On the “Philosophy” of the Hostages and the Church of the Left (Column 711)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
I wish to describe here an article by a philosophy lecturer named Uri Eran, who purports to discuss systematically the hostage deal and the objections to it. Precisely because of his pretense to systematic thinking (the article appears on the site “‘Telem’ – A Platform for a Different Political Conversation,” no less!), his article marvelously illustrates the bias of the Church of the Hostages, even when it is hidden behind a philosophical, systematic façade. I refer to it as the Church of the Left, even though the hostage issue should not be a right–left dispute, for two reasons: 1) In practice it is a right–left dispute (and I have explained this in the past; see columns 607, 611, 627, 666, and briefly also in the Q&A here). 2) The rationales invoked in this issue express a mode of thinking of the Church of the Left, as the author himself notes.
I apologize in advance for the excessive attention I devote to a rather foolish, if very puffed-up, article, but precisely for that reason the lesson from it is very important. People tend to be impressed by philosophical discourse that appears balanced on its face, even if it hides behind it utter nonsense. It can indeed sound to them like a “different political conversation” (and good for them). From here arises the prevalent, mistaken perception that on the left there are more intellectuals and smart people. Ultimately, as a continuation of the previous column, I, as someone who does not belong to any church, must examine the arguments in detail one by one, and only at the end draw conclusions about the author himself. Hence the need for detail.
Background: A Look at the Dispute over the Hostages
In the previous column I pointed to a loop that ruins public discourse and the social fabric in Israel (and not only here, of course). Among other things, I argued that in most issues there is quite broad agreement in most of the population and that there are no deep value or ideological disagreements. My claim was that if there were actual discourse here, rather than churchly preaching and accusations, both sides would see that there are arguments on the other side as well, and then two things would occur: 1) Perhaps they would reach agreement. 2) Even if not, each side would at least understand that the other is not evil and/or stupid but simply a person with different views (usually different assessments of reality), and then they would likely agree to make decisions together, despite the disagreement, according to agreed-upon rules (sit together at the table).
One of the examples I gave there was the issue of hostage deals. I have written my view on this more than once, but one of the frustrating features of the discussion is its religious-churchly character. The topic is accompanied by emotions on steroids, and therefore the above description is expressed here far more extremely. Supporters of the deal diagnose cruelty, immorality, betrayal of the social contract, and total indifference in its opponents (how many times have you heard about Bibi and Smotrich and their adherents: “they couldn’t care less”? See, for example, Dana Weiss’s typical, brazen falsehood here). The side that opposes the deals sees their supporters as spineless fools and anti-Zionists. I must say that I, as someone who opposes the hostage deals on the table, do indeed discern such features on the side that supports the deal: I wrote that I see sentimentality, individualism, and a lack of thinking (because of the sentimentality, not necessarily because of stupidity). I note this because I am not here to argue that these features are untrue. I think some of them are true (of course not about every supporter, but as a group). My claim is that despite everything, it is clear there are arguments in favor of that side as well. Moreover, it is clear to me that it is not a collection of evildoers nor a collection of fools (I suppose the distribution there is like in any human group). This is the important point for me.
I certainly see emotionality there, and I wrote as much. That’s a legitimate characterization in my eyes, and my claim here is not aimed against it. Nor do I intend to claim that in every question both sides are right. Certainly not. I am a monist, and in my opinion in most cases there is one correct answer (though not necessarily mine). Still, I try to listen to the arguments raised from that side (even though it is very hard for me because of their one-sidedness and emotionality) and to form a stance that takes them into account as well. I don’t know if I always succeed in this, because I am human too. But I can honestly say that at least I try. Therefore it is clear to me they are neither fools nor evildoers. In my view, after examining their arguments, their stance is indeed foolish, but this does not stem from their stupidity or wickedness (but apparently from emotionality and brainwashing. Yet it is also possible that they are the ones who are right and I am the one who is wrong for one reason or another). In any case, when I say that those arguments are foolish, this is a conclusion from an examination I conducted after listening to them, not an a priori characterization that obviates the need to listen to them—and that is the important point.
Therefore I am certainly not prepared to say that their stance is illegitimate or to deny their right to express it and even act upon it, and if they held leadership positions then also to make decisions accordingly. I would not have been prepared for all this (to the extent it were in my power) if I thought they were evildoers or fools. My claim is that despite those features, this is a dispute like any other, and this is how it should be conducted and how decisions should be made. This demonstrates my claim from the previous column. Here I wish to deal with a more complex manifestation of the picture I have described, but before I continue to that subject, I wish to bring an illustration of my claim from a discussion I conducted by email following the previous column.
Email Discussion about the Previous Column
Since I belong to the side opposing the deals, I chose an example from someone who holds my own view. I wish to show that these fallacies exist on both sides of the discussion (and as for the side supporting the deals, I have more than once written here about these fallacies on their part). The discussion is with a person who, as you will easily see, opposes the deals and thinks we must wage a war of annihilation in Gaza until complete victory (a dirty word in the opposition, which usually doesn’t even bother to explain why). I bring this discussion to illustrate my two points: A) The dispute is mainly about facts, not values and ideologies. The values are fairly agreed upon. B) If one understands this, one can conduct it more sanely and balancedly and reach agreed decisions, and perhaps even be persuaded.
