Harediism between a substantive definition and a sociological-institutional definition (column 731)

With God’s help

Some time ago I received Rabbi Menachem Navet's book, Haredim al-Dabru – Harediism between a sector and a movement, which deals with the definition of Harediism and misconceptions about it (both among the Haredi themselves and others). Anyone who wants a summary can listen to the interview with him here. The book, as expected from a work by Rabbi Navet, was fascinating and original, and I agreed with quite a few of the things I saw in it. And yet something about his main thesis bothered me throughout the reading. I constantly felt that Rabbi Navet, who obviously does not observe this phenomenon from the outside, presents Harediism too purely, and in fact sees it in his own image as his own image. He essentially presents us with what is desirable (in his eyes) instead of describing what is present (he even says so more than once). In my opinion, the product is not a description of Harediism as it is, which in my opinion is entirely what he calls a 'sector', but rather a kind of utopian model, what he calls 'Harediism as a movement.' The characteristics of Harediism in practice are different from what he describes, and he is aware of this but presents it as a deviation from the Haredi model. He calls on the Haredim to return to being a movement and not a sector, and also calls on scholars to understand that this is the true nature of Harediism. I strongly identify with the religious model that Rabbi Navet describes, but precisely because of this I do not see it as another type of Harediism but simply as modern religiosity. In other words, I do not agree with his proposal to define Harediism, but I agree with most of the religious model he describes in terms of content (I will elaborate more later).

Even if I accept his very definition of the Haredi movement, even as a utopia, it seems problematic to me as a definition of Haredi women. It is a description of some type of religiosity in general, not necessarily Haredi. I think the main point of disagreement between us is that in my opinion Harediism is indeed a sector and not a movement, and it is defined on the basis of its social institutions and the way it conducts itself practically, and less through the essence of the program that it proposes. Therefore, Rabbi Navet's move to try to present it as a movement, in my opinion, is essentially forcing it into this definition without any injustice. I am writing all of this here, in order to place everything that will be brought here later in a general context, and to help the reader follow the course of my words.

I must qualify this and say that in the column 693 I mentioned that I had always thought that Haredi was a sector, and at some point it became clear to me that it also had the characteristics of a unique movement, beyond the sector in which it was located. I argued there that Haredim see themselves as 'the next world' as opposed to 'this world'. This is an ideological characteristic of a distinct Haredi worldview, that is, a Haredi ideology, and not just a sectoral structure of a political establishment and movement. See also the column on this 720But Rabbi Navet's description does not coincide with this, and I do not accept it.

Later I will try to show all of this in more detail, but before that I must make an important methodological introduction that touches on the basis of the problems I described.

Methodological introduction

In my series of columns on poetry (107 – 113) I proposed a systematic methodological approach towards defining the concept of 'poetry'. In my remarks there, I discussed at length the difficulty that exists in defining complex concepts. We saw there that a definition is by its very nature simplistic and attempts to include diverse and complex phenomena within a single simple framework, and therefore there will usually be quite a few phenomena that seem to belong to the defined concept and yet do not fit well into its definition. Many people believe that this undermines the proposed definition and perhaps the very pretense of seeking a definition for such concepts. They claim that life is more complicated than philosophy, and it is wrong to put it into a narrow intellectual framework that is good for theoretical thought but not for life itself.

My goal there was to show that this appeal is neither accurate nor necessary. Indeed, the study does not always capture reality in its entirety, but that is not its role either. Theoretical analysis tries to put its finger on the essence of the phenomenon in question. After understanding that this is the essence, we often find unusual phenomena that are on the margins of the defined concept. They contain the essence but in different doses (somewhat similar to what I described inMy articles on sustainability). For example, in that series of columns we saw several genres that have the fundamental element of poetry, but it appears in them in different doses, and other elements are mixed in. The definition of poetry attempts to capture the essence of the matter, the one that is common to all its manifestations. This should also be true of the definition of Harediism. Harediism operates in the world and is made up of flesh and blood people, and as such it is complex and difficult to fit into a rigid and unambiguous conceptual framework. There are many different shades of Haredi. Therefore, we should not expect a definition that will cover every Haredi person. On the other hand, it is not right to give up on trying to define the essence of the concept of Harediism because of this. The argument is that if there is a collection of different phenomena and shades that we associate with the concept of Haredi or Harediism, they must have something in common that appears in all of them in different doses, and the theoretical definition strives to reveal it.

This introduction works in favor of Rabbi Navet's methodology. The fact that he does not capture all Haredi behavior and all Haredi shades should not be a detractor from the picture he presents. He may capture the essence of the phenomenon, and we should not reject this because of various phenomena on its margins. The question is, did he really capture the essence of Harediism? In my opinion, no.

