his upbringing. But the other side of the coin is that if he has reached a different conclusion, then we really have no ability to judge him and demand anything from him. It is not that I am proposing a pluralism according to which he is also right. My argument is that his perception is indeed wrong, but the fact that he has the knowledge does not mean that he acts only out of instinct and that he is guilty of his mistake.

'Repentant' and 'repentant'

In a column 367 I distinguished between a 'repentant' and a 'repentant'. A 'repentant' is someone who returns to his original state. He knows what is right and has always known what is right, but his instincts have led him astray. Now he returns to doing what was always right in his eyes. Such a person is a true sinner, because even when he sinned, he knew that it was wrong to act this way. He failed because of an instinct, and now he returns and takes control from his instincts. His consciousness is that of someone who has failed until now and now he takes it upon himself not to fail again. On the other hand, a 'repentant' is a person who changes his worldview. He was secular or atheist, and now he has become (and not 'returned') a believer and committed. Such a person was not a sinner in the past either, and of course he has no consciousness of failure. Until now he simply made a mistake and thought differently. He did not know the truth, and therefore was forced. Now he recognizes the truth and embraces it, and from now on he feels obligated and clings to this commitment.

In this terminology, it can be said that in the ancient world there were mainly 'repentants'. All that could change was the degree of submission to the urge, and a person was required not to give in to it and to do what was right (in his eyes). To return to the truth that he had always known. In our world, the phenomenon of 'repentants' has been renewed, meaning people who changed their worldview. They were secular and became religious. Think of the act of Rabbi Eliezer ben Dordia (1771), who is the prototype of a Baal Teshuvah. Rabbi Ben Dordia was a repentant person and not a Baal Teshuvah. Hence also comes a saying such as the one found in Berakot 17a, the prayer of Rabbi Alexandri, who would say after the prayer:

Lord of the worlds, it is clear and known before You that our desire is to do Your will, and who can hinder the light that is in the midst of oppression and the enslavement of kingdoms? May it be Your will that You save us from their hands and that we may return to do the laws of Your will with a whole heart. .

He himself prays to repent and overcome his desire. It is clear to him that sin begins with desire. I know what is right and want to do what is right, but there is something holding me back (the light that is in the pulp). In contrast, a Baal Teshuvah of today does not turn to God at all because he does not recognize His existence. He does what he truly thinks, and does not perceive himself as having failed.

From this we can understand that in the distant past the phenomenon of secularism did not exist as a phenomenon. First, because there were no people without religion, but only converts and sinners. But beyond that, there were people back then who failed because of their instinct, to anger or to appetite, and they are called to return to what is best. There were no people there who simply thought differently. There were no secularists then (at least not as a phenomenon). The secularist of today does not commit offenses to anger or to appetite. From his point of view, he does not commit offenses at all. It is no wonder that the concept of secular is a new concept, and it is a mistake to copy references and a conceptual system that were formulated in a completely different era. The use of the conceptual system of 'converted to anger', 'converted to appetite', 'baby who was captured', and the halachic implications attributed to each such type, is a collection of errors. We must examine the nature of this new type and formulate the correct attitude towards it from a halachic perspective.

You can of course argue that the well-known claims of theHazo"a, Like the one that no one in our generation knows how to prove, actually intends to claim it itself. I highly doubt it, since in principle it is clear to him that it is a matter of being able to prove. There is still an instinct here and the belief exists in some way within the sinner. But even if this is true, it is not really important to me. This is the correct description, whether theHazo"a Whether he meant it or not, and it didn't come out of my reading of my writings. Hazo"a Or other recent ones, from ancient sources, from comparisons and difficulties, contradictions and excuses, but from conceptual analysis and sober observation of the contemporary situation. As I said, sometimes a first-order ruling is enough for conceptual analysis and sober observation of reality with common sense, and this makes all the chatter and comparisons that bend themselves to the ancient language unnecessary. The ancient language can give us directions, we can be impressed by the similarities and differences compared to the situation in our time, but it is not right to force the discussion into its framework. This goes a bit against the DNA of halakhic discourse, but it is still what is true. Sometimes we need to free ourselves from the tradition that binds us, because it actually distances us from doing God's will at this time. There is no need to add epicycles and differentials to existing theories and systems of concepts in order to explain a completely different phenomenon, as they used to do in Ptolemaic cosmology. Sometimes you have to change your perspective, just like Copernicus did, and then you discover that everything suddenly seems much simpler and more convincing.

We are left to ask ourselves how to truly relate to this phenomenon. If the answer cannot be derived from the existing halakhic conceptual system, we must formulate it ourselves.