Here is a quotation from the first part of that discussion (I added a few brackets in my words to clarify):
| Y:
Hi, I read Miki’s article about the loop that bogs us down. As usual, well-written, logical, and clear. If I wanted to summarize what I understood, I’d write: “We are facing a dispute between churches, which is much less deep than it seems. If we only began listening, then…” As I see it, the article was written from an academic ivory tower and ignores the reality on the ground and the dimension of time. I’ll give an example that in my eyes is essential. If we want to decisively defeat Hamas, we must enter Gaza quickly: the reservists are burning out, American goodwill is eroding, Hamas is growing stronger, public opinion is drifting away… There is a dispute whether returning the hostages takes precedence over achieving decisive victory. The longer the dispute continues, the farther away decisive victory gets. Those who want to delay decisive victory raise the dispute over the hostages, and the very existence of the dispute helps their position, and an article that sanctifies dispute helps them. It’s clear to me that it’s better to make decisions out of consensus. But sometimes that’s not feasible, and then we have no choice but to act amid friction. For example, I think that bringing in humanitarian aid will harm decisive victory. Therefore, I want an endless dispute over whether to bring in aid, and thus delay it. It’s clear to me that first and foremost we must enable the decision-makers to act and allow disputes only where the time dimension is not critical. Only then is there room for the article. Me: Y., hello. I received your comments. Thank you. I agree with every word of yours. But my claim is that you have posed the dilemma incorrectly: this is not a question of returning the hostages versus defeating Hamas. To argue, we must first agree on the alternatives before us. I suspect we have no option at all to bring back all the hostages even if we stop the war (I estimate that Hamas will not give up its cards), and what is even clearer to me is that we also don’t have the option to first return them and then eliminate Hamas (because after the agreement we will not really be able to re-enter a war of annihilation and we will return to drizzles and endless terror attacks). Therefore, in my opinion there are no such alternatives between which we are to choose. I also argue that no one among us truly claims that we must return the hostages “at any price” (returning the Gaza envelope to the Palestinians— is that a reasonable price for the hostages? Or perhaps simply emptying Netanya of its residents? Transferring a tank battalion to Hamas?). That’s just an empty slogan. Therefore, posing the positions against each other in that manner is misleading and mistaken. Whoever claims such alternatives exist (like returning the hostages and afterward eliminating Hamas)—if he is factually correct, I am prepared to consider his principled position regarding priority. I would return the hostages and then eliminate Hamas. That is what they propose. My claim is that such an option does not exist. Therefore the dispute is not about the priority of objectives (a value dispute) but about whether such alternatives exist at all—which is a dispute about facts (or at most about assessment of reality). You can see that there is no value-ideological dispute here but mainly a factual one. If we agree on the facts and accordingly set the actual alternatives against each other, most of us will agree also on the ideology, or at least we will be able to make decisions about it. Continuing to present the dispute as a value dispute—what comes first, returning the hostages or defeating Hamas (as you too presented it)—is a deception employed by both sides, and it aptly illustrates my claim in the column. I am not calling to make decisions by consensus at all. That is not what is written in the article. I do claim that in practice there is almost full consensus, and the dispute stems from lack of listening and lack of trust, and from a dispute over the facts. After there is listening (and perhaps trust), and the facts are clarified and we set against each other the alternatives that actually exist and not imaginary ones, one of two things will occur: 1) Either we will reach an agreed compromise (because there will be almost no dispute among the overwhelming majority of the public), or the majority will decide and the minority will accept its decision because it will understand that the majority has arguments and we are not dealing with fools/evildoers. This is how I explained it in the column (though I noted that this is an utopian proposal). Thus, for example, when I was asked whether I am for or against the Disengagement I answered that the question is undefined and cannot be answered. Tell me what alternatives stand before me. Leaving Gaza is not an alternative that stands on its own. Give me cases and responses to everything expected to occur, and then one can think whether I am for or against. That was yet another case in which there was a stormy dispute between sides that did not at all deal with the real alternatives before us. But everyone had a very firm position about whether he was for or against. And so it is with most of the disputes raging in our milieu. |
Our discussion continued there, but to clarify my point here, what I have brought suffices. Of course, one can argue over the particulars and further clarifications and reservations are needed.
Systematic Positions that Support the Deal
I have described the state of discourse regarding hostage deals. I said it is highly emotional and not grounded in argument. Certain arguments do arise quite often, but the focus on one argument while ignoring many others shows us that despite appearances, this is not truly a balanced and considered discussion. The argument, even when it is raised, serves as a fig leaf for a gut position. A systematic argument is supposed to look at the full spectrum of aspects of the issue, analyze them, and then reach (or not reach) a conclusion.
Still, it is pleasant to occasionally find references that do seem systematic and balanced regarding the hostage issue—attempts to analyze it with philosophical and systematic tools and to form a position in an orderly way. This is very rare, but it does happen from time to time. Yet at least in the cases I encountered, after reading the analysis my feeling was that the bias is entirely there. The presentation is more balanced, measured, and systematic, yet there is still no dealing with counter-arguments and refutations and with the full set of aspects. There too, the simplification reflects bias despite the philosophical façade.
I have written before that it is harder to find systematic discussion on the side supporting these deals, because in this issue the strong emotion pulls mainly in their direction. One must overcome emotional biases to perform a cold analysis. Therefore I chose here an example from that side. You will see from it that even when such an analysis is attempted, it is evident that they did not truly succeed in overcoming those biases.
The Opening of Uri Eran’s Article: The Amended Trolley Problem
I read the article “Ben-Gvir’s Trolley Problem” already a few months ago (afterwards someone posted it on the site and asked my opinion). In my view it is a philosophical façade hiding an agenda. I will detail this a bit more. As stated, the very attempt to conduct a substantive discussion actually sharpens the bias and the churchly fallacies in the discourse.
I will preface by noting that this article does not deal only with the dilemma regarding the hostage deal itself but mainly with a particular facet that the author chose to focus on: the responsibility of office-holders and their different status in such a discussion. Therefore he begins with the famous trolley experiment of the philosopher Philippa Foot, and from it derives conclusions for that particular point. A person stands at a railway junction with his hand on the switch. A trolley is approaching him and if it continues straight it will run over five people sleeping on the track. That person can divert the trolley to the other track and there one person will be run over. What should he do?! Afterwards Judith Jarvis Thomson added another element to this experiment. Consider a case where the person is the train’s driver. Her claim is that this is a different situation, because in the first experiment the question is whether to let five die or to kill one, whereas in the second the formulation is whether to kill one or to kill five. Because the driver is responsible by virtue of his role for the movement of the train and for the safety of those around him, even his omission counts as an active deed.
The conclusion arising from this analysis is that in a case where it is the driver it is clear he must divert the trolley, since there is no doubt that it is preferable to kill one person rather than five. Eran argues that even if one does not accept Thomson’s analysis, she sharpened an important point. The discussion of the situation depends on the status of the person involved. If he holds an office and bears responsibility for the situation, the ethical result can be different.
A Note on the Analysis Itself: Ethical Solipsism
I cannot resist a remark on the analysis itself. First, I will touch on Foot’s original case. Many hang the correct answer on whether morality is determined by motives and actions or by consequences. If the consequence determines, then it is obvious that it is better that one die than five. But if ethical judgment is determined by motives and actions, then there is a preference for an omission that leads to a transgression over an active deed that produces the problematic result with one’s own hands.
This sounds like a learned inquiry into a Talmudic sugya, except that here we are dealing with ethics. For some reason the entire discussion ignores the fact that there are other people involved in the situation, and they really don’t care whether they were killed by someone’s hands or died due to an omission. This whole discussion reflects ethical solipsism (see columns 236, 357–359 and more, on spiritual solipsism in halakhah), since that person analyzes the situation by the criterion of how he himself comes out the most moral. He ignores the interests of the others in the situation. Therefore I very much doubt that there is any significance to the difference between the two possibilities. There could be such a difference if we were speaking of intentional murder versus omission of rescue. But here we are dealing with an act of rescue whose intention is good, and the only question is which of the options is preferable. In such a case, it seems to me that the outcome is what matters and also determines the right act. I am speaking here about judging the act and not the agent, and in my view that is what matters when making decisions in such dilemmas. Even after the fact, when we come to judge the person, if he made the optimal consideration in his view at the time of decision, then our judgment of his actions and of him should be accordingly. But the entire discussion should begin with judgment of the act.
If this is the situation regarding the trolley problem in general, I do not see why the distinction that Thomson made in the amended dilemma—between a bystander and the driver—matters. For those who died, it doesn’t really matter whether the driver was responsible or a bystander. They want to live. If a bystander should, supposedly, refrain from diverting the trolley and let five die (as I said, I find this most implausible), then the fact that he is not standing aside but rather driving the train should not justify his deed to the one who will die as a result. Why should people’s fates change just because the person making the decision holds one role or another?! This entire discussion, in my opinion, suffers from ethical solipsism—that is, from an analysis focused on the question whether I will be okay (when a commission of inquiry is established) instead of on the question what ought to be done in such a situation.