Beyond that, there is an inherent difficulty in discussions of this kind. When you come to define a phenomenon or a social group, the question arises as to how closely you should adhere to what those who take part in the phenomenon or those who are members of the group really believe. I mean here their perceptions, values, and way of thinking, as well as their actual conduct (which does not always and does not necessarily reflect their stated perceptions). Are you allowed to present a different model because of a personal criticism you have of the perceptions and conduct of those people? When you come to define Haredi, are you supposed to adhere to what those who define themselves as such actually think and do, or can you discuss this concept a priori, and present a picture that does not entirely correspond to the thinking and conduct of the group members? Ostensibly, it can be argued that Haredi is X, and the fact that many Haredi (perhaps most of them) believe it is Y is an error in their perception of themselves, or perhaps a deviation (intentional or not) from the concept as it originally was.

As an example, let's look at a study that deals with the question of what Judaism is. The sociologist is usually supposed to describe what Jews think and do, and extract from this the definition of Judaism. What should he do if he believes that they are acting in a way that is not in accordance with the sources of Judaism? Is he allowed to define Judaism according to what he thinks and say that they are mistaken or deviate from the original meaning of the concept, or is it that as a sociologist he is obliged to present it as it actually is? There is no single correct answer here. On the surface, it seems that two types of research are involved: sociological research and conceptual-theoretical-conceptual research (for a similar distinction, seeMy articles on the humanities).

The study of Harediism is inherently sociological research. As such, it is of course supposed to stick to the facts, that is, to the way of thinking and the behavior of the people we are studying. Sociological research is not supposed to criticize people for their way of thinking and behavior, but mainly to describe them. It is not right to bring the researcher himself, his personality, values, and thoughts, into the picture. Of course, if there is a deviation between the way of thinking of those people and the sources on which they themselves rely, or between their actual behavior and their theoretical and ideological doctrine, the researcher can present this and even criticize them for it. He can describe the ideal picture that is more accurate in his opinion, and point out the gaps between it and reality. This is certainly true for research that deals with the question of what Judaism is. But as I will see shortly, with regard to Harediism, this possibility is less present. In any case, here we have moved from sociological research to philosophical research, which deals with the conceptual-theoretical level.

Conceptual research can and should enter into an analysis of the concept and its sources, into the theoretical definitions of the Haredi Mishnah from its sources, and from there derive a picture of Harediism. The product can of course be different from the picture painted by sociological research, which is essentially descriptive. And of course, philosophical-theoretical research, unlike sociological research, can certainly criticize the members of the group and claim that they have deviated from the path. Not necessarily in the name of what appears to the researcher himself, but from a comparison with their own doctrine and sources. Thus, one can claim that religious Judaism does not actually act in accordance with the principles of Judaism (every prophet or preacher who rebukes the people essentially claims this). This is a completely legitimate claim on the philosophical-theoretical level, but it is less relevant to sociological research. At most, the sociologist can offer explanations for why such a deviation occurred.

But, as mentioned, with regard to the study of Haredi, the situation is slightly different from that which prevails with regard to the study of Judaism. Haredi women do not have binding canonical sources. This is a social-sociological phenomenon. There are, of course, writings and testimonies about the goals of Haredi thinkers and leaders, but they do not have binding canonical status, and it is difficult to claim that they are the ones who define the concept of Haredi. If a person discovers that a Jewish group is acting contrary to the Torah, Talmud, and Poskim, he is entitled to criticize them for this and claim that they are not truly Jews (i.e., do not think and act in a Jewish way). This is a legitimate result of substantive-theoretical study (as opposed to sociological research). But if I discover that there is a group of Haredi who do not act according to the writings of Rabbi Yaakov Rosenheim or the Chofetz Chaim, it is highly doubtful whether this is sufficient basis to say that they are not Haredi. The conclusion is that if in the study of Judaism one can choose the dosage of sociology versus essence, the study of Harediism by its very nature should focus more on sociology than on essence (it is not clear to what extent there is essence there at all. More on this below).

Beyond that, the distinction between these two types of research is not as sharp as it seems. As I will explain immediately, it is difficult to define sociological research in isolation from substantive research. Note that by the very nature of sociological research, it must be based on definitions that differentiate between groups that belong to the same type. For example, between ultra-Orthodox and modern religious Jews, who are two different species within the type of religious Jews. That is, there are (ethnic) Jews, within whom (sociologically, even if not substantively)[1] There are religious people and those who are not, and among the religious there are Haredi and those who are not. This taxonomy is a necessary basis for sociological research, since it is what determines who I should study in order to reach conclusions about the Haredi or the religious Zionists. A definition that would fit every religious Jew, and certainly one that fits every Jew, would not be sufficient as an answer to the question of what Haredi is. But even a more narrow definition that would fit a given group of religious Judaism, if this subgroup is different from sociological Haredi, is a problematic definition. And here is the problem: in order to study the Haredi sociologically, you must decide who a Haredi is. Before any research, we must decide who the members of the group being studied are. Only after you have defined this can you describe the way of thinking and behavior of a Haredi person or group. Studying Haredi can only come after I know what Haredi is. But as long as I have not studied what Haredi is on a sociological level, how will I know conceptually who and what Haredi is? And as long as I have not determined what Harediism is at the essential level, how can I determine what sociological Harediism is? There is a methodological loop here that does not allow us to disconnect between the essential study and the sociological research, at least when it comes to ideological groups.

