Where Are We Headed: A Different Look at the Current Situation (Column 717)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

In Column 710 I pointed out a loop that jams our discourse. Each side is unwilling to listen seriously to the other, which creates the feeling that the other side has no arguments; therefore, if it still holds its position it must necessarily be evil and/or foolish. But if that’s the case, there’s no point in listening to its arguments—and so on in a vicious circle. In the overwhelming majority of cases in our public discourse, this applies to both sides of the debate.

I argued there that listening to both sides can lead to more informed and balanced positions, and I demonstrated this through the heavenly voice (bat kol) that ruled like Beit Hillel because they prefaced Beit Shammai’s words to their own. In many cases your view will thus be refined and improved. But even if in the end you don’t change your position, it will certainly be more grounded and balanced after you take your opponent’s arguments into account. Here I wanted to bring a more concrete example and, through it, to suggest a slightly different perspective on our present situation.

Micah Goodman’s Article

The trigger for this discussion is an article by Micah Goodman that was published on the eve of the holiday on YNET and in the print newspaper. People were very enthusiastic about the piece, and I received it this morning from two different directions on WhatsApp. Goodman describes the tension between nationalism and liberalism that begins in the Declaration of Independence and sharpens in today’s political divide. His claim is that between the two extreme camps stands a third camp—not an average and not a compromise—but one that fully lives both ideas, nationalism and liberalism, including the contradiction between them, and is unwilling to compromise between them or give up either. This camp has no expression in the political discourse, and for various reasons (opinions on practical policy) it joins one of the two sides and thus loses its own expression. He argues that now there is an opportunity to form this middle camp, as one side has sobered up from the dreams of peace and the other side understands that it is no longer possible to exempt the Haredim from conscription (yes, yes! that is the thrust of his words as written).

This move is classic Goodman. Micah Goodman is enamored of the dialectic of thesis and antithesis, and his synthesis is always living in contradiction—unity of opposites. I think this structure describes all his writings. As usual, I felt I very much agree with the spirit of his argument. But Goodman, as is his wont, sketches a conceptual picture that is a bit too perfect. As I will explain shortly, I do not think there is a sobering up from the idea of peace and compromise. On the contrary. As for the other side, the supposed sobering up from the Haredi exemption, here we already see an artificial clinging to the dialectical structure just for symmetry. As if the exemption for the Haredim were the organizing idea of the right-wing nationalist side. I also strongly disagree with the “unity of opposites” and “living in contradiction.” To my mind, such terms express intellectual laziness. Instead of speaking about the unity of opposites, one should present a consistent and complex doctrine and show that there is no contradiction. It sounds very deep, but to me it’s lazy nonsense.

But Goodman is entirely right that the center does not exist in the discourse because it is split, cognitively and terminologically, between the two poles (which he does not define correctly). Moreover, in my view this missing side is indeed the center, and even if there is a combination here, it is not a contradictory fusion of nationalism and liberalism but a logical synthesis between them (at most with a bit of tension—phrases like “contradiction” and “unity of opposites” are unnecessary and, as noted, reflect laziness). Goodman is in love with the dialectical structure and therefore tends to cling to it in many cases artificially. Yet I must say that almost always, while it is indeed an overly rounded and aesthetic presentation of the idea, the idea itself is correct (a bit like Leibowitz who, as I have written more than once, almost always takes a correct idea and goes one step too far).

For the purpose of the discussion here, I’ll focus on the current disagreement regarding the war. For a change: without hostages and without judicial reform. Without corruption, and without Bibi and his trials.

A Look at the Dispute Regarding the War

I think the schematic description I’ll now offer does not stray too far from the truth. One side, which for simplicity I’ll call “the government,” speaks about complete victory, the collapse of Hamas, and some of it talks about conquering Gaza and settling it. The other side, which I’ll call “the protest,” is perceived by the first as harboring peace delusions, as defeatist, and in effect collaborating with the enemy. A political settlement is out of the question, certainly not after October 7. The other side, for its part, tends to think this is a futile war with no purpose—a war for its own sake in which there is no chance of victory (you can’t defeat an idea). Therefore, those who conduct it are evil and political opportunists, and/or messianic actors whose entire concern is the conquest and settlement of Gaza and taking over the universe. They also criticize the government for having no plan to end the war, i.e., a blueprint for the “day after” (since total victory is impossible, you must necessarily think about what to do once you stop—what you’re aiming for). In this context they do not stop citing Clausewitz, that war is the continuation of policy by other means, hence without policy there is no point to war. Note that I have not mentioned the hostages, since that issue skews the discourse here and I have addressed it more than once.