I can only console Thomson and Eran that they are in good company. In my view, many later authorities erred in a very similar mistake in their analysis of the sugya of a “transgression for the sake [of Heaven]” (aveirah lishmah). There too, some later authorities condition permission on the person’s intention. In their view, committing a transgression “for the sake” is permitted and proper only if it is done for the sake of Heaven. To me this is simply untenable. Consider, for example, Jael, wife of Heber the Kenite, who needed to have relations with Sisera in order to kill him and save Israel. Suppose her intention was merely to commit adultery with him—would that mean Israel should not be saved?! If Jael recognized within herself impure intentions, not for the sake of Heaven, should she have let the people of Israel be annihilated? I see no logic in the claim that her intention changes anything regarding the permission and need to perform the act. See on this principle and further examples in columns 353, 441, 616, and more.
But all this does not directly touch our matter. We now come to Eran’s point. But before that, one more churchly remark.
On the Leftist Church
Eran now moves to his practical conclusions. He prefaces with the remark that indeed one does not find systematic treatments of the hostage deal. The explanation he offers is that it is self-evident that one should support it because most philosophers belong to the liberal center up to the radical left (what does that say about the field of philosophy and those engaged in it? I leave that to you), and in those terms it is obvious that one must support the deal. Well, this profound argument left me a bit breathless, but I understood that apparently he has not yet reached in his deep philosophical studies fallacies such as begging the question and ad hominem. Since in my eyes it is almost self-evident that one should oppose the deal, and in order to find a minimally passable argument hinting at support for the deal I need to exert myself greatly, the sad conclusion is that apparently I do not belong to the liberal center nor to the radical left, to my shame.
How good, then, that this Eran does an act of kindness for primitives lacking education like me and proceeds to offer explanations that could persuade even fools like us and grant us intellectual illumination. Let’s see whether he succeeds (assuming someone as poor as I am is worthy to examine such brilliant arguments). To do so he must “stoop a little low,” as he puts it, since to find rationales among opponents of the deal he must resort to Ben-Gvir and to the rationales he presented when he withdrew from the government following the last hostage deal.
I cannot resist bringing the following passage from his words:
It is almost superfluous to note that I am skeptical about the possibility that Ben-Gvir’s declared rationales are truly the real and decisive ones for him. It is likely that political considerations played a more significant role in his decision.
As a sharp opponent of Ben-Gvir, I think that if there is a politician whom I believe when he lays out rationales for leaving the government, it is Ben-Gvir. Whether I agree or not, I think he indeed says what is on his heart (and of course that is precisely what so annoys leftists). But that’s how churches operate. If on the way one can accuse members of the opposing church of dishonesty, why not?! In any case, it appears that this Eran is judging Ben-Gvir favorably, since according to him Ben-Gvir apparently supports the hostage deal and withdrew from the government only for political reasons of one sort or another. It seems he did not notice this.
At any rate, it seems Ben-Gvir is the most prominent intellectual he found among the “Indians” who oppose the deal. This reminds me of Rabbi Druckman’s rebuke of Shelly Yachimovich (then a radio host) after Rabin’s assassination, for having interviewed only leftist intellectuals. Yachimovich replied without batting an eye that she actually wanted to but did not find intellectuals on the right (except for Naomi Shemer). There you have it—indeed it’s a problem to find leftists on the right. In fact, it even sounds to me quite impossible, but perhaps that’s only to a primitive like me. As I said: the leftist church behaves similarly to all other churches. In no other church are there sages, and certainly not righteous people. All the rest are evildoers and/or fools, and certainly not intellectuals…
Well then, time to enter Eran’s arguments.
Ben-Gvir’s Arguments
To the matter itself, Eran brings Ben-Gvir’s arguments from his resignation letter:
“Stopping the war, releasing hundreds of murderous terrorists, withdrawing from the Netzarim Corridor, returning Gazans to the northern Strip, agreeing to a selection among hostages that seals the fate of the rest, and withdrawing from the Philadelphi Corridor later on are, to my deep regret, a complete victory for terror. Surrender to terror means an equation in which terror pays. It invites more and more terror—more kidnappings, more murder, and more rape. The figures from the past are clear—82% of those released return to terror. October 7 was brought upon us by Yahya Sinwar, released in the Shalit deal. I cannot look in the eyes of the widows and orphans, those who already exist and those who, God forbid, will exist. What will we tell the families of IDF fallen who fell in Gaza?! How will we look in the faces of the victims of terror that will result from this deal?!”
Immediately after comes Eran’s magnificent pilpul that would not shame R. Yonatan Eybeschütz:
Before we approach the rationales stated here, it is worth pausing over the elephant in the room—or, more precisely, the elephant that is not in the room. Seemingly, a central, common rationale for opposing the deal is missing, namely, that the deal will entrench Hamas rule and prevent its collapse. This is not accidental, I think, that this rationale is missing. In fact, Ben-Gvir himself hints that he believes it will be possible to topple Hamas even after the deal, when he writes later in the letter that “we will not return to the government table without a full victory against Hamas and full realization of the goals of the war.” What follows: such a full victory, meaning the removal of Hamas, is possible, whether or not there is a deal.
Even if Ben-Gvir thinks it will be possible to topple Hamas after the deal, one can imagine an opponent who thinks this is, indeed, impossible. But the claim that a deal will prevent the collapse of Hamas rule or will entrench its rule so that we will never be able to topple it is implausible. It is more likely that a deal will entrench its rule in the short term and delay the collapse of its rule. It may be, however, that because of this delay we will pay a heavy price in blood, but Ben-Gvir does address the blood price, and therefore I postpone that discussion. For our purposes now—delay alone is not a good enough reason to oppose the deal. If we waited 18 years, it is proper that we restrain ourselves another year or two, if that is what will save the lives of the hostages.
This truly requires parsing a layman’s words. Well, let us not forget we are dealing with the main right-wing intellectual, perhaps the only one, so naturally we must be exact about every jot and tittle of his words. Yet to a fool and ignoramus like me it seems that Ben-Gvir meant precisely that after the deal it will not be possible to topple Hamas (or at least that the chances are very small), as I also noted above. Otherwise, what is the problem if Hamas continues terror? We will topple it afterwards and the terror will stop. Isn’t it far more reasonable that this is what Ben-Gvir means? It is both very logical and called for, but such considerations are apparently not attributed to right-wing intellectuals. With respect to them, the way is to build a straw man and attack him with full force. But perhaps that’s only me.
As for his claim that this is implausible—nonsense. It is quite plausible, and history will prove it. Beyond that, his assumption that if toppling is possible later, is it not a question of costs—on both sides: how much we will pay for a future toppling of Hamas (in soldiers, in the embittering of the lives of residents of the envelope, and in terror victims) and what we gain from the deal (21 people alive and bodies). Does that sound self-evident to you? To me it does not. Well, he says he will address this later, so I will wait as well (after all, best to learn the ways of leftist intellectuals—maybe I too will have some chance).
One more remark. He writes that he chose Ben-Gvir’s rationales only as a means to engage with the arguments of opponents of the deal in general. But in practice he mentions that there is another possibility for opposing the deal, not from the rationales he puts in Ben-Gvir’s mouth without justification (namely, assuming that toppling Hamas is impossible afterward), and he casually dismisses it. All in all, history proves that it will be almost impossible—so why address such a claim at all?! He prefers to attack the straw man that does not hold water. Much more convenient.
