Answer to the gates of justice

I will start with the general question. He claims that every ordinary monetary obligation begins with the Torah, so there is no need to divide. There are obligations that the Torah renews and there are those that it merely adds a religious level on top of the legal level. It all depends on the case (there is no general criterion here).
Regarding damage, there is a well-known Toss that sees tort claims as an innovation of the Torah (accompanying what is written in the Torah), and apparently R’s assumes it (I no longer remember what he writes there). This is not the accepted view. What is the explanation for this? My daughter, who recently learned the issue, wanted to say that without the innovation of the Torah, we would think that there is no way to repair the damage, and the harmer might receive punishment. It is the Torah that innovated that payment constitutes a correction to the actual damage. Incidentally, this can perhaps be linked to the dispute between Maimonides and the Rabbinate P.B. Mahall’s argument regarding an oath for land damage. It is accepted to explain that they disagreed on the question of whether tort claims are the restoration of the situation to its former state or an obligation to compensate. And one must be careful with this.
By the way, in torts, one certainly goes down to the assets of the tortfeasor, so if that is the criterion, it is a legal obligation.
By the way, the difference regarding the reduction to assets is not in the question of whether it is an obligation from the Torah or before the Torah, but in the question of whether it is a halakhic obligation (Yora De’ah) or a legal obligation (Hoshan Mishpat). Charity and interest are in Judaism, while loans and damages are in foreign countries. However, the obligations of the Torah are by definition legal obligations and not halakhic. However, there can be obligations that the Torah itself renews that are purely legal and not halakhic obligations. The Torah renewed that there is a legal obligation here and not just a mitzvah. For example, we see in the Maimonides’ method regarding the repayment of a loan (which I may write a column about in the future), according to his method it is a mitzvah (payment by a debtor) and not a legal debt, and yet assets are reduced. After the Torah renewed that there is a mitzvah to repay, it turned this into a legal obligation, and therefore assets are reduced. There is more to be said about this.