What does this mean halachically?

Apparently everyone understands the idea that a person who does what he truly believes in is a complete rascal. It is clear that one cannot come to him with arguments if he does not know the truth. But from whom? The arguments arise here about how the Torah instructs to punish idolaters and heretics? From this seemingly follows the conclusion that different beliefs are a sin, and certainly not an argument for innocence (rape). In other words, the idea is certainly correct, but we have halachic evidence against it. Now it seems that the same methodological error described above appears here.

Consider the legend (see Sanhedrin 122b) according to which King Manasseh appears to Rav Ashi in a dream and tells him that if he were alive in his time, he would roll up the hem of his robe and run to worship idols. Again, there is a view here according to which circumstances and desires dictate sin, not perceptions. The Gemara also says in Yom Sat (see in the column575 ) describes that the people of the Great Knesset abolished the urge to worship idols, that is, they moved us to a state where sin is the result of perception and not just of impulses and influences. In my understanding, this is a legendary description of a cultural process that has passed through us throughout the generations, the formation of secularism. To understand this, think about the fact that today we are unable to understand the phenomenon of idolatry at all, since we do not have such an urge. It is clear to us that idolaters of the past simply believed in it and therefore did it. Therefore, we wonder how it is possible that they believed in the nonsense that a stone brings rain or cures. And hence we also do not understand why they were punished? What is the argument against them? After all, they really believed in it. The explanation for these two difficulties is that in the past it was a matter of urge and not of faith. They did not really believe in it but did so because of urge. That is why they are brought to them with allegations and therefore punished. Think about the urge to commit adultery. There, to this day, we understand that there can be a situation where a person acts in a way that he himself understands is inappropriate (to commit adultery with another person's wife). In the past, this was also the case with idolatry, they did it out of instinct and not because of another belief. This is what has changed since then, and this is what the Gemara describes with regard to the Great Knesset. From our perspective today, when it is clear to us that a person who observes the commandments of a certain religion does so because he believes in it, and someone who practices idolatry (when the instinct to do so has already been eliminated) probably truly believes in it, and therefore these things are really incomprehensible to us. This is an anachronism that results from our failure to take into account the change in reality that has occurred since then and to this day.

Many claim that it is impossible to see a worshipper of idols or an apocrypha as a rapist. This cannot protect the sinner, since it is a fact that worshippers of idols are severely punished (and it is clear that they worshipped because they believed in it). This is probably where Rabbi Brisk's well-known saying that an apocrypha in rape "is na'abich apocrypha" arose, meaning that according to his view, there is no rape claim for heresy. But this is the same mistake. In the past, worshippers of idols and apocrypha were punished because they did it out of instinct. They understood that they were sinners and yet they did it out of instinct. Therefore, they were punished. Today, there is a new situation, in which there are people who sin because they do not believe. Such people are indeed rapists, and there is no reason to punish them. It is not right to learn from past precedents that punish in such a situation as well. The precedents dealt with a different situation, of sin out of instinct.

We have seen that the explanation suggests that anyone who truly believes in what they are doing is a complete anos. In light of what I have explained, you will understand that there is also no halakhic evidence against it. This 'evidence' stems from ignoring the differences in circumstances between the past and the present, and from an unwillingness to break free from anachronistic conceptual systems.

One possible implication of this description is regarding the liability for sin. The Talmud cites several disputes regarding the status of a baby who was taken captive, whether he was raped or by mistake. According to the law, it is ruled that a baby who was taken captive is not raped but by mistake, and therefore he is liable for sin for every type of offense he committed (according to the number of disappearances. See the column on this in 441). My argument is that this ruling is based on the assumption that that infant must be aware of his basic religious duty, and what he lacked was information about each and every offense, and for each such omission he is guilty of a sin. This was indeed the case in the past. But the secular person of today will be guilty of at most one sin, if at all. His whole concern is one omission: the very religious obligation, and therefore he can be held guilty of at most one sin. Admittedly, such a fundamental omission could also be considered rape, and if so, then it does not entail a sin at all.

And indeed, we find a precedent for this matter in the well-known words of the Radbazar in his reply (Chad 4, Aleph Rana) on rape in the opinions presented in the column. 657:

A person who errs in one of the tenets of religion due to his own faulty knowledge is not considered an infidel, because he thinks that what he has learned is true, he is a heretic and exempt..

We see here that someone who errs through his own eyes is an anus. How does this reconcile with the obligation to pay the sin of a baby who was captured? It is clear that Radbaz understands that someone who errs through his own eyes is not a baby who was captured, and therefore is an anus and not a mistake. The baby does not err through his own eyes, but someone who lacks information, but one who errs through his own eyes is an anus. And these are my words.