Surrender to Terror versus the Consequences
If you thought we were done expounding Ben-Gvir’s language properly, you are mistaken. Here is the continuation:
Now to the rationales that Ben-Gvir does state. The first rationale—and the order here is probably not accidental—is that the deal is a surrender to terror, and the meaning of such surrender is that terror pays. Subsequently Ben-Gvir details the expected consequences of this surrender. However, and this is important, it appears that he and others think that the deal is wrong regardless of its consequences, such that even if we could prevent its bad consequences—for example, if we could with certainty thwart future attacks and protect Israeli citizens from them—the very surrender to terror is wrong.
Well, with Ben-Gvir as with Maimonides, order matters. Do not think there is a single word out of place or without deep thought behind it. After all, we are dealing with the most prominent intellectual of the right (besides Naomi Shemer). To the matter itself, I confess and am ashamed that in my ignorance I read Ben-Gvir’s words and see absolutely none of this wondrous exegesis. Ben-Gvir explicitly writes that surrender to terror is problematic because of its consequences, and he does not at all separate between the surrender itself and the consequences. But perhaps that’s just me.
By the way, my personal view is that surrender to terror is indeed problematic in and of itself. Moreover, in Eran’s eyes too this is the situation. Don’t believe it? Here you are:
Let us assume for a moment that Ben-Gvir is right and the deal is surrender to terror. Why is surrender to terror bad or wrong in itself? Perhaps because a people or a person who surrenders to terror is weak and displays a flawed moral character. And perhaps because such surrender grants a prize to the wicked, instead of punishing them, and thereby makes our world less just—wickedness prospering.
But fear not—this note comes with its own receipt. Here’s the punchline:
But even if one accepts the claim that the deal is surrender to terror and therefore bad in itself, it is not plausible that the bad inherent in this surrender can outweigh the good that the deal would bring—saving the hostages’ lives, ending the horrific suffering and torture they are undergoing, ending the suffering of their relatives, and restoring the trust of those who believe the government is obligated to return all those kidnapped on its watch.
Well, here I, in my hat as a non-radical left ignoramus, see a logical problem. Let us suppose his silly exegesis is correct, and indeed Ben-Gvir claims (the correct claim) that surrender to terror is bad in itself. Is there any hint in Ben-Gvir’s words that this alone suffices to justify opposing a hostage deal? He lists all the drawbacks of the deal—the surrender to terror and afterward the consequences—and the conclusion is that, on the aggregate, there is no justification to make a deal. Eran decided for Ben-Gvir that, in his view, each reason alone suffices to reject the deal. Whence did he derive this? Only Eran knows. Apparently from the fevered mind of the straw man he is attacking.
If you think Eran did not sense this himself, you are wrong. Here is the next paragraph:
It could be that Ben-Gvir, or the fair-minded opponent who is not a moral monster, will not agree with me on this. But the fact that Ben-Gvir speaks later also about the expected consequences of the deal, and not only about the problematic nature of surrender itself, suggests that he himself is not convinced (or at the very least, he fears his public will not be convinced) that the bad inherent in surrender can outweigh the good that will come from the deal for those who will return from captivity and for their loved ones.
In other words, Ben-Gvir himself actually believes that surrender to terror in and of itself is enough to reject the hostage deal. But he knows that the ignorant flock of his pasture will not accept this, and therefore he adds further rationales based on consequences. The ignorant flock thinks that what rejects the deal is only the aggregate of considerations, but Eran, in his holy spirit, knows this is only Ben-Gvir’s public’s view. Ben-Gvir himself holds that surrender alone suffices to reject the deal.
And now to the consequences themselves.
On Leftist Generosity
Eran now moves to the first consequence:
The second rationale that can be extracted from Ben-Gvir’s words is a bit vague, since it is unclear whether he is referring only to the consequences of the deal for him or also to its moral nature. It appears when Ben-Gvir says that he cannot “look in the eyes of the widows and orphans, those who already exist and those who, God forbid, will exist. What will we tell the families of IDF fallen who fell in Gaza?! How will we look in the faces of the victims of terror that will result from this deal?!”
One way to understand what is said here is that Ben-Gvir opposes the deal because he wishes to avoid the awkwardness that will be caused to him when he encounters the deal’s future victims and bereaved families (who may think their loss was in vain). This is, of course, an uncharitable interpretation, since a good statesman should give decisive weight to considerations of the public good, and negligible—if any—weight to considerations of awkwardness that will be caused to him as a result of his political decisions.
A more charitable interpretation is that one should oppose the deal because it will wrong its future victims and bereaved families. Here we must separate the two groups. As for the bereaved families, although it is certainly possible that some will feel that signing the deal wrongs them, that does not yet mean that they were indeed wronged, and that the wrong is greater than that which will be caused to the hostages and their loved ones and to the bereaved families who favor a hostage deal if it does not go forward. The relevant question is not who will be angry and accuse whom and how much, but whether the deal will cause more wrong and harm than refraining from it.
Again, you utterly non-intellectual yokels must be wondering why the first paragraph was necessary when it is obvious that Ben-Gvir’s intent is the second. He is certainly not speaking about his own personal distress but about the actual consequences. But a philosophical pedant like Eran cannot just let that pass. After all, it helps portray Ben-Gvir as an idiot or a villain—how can one give that up, even when it is obviously nonsense? In any case, even leftists’ renowned “charitability” has its limits. Eran claims that Ben-Gvir is not speaking about problematic consequences themselves but about the illusion of consequences. But what matters are the consequences, not what you think they will be. Wow, breathtaking. That is, the fact that you, Ben-Gvir, fear there will be severe consequences does not mean there will be. Therefore you may not relate to what you yourself think. Only consequences in reality matter. And how shall we know what will be in reality? After all, all we can say about reality is only what we ourselves think about it. Well, this is an unseemly question for philosophers, only for ignoramuses like me. Reality itself is whatever the leftist says it will be. What the ignorant right-winger (even if an intellectual like Ben-Gvir) thinks is only his opinion and bears not a whit of connection to reality itself.
The Percentage Who Return to Terror
Eran now turns to the question of released prisoners returning to terror:
As evidence for his words, Ben-Gvir brings the figure that 82 percent of those released return to terror, and the fact that Yahya Sinwar, the architect of October 7, was among those released in the Shalit deal.
First, it is important to note that Ben-Gvir presents the data somewhat misleadingly, such that the impression is created that 82 percent of those released from all prisoner exchanges to date (in Israel, or at all) returned to terror. But the known data are that 82 percent of those released in the Shalit deal returned to terror. The data for all deals are more ambiguous—in the past it was reported that more than 50 percent returned to terror. That is of course not little, but it is not impossible that this is similar to the rate of those engaged in terror (according to the Israeli definition) among the general Palestinian population. And if that is the case, the released are not more dangerous than the rest of the population.
Here is another interesting pilpul. First, 82% of those released in the Shalit deal is not a bad indicator. But it is far more important to point out Ben-Gvir’s imprecision than to discuss the matter itself. Beyond that, if in the estimation of a leftist like Eran some 50% of Palestinians engage in terror (according to the Israeli definition—Eran apparently thinks they are freedom fighters), I think the discussion is pretty much over. And if he wishes to claim that this percentage is similar to the general Palestinian population, he is simply delusional. Even an ignorant right-winger like me does not think so. In the desire to smear Ben-Gvir, he is prepared to shoot himself in the foot and, of course, to fib and admit that supposedly there are 50% of the entire population engaged in terror (according to our usual definition). In the Church of the Hostages anything goes to slander Ben-Gvir.
Comparing Future Harm to Present Harm
He now continues:
But let us assume that Ben-Gvir’s figures are accurate; and that we can infer from them that history will repeat itself precisely, so that an identical percentage of those released in the present deal will return to terror, and that this percentage is significantly higher than the percentage engaged in terror among the general Palestinian population. All these are good reasons to think that carrying out the deal will lead to a rise in terror; but it does not follow that carrying out the deal will lead to more terror than not carrying it out. One could argue that if carrying out the deal will cause a spike in terror, it is reasonable that, all else being equal, not carrying it out will not cause such a spike. But in practice, all else will probably not be equal. For example: carrying out the deal will be accompanied by diplomatic moves and strengthening of American security guarantees that can prevent the spike in terror, whereas not carrying it out will not be accompanied by such moves. Therefore, the opponent of the deal owes us an explanation as to why carrying out the deal alongside those moves is worse than not carrying it out and forgoing them.
This, in fact, I am inclined to agree with (recall, I do not belong to a church; every argument on its merits). True, American guarantees are worth bupkis, but I too think that if the issue on the table were the release of terrorists with the risk of increased terror versus the release of hostages, I would support the deal, because uncertainty does not override certainty. The horrific results of October 7 are the result of our failure, and it is not correct to assume that they will repeat even if we release a few more Yahya Sinwars (see, for example, columns 607, 608, and 666). But there are additional considerations against the deal, and therefore in aggregate the overall set of considerations (which, recall, is what matters, not each one separately) in my opinion dictates opposition to it.
Hamas’s threat of terror and of rocket fire that does not allow normal life for residents of entire regions—and of course the threat of further October 7-type terror that robs residents of sleep and gives them no rest—is a far more significant consideration in my eyes than tallying victims one way or the other (apropos the trolley problem). These threats constantly force us into defense and regularly result in not a few casualties. These are, in my eyes, far more cardinal considerations. I must remind, and forgive the accounting, that we are speaking of about twenty hostages, and a state does not make strategic choices based on the painful fate of twenty people. If that were the calculation we would never wage any war, we would not permit driving cars on roads, and so on.
But again, this is something one can argue about and disagree. I am not saying that someone who disagrees with me on these considerations is evil or stupid. But Eran’s analysis is indeed churchly and biased, both because he attacks a straw man dishonestly and gives most uncharitable (indeed false) interpretations of his subject’s words, and because he focuses on each argument separately and ignores the cumulative picture (whereas Ben-Gvir apparently did address it, contrary to his straw man).
Yaniv Iczkovits
In the next paragraph Eran praises the writer and philosopher Yaniv Iczkovits (I have no idea who he is):
The writer and philosopher Yaniv Iczkovits, unlike me, thinks that the only duty of Israel’s ministers is to bring back all the hostages, and that this is not up to them—“it follows from their very failure,” he writes. The fact that the ministers failed to protect citizens’ security and are duty-bound to repair the damage they caused is certainly a strong consideration in favor of a hostage deal. But if Iczkovits means that from the fact that the ministers failed it follows that they must bring back the hostages regardless of the terms, then he is wrong.
This is an argument that recurs often among supporters of the deal, so I address it, even though it is, of course, plainly foolish. This is exactly because of what I explained at the beginning of the column regarding a “transgression for the sake [of Heaven].” None of us should pay the price of their failure. Since they are responsible for the failure, perhaps they should bear the consequences. So let them pay the price. But why should all citizens of the state pay the price? Do they have no right to government protection, only the hostages from October 7? Does atonement for the failure then justify a willful failure now?
To Eran’s credit, he agrees here that this is nonsense:
To show why, we can imagine a situation in which we knew with certainty that carrying out the deal would bring about a disaster ten times the scale of October 7, and that it would be possible to prevent that future disaster if only we refrained from signing a deal. In such a case, all else being equal, I do not think that the ministers’ duty to save those whom they abandoned, together with the consideration of ending the suffering of the hostages and their loved ones, could outweigh the consideration of preventing the future, horrific, certain disaster. But in our world, we have no such certainty regarding the consequences of carrying out the deal or refraining from it. Therefore, under current conditions, the ministers’ duty to save those whom they abandoned, together with the consideration of ending their suffering and that of their loved ones, outweighs the consideration of preventing future atrocities whose scope and likelihood we can only estimate.
His phrasing is not precise. There is a declaration that Iczkovits is wrong without a rationale (only by way of illustration). But in my great generosity I will judge him favorably and assume he too means the rationale I wrote above.
On Ministers and on Citizens
This brings Eran to his claim grounded in the trolley example above. He argues thus:
However, Iczkovits is right about something else: the opposition of an ordinary citizen to a hostage deal is essentially different from that of a minister entrusted with public security. And here we return to the conceptual insight taught to us by the trolley problem: the role matters. If you are an ordinary citizen who opposes the deal for reasons of reducing future suffering, your position, as I said, seems to me questionable but not implausible. By contrast, if you are Itamar Ben-Gvir, that is, a politician in a position of influence who was among those entrusted with Israel’s public security on the morning of October 7 when people were kidnapped from their beds to Gaza, there are two important implications.
First, unlike an ordinary citizen, you, Ben-Gvir, are not only choosing to let the hostages die—you are also betraying your duty to save them from a disaster you were among those responsible to prevent. As in the trolley problem, the role changes the nature of the act we do when we oppose or support the deal. An ordinary citizen who opposes because of fear of future consequences is like a passerby, whereas a senior minister in the government is more like the driver. This does not mean that the minister’s choice is between killing the hostages or killing the deal’s future victims (the victims were, and will be if and when, killed by Hamas operatives or other Palestinian terror organizations). But it does mean that when a minister decides whether to support the deal, he cannot take into account only expected or estimated cost–benefit balances—he must also give heavy weight to his duty to repair the damage he himself was supposed to prevent. This is precisely what the demonstrators and the hostages’ families mean when they speak of the need to prevent a second abandonment.
I answered this above. Here I will only add that despite his disagreement earlier, he essentially accepts Iczkovits’s claim de facto. And indeed his words here suffer from the very same fallacy.
And the second implication:
Second, a senior politician who opposes the deal for the above reason thereby undermines his fitness to continue serving in his role if the deal goes forward. Such a politician is essentially saying: if the deal goes forward, terror will run wild in the streets and exact many victims, perhaps more kidnappings; the State of Israel will be helpless in the face of this wave of terror and will not be able to protect its citizens properly; and therefore the only way to continue providing a reasonable level of security to Israel’s citizens is to avoid deals with terror organizations across the board. But if this is true, and if nevertheless the deal is signed, an honest politician who opposed for this reason must frankly admit that he can no longer serve in a senior role in which he is entrusted with our security. Since in the past he implicitly admitted that he would lack the ability to protect Israel’s citizens in such a situation, once it has arisen—he is no longer fit to protect its citizens.
