An eye for an eye for money
The Pasha text tries in every way to tell us to take out a limb for a limb. In addition, we are told that when a woman holds someone's private parts while trying to help her husband in a fight, her paw should be cut off (except, of course, in cases where the limbs of inferior people, such as slaves, are injured, in which case the law is different). The laziness, as we know, does not prevent us from interpreting this as money in a blanket sense. Even when we cite a baraita in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, which is literally an eye for an eye, the Amoraim distort it and explain that he meant to say the money of the harmed person, not the harmed.
My question is how do you explain this to yourself? Did the Amoraim believe that it had always been law? After all, in Judaism at the end of the Second Temple, there were sects that strictly adhered to the literal eye for an eye (just). Couldn't God have written more clearly? The Code of Hammurabi also spells out quite similar laws of an eye for an eye, meaning that it was a common law in the Mesopotamian region at that time. If the Sages understood that they were distorting it, how did they do it? What is the justification? Especially when there are mechanisms for deriving the text and do not require a reason for reading (all the arguments in the Gemara that there cannot be a literal organ, because it is not always possible to accurately compare it to the damaged one seem to come from Kahneman and Tversky's System 2).
In my opinion, they knew that in the past they taught it literally, and their descriptions serve to strengthen their current position. The Rishonim have already written several times that the term "halakhah to Moses from Sinai" was sometimes written only to strengthen rabbinic or non-Sinai halakhah, and should not necessarily be interpreted literally.
As for how they did it, the law of money under the eye is learned from the GAZASH. It is written how they did it.
I didn't mean how they did it in the formal sense. What is their understanding of the mechanism of halakhic change? God originally intended a literal eye, right? So how do we work against the original author's intention? Does he want us to literally uproot his intention when we don't see it? And on what basis did they change? Would it seem immoral to them? What about the original halakhic value of an eye for an eye?
I don't understand the question. They demanded an equal cut and this is what came out. If it doesn't fit what was in the past, then no. Of course, within the framework of the GASA, there are also variations.
And since the giving of the Torah until their days, they have not demanded this equal decree? And after all the tinkering, God wrote quite clearly that He wanted an eye. I suppose they understood that too, didn't they? How do you explain the text itself to yourself?
You are making incorrect assumptions about the relationship between the plain and the rabbinical. What the Torah wants is both the plain and the rabbinical. I have written quite a bit about this. The Neske in his article on the Ma’ain Tashlaz deals with this and also needs an eye for an eye.
Can you give me a good reason why to think that the Torah (God) also intended that we demand the verse an eye for an eye for wealth?
So why are my assumptions incorrect?
Rihal, in the third article in Kozari, writes that the Sanhedrin is given the authority to interpret Torah verses as they wish, even contrary to the literal meaning. He writes that if the Sanhedrin had decided to understand "the day after the Sabbath" literally, that would be the law.
Even three reasons: 1. The compatibility between religious values and morality, especially when it comes to such a sharp deviation from morality. 2. The existence of a "Gaz" under-under. 3. The tradition that tells us that all verses are learned in the plain language and in the sermon and that there is no need to coordinate between them.
What the Khazari writes about should be asked.
1. If we understand that there is a separation between religion and morality and that they cannot always go together, how can we be so sure, beyond the verses, that God does not intend for us to gouge out an eye?
2. Who even said that an equal decree should be made? Do you believe that all the textual homily standards came down to Moses at Sinai? I'm not asking what tradition says, I'm asking how you formulated for yourself what seems most correct to you. There were traditions among the people of Israel that the homily standards were an invention (Sadducees in the Yahutsumi, Karaites, Avivim). Does it make sense to you that God didn't simply write to pay money under the eye? Where is the common sense here? Don't you see that it's crooked?
Not spring, I meant Essenes.
1. You assume what is requested. It does not invalidate the verses if they are read in the Darsh at the same time as the Pesht.
2. Regarding the tradition of the sermon, I have written extensively about it. See, for example, my series of articles on dynamic tradition.
3. These "traditions" were positions, not traditions. In philology, it is known that if you have a book with a distorted text and the same book with a corrected text, the original is the distorted one, not the corrected one. The reason: people correct distortions, not distort a proper text (and of course, one has to be careful when this is the case). Here too, these "traditions" were created because of doubts like yours, and therefore these are not traditions, but positions.
3. You assume that what is distorted is the Pharisee tradition, but we can see it the other way around, the original text and the original tradition are morally distorted, and therefore there is a strong interest in raping the verses so that we don't gouge out eyes, we don't kill a rebellious and disobedient son, we don't slaughter all kinds of offenders left and right (we will demand strict conditions of testimony and warning), etc.
You are discussing this "from the inside." What truth value would you formulate if you had to discuss a book of revelation from another people that explicitly says to do X (which was acceptable in the ancient world despite being less moral) and today they rape Y in a way that is not mentioned at all in the text, but is much more moral and acceptable (of course in the morality of 2000 years ago, and that's where we progressed from)? Would you really say that you think the author's original intention is an invention called a sermon without good foundation?
I would be happy if you would direct me to your column that tries to convince me why the tradition that claims the opposite of the simple way of preaching is more plausible.
This requires a broad explanation and has no place here. In general, it is not correct to characterize the sermons as a tool used by the sages to find moral solutions. This is not what sets them apart, unlike the Midreshet Eye for an Eye (and perhaps the Antics of a Wayward Son and a Remote City). Therefore, in my opinion, even in these cases, the motivation was not moral, but rather it was clear to them that the Torah did not intend this (also religiously. The thesis of compatibility). There is no sermon that qualifies bastards, or that allows a priest's wife to stay with her husband, abolishes the killing of those who are liable to death, and so on. Even the reservations about the law of a woman of good character are based on the halakhic prohibition of a Gentile coming in and not on the moral prohibition of raping a captive. The moral glosses that you find in the sermons of the sages are, in my opinion, evidence to the contrary. This shows that this was not their motivation, and the compatibility is almost accidental.
There is no column of mine that says that tradition for more opposite ways of preaching is acceptable. What I wrote is an appeal to columns that show that tradition is not a fixed thing. Tradition is dynamic and is still a tradition. I showed this with regard to the qualities of preaching. Sects that existed for several years and held other positions whose origin is completely clear (adherence to simplicity) do indeed look like positions and not traditions. This is an opposition to tradition that is based on claims like yours. To me, it is simple.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer