Response to the Rabbi's comment in the book "Science of Freedom"
Peace and blessings,
In the book "Sciences of Freedom" on page 78, in the first interlude, the Rabbi brings the Maimonides' question in the Laws of Repentance (6:5) about "they enslaved them and tormented them" and about "this people rose up and committed fornication" [and his answer]. The Rabbi comments in note 37 that there is apparently a confusion here between the ability to predict and objective determination, that is, apparently "what is written in the Torah is that God knew that this would happen, but it does not say that He decreed it upon them" [and about the question news And about choice, the Maimonides already answered at the end of the previous chapter (ibid. 5:5) that there is no contradiction between knowledge of God and choice, but that we do not know the knowledge of God. The rabbi replies that the Maimonides apparently understood that this was indeed a decree.
In my opinion, it is difficult to understand the text in this way, and it is not clear what caused the Rambam to understand it this way. In particular, regarding "and this people arose and committed fornication," how could I possibly say that this is a decree, and why would he decree that Israel commit fornication? This is merely a statement. Not a decree.
But the Rabbi's question in the comment is not difficult at all. On the contrary, it is indeed a matter of knowledge only and not of decree. The point is that in both cases it is not only a matter of Knowing [God's own] but In the message [to flesh and blood]. As soon as the Lord Sharing with someone In his knowledge, even without "deducing", but that what God knows - someone else knows - at that moment the matter exceeds the limits of God's knowledge and in this itself it becomes, without choice, a derivation = contradicting choice. Because it is no longer possible to answer that we do not attain it, etc., regarding human knowledge.
I will elaborate on the matter, I am currently only addressing the problem of knowledge and choice [therefore ignoring the fact that this is a collective, which is really what Maimonides is expounding, I am only explaining why he must expound in this way]:
If God tells Moses that He [God] knows that the people will commit fornication, it is no longer possible to reconcile this knowledge with the people's choice. For if Moses knows what will happen, and knows for a fact that the people will commit fornication – the people have no choice, because with the knowledge of flesh and blood there is no excuse for the Rambam (ibid. 5:5) that we do not attain it. And if Moses' knowledge is not true, and there is a possibility that the people will not commit fornication – it is found that God told Moses a lie / God did not know the future, and this is impossible.
In fact, paying attention to the words of the Maimonides, he himself says that this is a matter of knowledge/announcement and not a decree, and even incorporates in his response what he already said that God's knowledge does not contradict choice:
"...and the Creator did not announce anything except the custom of the world, etc., because He announced to Moses that there would be wicked people in Israel, etc., and likewise the Egyptians, etc., announced that the end of his seed would be enslaved in a land not theirs, and we have already said that man has no power to know, as God, blessed be He, knows, things that will happen."
If the issue here is a decree, then after having already answered that there is no decree here about individuals, why does Maimonides need to add "and we have already said" that God's knowledge does not contradict choice? Who now spoke about the problem of knowledge and what it has to do with the issue at hand? On the other hand - if this answers the question, then why was all the chatter about the collective necessary?
But as mentioned, all that is being discussed here is knowledge, not a decree. However, a declaration becomes a decree. Therefore, first the Maimonides excuses the part of the declaration, and then "closes the corner" and says that in the first place the problem was only with the The message And not with a bone The news.
In other words, the precision of the Maimonides' language in his justification shows that he distinguishes between what God informed [to Moses] and what he knows [for himself]. Moses only informed the custom of the world, only about the collective, in any case there is no contradiction to the choice since this is a statement only about the collective. But Maimonides knows that God's knowledge for Himself is not to be justified in this way, because God for Himself also knows the future of the individuals – therefore he adds that after you are a problem of what Window You know – we solved it, what? God I know – it’s not a problem at all, as already answered in the previous chapter.
Regards
Nathaniel
Hello.
There is no difference between knowledge of God that remains with Him and knowledge that is conveyed to humans. In both cases, it negates the ability to choose. This is the truth. Whether Maimonides thought so or not is a less important question for me.
I didn't understand. The entire discussion in the comment there was about the opinion of the Rambam. The Rabbi asked about the Rambam's failure to distinguish between knowledge and decree in the question of the Egyptians and the people. The Rabbi could also answer that the Rambam believed that there was no distinction between them, and that is not the truth, but the Rabbi writes there, "The Rambam apparently understood that..." etc. So if we are talking about what
The Rambam understood and intended, and why the Rambam asked about "where this people has come from and fornicated" - then the Rambam explicitly believes that the knowledge of God does not contradict choice and wrote this in his answer on this matter itself as I quoted, but it is not possible to say so about a message to others, and therefore from the perspective of the Rambam, a message to others is a mishnah, and I say that this is what underlies the Rambam's question about "where this people has come from and fornicated".
I understand. And I say that for me it doesn't really matter what Maimonides thought, and therefore I won't go into this matter here.
By the way, distinguishing between knowledge and decree is not like distinguishing between knowledge that is conveyed and knowledge that is kept by him. To the same extent, it is possible to explain that he understood "and this people arose and committed fornication" as a decree. But as mentioned, the issue is not important in my opinion.
I'm sorry, but I don't understand... I'm talking about a comment in the book in which the Rabbi does deal with the words of Maimonides, in the book the subject was important to the Rabbi and the Rabbi dealt with it, and discussed it in the comment. I bought the book and I'm reading it now and I have a response to what the Rabbi wrote there. The Rabbi tells me that it doesn't matter what Maimonides thought, and therefore the Rabbi doesn't go into this matter here. Where would I ask about the comment in the book if not here? I can't talk to the book.
Nathaniel, I think the light is happy to say the same as you, when he disagrees with the Ra'av on the website.
See here (including in the comments):
https://mikyab.net/shout/questions-regarding-knowledge-and-choice/
Indeed! Thank you very much! This is exactly what the Light of Joy says in two words (about the attainment of the R'Avad that knowledge of God is not compulsory): "Knowledge of the prophets is compulsory," and nothing more.
Following your words and the O'Sh, I now looked at the Rab'ad there and saw in his words the distinction I made in my question to Rav Michi between the two cases, that of the Egyptians and that of "And the people arose and fornicated," and I argued that there is no logic or reason to think that "And the people arose and fornicated" is a decree and that it is simply a matter of knowledge. Thus we see in the Rab'ad there, that to "And the people arose and fornicated" he answers that it is a matter of knowledge and not a decree, and that he elaborates on the Egyptians in another context.
In fact, according to his opinion, the Rambam's question is that he understood that both cases are about a decree. How did the Rambam understand what the Rambam himself writes at the end of his answer, that "we have already said" that knowledge of God is not obligatory? What does this knowledge have to do with this question? [And perhaps because even if we solved the problem of the decree, a question about knowledge would remain, so the Rambam mentions that such a question does not exist in every case].
I have now seen and will note that the Lechem Mishnah also teaches that in both cases it is a question of knowledge and not of decree, and says that the Rambam is actually asking the question of knowledge here again [and not a new question from the side of decree], and this is what the Rambam wrote at the end that the knowledge of God is not obligatory, and the Rambam only said that in the case of a collective there is an additional answer, etc. [Since I myself do not understand anything of his words, I only noted for our purposes].
Thanks again
Nathaniel
According to Maimonides, there is certainly a difference. After all, knowledge of God, the Blessed One, is not knowledge in the ordinary sense and precisely for that reason is not obligatory (what the meaning of this knowledge is, that is another question), while knowledge of man is knowledge in the ordinary and familiar sense and therefore is also obligatory (assuming it is certain knowledge).
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