Consider definition X that is proposed for the term 'Haredi'. It obviously does not apply to all so-called Haredim. Does this mean that not everyone who is called Haredi is truly Haredi? Does this mean that the definition is incorrect? Does this mean that when we examined Harediism, we did not examine the Haredi group but a different group? It seems inevitable that we should introduce a conceptual study into the sociological investigation, but on what will we base the conceptual study, if not on the way of thinking of those who are sociologically defined as Haredi? Furthermore, we must be aware that if the scope of the Haredi group that emerges from the conceptual-substantive study (who is Haredi) is very different from that accepted in sociological definitions (whether it does not apply to all Haredi or whether it also applies to members of other groups), then it is important to emphasize this when presenting the results and findings, and in fact to reconsider their very validity. The same is true if there is a difference between the group's actual conduct and the theoretical definition we found for it. I described a similar phenomenon more generally in the column 715 (In scholarly jargon, one could say that this is essentially a distinction between the taste of Harediism and the fence of Harediism.)

Summary of the introduction and compromise

These introductions are important because, in my opinion, Rabbi Navet's research fails precisely on these points. He paints a picture of Harediism from a substantive perspective (what is right to think as Haredi), but this picture comes out very different from the sociological phenomena of Harediism (they do see themselves as a sector and not as a movement). On the other hand, the picture he describes (the 'Haredi' movement) also fits many religious Jews who are not Haredi. As I noted above, the root of the problem is that it is not clear how it is possible to do substantive research on Harediism at all, if it does not have binding canonical sources. This is a sociological phenomenon, and as such it is very difficult to separate the substantive-normative question from the factual-sociological question. In this sense, Harediism is what the (sociological) Haredi think, and of course it is only about those characteristics that differ in the thinking of Haredi from the thinking of other religious Jews (therefore, their loyalty to the Torah and the mitzvot cannot be a good definition).

From here on, I will critically review the six parts of Rabbi Navet's book. I highly recommend keeping these introductions in mind as you read. The letters at the beginning of the following titles indicate the part of the book in question. I will not review all the parts of the book, but I will try to review the first part, which leads us to Rabbi Navet's proposal for how to view Haredi Judaism.

A. Research into Haredi Judaism

The first part of the book deals with the general methodological question of how to research Harediism, between sociology and ideology. I already touched on this in the first part of the column, so I will not go into the matter again here. Nevertheless, it is interesting to quote Benny Brown's opening to his book, A guide to ultra-Orthodox society (Also cited in Rabbi Navet, p. 23). In the 1992 budget law, a certain amount was dedicated to "cultural activities for the Haredim." The Ma'ale association, which is a religious Zionist association, petitioned the High Court of Justice demanding to receive a share of this budget. Its claim was that a Haredi is a person who is afraid of the word of God, and religious Zionists also meet this criterion and therefore deserve a share of the same budget. The panel headed by Aharon Barak understood that there was a somewhat contentious issue here, and it is clear that this was not the legislator's intention (although the legislator's intention is not necessarily a relevant criterion in legal interpretation, as Aharon Barak himself has written more than once), but when they came to justify their decision, they seemed to have taken a bit of a detour to explain why they rejected the petition.

They explained there that the term 'Haredi' in the language of the law refers to a special Jewish religious movement that is characterized by particularly religious strictness in all matters concerning education, the nature of community life, and the ways of life. In the vernacular, "Haredi" and "observant Jews" are not the same (of course, this does not mean much, since Haredi can be defined as someone who is very or completely committed to the Torah and mitzvot. There are quite a few who think so. According to this definition, some of the religious Zionists can certainly be included there). The law itself also distinguishes between Haredi culture and Torah culture (by the way, in my opinion, Haredi will be able to benefit from the budgets of Torah culture, since it seems that they are also included in the term 'Torah'. Wonderful of our legislators). The ruling there reflects the ambiguity inherent in the definition of the term 'Haredi'. What exactly distinguishes them from other religions? By the way, I think that the sentence that deals with excessive strictness in education, a special character of community life and lifestyles, accurately describes every religious group. I don't know if in the ruling they also detailed these unique characteristics or if they were satisfied with this generic description that obviously doesn't add much to the understanding of the concept of 'Haredi'.

What is interesting is that Rabbi Navet begins his book with this ruling and ends it with a definition that, in my opinion, leaves this ambiguity intact (although I will see later). It seems to me that if the judges had read Rabbi Navet's book and adopted his conclusions, they would have had to grant the petition and also budget for some religious-Zionist and even traditional elements (although this was clearly not the legislator's intention).