If anyone in Israel still thinks that Ben-Gvir is fit to perform his role, then his resignation from the government for the above reasons is tantamount to an admission that from the moment the deal went forward he is unfit. And if anyone still thinks Ben-Gvir is an honest politician, he will probably sober up when he sees him crawling back to the cabinet table.
This I actually largely agree with, though even here the picture he paints is a bit too black-and-white. Clearly a politician chooses the lesser evil and does not always achieve all his goals. If a deal was made, Ben-Gvir thought he could not and did not want to be responsible for it, and therefore resigned. Thereafter a new situation arose in which he could once again weigh the lesser evil. If the alternative is that Eran’s people will lead the country and (in Ben-Gvir’s view) bring it to ruin, he may decide to join the government despite the price of terror that cannot be eradicated, because in his view it is the lesser evil.
Conclusion
Sorry for the deep dive and long quotations from an article that truly is not worth it. My intent here was not to defend Ben-Gvir and not even to present a stance on prisoner deals (I have done that before). I wanted to demonstrate how a façade of systematic, philosophical analysis hides behind it a collection of fallacies that would lead me to fail a first-year philosophy student. If Eran is a philosophy lecturer at the Hebrew University, as he is presented, I would choose to take other courses there. His article is a paradigmatic example of utterly deranged condescension, especially when it comes against the backdrop of truly foolish arguments. Only someone living in a bubble can treat such a collection of drivel as systematic, intellectual analysis that delivers a death blow to the opponents’ arguments. Since I tend to think we are not dealing with a certified fool, I am quite convinced this is the result of living in a churchly bubble. Even when you encounter counter-arguments you don’t weigh them at all but dismiss them with chaff—or with a straw man. Indeed, the article is worthy of the platform on which it was published: “Telem—A Platform for a Different Political Conversation.”
One thing I will not forgive the leftists’ church for is that it forces me to defend Ben-Gvir as if he is the most prominent intellectual representative of my side. I console myself that relative to them he indeed looks like an intellectual lighthouse.
Another example of a systematic stance in favor of a hostage deal can be seen in a Q&A on the site (there is no primary source there, but there is a description of the rationales and a brief note of mine). I will not enter into it here.
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“Let us assume that Ben Gvir's data is accurate; and that we can conclude from them that history will repeat itself precisely, so that the same percentage of those released under the current deal will return to terrorism and that this percentage is significantly higher than the percentage of those who engage in terrorism among the entire Palestinian population. These are all good reasons to believe that implementing the deal will lead to an increase in the scope of terrorism; but it does not follow that implementing the deal will lead to more terrorism than not implementing the deal. One could argue that if implementing the deal leads to a surge in terrorism, it is likely that, other things being equal, not implementing it will not lead to such a surge. But in practice, the other things are probably not equal. For example: implementing the deal will be accompanied by political moves and strengthening American guarantees for our security that can prevent a surge in terrorism, while not implementing the deal will not be accompanied by such moves. Therefore, the opponent of the deal owes us an explanation why carrying out the deal alongside these moves is worse than not carrying it out and avoiding them”
I didn't quite understand that assuming that the truth is that the percentage is the same and a wholesale release would cause an increase in terrorism, why does the opponent of the deal need to provide evidence that there will be no other intentional offsets and that all other conditions are equal?? Maybe the supporter of the deal needs to provide evidence that there will be offsets? Why does he elegantly shift the burden of proof to the other side
Finally, it's nice to read polished posts that haven't been there in a long time.
When he presents the elephant in the room in his words – the strengthening of Hamas rule, he presents that Ben Gvir also doesn't believe that this won't happen, and for those who might think so (which he should have imagined) he claims that it's unlikely and a deal will only delay the collapse of Hamas rule. While Ben Gvir resigned over a deal that wasn't final and could have been withdrawn from at the end of phase one’ so that they would return to fighting, the obvious conclusion from his words is that we should support a hostage deal that will bring everyone back – to which it's pretty clear that if Hamas does agree to it, it will only be one that guarantees its rule and not one that only “delays its collapse” (Or he believes that Hamas people are not intellectuals and they don't think about it), so the elephant in the room that was supposed to be in his words and that is the main argument for opposing the deal according to him – still exists with respect to a final deal that will return all the hostages, while the attack on Ben Gvir's arguments dealt with a partial deal, so he has not yet fulfilled his duty towards a final deal. (Maybe we should draw his attention to this😉).
Another thing, I believe that you judged him on the merits (perhaps a counter-measure for judging Ben Gvir on the merits) that he understands that the whole can constitute an argument against the hostage deal, while in his words it seems that his intention is that if one argument fails, another argument is brought forward not as a whole, but as an attempt to make another argument.
And it's good to know that this is what an initial “philosophical” reference looks like after there was a lack of such articles.
This column is puzzling to me, especially against the backdrop of the previous column. With all the shortcomings of the article (with which I mostly agree) – Don't you think it's better than the alternative? Even in public discourse, there is a spectrum between destructive and destructive discourse, slanderous discourse and constructive discourse. Where would you place Eran's column on this spectrum? Because in my opinion, it clearly leans towards the end rather than the end.
For example, he doesn't call anyone (not even implicitly in my opinion, here we may disagree) monsters or crazy people, he doesn't challenge the perception of shared reality, he's not conspiratorial and yet another seed of shame in public discourse today.
I'll ask it differently: Suppose you wanted to send a person who holds strong views against the abductee deal an article that presents a position in favor of the abductee deal (or vice versa), what would you send? If the solution is to "truly listen" – Who should you really listen to? It will surely be clear to you that if our answer is "no one" - then we too are part of the church.
Your bewilderment is puzzling to me. I explained exactly that. I chose this column precisely because the initial impression is of a matter-of-fact and systematic approach. The lesson I wanted to convey is that we should not be impressed by the facade of a systematic discussion if there is something completely different behind it. The art of such people is to present their slander in relatively polite language, and this is very dangerous because people think that there is a matter-of-fact discussion here when the truth is that there is not.
Several times in the past I have spoken about how we focus on the manners of the debate instead of the essence. What I lack today is not manners (although that is not harmful, of course). What I lack is the essence. When you rebuke someone for being impolite, you implicitly accept their disregard for the essence. I very much prefer people who are matter-of-fact and articulate over polite people who are not matter-of-fact. This is precisely why I chose this article.
By the way, he completely calls his opponents monsters and crazy. You too were fooled by external politeness. This article is incredibly rude and crude, because I look at the content and not the words. I suppose you will agree that even if I say that someone does not belong to the group of those who are not monsters, I said that they are monsters. That is roughly what he did here, and I think I have shown it clearly.
In short, your counter-comment was exactly the reason for choosing my column. I guess I failed.
If you ask who to listen to? Anyone who speaks and has content in what he says. Ignore the impoliteness and the snobbery. Unfortunately, there are very few who make substantive arguments, so it is really difficult to find someone to listen to. And no, you are wrong: if there is no one to listen to, then it is impossible to listen. It has nothing to do with churchliness. A church is someone who does not listen when there is someone to listen to. Just as someone who fights against enemies can be considered a peacemaker. Someone who is not a peacemaker is someone who fights when there is no need to fight.