My sense in recent weeks is that this is a clear example of the phenomenon I described in Column 710. I will slightly alter Micah Goodman’s structure and argue what I argued there: that each side contains a correct aspect and sound arguments. A fuller and more balanced picture emerges if one tries to extract the correct aspects from both sides. What characterizes the extremes (the protest and the government) is that they do not do this. The third side, contrary to Goodman’s formulation, is not supposed to “live in contradiction.” There is no contradiction here. One can gather the correct elements from each side and create a different picture—entirely coherent. Note, as I claimed in Column 710, that this is almost always the case, and here I will try to demonstrate it.

The Third Side

In recent weeks there have been encouraging signs on the Hamas side. It seems to be in a truly desperate state and losing control in the Strip. It is willing to compromise far beyond what it was ever willing to do in the past, but not at the price of suicide. For if it is already to commit suicide, it would rather do so literally and take with it as many Israelis (and Palestinians) as possible. On the other hand, we are losing the world’s sympathy because we are not expressing a willingness for a genuine compromise. The world stands with the protest, i.e., it sees this as a purposeless war for its own sake (a Trump-style transfer is not an option, and of course will not happen in practice). The war continues, and it seems it truly will not achieve its goal. The opposition from outside and within could itself cause the war to fail to achieve its objective. It’s a self-fulfilling idea. The government, meanwhile, continues to speak of complete victory and the defeat of Hamas. The jokes about Bibi’s statement that we are “a hair’s breadth from complete victory,” said already about a year ago, reflect the despair and lack of trust in him and in the war.

At the same time, proposals are emerging from moderate Arab states that sound almost like the messianic era: forging peace and friendship with Israel, disarming Hamas and removing it from power, creating a demilitarized Palestinian state not under its rule, with mutual recognition of Israel. Note: this is not a proposal from the Likud Central Committee but from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, from Trump, and from a significant part of the enlightened world.

So what do we do—continue fighting until complete victory, or head toward a political settlement? I propose both: fight until complete victory, and then move to a political settlement.

It is quite clear that a political settlement is impossible until Hamas is defeated. If it is not defeated, there is no actor that can govern the Strip the day after, and talk of this as a substitute for defeating Hamas is empty verbiage. Moreover, in my unlearned assessment there is indeed a possibility of defeating it. It is already on its knees, and within a few more months it may no longer exist as an organization. You may be surprised to hear, but as the Chief of Staff also said (he is neither a member of the Likud Central Committee nor of the Religious Zionism party, nor Ben-Gvir), we are indeed a hair’s breadth from complete victory. The nasty jokes about Bibi are tendentious and baseless. We are indeed there. With a bit more patience we can achieve it, provided the protesters and jesters don’t hinder us. One must remember that in a 150-year conflict whose end is not in sight, a year and a half is indeed “a hair’s breadth.”

Add to this the fact that there can be no political arrangement that circumvents Hamas if it is not defeated on the battlefield. Contrary to the protest’s delusions, it is highly unlikely that Hamas will reach an arrangement without remaining in power and armed—or, alternatively, only after it has been defeated. On the other hand, waging war to defeat Hamas does not bring us to the end of the road. The conflict with the Palestinians remains, and Hamas’s idea can rise again and gain organizational and military flesh. Here the protest errs. The world also does not accept a war with no political horizon.

My conclusion is that our policy right now should be as follows: we continue until complete victory over Hamas—until it does not exist in any form, neither militarily nor organizationally. Complete in the literal sense. After that, we turn to a political settlement, and our face is toward the proposal of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. A new Middle East. We will make a reasonable territorial compromise (which already exists de facto), mutual recognition between us and the Palestinians, moderate governance in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, total demilitarization, with our right to intervene by force when we see violations of the demilitarization agreement. Note that there is no contradiction at all between fighting to complete victory and a political horizon. On the contrary, one builds the other. So what, for heaven’s sake, is the argument about?!

All this must be declared as publicly and clearly as possible before the people (of Israel) and the world. If this is the policy, there is a chance that many—both in Israel and abroad—will accept it. We will clarify that we do not talk with Hamas, and as long as it exists there will be no peace here. This is a war for the sake of peace and against the terror that prevents it. We will say that we are not stopping until the total eradication of Hamas, but we have no intention to conquer or settle Gaza. Even so, the war will continue until Hamas is destroyed. Period. We will add that our goal is precisely the implementation of the proposal of the Arab states. We accept it fully, verbatim. The ball is now with the Palestinians and Hamas. The world—or the sane part of it—will also accept this policy, and the Palestinians too can pressure Hamas to stop the systematic destruction of their people.

In such a situation, Hamas can do one of two things: either save its men at the price of surrender and disarmament and the departure of its leadership (those who remain) from Gaza, or fight to the end and be destroyed. But with such a policy there is both a decisive victory and a political horizon. There is strategy and policy, and at long last there is a chance to realize all this. The left’s vision of peace might perhaps gain flesh, ironically through the very war it most opposes. Therefore I find it hard to see sweeping opposition within Israeli society to such a move. And even if there will be opposition, we shall nonetheless continue—until complete victory and negotiations for a political settlement.

We must understand that the land is already de facto divided, and all that is required of us is to agree to this formally, to recognize this reality, and to retreat from dreams of the whole Land of Israel, which in any case exist only within a small part of the right-wing public. Most are on the right mainly due to security issues. In my eyes this is a historic opportunity for a reasonable political settlement between us and the Palestinians, the like of which we have never had. Such a settlement will be achieved only when the Palestinians give up their dreams of defeating Israel and internalize the heavy price they pay for those dreams. This terrible war has a positive outcome, for it helps them rid themselves of those religious dreams by ensuring the price is indeed unbearable. To that end, Gaza must be laid waste and we must relentlessly destroy anything that moves there, until they express a desire for the sort of settlement I described above. All this not out of unbridled lust for war, and not in order to settle there, but because this is the only path that gives us any chance of advancing the resolution of the conflict.

Two Reservations

I am not naive, and it is clear to me that the likelihood of a sustainable arrangement arising here is quite small. Still, in my view—unlike in the past—now there is indeed such a chance, and we are strong enough to take the risk that it may fail. After all, there is hardly any concession here on anything that does not already exist today. The division of the land and Palestinian governance (internationally recognized) already exist. The threats of terror exist today as well. Moreover, even if the arrangement fails, at least we will have destroyed Hamas and solved that problem. The achievements of the war remain in any case, and if such a proposal/statement exists now, that itself creates a chance to realize them (without such a proposal/statement we may well fail even to destroy Hamas because there will be no legitimacy to continue the war). If we fail, at worst we will be left in the situation that existed until now—with the improvement that Hamas is no longer on the scene.

Beyond that, there is a fair chance that once we declare our readiness for this process, we will have agreements with Arab states across the region, and the diplomatic map and regional balance of power will change. Incidentally, this diplomatic situation may perhaps hold up in some fashion even if in the end the arrangement with the Palestinians fails or is imperfect. Perhaps. Even if not, I don’t see what there is to lose here, apart from dreams that are not realizable anyway. This is in addition to achieving social consensus within Israel and bridging the supposed rift that tears us apart. I wrote that it is “supposed” because I believe a vast majority of the public could agree to such a synthesis. If we manage to break the dichotomy between the extremes, the silent majority will discover that there is in fact broad agreement.