In the remainder of the first part, Rabbi Navet reviews the existing approaches among various scholars, and rejects them. In my opinion, not always rightly. For example, he writes that regarding listening to the elders of the generation, it does not specifically distinguish the Haredim, nor does it characterize all of them. But as I have already noted, extreme phenomena do not necessarily threaten the validity of the definition. He himself speaks of flexible definitions for complex phenomena, as I also mentioned above. But here I am concerned with the definition that he himself proposes, and not with a comparative examination of other proposals. Listening to people who are defined by the group as elders of the generation is certainly a distinct Haredi characteristic, although it is also shared by Haredi groups. I will note that some of Navet's definitions are shared by more distant groups (such as the traditionalists).

Important interlude: Harediism between essence and politics

At the end of Chapter 4, Rabbi Navet writes that the Haredi community sees itself as an ancient phenomenon that continues the tradition of Israel as it has been since then, contrary to the assertions of scholars (mainly following Yaakov Katz) that the Haredi community and Orthodoxy in general are new phenomena, in fact a certain reaction to modernity. Rabbi Navet argues that although the Haredi institutionalization is new, it is the use of new tools to defend an ancient perception and phenomenon. He does not accept the claim that the Haredi community is a new phenomenon, if only because the Haredim themselves do not perceive themselves as such. Here too, I disagree with his methodological claim. The self-perception of the group members is of some importance, but it is not decisive. It is certainly possible that they live in a movie as if they are continuing the ancient tradition as it was, but this is an illusion. A researcher who examines their actual conduct and compares it to what was in the past can certainly claim that this is an incorrect self-perception (false belief). I once quoted here a statement by my uncle, a Hasidic resident of the United States, who used to say, And Rava must have learned Yiddish, because they knew how to learn (as is well known, those who know how to learn learn in Yiddish). He of course knew that this was not factually true, but he lived with the firm conviction that it was true. The same is true of the statements that they did not change their language and dress, which come to praise those who walk around in the dress of 17th-century Polish gentiles and speak a language (Yiddish) that is a German dialect, which undoubtedly Moses, Rav Ashi, Maimonides and the authors of the Toss never even dreamed of. The Haredim excel at inventing ethos and adapting history and facts to suit their needs. Therefore, relying on their own judgment regarding the origin of values and norms practiced among them sounds a bit naive to me and is not at all recommended for improving research objectivity.

Here I will present a fundamental comment that I have about the entire course of the book. The researchers are completely right. Harediism is indeed a new phenomenon. It is a new social institution that came to protect ancient religious perceptions. But the ancient perceptions protected by it are not Haredi but religious Jewish. Harediism is only the form of institution and the defense tactic, not the perceptions themselves. Therefore, it is indeed a new phenomenon, and the researchers are right to focus on the study of Haredi social institutions and not on the essential perceptions. As mentioned, the study of Harediism is supposed to focus on sociology and not on the essence. And if the Haredi themselves perceive things differently (I doubt this), then they are living in a movie. This does not prove that the researchers are wrong. As we have seen, a sociologist can claim that the objects of his research live in a movie.

To clarify, I will add that if Rabbi Navet thinks that he does indeed represent the essential religious position of the Chofetz Chaim, then he also lives in the film. Those characteristics of his that I like, such as the breadth of the canvas, the reference to external philosophical and academic sources, their assimilation into the religious concept, the integration of women and their empowerment, and so on, are completely unsuitable for the Haredi core (although there were of course a few other Haredi thinkers and leaders, such as Breuer and others. This is a negligible minority that does not represent anything. Moreover, this minority was religious-modern and not Haredi, except perhaps for his attitude towards Zionism and secularism). In other words, not only is the picture he portrays not Haredi, but this picture describes him himself, and this means that he himself is not Haredi.

On page 60, Rabbi Navet comments on an internal contradiction in the research concept of Harediism (this is detailed in more detail on page 69).[2] On the one hand, scholars say that this is a new phenomenon, a reaction to secularization, and on the other hand, they see Harediism as an old concept that has lost its appeal. I don't understand what contradiction he sees here. The new phenomenon they point to is not the content that the Haredim are struggling with and that they are anxious about. The content is indeed old, Jewish tradition and halakha. But this is not Harediism. What is new in the Haredi way is the form of defense against the changes in reality that threaten this content. The Haredi are trying to preserve the old tradition, but they are doing so in new forms. The argument is that while Judaism has always stood against the winds of time in various forms, it has also been influenced by them and allowed itself to change according to them and in response to them. The Haredi are trying to harden their attitude to changes in the world and raise the walls in order to not give room to such influences, and this is a policy that is itself a new phenomenon, even if its goal is to preserve old content.