I agree that one should not be fooled by politeness. I simply do not think that is the case here. The author of the article's "innuendos" are really not clear or substantive, but rather one interpretation, (and not a particularly generous one) of the author's words, while speculating on his motives and beliefs.
I do not think that he is calling anyone a monster or a madman in beautiful words or in a polite manner. The choice of a careful analysis of Ben Gvir's statements or the use of straw men is problematic, certainly from an agenda (not that there seems to be an attempt to hide the agenda here), but does not negate the substantive discussion.
Sorry, I do not accept your last argument about the church. Someone who says "I am willing to listen, but I have no one" is a very strong (even if not definitive) indication of a church mentality. The things are similar to someone who says “I'm not anti-Semitic, I just rarely met a Jew who isn't in love with money and loves the blood of children”.
Specifically for our case, I think there are many people who raise relevant arguments around the issue of the hostage deal, and those who fail to find relevant arguments are almost certainly from a church mindset
Well, here it's a matter of impressions. How would you view someone who assumes without any basis that your decisions to oppose the hostage deal or support the war are based on political interest and not on business? That's actually a "murderer" in beautiful words. There are many more examples of such particularly ugly deceptions, and if you open your eyes, the rest is just unnecessary.
Regarding the church, your words are strange logically and also in terms of reading comprehension.
Logically. What happens if there really is no one to listen? If there really are no arguments, should I still listen? But this is just a logical comment.
In terms of reading comprehension. I completely listen and said that there are arguments against, and after all this entire column is nothing more than a (completely businesslike) reference to the arguments that were raised. I definitely find businesslike arguments in favor of the deal. Moreover, I find such even in him (after all, I agreed with at least two of his arguments). What I argued is that his consideration is biased and irrelevant, meaning that he has no real consideration and consideration for the counterarguments, and a significant portion of the arguments he raises are biased and quite stupid (and according to the principle of grace and also according to my logic, I prefer to assume that he is biased rather than that he is stupid). This is a church by definition. I, on the other hand, examined his arguments in a completely objective manner (this is what the column is dedicated to), and I found many mistakes there (and also a few correct arguments). This is a purely objective and non-ecclesiastical approach.
In the margins of the last comment, I already wrote to you once that there is a difference between claiming that someone is a priest and therefore denying his arguments and denying his arguments and then concluding that if his arguments are so weak then he is probably a priest. After all, there are priests in the world, and if every claim that someone is a priest is itself a church, you left no room for discussion.
Your response article is an incredibly churchy article. From the very beginning, you only attack the author of the article, admit that you assume that the position of the supporters of the deal is emotional, and scrutinize the author's words to find what you are looking for, without giving him any “grace”.
You only prove the fact that right-wing intellectuals are a small minority. Your writing is the writing of a persecuted person, not of a person who is willing to discuss things substantively.
Feel free to criticize my writing as well, but I am just responding randomly and do not claim to be intellectual or substantive.
And it's good that you don't claim this. After all, there should be some connection between what you write and the truth. You certainly have one: your admission that your writing is indeed ecclesiastical and not reasoned.
Considering the fact that every word I said is backed up by an argument, and the fact that I agreed with two of the writer's arguments, I think I am exempt from responding to statements that are as airy as yours. Don't forget the Holy Bread…
If the best arguments you found appear in some philosophy professor responding to some letter Ben-Gvir wrote, I'm sorry to tell you, but you need to look for better arguments from those who support the deal.
You always bring up a straw man argument about people who say a deal at any cost and say that ”they won't be willing to give up settlements for the kidnapped ones either”, come on… Hamas has never proposed such a thing and it's clear that no one intends to do it. A hostage deal is a very, very simple and clear thing – the release of all the kidnapped ones in exchange for x detainees and the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip and the cessation of fighting. Any person with half a functioning hemisphere understands the intention. There is no room for interpretations and gibberish. And by the way, from the beginning of the war, Hamas has demanded exactly the same thing – all partial deals are ideas of the Israeli government, and not long ago, Hamas again proposed exactly this proposal and Netanyahu in his own words rejected it, by the way, in complete contradiction to your claims from the beginning of the war that Hamas will not release all the hostages – it seems that the Israeli government is not willing to release all the hostages.
Compared to a hostage deal that is simple and clear, “the complete victory”, “the collapse of Hamas”, “the complete decision” and all these other phrases are deliberately vague and mean nothing, anyone can interpret them as they wish and insert their own meaning into these phrases, something that you completely ignore and cannot ignore because this is the (alleged) alternative to a hostage deal.
If the meaning of the complete victory is that all Gazans will move to Indonesia (or any other distant country) I think that this is an unrealistic goal, and if that happens I will eat my hat and vote for Benjamin Netanyahu or Ben Gvir until they retire from public life (-in other words, I estimate that it will happen at 0%. That is, my assumption is that Palestinians will remain in the Gaza Strip.
Let's assume that the complete victory means the exile of everyone who has Hamas written on their forehead, it still will not benefit Israel in either the short or long term, soldiers will still continue to die in Gaza and there will still be attacks - to what extent I cannot know, but I estimate that more than there are in Judea and Samaria. I'm not sure how aware people are of this fact, but besides Hamas (and Islamic Jihad), there are about 10 other terrorist factions in the Gaza Strip, and for a large part of their actions against the IDF, they take responsibility and publish documentation on the Internet. In other words, even if the Hamas regime is completely eradicated, it doesn't mean that terrorism will stop. Another terrorist organization will emerge. After they expelled Ashef from Lebanon, Hezbollah emerged.
Therefore, anyone who is not impressed by the illusion of a complete victory understands that in order to achieve a complete victory, we will have to be immersed in the "Gaza mud" for many years to eradicate terrorism. We will pay a very heavy price in dead and wounded soldiers, and we will probably be "dragged" To military rule over Gaza (in quotation marks because in my opinion this is the government's ambition - it has no mandate to decide such a thing in my opinion) and will pay off even more economically than the war itself.
The one who defined realistic and logical goals very well, surprisingly, is precisely the government… As far as I know, the goals of the war are: eliminating Hamas' military and governmental capabilities, ensuring that Gaza will not threaten Israel, releasing all the hostages and returning the residents safely to their homes.
The second and last goals were achieved, Hamas does not have the military capabilities it did on the eve of October 7, and the residents of the south returned to their homes (in my assessment, also safely). The other two goals were achieved almost in full, most of the hostages (mostly the living) returned and most of Hamas' capabilities were destroyed. While searching for the last Kalashnikov or the last tunnel is useless to me (certainly not at the price we will have to pay - soldiers' lives, economically and politically), returning the last kidnapped person has a much greater benefit to me.
The second and final goal has indeed been achieved, but any agreement that Hamas agrees to will certainly include a return to the status quo without any Israeli ability to influence the matter (Hamas will very quickly take back control of the Strip, or will live alongside a sympathetic Palestinian government like Hezbollah in Lebanon, and weapons will continue to flow into the Strip from Egypt)
In another twenty years we will be in exactly the same situation as a year and a half ago, so it is difficult to call this the achievement of a goal
How can you say that something will happen for sure? If you have a crystal ball, I would love to know where you get one.
In my opinion, this is one of the serious failures in all these discussions – What will happen in 20 depends on us quite a bit, but more than it depends on us, it depends on the Palestinians, the only way it will depend on us (almost completely) is only if 2M Palestinians disappear completely – and as mentioned, these are delusional fantasies of some people.