In a column 372 I insisted that it is appropriate to judge a person according to his own system and not according to our system. The assumption underlying the matter is that a person who acts according to the best of his understanding, even if he is wrong, is a fornicator. Therefore, although his act is wrong and perhaps even bad, the person who did the act is not evil. The determination of whether a man is evil or not should be made according to his own system. Many believe that this is not the case in Halacha. There, people are judged even if they acted according to their system, and the evidence is that they punished idolaters and cast them into the pit of heretics. But according to what we have seen here, this is not the case. Those people with whom Halacha deals are not mistaken in their own judgment, but criminals due to instinct. They know their Lord and rebel against Him. At most, there are babies who are captured, and of course they are not punished. But none of these are mistaken in their own judgment, and therefore the question does not arise there whether to judge them according to their system. But someone who errs in his own judgment is a fornicator, and therefore, Halacha must also judge him according to his own system.

Note: Repressed faith

Many believe that Halacha sees us all as believers within ourselves. Every Jew is essentially a believer within himself, and his heresy and transgressions are the result of instinct. This is the phenomenon of repressed or unconscious faith (in the column 575 I dealt with the status of repressed beliefs. See also in the column 203 (On false consciousness). As a rule, I do not accept this claim, both factually and normatively. Factually, it is not true in my opinion that every Jew is a believer. Anyone who is an atheist is an atheist. Why assume that inside him he believes?! Where does this assumption come from? And that each of us is Abraham our father who discovered his God for himself? But even if I accept this strange factual assumption, normatively I do not accept that repressed beliefs have meaning. Even if inside he believes, it has no value. A person's views are only his conscious views, those that he has formulated and decided upon, and we are supposed to judge him according to his conscious system and not according to what is in the depths of his soul, even if we had a way of knowing what is there.

Many cite evidence for the concept of repressed faith from the law "force him until he says, 'I want it.'" As is well known, the Maimonides in the book of divorce, chapter 2, verse 22 (and see also the book of the act of sacrifice, chapter 4, verse 16) explains it on the basis of the assumption of repressed faith:

If the law allows him to be forced to divorce his wife and he does not want to divorce her, a court of Israel in any place and at any time prepares him until he says, "I want to," and writes the divorce, and it is a valid divorce. Likewise, if Gentiles beat him and told him to do what the Israelites tell you, and the Israelites pressed him into the hands of the Gentiles until he divorces her, then this is valid. And if the Gentiles themselves raped him until he wrote it, since the law allows him to write it, then this is an invalid divorce. And why is this divorce not nullified, since it is coercion whether by Gentiles or by Israelites, and they do not say coercion except for someone who is pressured and coerced to do something that is not required by the Torah to do, such as someone who was beaten until he sold or gave it away? But whoever was attacked by his evil inclination to break a mitzvah or commit a transgression and was beaten until he did something that he was obligated to do or until he refrained from something that was forbidden to do, this is not a coercion on his part, but he has coerced himself with his evil intention. Therefore, the one who does not want to be expelled because he wants to be from Israel wants to do all the mitzvahs and abstain from transgressions, and it is his inclination that attacked him, and since he was beaten until his inclination was exhausted, and he said, "I want to, I will already expel him at his will."…

This is a clear source for the thesis of the suppressed faith in every Jew. But note that its assumption is that every Jew who sins does so because of his evil nature and not because of a different perception. As I explained, today it is clearly seen that the situation is different. There are Jews who sin or do not observe the halakha because they do not believe in it. For them, this opinion of the Maimonides is not relevant, and in my opinion, the law of coercion does not apply in such cases either. In the case of an atheist husband or one who does not believe in the status of Mount Sinai and the obligation to it (even if he factually accepts the status), there is no way to coerce him and get out of the law of a fake divorce. See this in the column 199 And in the Hindi story there.

The words of the Rambam were spoken in an ancient period when it was assumed that sin is always due to an error or an instinct. But as mentioned, the situation is different today, and there are sinners and sinners today who are mistaken in their judgment. Therefore, one should not draw a conclusion from this Rambam for today, according to which a person who errs in his judgment is a sinner and in fact secretly believes that he is a sinner because of his instinct. It is not correct to apply to phenomena in our day the laws and concepts that were formulated in another era in which a different reality prevailed.