Wearing 17th-century Polish clothes and speaking in an early medieval German dialect are old and irrelevant matters (of course, the clothes and language are just an example here). Only the insistence on doing so is new, and this is the essence of Harediism. And more generally, what the Haredim are trying to preserve is faith and tradition in their old (but not really ancient) form, and this is why researchers say that in our world this tradition is irrelevant (since our tradition requires changes and adaptations to the new world). Their argument is that the content that the Haredim preserve in the new world that exists today is old and irrelevant. The argument is that Jewish tradition teaches that the old traditions must undergo changes in form under the influence of the new world (this is the thesis of modern Orthodoxy. See in the columns 475 – 480) to be relevant. The extreme conservative policy of the Haredim opposes this, and is thus new. These two claims do not contradict each other in any way.[3]

Between uniqueness and importance of characteristics in definition

It can of course be argued that if we want to define Harediism, we should focus on the content that is preserved and not on the forms and institutions that were developed for this purpose (clothes, language, parties, rabbinical institutions, closures, expansion of concepts such as 'Torah knowledge', and so on). The content is indeed old and consistent with tradition, and perhaps this old content is the definition of Harediism. Institutions and politics are indeed a new matter, but this is not the essence of Harediism. Later on, it seems that Rabbi Navet really claims exactly this. However, it is already important for me to point out my main criticism of his approach. Loyalty to tradition, to Torah, and to Halacha does not define Harediism, but rather Torah and Halacha Judaism in general. Harediism is a particular shade within this tradition (Haredi is a species within the type of observant Jew, who is himself a type of Jew). What distinguishes this species is precisely the forms of preservation it adopts, that is, its political dimension. In other words, when we come to define Harediism, we must focus specifically on the political dimensions and not on the content, since the content (loyalty to Torah and Halacha) does not specifically distinguish them.

I agree that this does not mean that politics is more important to them than content (although sometimes it really seems that way). Rather, politics is what distinguishes them, and therefore, for the purpose of defining the phenomenon, we must use it. Just as when I wanted to define an observant Jew, I would not focus on strictly observing the prohibition of murder, even though this is the most severe and important prohibition in halacha. The reason for this is that the prohibition of murder does not specifically distinguish observant Jews, and therefore, despite its importance, it is not right to hang the definition of Judaism specifically on it. Aristotle already taught us that when we come to define any concept, we must present the type to which it belongs and what distinguishes it as a species compared to the other species that belong to the same type. The characteristics that will be included in the definition are chosen according to their uniqueness and not according to their importance. This is not always the same. Incidentally, many Haredim fail in the same mistake from the opposite side. There is a disdain for moral values that are not clearly identified with halacha and Torah (at least as they understand them). Again, the reason for this is that for them, if it is not specifically unique to Jews, then it is not important. But this is a mistake. There are values and principles that are very important and yet are not unique to Judaism. On the contrary, sometimes precisely because of their importance and thoroughness, they are required of everyone in the world, not just Jews.

B. The Secularization Thesis and Dichotomies

The second part of the book deals with the secularization thesis and its impact on reality itself, and no less on the research and its researchers. Rabbi Navet's claim is that the researchers themselves live in a false consciousness, that is, they are unaware of their own biases when it comes to researching Harediism. Their conclusions that this is a new phenomenon (which is also supposed to disappear, according to their assumption) are based on biases of which they are unaware. The foundation of these biases is the 'secularization thesis.' The researchers see Harediism as a reaction to the phenomenon of secularization, and therefore when we come to examine their words, we must investigate the phenomenon of secularization itself.

After describing the emergence of secularism and its meaning, Rabbi Navet moves on to the implications of the matter for our issue. After secularism was created, a sharp dichotomy was created between secular and religious. Thus, religion became the negation of secular freedom and the absence of restrictions, in thought and action. Religion is perceived as opposed to rationality, culture, and science. Clinging to the old and opposing the new. The secularization thesis also sees secularism as a natural and necessary development of the world, its progress. In the secular age, it is precisely religiosity that is perceived as the approach that requires justification. The default is secularism, and therefore religious approaches that cling to the old tradition can at most be perceived as a new response to secularism.

In the second part, Rabbi Navet emphasizes three dichotomies that were created as a result of the secularization thesis: the old and the new, the inner and the outer, and the heavenly and the earthly (the sacred and the profane). The religious person clings to the old and alienates and opposes the new. He is concerned with his own affairs and the affairs of his community and tradition, and not with the wider, global world. The religious person's concern is with the sacred and the metaphysical plane, with religion and spirituality, while the secular person is concerned with this world and its development. In any case, it is clear that the objective world is the secular one, and everything else is a subjective matter, perhaps imagined, that belongs to the individual's and perhaps also the community's. This does not concern the real, objective world. Here begin three chapters (7-9), each of which deals with one of these dichotomies.

Again, between religious and ultra-Orthodox

Before I continue, I will make an important point. Rabbi Navet challenges the secularization thesis in two different dimensions: 1. The assumption that secularism is the starting point and that religious belief is what requires tzedakah. The burden of proof on her and her desire to express herself within the realm of the public domain is a compulsion that tzedakah requires. Rabbi Navet does not accept this. 2. The relegation of religion to the confines of the sacred (heavenly), the old, and the inner. Rabbi Navet claims that religion has something to say in all aspects and on both sides of these dichotomies. He is not willing to accept the reduction of religion to these three levels.

This is the place to return to the same comment I made above. In my opinion, Rabbi Navet is completely right about religion. I share his views about the bias created by the secularization thesis. But this is true of religiosity, not of Harediism. On the contrary, Harediism is that part of religious Judaism that fully accepts the secularization thesis, and therefore also accepts a convergence on the inner, the sacred, and the old. This is the term 'Noah's Ark', which is attributed mainly to yeshivas but also to Haredi society and the community in general, which is so essential to the Haredi ethos. Modern religiosity is the one that challenges this, and therefore it is precisely it that is in conflict with the secularization thesis. Harediism fully shares secularism in its perception of religion, and this is precisely what is new about it. Again, Harediism is indeed a sector and not a movement. Here again, we can see that Rabbi Navet himself is not truly Haredi. He defends his own perception with strength and wisdom, but is mistaken in seeing it as a description of a Haredi perception. How can one dispute that the essence of Harediism is separation and convergence, separate units in the army (even for the small minority who are already ready to enlist), separate educational institutions, the press, and the media (Internet and cellular) with strict censorship of everything that happens outside, which is also careful not to engage in anything that happens outside, including theoretical areas such as those that Rabbi Navet himself often engages in, and of course current and political discussions. The essence of Harediism is separation and social institutionalization, not the content that this separation is intended to preserve. On pp. 7-76 he describes the problem of "integrating" the Haredi, a term that ostensibly expresses a point of view of the secularization thesis. The general space is secular, and the question is how it is possible to integrate the Haredi from the bubble of the "inside" into the "outside". However, he again chooses to ignore the fact that all Haredi (!) fully share this perception. Even if they accept the secularization thesis. I wrote "everyone," but there are exceptions, like Rabbi Navet himself and a few other exceptions. You see, here too, Rabbi Navet represents a modern religious position, not a Haredi one, and insists on presenting it as a Haredi one.

In Chapter 9 he deals with the relationship between the heavenly and the earthly, that is, with the separation from mundane life and worldly wisdom and science (and, in fact, facts in general). And again he is right in describing the mundane thesis and the biases that arise from it, but he is wrong in his diagnosis of Harediism. Harediism fully accepts this thesis, and therefore distinguishes itself from mundane life and external wisdom. It is modern religiosity that undermines this dichotomy, and Rabbi Navet is once again in it and yet insists on presenting himself as Haredi.

In Chapter 10, which concludes the second part, Rabbi Navet emphasizes the biases created by the secularization thesis in the three circles and its transparency, meaning that we are all captives within it and do not notice it. I completely agree, except that this captivity characterizes both the secular and the ultra-Orthodox (as he himself writes there). The only ones who truly come out against these biases are the modern religious. Rabbi Navet calls on the ultra-Orthodox to free themselves from the biases and captivity in this perspective, which he claims turns them from a movement into a sector, but he does not notice that he is actually calling on the ultra-Orthodox to stop being ultra-Orthodox and become modern religious. Ultra-Orthodoxism is a sector, not a movement. The movement he is talking about is (Torah) Judaism, not Ultra-Orthodoxism. Ultra-Orthodoxism is that sector in Judaism that lovingly accepts the secularization thesis and therefore converges in the realm of the old-inner-heavenly and distinguishes itself as an ideology from all the circles outside.

C. Harediism as a theological movement

In this section, Rabbi Navet introduces his own proposal to define Haredi. He argues that concepts that are associated with Haredi in the research world, such as "Da'at Torah", "Hevrat HaLomam", "Hegbahat HaMomot", "Noah's Ark", "News forbidden from the Torah", "Rabbinish rule" and the like, miss the point. This is an outsider's view of the Haredi world. The Haredi themselves do not see themselves around these concepts, but around an uncompromising commitment to Torah and mitzvot. Beyond my comment in the introduction regarding the non-binding status of the group's self-perception in order to arrive at its definition, and beyond the dilemma of looking from the inside or outside, it seems that such a description apparently suffers from another flaw that I also described above: it mixes the important with the unique. There is no doubt that Torah and mitzvot are more important to the Haredi person than the rule of the rabbis or Noah's Ark, since all of these came to serve him. The question is, is this unique to Haredi? We have seen that important characteristics are not sufficient for defining a phenomenon. They should primarily be unique. Is this characteristic unique to the Haredi? It is highly doubtful. Many religious Jews see commitment to Torah and commandments as the essence of their existence, and therefore it is difficult to see this as a uniquely Haredi characteristic. And if this characteristic also describes non-Haredi groups, what remains that distinguishes the Haredi group from other religious groups are the social institutions and the list of concepts presented above. Although they are less important, they seem to be the distinguishing and unique characteristics, and therefore the definition of Harediism should be based on them.

Rabbi Navet does feel this and goes on to argue that only among the Haredi is this commitment the essence of their existence and the essence of their lives. Their entire world and their daily lives, cultural events and various activities revolve around it. Social institutions and the way they conduct themselves in life come to serve this fundamental idea. Therefore, from the perspective of the Haredi person, anyone who abandons religious commitment and the Haredi world is likened to a dead person, which is not characteristic of other religious worlds. In other religious worlds, one can find strict observance of commandments, but there these are not necessarily the definers of existence and the determinants of language.

The rest of the book is mainly a continuation of other minor characteristics, such as the traditional perception of the Torah (he connects Harediism with traditionalism), the lack of self-awareness and the absence of ideologies, the issue of the Haredi's 'anxiety', and other social phenomena. All of this essentially boils down to the distinction between a movement and a sector. But the gist of Rabbi Navet's proposal has been presented here. Regarding the continuation, I have a great deal to comment on, but these are specific comments. My goal in this column is to present a critique of the gist of his words and the core of his move, and that is what I will do now.

Two notes

Rabbi Navet essentially proposes replacing the institutional-sociological-social definition (which is accepted among scholars) with a substantive definition (which is accepted when viewed from the inside). He goes on to describe this as replacing the sector with a movement, and adds that this is not just a theoretical proposal but a practical call that is also addressed to the Haredi society itself. It too needs to internalize and assimilate that it constitutes a movement and not a sector, since sometimes it internalizes the external perception of its scholars and gets a little lost between the main thing and the main thing.

Let me start by saying that I absolutely do not disparage this suggestion, and it seems that there is definitely some truth to it. It captures an important and essential characteristic of the Haredi world. Nevertheless, I will make two comments about it:

1. This also exists in the Haredi society, and perhaps not only in it. It is true that life is conducted on broader levels, but everything is done from and within the language of Torah. One can look at this with a negative eye and say that these are excuses. In fact, they want to live a secular life and give it kosher retrospectively in terms of Torah, but this is an incorrect view. Their religious world is broader, and it is still definitely at the focus and center of their lives. Until not long ago, even in a regular religious Zionist home, far from the Haredi, a child's abandonment of religious commitment was a huge crisis, just like in the Haredi world. This is changing in recent years for various reasons (for example, the expansion of the phenomenon and its recognition), but this is also true of the Haredi world. It's just that these processes happen more slowly there. But everything happens there too.
2. Even if this characteristic is unique to the Haredi world, to abandon the entire institutional and social structure (expressed in the collection of concepts presented above) because of it seems unserious. It is very difficult to accept that all of these are deviations from the main point and do not concern the definition of Harediism. The fact is that other societies that experience the religious and Torah world in the same way, but operate through different social structures and institutions, will not accept the title 'Haredi'. Of course, one can continue to insist that this is a deviation and that in fact the essence is the Torah as defining identity and everything else is fluff, but this is already mainly a semantic argument.

The meaning of the definition

To clarify this, let's try to think about how important the definition of Haredi is. What are the implications of the question of whether Haredi is defined through an identity commitment to Torah or through its social institutions? Ostensibly, it is just a semantic matter, one can define it this way and another, since both definitions well characterize the group in question. So what is the meaning of the claim that this definition is correct and that one is not? Without any implication for the difference between the definitions, the discussion is emptied of content.

Such implications can be sought in several directions. For example, at the judicial level. Is being Haredi according to the institutional definition an invalid or inappropriate matter? Later in the book it seems that Rabbi Navet's intention is to call for a change in institutional perceptions in favor of the essential perception. To transform from a sector into a movement, and in the process to give up some of these institutions or the dosage of their importance. But in this way, Rabbi Navet shares the widespread criticism of Harediism as a sector. He also sees its ills and calls for them to be changed (not necessarily with all the details). Hence, he, like other critics of Haredi society, sees it as flawed and calls for its change. So what does it mean for Mai Navet to propose an alternative definition for Haredi society? He is essentially calling on us to abandon adherence to technical sectoral institutions and focus on the Torah and commitment to it. Just like all other critics of Harediism.

It is important to understand that these are not just technical institutions, but rather essential characteristics of Harediism, such as closure to other worlds, resistance to integrating different fields of knowledge, lack of openness to values that come from outside (even if they find an anchor in the Torah in the broad sense), etc. All of these are intrinsically linked to that atmosphere in which the Torah is the essence of life.

Haredi and modern religiosity

Rabbi Navet is essentially calling on Haredi society to detach itself to a certain extent from its technical-institutional characteristics, or at least to reduce their importance, and thus become a modern religious society. What should remain of Haredi in the phase he proposes is probably an additional emphasis on faith and Torah as identity-defining elements, which he claims probably does not exist in the modern religious world.

I don't think you'll find any principled opposition to such a proposal in a modern religious society. Many there would be willing to accept a broad and open Torah that constitutes the essence of their existence and the essence of their lives. By the way, I'm not at all sure that it doesn't exist there. Certain circles of modern religiosity certainly revolve around Torah, but the concept of 'Torah' itself is much broader for them. By way of refinement, we can say that there we are talking about Torah and not about the Torah. Therefore, I don't think that much of the Haredi community will remain if and when it adopts Rabbi Navet's proposals (don't worry. There's no chance). This, of course, indicates that the institutional-social characteristics are precisely the essence of Harediism, and renouncing them would actually annihilate Harediism.

Furthermore, if modern religious society shares this concept in principle but, according to him, is less successful in implementing it (i.e., they have not succeeded in creating a situation where the Torah and religious language constitute an existential identity and the essence of life), doesn't this mean that the Haredi social institutions are necessary to create this atmosphere? In other words, that without them it cannot exist. Is it possible to create a world that breathes Torah in all its ways, along with openness to the outside world, its wisdom, and its values? Very doubtful. It is possible to create a broad world that breathes Torah, but it is doubtful whether it is possible to create a broad world that breathes Torah. This is a kind of oxymoron, since the difference between Torah and Torah is mainly the width of the canvas. Part of the problem is the prohibition against examining your beliefs, forming your own position, being in contact with people who are different from you, giving women a different status, reading external literature, especially in fields such as philosophy, biblical criticism and archaeology, religious research, and more, seeing the Tz'al (= righteous and wicked) as an ideal model of a servant of God, and so on. All of these belong to institutional and non-essential Haredi (since there is no connection here to commitment to the Torah). And yet, is it possible to open up all of these and preserve that naive and innocent Haredi existence (in both senses), the existential traditionalism that he describes? To the best of my judgment – no. It seems that Rabbi Navet is actually calling on us to create a broad religious and Torah world that maintains its narrowness. Beyond the practical difficulty of creating such a world, it is difficult for me to even understand what I wrote here.

In other words, I wonder whether such an argument that proposes replacing the institutional-social definition with substantive definitions does not undermine the very possibility of change, and alternatively, Haredi in general? On the surface, it seems very tempting to take the best of all worlds, but it is not at all certain that this is possible. As mentioned, adhering to the Torah with a broad canvas is an oxymoron, and adhering to the Torah with a broad canvas already exists in the modern religious world, and it is unlikely to be seen as another shade of Haredi. And even if it does not exist, then Rabbi Navet's proposal is at most to improve modern religiosity and not to return to being Haredi. The term Haredi is emptied of its content here, and this is because, as I have said, it really has no substantive content, but only institutional-social. It is not for nothing that modern religious society is not united by social institutions and is a collection of individuals. This is almost a derivative of such a broad religious necessity, and it seems to me that even in this sense, Rabbi Navet himself (as far as I know him from his writings) is completely there and not on the Haredi side.

I must add that in my opinion a religious society that clings to the Torah, even if it were defined and even practical, is not an ideal society. Living around Torah is excellent, but not living around the Torah. This is a limited Torah that may be easier to cling to and breathe as a whole life, but in my understanding this is not really the Torah that was given to us at Sinai. This is at most a sect with some proximity to the original Torah (the Haredi sect). That Torah, the one given to us at Sinai, should be present in all areas of life, and in such a situation it is certainly possible to breathe Torah, but it is doubtful whether it is possible to breathe the Torah. And as mentioned, when we breathe Torah in a broad Torahic world of this kind, you have received modern religiosity in all its glory.

To conclude

As mentioned, the rest of the book, in my opinion, is mostly details. The rest is here. Because I have already gone on long enough, I will not continue with the criticisms I have about the rest of his words (see Review (Additional to Rabbi Navet's book written by my friend Rabbi Moshe Shochat. You can find additional points there.)

I will only conclude by saying that I am willing to agree that Haredi is a movement and not just a sociological sector, meaning that it is also distinguished by ideology and not just by social institutions, but I believe that this content is related to its being a collection of "people of the next world," as I explained in the columns. 693 and-720. Rabbi Navet's description does not coincide with this, and, as mentioned, I do not accept it. The existential commitment to the world of Tair is indeed a unique Haredi characteristic, but I do not think that Rabbi Navet intended this. At least from my acquaintance with him, he means the Torah and not Tair, and here I very much accept this, but I do not see how such modern religiosity can constitute an alternative definition for Haredi.

I know that it is not acceptable to refer to a person's body, but here I cannot avoid saying again that in my opinion Rabbi Navet himself does not meet these definitions of Haredi. I cannot delve into the intricacies of his soul and religious consciousness, and I do not know him well enough, but a broad and open Torah like I see in him seems to me to be a completely modern religiosity. As mentioned, I myself identify very much with this breadth (even if we have quite a few substantive arguments, as I have found out more than once in the past), but it is a modern religiosity that I find difficult to associate with Haredi.

[1] I am implying here that I believe there is no secular Judaism. There are secular Jews. See on this inbooklet Mine on Secular Judaism (and more on that) here).

[2] As far as I can see, this point does not appear before page 60, although he seems to refer to it as if it had already been discussed before. The discussion itself, as mentioned, is on page 69, and perhaps this changed with the editing of the book.

[3] On page 70, Rabbi Navet himself insists on this distinction, but for some reason he sees it as a critique of the scholars' view, and not of it.