Even if 50% of the population remains in Gaza after the war and even if everyone somehow connected to Hamas leaves for exile in Libya, Indonesia or Somaliland, it still doesn't mean anything for sure – There is a good chance that another terrorist organization will simply take control of the Strip – and it will not necessarily be better than Hamas.
Equally, even if the IDF completely withdraws from the Strip with the exchange of our hostages for their prisoners – There is a good chance that the Palestinians themselves will overthrow the Hamas government.
Either way, it doesn't depend on us - it depends mainly on the Palestinians and their wishes.
And just a point to think about, if after killing 1,200 people on October 7, public opinion in Israel made a big shift to the right - and there are almost no leftists who dare to talk about peace, what will happen to Palestinian public opinion after we killed 50,000 of them (according to the most conservative estimates), which is 2.5% of the population?
I hope that both sides will simply give up on the wars and the destruction and devastation they bring and that we will reach peace, a cold peace, an agreement or even understandings that will last long enough.
The Palestinians pay the price of war in cash, we pay it in installments - but we pay
“It won't necessarily be better than Hamas”
It will likely be worse than Hamas. Especially because as much as the Gazans hated us before the war, they hate us even more now.
I don't understand at all what the point is in talking about a person's body, whether it's directly about the person or whether it's derived from the claim he made, it's unnecessary chatter. Why not talk about the claim itself and that's it? Why add compliments about the person making the claim? How does that advance the discussion?
After all, one of the main reasons why discourse becomes emotional is because people are hurt during the discussion and react back to the person's body and vice versa. The interlocutor may be hurt when you condemn him personally, or you call for him not to go to study in the major he teaches at the university… I really have a hard time understanding how this approach contributes to the culture of discourse.
The esteemed and disrespectful rabbi, and it seems arrogant too. It is not a good practice to belittle an opinion that disagrees with you.
1. “The tendency of the Church of the Kidnapped”
2. “I refer to it as the Church of the Left”
3. “I apologize in advance for the excessive attention I am devoting to a rather stupid, even if very inflated, article”
4. “This is where the widespread and erroneous perception comes from that there are more intellectuals and smart people on the left”
5. “I will not forgive the Church of the Left for one thing, that they force me to defend Ben Gvir”
To refer to Uri Eran's article as a representation of the “Church of the Referendum” or the “Church of the Kidnapped” is actually a Jewish insult.
Not only does it disrespect, but it also hides and diminishes Uri Eran's article, which I did not know until now. I looked for it and this is the link to the article “Ben Gvir's Caravan Dilemma” https://telem.berl.org.il/12069/ .
Oh.
Dear Dobi. I am not belittling an opinion that disagrees with me, but an opinion that was not formulated properly. You also probably have a reading comprehension problem. I am sorry, but it is difficult to discuss with people like this who, instead of raising arguments, are offended.
Thanks for the link. I think Miki presents what is said in it fairly. Maybe hiding but not minimizing.
But he is wrong about the “church of the left”. We are not a church, as proven by the political division on the left.
*** Deleted due to trolling. And if this continues I will delete the entire thread. (M”A) ***
Hello Mikhi
You are presenting a process in which we first agree on the facts, present the options, and then there will be almost no value debate left.
The problem is that most church members understand the process, and therefore there is no agreement already at the facts stage. They understand that there are facts that lead to slightly different positions than theirs and insist on the ”correct” facts.
I will give an example from a discussion that took place with three friends, with whom I have been a partner for several years in a business venture. In my opinion, these are good, intelligent, and decent people.
In response to my question about the choice between returning the kidnapped and Hamas's decision. After there was no agreement that in fact there is no option to return the kidnapped and after, in accordance with their demand, I defined what Hamas's decision was.
The first claimed that the kidnapped were more important because they did not have time and it was always possible to continue fighting.
The second claimed that Bibi is a liberal communist, the kidnapped are a secondary factor, but the fighting should not continue because it is being managed in a poor manner. See Brick's positions.
The third claimed that this is an idiotic question, like asking a father which child he prefers.
It is clear to me that they are probably closer to me than to each other, but they are united by hatred for Bibi and the sycophants who support him. The fact that I do not support Bibi, but do not hate him either, is enough to define me in the second church.
It seems to me that you think in your terms, in which the logical discussion of the facts precedes value considerations and is free from emotional questions.
This does not happen and will not happen. The facts are mixed with value/emotional considerations. For example, I met people who hate Bibi, who are clear to them that Ronen Bar is telling the truth and Bibi is lying. No reasoning has swayed them.
They understand that if they agree that Ronen Bar might be lying, they will have to change their emotional stance of hating Bibi, and they will not let that happen.
I am indeed presenting a proper process, and one that is not found in practice (unfortunately). This is precisely what the column was dedicated to, the fact that what is actually happening is crooked. What you described is exactly the ecclesiastical attitude that I was talking about. So what is the claim you are making?
Hello Mikhi
This is not an argument, but more of my insights.
It was quite clear that the process was appropriate, but not in practice. Now I understand that there is no chance that it will be.
Except for a little while, there is no separation between the factual discussion and the emotional/value discussion, and therefore there is no chance that we will reach a point where the value gap is small and narrowing.
Figuratively, the article is a kind of wake-up call, which in my opinion falls on deaf ears.
In other words, we are facing a continuation of the violent battle between the sides, with ”dialogue” being another tool in the arsenal.
This insight stems directly from the article. The discussion itself gave me another insight, which you may not agree with.
Until today, I thought to myself that this was a struggle between the left and the right. The violent nature of the struggle stems from the left's approach since the time of communism, according to which its values are more important than national interests.
Now I understand that there is another struggle, no less passionate, for power and control. One of the parties in this struggle is a member of the left and probably, secretly, assumes that after winning power, he will push the left to the margins.
The processes that are happening today in the prosecutor's office, in the judicial system, in the Shin Bet, the continuation of the fighting, are destructive. If he wins, he will find himself with all the damage.
A struggle for power and control, in my opinion, is legitimate. It is not legitimate in my opinion to do so, while harming national interests.
The side that is in the power struggle and a member of the left, does prefer national interests, over the values of the left. Perhaps here is precisely where there is a place to try the process you presented in the article.
In the column itself, I wrote that it was naive and probably not applicable, and I explained why I was writing it anyway.
I didn't understand the division in your words here between different groups that are connected to the left. It is clear that the struggle is about power and control, but I don't agree that it is disconnected from the substantive struggle. People want power and control because they think they are right and that society should be run according to their system. In this sense, they are more honest in my opinion than you portray. Power is not required here to promote narrow interests. And yet, as I wrote, the positions in whose name they strive to accumulate power are formulated incorrectly and unbalancedly.
By the way, the left of that time was a modernist left, and therefore it is difficult to connect it to the postmodern left of today. They acted in the name of positive values and therefore exerted power. Today, the left exerts power against positive values, whatever they may be. De facto it turns out that their negative values (the lack of values) have become religious dogmas that are treated as if they were positive values. I have often explained this by saying that people need a religion. If they don't have one, they invent one. And then of course they are the ones who accuse the religious (who believe in God) of inventing a religion for themselves. They dismiss it out of hand.