Conclusions

The conclusion is that today's convert, whether to another faith or to secularism, usually does not do so to anger or to appease, nor is he mistaken. He is simply mistaken in his judgment. A person who is a Christian or a secular Jew is not necessarily a criminal. He may simply be mistaken in his judgment. Even someone who converts to Christianity or converts (such a person certainly does not lack the relevant information, after all, he received it at home and in his upbringing) is not necessarily a criminal, but may also be mistaken in his judgment. He has reached a different conclusion.

It is true that even today there are those who act out of their evil instincts. I am not claiming here that this old phenomenon has become extinct. For example, many traditionalists are converts to appetite, since they know their Lord and even the information is not always lacking for them, but for some reason they do not do their duty. It follows from this that they are much worse than atheists and heretics, of course, since the latter are mistaken in their examination and are not criminals at all. Traditionalists of this type, on the other hand, are considered halakhically wicked (not morally but religiously). They know their Lord and rebel against him. There are of course also other types of traditionalists (those who do not really believe but are only connected to religious Jewish folklore, or to sentiments from their father's house). The same is true for types of secularists who know everything and understand their obligation and yet choose not to do so. They are also certainly criminals, and the ancient laws and concepts apply to them in full.

In conclusion, I will present here what I wrote in the aforementioned WhatsApp discussion:

All of these [=The inclusive approaches that depend on ancient concepts] Generalizations. A baby who is taken captive describes a person who makes wrong decisions based on partial information (through no fault of his own). There are quite a few secular people like that today (and religious people as well, but their decision happened to be correct). The indication is that, assuming that he is exposed to the full information, he will realize that he was wrong and decide differently. But today there are also people who make a wrong decision based on complete information. They simply think differently even though they do not lack any information. The indication is that no additional information will change their position (and not because of the evil inclination but because their perception is different). These are not really babies who are taken captive, unless you make a wild expansion of the meaning of the concept. Halacha sees them as consequentially wrong, and can still fully respect their decision in light of their own perception.

The assumption here is that there is a difference between judging a person (evil or righteous) and judging an action (good or bad). Judging a person should be done according to his or her own system (as long as it is formulated seriously, responsibly, and reasonably). This is not a baby that was captured, and yet this statement does not destroy anything in the Jewish halakhic and social structure.

I should note that although I argued that the traditionalist is worse than the atheist, this was said regarding the judgment of the man. At the same time, it is certainly possible to argue that the fact that the traditionalist performs more commandments than the atheist is a blessed matter. This is a judgment in terms of the act, and not in terms of the act. Furthermore, I will now argue that there is another difference in favor of the traditionalist over the secularist. As a background, I will mention thatMy articles "On the fall of a secularist in transgression," I argued that the one who does not believe in God and/or in the giving of the Torah, his commandments have no value and his transgressions are not transgressions either. He cannot be included in the minyan and his status is that of a flowerpot. A minyan requires ten people who understand the matter of prayer and the obligation to do so. They essentially join the prayer. Someone who cannot pray cannot be considered a worshipper, and therefore a secularist is not counted to create a minyan of ten worshippers. In this respect, the status of the traditionalist is better than that of the atheist. The atheist is a flowerpot and is not counted in the minyan. On the other hand, the traditionalist certainly joins, since he knows his Lord and understands the matter of prayer and the obligation, even though he rebels against it. The fact that he is more wicked does not mean that he joins the minyan less. The addition to the minyan and the invalidation of the atheist's commandments and transgressions is not a sanction but rather a necessary consequence of his perceptions. Therefore, the question of how wicked he is is irrelevant. The same is true of the traditionalist. His prayer and blessings are, of course, a commandment for everything, and precisely because of this, the fact that he does not do so makes him evil. In contrast, the atheist is incapable of observing commandments and transgressions, and therefore non-observance does not make him evil.

In light of comments I have received in the past, I must clarify and say that I do not intend to claim that an atheist is exempt from the commandments. He is a Jew and as such he is certainly obligated to them. Our duty is also to try and make him fulfill these obligations. My argument is only that as long as he is secular he cannot fulfill them, even if he wanted to. This is a different level of discussion.

I ended there with the following paragraph:

Of course, these are two ideal types, and usually people are somewhere in the middle between them. For example, one should discuss a person who, without additional information, can be freed from biases (conscious or not) and brought about a change in perception.

In other words, this typological discussion should also be taken with caution. It also describes ideal types and it is not right to stick to it when dealing with real people, flesh and blood. But the models, as mentioned, provide direction and a framework for systematic thinking on this subject. The diagnosis of each person in the particular situation before us, how to understand him and his assumptions, is of course a more complicated matter, and I will mention again that one must be careful here of dogmatism and excessive conceptual rigidity.