True, there is the Palestinian Charter and the Hamas Charter. There are Islamic principles of deceiving enemies and a sham peace that is actually a hudna until “our hand is strong” (sound familiar?). One can sink into this fatalistic despair, and I do not deny that there is something to it. This is a calculated risk that we must take. We must remember that life is dynamic. Not all Palestinians are Muslim zealots. Some are driven by national aspirations rather than religious motives. In Islam too there are different interpretations of its principles, and there is pragmatism in dealing with reality—just like with us. We also have various religious principles that can be cited, such as “lo teḥonem” (do not grant them a foothold in the land), the destruction of the seven nations, theft from a gentile and the expropriation of his loan, and more. And the fact is that among us there is pragmatism as well, not only among the secular. Religious principles chart a direction that is not meant to be fully realized in every reality, and even the aspirations to realize them can ebb in the face of reality. Perhaps we can help the Palestinians rid themselves of their religious dreams and be more pragmatic—or at least not allow those unwilling to do so to lead them—just like with us. If they see that their situation truly improves, I think there is some chance for this.

My Improved Dialectic

Such a proposal cannot be presented by the current government, since in today’s government there is no one who can declare intentions for peace. For them, the very declaration is a betrayal of the idea of complete victory. There is no mental readiness for this. Nor is there anyone there who will declare a renunciation of the dream of the whole Land of Israel, even though it is clear to all of us that it has long since ceased to exist (the land is already divided). On the protest side as well, there is no one willing to acknowledge that we are indeed close to complete victory—truly a hair’s breadth away, if we gird ourselves with a bit more patience. They are unwilling there to recognize that this war is indeed in its place and, despite the terrible failure and the horrific massacre that occurred, it may achieve its goals before long—and much more besides. It creates an opportunity to realize all their dreams which until now were fantasies. We are a hair’s breadth from complete victory—have I mentioned that already?!

Methodologically, note that this is a proposal that combines elements from both sides—the government and the protest—and I think it offers a more logical and healthy balance, just as I described in Column 710. Note the contrast with what Goodman proposes. I do not think we are sobering up from the idea of peace. On the contrary, I must say that I, who had despaired of it, now see some chance for it (even if not great). Precisely thanks to this war and thanks to the government’s persistence and resolve (even though that is not its policy). If we know how to leverage the successes of the war, then we could say that Smotrich and Ben-Gvir brought peace.

Moreover, this is not living in contradiction, as Goodman describes it, but living in harmony. It is not true that anyone who wants peace must oppose complete victory or belittle it. And it is not true that anyone who supports complete victory does not want peace. The opposite is the case: only complete victory will bring peace (not surrender and domination, not the whole Land of Israel, but peace). If you extend to your enemy both a sword and an olive branch, there is a chance you will not need to use the sword. Those who offer only an olive branch (the left) will fail. Those who offer only a sword (the right) will also fail, because a desperate enemy threatened with annihilation fights to the end. Not for nothing does the Torah command leaving a fourth side open in a besieged city.

This is an example of why it is worthwhile to listen to the arguments of both sides. They are not necessarily contradictory, and one can build a balanced and coherent synthesis between them. A further bonus of this attentiveness is that, as I wrote in Column 710, we will realize that the other side is not a collection of evil fools. There is a position there with arguments, some of them good, and it is worth taking them into account. If we do so, we will reach a more balanced and logical policy and position, and in this way there is a chance we will solve our problems at home and perhaps also abroad. At least, it is worth considering this angle of vision.

I have no doubt that in the talkbacks here there will be many who will explain, with great eloquence, why I am a naive leftist and of course wrong all along the way. I do not think so, but my claim is that this proposal is at least an option, and it seems to me that many are not prepared to consider it at all. It is simply not on the table, because it does not fit the agenda of the protest nor that of the government. After you weigh everything, you are of course welcome to reject it. Even if I am wrong in all my analysis, my aim here—and on the site in general—is not only the content but mainly the method. If we at least consider listening to the other side and neutralizing the vicious loop described in Column 710; if we consider fleeing the schematic slogans that obligate us to bias in discourse; if we are willing to examine the other side’s arguments and build a more complex position that takes into account the arguments of both sides—then even if in the end you decide I am wrong and you remain on one side or the other, I have done my part.

Before you start shouting and protesting, I only ask that you read attentively and respond to the substance.